The ALLEGED Church of Science
Gordon Fitch
|>> [Scientists] think nothing of placing absolute faith in such concepts
|>>as time and space, and even empiricism. Empiricism is a metaphysical idea.
|>>The only "proof" that empiricism is "true" is empirical evidence. That's just
|>>like claiming that God is real because God said so. How many scientists are
|>>willing to accept the idea that the Scientific Method is not a totalitarian,
|>>absolutist "fact" of the universe, but an unproveable, metaphysical
|>>"religious" belief system that happens to be aesthetically pleasing to a vast
|>>number of people?
batc...@nssdca.gsfc.nasa.gov (Dave Batchelor, Space Phys. Data Facil. 301/286-2988) writes:
| >The rejection of empiricism as just another metaphysical, unproveable
| >belief has been pretty discredited. Philosophers left it behind decades
| >ago, when they couldn't solve the conundrums it posed and its irresistible
| >urge toward solipsism. ...
| > ... Science is not a matter of mere aesthetics. It's
| >endless comparison among objects manipulable by the hands as well as
| >the mind, to learn regularities and reliable rules for power over the
| >physical world. By denying that power, you just limit yourself, not
| >the rest of us. Good luck escaping from the hole that you have dug
| >for yourself with your doubts about the reality of scientific
| >achievements.
CZ36000 <CZ...@MUSICA.MCGILL.CA>:
| BRAVO!
The style of this discussion reminds me a lot of an old-time
argument between a cracker-barrel atheist and the local
Baptist preacher. The crowd down at the general store gets
uncomfortable as the atheist pokes holes in Christian
doctrine; then the minister responds with an orotund defense
of the faith which reassures every believer, and someone
shouts "A-men."
--
)*( Gordon Fitch )*( g...@panix.com )*(
CZ36
Style aside, what of the content?
__________________________________________________
"It's never too late for a little Ernest Gellner."
Pete W. Moore
cz...@Musica.McGill.CA
Gordon Fitch
| >The style of this discussion reminds me a lot of an old-time
| >argument between a cracker-barrel atheist and the local
| >Baptist preacher. The crowd down at the general store gets
| >uncomfortable as the atheist pokes holes in Christian
| >doctrine; then the minister responds with an orotund defense
| >of the faith which reassures every believer, and someone
| >shouts "A-men."
CZ36 <CZ...@MUSICA.MCGILL.CA>:
| "Uncomfortable," no. Amused, yes.
| Style aside, what of the content?
The content is beginning to remind me of twice-warmed frijoles
refritos. Christopher Ogden draws some interesting parallels
between the structures and metaphysics of science and various
religions. However, because science is a praxis which fits
into the metaphysics of several religious systems, at least one
of which contains a jealous monotheos, I would say it is not,
itself, a religion or a religious system.
CZ36000
Well I meant the content of Bachelor's comments to which I originally
voiced support. I don't find much disagreement here except on the
frijoles which are fine even old. So I respond with an AMEN.
Pete
Kenneth Mostern
My last post received no response. Perhaps I was not clear enough, I wrote
too quickly. I'll try again.
It makes no sense to discuss "science" or "religion" until one has recognized
them for what they are . . . *social institutions*. The existence or non-
existence of "facts" has nothing whatsoever to do with what "science" or
"religion" is. This is the obvious sense in which science and religion are
the same: like all social institutions, they have xplicit rules of initiation,
regulated means of challenging authority and allowing some change, within
bounds, serious participants who come up with creative explanations of phen-
omena, and power dynamics that suppress positions in ways that outsiders may
or may not see as appropriate. All versions of science and all versions of
religion reflect the biases and social locations (i.e. race, class, gender) of
their members; that is why it is not surprising that both scientific and
religious institutions have, historically, been at the forefront of promoting
racism and sexism (to give two examples) dogmatically; that is also why it
is not surprising that, in the second half of this century, both science and
religion have been instrumental in fighting racism and sexism.
Having said this, science and religion are, obviously, not the same. They
share characteristics that are general to social institutions; but they have
characteristics that are specific as well, characteristics that make them
more appealing to individuals depending on circumstance and rational
consideration. (I prefer science myself, in case you were wondering.) Even
this is not good enough: both "science" and "religion" refer to lots of
different and sometimes unrelated practices, and any real analysis of them
as specific practices has to disaggregate the terms. (For this reason, despite
my general preference for science I find it easy to prefer the American
Friends Service Committee to the Human Genome Project.)
Under many circumstances I am happy to explain why I trust "science". But in
order to do so I need to know exactly what I'm being asked to "trust". I
Haven't the slightest clue whether or not to trust the information in papers
written by my physicist brother-in-law, least of all when he argues against
someone else's position in his papers. I can't read his work; if he disagrees
with another physicist, and I say that I "believe" in science, what is it that
I believe in? Of course, if I go back again and say that science is first an
institution, than I can evaluate the institutional behavoir of Matt (my
brother-in-law), his understanding of the rules of his institution and his
professional attempt to make arguments within them. I can also explain why
my doctor probably knows what's going on in my body; it is certainly within
the interests of his institution and practice that he should. Basically, I
imagine that science is an institution with pretty good rules for describing
things. That makes it one of a number of such institutions.
I want it to be clear that this position is not intended to be "postmodern",
in the style of Christopher Ogden, because I don't see language as somehow
creating reality. Of course we organize our world through language, but to say
this is useless unless it is accompanied by the fact that there is a world to
be organized. Language is independent from that world, but our use of it is
not therefore arbitrary. Our already given social location is what allows us
certain uses of language (be they scientific, religious, theoretical, etc.)
[editing error I can't correct] and though we can change social positions and
we can't do so at will
--for many of us, who started at the bottom, it is a lifetime of work.
Nor is my position "empiricist". At no point can I claim that I simply observe things and they are or are not. All observance happens within pre-given social
institutions like science, religion, or social theory, my own professional
allegiance.
The old word for a position like this one was "dialectical", though peope
on both sides will undoubtedly be willing to tell me its been "discredited".
Marx may not have freed me, nor most of the world; I put no faith in the
future of socialist revolution. (Nor do I think it would be a bad idea.)
His legacy, however, continues to provide a useful method of mapping social
space, which is the intent of this argument.
Be seein' y'all later.
--
Kenny.
Ideas expressed in this posting probably come from some combination of reading
Karl Marx, Paulo Freire, bell hooks, Malcolm X, Frantz Fanon, and Emma Goldman.
Listening to too much James Brown and The Clash probably hasn't helped either.
The mistakes are, of course, all mine . . .
Dave Batchelor, Space Phys. Data Facil. 301/286-2988
>gcf:
>| >The style of this discussion reminds me a lot of an old-time
>| >argument between a cracker-barrel atheist and the local
>| >Baptist preacher. The crowd down at the general store gets
>| >uncomfortable as the atheist pokes holes in Christian
>| >doctrine; then the minister responds with an orotund defense
>| >of the faith which reassures every believer, and someone
>| >shouts "A-men."
>
>CZ36 <CZ...@MUSICA.MCGILL.CA>:
>| "Uncomfortable," no. Amused, yes.
>| Style aside, what of the content?
>
>refritos. Christopher Ogden draws some interesting parallels
>between the structures and metaphysics of science and various
>religions. However, because science is a praxis which fits
>into the metaphysics of several religious systems, at least one
>of which contains a jealous monotheos, I would say it is not,
>itself, a religion or a religious system.
Thank you! It is refreshing to see a debater in this news group
politely and honorably concede a point. There is so much
invective and preaching exchanged here.
Regards,
Dave
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. David Batchelor Space Science Data Operations Office Mail Code 632
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center Greenbelt MD 20771 USA
batc...@nssdca.gsfc.nasa.gov * personal opinions only, not NASA policy *
Theorem: Consider the set of all sets that have never been considered.
Hey! They're all gone!! Oh, well, never mind...
gerry harbison
>It makes no sense to discuss "science" or "religion" until one has recognized
>them for what they are . . . *social institutions*.
This in itself is contentious. If I were to define science, it
would be something along the lines of `a process using empirical
methods to determine the truth about the natural world'. Although I
agree with Popper about the pointlessness of arguments about
definition.
I don't think most scientists regard science as a social institution
at all.
> The existence or non-
>existence of "facts" has nothing whatsoever to do with what "science"or
>"religion" is. This is the obvious sense in which science and religion are
>the same: like all social institutions, they have xplicit rules of initiation,
>regulated means of challenging authority and allowing some change, within
>bounds, serious participants who come up with creative explanations of phen-
>omena, and power dynamics that suppress positions in ways that outsiders may
>or may not see as appropriate.
Again, as a scientist I almost totally disagree with this.
Science is not a social institution. While groups of scientists may
have initiation rituals, procedures and power dynamics, IMO these are
ephemera.
There are classic examples of people coming from outside the
scientific establishment revolutionising scientific thought. Gregor
Mendel is one example. Mendel was a scientist par excellence; the
world regarded him as a monk.
>All versions of science and all versions of
>religion reflect the biases and social locations (i.e. race, class, gender) of
>their members; that is why it is not surprising that both scientific and
>religious institutions have, historically, been at the forefront of promoting
>racism and sexism (to give two examples) dogmatically; that is also why it
>is not surprising that, in the second half of this century, both science and
>religion have been instrumental in fighting racism and sexism.
Can you provide some examples of how science has been at the
forefront of promoting racism and sexism? Bastardized genetics and
racist physiologists were involved in Nazi-ism, for example, but
these are examples of the corruption of science by politics, not
examples of science at work. In general, science as a process has
rejected politically inspired ideas.
>Under many circumstances I am happy to explain why I trust "science". But in
>order to do so I need to know exactly what I'm being asked to "trust". I
>Haven't the slightest clue whether or not to trust the information inpapers
>written by my physicist brother-in-law, least of all when he argues against
>someone else's position in his papers. I can't read his work; if he disagrees
>with another physicist, and I say that I "believe" in science, what is it that
>I believe in?
One would be foolish to trust that which one does not have
knowledge of. I think placing trust in the results of an individual
physicist, brother-in-law or no, would be crazy. I write papers in
physics in which I often question the deductions of physicists. Trust
in many ways is the antithesis of science.
On the other hand, one might ask if one should trust that science will
ultimately provide answers to a specific class of questions. This is
in my opinion not a scientific question, but rather a historical one.
I believe the answer is yes, but that answer is based on my
knowledge of the history of science, not of science itself.
>Of course, if I go back again and say that science is first an
>institution, than I can evaluate the institutional behavoir of Matt (my
>brother-in-law), his understanding of the rules of his institution and his
>professional attempt to make arguments within them. I can also explain why
>my doctor probably knows what's going on in my body; it is certainly within
>the interests of his institution and practice that he should. Basically, I
>imagine that science is an institution with pretty good rules for describing
>things. That makes it one of a number of such institutions.
Science is a process, which may be an effective one for determining
the rules which govern things. To equate science with any of its
rules is fallacious, IMO. Any one of its rules may be thrown out at
any moment (well, conservation of mass-energy might take a while, but
it could nonetheless be refuted)
>I want it to be clear that this position is not intended to be
"postmodern",
>in the style of Christopher Ogden, because I don't see language as
somehow
>creating reality. Of course we organize our world through language,
but to say
>this is useless unless it is accompanied by the fact that there is a
world to
>be organized.
[...]
I've always wondered what postmodernism is. Is this really it - a
school of thought that says language creates reality? Owch! No
wonder it's an uphill struggle arguing with them! It's like throwing
Brer Rabbit in the briar patch.
>The old word for a position like this one was "dialectical", though peope
>on both sides will undoubtedly be willing to tell me its been "discredited".
>Marx may not have freed me, nor most of the world; I put no faith in the
>future of socialist revolution. (Nor do I think it would be a bad idea.)
>His legacy, however, continues to provide a useful method of mapping social
>space, which is the intent of this argument.
I think the concept of a dialectic was one Marx drew from Hegel. To
get an idea of what some philosophers of science think of Hegel, try
Popper's "The Open Society and it's Enemies", volume 2.
>Be seein' y'all later.
>--
>Kenny.
>Ideas expressed in this posting probably come from some combination of reading
>Karl Marx, Paulo Freire, bell hooks, Malcolm X, Frantz Fanon, and Emma Goldman.
>Listening to too much James Brown and The Clash probably hasn't helped either.
>The mistakes are, of course, all mine . . .
(You *can't* get too much James Brown or the Clash. Too bad about
the other guys!)
Benjamin J. Tilly
harb...@unlinfo.unl.edu (gerry harbison) writes:
> ken...@OCF.Berkeley.EDU (Kenneth Mostern) writes:
>
>
>
> >It makes no sense to discuss "science" or "religion" until one has recognized
> >them for what they are . . . *social institutions*.
>
> This in itself is contentious. If I were to define science, it
> would be something along the lines of `a process using empirical
> methods to determine the truth about the natural world'. Although I
> agree with Popper about the pointlessness of arguments about
> definition.
>
I do not think of the previous statement as contentious at all. In fact
it seems to be just common sense.
> I don't think most scientists regard science as a social institution
> at all.
>
There is a (are) social institution(s) that is (are) called the
scientific community. Science is what that community produces in the
way of information. Most scientists IMHO would agree with that.
> > The existence or non-
> >existence of "facts" has nothing whatsoever to do with what "science"or
> >"religion" is. This is the obvious sense in which science and religion are
> >the same: like all social institutions, they have xplicit rules of initiation,
> >regulated means of challenging authority and allowing some change, within
> >bounds, serious participants who come up with creative explanations of phen-
> >omena, and power dynamics that suppress positions in ways that outsiders may
> >or may not see as appropriate.
>
> Again, as a scientist I almost totally disagree with this.
> Science is not a social institution. While groups of scientists may
> have initiation rituals, procedures and power dynamics, IMO these are
> ephemera.
