Political Correctness as the basis of a new industry
Brett McInnes
Recently there was an article reproduced in the ST with the enticing
headline: "CLONING: LET COMMON SENSE DECIDE, NOT ETHICS."
Again, recently the US Congress threatened to impede funding for the
IMF unless some crackpot anti-abortion propaganda was added to the
relevant bill. Think about that.
For the purposes of this diatribe, I shall define "political correctness"
to mean "advocacy of blatantly irrational public policies based on
ethical, supernatural, or kindred human follies." [I realise
that this is not standard usage, the term usually being confined
to left-wing stupidity; but the abortion example above shows that the
Right is quite as capable of egregious irrationality as the Left.]
Now one of the nicest things about Singapore is the truly amazing
extent to which political correctness has failed to take root here.
Of course we have a few sports of nature like Gopal Baratham, but these
people have no real influence. Animal Rights, Right to Life, opposition to
capital punishment: all of these, if they exist here at all, have
zero effect on policy. The immigration authorities can announce
draconian measures regarding illegal immigrants, and nobody sheds
a tear. It's all rather astonishing and gratifying.
I propose that Singapore exploit this strength. For example, research
on various kinds of brain disease ground to a halt in the US because
fetal brain tissue was being used. This was a golden opportunity
for Singapore to go into this field in a big way and snap up some
potentially very lucrative patents. Again, now all the "ethicists"
in the West are droning on about cloning, asking the usual highly
unoriginal question ["Dare we play God?"---though why anyone would
want to sit around doing nothing for 15 billion years has yet to
be explained]. I urge the authorities to seize this opportunity
and promote human cloning. We should be identifying researchers
whose work is threatened by the ethics cabal, and quietly offering
them support if they transfer here.
Animal experimentation, xenotransplantation, the fur industry....the
opportunities are endless. In short, there are fortunes to be made from
subverting political correctness. Singapore's youth must be encouraged to
seize these opportunities with both hands.
Timmins William Anthony
In article <MOD$98031...@sintercom.org>,
Brett McInnes <matm...@leonis.nus.sg> wrote:
[lots of mostly sensible (for a change) stuff - deleted to keep the daemons
happy]
>subverting political correctness. Singapore's youth must be encouraged to
>seize these opportunities with both hands.
Yes! So that their children (sorry descendants) can grasp even bigger
opportunities with all 23 radiation proof fingers of their 7 hands!
--
_______________________________________________________________________
/ <*> I'll design a proper signature real soon /
/__/ . / /_ _/ BillT mailto:t...@np.ac.sg http://www.np.ac.sg/~twa /
/__/_/_/_/ _/__________________________________________________________/
alf
Brett McInnes (matm...@leonis.nus.sg) wrote:
: In short, there are fortunes to be made from subverting political
: correctness.
Of course it's debatable whether you're advocating mere political
correctedness to be subverted or morality itself.
Alvin Lim Cheng Hin
http://www.geocities.com/Tokyo/4297
http://www.singnet.com.sg/~chlim
Scythe
Timmins William Anthony wrote:
> Yes! So that their children (sorry descendants) can grasp even bigger
> opportunities with all 23 radiation proof fingers of their 7 hands!
>
> --
Geez, that amounts to what, 3 and 2/7th finger on each hand? You got a weird
idea of progress :)
Thong Wei
In article <MOD$980318...@sintercom.org>, alf
<art5...@leonis.nus.sg> writes
>Of course it's debatable whether you're advocating mere political
>correctedness to be subverted or morality itself.
Ah.. but whose morality? Would Catholics mind if the government allows
extensive trials for new abortion pills?
Some things to work on: research using aborted foetuses, embryos etc.
--
Thong Wei
Timmins William Anthony
In article <MOD$980318...@sintercom.org>,
Scythe <scy...@cynosure.com.sg> wrote:
>Timmins William Anthony wrote:
>> Yes! So that their children (sorry descendants) can grasp even bigger
>> opportunities with all 23 radiation proof fingers of their 7 hands!
>idea of progress :)
1. Obviously there will be different specialised hands, some with only
opposing thumbs, some with more fingers, some less etc
or, alternatively,
2. It'll be designed in Singapore, what do you expect :-)
Brett McInnes
Thong Wei (t...@potash.demon.co.uk) wrote:
: In article <MOD$980318...@sintercom.org>, alf
: <art5...@leonis.nus.sg> writes
: >Of course it's debatable whether you're advocating mere political
: >correctedness to be subverted or morality itself.
: Ah.. but whose morality? Would Catholics mind if the government allows
: extensive trials for new abortion pills?
Personally I have always found the Pope's words a very useful way of
distinguishing wrong from right. If you see my point.
As for RU486, the "abortion pill" [though it had many other uses as
well---not that I would expect the anti-abortion rabble to put the
interests of real humans ahead of those of zygotes] was eventually
developed in France, after research was halted in the US. A missed
opportunity for Singapore.
I was very disappointed at the attitude of the Church to cloning,
however. One would have thought that they would be delighted at the
prospect of asexual reproduction. There's no pleasing some people.
alf
Thong Wei (t...@potash.demon.co.uk) wrote:
: Ah.. but whose morality?
Is morality necessarily relative to the particular group or individual? I
doubt so. Morality can be seen as objective, perhaps in terms of what
would be true for all rational agents (just as Kant's project set out to
achieve), or perhaps in terms of what would be true for all humans (well,
this is speciesist but it would be a step away from relativism).
Perhaps, as an example of the latter, one can think of morality as those
rules governing institutions which complement and promote human
flourishing. An example of such an institution would be the
institutionalised respect for life. The term 'institution' arguably
connotes the possibility of moral relativism, since one may revoke ones
membership in an institution, and hence if the account is correct,
morality is relative to ones choice of membership in particular
institutions.
But this objection is founded on a fallacious identification between those
institutions of which membership is contingent and those institutions of
which membership is necessary if one is to be part of a flourishing human
society. Lyall Watson in 'Dark Nature' has provided an account of the
Yanomamo tribe, which is distinguished by its homicidal institutions such
as institutionalised violence and infanticide. The Yanomamo lack
institutions which characteristically complement and promote human
flourishing, such as an institutionalised respect for life. The Yanomamo
are in decline precisely because of their institutions. Hence this account
of morality is objective and not relativistic.
Ray Ng W.L.
alf wrote:
> Thong Wei (t...@potash.demon.co.uk) wrote:
> : Ah.. but whose morality?
>
> Is morality necessarily relative to the particular group or individual? I
> doubt so. Morality can be seen as objective, perhaps in terms of what
> would be true for all rational agents (just as Kant's project set out to
> achieve), or perhaps in terms of what would be true for all humans (well,
> this is speciesist but it would be a step away from relativism).
Is "objective" morality, such that it is true for all human beings, possible?
Morality is a product of man's rational thinking and supertitious beliefs, and
given man's natural incoherence in these aspects, I'd say it is impossible,
except perhaps when imposed in a totalitarian, oppressive society. But then,
it is not "true" when it is imposed.
IMO morality will be relativistic as long as man is capable of diverse,
independent thinking. Even if moral values are institutionalised and rules
established, they are at best a democratic consensus, at worse a totalitarian
oppression.
Perhaps morality is closest to the "objective" form as you call it, when an
absolute democratic consensus is achieved. But in modern societies, I am
doubtful that every single "rational agent" can be conformed to one set of
moral doctrine. Subdued perhaps, but not conformed. Even then, it is transient
with the passing of generations.
> Perhaps, as an example of the latter, one can think of morality as those
> rules governing institutions which complement and promote human
> flourishing. An example of such an institution would be the
> institutionalised respect for life. The term 'institution' arguably
> connotes the possibility of moral relativism, since one may revoke ones
> membership in an institution, and hence if the account is correct,
> morality is relative to ones choice of membership in particular
> institutions.
>
> But this objection is founded on a fallacious identification between those
> institutions of which membership is contingent and those institutions of
> which membership is necessary if one is to be part of a flourishing human
> society.
The meaning of "flourishing human society" will be subjective among
individuals e.g. economic or spiritual?
Perhaps I misunderstood you, but I don't see any major difference between your
"institutions" and the existing forms of institutionalised morality e.g.
religious and sociopolitical groups. The former seems to be a microcosm of the
latter.
> Lyall Watson in 'Dark Nature' has provided an account of the
> Yanomamo tribe, which is distinguished by its homicidal institutions such
> as institutionalised violence and infanticide. The Yanomamo lack
> institutions which characteristically complement and promote human
> flourishing, such as an institutionalised respect for life. The Yanomamo
> are in decline precisely because of their institutions. Hence this account
> of morality is objective and not relativistic.
In your example of the Yanomamo tribe, are you trying to say that it
diminished due to its homicidal institutions which are essentially
self-destructive?
But perhaps these institutions are in fact relativistic, albeit to the
conservatives of the tribe? Perhaps another reason behind its decline is the
defection of members who do not fully subscribe to the traditional
institutions. They ceased to be Yanomamo when they merged with another
society/tribe.
Ray Ng W.L.
Ray Ng W.L.
Brett McInnes wrote:
> ...snipped...
>
> For the purposes of this diatribe, I shall define "political correctness"
> to mean "advocacy of blatantly irrational public policies based on
> ethical, supernatural, or kindred human follies."
>
> ...snipped...
>
> Now one of the nicest things about Singapore is the truly amazing
> extent to which political correctness has failed to take root here.
>
> ...snipped...
This article tinges with sarcasm... or am I reading it wrong? Nevertheless...
On one hand, if political correctness is taken to extreme levels, it becomes a
negative, even disastrous, influence on government policy-making.
Bad thing...
On the other extreme, if zero political correctness exists, it could mean that
there are no efforts from groups external of the government to check/influence
policy making. No civil groups with the interest/passion to pursue broad
sociopolitical concerns/ideologies.
Is this good, or bad?
Ray Ng W.L.
Autolycus
BEGINQUOTE
* "Ray Ng W.L." <r...@kami.com> wrote:
>Is "objective" morality, such that it is true for all human beings, possible?
>Morality is a product of man's rational thinking and supertitious beliefs, and
>given man's natural incoherence in these aspects, I'd say it is impossible,
>except perhaps when imposed in a totalitarian, oppressive society. But then,
>it is not "true" when it is imposed.
Sorry to be picky, but there are a large number of unwarranted assumptions here!
1) Morality is a product of rational but incoherent thinking.
2) ... and/or of naturally incoherent superstition.
3) Morality cannot be objective.
4) ... unless it is imposed rigidly.
5) And if imposed, is not anymore defined as 'morality'.
This is all based on how YOU define morality, which leads to a lot of
fuzzy thinking, I'm thinking.
'Morality' comes from Latin 'moris', which means a custom, practice,
tradition or law. The emphasis is on a code of civil practice; i.e., what
a society considers prerequisite for 'civilised' behaviour. It can be made
objective like any other code of customs, practices, traditions or laws -
however, the interpretation of such codes is what may become subjective.
Hence, for practical purposes, it requires very tight definitions or risks
loss of objectivity.
Example: the Mosaic law, beginning with the 10 commandments, is
fundamentally well defined for its original purpose - Do not bear false
witness, do not commit adultery, these are clear, without exception.
However, the attached body of law, when applied to a changed society more
complex than the original one, has bred a nation (or race, or ethnic
group) well known for its lawyers...
Note that the Roman law, an ancestor of our local law, would consider
itself a code of morality by Roman definitions. That is, there is not
necessarily a religious or superstitious component, but necessarily a
legal one, in 'moral' matters.
Would this shed new light on our lengthy and broad debate on such matters?
Probably not.
*grin*
Autolycus
--
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/ 3b-'-':| ==========================================================
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C "騖,::@::: * MUNDUS VULT DECIPI: The world wishes to be deceived. *
C |:::::; * *
`( \ _`::; * It is up to you to decide whether to oblige or not. *
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VeryNiceGuy
Autolycus wrote:
>
...> Sorry to be picky, but there are a large number of unwarranted
assumptions here!
>
> 1) Morality is a product of rational but incoherent thinking.
> 2) ... and/or of naturally incoherent superstition.
> 3) Morality cannot be objective.
> 4) ... unless it is imposed rigidly.
> 5) And if imposed, is not anymore defined as 'morality'.
>
> This is all based on how YOU define morality, which leads to a lot of
> fuzzy thinking, I'm thinking.
good observations, Autolycus. but these stem from his 'relativistic'
position.
> 'Morality' comes from Latin 'moris', which means a custom, practice,
> tradition or law. The emphasis is on a code of civil practice; i.e., what
> a society considers prerequisite for 'civilised' behaviour. It can be made
> objective like any other code of customs, practices, traditions or laws -
if you base your definition of morals from "custom, practice, tradition
or law", then different societies have different customs, practices,
traditions or laws, and we are back to square one.
[[for me, i hold that the different different customs, practices,
traditions or laws are glimpses of what the perfect morals should be -
incomplete, not fully accurate, as though seeing through a broken
mirror;
it is like seeing within your locale, not beyond your horizon.
different people then will have a map of their locales. if you piece
together all these maps, some parts overlapping, they form an atlas.
well, provided these maps don't conflict in their descriptions. the
result may or may not be a good description of the whole globe and some
parts of the globe may be "uncharted". now: even if the combined map is
an incomplete or inaccurate description, that does not deny the
existence of the whole globe, right?]]
> however, the interpretation of such codes is what may become subjective.
> Hence, for practical purposes, it requires very tight definitions or risks
> loss of objectivity.
i thought "morals" and "laws" are not the same?
the problem with very tightly defined laws is that they can never
capture everything that morals are intended to be.
...
> Would this shed new light on our lengthy and broad debate on such matters?
> Probably not.
i doubt so too. there is thing called the "spirit of the law" versus
the "letter of the law".
--
--- -----------------------------------------
o--- / \ who is the champion of morals?
---| / \ who claims to be blameless?
--- | / * \ come, lets weigh all our
/ \ | ======= excreta on the perfect balance.
/***\ | -- Very Disinterested Guy
/*****\ | -----------------------------------------
======= | another quality quote from the
---------+--------- Very Nice Guy
Brett McInnes
Ray Ng W.L. (r...@kami.com) wrote:
: This article tinges with sarcasm... or am I reading it wrong?
Yes, you were reading it wrongly.
: On the other extreme, if zero political correctness exists,
it could mean that
: there are no efforts from groups external of the government
to check/influence
: policy making. No civil groups with the interest/passion to pursue broad
: sociopolitical concerns/ideologies.
No raving rightists impeding the progress of medical research....
no infinitely boring socialists moralising about the evils of
money....sounds good to me.
By the way, did you see the photograph in the ST showing PETA
[People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals] apes lying in coffins
as a protest against the wearing of fur? Did you note that all
of the lids and nails were kept safely out of sight? What poor
sportsmanship. PETA is no fun.
: Is this good, or bad?
A question to be settled by experimental observation. The conclusion
is unequivocal: it's good to be freed of these twerps.
JOIN PUTA! People for the Unethical Treatment of Animals.
Alvin Lim Cheng Hin
Ray Ng W.L. (r...@kami.com) wrote:
: Is "objective" morality, such that it is true for all human beings,
: possible?
Yes, I argue that it is possible.
: Morality is a product of man's rational thinking and supertitious
: beliefs, and given man's natural incoherence in these aspects, I'd say it
: is impossible, except perhaps when imposed in a totalitarian, oppressive
: society.
<snip!>
But aren't you confusing morality with moral codes or standards of
behaviour?
Morality refers to the realm of what is good, what one ought to do, etc.
Moral codes are society's institutionalised rules governing what each
member ought and ought not to do. While the latter is arguably
relativistic, it's debatable whether the former is.
: The meaning of "flourishing human society" will be subjective among
: individuals e.g. economic or spiritual?
I don't think this semantic diversity necessarily entails moral
relativism.
: Perhaps I misunderstood you, but I don't see any major difference
: between your "institutions" and the existing forms of institutionalised
: morality e.g. religious and sociopolitical groups. The former seems to be
: a microcosm of the latter.
