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A A C A R B U L L E T I N
of the Association for the Advancement of
Central Asian Research
Editor: H. B. PAKSOY Vol. V, No. 1, Spring 1992
EDITORIAL ADDRESS: BOX 2321 AMHERST, MA 01004
BOOKS FOR REVIEW, NEWS ITEMS AND COMMUNICATIONS
SHOULD BE SENT TO THE EDITOR. )
TARZ-I SIYASET
(THREE POLICIES)
Yusuf Akchura (1876-1935)
Akchura's Tarz-i Siyaset (Three Policies) appeared during
1904 in the newspaper TURK (Nos. 24-34) in Cairo, then under
British rule. The work was re-printed in 1912 in Istanbul, as a
pamphlet. In 1976, Tarz-i Siyaset was re-issued with the late
E. Z. Karal's introduction, also containing two of the original
responses to the work: by Ali Kemal and Ahmet Ferit (Tek).[1] Due
to the prevailing censorship in Istanbul, a number of periodicals
opposing the rule of Abdulhamid II were being printed in
Cairo.[2] One such paper of the era was AL-NAHDAH[3] published by
Ismail Bey Gaspirali (1854-1914)[4], who was related to Akchura by
marriage.
The issues discussed in Three Policies have occupied the
thoughts of a large number of individuals belonging to almost all
persuasions, and the administrative strata of the majority of
political entities of its time. The perspectives from which
Akchura viewed those issues are also very wide, and the
conclusions he reached essentially foretold what was to become.
The concerns Akchura articulated are still valid for most of the
region.
A brief biography of Akchura is provided by David Thomas,
immediately following the translation proper.[5]
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION:
[1] Yusuf Akchura, Tarz-i Siyaset (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu,
1976). The dedication page states: "In commemmoration of Akchura's
100th birth anniversary, one of the first Presidents of the Turk
Tarih Kurumu [Turkish Historical Society, founded by the order of
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 1925 and maintained by his legacy
provided in his last will and testament]." The volume contains a
biography of Akchura by Karal, and a bibliography of Akchura's
writings.
[2] To place the events of the era into perspective, see for
example, Y. H. Bayur, Turk Inkilabi Tarihi (Ankara, 1940-1967)
Three Vols.; A. B. Kuran, Inkilap Tarihimiz ve J n Turkler
(Istanbul, 1945); T. Z. Tunaya Turkiyede Siyasi Partiler, 1859-
1952 (Istanbul, 1952), of which there is now a new and expanded
edition; Serif Mardin, J n Turklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 1895-1908
(Ankara, 1964); A. Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, La
presse et le mouvement national ches les musulmans de russie
avant 1920 (Paris, 1964); E. E. Ramsaur, The Young Turks (Beirut,
1965); Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and
Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914 (Oxford, 1969); Sina
Aksin, 31 Mart Olayi (Ankara, 1970); S. S. Aydemir, Makedonya'dan
Orta Asya'ya Enver Pasa, Vol. II. (Istanbul, 1976) 2nd Ed.
(Especially Pp. 443-494); Stanford J & E. K. Shaw, History of the
Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. II (Cambridge University
Press, 1977); M. S kr Hanioglu, Bir Siyasal rg t Olarak
'Osmanli Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti' ve 'J n Turkl k' 1889-1902
(Vol I) (Istanbul, 1985); Masami Arai, Turkish Nationalism in the
Young Turk era (Leiden, 1991). Most contain extensive
bibliographies.
[3] Thomas Kuttner "Russian Jadidism and the Islamic World:
Ismail Gasprinskii in Cairo, 1908" Cahiers du monde russe et
sovietique. 16. (1975).
[4] Edward Lazzerini, "Gaspirali Ismail Bey's Terc man" Central
Asian Monuments, H. B. Paksoy, Ed. (at press); idem, "Gadidism at
the Turn of the Twentieth Century: A View From Within" Cahiers du
monde russe et sovietique. 16 (1975); idem "From Bakhchisaray to
Bukhara in 1893: Ismail Bey Gasprinskii's Journey to Central
Asia" Central Asian Survey Vol. 3, No. 4 (1984); idem, "Ismail
Bey Gasprinskii and Muslim Modernism in Russia, 1878-1914"
(Doctoral dissertation, University of Washington, 1973); Ismail
Bey Gasprinskii, Russkoe musul'manstvo: mysli, zametki I
nablyudeniya (Simferopol, 1881) Society for Central Asian Studies
(Oxford, 1985) Reprint No. 6; Cafer Seydahmet, Gaspirali Ismail
Bey (Istanbul, 1934).
[5] For further details, see David Thomas, "Yusuf Akchura and the
Intellectual Origins of Tarz-i Siyaset" Journal of Turkish
Studies/Turkl k Bilgisi Arastirmalari Vol. 2 (1978); idem, "The
Life and Thought of Yusuf Akchura 1876-1935" (Doctoral
Dissertation, McGill University, 1976).
THREE POLICIES
Translated by David S. Thomas, PhD.