And I disagree strongly.
> There are classic examples of people coming from outside the
> scientific establishment revolutionising scientific thought. Gregor
> Mendel is one example. Mendel was a scientist par excellence; the
> world regarded him as a monk.
>
In most of these examples, like Medel, they were ignored by the
scientific establishment for some time. Often they were "discovered"
only when "real" scientists paralleled their work. Science is littered
with examples of this.
> >All versions of science and all versions of
> >religion reflect the biases and social locations (i.e. race, class, gender) of
> >their members; that is why it is not surprising that both scientific and
> >religious institutions have, historically, been at the forefront of promoting
> >racism and sexism (to give two examples) dogmatically; that is also why it
> >is not surprising that, in the second half of this century, both science and
> >religion have been instrumental in fighting racism and sexism.
>
> Can you provide some examples of how science has been at the
> forefront of promoting racism and sexism? Bastardized genetics and
> racist physiologists were involved in Nazi-ism, for example, but
> these are examples of the corruption of science by politics, not
> examples of science at work. In general, science as a process has
> rejected politically inspired ideas.
>
Read _The Mismeasure of Man_ by Stephen J Gould for starters. He has a
*lot* of examples of that in particular. IMO the previous person has a
good point, and I fully agree that science is frequently used to
justify peoples preconceptions. Furthermore it is often respected
scientists who do so.
> >Under many circumstances I am happy to explain why I trust "science". But in
> >order to do so I need to know exactly what I'm being asked to "trust". I
> >Haven't the slightest clue whether or not to trust the information inpapers
> >written by my physicist brother-in-law, least of all when he argues against
> >someone else's position in his papers. I can't read his work; if he disagrees
> >with another physicist, and I say that I "believe" in science, what is it that
> >I believe in?
>
> One would be foolish to trust that which one does not have
> knowledge of. I think placing trust in the results of an individual
> physicist, brother-in-law or no, would be crazy. I write papers in
> physics in which I often question the deductions of physicists. Trust
> in many ways is the antithesis of science.
>
Is it then foolish for people who use stats, such as biologists,
medical researchers, social scientists, and so on, to believe the
mathematicians when they say that you can use a normal distribution
because of the central limit theorem. Remember that most of the people
who use this result do not have the background to understand the actual
statement of the theorem, let alone the proof.
[...]
> >I want it to be clear that this position is not intended to be
> "postmodern",
> >in the style of Christopher Ogden, because I don't see language as
> somehow
> >creating reality. Of course we organize our world through language,
> but to say
> >this is useless unless it is accompanied by the fact that there is a
> world to
> >be organized.
> [...]
>
> I've always wondered what postmodernism is. Is this really it - a
> school of thought that says language creates reality? Owch! No
> wonder it's an uphill struggle arguing with them! It's like throwing
> Brer Rabbit in the briar patch.
>
I am not sure what they believe. However I would say that it is true
that language helps create our impression of reality. Whether this has
anything to do with reality is a different story. :-)
[...]
Ben Tilly
Gordon Fitch
| : Science is not a matter of mere aesthetics. It's ....
ken...@Hawaii.Edu (Kennan Ferguson):
| Since when are aesthetics "mere"?
Many people consider them _mere_.
Christopher Ogden
>school of thought that says language creates reality? Owch! No
>wonder it's an uphill struggle arguing with them! It's like throwing
>Brer Rabbit in the briar patch.
That's a gross misunderstanding of postmodernism. To claim such a thing would
itself be a metaphysical claim. Language does not *create* "reality",
language {be-comes} reality. All experience comes down to a matter of symbols
that are human-constructed--sight symbols, sound symbols, taste symbols, smell
symbols, touch symbols. Our mind constructs reality by using those cultural
symbols and pasting metaphysical significance upon them according to aesthetic
judgements.
-----------------------------
Christopher Ogden
ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
Felix Lee
>Language does not *create* "reality", language {be-comes} reality.
>All experience comes down to a matter of symbols that are
>human-constructed--sight symbols, sound symbols, taste symbols, smell
>symbols, touch symbols. Our mind constructs reality by using those
>cultural symbols and pasting metaphysical significance upon them
>according to aesthetic judgements.
I'm still confused. You seem to be making a distinction between these
two statements:
the mind uses language to structure reality
the mind uses language to construct reality
Is this correct? I'd agree with the first statement, but the meaning
of the second statement still eludes my grasp.
If sensory symbols are human-constructed, does this mean they are
arbitrary? How do you explain experiments that demonstrate that
people in different cultures tend to agree on what the "primary"
colors are, even if they don't have distinct names for colors?
Can humans construct a symbol-system such that the word "furrfu"
refers to the concepts "my left foot", "hats without brims", "electric
razors", and "falling without a parachute" in the symbol-system we
have now? (Why do we call emeralds "green" instead of "grue"?)
Another thing I don't understand is "metaphysical significance". Is
significance always metaphysical? Actually, I don't see anything
metaphysical about significance, so either I've been brainwashed by
the church of science, or I don't understand the terms "metaphysical"
and "significance".
--
gerry harbison
>In article <2j6ivm$n...@crcnis1.unl.edu>
>harb...@unlinfo.unl.edu (gerry harbison) writes:
>> ken...@OCF.Berkeley.EDU (Kenneth Mostern) writes:
>>
[point about science and religion being social institutions]
>>
>> This in itself is contentious. If I were to define science,
it
>> would be something along the lines of `a process using empirical
>> methods to determine the truth about the natural world'. Although
I
>> agree with Popper about the pointlessness of arguments about
>> definition.
>>
>I do not think of the previous statement as contentious at all. In
fact
>it seems to be just common sense.
Expand?
>> I don't think most scientists regard science as a social
institution
>> at all.
>>
>>
>There is a (are) social institution(s) that is (are) called the
>scientific community. Science is what that community produces in the
>way of information. Most scientists IMHO would agree with that.
A definition of science as that which is produced by the scientific
community is (1) circular (2) excludes scientific information produced
by Swiss patent examiners, Austrian monks, bird-watchers, high-school students
etc... Definitely exclusionary.
>> Again, as a scientist I almost totally disagree with this.
>> Science is not a social institution. While groups of scientists may
>> have initiation rituals, procedures and power dynamics, IMO these
are
>> ephemera.
>And I disagree strongly.
Fine.
>> There are classic examples of people coming from outside the
>> scientific establishment revolutionising scientific thought. Gregor
>> Mendel is one example. Mendel was a scientist par excellence; the
>> world regarded him as a monk.
>>
>In most of these examples, like Medel, they were ignored by the
>scientific establishment for some time. Often they were "discovered"
>only when "real" scientists paralleled their work. Science is
littered
>with examples of this.
That doesn't in any way negate their work. The fact that your
scientific community didn't immediately incorporate it, doesn't make
it any less science. Your argument is circular. Of course, if you're
going to relate science exclusively to the scientific community, then
stuff coming in from outside won't count!
>> >All versions of science and all versions of
>> >religion reflect the biases and social locations (i.e. race, class, gender)of
>> >their members; that is why it is not surprising that both scientific and
>> >religious institutions have, historically, been at the forefront of promoting
>> >racism and sexism (to give two examples) dogmatically; that is also why it
>> >is not surprising that, in the second half of this century, both science and
>> >religion have been instrumental in fighting racism and sexism.
>>
>> Can you provide some examples of how science has been at the
>> forefront of promoting racism and sexism? Bastardized genetics and
>> racist physiologists were involved in Nazi-ism, for example, but
>> these are examples of the corruption of science by politics, not
>> examples of science at work. In general, science as a process has
>> rejected politically inspired ideas.
>>
>Read _The Mismeasure of Man_ by Stephen J Gould for starters. He has a
>*lot* of examples of that in particular. IMO the previous person has a
>good point, and I fully agree that science is frequently used to
>justify peoples preconceptions. Furthermore it is often respected
>scientists who do so.
When it is, it ain't science. Not having read Gould's book, I'm not
really competent to discuss it, but I was under the impression it
related tothe abuse of a single small area of science (Human genetics).
Again, this hearkens back to your
initial definition. I don't regard the political abuse of science as
science, Just because a respected scientist says it,
doesn't make it science!
[...]
>>
>> One would be foolish to trust that which one does not have
>> knowledge of. I think placing trust in the results of an individual
>> physicist, brother-in-law or no, would be crazy. I write papers in
>> physics in which I often question the deductions of physicists. Trust
>> in many ways is the antithesis of science.
>>
>Is it then foolish for people who use stats, such as biologists,
>medical researchers, social scientists, and so on, to believe the
>mathematicians when they say that you can use a normal distribution
>because of the central limit theorem.
Yes, it is foolish. Not only for that reason though (see below).
>Remember that most of the people
>who use this result do not have the background to understand the actual
>statement of the theorem, let alone the proof.
I think it's important to understand the foundations of that which is
essential to one's research. For a host of practiccal reasons, mainly.
Using tools without understanding them is often a short cut to a
screw-up.
[...]
>I am not sure what they believe. However I would say that it is true
>that language helps create our impression of reality. Whether this
has
>anything to do with reality is a different story. :-)
I agree!
>[...]
>Ben Tilly
gerry harbison
Thanks for this updated definition. I know you're probably not
interested in conducting a tutorial on this school of thought, but it
appears to me that it
(1) discounts any pre-symbolic experience, or any 'raw' experience
or perception existing before humans give names or their equivalent to
it, much less any exterior objective reality that our senses or
measuring instruments give us information on.
In other words, say, there is no essential 'yellowness' of a
perception that exists before our brains say 'hey, that's yellow'
(I use yellow as an example because it's not a color directly
perceived by the human eyes). Is this a correct assumption?
(2)essentially gives primacy to a subjective aesthetic, since it seems
that ultimately all judgements on symbols be aesthetic judgements.
Am I being unfair here?
>-----------------------------
>Christopher Ogden
>ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
Gerry Harbison/ in Lincoln Nebraska.
Benjamin J. Tilly
harb...@unlinfo.unl.edu (gerry harbison) writes:
> Benjamin...@dartmouth.edu (Benjamin J. Tilly) writes:
>
> >In article <2j6ivm$n...@crcnis1.unl.edu>
> >harb...@unlinfo.unl.edu (gerry harbison) writes:
>
> >> ken...@OCF.Berkeley.EDU (Kenneth Mostern) writes:
> >>
> [point about science and religion being social institutions]
[intermediate stuff deleted]
> >I do not think of the previous statement as contentious at all. In
> fact
> >it seems to be just common sense.
>
> Expand?
>
I assume that you agree with the fact that religeon is a social
institution. The reason why I would call science a social institution
are similar. Science is a community activity. Without a scientific
community no individual would be really capable of doing science. Sure
there might be an occasional Leonardo da Vinci, but even those like him
are not really capable of really doing science. It is just too big.
Therefore science is carried out in a communal fashion. Therefore it is
a social activity. Now it is a fact, perhaps an unpleasant one, but a
fact that the doing of science has been institutionalized in several
types of institutions. Therefore it is accurate to analyze science as a
social institution.
> >> I don't think most scientists regard science as a social
> institution
> >> at all.
> >>
>
> >>
>
> >There is a (are) social institution(s) that is (are) called the
> >scientific community. Science is what that community produces in the
> >way of information. Most scientists IMHO would agree with that.
>
> A definition of science as that which is produced by the scientific
> community is (1) circular (2) excludes scientific information produced
> by Swiss patent examiners, Austrian monks, bird-watchers, high-school students
> etc... Definitely exclusionary.
>
As long as we can label the scientific community it is not circular. In
fact we can not only label it, but we can even characterize a good deal
of how it works. Therefore I do not think that the definition is really
that circular, although it does move the problem to one of how we can
recognize a scientific community.
Secondly it is far less exclusive than you indicate. Membership in the
community essentially means that you are an active participant in the
community. It is true that there are certain symbols that have been
developed to help label people, but to some extent these are
artificial. Therefore, with this definition of membership, it can
include all of the people that you indicate. OTOH it is true that this
definition will exclude those who, like Leonardo, who are not part of
the general scientific community but who are learning about the world.
This is unfortunate, but it is also true that ideas that are not being
thought about by the scientific community are not considered part of
science, no matter how good they are.
[...]
> >> There are classic examples of people coming from outside the
> >> scientific establishment revolutionising scientific thought. Gregor
> >> Mendel is one example. Mendel was a scientist par excellence; the
> >> world regarded him as a monk.
> >>
>
> >In most of these examples, like Medel, they were ignored by the
> >scientific establishment for some time. Often they were "discovered"
> >only when "real" scientists paralleled their work. Science is
> littered
> >with examples of this.
>
> That doesn't in any way negate their work. The fact that your
> scientific community didn't immediately incorporate it, doesn't make
> it any less science. Your argument is circular. Of course, if you're
> going to relate science exclusively to the scientific community, then
> stuff coming in from outside won't count!
>
I would not put down their work. OTOH if you asked an expert biologist
10 years after Mendel did his research if these ideas were part of
science, you would have been told that they were not. I *do* think that
it is fair to say that, until Mendel's work was reviewed by scientists,
it was not science.
[...]
> >> Can you provide some examples of how science has been at the
> >> forefront of promoting racism and sexism? Bastardized genetics and
> >> racist physiologists were involved in Nazi-ism, for example, but
> >> these are examples of the corruption of science by politics, not
> >> examples of science at work. In general, science as a process has
> >> rejected politically inspired ideas.
> >>
> >Read _The Mismeasure of Man_ by Stephen J Gould for starters. He has a
> >*lot* of examples of that in particular. IMO the previous person has a
> >good point, and I fully agree that science is frequently used to
> >justify peoples preconceptions. Furthermore it is often respected
> >scientists who do so.