The institutions I am referring to are those institutionalised human
constructs (e.g. respect for life, respect for the truth) which promote
and complement human flourishing. These are certainly more basic or
fundamental compared to larger organised institutions such as those you
referred to.
: In your example of the Yanomamo tribe, are you trying to say that it
: diminished due to its homicidal institutions which are essentially
: self-destructive?
That was Watson's conclusion in his case study of the tribe.
David Low
Hola
Habla espanol ?...
One might not want to join PUTA, not when one finds out what that means in
Spanish :-)
Brett McInnes wrote in message ...
>Ray Ng W.L. (r...@kami.com) wrote:
>
>: This article tinges with sarcasm... or am I reading it wrong?
Thong Wei Koh
In article <MOD$980319...@sintercom.org>, alf
<art5...@leonis.nus.sg> writes
>Is morality necessarily relative to the particular group or individual? I
>doubt so. Morality can be seen as objective, perhaps in terms of what
>would be true for all rational agents (just as Kant's project set out to
>achieve), or perhaps in terms of what would be true for all humans (well,
>this is speciesist but it would be a step away from relativism).
I don't see how morality can be purely objective. Goodness and badness
are subjective qualities.
>But this objection is founded on a fallacious identification between those
>institutions of which membership is contingent and those institutions of
>which membership is necessary if one is to be part of a flourishing human
>society. Lyall Watson in 'Dark Nature' has provided an account of the
>Yanomamo tribe, which is distinguished by its homicidal institutions such
>as institutionalised violence and infanticide. The Yanomamo lack
>institutions which characteristically complement and promote human
>flourishing, such as an institutionalised respect for life. The Yanomamo
>are in decline precisely because of their institutions. Hence this account
>of morality is objective and not relativistic.
You attempt to describe `goodness' in terms of `objective' measures like
the survivability of cultures?
You have confused the word `dysfunctional' and `goodness'. The Yanomano
tribe may be dysfunctional. So is modern American pop culture. They
are dysfunctional when you choose a criteria to measure them up to - in
this case civility and survivability of the society.
Goodness is more than simply being non-dysfunctional. The attitudes and
social values that drove the Western cultures to rape, pillage and
decimate local cultures wherever they went in the American continent and
elsewhere certainly have no impact on the survivability of their own
societies. In fact, the opposite is true. Are those racist, ignorant
and arrogant attitudes the epitome of goodness?
How would you measure the Buddhist teaching of tolerance, pacifism and
detachment? How do you think a country run purely on Buddhist
principles will survive in this modern world? Perhaps the Church's call
to arms during the crusades would be more successful to keep its
institutions alive. Would the increased number of `willing' converts in
the new world be an adequate demonstration of the `moral goodness' of
the Church's actions?
There are very few ideals that are safely universal - things like right
to live and to eat. I doubt any sane person would think that these are
good things to have. However, morals, as pointed out by autolycus, are
just social customs and traditions. If you like, morals are like bits
of social technology for some end. Morals do change. They change
because circumstances are different and therefore the technology to
achieve the ideals need to be reinvented. Some animals eat their young
because of very complex reasons (survivability is one) and I don't think
any `moral' judgement is appropriate. In the same manner, I don't see
how you can judge the Yanomamo tribe without studying the context in
which it has developed it's perculiar culture.
--
Thong Wei Koh
Thong Wei Koh
In article <MOD$980321...@sintercom.org>, Brett McInnes
<matm...@leonis.nus.sg> writes
>By the way, did you see the photograph in the ST showing PETA
>[People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals] apes lying in coffins
>as a protest against the wearing of fur? Did you note that all
>of the lids and nails were kept safely out of sight? What poor
>sportsmanship. PETA is no fun.
I would just like to point out that nobody really asks those females
perpetually in protest under the banner of some environment issues
whether they had bothered to measure how many tons of sanitary napkins
were discarded in landfills every year. Perhaps we should have a
campaign for the banning of makeups, sanitary napkins and baby nappies.
How recyclable are these things anyway?
Have you noticed how people would march in support of anti-fur campaigns
in nice leather shoes/shoes? Maybe they should have a campaign ad where
they show some supermodels wearing roadkill.
--
Thong Wei Koh
Alvin Lim Cheng Hin
Thong Wei Koh (t...@potash.demon.co.uk) wrote:
: Goodness and badness are subjective qualities.
This is the case only if you adopt an antirealist account of morality.
: You have confused the word `dysfunctional' and `goodness'.
I have suggested a particular realist account of morality, i.e. one which
reduces moral qualities to the non-moral ones of particular institutional
facts.
<snip!>
: Are those racist, ignorant and arrogant attitudes the epitome of
: goodness?
Are these 'attitudes' indeed institutional facts which complement and
promote human flourishing? They would have to be in order to act as
counterexamples to my suggestion.
<snip!>
: Morals do change. They change because circumstances are different and
: therefore the technology to achieve the ideals need to be reinvented.
This seems to be a hasty identification of morality and moral codes.
Ray Ng W.L.
Alvin Lim Cheng Hin wrote:
> : Morality is a product of man's rational thinking and supertitious
> : beliefs, and given man's natural incoherence in these aspects, I'd say it
> : is impossible, except perhaps when imposed in a totalitarian, oppressive
> : society.
> <snip!>
>
> But aren't you confusing morality with moral codes or standards of
> behaviour?
>
> Morality refers to the realm of what is good, what one ought to do, etc.
> Moral codes are society's institutionalised rules governing what each
> member ought and ought not to do.
Umm nope.... I am too refering to morality as the sense of right/wrong, not as
a code/doctrine. When I said "_perhaps_ when _imposed_", I'm suggesting it as
the closest form of morality such that it is true for all human beings (which
IMO is not possible). I went on furher to say that since it is imposed, it is
not "true" anymore. This is bcos it is inconsistent with the morality of those
imposed upon. In other words, morality once imposed becomes a code/doctrine.
> While the latter is arguably
> relativistic, it's debatable whether the former is.
Yup it is debatable... tho' IMHO morality can only be relativistic :-)
Pls allow me to quote from my other reply to VNG (which BTW is on a similar
topic) :
I believe that morality is relativistic because to me the counter argument is
too far-fetched. Universal/absolute morality? Morality as an essence
independent of man? But morality is shaped by man! It doesn't matter that man
is so diversified in their concepts of morality. There is no "truth" that is
hidden from everyone. Everybody has their own "truth", and that is why I
believe that morality can only be relativistic.
> : The meaning of "flourishing human society" will be subjective among
> : individuals e.g. economic or spiritual?
>
> I don't think this semantic diversity necessarily entails moral
> relativism.
But how can your "objective" (as opposed to relativistic) morality be built
upon institutions for "human flourishing" when the truth behind "human
flourishing" is essentially relativistic?
Regards,
Ray Ng W.L.
"You might say I'm a dreamer,
but I'm not the only one..."
John Lennon
VeryNiceGuy
Alvin Lim Cheng Hin wrote:
>
>
> : Goodness and badness are subjective qualities.
>
> This is the case only if you adopt an antirealist account of morality.
>
ah at long last i have a comrade in the "Objectivist" or "Realist"
camp. you may like to refer to my Blind Man and the Elephant analogy in
another subtread on Universal Morality. i used it as an analogy. it is
not a proof. but i think it convincingly argues at least that our
subjective views on morality NEED NOT necessarily refute the existence
of objective morality.
as to convince another person the EXISTENCE of objective morality, it is
like a blind man trying to convince another blind man about the reality
of the elephant. i think this will go on like one of those existence of
God debates.
Victor Huang
Thong Wei Koh wrote:
> I would just like to point out that nobody really asks those females
> perpetually in protest under the banner of some environment issues
> whether they had bothered to measure how many tons of sanitary napkins
> were discarded in landfills every year. Perhaps we should have a
> campaign for the banning of makeups, sanitary napkins and baby nappies.
> How recyclable are these things anyway?
I do not know why you have restricted this argument to females. Suffice
it to say that I feel that the quality of my own life has been
significantly improved by each of the above products, and that the
environmental impact is negligible, especially when incineration is
involved.
> Have you noticed how people would march in support of anti-fur campaigns
> in nice leather shoes/shoes? Maybe they should have a campaign ad where
> they show some supermodels wearing roadkill.
I suppose you must have missed out on "I'd rather go naked than wear
fur," which was launched by PETA in late 1993 and sporadically springs
back to life (the campaign, not the roadkill).
Thong Wei Koh
In article <MOD$98032...@sintercom.org>, Alvin Lim Cheng Hin
<ch...@merlion.singnet.com.sg> writes
>This is the case only if you adopt an antirealist account of morality.
So? Is my concept of morality not the `right' one?
>Are these 'attitudes' indeed institutional facts which complement and
>promote human flourishing? They would have to be in order to act as
>counterexamples to my suggestion.
I would ask you to quantify `human flourishing'? Some people believe
that humans should limit their effect on nature as far as possible. If
a tribe chooses to believe that it is `moral' not to overextend its
population, would you say that this culture is inferior to one that
encourages procreation? What about a culture which emphasises the need
to empathize with nature, worships spiritual and material minimalism and
eschew material wealth creation?
>This seems to be a hasty identification of morality and moral codes.
What is morality? It is a nebulous concept that can be glimpsed only by
concrete moral codes accepted by a society. The two concepts are
different, but not unrelated. Perhaps you subscribe to this thing
called divine revelation as to what is morally good or bad.
Let me push this discussion on a bit: I hold a vaguely relativistic
perspective on morality, only so far as to counter any suggestion that
there is any one canonical definition of morality. At the end of the
day, one has to admit that he/she is making a subjective judgement on
what he/she thinks are `desirable' outcomes. The important thing is to
understand when one is making an assumption and when one is stating a
theorem. For myself, I admit freely that I am influenced by my cultural
heritage and experiences to form a moral code, and I do not kid myself
that my moral code is in anyway the only possible one. It is a
difficult world, and the quicker people understands this the better. Be
it Buddhist metaphysical theories about reincarnation and extrapolations
about retribution, or Christian idea of Heavenly rewards or Hellish
punishment, they are just assumptions/beliefs which lay at the
foundation of a particular moral code. And woe to anyone who asserts
that any of these systems are canonical in this newsgroup.
--
Thong Wei Koh
Ray Ng W.L.
Autolycus wrote:
> BEGINQUOTE
> * "Ray Ng W.L." <r...@kami.com> wrote:
> >Is "objective" morality, such that it is true for all human beings, possible?
> >Morality is a product of man's rational thinking and supertitious beliefs, and
> >given man's natural incoherence in these aspects, I'd say it is impossible,
> >except perhaps when imposed in a totalitarian, oppressive society. But then,
> >it is not "true" when it is imposed.
> ENDQUOTE
>
> Sorry to be picky, but there are a large number of unwarranted assumptions here!
Umm.. heheh... I think you read me wrong, Autolycus :-)
Maybe it's my brevity....
> 1) Morality is a product of rational but incoherent thinking.
I meant that morality, in general, is a product of both rational thinking and
superstitious beliefs (RT&SB). For some it will be somewhat/extremely one-sided, for
others a balanced mixture.
Hence, in order to establish a morality that is true for all human beings, a
condition would be coherence in man's RT&SB.
Perhaps it is debatable whether it is 'natural', but currently it is such that man
is highly diversified in their RT&SB. That is why I believe that it is impossible
that morality exists such that it is true for all human beings.
> 2) ... and/or of naturally incoherent superstition.
Nope, pls see above.
> 3) Morality cannot be objective.
> 4) ... unless it is imposed rigidly.
Morality can be objective for an individual, if it is based purely on rational
thinking. But for a society "such that it is true for all human beings"? How can we
establish consistency among all individuals' objective morality? People can have
perfectly objective reasoning behind their different concepts of morality. The best
that is achievable is only a consensus.
This is why I suggested that the closest to such a 'universal' morality is when
imposed in a tolalitarian, oppressive society. BUT it wouldn't be "true" in the
sense it is actually inconsistent with the morality of those imposed upon.
In other words, morality when imposed becomes a doctrine, a set of rules/guidelines.
> 5) And if imposed, is not anymore defined as 'morality'.
Pls see above...
> This is all based on how YOU define morality, which leads to a lot of
> fuzzy thinking, I'm thinking.
Still fuzzy? :-) I'm fuzzy, but only bcos I hadn't slept since yesterday...
> 'Morality' comes from Latin 'moris', which means a custom, practice,
> tradition or law. The emphasis is on a code of civil practice; i.e., what
> a society considers prerequisite for 'civilised' behaviour. It can be made
> objective like any other code of customs, practices, traditions or laws -
> however, the interpretation of such codes is what may become subjective.
> Hence, for practical purposes, it requires very tight definitions or risks
> loss of objectivity.
Hmm, but isn't the fundamental meaning of morality a sense of right/wrong? What you
are discribing sounds more like a form of morality applied to societies (rules), as
opposed to individual morality (independent thinking).
I was talking about morality as a sense, based on independent thinking. Not a
code/doctrine.
> Example: the Mosaic law, beginning with the 10 commandments, is
> fundamentally well defined for its original purpose - Do not bear false
> witness, do not commit adultery, these are clear, without exception.
> However, the attached body of law, when applied to a changed society more
> complex than the original one, has bred a nation (or race, or ethnic
> group) well known for its lawyers...
>
> Note that the Roman law, an ancestor of our local law, would consider
> itself a code of morality by Roman definitions. That is, there is not
> necessarily a religious or superstitious component, but necessarily a
> legal one, in 'moral' matters.
Heheh it is clear now... our misunderstanding on "morality"...
> Would this shed new light on our lengthy and broad debate on such matters?
> Probably not.
>
> *grin*
...newfound confusion.... :-D
Ray Ng W.L.
Nope, haven't seen the photo. But I don't understand your seemingly
condescending view of the protest. It appears to be a peaceful attempt to
highlight their cause. Now I understand that sometimes over-zealous activists
can interfere in the development of more relevant issues, but it is not always
so. Furthermore, we shouldn't allow incidents of over-zealous activism to
cloud our opinions of their fundamental cause, whether you subscribe to it or
not.
Like a coin, civil activism have two sides to it, perhaps 'dark' and 'light'
sides. Not all causes are irrelevant, bigoted or otherwise 'bad'. For example,
activism on environmental protection has successfully educated the public and
influence government policies. Further, those who in history protested against
racism/slavery, would you call them "twerps"? It is not the prerogative of the
government or ruling classes to change society.
Ray Ng W.L.
"You might say I'm a dreamer,
but I'm not the only one..."
John Lennon
Brett McInnes wrote:
> No raving rightists impeding the progress of medical research....
> no infinitely boring socialists moralising about the evils of
> money....sounds good to me.
>
> By the way, did you see the photograph in the ST showing PETA
> [People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals] apes lying in coffins
> as a protest against the wearing of fur? Did you note that all
> of the lids and nails were kept safely out of sight? What poor
> sportsmanship. PETA is no fun.
>
Thong Wei Koh
In article <MOD$980323...@sintercom.org>, VeryNiceGuy
<ngso...@pacific.net.sg> writes
>but i think it convincingly argues at least that our
>subjective views on morality NEED NOT necessarily refute the existence
>of objective morality.
In the absense of a more persuasive case for `objective' morality, I
regret to say that it belongs to the same category as UFOs and whatnot
:)
>i think this will go on like one of those existence of
>God debates.
Ultimately, it boils down to it. Not merely the existence of one God,
or a pantheon of Gods, but also the veracity of some metaphysical
assumptions in many religions and cultures.
--
Thong Wei Koh
alf
Ray Ng W.L. (r...@kami.com) wrote:
: I believe that morality is relativistic because to me the counter
: argument is too far-fetched.
<snip!>
But moral relativism suffers from a number of well-known contradictions.
I shall address a number of these, but first I shall address the question
of why moral relativism seems to be a true depiction of morality.
It appears that the seeming truth of moral relativism arises from the
empirical evidence of cultural diversity which includes a diversity of
cultural values and moral codes. From the premise that there exist a
diversity of societies with their own moral codes, one might conclude that
moral values are therefore relative to each society.