Rhode Island College
It seems to me that since the rise of the desires for
progress and rehabilitation spread from the West, three principal
political doctrines have been conceived and followed in the
Ottoman dominions. The first is the one which seeks to create an
Ottoman Nation through assimilating and unifying the various
nations subject to Ottoman rule. The second seeks to unify
politically all Muslims living under the governance of the
Ottoman State because of the fact that the prerogative of the
Caliphate has been a part of the power of the Ottoman State (this
is what the Europeans call Pan-Islamism). The third seeks to
organize a policy of Turkish nationalism (Turk Milliyet-i
siyasiyesi) based on ethnicity.
The first of these principles had an important influence on
the general political policy of the Ottoman Empire, whereas the
last appeared only recently in the writings of certain authors.
I
The desire to bring into being an Ottoman nation did not aim
at a lofty objective nor high hopes. Rather the real purpose was
to grant and impose the same rights and political duties on the
Muslim and non-Muslim peoples of the Ottoman dominions, and thus
to realize perfect equality between them and to grant complete
freedom of thought and worship. The aim was thus to create an
Ottoman Nation (Osmanli Milleti) a new nationality united in a
common country similar to the American nation in the United
States of America by blending and assimilating to each other the
above mentioned peoples in spite of the religious and racial
differences [existing] among them. The ultimate result of all
these difficult processes was to be the preservation of the "High
Ottoman State" in her original external form, that is within her
old boundaries. Although the continuance and strengthening of the
power of a state whose majority was Muslim and Turkish in its
major part was beneficial to all Muslims and Turks, this
political principle would not directly serve them. For this
reason the Muslims and Turks living outside the Ottoman lands
could not be so interested in this policy. The point is that it
would only be a local and internal matter.
The policy of creation of an Ottoman nation arose seriously
during the reign of Mahmut the Second.(1) It is well known that
this ruler said: "I wish to see the religious differences among
my subjects only when they enter their mosques, synagogues, and
churches..." Around the beginning and the middle of the
nineteenth century it was natural that this policy was thought
preferable and practicable for the Ottoman dominions. At that
time in Europe the idea of nationalism, through the influence of
the French Revolution, accepted as the basis of nationality the
French model based on the principle of conscience rather than
that of descent and ethnicity. Sultan Mahmud and his successors,
self-deceived by this principle which they could not thoroughly
comprehend, believed in the possibility of blending, and molding
the subjects of the state who were of different ethnicities and
faiths into a united nation, by means of freedom, equality,
security and fraternity. Some examples which could be observed in
the history of the integration of nationalities in Europe also
strengthened their conviction. In fact did not the French
nationality originate from a compound of German, Celtic, Latin,
Greek, and other elements? Were there not many Slavic elements
digested in the German nationality? Is not Switzerland a nation
despite differences of ethnicity and religion? It is not
improbable that these Ottoman statesmen, through an inadequate
understanding of the nature of the policies pursued by the
Germans and the Italians, who were striving for their political
unity at that time, presented these movements as evidence to
support the correctness of their policy.
The idea of an Ottoman national unity was observed
especially during the time of Ali and Fuat Pasha. Napoleon the
Third, the apostle of creating nations according to the French
principle of the plebiscite, was the most powerful supporter of
these Westernized pashas. The French inspired reforms during the
time of Sultan Abd laziz and the lyc e at Galatasaray which this
reform symbolized were all results of the time when this system
was fashionable.
But when Napoleon and the French Empire fell in 1870-1871
which symbolized the victory of the German interpretation of
nationality, that of assuming ethnicity as the basis of
nationality, which, I believe, is closer to reality, the policy
of Ottoman unity lost its only powerful supporter.
It is true that Mithat Pasha was to a degree a follower of
the two famous ministers mentioned above but his political
program which was more complex in relation to theirs disappeared
very quickly. As for the program of present-day Young Ottomans,
who pretend to follow the work of Mithat, is very vague. I
believe therefore it would not be a mistake if one assumes that
the illusion of organizing an Ottoman nation passed away with the
French Empire and, like it, can never be revived again.
When the policy of creating an Ottoman nation failed, the
policy of Islamism appeared.(2)
This idea which the Europeans term Pan-Islamism was recently
developed out of Young Ottomanism, namely by a group who
partially adopted a policy of forming an Ottoman nation. The
point to which many Young Ottoman poets and politicians
ultimately arrived, having begun first of all with the slogans
"Homeland" and "Ottomanizm" --that is Ottomanizm composed of all
the peoples living in the homelands-- was "Islamism." The most
influential cause of this metamorphosis was their experience of
Europe and their closer observation of Western ideas. When they
were in the East they stuffed their heads with the ideas of
eighteenth century political philosophy --one of them was a
translator of Rousseau-- but they were unable completely to
comprehend the importance of ethnicity and religion and
especially they were unable to understand completely that the
time had passed for creating a new nationality; that the
interests, if not desires, of the various elements under the rule
of the Ottoman state were not in accordance with such a unity and
blending and hence that the application of the French conception
of nationality was impossible in the East. When they were in
foreign countries, however, they saw their own country with
greater clarity from afar, and they were successful in
understanding the gradually increasing political importance of
religion and ethnicity for the East. As a result they realized
that the desire to create an Ottoman nation was an illusion.
{end of part one, to be continued}