>
> When it is, it ain't science. Not having read Gould's book, I'm not
> really competent to discuss it, but I was under the impression it
> related tothe abuse of a single small area of science (Human genetics).
> Again, this hearkens back to your
> initial definition. I don't regard the political abuse of science as
> science, Just because a respected scientist says it,
> doesn't make it science!
>
So if you do not like it then it is not science, but if you do then it
is science? In fact Gould's book is about a rather broad selection of
topics, all of which were considered part of science in their day. Many
of the topics were by people who were, in fact, considered top
scientists in their day. So by what feasible standard can you claim
that those ideas were not part of science? Incidentally I would include
many past and discarded theories as being part of science in their day.
A number of them I disagree strongly with, but they were part of
science and are regarded as such by historians of science.
I strongly advise you to read the book. He focuses on how science has
been used to justify racism, but his claims about biases are quite
valid regardless.
> [...]
> >>
> >> One would be foolish to trust that which one does not have
> >> knowledge of. I think placing trust in the results of an individual
> >> physicist, brother-in-law or no, would be crazy. I write papers in
> >> physics in which I often question the deductions of physicists. Trust
> >> in many ways is the antithesis of science.
> >>
> >Is it then foolish for people who use stats, such as biologists,
> >medical researchers, social scientists, and so on, to believe the
> >mathematicians when they say that you can use a normal distribution
> >because of the central limit theorem.
>
> Yes, it is foolish. Not only for that reason though (see below).
>
> >Remember that most of the people
> >who use this result do not have the background to understand the actual
> >statement of the theorem, let alone the proof.
>
> I think it's important to understand the foundations of that which is
> essential to one's research. For a host of practiccal reasons, mainly.
> Using tools without understanding them is often a short cut to a
> screw-up.
>
Let me ask some questions. Have you ever used stats? Do you know the
correct statement of the central limit theorem? Do you know a proof of
the central limit theorem? Do you feel competant to handle basic stats
questions, including working out confidence intervals?
I am a grad student in mathematics. I would answer yes to every one of
those questions exept the third. (I am confident that I could
understand a full proof, but I have never actually been through it.)
But I feel that there is no need for every biologist to learn that much
math just so they can say that they have verified the proof so they
know that the methods that they have learned work.
Similarly there is no need to learn how an engine works to be allowed
to drive. There is no reason to know the exact axioms of the real
numbers to be allowed to do calculus. There is no need to know how
Dedekind cuts work, or how to use Cauchy sequences to understand how to
use the decimal system. There is no need to go through a formal proof
that any positive integer has a unique expansion in base 10 to be
allowed to use base 10 for doing arithmetic. There is no need to learn
Maxwell's equations to use a radio. There is no need to learn QM to use
a television. And so on and so forth.
It is plain common sense to accept that some things on faith. It is
important to have a basic understanding of the main ideas. But there is
no need to check every detail yourself.
[...]
Incidentally I have deleted the cross-posting since I feel that this is
specifically interesting only to people in soc.culture.scientists since
it is no longer about religeon...
Ben Tilly
Ben Tilly
Kenneth Mostern
I'm a "social scientist" (ot in "cultural studies", which I prefer), and so
I was amused to note that when I offered an alternative account of the
meaning of the term science in this thread (and I do mean "definition", not
"meaning"), the scientists were split, but at least provided response, while
the person who began the thread, Christopher Ogden, didn't bother. This is
characteristic. Ogden is the worst sort of postmodernist, the one who knows
just enough to use "metaphysical" as an epithet and for the rest play
language games, pointing out (correctly) that anything you can see about the
world I can turn on you by demanding attention to you language. Fortunately,
some of us who have read deeply in postmodern and poststructuralist thought
have discovered that when you come out the other end there is still some-
thing worth theorizing, like where my dinner is going to come from when I get
off this rather metaphysical space I'm addressing as I type. With any luck
Ogden might take note one day.
For the rest of you--my initial categorization of postmodernism was inten-
tinally crude, and while not inaccurate, certainly limited and arguably
unfair. A more complete discussion would refer to the complex of relation-
ships we call "artistic", "cultural", "technological"
"political", and "economic" under late capitalism (I didn't make this rather
peculiar term up) and attempt to address why certain theoretical and artistic
practices have become prominent at this time. If people are really curious
Jameson's *Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* and
Harvey's *The Condition of Postmodernity* are fine sources, and neither
rants and raves without reference to anything, as Ogden does.
I'll post a few notes regarding the responses to my stuff elsewhere, when I
finish reading them.
Christopher Ogden
>I'm still confused. You seem to be making a distinction between these
>two statements:
> the mind uses language to structure reality
> the mind uses language to construct reality
The first idea, the way it was originally stated, was that postmodernism
be-lieves that language *creates* reality. This idea presupposes a
metaphysical distinction between language and reality, and the metaphysical
idea that one of these can "create" the other. This is not the view of
postmodernism; rather, this is merely the negation of the modernist philosophy
that reality creates language. The deconstructionist view is that the
distinctions between the signifier and the signified are metaphysical
distinctions--where one ends and the other begins is a matter of ontology.
I'm saying that language {becomes} reality because we cannot deal with reality
except through language. I'm making no statements about the nature of
reality, only the nature of language.
>If sensory symbols are human-constructed, does this mean they are
>arbitrary? How do you explain experiments that demonstrate that
>people in different cultures tend to agree on what the "primary"
>colors are, even if they don't have distinct names for colors?
What you pick as the primary colors is a matter of taste. The television
industry chooses green-red-blue, while others choose cyan-magenta-yellow.
But regardless of this, the very idea of "primary" colors is an arbitrary
distinction anyway. Why should such light wavelengths be so distinguished?
Because its part of our culture.
>Can humans construct a symbol-system such that the word "furrfu"
>refers to the concepts "my left foot", "hats without brims", "electric
>razors", and "falling without a parachute" in the symbol-system we
>have now? (Why do we call emeralds "green" instead of "grue"?)
Why not? By the way, I'm not suggesting that all symbolic languages are
equally likely or equally desireable, only that there is no one symbolic
language that has a priviledged place in the universe.
-----------------------------
Christopher Ogden
ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
Christopher Ogden
> Thanks for this updated definition. I know you're probably not
>interested in conducting a tutorial on this school of thought, but it
>appears to me that it
>(1) discounts any pre-symbolic experience, or any 'raw' experience
>or perception existing before humans give names or their equivalent to
>it, much less any exterior objective reality that our senses or
>measuring instruments give us information on.
>In other words, say, there is no essential 'yellowness' of a
>perception that exists before our brains say 'hey, that's yellow'
>(I use yellow as an example because it's not a color directly
>perceived by the human eyes). Is this a correct assumption?
In the sense that "yellowness" is a human-defined idea, the concept would not
have existed before humans defined it. The question of what would "exist" if
there weren't "yellowness" is a metaphysical question that is a matter of
taste.
>(2)essentially gives primacy to a subjective aesthetic, since it seems
>that ultimately all judgements on symbols be aesthetic judgements.
>Am I being unfair here?
That's reasonable, except that the idea of "subjective" is problematic.
Distinctions between "subjective" and its Other, "objective", presupposes
metaphysical definitions of both of these words, and it appears to me that the
distinction between the two ideas is somewhat arbitrary and culture-defined.
-----------------------------
Christopher Ogden
ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
Sandrocotus
batc...@nssdca.gsfc.nasa.gov (Dave Batchelor, Space Phys. Data Facil.
301/286-2988) writes:
>but the true scientists are being rational, and I suggest
>paying heed to a higher discipline.
******************
Uh, how to get and maintain tenure and other rewards, and how not to
endanger one's standing within the society of science?
I agree that this would require a high degree of discipline,
though the use of the word "higher" seems far-fetched
in these post-idealism days of science. At least within
all (too-long) established communities of science.
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arnold v. lesikar
>
>The first idea, the way it was originally stated, was that postmodernism
>be-lieves that language *creates* reality. This idea presupposes a
>metaphysical distinction between language and reality, and the metaphysical
>idea that one of these can "create" the other. This is not the view of
>postmodernism; rather, this is merely the negation of the modernist philosophy
>that reality creates language. The deconstructionist view is that the
>distinctions between the signifier and the signified are metaphysical
>distinctions--where one ends and the other begins is a matter of ontology.
>I'm saying that language {becomes} reality because we cannot deal with reality
>except through language. I'm making no statements about the nature of
>reality, only the nature of language.
>
Very clear and reasonable. This is completely unexceptionable as far
as I can see. Given that one cannot escape from metaphysics, the
question then becomes, whether or not you acknowledge at least
qualitative rankings among different metaphysics?
It seems that we do not have complete control over the nature of our
experiences. We cannot leap of the top of two story buildings without
experiencing pain, and perhaps death.
The flood of experience that overwhelms our brains resists complete
control. Physicists refer to this as "the obstinacy of nature." What
do postmodernists call it?
arn
les...@tigger.stcloud.msus.edu
Dave Batchelor, Space Phys. Data Facil. 301/286-2988
>In article <FLEE.94F...@dictionopolis.cse.psu.edu> fl...@cse.psu.edu
(Felix Lee) writes:
>>I'm still confused. You seem to be making a distinction between these
>>two statements:
>> the mind uses language to structure reality
>> the mind uses language to construct reality
>
>metaphysical distinction between language and reality, and the metaphysical
>idea that one of these can "create" the other. This is not the view of
>postmodernism; rather, this is merely the negation of the modernist philosophy
>that reality creates language. The deconstructionist view is that the
>distinctions between the signifier and the signified are metaphysical
>distinctions--where one ends and the other begins is a matter of ontology.
>I'm saying that language {becomes} reality because we cannot deal with reality
>except through language. I'm making no statements about the nature of
>reality, only the nature of language.
Here again is where you are very mixed up by this postmodern mess.
Language is only one way people deal with reality. All day long
you perceive and react to events without a spoken narrative. For
example, your reflexes react without any verbal or narrative brain
functions, keeping you walking erect, swallowing your food, breathing
etc. Your notion that we cannot deal with reality except through
language is baloney.
People use unspoken thoughts all the time. If you were not so blinded
by your philosophical conceits, you would see the crash of this
postmodern house of cards.
>>If sensory symbols are human-constructed, does this mean they are
>>arbitrary? How do you explain experiments that demonstrate that
>>people in different cultures tend to agree on what the "primary"
>>colors are, even if they don't have distinct names for colors?
>
>What you pick as the primary colors is a matter of taste. The television
>industry chooses green-red-blue, while others choose cyan-magenta-yellow.
>But regardless of this, the very idea of "primary" colors is an arbitrary
>distinction anyway. Why should such light wavelengths be so distinguished?
>Because its part of our culture.
Your're begging the question, a logical fallacy. Why is it part of our
culture? You are arbitrarily stopping your inquiry before reaching a
sensible explanation.
>>Can humans construct a symbol-system such that the word "furrfu"
>>refers to the concepts "my left foot", "hats without brims", "electric
>>razors", and "falling without a parachute" in the symbol-system we
>>have now? (Why do we call emeralds "green" instead of "grue"?)
>
>Why not? By the way, I'm not suggesting that all symbolic languages are
>equally likely or equally desireable, only that there is no one symbolic
>language that has a priviledged place in the universe.
This is misplaced relativism, motivated by a slavish devotion to
anti-elitism. The science of celestial mechanics achieves its goals
by using a language of point masses, whose dynamics are determined
by Newton's laws; the planetary orbits can be calculated with
remarkable precision thereby. This is a privileged symbolic
language which is special because it models the actual motions of
the planets. The more accurate but mathematically unwieldy
Einsteinian language can be used with greater effort, but is
usually unnecessary. These languages are better suited than any
others for their purposes. Why do you want to challenge that idea?
>Christopher Ogden
>ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
gerry harbison
>batc...@nssdca.gsfc.nasa.gov (Dave Batchelor, Space Phys. Data Facil.
>301/286-2988) writes:
>>but the true scientists are being rational, and I suggest
>>paying heed to a higher discipline.
> ******************
>Uh, how to get and maintain tenure and other rewards, and how not to
>endanger one's standing within the society of science?
You know, this probably sounds naive, but I don't think a majority of
scientists are like this. Most of my collegues do research on what
they're interested in, and publish pretty much regardless of standing,
etc. There are of course exceptions, and different fields vary. It's
been my (highly subjective) impression that well-funded areas, such
as biomedical research, are indeed rather cut-throat. However, where
funding is sparse (say, solid-state physical chemistry) people really
are in it for intellectual curiosity and the joy of doing research.
>I agree that this would require a high degree of discipline,
>though the use of the word "higher" seems far-fetched
>in these post-idealism days of science. At least within
>all (too-long) established communities of science.
Some of us still have ideals, and feel rather sorry for those who have
lost theirs.
Gerry Harbison
gerry harbison
>In article <2jb489$h...@crcnis1.unl.edu>
>harb...@unlinfo.unl.edu (gerry harbison) writes:
>> Benjamin...@dartmouth.edu (Benjamin J. Tilly) writes:
>>
[...]
>I assume that you agree with the fact that religeon is a social
>institution. The reason why I would call science a social institution
>are similar. Science is a community activity. Without a scientific
>community no individual would be really capable of doing science. Sure
>there might be an occasional Leonardo da Vinci, but even those like him
>are not really capable of really doing science. It is just too big.
>Therefore science is carried out in a communal fashion. Therefore it is
>a social activity. Now it is a fact, perhaps an unpleasant one, but a
>fact that the doing of science has been institutionalized in several
>types of institutions. Therefore it is accurate to analyze science as a
>social institution.
I don't disagree that we *can* analyze science as a social
institution.
I disagree with the generalization that science is too big to be done
by individuals. Some science is, some isn't. I also disagree that
even in a collective endeavor, science can be fully described as the
interactions of those individuals. Most scientists share a common
picture of an abstract ideal of science, or of a way of doing what
they do, which they call science. That ideal or that method can be
discussed in the absence of social context, IMO.