This argument is open to a number of counterarguments. One might counter
that the diversity in moral codes is merely shallow, and that these are
manifestations of deeper objective moral principles, for example
utilitarian principles or universalisation principles. For example, while
in most cultures cannibalising ones kin would be considered (at very
least) an act of gross disrespect, until an epidemic of kuru, a spongiform
encephalopathy, stopped the practice, the Fore of New Guinea practised
ritual kinship cannibalism as they viewed it as an act of love and respect
for the dead. Hence the fact of cultural diversity does not necessarily
entail moral relativism.
One might also point out that the argument is counterintuitive. If a
society possesses the belief that it is wrong to commit murder, one does
not believe that a murderer is morally blameworthy simply because his
society disapproves of his act, but under moral relativism, since the
moral status of an act is determined solely by whether the particular
society approves or disapproves of it, the murderer is morally blameworthy
only because his society has determined it to be wrong.
Worse, moral relativism limits the scope of moral criticism. If a practice
of a particular society satisfies its moral codes, then under moral
relativism that practice is moral. This would mean that one may not
criticise the practice of slavery in the antebellum American South, since
slavery satisfied the moral code of antebellum American South society.
Moral reform is also held to be impossible under moral relativism. It is
impossible for a societys moral code to be morally criticised since it is
that very code that is the standard of morality. Moral reformers hence are
immoral by their very act of attacking their societies' moral codes.
: But how can your "objective" (as opposed to relativistic) morality be built
: upon institutions for "human flourishing" when the truth behind "human
: flourishing" is essentially relativistic?
Is this necessarily the case? The (apparant) semantic diversity of 'human
flourishing' does not necessarily entail a corresponding ontological
diversity.
Thong Wei Koh
In article <MOD$980324...@sintercom.org>, alf
<art5...@leonis.nus.sg> writes
>This argument is open to a number of counterarguments. One might counter
>that the diversity in moral codes is merely shallow, and that these are
>manifestations of deeper objective moral principles, for example
>utilitarian principles or universalisation principles. For example, while
>in most cultures cannibalising ones kin would be considered (at very
>least) an act of gross disrespect, until an epidemic of kuru, a spongiform
>encephalopathy, stopped the practice, the Fore of New Guinea practised
>ritual kinship cannibalism as they viewed it as an act of love and respect
>for the dead. Hence the fact of cultural diversity does not necessarily
>entail moral relativism.
Hang on. I don't see any counterarguments here against relativism. You
have not demonstrated why your example of the Fore of New Guinea
adequately supported your case for a canonical moral code. All I see
here is evidence of a modification of a moral code due to a
change/realization of circumstance. It further strengthens the case
that moral codes are directly influenced by physical needs and
limitations.
>One might also point out that the argument is counterintuitive.
<snip>
>since the
>moral status of an act is determined solely by whether the particular
>society approves or disapproves of it, the murderer is morally blameworthy
>only because his society has determined it to be wrong.
I don't see anything counterintuitive about the latter part of your
paragraph if that is what you are trying to suggest. Please explain.
>Worse, moral relativism limits the scope of moral criticism.
This is bizzare. You make a `moral criticism' simply because of a
perceived violation of a moral code. You don't justify the
establishment of a canonical moral code BECAUSE you wish to criticize
someone else. All this sounds extremely facist to me. So what if moral
relativism limits the scope of moral criticism? Is that a good reason
to reject it?
>It is
>impossible for a societys moral code to be morally criticised since it is
>that very code that is the standard of morality. Moral reformers hence are
>immoral by their very act of attacking their societies' moral codes.
No, you can continue to criticize it on the basis that the act violates
YOUR moral code. Simple as that. Then, to justify your criticism, you
furnish the other party with ample arguments to persuade them to change
their moral code.
It depends how you attack other's moral codes. If you say that others
are evil simply because of an outright assertion (like you will go to
hell if you marry more than one wife) without adequate justification,
then you deserve a kick in the behind. Once you start laying out your
objections to someone else's actions, you examine which moral principles
are perculiar to your own cultural, societal experience. As such, I
don't think all moral reformers are immoral.
>Is this necessarily the case? The (apparant) semantic diversity of 'human
>flourishing' does not necessarily entail a corresponding ontological
>diversity.
Why not? It is clear that once your objectives are different, your
moral code will change dramatically.
--
Thong Wei Koh
Alvin Lim Cheng Hin
Thong Wei Koh (t...@potash.demon.co.uk) wrote:
: So? Is my concept of morality not the `right' one?
In my view, it isn't an accurate depiction of morality.
: >Are these 'attitudes' indeed institutional facts which complement and
: >promote human flourishing? They would have to be in order to act as
: >counterexamples to my suggestion.
: I would ask you to quantify `human flourishing'?
Is it fair to reply to questions/criticisms with questions which, though
relevant to the topic at hand, are irrelevant to the questions/criticisms?
Anyway, to answer your question, as yet I don't hold any particular view
of what human flourishing consists in, though the wide variety of views on
the matter certainly does not entail anything about its ontological
status.
: What is morality? It is a nebulous concept that can be glimpsed only by
: concrete moral codes accepted by a society.
Is one's sense that murder or genocide is morally wrong only because it
conflicts with the moral codes against murder and genocide?
And even if your claim were true, and I don't think that it is, how one
perceives morality does not say anything about what morality is.
: The two concepts are different, but not unrelated.
While this might be the case, it is still the case that one ought not to
confuse between morality and moral codes, especially since certain moral
codes might be inspired by extra-moral sources.
: Perhaps you subscribe to this thing called divine revelation as to what
: is morally good or bad.
No, I don't. :)
FYI the divine theory of morality is not the only realist account of
morality available.
Ray Ng W.L.
alf wrote:
> But moral relativism suffers from a number of well-known contradictions.
> ...snip...
> One might also point out that the argument is counterintuitive. If a
> society possesses the belief that it is wrong to commit murder, one does
> not believe that a murderer is morally blameworthy simply because his
> society disapproves of his act, but under moral relativism, since the
> moral status of an act is determined solely by whether the particular
> society approves or disapproves of it, the murderer is morally blameworthy
> only because his society has determined it to be wrong.
> ...snip...
Perhaps there is some misunderstanding here, Alvin :-)
I believe that morality is relativistic because I believe it stems from
individual, independent thinking. The fundamental units of morality are within
you and me, individuals, the smallest unit of a society. Morality at a social
level are at best, a democratic consensus, or at worse, a totalitarian
oppression. When imposed, morality ceases to be its 'true' form, and is reduced
into a doctrine, a code, just a form of morality.
IMHO, the rigidity of moral codes you described is not a flaw of moral
relativism. It is due to conformist thinking, as opposed to independent thinking.
So on the contrary, to me relativistic morality is flexible, because it is
relative to individuals, as well as societies. If the social moral codes
contradicts your personal sense of morality, it is your decision to rethink,
conform, or otherwise.
> : But how can your "objective" (as opposed to relativistic) morality be built
> : upon institutions for "human flourishing" when the truth behind "human
> : flourishing" is essentially relativistic?
>
> Is this necessarily the case? The (apparant) semantic diversity of 'human
> flourishing' does not necessarily entail a corresponding ontological
> diversity.
Ontological? Is morality a metaphysical thing? But IMHO morality is a product of
man's contemplation, and nothing else! Even if man's contemplation is partly
influenced by superstition/religion, it is man's decision on right/wrong that we
call morality. Is there a higher "truth" somewhere behind our morality? Something
we don't see? But we are not talking about God or alien lifeforms. Morality
originates from us, our thinking. It is man's creation. It is diversified among
us, as art is. Similarly, there is no single "truth" behind art. The "truth" is
in each individual, and that is why I belief morality is relativistic.
Not everything converges into a single metaphysical truth...
Regards,
Thong Wei Koh
In article <MOD$980324...@sintercom.org>, Thong Wei Koh
<t...@potash.demon.co.uk> writes
>At the end of the
>day, one has to admit that he/she is making a subjective judgement on
>what he/she thinks are `desirable' outcomes. The important thing is to
>understand when one is making an assumption and when one is stating a
>theorem.
Good. I get a chance to qualify my own statements further before I get
bashed on the head:
What I meant to say was that we are making an assertion that `an action
X is moral', it is important to distinguish between an outright
commandment and a statement that has with it a cogent argument that can
be elucidated and translated into another culture. Of course there will
always be assumptions made in any argument. Some arguments are simply
statements of assumptions. What we are really interested in are
arguments that rely on basic assumptions that are common to cultures in
question. I hope that clarifies things a bit more.
`No, no. I am not a facist. Facists are people who wear black and go
around telling people what to do, whereas priests... er.. Another round
of beer for everyone!' Father Ted in `Father Ted', a BBC comedy
series.
--
Thong Wei Koh
VeryNiceGuy
Thong Wei Koh wrote:
>
> In article <MOD$980323...@sintercom.org>, VeryNiceGuy
> <ngso...@pacific.net.sg> writes
> >but i think it convincingly argues at least that our
> >subjective views on morality NEED NOT necessarily refute the existence
> >of objective morality.
>
> In the absense of a more persuasive case for `objective' morality, I
> regret to say that it belongs to the same category as UFOs and whatnot
> :)
>
the case for 'relative' morality is even worse. it's like saying:
because everybody in this world sees the earth as flat in his/her locale
and see different views and terrains, therefore there is no world.
i have also mentioned that even in Einstein's Theory of Relativity there
are constants. why can't there be moral absolutes even where there is
diversity in frames of reference? AFAIK, no one has rebutted me on
these points.
yours with respect,
Very Nice Guy
Brett McInnes
Thong Wei Koh (t...@potash.demon.co.uk) wrote:
: In the absense of a more persuasive case for `objective' morality, I
: regret to say that it belongs to the same category as UFOs and whatnot
: :)
That's not fair. One can readily imagine ways of determining that
UFOs are real, if that is indeed the case. Can one say the same
about "objective morality"?
Thong Wei Koh---unfair to UFOs.
alf
<snip!>
: >Hence the fact of cultural diversity does not necessarily
: >entail moral relativism.
: Hang on. I don't see any counterarguments here against relativism.
In case you didn't notice, my paragraph was seeking to show that cultural
diversity does not entail moral relativism.
: You have not demonstrated why your example of the Fore of New Guinea
: adequately supported your case for a canonical moral code.
That's because my example wasn't seeking to achieve that. (In fact, moral
realism is not necessarily manifested in a 'canonical moral code', and I
am certainly not trying to prove any case for such.) My example was simply
used to illustrate the point that cultural diversity (cannibalism and
non-cannibalism) does not entail moral relativism (since both practices
are rooted in deeper objective principles).
: >since the
: >moral status of an act is determined solely by whether the particular
: >society approves or disapproves of it, the murderer is morally blameworthy
: >only because his society has determined it to be wrong.
: I don't see anything counterintuitive about the latter part of your
: paragraph if that is what you are trying to suggest. Please explain.
<snip!>
There's a world of difference between saying that one feels that an act is
wrong because of one's perception that it is wrong, and that one feels
that it is wrong because it violates the moral code that one has.
This distinction is particularly clear in the case of some extreme crime
such as murder or genocide. Do you feel that genocide is wrong *only*
because it violates your moral code?
: No, you can continue to criticize it on the basis that the act violates
: YOUR moral code. Simple as that. Then, to justify your criticism, you
: furnish the other party with ample arguments to persuade them to change
: their moral code.
<snip!>
But under moral relativism the other party's action is morally correct
simply because the act conforms to their moral code. They can certainly
acknowledge that under your moral code their action is wrong. But there is
nothing contradictory here. You can provide as much justification as you
want, but from their point of view, this justification only justifies
*your* perception that their act is immoral.
: Why not? It is clear that once your objectives are different, your
: moral code will change dramatically.
Once again, diversity in moral codes (cultural diversity) does not entail
moral relativism.
Ray Ng W.L.
VeryNiceGuy wrote:
> the case for 'relative' morality is even worse. it's like saying:
> because everybody in this world sees the earth as flat in his/her locale
> and see different views and terrains, therefore there is no world.
>
> i have also mentioned that even in Einstein's Theory of Relativity there
> are constants. why can't there be moral absolutes even where there is
> diversity in frames of reference? AFAIK, no one has rebutted me on
> these points.
Aha! :-)
You cannot compare morality with that of natural existents/phenomena,
bcos....
Morality is NOT a natural existent/phenomena! It is man's creation, it
originates from within man. It is a product of man's contemplation. There
exist no morality for which no man is accountable for. Unless you claim that
morality is a natural/supernatural entity. Do you?
I'm no expert in Einstein's theorems. It appears to me that Einstein (and
others before him) has brilliantly perceived that physical phenomena
converges to a single 'truth', and has formulated theorems that are indeed
very close to the 'truth' except for inconsistencies, some of which you
mentioned. Perhaps someday another scientist would further refine these
theorems to bring them even closer to the 'truth'. But would you/Einstein
venture to say that workings of morality can be _reduced_ in a similar
manner?
Thong Wei Koh
>relevant to the topic at hand, are irrelevant to the questions/criticisms?
It is, if there is some confusion over a critical point.
>Is one's sense that murder or genocide is morally wrong only because it
>conflicts with the moral codes against murder and genocide?
No. There is no causality between moral codes and morality (`because'
doesn't even start to get into the picture). Morality is about some
idea of `goodness'; some sense of judgement. This idea of `goodness' is
then described by tenets in moral codes. In this instances, `thou shalt
not kill' is part of a moral code and it captures one aspect of one
brand of morality.
>And even if your claim were true, and I don't think that it is, how one
>perceives morality does not say anything about what morality is.
No. All I am saying is that the only sensible way to talk about
morality is to talk about it in the language of moral codes.
>While this might be the case, it is still the case that one ought not to
>confuse between morality and moral codes, especially since certain moral
>codes might be inspired by extra-moral sources.
I am not confusing the two. One is used to describe the other.
--
Thong Wei Koh
Darrian Ashoka
In a time not yet long forgotten Brett McInnes <matm...@leonis.nus.sg> sayeth:
> That's not fair. One can readily imagine ways of determining that
> UFOs are real, if that is indeed the case. Can one say the same
> about "objective morality"?
and these ways of determining that UFOs are real are not used or have
failed because? simply because they are not conclusive enough or
scientific enough. besides, if there is a alien species really that
much advanced than us, they would do a better job with aerospace
design than making the crafts look like saucers, just doesn't make
aerodynamical senses.
--
If you are feeling good, don't worry about it, you'll get over it.
Darrian Ashoka
In a time not yet long forgotten Ray Ng W.L. <r...@kami.com> sayeth:
> Morality is NOT a natural existent/phenomena! It is man's creation, it
> originates from within man. It is a product of man's contemplation. There
> exist no morality for which no man is accountable for. Unless you claim that
> morality is a natural/supernatural entity. Do you?
how did you arrive with the conclusion that morality is NOT a natural
existent. i know many out there believe that it is, especially those
with religious background. isnt' certain acts, eg. murder,genocide,
paedophilia, etc considered by all? doesn't all child know that
certain acts are not good despite not having received specific
education in that area? by claiming that morality is NOT a natural
existet, then you take the stance that a man's psyche is a clean sheet
when he or she is born (i forgot the name of the philosopher who
believed in this) and from then on, everything is learned and applied.
i believe the counter arguments on this is quite strong.
--
Anything good in life is either fattening, immoral or illegal.
Thong Wei Koh
In article <MOD$98032...@sintercom.org>, VeryNiceGuy
<ngso...@pacific.net.sg> writes
>the case for 'relative' morality is even worse. it's like saying:
>because everybody in this world sees the earth as flat in his/her locale
>and see different views and terrains, therefore there is no world.
Ahhh....obvious mistake. The proof that the world is not flat is
physically verifiable. Therein lies the difference. You have chosen
the wrong analogy.
>i have also mentioned that even in Einstein's Theory of Relativity there
>are constants. why can't there be moral absolutes even where there is
>diversity in frames of reference? AFAIK, no one has rebutted me on
>these points.
What are the absolutes? Analogies are fine, but applying propositions
from analogies to the actual issue at hand is dodgy.
--
Thong Wei Koh
Thong Wei Koh
In article <MOD$980325...@sintercom.org>, alf
<art5...@leonis.nus.sg> writes
>In case you didn't notice, my paragraph was seeking to show that cultural
>diversity does not entail moral relativism.
Not quite right. You are only entitled to this view if you believe that
moral codes do not adequately reflect morality. Thus, in my view, your
example only serves to further the case that moral codes differ and
since they reflect a sense of morality, you have effectively supported
my case for moral relativity.
Moral codes are different from social conventions.
>My example was simply
>used to illustrate the point that cultural diversity (cannibalism and
>non-cannibalism) does not entail moral relativism (since both practices
>are rooted in deeper objective principles).
Why not? What deeper objective principles? That of survival? I can
agree with that. My point is that objective principle can only be
achieved in specific ways in certain circumstances and this influences
the development of morality in that context.
>There's a world of difference between saying that one feels that an act is
>wrong because of one's perception that it is wrong, and that one feels
>that it is wrong because it violates the moral code that one has.
Heh. This is contrived. If the moral code describes morality, then
surely if a perceived violation would mean a violation of the moral
code. Give me one example of how morality would not be captured by a
moral code. Look, if you can't express it in words or form, then it is
a useless concept.
>This distinction is particularly clear in the case of some extreme crime
>such as murder or genocide. Do you feel that genocide is wrong *only*
>because it violates your moral code?
Yes. Genocide is wrong, in my opinion, because my moral code deemed it
to be evil. Same goes for murder. Well?
>But under moral relativism the other party's action is morally correct
>simply because the act conforms to their moral code. They can certainly
>acknowledge that under your moral code their action is wrong. But there is
>nothing contradictory here. You can provide as much justification as you
>want, but from their point of view, this justification only justifies
>*your* perception that their act is immoral.
Yes. That is correct. Again, this reinforces the fact that immorality
is subjective. One can only hope to persuade another to change his/her
moral code. How? By explaining one's objections and firming one's
arguments on common shared objectives. You seem to have a tendency to
want to `hit someone over the head' until the other party agrees to your
particular moral code. I find that presumptious and dangerous.
>Once again, diversity in moral codes (cultural diversity) does not entail
>moral relativism.
Why not? Because one of your assumptions is that morality is not
adequately described by moral codes? I don't happen to share that
assumption. Perhaps you would like to persuade me that this is true.
--
Thong Wei Koh
Thong Wei Koh
In article <MOD$980325...@sintercom.org>, Brett McInnes
<matm...@leonis.nus.sg> writes
>Thong Wei Koh---unfair to UFOs.
>
Heh. I have this thing I want to show you - I have a 7 foot dragon
living in my second bedroom. It breathes a special kind of smoke. The
problem is that you can't see it(including the smoke) or touch it, nor
does it respond to any kind of known physical tests. I know it is
there. Wanna have it? I'll let you have it for a fiver. Nice pet, no
fuss, no mess. I call it Harvey II.
--
Thong Wei Koh
VeryNiceGuy
Ray Ng W.L. wrote:
>
> VeryNiceGuy wrote:
>
> > the case for 'relative' morality is even worse. it's like saying:
> > because everybody in this world sees the earth as flat in his/her locale
> > and see different views and terrains, therefore there is no world.
> >
> > are constants. why can't there be moral absolutes even where there is
> > diversity in frames of reference? AFAIK, no one has rebutted me on
> > these points.
>
>
> You cannot compare morality with that of natural existents/phenomena,
> bcos....
note i am not using Einstein's theories to prove anything about
morality. i am highlighting this to prove that if you try to prove that
there is no objective truth just because some things are relatively
described, then this so-called proof is provably an illogical line of
proof.
:-P
:-???
ok, here is a simpler example:-
sit across a friend, with a paper windmill turning between both of you.
you see the windmill turn clockwise. your friend sees the windmill turn
anticlockwise. then both of you argue .... now can you conclude that
just because the windmill is "clockwise" (according to one) and
"anti-clockwise" (according to another) that there is a contradiction?
that there is no turning? or that there is no windmill?
obviously this kind of reasoning is absurd. i leave you to pin point
what is wrong with this argument.
transplant this logic to relativistic morality. then perhaps you'll see
why i am not very convinced about it.
VeryNiceGuy
Thong Wei Koh wrote:
>
> Not quite right. You are only entitled to this view if you believe that
> moral codes do not adequately reflect morality. Thus, in my view, your
> example only serves to further the case that moral codes differ and
> since they reflect a sense of morality, you have effectively supported
> my case for moral relativity.
you are hinging on the "moral codes do adequately reflect morality"
assumption. so this argument is not going anywhere either.
...
> code. Give me one example of how morality would not be captured by a
> moral code.
but if you have already assumed that morality is relative, what is the
use of the example?
> Look, if you can't express it in words or form, then it is
> a useless concept.
ah! this is the crux of the conflict. you mean you believe that a
human being can know all there is to know, can conceive all there is to
know (about the universe as well as morality), and that all these can be
encapsulated in words or form?
> Yes. That is correct. Again, this reinforces the fact that immorality
> is subjective. One can only hope to persuade another to change his/her
again you are arguing that just because different people disagree on
immorality hence there is no objective morality. this very line of
reasoning is faulty. i have use many examples to show that this is
faulty reasoning. don't get sidetracked by the /content/ of my
examples. it is the /structure/ of the argument i am against. if your
structure of argument is faulty, i don't have to look very much at the
content, because it would falls apart.
>...
Thong Wei Koh
In article <MOD$980326...@sintercom.org>, VeryNiceGuy
<ngso...@pacific.net.sg> writes
>note i am not using Einstein's theories to prove anything about
>morality. i am highlighting this to prove that if you try to prove that
>there is no objective truth just because some things are relatively
>described, then this so-called proof is provably an illogical line of
>proof.
The word `relative' has an independent meaning and usage apart from
physics. I don't quite understand what you are getting at. You attempt
to use a proposition proven in a different context and apply it to a new
context? Amazing.
<snip>
>that there is a contradiction?
>that there is no turning? or that there is no windmill?
No. Obviously both saw the windmill. And both are correct, unless they
agree to define the direction in terms of a specific perspective.
Again, you are using a wrong analogy. Try again.
>obviously this kind of reasoning is absurd. i leave you to pin point
>what is wrong with this argument.
Heh.
Try sticking to the discussion proper, you are not getting any thing
clear across this way. Choose your analogies properly.
--
Thong Wei Koh
VeryNiceGuy
Thong Wei Koh wrote:
>
> In article <MOD$98032...@sintercom.org>, VeryNiceGuy
> <ngso...@pacific.net.sg> writes
> >because everybody in this world sees the earth as flat in his/her locale
> >and see different views and terrains, therefore there is no world.
>
> physically verifiable. Therein lies the difference. You have chosen
> the wrong analogy.
note "it's like saying", not "it's saying". my many examples are to
exemplfy faulty reasoning. don't get sidetracked by the /content/ of my
examples. it is the /structure/ of the argument i am against. if your
structure of argument is faulty, i don't have to look very much at the
content, because it would fall apart.
i think this is a pertinent analogy because with regard to questions
about morality, we seem to be like what people used to think about the
earth. with the benefit of hindsight and "physical verification", we
now "know" that their way of thinking is wrong. but if the truth is the
truth, and if you agree with me that epistemological principles are
timeless invariants, then you would agree that
even without the benefit of hindsight and "physical verification", their
way of thinking was wrong. likewise with regard to morality, if you use
the same kind of argument to support the "relative morality" thesis,
then this kind of argument is ridden with dangers.
further, is "physical verification" the basis of all verification? do
you want to physically verify that
2903459208362346 + 489797653227 = 489797653227 + 2903459208362346
for all time, all space and all classes of objects?
there are of course differences in content. the structure of argument
is the same. if you argue this way
View(x,S) =/= View(y,S) ==> not exist S
or in this manner
View(x,S) =/= View(y,S) ==> not exist f,g such that
g(f_inverse(View(x,S)) = View(y,S) and
f(g_inverse(View(y,S)) = View(x,S)
your method of argument is faulty.
ok, maybe for the fun of it, lets swap shoes. let's say you think and
vehemently insist that objectively the earth exists, and it is round. i
say and vehemently insist that this world is not real, just a figment of
my imagination, (because everyday i see buildings all around while my
friend sees the jungle everyday). even if it is real, the earth is flat
not round. now convince me that your position is correct. take up the
challenge?
> What are the absolutes? Analogies are fine, but applying propositions
> from analogies to the actual issue at hand is dodgy.
again i am only using analogies to show the structure of arguments. my
analogies are not proofs. but i think they show up the faulty structure
of the relativistic argument for morality quite well.
Ray Ng W.L.
Darrian Ashoka wrote:
> how did you arrive with the conclusion that morality is NOT a natural
> existent. i know many out there believe that it is, especially those
> with religious background. isnt' certain acts, eg. murder,genocide,
> paedophilia, etc considered by all? doesn't all child know that
> certain acts are not good despite not having received specific
> education in that area?
All children? There are numerous child-criminals out there, my friend.
Values need to be acquired, learned. If you give a knife to a baby, will he/she
innocently slash you with it? It is possible of course.
Explicit education is not the only source of knowledge, children can learn /alot/
from observation and thinking.
> by claiming that morality is NOT a natural
> existet, then you take the stance that a man's psyche is a clean sheet
> when he or she is born (i forgot the name of the philosopher who
> believed in this) and from then on, everything is learned and applied.
> i believe the counter arguments on this is quite strong.
Hardly strong enuf, IMHO.
My humble opinion is that individuals are born with natural physical instincts and
nothing else. Our values are shaped by influences experienced during our growth.
For example, if a child is raised in an incestuous family and has no contact with
the outside world, has no opportunities for any alternative
experiences/information that leads him/her to re-think, he/she will grow up to be
similarly incestuous.
alf
: >Is it fair to reply to questions/criticisms with questions which, though
: >relevant to the topic at hand, are irrelevant to the questions/criticisms?
: It is, if there is some confusion over a critical point.
FYI the confusion I pointed out in my original question was manifest in
your failure to construct a proper counterexample to my argument. Your
reply was irrelevant to this criticism, which you have yet to answer.
: No. There is no causality between moral codes and morality (`because'
: doesn't even start to get into the picture). Morality is about some
: idea of `goodness'; some sense of judgement. This idea of `goodness' is
: then described by tenets in moral codes. In this instances, `thou shalt
: not kill' is part of a moral code and it captures one aspect of one
: brand of morality.
This paragraph raises several questions. If moral codes 'capture'
(whatever this means) the agents' sense of morality, then what is the
precise status of the latter? Where do moral codes arise from? What
precisely do they reflect?
: No. All I am saying is that the only sensible way to talk about
: morality is to talk about it in the language of moral codes.
And I deny this, simply because moral codes can arise out of non-moral
values such as cultural norms, and also because one can reflect on what
morality is without the utilising of moral codes.
alf
Ray Ng W.L. (r...@kami.com) wrote:
<snip!>
: The fundamental units of morality are within you and me, individuals,
: the smallest unit of a society.
Just thought you'd like to know that viewing moral relativism in terms of
individual moral actors is even more problematic than viewing it in terms
of larger groups like societies. For one thing, if such moral relativism
is true, then the individual agent will necessarily be infallible in his
moral judgement. If what is morally right is precisely what the moral
agent thinks is morally right, then the moral agent *cannot* be mistaken
about what is morally right. Is this a consequence that one would like to
accept?
: Ontological? Is morality a metaphysical thing? But IMHO morality is a
: product of man's contemplation, and nothing else!
Um... Isn't that what it supposed to be determined in the very first
place?
Anyway, viewing morality as consisting of objective facts need not bind
one to viewing moral reality as consisting problematic or weird sui
generis moral facts. The moral realist is perfectly free to view moral
reality as supervening on non-moral facts such as institutional facts,
laws of reason (e.g. universalisation principles), functionalism, etc.
VeryNiceGuy
Thong Wei Koh wrote:
...>
> physics. I don't quite understand what you are getting at. You attempt
> to use a proposition proven in a different context and apply it to a new
> context? Amazing.
as i have said before, i use my analogies to reveal the structure of the
argument, not the content. i am saying that there is something wrong
with the structure of the relativistic argument. do not get
side-tracked by the content: wind-mills, earth, elephants, or genocide,
... etc.
...
> No. Obviously both saw the windmill. And both are correct, unless they
> agree to define the direction in terms of a specific perspective.
> Again, you are using a wrong analogy. Try again.
no, this analogy is pertinent. and your answer is right on target.
the "anticlockwise" and "clockwise" depend on the frame of reference -
so that part is relative. but the windmill is turning - this is
objective. so different subjective views do not negate objective
reality. that was what i have been arguing all this while. don't tell
me you have one logic for "everyday things" and another logic for
morality? that would be inconsistent wouldn't it?
> Try sticking to the discussion proper, you are not getting any thing
> clear across this way. Choose your analogies properly.
refer to my remark above about /structure/ of argument.
VeryNiceGuy
> : No. All I am saying is that the only sensible way to talk about
> : morality is to talk about it in the language of moral codes.
>
> And I deny this, simply because moral codes can arise out of non-moral
> values such as cultural norms, and also because one can reflect on what
> morality is without the utilising of moral codes.
>
just to add:
can the language of moral codes encapsulate all of morality? it is like
saying our finite number of words can capture all possible concepts,
nuances and meanings and all there is to know, which may be infinite.
also, i find this untenable not least due to the limitations of mankind.
MANKIND IS LIMITED IN POWER
have you ever tried relocating Mount Everest to the moon?
MANKIND IS LIMITED IN FORESIGHT
could anyone have foreseen, say, the current financial crisis? the
collapse of the Soviet Union? the various wars? earthquakes? plane
crashes? sinking of the Titanic?
MANKIND IS LIMITED IN UNDERSTANDING
anybody here understands how to make everybody in this world happy,
rich and at peace with one another? anybody here understands how to
create extra energy without destroying mass?
MANKIND IS LIMITED IN ABILITY TO PROVE ALL THINGS MATHEMATICALLY
Go"del proved the Incompleteness of Logic in 1931.
MANKIND IS LIMITED IN ABILITY TO PROVE ALL THINGS SCIENTIFICALLY
Einstein says no amount of experiments can prove that his theories
are right,
but it only takes one experiment to prove that his theories are wrong.
... <you may add your own examples to this list>
so i believe if one says moral codes express all there is to morality,
one is walking on thin ice.
further, if one's mind is shut and thinks moral codes is the be all and
end all of morality, even if some higher being comes and reveals
something about morality which we cannot express in words or moral
codes, or someone discovered some new "moral technology" that is able to
show the inadequacies of our moral codes, it would be futile because the
answer will not be accepted.
alf
Ray Ng W.L. (r...@kami.com) wrote:
: Morality is NOT a natural existent/phenomena!
Morality need not exist as some sort of weird natural entity or phenomenon
in order for it to be objective.
What the moral realist can simply argue for is for morality to be
supervenient on existing non-moral natural entities.
: It is man's creation, it originates from within man. It is a product of
: man's contemplation.
<snip!>
While it is arguably the case that moral codes are in fact human
constructs, it does not necessarily follow that this is the case for
morality.
Alvin Lim Cheng Hin
Thong Wei Koh (t...@potash.demon.co.uk) wrote:
: Not quite right. You are only entitled to this view if you believe that
: moral codes do not adequately reflect morality.
<snip!>
This is my conclusion; this claim is not assumed in my argument. I examine
the diversity of moral codes and determine that there are deeper objective
moral principles on which these are built on. Hence I conclude that
cultural diversity, as manifest in the diversity of moral codes, does not
entail moral relativism.
: Moral codes are different from social conventions.
I view moral codes as those socially-constructed norms of behaviour which
govern the moral life of a community. I distinguish this from other
non-moral norms of behaviour such as rules of etiquette or institutional
rules.
: Why not? What deeper objective principles? That of survival? I can
: agree with that. My point is that objective principle can only be
: achieved in specific ways in certain circumstances and this influences
: the development of morality in that context.