I'm not competent to discuss religion. I was once a catholic, and
threfore presumably subscribed to the idea that that was the One True
Faith. I am no longer anything. But based on my recollection of
catholicism, I doubt that a catholic theologian would describe the
church as a social institution. More like 'the bride of Christ' I think.
Enforced celibacy tends to make their imagery rather lurid :-)
>>
>> >There is a (are) social institution(s) that is (are) called the
>> >scientific community. Science is what that community produces in the
>> >way of information. Most scientists IMHO would agree with that.
>>
>> A definition of science as that which is produced by the scientific
>> community is (1) circular (2) excludes scientific information produced
>> by Swiss patent examiners, Austrian monks, bird-watchers, high-school students
>> etc... Definitely exclusionary.
>>
>As long as we can label the scientific community it is not circular. In
>fact we can not only label it, but we can even characterize a good deal
>of how it works. Therefore I do not think that the definition is really
>that circular, although it does move the problem to one of how we can
>recognize a scientific community.
Yes, it does. Define 'scientific community' without using the word
'science'! And don't paraphrase 'science', because I'll claim that in
doing so, you've defined it!
>Secondly it is far less exclusive than you indicate. Membership in the
>community essentially means that you are an active participant in the
>community. It is true that there are certain symbols that have been
>developed to help label people, but to some extent these are
>artificial. Therefore, with this definition of membership, it can
>include all of the people that you indicate. OTOH it is true that this
>definition will exclude those who, like Leonardo, who are not part of
>the general scientific community but who are learning about the world.
>This is unfortunate, but it is also true that ideas that are not being
>thought about by the scientific community are not considered part of
>science, no matter how good they are.
In the long term, they will be. Was Gregor Mendel elevated to being a
member of the scientific community post mortem? That seems an awkward
consequence of your definition. I have problems with a
definition of science that includes disinterment (except of course in
Frankenstein movies.) 8-[
>[...]
>> That doesn't in any way negate their work. The fact that your
>> scientific community didn't immediately incorporate it, doesn't make
>> it any less science. Your argument is circular. Of course, if you're
>> going to relate science exclusively to the scientific community, then
>> stuff coming in from outside won't count!
>>
>I would not put down their work. OTOH if you asked an expert biologist
>10 years after Mendel did his research if these ideas were part of
>science, you would have been told that they were not. I *do* think that
>it is fair to say that, until Mendel's work was reviewed by scientists,
>it was not science.
So what made it science was its discovery by other biologists? This
is getting really awkward. What was Mendel's work before its
recognition magically made it science? (Shades of the ugly duckling
here) It seems your definition requires us to have two words
for exactly the same body of work, one before it's recognized, one
after.
As i said it's only a definition, and a better definition is merely one
that describes reality more efficiently. It seems in this case you are
needlessly multiplying entities
>[...]
>So if you do not like it then it is not science, but if you do then it
>is science? In fact Gould's book is about a rather broad selection of
>topics, all of which were considered part of science in their day. Many
>of the topics were by people who were, in fact, considered top
>scientists in their day. So by what feasible standard can you claim
>that those ideas were not part of science? Incidentally I would include
>many past and discarded theories as being part of science in their day.
>A number of them I disagree strongly with, but they were part of
>science and are regarded as such by historians of science.
>I strongly advise you to read the book. He focuses on how science has
>been used to justify racism, but his claims about biases are quite
>valid regardless.
Yes I agree that this is a problem. Without too much entity
multiplication, perhaps we can have 'bad' science and 'good' science,
good science being bathed in the pure light of the scientific method,
bad science being stained by the sins of political motivation,
prejudice, etc. (Sorry, residual catholicism showing here!)
And I will check out Gould's book, next trip to the library.
>> [...]
>>
>> I think it's important to understand the foundations of that which is
>> essential to one's research. For a host of practiccal reasons, mainly.
>> Using tools without understanding them is often a short cut to a
>> screw-up.
>>
>Let me ask some questions. Have you ever used stats? Do you know the
>correct statement of the central limit theorem? Do you know a proof of
>the central limit theorem? Do you feel competant to handle basic stats
>questions, including working out confidence intervals?
(1) Yes.
(2) I think so. (will it be on the final?)
(3) No, but I could look it up.
(4) Absolutely, because I usually derive statistical methods before I use
them. I'm never confident enough that I'm sure of their validity if I
don't. I'm collaborating with a statistician at the
moment, on a determinental analysis of a data set. Statistics is
incredibly boring if you just apply recipes, and it's fascinating if
you try to understand what you're doing.
>I am a grad student in mathematics. I would answer yes to every one of
>those questions exept the third. (I am confident that I could
>understand a full proof, but I have never actually been through it.)
>But I feel that there is no need for every biologist to learn that much
>math just so they can say that they have verified the proof so they
>know that the methods that they have learned work.
It depends very much on how central statistics is to the biologists
research. If we're merely talking about calculating a standard
deviation, maybe he/she could get by. If it's someone whose research
lives or dies by stats, (say a population geneticist) they should
probably understand the mechanisms of what they're doing
Not necessarily the full body of research or all the controversies,
but the bones of the theory.
>Similarly there is no need to learn how an engine works to be allowed
>to drive. There is no reason to know the exact axioms of the real
>numbers to be allowed to do calculus. There is no need to know how
>Dedekind cuts work, or how to use Cauchy sequences to understand how to
>use the decimal system. There is no need to go through
>that any positive integer has a unique expansion in base 10 to be
>allowed to use base 10 for doing arithmetic. There is no need to learn
>Maxwell's equations to use a radio. There is no need to learn QM to use
>a television. And so on and so forth.
Sure, anything is ridiculous if taken to extremes. Taken to extremes,
one would have to know everything to do anything. We still teach our
students in physical chemistry that if their research depends on an
instrument, they should understand how the instrument works; if their
research depends on a theory, they should understand the theory.
And I think this is an excellent principle.
>It is plain common sense to accept that some things on faith. It is
>important to have a basic understanding of the main ideas. But there is
>no need to check every detail yourself.
Not every detail, no.
>[...]
>Incidentally I have deleted the cross-posting since I feel that this is
>specifically interesting only to people in soc.culture.scientists since
>it is no longer about religeon...
Just as I was gearing up to reminisce about the good times I has as an
altar boy. Damn!
>Ben Tilly
>Ben Tilly
Gerry Harbison
gerry harbison
>>If sensory symbols are human-constructed, does this mean they are
>>arbitrary? How do you explain experiments that demonstrate that
>>people in different cultures tend to agree on what the "primary"
>>colors are, even if they don't have distinct names for colors?
>What you pick as the primary colors is a matter of taste. The television
>industry chooses green-red-blue, while others choose cyan-magenta-yellow.
>But regardless of this, the very idea of "primary" colors is an arbitrary
>distinction anyway. Why should such light wavelengths be so distinguished?
>Because its part of our culture.
Rubbish. There are three primary colors because there are three
types of color vision photoreceptors in the human eye. It's purely
physiological, culture has nothing to do with it. We can choose
primairy colors which approximate the absorbtion maxima of these
photoreceptors (RGB) or we can take linear combinations (CMY), but
*any* arbitrary mixture of lights of different wavelength can be simulated by
three colors as far as our visual system is concerned.
Strike one against cultural relativity.
Felix Lee
>If sensory symbols are human-constructed, does this mean they are
>arbitrary? How do you explain experiments that demonstrate that
>people in different cultures tend to agree on what the "primary"
>colors are, even if they don't have distinct names for colors?
Christopher Ogden wrote:
>What you pick as the primary colors is a matter of taste. The television
>industry chooses green-red-blue, while others choose cyan-magenta-yellow.
>But regardless of this, the very idea of "primary" colors is an arbitrary
>distinction anyway. Why should such light wavelengths be so distinguished?
>Because its part of our culture.
Umm, no. I guess I didn't state that well.
Anthropological research has shown that people in various cultures
agree on what colors are "focal" colors, eg, the "best" representative
of a particular color concept.
In the experiments I read about, the experimenter shows a subject a
whole palette of colors and asks, "which of these is the best
representative of color X"? And the results are pretty consistent
across cultures, even for cultures with relatively impoverished color
vocabulary. (I think there was one culture that has just one word for
all blue and green hues. When asked about this color word, something
like half the subjects pointed at focal blue, the other half pointed
at focal green.)
My memory of this is a little vague, so I'm not completely confident
of the details. I think I read this either in _Women, Fire, and
Dangerous Things_ by George Lakoff, or _Color for Philosophers_ by
C. L. Hardin.
These results apparently tie neatly into physiological models of color
perception.
But anyway, my guess is this is irrelevent, because you also say:
>The deconstructionist view is that the distinctions between the
>signifier and the signified are metaphysical distinctions--where one
>ends and the other begins is a matter of ontology. I'm saying that
>language {becomes} reality because we cannot deal with reality except
>through language. I'm making no statements about the nature of
>reality, only the nature of language.
Is the following an accurate summary?
- you cannot know reality "directly"
- knowledge of reality is mediated through symbols
- the distinction between symbol and object is arbitrary or irrelevent
- the only reality we know is entirely symbolic
This, I think, is somewhat reasonable, given an appropriate definition
of "symbol" (although I think it's pretty uninteresting unless you
conflate a couple different meanings of "symbol").
The thing that puzzles me is you seem to be going beyond this in
saying that all symbol systems are essentially arbitrary and there's
no reason to choose one over another; it's just a matter of
"aesthetics".
But then you say:
>By the way, I'm not suggesting that all symbolic languages are
>equally likely or equally desireable, only that there is no one symbolic
>language that has a priviledged place in the universe.
which confuses me again. How are you supposed to determine that some
symbolic language is less likely or less desirable without resorting
to symbols? Or is your aesthetic choice non-symbolic by nature?
--
ron house
>I'm saying that language {becomes} reality because we cannot deal with reality
>except through language.
I want to understand something here, and I am going to say something that
sounds like a flame, but it isn't, it is just an expression of my dilemma:
To me, the above statement is totally moronic.
This is my problem. This remark is so self-evidently false, I am completely
mystified that so many intelligent people believe it. I have, many times on
many topics, formulated an idea and been at a loss for the words to express
it. Even with so mundane a task as driving to work, I swerve to avoid a
wallaby or an echidna without verbalising any of the things I do in
'dealing with reality'. If I can't see whether something was a horned
lizard or a frilled one, or if I were one of those people who can't
remember their right from their left, would I be unable to "Swerve right
to avoid the horned lizard"?
On a more metaphysical level, many religious ideas are taught by absorbing
the concept from spiritual action, precisely because the idea is ineffable.
Yet the fact that thousands of people feel rewarded for the practice
surely shows that there is, at least, a consistent idea (whether true
or false) to be uncovered in this way. (Otherwise, any random action
would feel 'good'.)
So, why do so many people believe this (to me) completely absurd idea?
Are there two different kinds of minds, those that think verbally and
those that think intuitively?
>>If sensory symbols are human-constructed, does this mean they are
>>arbitrary? How do you explain experiments that demonstrate that
>>people in different cultures tend to agree on what the "primary"
>>colors are, even if they don't have distinct names for colors?
>What you pick as the primary colors is a matter of taste. The television
>industry chooses green-red-blue, while others choose cyan-magenta-yellow.
>But regardless of this, the very idea of "primary" colors is an arbitrary
>distinction anyway. Why should such light wavelengths be so distinguished?
>Because its part of our culture.
This is definitely wrong. If you don't print using the subtractive
primary colours cyan-magenta-yellow, you can _not_ reproduce all observable
colours. Ditto for grb, which are the additive primaries, which must be
used for light-generating colour applications such as colour monitors.
--
Ron House. USQ
(ho...@usq.edu.au) Toowoomba, Australia.
Ray Ingles
>In article <FLEE.94F...@dictionopolis.cse.psu.edu> fl...@cse.psu.edu (Felix Lee) writes:
>>I'm still confused. You seem to be making a distinction between these
>>two statements:
>> the mind uses language to structure reality
>> the mind uses language to construct reality
>
>The first idea, the way it was originally stated, was that postmodernism
>be-lieves that language *creates* reality. This idea presupposes a
>metaphysical distinction between language and reality, and the metaphysical
>idea that one of these can "create" the other. This is not the view of
>postmodernism; rather, this is merely the negation of the modernist philosophy
>that reality creates language. The deconstructionist view is that the
>distinctions between the signifier and the signified are metaphysical
>distinctions--where one ends and the other begins is a matter of ontology.
And therefore, of course, any ontology is equally as good as any other.
Not.
>I'm saying that language {becomes} reality because we cannot deal with reality
>except through language. I'm making no statements about the nature of
>reality, only the nature of language.
Again, brain damage can induce verbal and written aphasia; people can lose
the ability to use language. They can often retrain other parts of their
brain to do the job passably well, however. And they don't report losing
all tough with reality when all language disappeared.
>>If sensory symbols are human-constructed, does this mean they are
>>arbitrary? How do you explain experiments that demonstrate that
>>people in different cultures tend to agree on what the "primary"
>>colors are, even if they don't have distinct names for colors?
>
>What you pick as the primary colors is a matter of taste. The television
>industry chooses green-red-blue, while others choose cyan-magenta-yellow.
>But regardless of this, the very idea of "primary" colors is an arbitrary
>distinction anyway. Why should such light wavelengths be so distinguished?
>Because its part of our culture.
Come now, a science type like youself should be familiar with the notion
of an orthogonal basis set. You can pick any point in the universe to be
the origin of a coordinate system; you need three colors of the right
level of separation in wavelength to represent all the other colors. And
while each representation will have a different description of, say, sky
blue, if you mix up sky blue according to RGB, and according to CKMY, people
will agree that they are the same color reached through different means.