My point is that these objective principles can be seen as the non-moral
objective foundations on which morality supervenes.
: If the moral code describes morality, then surely if a perceived
: violation would mean a violation of the moral code.
<snip!>
Um... It is this very antecedent which is under debate; it simply begs the
question to assume its truth.
: Yes. Genocide is wrong, in my opinion, because my moral code deemed it
: to be evil. Same goes for murder. Well?
<snip!>
Surely you can see the problem in this. If morality can be reduced to the
moral code a society holds, as relativism would claim, then genocide or
murder would be morally right if a society's moral code deems it to be so.
One would expect that (or at least hope that) the wrongness of genocide
and murder is objectively true rather than being merely relative to the
moral codes of different societies.
: You seem to have a tendency to want to `hit someone over the head' until
: the other party agrees to your particular moral code.
<snip!>
? Um... I'm not the one holding fast to the unargued dogma about morality
being reflected in moral codes. :)
: Why not? Because one of your assumptions is that morality is not
: adequately described by moral codes?
No. I claim this because I have argued that the diversity in moral codes
is shallow and can be seen to reflect objective moral principles.
Autolycus
BEGINQUOTE
*v...@letterbox.com wrote:
>the case for 'relative' morality is even worse. it's like saying:
>because everybody in this world sees the earth as flat in his/her locale
>and see different views and terrains, therefore there is no world.
Disingenuous.
Relativity is perfectly OK for morality - we see what we call morality or
ethics or virtues or whatever, but they do not imply an absolute or
objective morality. They only would seem to imply that something of
greater simplicity (a fundament) or greater complexity (the Infinite) is
at the root of these things, and only because we generally have this
desire to make sense out of things which do not necessarily make sense.
As a Christian, I believe in absolute morality not because I can reason
that it is so, but because I choose to believe in what is essentially a
matter of FAITH. [All of us believe in certain matters of faith - for
some, it is that the universe may be described fruitfully (or apprehended,
or circumscribed) by laws and definitions.]
As a scientist, I believe in absolute morality because I hate meaningless
jumbles of data points and HOPE that there is an underlying pattern which
we codify as a body of laws.
As a philosopher, I LOVE screwing around with people's minds.
There you have it: Faith, Hope and Love - these three abide, and the
greatest of these is Love.
*grin*
Autolycus
--
. . **********************************************************
/b /| * Autolycus: Lone Wolf * email auto...@pacific.net.sg *
/ 3b-'-':| ==========================================================
.d~ .:::; * *
C "騖,::@::: * Be forever curiously testing new opinions *
C |:::::; * and courting new impressions, never acquiescing *
`( \ _`::; * in a facile orthodoxy... Walter Peters (1868) *
~`\`\::; * *
`~~' **********************************************************
Autolycus
BEGINQUOTE
>failed because? simply because they are not conclusive enough or
>scientific enough. besides, if there is a alien species really that
>much advanced than us, they would do a better job with aerospace
>design than making the crafts look like saucers, just doesn't make
>aerodynamical senses.
Actually, quite a number of modern flying devices aren't aerodynamic. The
stealth fighter for one. Such craft need constant computer adjustment to
keep airborne. Why do people design such aircraft? Perhaps because the
aerodynamic instability can be overcome, and the design confers important
advantages (like being near-invisible to radar).
If flying saucers really existed (and they aren't the only design
reported), perhaps it's because radial symmetry is important to these
aliens for scientific reasons, religious reasons, or practical reasons -
or becuase of some advantage they think is more important then
aerodynamics. And then again, maybe they use inertialess propulsion, and
aerodynamics is not important to them.
I think that one ought to be asking how come a thread on objective
morality ever became one on flying saucers. My conclusion is that Thong
Wei's delight in demonstrating his ability to argue has reacted with
Brett's delight in exposing certain classes of argument... but then again,
maybe not.
Maybe they use philosophy (oh, horrors!) and morality is not really
important to them, for scientific, religious, or practical reasons...
*grin*
Autolycus
--
. . **********************************************************
/b /| * Autolycus: Lone Wolf * email auto...@pacific.net.sg *
/ 3b-'-':| ==========================================================
.d~ .:::; * *
C "騖,::@::: * In girum imus nocte et consumimur igni. *
C |:::::; * *
`( \ _`::; * Into the circle after dark and consumed by fire. *
Thong Wei Koh
In article <MOD$980326...@sintercom.org>, alf
<art5...@leonis.nus.sg> writes
>FYI the confusion I pointed out in my original question was manifest in
>your failure to construct a proper counterexample to my argument. Your
>reply was irrelevant to this criticism, which you have yet to answer.
Let me paste in what had transpired:
You asked:
"Are these 'attitudes' indeed institutional facts which complement and
promote human flourishing? They would have to be in order to act as
counterexamples to my suggestion. "
To which I responded:
"I would ask you to quantify `human flourishing'?"
I would call that request for definition rather relevant. Perhaps this
refusal of yours is `manifest in your failure' to understand what you
mean by human flourishing.
For example, `human flourishing' could mean to some possible culture
that the ideal destiny of man is for each individual to own exclusively
an amount of land as far as the eye can see.
Even if I take `human flourishing' to mean simply human survival, I can
imagine a stone age community stranded on a small island with limited
resources to embrace a particular morality that says it is the moral
duty for the males in the group to kill any child born out of wedlock -
the child has no moral right to live. It is not simply a social
convention. The fact that such things may be acceptable in that society
means that they have accepted that such actions are not immoral.
>This paragraph raises several questions. If moral codes 'capture'
>(whatever this means) the agents' sense of morality, then what is the
>precise status of the latter? Where do moral codes arise from? What
>precisely do they reflect?
The precise status of morality is simply the `thing' that a moral code
describes. Where do moral codes arise from? Well, they are shaped and
invented by human (possibly all animal) societies for some end - that is
what they reflect. When these are shaped, they embody (totally) the
ideal which is given the name `morality'.
You may argue that there are some `morals' that have not been encoded.
Wrong. As soon as you try to describe these morals to someone else, you
have to describe them in some form - ie. moral codes. Is there separate
existence of such `ideas'? Not quite except for the names that they are
given. Perhaps you can argue that moral codes may not adequately
describe your morality. I will argue that perhaps you have not thought
hard enough to put them down in some form or other but the moral codes
exists as much as the idea of morality exists in your head.
In anycase, you have not responded to my challenge to describe (heh)
some morals that cannot be described. Genocide and murder have been
dealt with. Anything else?
>And I deny this, simply because moral codes can arise out of non-moral
>values such as cultural norms, and also because one can reflect on what
>morality is without the utilising of moral codes.
I think you mean social convention - like tipping your hat as greeting
or sticking out your tongue. Those are not moral codes.
--
Thong Wei Koh
Thong Wei Koh
>argument, not the content. i am saying that there is something wrong
>with the structure of the relativistic argument.
I still do not understand. To make a statement about the `structure' of
the argument, you need to persuade me that the analogy provides an
adequate model. All I see is the attempt to reconcile two uses of the
word `relative' (or relativity). Hardly convincing.
>the "anticlockwise" and "clockwise" depend on the frame of reference -
>so that part is relative. but the windmill is turning - this is
>objective. so different subjective views do not negate objective
>reality. that was what i have been arguing all this while. don't tell
>me you have one logic for "everyday things" and another logic for
>morality? that would be inconsistent wouldn't it?
Ah.. But you can actually see and go up and touch the windmill. That
makes verifies its physical existence. The rest of the story is about
description. The problem with morality is that we can't start to touch
it or see it in any way. The only way we can talk about it is by
description. You can see the problem now. It is almost impossible to
define a frame of reference if the descriptions themselves are
subjective and there is nothing physical to pin anything on.
--
Thong Wei Koh
Maque
Actually any aliens worth their salt should be travelling by "worm holes".
Why would they need to travel in a physical craft at all?
--
The best way to be supportive of other women is to get into
situations in which you can change the rules - as a person,
not as a woman. - Jean Denton
^Ma Que Sui Xiao, Wu Zhang Ju Chuan^
Thong Wei Koh
>individual moral actors is even more problematic than viewing it in terms
>of larger groups like societies. For one thing, if such moral relativism
>is true, then the individual agent will necessarily be infallible in his
>moral judgement. If what is morally right is precisely what the moral
>agent thinks is morally right, then the moral agent *cannot* be mistaken
>about what is morally right. Is this a consequence that one would like to
>accept?
None of your so-called `problems' with moral relativism has anything to
do with the actual veracity of the claim that there is no objective
moralism. For example, your objection above is a matter of social
convenience. It is true that the individual as a moral agent cannot be
mistaken about what is morally right as far as he is concerned. Why do
you think society takes so much effort to inculcate `civil' values into
the young - to create compatible moral codes in individuals so that they
can function in society. So, does society have common moral values?
Yes, simply because they share the same physical reality and perhaps
share similar experiences to shape these commonalities.
Again, your objections are purely a matter of desirability for an
objective morality to exists. That is not sufficient.
--
Thong Wei Koh
Thong Wei Koh
>use of the example?
Err.. Read again. I said: `give me one example of how morality, any
morality (yours), would not be captured by a moral code'. Nothng about
relative morality here.
> you mean you believe that a
>human being can know all there is to know, can conceive all there is to
>know (about the universe as well as morality), and that all these can be
>encapsulated in words or form?
I don't know if it is possible, but if you are unable to describe the
concept in any form to any one else, then it is useless. Description
could simply be a physical reproduction or bringing someone to actually
see or experience the phenomenon.
>again you are arguing that just because different people disagree on
>immorality hence there is no objective morality. this very line of
>reasoning is faulty. i have use many examples to show that this is
>faulty reasoning.
No you haven't. All your arguments are faulty and I have demonstrated
why.
>if your
>structure of argument is faulty, i don't have to look very much at the
>content, because it would falls apart.
Heh. Please read my previous post. You haven't a leg to stand on if
you want to talk about /structure/.
--
Thong Wei Koh
Thong Wei Koh
>exemplfy faulty reasoning. don't get sidetracked by the /content/ of my
>structure of argument is faulty, i don't have to look very much at the
You attempt to fault an argument by using an analogy. To achieve that,
you have to demonstrate that your analogy provides an adequate model. I
am pointing out that your analogy doesn't fit. Nothing about structure.
By the way, please explain what you mean by structure.
>but if the truth is the
>truth, and if you agree with me that epistemological principles are
>timeless invariants, then you would agree that
>even without the benefit of hindsight and "physical verification", their
>way of thinking was wrong. likewise with regard to morality, if you use
>the same kind of argument to support the "relative morality" thesis,
>then this kind of argument is ridden with dangers.
Sigh. Intrinsic truth is a nasty concept and I'd rather not deal with
it. There are beliefs and there are facts. Facts are things you either
prove theoretically or things you can physically verify. Belief in the
flat world in history is just that - a belief. Likewise for morality.
You can speculate about the existence of unicorns for all I care - in
fact I can challenge you to refute the existence of unicorns. That
doesn't do any good. What I am interested in are good arguments, maybe
not necessarily solid proof, plausible enough to convince me that there
is such beast such as objective morality. Simply saying that there is a
possibility that there is such a thing is not really interesting.
>further, is "physical verification" the basis of all verification? do
>you want to physically verify that
> 2903459208362346 + 489797653227 = 489797653227 + 2903459208362346
>for all time, all space and all classes of objects?
Heh. If you are interpreting '+' as numerical addition, it is DEFINED
as commutative in arithmetic. There you go. Yes. It is true, rather
trivially, that the above is true for `all time, all space and all
classes of objects'. In fact, to save you trouble, you can simply type
a + b = b + a for a,b any number.
>there are of course differences in content. the structure of argument
>is the same. if you argue this way
> View(x,S) =/= View(y,S) ==> not exist S
>or in this manner
> View(x,S) =/= View(y,S) ==> not exist f,g such that
> g(f_inverse(View(x,S)) = View(y,S) and
> f(g_inverse(View(y,S)) = View(x,S)
>your method of argument is faulty.
This is quite silly. Oh I see, you mean `structure' as the collection
of `rules' allowable in an argument. By the way, the latter part of
your paragraph do not make much sense. Some note on these things: even
if I adopt a rule - View(x,S) != View(y,S) -> not exists S, it is still
consistent logically, provided that I cannot prove, within the same
system, that exists S is true - then I get a contradiction.
You see, your attempt here, by way of the example of the windmill, is
flawed simply because exists S (windmill) is verifiable (at least what I
understand to be commonly accepted as existing physically, and
conflating `exists' with physical existence). Thus you come to the
conclusion that the rule must be wrong since exists S is verifiable.
Indeed, logically, you can deduce the negation of either the rule or
exists S. To spell it out to you, in the absence of the possibility of
physical verification of S, you can choose to deduce not exists S. :)
There.
>ok, maybe for the fun of it, lets swap shoes. let's say you think and
>vehemently insist that objectively the earth exists, and it is round. i
>say and vehemently insist that this world is not real, just a figment of
>my imagination, (because everyday i see buildings all around while my
>friend sees the jungle everyday). even if it is real, the earth is flat
>not round. now convince me that your position is correct. take up the
>challenge?
Yeah, why not. Ok. First define for my what physical existence is.
Would you be happy to accept that I, and the rest of the world, am not a
figment of your imagination? If you say no, then forget about the whole
exercise and carrying on dreaming. If you say yes, then would you
accept the physical reality of physical sense such as sight and touch?
If your answer is still yes, then we are in business: Go out in the
garden and touch the grass and soil. Yes. That's part of earth. If
you like, you can hide away on the next ariane rocket and view the earth
from space.
>again i am only using analogies to show the structure of arguments. my
>analogies are not proofs. but i think they show up the faulty structure
>of the relativistic argument for morality quite well.
No. They are faulty simply because there are different provable
propositions in your analogies that have no parallels in the actual
discussion. Read the above.
--
Thong Wei Koh
Brett McInnes
Sorry, I spent all my money on the apparatus in my Objective
Morality Laboratory. The erbium dowels in the Sexual Morality
Particle Detector were particularly expensive.
Alvin Lim Cheng Hin
Thong Wei Koh (t...@potash.demon.co.uk) wrote:
<snip!>
: For example, your objection above is a matter of social
: convenience. It is true that the individual as a moral agent cannot be
: mistaken about what is morally right as far as he is concerned. Why do
If moral relativism of the individualistic variety is true, it is not
simply that the agent 'cannot be mistaken about what is morally right', it
is that what is morally right for him is what is morally right.
: you think society takes so much effort to inculcate `civil' values into
: the young - to create compatible moral codes in individuals so that they
: can function in society.
If what is morally right is what is morally right for the agent, then it
is impossible for the agent to be wrong about what is morally right. This
makes the entire project of moral inculcation incomprehensible. If the
goal of moral inculcation is to correct the wrong moral values of the
youth, then the project cannot even begin since these youths create what
is morally right simply by virtue of their moral beliefs.
: Again, your objections are purely a matter of desirability for an
: objective morality to exists. That is not sufficient.
My objections here are objections against moral relativism. My arguments
for moral realism are different.
Alvin Lim Cheng Hin
Thong Wei Koh (t...@potash.demon.co.uk) wrote:
: I would call that request for definition rather relevant. Perhaps this
: refusal of yours is `manifest in your failure' to understand what you
: mean by human flourishing.
<snip!>
I recall explaining that the semantic diversity of 'flourishing' does not
entail anything ontologically.
: You may argue that there are some `morals' that have not been encoded.
: Wrong. As soon as you try to describe these morals to someone else, you
: have to describe them in some form - ie. moral codes.
Um... I can simply describe them as propositions. Morality need not solely
be described in terms of moral codes.
: In anycase, you have not responded to my challenge to describe (heh)
: some morals that cannot be described.
This is simply because my argument does not require morality to be of the
sui generis indescribable sort.
If you've been following my posts, you should have realised that I'm
adopting the moral realist claim that morality can be reduced to objective
non-moral facts.
: I think you mean social convention - like tipping your hat as greeting
: or sticking out your tongue. Those are not moral codes.
Nor do I think so. Moral codes are those social norms which govern moral
life; other social norms, such as rules of etiquettedo not belong to the
class of moral codes. :)
Ray Ng W.L.
alf wrote:
> Just thought you'd like to know that viewing moral relativism in terms of
> individual moral actors is even more problematic than viewing it in terms
> of larger groups like societies. For one thing, if such moral relativism
> is true, then the individual agent will necessarily be infallible in his
> moral judgement.
Necessarily infallible? But I don't see why. I'm not saying that Man have
absolute morality 'built-in' since birth. Individuals learn from, and
observe, each other. Each individual goes through cycles of knowledge
acquisition and re-thinking. Morality is learned this way, and each
individual forms his/her own concept of morality, some distinctive, others
similar.
I cannot see why you suggest this. Our thinking must be very different, for
it seems so inconceivable to me... :-) Do you think that some 'absolute
morality' (i.e infallible) exists out there, that originate /not/ from Man's
thinking?
If we disaggree fundamentally that morality is purely a result of Man's
contemplation, I don't think we can ever concur on whether morality can only
be relativistic.
> If what is morally right is precisely what the moral
> agent thinks is morally right, then the moral agent *cannot* be mistaken
> about what is morally right. Is this a consequence that one would like to
> accept?
Yes and no...
Yes, in the sense that there will always be minorities in societies who do
not subscribe to the prevailing norms. As a minor example, some people
thinking that killing is inherently immoral, whereas I think it depends on
underlying motives and circumstance.
No, in the sense I cannot agree that "the moral agent cannot be mistaken
about what is morally right". If an individual observers that some others
have differing moral thinking, it is up to the individual to accept, reject
or re-think.
> : Ontological? Is morality a metaphysical thing? But IMHO morality is a
> : product of man's contemplation, and nothing else!
>
> Um... Isn't that what it supposed to be determined in the very first
> place?
I'm doubtful on how "metaphysical" is morality, in a philosophical sense.
Morality is not an external phenomenon that individuals perceive through
senses. It is conceived in our minds. Yes, it is a product of an individual's
observation and education, but it is not merely an assembly of learned ideas.
It is greater than the sum of it's parts, for it is processed and created
through a person's independent judgement (no matter how insignificant a role
it plays). Further, is metaphysics relevant in our learning of morality? Is
the transfer of knowledge between individuals subjected to the limitations of
our sensory perception? Yes, but not necessarily. Ideas can possibly be
communicated between persons without any loss of substance.
IMHO morality is not so much of a perception of external reality, but more of
a contemplation and invention of ideas to make sense of social complexities.
> Anyway, viewing morality as consisting of objective facts need not bind
> one to viewing moral reality as consisting problematic or weird sui
> generis moral facts. The moral realist is perfectly free to view moral
> reality as supervening on non-moral facts such as institutional facts,
> laws of reason (e.g. universalisation principles), functionalism, etc.
If such "moral reality" exists, it could not have originated from Man.
Individuals learns and develop morality as they grow, and if their morality
is not a product of their contemplation, that means some supernatural beings
is pushing buttons in their brain, uploading moral codes... wooah...
Ray Ng W.L.
Alvin Lim Cheng Hin wrote:
> If moral relativism of the individualistic variety is true, it is not
> simply that the agent 'cannot be mistaken about what is morally right', it
> is that what is morally right for him is what is morally right.
> <snip!>
Only if the "agent" is so naturally, absolutely bigoted that they totally
disregard what the rest of the world thinks. This is impossible, for morality
is learned, and learning implies a transfer of knowledege from another party.
When individuals perceive in others differing moral thinking, it is up to them
to accept, reject or re-think.
(Moral relativism does not entail the intellectual isolation of individuals.)
Moral relativism does not entail that some absolute, infallible morality
exists in individuals. Rather, each individual's morality is a direct result
of his/her contemplation and decisions, and an indirect result of his/her
social environment. Some individuals have similar morality, others
distinctive. No 'absolute morality' exists.
L.Angel
Maque <wg8...@cnsvax.albany.edu> wrote:
>Actually any aliens worth their salt should be travelling by "worm holes".
>Why would they need to travel in a physical craft at all?
The idea of "worm holes" is theoretical at best, Maque.
In any case you still NEED a physical vehicle to travel TO the worm
hole in the first place and wherever after you went thru.
Wom holes are like MRT stations or airports you can take it from one
fixed point to another. but it won't land you right outside The Burger
King at Penisular or right at your doorstep.
The little lost angel
And her featherhead's two cents worth of dreaminess. :)
100% Intel NOT inside, no Intel CPU, no Intel chipset
Email : an...@lovergirl.com
I'm not interested in any money making schemes, net purchases
or other services which are 99% irrelevant due to my location.
Ray Ng W.L.
Alvin Lim Cheng Hin wrote:
> If you've been following my posts, you should have realised that I'm
> adopting the moral realist claim that morality can be reduced to objective
> non-moral facts.
Do you really mean "facts"? Can it be described? Can an example be raised?
Or do you mean that Man's morality can be reduced to an existent that is
beyond Man's comprehension? Some kind of supernatural 'morality'?
alf
Ray Ng W.L. (r...@kami.com) wrote:
: Necessarily infallible? But I don't see why.
<snip!>
Well, this point was meant as a criticism against moral relativism on the
basis of the individual agent. Such relativism states that whatever the
individual moral agent perceives to be morally right is indeed what is
morally right. Hence the agent (by definition) cannot be wrong about what
he perceives, i.e. since whatever the moral agent perceives to be morally
right is indeed what is morally right, it is impossible that the agent can
ever be mistaken. That is, it cannot be the case that something the agent
perceives to be morally right is in fact morally wrong, since whatever the
agent perceives to be morally right is indeed what is morally right.
: Morality is not an external phenomenon that individuals perceive through
: senses. It is conceived in our minds.
This is precisely what you have to show.
: Further, is metaphysics relevant in our learning of morality?
<snip!>
I'm not sure that the ontological status of morality is important for the
*learning* of morality, but it is an important issue in the study of
morality, since this issue is crucial for problems such as the question of
whether morality is indeed relative.
: > Anyway, viewing morality as consisting of objective facts need not bind
: > one to viewing moral reality as consisting problematic or weird sui
: > generis moral facts. The moral realist is perfectly free to view moral
: > reality as supervening on non-moral facts such as institutional facts,
: > laws of reason (e.g. universalisation principles), functionalism, etc.
: If such "moral reality" exists, it could not have originated from Man.
: Individuals learns and develop morality as they grow, and if their morality
: is not a product of their contemplation, that means some supernatural beings
: is pushing buttons in their brain, uploading moral codes... wooah...
This is a problem only if one maintains the dogma that morality is the
product of the mind.
But the moral realist can argue that morality is simply supervenient on
non-moral facts, facts which are objective and can be observed and
studied, i.e. facts which are not mysterious at all.
The moral realist has no need to appeal to the supernatural or some other
mysterious realm in order to explain how morality can be objective.
alf
: > If moral relativism of the individualistic variety is true, it is not
: > simply that the agent 'cannot be mistaken about what is morally right', it
: > is that what is morally right for him is what is morally right.
: Only if the "agent" is so naturally, absolutely bigoted that they totally
: disregard what the rest of the world thinks.
<snip!>
This is not a consequence of the nature of the moral agent, this is a
direct consequence of moral relativism of the individualistic variety.
This variety of moral relativism simply states that that which is morally
right is precisely what the moral agent perceives to be morally right.
This means that the moral agent is necessarily infallible about his
perceptions of what is morally right, since by definition it cannot be the
case that what the moral agent perceives to be morally right is in fact
morally wrong.
VeryNiceGuy
Thong Wei Koh wrote:
>
> In article <MOD$980326...@sintercom.org>, VeryNiceGuy
> <ngso...@pacific.net.sg> writes
> >but if you have already assumed that morality is relative, what is the
> >use of the example?
>
> Err.. Read again. I said: `give me one example of how morality, any
> morality (yours), would not be captured by a moral code'. Nothng about
> relative morality here.
all the same: if our interface with morality is via moral codes, it
does not follow that moral codes capture all of reality. just like: i
communicate with you through words (interface). would you be able to
understand everything about me?
> I don't know if it is possible, but if you are unable to describe the
> concept in any form to any one else, then it is useless. Description
it is 'useless' to you (subjective). it is like presenting a $1000
dollar note to a hungry chicken. it is useless to the chicken, because
all it understands is grain. that does not mean it is useless.
> No you haven't. All your arguments are faulty and I have demonstrated
> why.
how so?
> Heh. Please read my previous post. You haven't a leg to stand on if
> you want to talk about /structure/.
how so?
--
--- -----------------------------------------
o--- / \ who is the champion of morals?
---| / \ who claims to be blameless?
--- | / * \ come, lets weigh all our
/ \ | ======= excreta on the perfect balance.
/***\ | -- Very Disinterested Guy
/*****\ | -----------------------------------------
======= | another quality quote from the
---------+--------- Very Nice Guy
VeryNiceGuy
Thong Wei Koh wrote:
>
....
> You see, your attempt here, by way of the example of the windmill, is
> flawed simply because exists S (windmill) is verifiable (at least what I
> understand to be commonly accepted as existing physically, and
> conflating `exists' with physical existence). Thus you come to the
> conclusion that the rule must be wrong since exists S is verifiable.
"verifiable" is not the same as "true". there is a limit to what human
logic can prove or disprove.
well if we are hinging the validity of the argument on whether S is
verifiable, then we are back to square one. but, i am sure you will
agree with me, the rule is not applicable in all cases ("physical" or
otherwise). but at least "physical").
so you make a distinction between "physical" and "non-physical". we
could start off at a tangent on what is "physical", ...
but sticking to the topic, our "S" (morality) is here being intangible,
has very little hope of being verifiable or falsifiable by human logic.
so still undecidable.
...
> Yeah, why not. Ok. First define for my what physical existence is.
> Would you be happy to accept that I, and the rest of the world, am not a
> figment of your imagination? If you say no, then forget about the whole
good. you are careful.
> exercise and carrying on dreaming. If you say yes, then would you
> accept the physical reality of physical sense such as sight and touch?
good. you are also careful here.
> If your answer is still yes, then we are in business: Go out in the
> garden and touch the grass and soil. Yes. That's part of earth. If
> you like, you can hide away on the next ariane rocket and view the earth
> from space.
so, you are relying on senses. could it be, regarding morality, humans
don't seem to be equipped with such senses, or have differing ability to
perceive morally?
> No. They are faulty simply because there are different provable
> propositions in your analogies that have no parallels in the actual
> discussion. Read the above.
"provable" is not the same as "truth". so we may be discussing one of
those 'undecidables' ...
alf
Ray Ng W.L. (r...@kami.com) wrote:
: Do you really mean "facts"? Can it be described? Can an example be
: raised?
Well, I've been arguing that one good candidate for this can be the
institutional facts of those institutions which complement and promote
human flourishing.
Of course there are different views on what consitutes human flourishing,
but this by no means entails that human flourishing cannot be objective.
Other candidates for such a non-moral objective foundation for morality to
supervene on include the laws of rationality, and linked to this, those
deep principles (e.g. universalisation principles, utilitarian principles)
which can be seen to underly the diversity of moral codes which exist.
: Or do you mean that Man's morality can be reduced to an existent that is
: beyond Man's comprehension? Some kind of supernatural 'morality'?
No. The epistemic status of these non-moral objective facts which underly
morality is irrelevant to the question of moral realism. Some may want to
argue that these facts can never be known to the agent; others may want to
argue that these facts can and are known to the agent. I personally don't
see any reason why the agent cannot know these facts.
VeryNiceGuy
Thong Wei Koh wrote:
>
...
> the argument, you need to persuade me that the analogy provides an
> adequate model. All I see is the attempt to reconcile two uses of the
> word `relative' (or relativity). Hardly convincing.
relative in the sense that different people hold different views or
opinions ...
...
> Ah.. But you can actually see and go up and touch the windmill. That
> makes verifies its physical existence. The rest of the story is about
if i want to be nasty, i could say everything is an illusion. even my
senses.
for someone of that conviction, there is ABSOLUTELY NO WAY someone else
can convince him/her otherwise. but i'm a very nice guy ... heh heh :)
> description. The problem with morality is that we can't start to touch
> it or see it in any way. The only way we can talk about it is by
> description. You can see the problem now. It is almost impossible to
> define a frame of reference if the descriptions themselves are
> subjective and there is nothing physical to pin anything on.
>
i think that is the difficulty when talking about morality. it is so
intangible.
how to settle the question? refer to Autolycus' recent post.
VeryNiceGuy
Autolycus wrote:
>
> BEGINQUOTE
> *v...@letterbox.com wrote:
> >the case for 'relative' morality is even worse. it's like saying:
> >because everybody in this world sees the earth as flat in his/her locale
> >and see different views and terrains, therefore there is no world.
> ENDQUOTE
>
> Disingenuous.
was i trying to bite more than i could chew? perhaps.
> Relativity is perfectly OK for morality - we see what we call morality or
> ethics or virtues or whatever, but they do not imply an absolute or
> objective morality. They only would seem to imply that something of
> greater simplicity (a fundament) or greater complexity (the Infinite) is
> at the root of these things, and only because we generally have this
> desire to make sense out of things which do not necessarily make sense.
good one. as hinted in my earlier post, my analogies are not proofs.
the relativistic arguments do not seem to hold water either. i think
you are right in taling about "making sense out of things". after all,
if you think about it, extrapolating an objective reality is what we do
all the time. when we "walk past a car" say, our view of the car
changes. but we do not think it is a different car every step we walk.
> As a Christian, I believe in absolute morality not because I can reason
> that it is so, but because I choose to believe in what is essentially a
> matter of FAITH. [All of us believe in certain matters of faith - for
> some, it is that the universe may be described fruitfully (or apprehended,
> or circumscribed) by laws and definitions.]
good and brave answer. i tried not to introduce "religious" elements in
my arguments so as to be "objective". but neither the "objective" camp
nor the "relativistic" camp could argue their case by logic alone. as
hinted earlier, i mentioned that there are limits to what mankind can
know, understand and prove i.e. what we can know, understand and prove
is a subset of all truth. to fill up the gap, we have to rely on
revealed truth - which we either accept or reject - as a matter of
faith.
but i don't believe that morality is a man-made thing. my definition of
morals involve behaviour, speech, conduct. it is about right vs wrong,
regardless of any social/moral/legal codes or convention. any being
(human or otherwise), as long as he/she/it is capable of volition
(choice) morality is involved.
> As a scientist, I believe in absolute morality because I hate meaningless
> jumbles of data points and HOPE that there is an underlying pattern which
> we codify as a body of laws.
good one!
> As a philosopher, I LOVE screwing around with people's minds.
yes! bull's eye!
> There you have it: Faith, Hope and Love - these three abide, and the
> greatest of these is Love.
>
> *grin*
first your diversive discussion on Roman law. seemed pretty lame. i
countered with the Chinese concept. then you wait for blind fools to try
to argue their way out hopelessly ... and now you are back with this.
you surely know how to save the best for last.
i think this is the best, clearest, honest, honest-to-goodness,
insightful post on this subject. and it deserves honour. ready? here
we go:-
baris! se-di.......ya!
lu-so .... sen-ja.....ta!
hormat kepada Autolycus ....
hormat sen-ja.....ta!
<band music on>
Thong Wei Koh
>can the language of moral codes encapsulate all of morality? it is like
>saying our finite number of words can capture all possible concepts,
>nuances and meanings and all there is to know, which may be infinite.
>also, i find this untenable not least due to the limitations of mankind.
Just to make sure - how do you `know' that there are `infinite' concepts
out there. It is not the number of alphabets that is the issue or the
number of words. It is the number of combinations that we are
interested in. Do we have that many? How many natural numbers are
there? Besides, the issue is not about representation, but whether we
can reason about a collection of infinite amount of information. We
can, for some classes of such collections.