[deletions]
>By the way, I'm not suggesting that all symbolic languages are
>equally likely or equally desireable, only that there is no one symbolic
>language that has a priviledged place in the universe.
There is no privileged intertial frame, but you will not pick one
centered on Betelgeuse to describe your trip to the store. There are some
descriptions of reality that are better than others for human purposes.
You certainly come across as denying this.
Sincerely,
Ray Ingles ing...@engin.umich.edu
"An apple every eight hours keeps three doctors away." - B. Kliban
George Heintzelman
Ray Ingles <ing...@engin.umich.edu> wrote:
> There is no privileged intertial frame, but you will not pick one
>centered on Betelgeuse to describe your trip to the store. There are some
>descriptions of reality that are better than others for human purposes.
>You certainly come across as denying this.
Not to mention, of course, that neither the frame you WOULD
pick nor the one centered on Betelguese are inertial. Amazing that
physics works at all, isn't it?
Trying to win pedant of the year....
George Heintzelman
geo...@mit.edu
Christopher Ogden
>Very clear and reasonable. This is completely unexceptionable as far
>as I can see. Given that one cannot escape from metaphysics, the
>question then becomes, whether or not you acknowledge at least
>qualitative rankings among different metaphysics?
Everybody ranks metaphysical constructs on an aesthetic basis. Most of us
have a preference for one model of the universe.
>It seems that we do not have complete control over the nature of our
>experiences. We cannot leap of the top of two story buildings without
>experiencing pain, and perhaps death.
>The flood of experience that overwhelms our brains resists complete
>control. Physicists refer to this as "the obstinacy of nature." What
>do postmodernists call it?
That depends on your point of view, how you define "control", and how you
define "nature".
-----------------------------
Christopher Ogden
ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
Christopher Ogden
>Here again is where you are very mixed up by this postmodern mess.
>Language is only one way people deal with reality. All day long
>you perceive and react to events without a spoken narrative. For
>example, your reflexes react without any verbal or narrative brain
>functions, keeping you walking erect, swallowing your food, breathing
>etc. Your notion that we cannot deal with reality except through
>language is baloney.
When I say "language", I mean a very loose construction of that word.
Language, in this sense, means not just verbal language, but visual, tactical,
ect. symbolic codes as well. When you feel pain, you indeed experience more
than sound, but when you explain what happened, you inevitably rely on
language to describe the experience; when you remember the event, you also
remember a symbolized, idealized representation. So when I say language, I
also mean the other symbolic codes that we use to describe the universe.
>This is misplaced relativism, motivated by a slavish devotion to
>anti-elitism. The science of celestial mechanics achieves its goals
>by using a language of point masses, whose dynamics are determined
>by Newton's laws; the planetary orbits can be calculated with
>remarkable precision thereby. This is a privileged symbolic
>language which is special because it models the actual motions of
>the planets. The more accurate but mathematically unwieldy
>Einsteinian language can be used with greater effort, but is
>usually unnecessary. These languages are better suited than any
>others for their purposes. Why do you want to challenge that idea?
Because of those nasty metaphysical words "accurate", "better", and "actual".
These words are empty. They are self-legitimizing. Science is "accurate"
because Science Says So. Science is "better" than other languages because
Science Says So. Science repersents "actual reality" because Science Says So.
You're so indoctrinated with the Western Worldview that you don't realize
what metaphysical leaps you are taking.
-----------------------------
Christopher Ogden
ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
Christopher Ogden
>Rubbish. There are three primary colors because there are three
>types of color vision photoreceptors in the human eye. It's purely
>physiological, culture has nothing to do with it. We can choose
>primairy colors which approximate the absorbtion maxima of these
>photoreceptors (RGB) or we can take linear combinations (CMY), but
>*any* arbitrary mixture of lights of different wavelength can be simulated by
>three colors as far as our visual system is concerned.
You've completely missed the point. You've justifying your worldview by
appealing to your worldview. According to you, the words "primary colors"
are defined as being exactly those wavelengths of light that match pigments in
the eye. Do you consider this to be a priviledged definition of "primary
colors"? Is there some monolith floating in space that has this definition
engraven upon it? No. Colors {are} "primary" because that's how we define
them, and the scientist can't make such a definition without appealing to
other metaphysical scientific definitions like "wavelength" and "light" and
"pigment".
-----------------------------
Christopher Ogden
ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
Christopher Ogden
> And therefore, of course, any ontology is equally as good as any other.
I can't answer that question without constructing a universal good-o-meter.
-----------------------------
Christopher Ogden
ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
Christopher Ogden
>Is the following an accurate summary?
>- you cannot know reality "directly"
>- knowledge of reality is mediated through symbols
>- the distinction between symbol and object is arbitrary or irrelevent
>- the only reality we know is entirely symbolic
I would agree with these statements.
>This, I think, is somewhat reasonable, given an appropriate definition
>of "symbol" (although I think it's pretty uninteresting unless you
>conflate a couple different meanings of "symbol").
"Symbol" itself is quite an empty word, and I can't think of an appropriate
definition, but I don't see any alternative to using the word.
>The thing that puzzles me is you seem to be going beyond this in
>saying that all symbol systems are essentially arbitrary and there's
>no reason to choose one over another; it's just a matter of
>"aesthetics".
No, what I'm saying is that there *is* a reason to choose one language over
another, and that reason is aesthetics.
>But then you say:
>>By the way, I'm not suggesting that all symbolic languages are
>>equally likely or equally desireable, only that there is no one symbolic
>>language that has a priviledged place in the universe.
>which confuses me again. How are you supposed to determine that some
>symbolic language is less likely or less desirable without resorting
>to symbols? Or is your aesthetic choice non-symbolic by nature?
Good question. I'm not sure I have the answer to that. I can say that I know
what an aesthetic choice {is}, but I can't explain what that means without
resorting to ontology. I guess this is an unanswerable question.
-----------------------------
Christopher Ogden
ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
Christopher Ogden
>>I'm saying that language {becomes} reality because we cannot deal with
reality >>except through language.
>This is my problem. This remark is so self-evidently false, I am completely
>mystified that so many intelligent people believe it. I have, many times on
>many topics, formulated an idea and been at a loss for the words to express
>it. Even with so mundane a task as driving to work, I swerve to avoid a
>wallaby or an echidna without verbalising any of the things I do in
>'dealing with reality'. If I can't see whether something was a horned
>lizard or a frilled one, or if I were one of those people who can't
>remember their right from their left, would I be unable to "Swerve right
>to avoid the horned lizard"?
The problem here arises from the metaphysical baggage that the word "language"
carries with it. When I said "language", I meant more than just verbal
communication; I also meant all signs and signifiers, be they visual,
tactical, verbal, or even signs of smell. The idea is that all of our
experiences are translated into some sort of "code" or language before it is
stored in our brains. We think in terms of signs and languages, and those
signs create our reality.
For example, we have a tactical sign for "hot" in our minds, and that's how we
think of that experience. When we describe that experience, we translate it
into the word "hot". These types of metaphysical imagery become reality to
us. We divide "reality" into these arbitrary packets we call signs.
-----------------------------
Christopher Ogden
ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
Scott Brown
I admit it, you're right. I have completely missed the point.
What's your point?
Scott
--
arnold v. lesikar
>
>The problem here arises from the metaphysical baggage that the word "language"
>carries with it. When I said "language", I meant more than just verbal
>communication; I also meant all signs and signifiers, be they visual,
>tactical, verbal, or even signs of smell. The idea is that all of our
>experiences are translated into some sort of "code" or language before it is
>stored in our brains. We think in terms of signs and languages, and those
>signs create our reality.
It sounds much like he is referring to what Dennett calls "qualia."
If that is the case, then it would seem that Ogden is covering up an
important distinction between "language" as it is ordinarily
used, and his use of the term, for we have much less control over
qualia than over the terms that we speak. One may choose which words
he uses to describe the perceived color of an object, but it is much,
much harder to change one's perceptions.
So it seems like Ogden here instead of redefining terms to make
sharper distinctions is in fact _removing_ distinctions between terms.
Dulling the edge of the blade hardly seems to be the way to remain at
the cutting edge of cultural criticism.
Gordon Fitch
| >Very clear and reasonable. This is completely unexceptionable as far
| >as I can see. Given that one cannot escape from metaphysics, the
| >question then becomes, whether or not you acknowledge at least
| >qualitative rankings among different metaphysics?
OGD...@caedm.et.byu.edu (Christopher Ogden):
| Everybody ranks metaphysical constructs on an aesthetic basis. Most of us
| have a preference for one model of the universe.
People construct models with different degrees of
explicitness and precision, and apply ranking to their
models and metaphysical constructions with different degrees
of strength. These differences may rest on aesthetics, but
the aesthetics may be empirical, that is, the result of
experience. For instance, one cannot learn anything without
knowing that one is ignorant, that is, that one's model of
the universe is significantly incomplete. If one enjoys
learning things (probably an a-priori aesthetic value) one
discovers that one must understand and accept one's
ignorance (probably something also learned, an a-posteriori
aesthetic value). Hence one's preference for a given
model of the universe may be pretty vague, in general or in
specific places, and it may be the subject of a dialog with
the universe, subjecting it to constant change.
--
)*( Gordon Fitch )*( g...@panix.com )*(
Gordon Fitch
| >>I'm saying that language {becomes} reality because we cannot deal with
| reality >>except through language.
ho...@helios.usq.EDU.AU (ron house) writes:
| >This is my problem. This remark is so self-evidently false, I am completely
| >mystified that so many intelligent people believe it. I have, many times on
| >many topics, formulated an idea and been at a loss for the words to express
| >it. Even with so mundane a task as driving to work, I swerve to avoid a
| >wallaby or an echidna without verbalising any of the things I do in
| >'dealing with reality'. If I can't see whether something was a horned
| >lizard or a frilled one, or if I were one of those people who can't
| >remember their right from their left, would I be unable to "Swerve right
| >to avoid the horned lizard"?
co:
|The problem here arises from the metaphysical baggage that the word "language"
| carries with it. When I said "language", I meant more than just verbal
| communication; I also meant all signs and signifiers, be they visual,
| tactical, verbal, or even signs of smell. The idea is that all of our
| experiences are translated into some sort of "code" or language before it is
| stored in our brains. We think in terms of signs and languages, and those
| signs create our reality.
|
|For example, we have a tactical sign for "hot" in our minds, and that's how we
| think of that experience. When we describe that experience, we translate it
| into the word "hot". These types of metaphysical imagery become reality to
| us. We divide "reality" into these arbitrary packets we call signs.
I think you're making excessively large assumptions about
how the nervous system works here. While I would agree that
the brain manipulates experiences at least partly in symbolic
form, it may also do other things; specifically, it may
construct non-symbolic models of the universe. (I assume we
all agree that a model is not (necessarily) a symbol.) My
guess is that there is a continuous interchange between
sense perception, non-symbolic models, and symbol-using
processes, another case of level leakage without which the
biological systems underlying mentation wouldn't work.
Some of our thinking -- the swerving to avoid something in
the road, the piling-up of boxes to reach a banana, under-
standing how a differential gearbox works, or some kinds
of procedures involving emotions -- appear to me to be
significantly non-linguistic.
Dave Batchelor, Space Phys. Data Facil. 301/286-2988
>In article <1994Feb10....@lamont.ldgo.columbia.edu>
les...@TIGGER.STCLOUD.MSUS.EDU (arnold v. lesikar) writes:
>>Very clear and reasonable. This is completely unexceptionable as far
>>as I can see. Given that one cannot escape from metaphysics, the
>>question then becomes, whether or not you acknowledge at least
>>qualitative rankings among different metaphysics?
>
>
>>experiences. We cannot leap of the top of two story buildings without
>>experiencing pain, and perhaps death.
>
>>The flood of experience that overwhelms our brains resists complete
>>control. Physicists refer to this as "the obstinacy of nature." What
>>do postmodernists call it?
>
>define "nature".
>
Come on! Do you really think there is some definition of "control" that
will enable you to leap off high buildings without injury?
Dave Batchelor, Space Phys. Data Facil. 301/286-2988
>When I say "language", I mean a very loose construction of that word.
>Language, in this sense, means not just verbal language, but visual, tactical,
>ect. symbolic codes as well. When you feel pain, you indeed experience more
>than sound, but when you explain what happened, you inevitably rely on
>language to describe the experience; when you remember the event, you also
>remember a symbolized, idealized representation. So when I say language, I
>also mean the other symbolic codes that we use to describe the universe.
>
atoms can be split. Perception has been studied carefully in the lab
in recent years, and it breaks up into components with temporal
structure and other analytic properties. So much of life takes
place on a lower level than symbols -- at nerve stimulus-response
levels -- that I think your theory is under-resolving meaningful
components.
DB>>This is misplaced relativism, motivated by a slavish devotion to
>>anti-elitism. The science of celestial mechanics achieves its goals
>>by using a language of point masses, whose dynamics are determined
>>by Newton's laws; the planetary orbits can be calculated with
>>remarkable precision thereby. This is a privileged symbolic
>>language which is special because it models the actual motions of
>>the planets. The more accurate but mathematically unwieldy
>>Einsteinian language can be used with greater effort, but is
>>usually unnecessary. These languages are better suited than any
>>others for their purposes. Why do you want to challenge that idea?
>
CO>Because of those nasty metaphysical words "accurate", "better", and
>"actual".
>These words are empty. They are self-legitimizing. Science is "accurate"
>because Science Says So. Science is "better" than other languages because
>Science Says So. Science repersents "actual reality" because Science Says So.
> You're so indoctrinated with the Western Worldview that you don't realize
>what metaphysical leaps you are taking.
>
If these words are empty, why do we use them? Why do you persist in
trying to persuade us toward your own view? Don't you have an urge to
straighten out us benighted muddleheads so that we understand your
accurate theory?