What you should be aiming for are statements that may be true about our
system of language that we cannot prove within our language. Something
along the lines of the Godel's incompleteness theorem. I grant you that
much. Still, we can launch ourselves into another debate whether we
think in a language or something else altogether (ala whatever mechanism
proposed in Penrose's book)
<snip>
>so i believe if one says moral codes express all there is to morality,
>one is walking on thin ice.
Well, explain what is morality to me. My position, or conjecture, is
that it is possible to describe morals in terms of codes of behaviour.
Whether or not it is a plausible conjecture depends on whether I am
refuted. As of now, I have seen no counterexample to my conjecture. I
am not saying that it is `true', I am saying that it is the most
sensible conjecture. I challenge you to provide me a counterexample.
Do you remember Harvey (II) the invisible dragon I tried to sell to
Brett? Well, your morality is something like Harvey. Perhaps sometime
in the future, someone may invent a pair of special spectacles that can
see him (He is a `he', I can assure you). Until then, I am sorry to say
that if I cannot demonstrate his existence, then not many people will
buy him.
>further, if one's mind is shut and thinks moral codes is the be all and
>end all of morality
As of now, it is the most plausible proposition about what morality is.
--
Thong Wei Koh
Thong Wei Koh
In article <MOD$980326...@sintercom.org>, Alvin Lim Cheng Hin
<ch...@merlion.singnet.com.sg> writes
>This is my conclusion; this claim is not assumed in my argument. I examine
>the diversity of moral codes and determine that there are deeper objective
>moral principles on which these are built on. Hence I conclude that
>cultural diversity, as manifest in the diversity of moral codes, does not
>entail moral relativism.
Ok. Please educate all of us and state these `deeper objective moral
principles'.
>My point is that these objective principles can be seen as the non-moral
>objective foundations on which morality supervenes.
I accept that as well. But these objective common desires may only be
satisfied by different means for cultures in different physical
realities. You see, you have only identified on part of the equation.
Morals are adapted to achieve these objective foundations, but they are
influenced to a large part by circumstance.
>Surely you can see the problem in this. If morality can be reduced to the
>moral code a society holds, as relativism would claim, then genocide or
>murder would be morally right if a society's moral code deems it to be so.
>One would expect that (or at least hope that) the wrongness of genocide
>and murder is objectively true rather than being merely relative to the
>moral codes of different societies.
That is not a problem. What you `object' to does not necessarily mean
that everyone else should. Genocide and murder might be immoral to us
and the majority of the world, but you cannot deny that there are others
who believe it is their moral duty to rid the world of `X' etc. That
fact is true. You cannot fault relativism for the need of mine, or
yours for that matter, to ensure that that our basic desire to survive
is not violated by these people.
Whether or not the moral reprehensibility of genocide or murder is an
objective truth needs to be argued out and put forth to the `offending'
party. I suspect it is not all that difficult. But I stressed that
this is easy only because the experiences we had with such transgressors
are limited to those who share significant physical and social realities
with us.
>No. I claim this because I have argued that the diversity in moral codes
>is shallow and can be seen to reflect objective moral principles.
Please state your objective moral principles first so that we have a
common ground to start more constructive discussions.
--
Thong Wei Koh
Thong Wei Koh
In article <MOD$980327...@sintercom.org>, Alvin Lim Cheng Hin
<ch...@merlion.singnet.com.sg> writes
>I recall explaining that the semantic diversity of 'flourishing' does not
>entail anything ontologically.
You mean you stated your opinion that this is so. It is my opinion that
the above, semantic diversity of `flourishing', has an impact on the
development of morality.
>Um... I can simply describe them as propositions. Morality need not solely
>be described in terms of moral codes.
Yes. You can describe them in any form, or even employ symbolism. My
problem is not that I refuse to accept that there are other methods of
expressing morality; My point is that it is possible to encoded these
as moral codes.
>This is simply because my argument does not require morality to be of the
>sui generis indescribable sort.
Oh. You have a Harvey as well.
>If you've been following my posts, you should have realised that I'm
>adopting the moral realist claim that morality can be reduced to objective
>non-moral facts.
Ok. But I would ask you to describe what those `objective non-moral
facts' are. I suspect that those `facts' are contingent on the
environment an individual or a society finds himself/itself to be in.
Somewhere deep in all of that is the concept of `desirability' -
desirability of outcome etc. Certain basic physical desires may be
universal - sexual, and survival instincts are undeniable. Even if you
have identified some common desirabilities, there are other `objective
facts' perculiar to certain physical experience of cultures to adopt
different approaches to satisfying those desires.
--
Thong Wei Koh
L.Angel
Why argue about this universal morality question?
Somebody gave a relative objective moral rule to this a long long time
ago.
Relative objective, ok some of you probably think I have no idea what
I'm talking about, but that's the best way to describe it. It's an
objective set of rules but the considerations are all relative to the
subject in question.
The morality of any action is the motivation behind it, hence the
universal morality rule looks at the motive, not the act.
A cannibal who kills another person for food is not motivated by any
desire to inflict pain or suffering upon a fellow human being, as far
as he knows it is perfectly acceptable to hunt and eat fellow human
beings. Just as he would not be surprised if some other cannibal comes
up and sticks him with their dinner spear. By the laws that he knows,
he has not done anything immoral, even if it was some modern man that
he had for dinner.
A modern doctor who saves a man so as to get the patient to help him
murder a rival has immoral motivations as his final objective is to
murder another human being. By the laws that he knows of his society
and profession, murder is not acceptable, even if he saves ten
thousand lives for the sole final objective of that single murder.
Let a man be judged by his motives against the highest set of laws
that he knows. That I feel is The universal morality rule.
Thong Wei Koh
In article <MOD$980327...@sintercom.org>, alf
<art5...@leonis.nus.sg> writes
>The moral realist has no need to appeal to the supernatural or some other
>mysterious realm in order to explain how morality can be objective.
Well, please explain then, in your own words, how morality can be
objective. This is the crux of the matter and it is no good simply
making that assertion again and again.
--
Thong Wei Koh
alf
Thong Wei Koh (t...@potash.demon.co.uk) wrote:
: Well, please explain then, in your own words, how morality can be
: objective.
<snip!>
Please refer to one of my other follow-ups, where I've explained this. (I
think this has been approved but so far it's not reached the NUS news
server yet...)
Ray Ng W.L.
alf wrote:
> Ray Ng W.L. (r...@kami.com) wrote:
>
> : Do you really mean "facts"? Can it be described? Can an example be
> : raised?
>
> Well, I've been arguing that one good candidate for this can be the
> institutional facts of those institutions which complement and promote
> human flourishing.
An abstract example at best. Once you dwell deeper and attempt to
fully describe one such "institutional fact", I think you will
realise that it is, at best, partly true for all rational beings.
Or is it such that even you cannot comprehend these
"institutional facts"?
> Of course there are different views on what consitutes human flourishing,
> but this by no means entails that human flourishing cannot be objective.
"Human flourishing" is not an external existent perceived by man.
If Man's /idea/ of "human flourishing" can be objective (such it
is true not only to you, but to all), despite Man's diversed
opinions, then such an objective idea must be beyond Man's full
comprehension. Are you saying that "human flourishing" is not a
human idea? Or are you refering to a consensus?
> Other candidates for such a non-moral objective foundation for morality to
> supervene on include the laws of rationality, and linked to this, those
> deep principles (e.g. universalisation principles, utilitarian principles)
> which can be seen to underly the diversity of moral codes which exist.
This is what you call "moral realism"? A hierarchical breakdown
of "morality" into our fundamental senses? According to your
"realism", universal morality exists independent of our thinking,
but oops only it is NOT actually morality, but some pieces of
"non-moral objective facts".
> : Or do you mean that Man's morality can be reduced to an existent that is
> : beyond Man's comprehension? Some kind of supernatural 'morality'?
>
> No. The epistemic status of these non-moral objective facts which underly
> morality is irrelevant to the question of moral realism. Some may want to
> argue that these facts can never be known to the agent; others may want to
> argue that these facts can and are known to the agent. I personally don't
> see any reason why the agent cannot know these facts.
So basically, you think that morality is derived from these
non-moral objective facts, but you find it irrelevant that they
be comprehensible/perceptible to you? Great argument this is,
that subscribing to
realism allows one to dream up whatever abstract,
incomprehensible constructs as supervening whatever that can be
supervened. And all this while disclaiming any application of
supernaturality.
Thong Wei Koh
In article <MOD$980327...@sintercom.org>, VeryNiceGuy
<ngso...@pacific.net.sg> writes
>all the same: if our interface with morality is via moral codes, it
>does not follow that moral codes capture all of reality. just like: i
>communicate with you through words (interface). would you be able to
>understand everything about me?
If you agree with me that morality can be explored by moral codes as
much as the effect of gravity can be `felt' by/ or have an effect on
physical bodies, then my work is done. Of course moral code and
morality are two different things. My point is that they are related
and that the former describes the second.
Whether morality has something else that moral code cannot capture is at
best a speculation. Why? Because I have not seen any example of this.
And since if you insist that I cannot be made to understand this
perculiar portion of morality either by words, pictures, use of senses
and experience, then it does not exist to me for all sense and purposes.
Note that we may never ever be able to capture all of the physical
`laws' of nature in mathematical form, but nevertheless they are there,
or could be verified to be there simply because they have a physical
effect at some level.
I am saying that I am continuing to hold the opinion that there is no
case for objective morality unless I am persuaded that there is a reason
for its creation to explain something that cannot be explained
otherwise.
>it is 'useless' to you (subjective). it is like presenting a $1000
>dollar note to a hungry chicken. it is useless to the chicken, because
>all it understands is grain. that does not mean it is useless.
Not quite. The chicken may not comprehend the meaning of that dollar
note, but the physical existence of that dollar note is still obvious to
it.
When I mean useless, I mean useless in the sense that there is no
conceivable way to experience or to manipulate it. Surely you can
imagine the chicken to peck at it, hold it in its beak and wave it
around.
>how so?
As far as logical structures and rules of reasoning are concerned, your
arguments are all flawed. If you insist that we should suspend
judgement on the truth value of the existence of an objective morality,
then you are moving towards intuitionism. Here, you are on shakier
ground as you have proposed that morality may not be possible for us to
comprehend or understand - ie. not verifiable or provable. The
suspension of judgement in intuitionism is more a matter of physical
limitation on the verification procedure. If you assert that it is
impossible, at all times, to sense morality, then it is necessarily so
that, for all time, every attempt to verify its existence will fail. As
such, with any accepted notion of existence, the existence of objective
morality is clearly false.
--
Thong Wei Koh
Thong Wei Koh
>supervene on include the laws of rationality, and linked to this, those
>deep principles (e.g. universalisation principles, utilitarian principles)
>which can be seen to underly the diversity of moral codes which exist.
I have no problems with such principles. But these principles do not
equate to morality. They suggest that there may be a rational argument
for certain morals and that they are not arbitrary. If you use the
principles to rationalize the existence of certain moral judgement in
some society, you will most likely find that you will need to make
certain assumptions about the physical circumstance that the society is
situated in.
What you are suggesting in your paragraph is something completely
different. You are suggesting that there is an objective morality.
Then instead of showing proof that there is an objective morality, you
proceeded to quote principles that purport to explain the diversity of
moral codes. Do these argument support the existence of an objective
morality? I see no attempt to even show this. Worse, your paragraph
suggests something else altogether:
You said; `Other candidates for such a non-moral objective foundation
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
for morality to supervene on include the laws of rationality, and linked
^^^^!!!!!!!!
to this, those deep principles..', ie. morality can be explained by
these principles, and then carry on to say that these principles
'underly the diversity of moral codes which exist.'
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^!!!!!!!!!!!^^^^^^^^^^^
Are you agreeing finally that moral codes reflect morals as suggested in
your paragraph? Perhaps you have committed an error. Please clarify.
--
Thong Wei Koh
Thong Wei Koh
>right is precisely what the moral agent perceives to be morally right.
You forget to qualify that: What is morally right to the agent is
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
precisely what the agent perceives to be morally right.
>This means that the moral agent is necessarily infallible about his
>perceptions of what is morally right, since by definition it cannot be the
>case that what the moral agent perceives to be morally right is in fact
>morally wrong.
I see no problem with this. The moral agent is infallible with respect
to his own perception of moral rightness, but that may contradict codes
of conduct/moral, whatever, that the society may hold.
Thus, your reply to the post where it was suggested that:
a moral agent may be `bigoted' enough to ignore the opinions of
the rest of the world
is confusing as the statement above is entirely coherent. The moral
agent in question here is judged to be `bigoted' by `the rest of the
world' (I take it to be a general concensus).
You have committed this mistake twice in two posts. I repeat: in the
context of moral relativism, the idea of moral rightness or wrongness is
relative. Therefore, when you suggest that there is something wrong
with saying someone is `bigoted' in the context of moral relativism, you
are confusing `moral rightness' to be a universally accepted notion
which is nonsensical within the system of moral relativism.
--
Thong Wei Koh
Ray Ng W.L.
alf wrote:
> <snip!>
> Hence the agent (by definition) cannot be wrong about what
> he perceives, i.e. since whatever the moral agent perceives to be morally
> right is indeed what is morally right, it is impossible that the agent can
> ever be mistaken.
> <snip!>
I don't understand why you are so fixated on your definition of
moral relativism. I have reiterated that the essence of moral
relativism is the LACK of such absolute, infallible morality!
Moral relativism does not require each man to live on his own
island, Alvin.
Moral relativism does NOT entail that some absolute, infallible
morality exists in individuals. Rather, each individual's
morality is a direct result of his/her contemplation and
decisions, and an indirect result of his/her social environment.
Some individuals have similar morality, others distinctive. No
'absolute morality' exists.
I repeat - no 'absolute morality' exists, that's the essence of
relativistic morality.
> : Morality is not an external phenomenon that individuals perceive through
> : senses. It is conceived in our minds.
>
> This is precisely what you have to show.
Your morality is NOT conceived in your mind? Well then, show me
where.
I'm not sure you read, but I have elaborated that morality is
learned and developed in our mind, as we go through cycles of
knowledge acquisition, contemplation and decision-making.
> This is a problem only if one maintains the dogma that morality is the
> product of the mind.
Is your morality a product of your own contemplation? Or is it
someone/something else's?
> But the moral realist can argue that morality is simply supervenient on
> non-moral facts, facts which are objective and can be observed and
> studied, i.e. facts which are not mysterious at all.
A casuistic realist can argue that whatever abstract construct
can supervene whatever that can be supervened. If you argue, as
realism, that universal morality exists independent of man's
thinking, fine. But oops, only now you are saying that this
"universal morality" is actually NOT morality, but a set of
"non-moral facts".
> The moral realist has no need to appeal to the supernatural or some other
> mysterious realm in order to explain how morality can be objective.
Your "objective morality" is certain mysterious, considering how
you are unable to describe it beyond abstract propositions.
Thong Wei Koh
>those 'undecidables' ...
I see you point here, but you have stated things quite badly. You see,
I am an intuitionist in the logical sense of the word - ie. I conflate
construction with truth. The classical idea of `truth' is something
else altogether. Even so, I find your outright assertion that there is
an objective morality troubling because
1. There is not even a classical proof for that (ie. arguments that
may include rules like reductio-ad-absurdum etc)
2. There is no viable reason to even need an object morality.
Of course you can believe that there is a flying unicorn somewhere in
the universe that may one day be discovered that has completely
controlled all our actions as a game. The test of whether we should
even bother to consider such possibilities is whether there is a
compelling reason, a hole we need to fill with such an assumption. At
this moment in time, I regret to say that I have not seen any arguments
to support the need for an objective morality.
As with your arguments for using the windmill as an appropriate analogy,
the fact that `S' exists (in the conventional sense of the word)
automatically invalidates the rule (that different views imply S does
not exists). I am pointing out that the rule is an entirely valid in
the general case. Whether or not objective morality `really' exists is
not really in question here since we cannot verify its existence, as
such I am entitled to deduce that from the rule that S does not exist.
You cannot object to the deduction because
`S' is not proven. You cannot object to it because its truth
value (even classically) has not been decided.