I think you have lead discussion away from the motives people properly
have for using words like "accurate". These words derive from results
of intercomparisons of other ideas and perceptions. Reliability,
repeatability, success, and so forth, are not concepts made up out of
nothing. They are derived from the scientific method, which has
proved itself powerful and useful. Aren't you avoiding those facts?
>-----------------------------
>Christopher Ogden
>ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
Regards,
Dave
Dave Batchelor, Space Phys. Data Facil. 301/286-2988
>In article <FLEE.94Fe...@dictionopolis.cse.psu.edu> fl...@cse.psu.edu
(Felix Lee) writes:
>>Is the following an accurate summary?
>>- you cannot know reality "directly"
>>- knowledge of reality is mediated through symbols
>>- the distinction between symbol and object is arbitrary or irrelevent
>>- the only reality we know is entirely symbolic
>
>
FL>>This, I think, is somewhat reasonable, given an appropriate definition
>>of "symbol" (although I think it's pretty uninteresting unless you
>>conflate a couple different meanings of "symbol").
>
Here we are at the bottom level of the impoverished system of ideas
being debated here. Ogden considers symbols the undefined/undefinable
elements of this system. They are derived through means of suspicious
reliability and he can't imagine any compelling means of evaluating
them or their correspondence with anything more meaningful. Once he
has labeled something a symbol, it is no longer valid in a non-arbitrary
sense.
>
FL>>The thing that puzzles me is you seem to be going beyond this in
>>saying that all symbol systems are essentially arbitrary and there's
>>no reason to choose one over another; it's just a matter of
>>"aesthetics".
>
CO>No, what I'm saying is that there *is* a reason to choose one language over
>another, and that reason is aesthetics.
No, the real reasons that people choose one language over another are
concerned with efficacy and power and the need to survive. If I make
a trip to France, I polish up my few french phrases, for reasons of
survival. I want to be able to order food in restaurants and obtain
a room at night. All of these practical considerations are missing
from Ogden's aesthetic evaluation of symbols.
Another critical language is the language of calendars. It evolved to
make planting crops a reliable undertaking and insure survival of the
family. Calendar makers were not motivated by aesthetics, but by the
need to survive. So they interpreted the signs of seasons changing
and codified methods for deciding what day to plant. Aesthetics did
not enter into it; survival was at stake. We are the descendents of
calendar makers -- I'm an astronomer, so I am a direct descendent,
intellectually. And it is not arbitrary when crops should be planted
so that I get to buy the produce at Safeway.
FL>>But then you say:
CO>>>By the way, I'm not suggesting that all symbolic languages are
>>>equally likely or equally desireable, only that there is no one symbolic
>>>language that has a priviledged place in the universe.
>
FL>>which confuses me again. How are you supposed to determine that some
>>symbolic language is less likely or less desirable without resorting
>>to symbols? Or is your aesthetic choice non-symbolic by nature?
>
CO>Good question. I'm not sure I have the answer to that. I can say that
>I know
>what an aesthetic choice {is}, but I can't explain what that means without
>resorting to ontology. I guess this is an unanswerable question.
Why don't you delve into phenomenology some more? It seems you have
reached a dead end now. ;-)
>-----------------------------
>Christopher Ogden
>ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
Dave Batchelor, Space Phys. Data Facil. 301/286-2988
>reality >>except through language.
>
RH>>This is my problem. This remark is so self-evidently false, I am completely
>>mystified that so many intelligent people believe it. I have, many times on
>>many topics, formulated an idea and been at a loss for the words to express
>>it. Even with so mundane a task as driving to work, I swerve to avoid a
>>wallaby or an echidna without verbalising any of the things I do in
>>'dealing with reality'. If I can't see whether something was a horned
>>lizard or a frilled one, or if I were one of those people who can't
>>remember their right from their left, would I be unable to "Swerve right
>>to avoid the horned lizard"?
>carries with it. When I said "language", I meant more than just verbal
>communication; I also meant all signs and signifiers, be they visual,
>tactical, verbal, or even signs of smell. The idea is that all of our
>experiences are translated into some sort of "code" or language before it is
>stored in our brains.
You may not be on solid ground here! You may have to admit that some
experiences are nothing more than nerve stimulus/response, and are not
stored at all, code or not. They are experiences, nevertheless. For
example, in a traffic accident, events often happen too fast for
reliable perception, and a victim wakes up in a hospital, not at all
sure how he got there; although he was conscious much of the time, he
does not remember. More routinely, one can trip and recover one's
balance without recalling it or being able to describe in detail how
it was done. Your model of symbolic thought processing does not
cover events that happen at reflex level, maybe in the midbrain if
I recall correctly. What about including something more primitive
such as a signal or nerve impulse? Experiments have been performed
using single neurons. Would you say that single neuron signals are
metaphysical? It is also understood now that neurons fire at
varying rates, but almost never stop altogether. The nerve impulse
is actually transmitted when the firing rate exceeds some
threshhold. Is there metaphysics in the sub-threshhold firing
rates, or only in the super-threshhold firings? Or is the
metaphysics in the threshhold, which varies with repeated stimuli?
CO> We think in terms of signs and languages, and those
>signs create our reality.
>
>For example, we have a tactical sign for "hot" in our minds, and
>that's how we
>think of that experience. When we describe that experience, we
>translate it
>into the word "hot". These types of metaphysical imagery become
>reality to
>us. We divide "reality" into these arbitrary packets we call signs.
This stuff is even more shaky. Within the brain, pain reception is
due to the reflex-level neurons, not the cognitive-level neurons.
Memory of pain is very different from pain itself. I remember
THAT something burned me, but I do not again feel the pain. However,
some memories are painful in themselves, in quite another way, and
generate pain when I remember them. For instance, the last time I
saw my father, he was very ill, and he did not recover; he is still
suffering in a state hospital with several nervous disorders
complicated by diabetes, and he is not coherent. This is painful
to recall in itself, whereas it is not painful to recall slipping
on some ice years ago, when I broke my hand. I don't think any
of these "packets" of symbols are arbitrary; rather they are
wired into the architecture of my nervous system, some parts in the
cognitive regions, others in the regions of lower-level functions.
I would function this way even if I knew nothing of science.
>-----------------------------
>Christopher Ogden
>ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
Regards,
Dave
Ray Ingles
>In article <2jf03e...@srvr1.engin.umich.edu>,
>Ray Ingles <ing...@engin.umich.edu> wrote:
>> There is no privileged intertial frame, but you will not pick one
>>centered on Betelgeuse to describe your trip to the store. There are some
>>descriptions of reality that are better than others for human purposes.
>>You certainly come across as denying this.
>
> Not to mention, of course, that neither the frame you WOULD
>pick nor the one centered on Betelguese are inertial. Amazing that
>physics works at all, isn't it?
Oh, bother. How about I phrase it this way: "If you were to pick an
inertial reference frame to describe your trip to the store, you would not
pick one with an origin as far away as Betelguese is currently." 'Kay? :->
>Trying to win pedant of the year....
You're well on your way. :->
Sincerely,
Ray Ingles || The above opinions are probably
|| not those of the University of
ing...@engin.umich.edu || Michigan. Yet.
Dave Batchelor, Space Phys. Data Facil. 301/286-2988
>les...@TIGGER.STCLOUD.MSUS.EDU (arnold v. lesikar) writes:
>| >Very clear and reasonable. This is completely unexceptionable as far
>| >as I can see. Given that one cannot escape from metaphysics, the
>| >question then becomes, whether or not you acknowledge at least
>| >qualitative rankings among different metaphysics?
>
>OGD...@caedm.et.byu.edu (Christopher Ogden):
>| Everybody ranks metaphysical constructs on an aesthetic basis. Most of us
>| have a preference for one model of the universe.
>
>explicitness and precision, and apply ranking to their
>models and metaphysical constructions with different degrees
>of strength. These differences may rest on aesthetics, but
>the aesthetics may be empirical, that is, the result of
>experience.
But these difference don't rest ONLY on aesthetics. That's
Ogden's fallacy, because he regards utility as invalid or
somehow only aesthetic. Aesthetics is that which pertains
to judging beauty, and any notion that utility is limited
to taste or beauty is mixed up, but that's how Ogden sees
it. I will agree that aesthetics contribute to people's
models of the world, but aesthetics is absolutely not the
be all and end all, as Ogden claims. Avoidance of pain
and death -- the chief value of utility and reliability --
has little to do with taste or beauty. If Ogden were not
one of us pampered academic elite, and had to till the land
for his bread, he wouldn't nurse such conceits.
>
> )*( Gordon Fitch )*( g...@panix.com )*(
Ray Ingles
>In article <2jf03e...@srvr1.engin.umich.edu> ing...@engin.umich.edu (Ray Ingles) writes:
>> And therefore, of course, any ontology is equally as good as any other.
>
>I can't answer that question without constructing a universal good-o-meter.
Do you have a universal meter-o-meter which rejects all other meters as
non-universal?
Do you have any comment about my point that humans can lose language
through brain damage and still deal with reality in many ways?
Sincerely,
Ray Ingles ing...@engin.umich.edu
"The meek can *have* the Earth. The rest of us are going to the
stars!" - Robert A. Heinlein
Felix Lee
>I'm saying that language {becomes} reality because we cannot deal
>with reality except through language.
Ron House:
>This is my problem. This remark is so self-evidently false, I am completely
>mystified that so many intelligent people believe it.
I think I'm slowly getting a handle on what Ogden is saying. Let me
see if I can get it right.
The first problem seems to be the word "symbol". Ogden is using it in
a generalized sense that includes any sort of model, representation,
etc. So if an edge-detector neuron fires, say, 20 times/second
instead of 1/second, this would be a "symbol" for a visible edge.
This is not the conventional linguistic/cognitive use of "symbol", and
I'm not so sure it's a useful concept, but I'm willing to run with it
a while.
The next confusion is that these "symbols" form "languages", which are
not necessarily human/verbal languages.
The last confusion is "aesthetic sense", which doesn't mean quite the
same thing as a preference for Rodin over Gauguin. As far as I can
tell, this aesthetic sense is *defined* as the method by which one
particular symbol-system is chosen over another. And this I'm pretty
sure *isn't* a useful concept, but I'd like to think about it some
more. ("choose" seems to be another problem word, but I'll skip this
for now.)
So my questions now are, how accurate is my synopsis?
Does everything possess an aesthetic sense? Does the edge-detector
neuron "choose" its symbols using an aesthetic "judgement"?
Is this aesthetic sense material, metaphysical, or a combination of
the two?
Most humans and animals seem to agree pretty well on what "water" {is}
and what you can do with it (eg, drink it). Is there an underlying
reason for this? Is there something universal about this aesthetic
sense? How does it arise?
--
Christopher Ogden
>I think you're making excessively large assumptions about
>how the nervous system works here. While I would agree that
>the brain manipulates experiences at least partly in symbolic
>form, it may also do other things; specifically, it may
>construct non-symbolic models of the universe. (I assume we
>all agree that a model is not (necessarily) a symbol.)
Isn't it? a non-symbolic model seems like an oxymoron.
>My
>guess is that there is a continuous interchange between
>sense perception, non-symbolic models, and symbol-using
>processes, another case of level leakage without which the
>biological systems underlying mentation wouldn't work.
But your "guess" is just an ontology game, since "non-symbolic models" are
just as unobservable (by definition) as a quark's armpit. If you could
observe it, it would become a sign.
-----------------------------
Christopher Ogden
ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
Christopher Ogden
>You may not be on solid ground here! You may have to admit that some
>experiences are nothing more than nerve stimulus/response, and are not
>stored at all, code or not. They are experiences, nevertheless. For
>example, in a traffic accident, events often happen too fast for
>reliable perception, and a victim wakes up in a hospital, not at all
>sure how he got there; although he was conscious much of the time, he
>does not remember.
And then the person constructs their narrative of the event from the sign
fragments left in memory.
When you have a reflex, you don't know what happened until after the fact.
When you touch a hot pan, first your hand reacts. Then, your brain constructs
a narrative of what happened based on signs from your spinal cord. According
to Science, you see your hand move before you feel the tactical sign from your
spinal cord, but your constructed "reality" changes the sequence of those two
events, so that according to your subsequently constructed narrative, you feel
before you see.
> I don't think any
>of these "packets" of symbols are arbitrary; rather they are
>wired into the architecture of my nervous system, some parts in the
>cognitive regions, others in the regions of lower-level functions.
>I would function this way even if I knew nothing of science.
I don't know how such cognitive symbols could form automatically in a
mother's uterus. Babies aren't born with an ego, they develop it later by
interracting with people and things. They have reflexes, of course, but
reflexes are not cognitive signs, by my definition.
-----------------------------
Christopher Ogden
ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
arnold v. lesikar
>of strength. These differences may rest on aesthetics, but
>the aesthetics may be empirical, that is, the result of
>experience. For instance, one cannot learn anything without
>knowing that one is ignorant, that is, that one's model of
>the universe is significantly incomplete. If one enjoys
>learning things (probably an a-priori aesthetic value) one
>discovers that one must understand and accept one's
>ignorance (probably something also learned, an a-posteriori
>aesthetic value). Hence one's preference for a given
>model of the universe may be pretty vague, in general or in
>specific places, and it may be the subject of a dialog with
>the universe, subjecting it to constant change.
Is it out of place to interject that Gordon's program here has
implications for survival?
I am bothered by the use of the term "aesthetics" here. Aesthetic
concerns seem to be connected with production surpluses. If every
individual has to struggle for subsistence, who will have time to
produce or enjoy art, or to develop a metaphysics. Aesthetic
considerations seem to emerge when survival is no longer a pressing
issue. In this sense there would seem to be certain lack of
seriousness to Ogden's philosophy.
Christopher Ogden
>a generalized sense that includes any sort of model, representation,
>etc. So if an edge-detector neuron fires, say, 20 times/second
>instead of 1/second, this would be a "symbol" for a visible edge.
That's it. I wish there was a better word than "language" for this particular
use--maybe "sign", or better yet, "simulacrum".
>The last confusion is "aesthetic sense", which doesn't mean quite the
>same thing as a preference for Rodin over Gauguin. As far as I can
>tell, this aesthetic sense is *defined* as the method by which one
>particular symbol-system is chosen over another. And this I'm pretty
>sure *isn't* a useful concept, but I'd like to think about it some
>more. ("choose" seems to be another problem word, but I'll skip this
>for now.)
To what use do you want to put the word "aesthetic"? I don't see much use for
it either, except for putting a label on the phenomenon.
>Does everything possess an aesthetic sense? Does the edge-detector
>neuron "choose" its symbols using an aesthetic "judgement"?
No. The scientist chooses the edge-detector's symbols by designing the
instrument to convert phenomena into information. The information is
based on aesthetic signs. We can't say anything about the phenomenon itself
without using the information to play ontological language games.
>Is this aesthetic sense material, metaphysical, or a combination of
>the two?
Like I say, I don't like to play ontological language games. The exact signs
we paste on "aesthetic" are quite arbitrary, as far as I can see.
-----------------------------
Christopher Ogden
ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
Malgosia Askanas
>Aesthetics is that which pertains
>to judging beauty, and any notion that utility is limited
>to taste or beauty is mixed up, but that's how Ogden sees
>it. I will agree that aesthetics contribute to people's
>models of the world, but aesthetics is absolutely not the
>be all and end all, as Ogden claims. Avoidance of pain
>and death -- the chief value of utility and reliability --
>has little to do with taste or beauty. If Ogden were not
>one of us pampered academic elite, and had to till the land
>for his bread, he wouldn't nurse such conceits.
I believe is that our aesthetic sense is very profoundly tied
to utility. It has to do with how we resonate to things outside
of ourselves, and this resonance, in turn, has to do with the
exact way in which our entire beings are part of the world --
what nourishes us, what strengthens us, what responds to us
or invites our response. I realize that the usual dictionary
definitions tend to put aesthetics into the straighjacket of
"taste" and "judgement", but it seems to me that this is
a very narrow-sighted viewpoint, and concerns itself mainly
with aesthetics as a _profession_ -- what it is one would get
paid for if one was paid to be an "aesthetician".
Gordon Fitch
so these are removed on the follow-up. If you think other-
wise, adjust your Newsgroups line accordingly. I have added
a.s.anarchy since I am making an anarchistic argument.)
| In article <2jin6n$l...@panix.com>, g...@panix.com (Gordon Fitch) writes:
| > ... aesthetics ....
les...@TIGGER.STCLOUD.MSUS.EDU:
| Is it out of place to interject that Gordon's program here has
| implications for survival?
|
| I am bothered by the use of the term "aesthetics" here. Aesthetic
| concerns seem to be connected with production surpluses. If every
| individual has to struggle for subsistence, who will have time to
| produce or enjoy art, or to develop a metaphysics. Aesthetic
| considerations seem to emerge when survival is no longer a pressing
| issue. In this sense there would seem to be certain lack of
| seriousness to Ogden's philosophy.
In my view, aesthetic evaluations precede every other
kind of evaluation; an infant knows nothing else. Food
is good, Mommy is good, falling is bad.... No doubt
the aesthetic is part of our biology, if it does not
emanate from an even deeper level. Then the world
impinges, not just the world of Nature with its hard
objects but the social world, and various structures
are substituted for the pure aesthetic reaction: "Do
that again and I'll tell your father." The energy that
supports the learning of these things is aesthetic, but
they are often turned against the aesthetic.
In some people the aesthetic is completely effaced by
being turned against itself. Since we know that humans
living under extremely difficult conditions often have
had lively aesthetic lives, it must be that the total
effacement of the aesthetic is a manifest of slavery,
that is, the complete absorption of the personality by
social forces.
It is more common to put the aesthetic on a leash and
take it for a walk now and then, to allow it to concern
itself with unimportant things like the decor of walls.
But this, I think, is a sham; it is still the ancestor
of every other value, however it is subjugated. Hence
its traces appear everywhere.
Dave Batchelor, Space Phys. Data Facil. 301/286-2988
>(This is probably not about religion and atheism any more,
>so these are removed on the follow-up. If you think other-
>wise, adjust your Newsgroups line accordingly. I have added
>a.s.anarchy since I am making an anarchistic argument.)
>
>| In article <2jin6n$l...@panix.com>, g...@panix.com (Gordon Fitch) writes:
>| > ... aesthetics ....
>
>les...@TIGGER.STCLOUD.MSUS.EDU:
>| Is it out of place to interject that Gordon's program here has
>| implications for survival?
>|
>| I am bothered by the use of the term "aesthetics" here. Aesthetic
>| concerns seem to be connected with production surpluses. If every
>| individual has to struggle for subsistence, who will have time to
>| produce or enjoy art, or to develop a metaphysics. Aesthetic
>| considerations seem to emerge when survival is no longer a pressing
>| issue. In this sense there would seem to be certain lack of
>| seriousness to Ogden's philosophy.
>
>kind of evaluation; an infant knows nothing else. Food
>is good, Mommy is good, falling is bad....
"Aesthetics" has acquired connotations of arbitrariness and
preference in this discussion, as well as the more abstract
term for the nature of sense perception that you are using.
I think that's why Arn doesn't like it. Of course an infant
is ruled by sense perceptions, but the conclusive, law-like,
abstract judgments that you attribute to infants above are
not representative of the infant response. I remember no
such capsule conclusions or summations as "Mommy is good"
until some time after learning to talk, but I had responses
along the same lines, experienced in more immediate urges:
I WANT food, I WANT Mommy, Don't let me fall! The kind of
evaluations that you express above were not formed until a
later stage. Before being able to make these abstract conclusions and
assertions like "I love Mommy" I experienced more elemental,
uncontrolable responses. I think they are prior to your
forms of the perceptions as evaluations; evaluations are
part of a higher faculty of mental processing that develops
later, at an age when a child can converse and answer
questions. This phase is not the first phase. In the
first phase, I did not have a choice of how to react to
aesthetic stimuli; in later phases, I learned how to
control myself and train myself to observe without fear,
whereas the infant me would have felt terror. This later
stage must be the phase that Ogden imagines to characterize
aesthetic judgments; in that case, his notions would make
some sense -- yet still be incomplete because even in
adults, some sense perceptions are irresistible, such as
reflexes and flight responses from danger. Ogden thinks
we can deny anything or twist our conclusions about any
perception into arbitrary results, and other posters have
rebelled against this by talking about throwing bricks at
his head. Perhaps Ogden would not flinch, but I probably
would, even at a projectile in a 3-D movie.
GF>No doubt
>the aesthetic is part of our biology, if it does not
>emanate from an even deeper level. Then the world
>impinges, not just the world of Nature with its hard
>objects but the social world, and various structures
>are substituted for the pure aesthetic reaction: "Do
>that again and I'll tell your father." The energy that
>supports the learning of these things is aesthetic, but
>they are often turned against the aesthetic.
>
>In some people the aesthetic is completely effaced by
>being turned against itself. Since we know that humans
>living under extremely difficult conditions often have
>had lively aesthetic lives, it must be that the total
>effacement of the aesthetic is a manifest of slavery,
>that is, the complete absorption of the personality by
>social forces.
I don't understand the effacement you identify here.
>
GF>It is more common to put the aesthetic on a leash and
>take it for a walk now and then, to allow it to concern
>itself with unimportant things like the decor of walls.
>But this, I think, is a sham; it is still the ancestor
>of every other value, however it is subjugated. Hence
>its traces appear everywhere.
Although it is leashed, some sense experiences can
loose the aesthetic; I think there are more than traces.
>--
> )*( Gordon Fitch )*( g...@panix.com )*(
Russell Turpin
In article <2jlg29$f...@panix.com>, Gordon Fitch <g...@panix.com> wrote:
> In my view, aesthetic evaluations precede every other
> kind of evaluation; an infant knows nothing else. Food
> is good, Mommy is good, falling is bad.... No doubt
While agreeing with what (I think) Fitch means to say above, and
most of his later comments, I think he has confused the issue
through poor word choice. What he describes above I suspect most
would label practical or biological (rather than aesthetic)
evaluation. The infant of his example does not give a damn about
what is beautiful, only about what hurts, what gives pleasure and
nurture, and what satisfies biological needs. Undoubtedly, there
are philosophers who would reduce the aesthetic to these; but to
jump the gun and call these things aesthetic evaluations is to
betray a view of aesthetics before it has been successfully
argued, much as deconstructionists betray an (unargued?)
epistemology when they claim that the validity of any particular
scientific theory is merely a verbal issue.
> ... if it does not emanate from an even deeper level. ...
Ah. Religious rant, again.
Russell
--
There is more to life than avoiding death. -- Jeffrey R. Hummel
Tim Dugan
ing...@engin.umich.edu (Ray Ingles) writes...
>[...]
>non-universal?
That sounds like the halting problem--ie, there is not algorithm
that can be used universally to determine if another algorithm will
complete.
Or does it?
-tbd
Gordon Fitch
| > In my view, aesthetic evaluations precede every other
| > kind of evaluation; an infant knows nothing else. Food
| > is good, Mommy is good, falling is bad.... No doubt
| > the aesthetic is part of our biology, ...
tur...@cs.utexas.edu (Russell Turpin):
| While agreeing with what (I think) Fitch means to say above, and
| most of his later comments, I think he has confused the issue
| through poor word choice. What he describes above I suspect most
| would label practical or biological (rather than aesthetic)
| evaluation. The infant of his example does not give a damn about
| what is beautiful, only about what hurts, what gives pleasure and
| nurture, and what satisfies biological needs. Undoubtedly, there
| are philosophers who would reduce the aesthetic to these; but to
| jump the gun and call these things aesthetic evaluations is to
| betray a view of aesthetics before it has been successfully
| argued, much as deconstructionists betray an (unargued?)
| epistemology when they claim that the validity of any particular
| scientific theory is merely a verbal issue.
I don't know how you can draw a definite boundary
between aesthetics and pleaure/pain. We're not dealing
here with culture and theory; we're dealing with a
primary thing which culture and theory modify and
clothe.
I regret that our primordial consciousness is so
chopped up that "aesthetic" has come to mean something
superficial, but so it is; that is why I said its
effacement was a measure of our unfreedom.
gcf:
| > ... if it does not emanate from an even deeper level. ...
rt:
| Ah. Religious rant, again.
If you call a single speculative phrase "ranting" you
must be really scared of the stuff. Well, I think we
have to recover our religious sensibility from the
organizations which stole it; but that's another issue.
I guess.
Russell Turpin
I wrote:
>> While agreeing with what (I think) Fitch means to say above, and
>> most of his later comments, I think he has confused the issue
>> through poor word choice. What he describes above I suspect most
>> would label practical or biological (rather than aesthetic)
Gordon Fitch replies:
> I don't know how you can draw a definite boundary
> between aesthetics and pleaure/pain. We're not dealing
> here with culture and theory; we're dealing with a
> primary thing which culture and theory modify and
> clothe.
Again, this reflects a particular notion of the aesthetic.
Some define "aesthetic" and "beauty" differently, so that
it is something very wrapped up with culture and theory,
rather than primary to it.
> I regret that our primordial consciousness is so
> chopped up that "aesthetic" has come to mean something
> superficial, but so it is; ...
I fail to see how the fact that Fitch prefers a
meaning for the word "aesthetic" that others do not
has *any* implication for our "primordial consciousness,"
chopped up or otherwise.
Gordon Fitch
| GF>In my view, aesthetic evaluations precede every other
| >kind of evaluation; an infant knows nothing else. Food
| >is good, Mommy is good, falling is bad....
batc...@nssdca.gsfc.nasa.gov (Dave Batchelor, Space Phys. Data Facil. 301/286-2988):
| "Aesthetics" has acquired connotations of arbitrariness and
| preference in this discussion, as well as the more abstract
| term for the nature of sense perception that you are using.
Well, someone has _given_ aesthetics the connotations of
arbitrariness and preference -- and superficiality -- but
who? Not me. I recognize, however, that that is the mes-
sage of the culture of enslavement: your feelings and
values don't count unless you can connect them with those
which are officially approved, using language (reason).
(Reason can often be taken over by those with wealth and
power, because they can hire professional reasoners; but
it may have a redeeming subversive quality in some
situations.)
db:
| I think that's why Arn doesn't like it. Of course an infant
| is ruled by sense perceptions, but the conclusive, law-like,
| abstract judgments that you attribute to infants above are
| not representative of the infant response. I remember no
| such capsule conclusions or summations as "Mommy is good"
| until some time after learning to talk, but I had responses
| along the same lines, experienced in more immediate urges:
| I WANT food, I WANT Mommy, Don't let me fall! The kind of
| evaluations that you express above were not formed until a
| later stage.
I don't think there's a solid distinction between "I like
Mommy" and "Mommy is good" except in that the latter can be
a way of projecting my likes, or our likes, or the
authority's likes, on the universe, so that my likes become
God's likes, and you'd better like them too. I wasn't
thinking at all of an abstract or law-like judgment; these
come about through language and the imposition of social
forces at a later point of development. When I say "good" I
am using the word the way Meister Eckhart did when he said
that God was good in exactly the same way as an apple was
good. How he avoided being broiled I don't know.
db:
| Before being able to make these abstract conclusions and
| assertions like "I love Mommy" I experienced more elemental,
| uncontrolable responses. I think they are prior to your
| forms of the perceptions as evaluations; evaluations are
| part of a higher faculty of mental processing that develops
| later, at an age when a child can converse and answer
| questions. This phase is not the first phase. In the
| first phase, I did not have a choice of how to react to
| aesthetic stimuli; in later phases, I learned how to
| control myself and train myself to observe without fear,
| whereas the infant me would have felt terror.