You can only object to the assumption of the rule, which is still a
reasonable assumption. Note that the whole deduction is contingent on
the discovery of the existence of S which would invalidate the
reasoning. I fully accept that. But if you insist to be fixated about
structure, and not content, this is how it should be seen.
--
Thong Wei Koh
Ray Ng W.L.
alf wrote:
> This is not a consequence of the nature of the moral agent, this is a
> direct consequence of moral relativism of the individualistic variety.
>
> This variety of moral relativism simply states that that which is morally
> right is precisely what the moral agent perceives to be morally right.
You're not hearing me, but your own definition of moral
relativism, Alvin. To repeat what I said in my previous post...
IMO, moral relativism does not entail that some absolute,
infallible morality exists in individuals. Rather, each
individual's morality is a direct result of his/her contemplation
and decisions, and an indirect result of his/her social
environment. Some individuals have similar morality, others
distinctive. No 'absolute morality' exists.
No 'absolute morality' exists. Such is the essence of moral
relativism, IMHO.
VeryNiceGuy
L.Angel wrote:
>
> Why argue about this universal morality question?
> Somebody gave a relative objective moral rule to this a long long time
> ago.
i was the idiot who started this tangential thread.
it seems that in this world, those with the guns, the power and the
money have the greatest say on what morality is. so morality seems to
be relative. attractive though this view may be, i think it is
superficial and i am convinced otherwise.
so we have gone round a few big circles, making forays into the poorly
charted realms of philosopical enquiry. now ... erm ... back to the
nagging questions:-
is bond-breaking immoral in and of itself?
or does it depend on the motives?
what constitutes the promise in the scholarship contract?
are there higher principles with which to evaluate this issue?
Autolycus
BEGINQUOTE
* Thong Wei Koh <t...@potash.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>Well, please explain then, in your own words, how morality can be
>objective. This is the crux of the matter and it is no good simply
>making that assertion again and again.
One presumes that this is a philosophical troll of some sort(?)
Morality can be objective as much as anything else can be objective.
However, from the various viewpoints expressed here, one tends to see that
most are agreed that morality is a human thing (including myself); it is
NOT the same as good and evil. If human, obviously not objective.
If one were to assume that morality could be objective, surely one would
be postulating an absolutely correct code of conduct. This code of conduct
would have to be immutable and consistent. It need not have to apply to
any other being, since humans are qualified (in the experiential sense) to
debate only human thought, but would have to be rationally apprehended by
all - and those unable to apprehend it would have to be readily seen as
lacking in something fundamental.
Now, I'm perfectly aware that I have left too many terms undefined. I'm
also sure that a comprehensive statement defining the situation is beyond
anyone's competence, since an aboslute, immutable, consistent code of
conduct would have to be able to cope with any possible variant and hence
be larger than the what it describes - which is human behaviour. And if
larger than human behaviour, probably larger than human capacity to reason
as well, and hence not capable of apprehension.
The converse is not true. A code of morality which escapes our reasoning
ability is not necessarily absolute, just darned big or strange or...
Heh, we might even attribute it to the Divine.
Summary: it doesn't matter. The objective nature of morality is less
useful to us than the objective nature of physics - and as difficult to
prove on closer examination.
See my earlier post on why I believe...
Autolycus
--
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Autolycus
>limitation on the verification procedure. If you assert that it is
>impossible, at all times, to sense morality, then it is necessarily so
>that, for all time, every attempt to verify its existence will fail. As
>such, with any accepted notion of existence, the existence of objective
>morality is clearly false.
BEGINTIRADE
Aiyoh, such a bad flaw in reasoning cannot go unpunished! Inability to
detect does not imply false. That's a false negative! One of the most
basic errors! Unforgivable!
ENDTIRADE
Actually, no experiment is perfectly reproducible. As such, we can say
that the entire sum of human knowledge exists based on things which are
close enough to fudge, but they do not necessarily confirm truth.
That's why, Thong Wei, your position is equally shaky although apparently
more sound. The scientific method, one of your main tools, can only
disprove, not confirm. Similarly, all forms of logic are able to
manipulate entities but not affirm or deny them, unless they are closed to
the existence of such entities in the first place.
I'm actually beginning to believe (heh-heh, the 'b' word) that my serene
position of faith is the most useful one there is...
*grin*
Autolycus
--
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/ 3b-'-':| ==========================================================
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C |:::::; * Therefore: Knowledge Corrupts *
`( \ _`::; * So: Censorship. *
~`\`\::; * Ignorance is Bliss. *
`~~' **********************************************************
Ray Ng W.L.
Autolycus wrote:
> BEGINTIRADE
> Aiyoh, such a bad flaw in reasoning cannot go unpunished! Inability to
> detect does not imply false. That's a false negative! One of the most
> basic errors! Unforgivable!
> ENDTIRADE
Hmmm curious... but if failure to detect does not imply non-existence, then it
means everything exists, and nothing don't? And if you say that neither does
it imply the contrary (that it exists), then what exist, and what doesn't?
Thong Wei Koh
In article <MOD$98033...@sintercom.org>, Autolycus
<auto...@pacific.net.sg> writes
>One presumes that this is a philosophical troll of some sort(?)
Heh. Not quite. It was a honest question, albeit a very hard one.
>Morality can be objective as much as anything else can be objective.
I don't see how you can assert that? How can `everything' else be
objective? Please explain. `Objective' morality presumably describes
some canonical set of moral values that should be applicable, or
accepted universally to all moral agents. The question is whether that
is possible. Of course, one has to state clearly how we can measure or
talk about morals (thus debate about moral codes), and then seek to find
out how morals came to be. Once you settle these with some general
acceptance, you then start to explain if it was possible that moral
values would be universal.
>And if
>larger than human behaviour, probably larger than human capacity to reason
>as well, and hence not capable of apprehension.
Ahh. The incomprehension lemma. :)
There is actually a way out of this whole nonsense. You see, when we
argue about whether an `objective morality' exists, everyone else
assumed that I was challenging the proponents to give an example of one
or argue that one alreay exists. In fact, what I was saying is that
1. I acknowledge that since we are similar biological creatures with
common biological needs, then 2. if somehow it was possible to reconcile
the different physical circumstances that different cultures find
themselves in (create a ideal superculture that share a common physical
reality), then an objective morality is possible.
--
Thong Wei Koh
Thong Wei Koh
>detect does not imply false. That's a false negative! One of the most
>basic errors! Unforgivable!
Not entirely correct. If there is a possibility of detection, then
there is hope. But if it is posited that it is IMPOSSIBLE to detect a
thing, then there is no possible verification procedure. Thus, proof of
existence will NEVER be possible. That is the difference. To
illustrate this: I cannot claim that there is no winged unicorn in the
universe because it is possible to verify it by sight etc when I find
it, but I can say that Harvey doesn't exist if I claimed that all known
and future physical tests will not detect Harvey.
Heh. Caught you there.
>The scientific method, one of your main tools, can only
>disprove, not confirm.
It depends on what you want to confirm. There are things that you can
confirm, like the commutativity of the arithmetic addition operator.
You mean to apply your observation to experimental science. Still, the
margin of tolerance with regards to duplication of experiments is
`infinitely' more acceptable than the erratic record for the
verification of any notion of a divine power.
--
Thong Wei Koh
Autolycus
BEGINQUOTE
* v...@letterbox.com wrote:
>is bond-breaking immoral in and of itself?
>or does it depend on the motives?
>what constitutes the promise in the scholarship contract?
>are there higher principles with which to evaluate this issue?
1. Bond-breaking is not intrinsically immoral.
It depends on what bond you are breaking, and how.
2. Does it depend on the motives? It doesn't matter.
If bond-breaking were intrinsically immoral, it would always be bad to
break a bond. But all that talk on the absence of objective morality would
seem to say that nothing can be intrinsically immoral. Hence, it is never
always bad.
If you look at my summary of 1., the bond and the means of termination are
at issue, not the motive. Only the payback differs. Murder is murder. It
is always 'bad' (in a human waste, non-moral sort of way). Motive may
ameliorate or mitigate another's views on it, but murder is always 'bad'.
Of course, that does not negate the fact that other things can be worse.
So we can justify a 'bad' thing by saying that other things are worse,
thus making 'bad' relatively 'good'.
That's just an example. It all boils down to DPM Lee Hsien Loong. What he
says appears to define morality for our sycophantic masses and amorality
for the rest.
3. Only what's on the paper. And maybe less.
All the rest is vapour. This newsgroup has debunked objective moral
standards enough for me to decide that the majority would prefer to reason
that way. Hence we owe nobody anything except what DPM Lee says is written
on the paper. Remember, we have a judiciary which reasons as follows: "If
a clause allows this undesirable thing to occur, it cannot be interpreted
right, because we would never have put such a silly clause in. And we
should therefore issue a clarification, no matter how it distorts sense;
failing which, of course, we rewrite the law to reflect what we think it
should be."
4. No higher principles.
They are irrelevant to DPM Lee. After all, he is the one (well, his father
too) who believes in pragmatism as a higher principle... but pragmatism
(from Gk 'praxis') just means doing whatever secures advantage. So
bond-breaking can be assessed in whatever way you want, as long as you
'win'. If the government 'loses' however, it is a bad sport.
Why don't we make this a working document, and get Alvin, Brett, CWiz,
Edmund, LAngel, Sophus, Thong Wei... etc to work on it until we have
created an objective moral code... hahaha I was just joking there. OOPS, I
mean an object-oriented moral code.
Regards
Autolycus
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`( \ _`::; * Into the circle after dark and consumed by fire. *
Ray Ng W.L.
VeryNiceGuy wrote:
> i was the idiot who started this tangential thread.
Aren't you glad so many attended the party? :-)
> it seems that in this world, those with the guns, the power and the
> money have the greatest say on what morality is. so morality seems to
> be relative.
Morality is relativistic /not/ because of various groups' powers of
influence, but because morality stems from the contemplation of individuals.
> attractive though this view may be, i think it is
> superficial and i am convinced otherwise.
Convinced, but yet unable to comprehend this "universal morality"?
> so we have gone round a few big circles, making forays into the poorly
> charted realms of philosopical enquiry. now ... erm ... back to the
> nagging questions:-
Oh no not again... :-P
> is bond-breaking immoral in and of itself?
IMHO, No.
> or does it depend on the motives?
IMHO, Yes.
> what constitutes the promise in the scholarship contract?
IMHO, the scholar's genuine intention to work for the sponsor in exchange
for sponsorship of education, and the sponsor's genuine understanding that
the scholar's obligation to serve bond cannot be reasonably ruled supreme to
all possible obligations that may arise in the unforseeable future.
> are there higher principles with which to evaluate this issue?
Possibly, but not in terms of morality.
Regards,
L.Angel
>>so i believe if one says moral codes express all there is to morality,
>>one is walking on thin ice.
>Well, explain what is morality to me. My position, or conjecture, is
>that it is possible to describe morals in terms of codes of behaviour.
>Whether or not it is a plausible conjecture depends on whether I am
>refuted. As of now, I have seen no counterexample to my conjecture. I
>am not saying that it is `true', I am saying that it is the most
>sensible conjecture. I challenge you to provide me a counterexample.
-snip-
>>further, if one's mind is shut and thinks moral codes is the be all and
>>end all of morality
>As of now, it is the most plausible proposition about what morality is.
May I ask what your moral codes are? If they simply are described in
terms of codes of behaviour without concern to the motivations and
situation behind the acts, unless your code of behaviour includes
every conceivable combination of situations and motivations, I would
say it's the least plausible proposition about what morality is.
The little lost angel
And her featherhead's two cents worth of dreaminess. :)
100% Intel NOT inside, no Intel CPU, no Intel chipset
Email : Go figure out what to remove, I'm getting sick of spam
alf
Ray Ng W.L. (r...@kami.com) wrote:
: I have reiterated that the essence of moral relativism is the LACK of
: such absolute, infallible morality!
Moral absolutism argues that what is morally good/bad is morally good/bad
independent of the agent's perspective. Moral relativism argues that what
is morally good/bad is morally good/bad depending on the agent's
perspective. This is why there is no objective morality; morality varies
from agent to agent. The consequence is that since what is morally
good/bad depends on the agent's perspective, the agent necessarily cannot
be wrong in determining what is morally good/bad.
alf
[I'm reposting this as the first copy seems to have vanished.]
Thong Wei Koh (t...@potash.demon.co.uk) wrote:
: Alvin Lim Cheng Hin <ch...@merlion.singnet.com.sg> wrote:
: >I recall explaining that the semantic diversity of 'flourishing' does not
: >entail anything ontologically.
: You mean you stated your opinion that this is so. It is my opinion that
: the above, semantic diversity of `flourishing', has an impact on the
: development of morality.
It is standardly known that the semantic diversity of a term may simply
reflect its rich sense and has nothing to do with its reference. For
example, 'Venus' refers to Venus, even though it is also known as 'the
Morning Star' and 'the Evening Star'. Similarly, take 'water' and
'dihydrogen oxide'. While both terms refer to the same stuff, their
meanings cannot be the same, for while, say a caveman (or someone who
lived prior to the discovery of the chemical composition of water) knows
what 'water' is, he wouldn't know what 'dihyrogen oxide' is. Semantic
diversity does not entail ontological diversity. In the same way, while
'flourishing' may have many meanings, this does not mean that is referent
is similarly diverse. The onus is on you to demonstrate that the semantic
diversity of 'flourishing' does in fact entail a similar ontological
diversity for its referent.
: My problem is not that I refuse to accept that there are other methods
: of expressing morality; My point is that it is possible to encoded these
: as moral codes.
If you define a moral code to simply be a proposition which describes
morality, then this is trivial and there is no disagreement.
But I distinguish moral codes from propositions which describe morality. I
define moral codes to be those socially constructed rules of conduct which
regulate the moral life of the society.
While moral codes may describe morality, they may also describe non-moral
values, such as superstitions, social taboos, etc.
: Ok. But I would ask you to describe what those `objective non-moral
: facts' are.
There is no hegemonic agreement on what such facts consist of. Different
moral realists have different accounts of these facts. (Other moral
realists don't see morality as supervening on non-moral facts, their
accounts of moral realism are different.)
I follow those who argue that these facts are those which are of those
institutions which complement and promote human flourishing. Others argue
that the base on which morality supervenes are those objective principles
such as universalisation principles and utilitarian principles. An
investigation of the diversity moral codes shows that one can see these
codes as operating on these principles. In a similar vein, other moral
realists argue that morality consists in the rules of logical argument,
since rational moral argument is the distinctive feature of morality.
alf
Thong Wei Koh (t...@potash.demon.co.uk) wrote:
: You forget to qualify that: What is morally right to the agent is
: ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
: precisely what the agent perceives to be morally right.
This tautology does not fully describe moral relativism. Moral relativism
denies the claim of moral absolutism that moral values are independent of
the perceptions of the moral agent. Moral relativism claims that morality
varies from agent to agent, since moral values depend on each agent's
perspective. While it is true that what is morally right to the agent is
what the agent perceives to be morally right, moral relativism claims that
what is morally right is what is morally right to the agent.
alf
Thong Wei Koh (t...@potash.demon.co.uk) wrote:
: I have no problems with such principles. But these principles do not
: equate to morality.
The principles are the basis on which morality supervenes.
: Do these argument support the existence of an objective morality?
I am not arguing for the existence of some strange sui generis objective
morality. What I am arguing for is something altogether different.
: Are you agreeing finally that moral codes reflect morals as suggested in
: your paragraph?
Moral codes do reflect morals, and they also reflect non-moral values.
This is why I distinguish them. But moral codes are useful for
investigation as one can determine from them the deeper principles which
arguably form the basis for morality.
alf
Ray Ng W.L. (r...@kami.com) wrote:
: Hmmm curious... but if failure to detect does not imply non-existence,
: then it means everything exists, and nothing don't?
Unless you're an anti-realist, existence and knowledge of existence are
distinct notions. It is possible for something to exist which no agent is
aware of. The ontological extravagance which you fear is not a consequence
of this; all that this entails is that we simply don't know whether this
thing exists or not.