Are you sure? Observing infants and small children has
convinced me that we are born with will and values. And
apparently an ability to process language; I've observed
elementary language comprehension in a four-month-old.
gcf:
| ...
| > [...] [T]he world
| >impinges, not just the world of Nature with its hard
| >objects but the social world, and various structures
| >are substituted for the pure aesthetic reaction: "Do
| >that again and I'll tell your father." The energy that
| >supports the learning of these things is aesthetic, but
| >they are often turned against the aesthetic.
| >
| >In some people the aesthetic is completely effaced by
| >being turned against itself. Since we know that humans
| >living under extremely difficult conditions often have
| >had lively aesthetic lives, it must be that the total
| >effacement of the aesthetic is a manifest of slavery,
| >that is, the complete absorption of the personality by
| >social forces.
db:
| I don't understand the effacement you identify here.
I believe the intuitive response of the whole being
is the most basic human response and I designate it
as aesthetic. I associate this reponse in infants
with the type of response I have to certain forms of
art or appearances of Nature, because both appear to
be independent of language and custom.
Now, if most people regard what is basic as
peripheral, then something must have happened to
them to cover up their perceptions of it, to efface
their view of it.
Since we know that humans living under very difficult
conditions have retained their view of the aesthetic
as important -- people have done art in Neolithic
caves, on desert islands, in jail and even in camps
where they awaited extermination -- then I assume
that the covering-up of the aesthetic does not take
place as a result of necessity imposed by Nature, but
as a result of social force -- it is imposed on people
as part of their social conditioning. Skipping
several steps, I relate this to the invention of
slavery, which I believe continues in a very modified
form to the present day. That is, the effacing of
the aesthetic sense is political and is connected to
the way our political and economic systems work.
ron house
>In article <house.760934573@helios> ho...@helios.usq.EDU.AU (ron house) writes:
>>>I'm saying that language {becomes} reality because we cannot deal with
>reality >>except through language.
>>This is my problem. This remark is so self-evidently false, I am completely
>>mystified that so many intelligent people believe it. I have, many times on
>>many topics, formulated an idea and been at a loss for the words to express
>>it. Even with so mundane a task as driving to work, I swerve to avoid a
>>wallaby or an echidna without verbalising any of the things I do in
>>'dealing with reality'. If I can't see whether something was a horned
>>lizard or a frilled one, or if I were one of those people who can't
>>remember their right from their left, would I be unable to "Swerve right
>>to avoid the horned lizard"?
>The problem here arises from the metaphysical baggage that the word "language"
>carries with it. When I said "language", I meant more than just verbal
>communication; I also meant all signs and signifiers, be they visual,
>tactical, verbal, or even signs of smell. The idea is that all of our
>experiences are translated into some sort of "code" or language before it is
>stored in our brains. We think in terms of signs and languages, and those
>signs create our reality.
OK. You are allowing the internal information structures of the brain to
count as 'language'. I can accept that, but I must say you are needlessly
going to confuse millions if you retain the word 'language' for this
idea. I for one can't think why you would want to be so misunderstood.
>For example, we have a tactical sign for "hot" in our minds, and that's how we
>think of that experience. When we describe that experience, we translate it
>into the word "hot". These types of metaphysical imagery become reality to
>us. We divide "reality" into these arbitrary packets we call signs.
But here you are already retreating from the statement you made above!
The use of the term 'language' has in fact got you confused. Taking your
example, I have many temperature-related experiences that I don't relate
to the 'word "hot"', or indeed to any other actual word. Also, you will
have to prove it if you assert that the internal information storage in
the brain is in terms of "arbitrary packets we call signs." There is
some evidence that the brain stores information in an analogous way to
a hologram. As you may know, these have no localised areas representing
specific parts of an image, but instead, the entire image is stored
everywhere. In fact, as it is even simpler than the brain, I challenge
you to devise a system of signs that can describe a hologram. If you
can't do that, then your 'sign' claim I shall take to have failed.
--
Ron House. USQ
(ho...@usq.edu.au) Toowoomba, Australia.
Dave Batchelor, Space Phys. Data Facil. 301/286-2988
(Malgosia Askanas) writes...
>Dave Batchelor:
>
>>Aesthetics is that which pertains
>>to judging beauty, and any notion that utility is limited
>>to taste or beauty is mixed up, but that's how Ogden sees
>>it. I will agree that aesthetics contribute to people's
>>models of the world, but aesthetics is absolutely not the
>>be all and end all, as Ogden claims. Avoidance of pain
>>and death -- the chief value of utility and reliability --
>>has little to do with taste or beauty. If Ogden were not
>>one of us pampered academic elite, and had to till the land
>>for his bread, he wouldn't nurse such conceits.
>
>to utility. It has to do with how we resonate to things outside
>of ourselves, and this resonance, in turn, has to do with the
>exact way in which our entire beings are part of the world --
>what nourishes us, what strengthens us, what responds to us
>or invites our response. I realize that the usual dictionary
>definitions tend to put aesthetics into the straighjacket of
>"taste" and "judgement", but it seems to me that this is
>a very narrow-sighted viewpoint, and concerns itself mainly
>with aesthetics as a _profession_ -- what it is one would get
>paid for if one was paid to be an "aesthetician".
That's "aesthete." ;-) This whole discussion has been tripping
over Ogden's failure to distinguish imperative from optional
aesthetic impressions upon observers. "Aesthetics" has both of
those senses (see Oxford Eng. Dict.). Ogden has totalized (to
use one of his favorite accusations) his notion of aesthetic
judgments, labelling them all optional. People tried to talk
some sense into him by imagining throwing rocks at his head,
but he wouldn't give in and admit that some aesthetic judgments
are not optional. Because words have twisty meanings and new
ones are being coined all the time, Ogden presumed that all
aesthetic perceptions are equally fluid. There is an aesthetics
of necessity and another of luxury, and science (the root topic
of this thread) is much closer to the aesthetics of necessity
than to luxury (Ogden's erroneous view). IMHO
Dave Batchelor, Space Phys. Data Facil. 301/286-2988
>gcf:
>| GF>In my view, aesthetic evaluations precede every other
>| >kind of evaluation; an infant knows nothing else. Food
>| >is good, Mommy is good, falling is bad....
>
>db:
>| Of course an infant
>| is ruled by sense perceptions, but the conclusive, law-like,
>| abstract judgments that you attribute to infants above are
>| not representative of the infant response. I remember no
>| such capsule conclusions or summations as "Mommy is good"
>| until some time after learning to talk, but I had responses
>| along the same lines, experienced in more immediate urges:
>| I WANT food, I WANT Mommy, Don't let me fall! The kind of
>| evaluations that you express above were not formed until a
>| later stage.
>
>Mommy" and "Mommy is good" except in that the latter can be
>a way of projecting my likes, or our likes, or the
>authority's likes, on the universe, so that my likes become
>God's likes, and you'd better like them too. I wasn't
>thinking at all of an abstract or law-like judgment; these
>come about through language and the imposition of social
>forces at a later point of development. When I say "good" I
>am using the word the way Meister Eckhart did when he said
>that God was good in exactly the same way as an apple was
>good. How he avoided being broiled I don't know.
>
>db:
>| Before being able to make these abstract conclusions and
>| assertions like "I love Mommy" I experienced more elemental,
>| uncontrolable responses. I think they are prior to your
>| forms of the perceptions as evaluations; evaluations are
>| part of a higher faculty of mental processing that develops
>| later, at an age when a child can converse and answer
>| questions. This phase is not the first phase. In the
>| first phase, I did not have a choice of how to react to
>| aesthetic stimuli; in later phases, I learned how to
>| control myself and train myself to observe without fear,
>| whereas the infant me would have felt terror.
>
>convinced me that we are born with will and values. And
>apparently an ability to process language; I've observed
>elementary language comprehension in a four-month-old.
>
the doctor for an inoculation, I must have experienced
uncontrolable terror at the sight of the hypodermic
needle. That is a non-optional aesthetic impression, not
an abstract judgment. At some later age, my mom could
explain to me that it wasn't dangerous, would only hurt a
little and then stop, be a "big boy", etc. Now I get the
flu shot every year and seeing the needle insertion is not
even scary. I have control over my aesthetic responses
that I did not have as an infant. There's a clear distinction
to be noted here, and it's at the heart of Ogden's fallacy.
He has maintained that all aesthetic judgments pertaining to
the foundations of science are optional matters of taste. I
and numerous other posters have argued instead that there are
irresistible judgments, connected with observation of
survival-related physical phenomena. I regard the
foundations of science as accumulated wisdom about non-
optional aesthetic judgments.
>gcf:
>| ...
>| > [...] [T]he world
>| >impinges, not just the world of Nature with its hard
>| >objects but the social world, and various structures
>| >are substituted for the pure aesthetic reaction: "Do
>| >that again and I'll tell your father." The energy that
>| >supports the learning of these things is aesthetic, but
>| >they are often turned against the aesthetic.
>| >
>| >In some people the aesthetic is completely effaced by
>| >being turned against itself. Since we know that humans
>| >living under extremely difficult conditions often have
>| >had lively aesthetic lives, it must be that the total
>| >effacement of the aesthetic is a manifest of slavery,
>| >that is, the complete absorption of the personality by
>| >social forces.
>
>db:
>| I don't understand the effacement you identify here.
>
GF>I believe the intuitive response of the whole being
>is the most basic human response and I designate it
>as aesthetic. I associate this reponse in infants
>with the type of response I have to certain forms of
>art or appearances of Nature, because both appear to
>be independent of language and custom.
Agreed, basically, but responses across cultural
boundaries can be very surprising.
>
GF>Now, if most people regard what is basic as
>peripheral, then something must have happened to
>them to cover up their perceptions of it, to efface
>their view of it.
>
>Since we know that humans living under very difficult
>conditions have retained their view of the aesthetic
>as important -- people have done art in Neolithic
>caves, on desert islands, in jail and even in camps
>where they awaited extermination -- then I assume
>that the covering-up of the aesthetic does not take
>place as a result of necessity imposed by Nature, but
>as a result of social force -- it is imposed on people
>as part of their social conditioning.
Other conditioning that occurs during maturity may be a
factor, not just social conditioning.
GF>Skipping
>several steps, I relate this to the invention of
>slavery, which I believe continues in a very modified
>form to the present day. That is, the effacing of
>the aesthetic sense is political and is connected to
>the way our political and economic systems work.
Interesting notion.
Regards,
Dave
>--
>
> )*( Gordon Fitch )*( g...@panix.com )*(
Bill Case
> Colors {are} "primary" because that's how we define them,
Isn't it "How we observed them"? The primaries are primaries because:
o You can't create primaries by mixing other colors.
o You can create all the other colors by mixing the primaries.
We didn't choose them.
Malgosia Askanas
>That's "aesthete." ;-) This whole discussion has been tripping
>over Ogden's failure to distinguish imperative from optional
>aesthetic impressions upon observers. "Aesthetics" has both of
>those senses (see Oxford Eng. Dict.).
>[...]
>There is an aesthetics
>of necessity and another of luxury, and science (the root topic
>of this thread) is much closer to the aesthetics of necessity
>than to luxury (Ogden's erroneous view). IMHO
I don't mean to restart a discussion that has already taken place
(so simply rebuff me if that's what I am doing)
but I don't quite understand the distinction between imperative
and optional aesthetics. I would also say that science as we
practice it -- a phenomenon characteristic of highly developed
countries -- seems to be associated with luxury more than with
necessity.
Dave Batchelor, Space Phys. Data Facil. 301/286-2988
(Malgosia Askanas) writes...
>Dave Batchelor writes:
>
>>That's "aesthete." ;-) This whole discussion has been tripping
>>over Ogden's failure to distinguish imperative from optional
>>aesthetic impressions upon observers. "Aesthetics" has both of
>>those senses (see Oxford Eng. Dict.).
>>[...]
>>There is an aesthetics
>>of necessity and another of luxury, and science (the root topic
>>of this thread) is much closer to the aesthetics of necessity
>>than to luxury (Ogden's erroneous view). IMHO
>
>(so simply rebuff me if that's what I am doing)
Sorry, I didn't buff you, so I can't rebuff you. ;-)
MA>but I don't quite understand the distinction between imperative
>and optional aesthetics.
"Aesthetics" as in having to do with sense perceptions generally,
not narrowly as in taste and preference. I put reflex stimuli
(someone throws a rock at your head) into the imperative group,
and I said they were imperative because you don't have an option
of response. What kind of curtains you choose for your living
room is a luxury, based on taste. Ogden was totalizing (his
word) his notion that all observations and measurements are in
the taste category; we have the luxury of interpreting them as
we choose. We opponents were arguing that repeatability and
verifiability by other experimenters suggest scientific
measurements are not so flexible; there is more force to believe
them than just personal or communal preference. In other posts,
I mentioned calendar science, wherein repeatable celestial
observations give farmers the vital cues they need for when to
plant. I also likened science to cooking. Ogden has not yet
budged from his assertion that all of these observations are
mere metaphysical whims which we ONLY believe in because we like
to. I say there is more force behind them, and the language of
science and math is a privileged language because it models the
observations in useful and important ways.
MA>I would also say that science as we
>practice it -- a phenomenon characteristic of highly developed
>countries -- seems to be associated with luxury more than with
>necessity.
I would say that might have been true in tribal, pre-civilized
times, but if our farmers lost all information and knowledge
about planting times and cultivation methods -- scientific and
practical techniques that are not arbitrary whimsical choices --
then a lot of people would starve to death. On the other hand,
there are scientific investigations that we can well survive
without, today. We may or may not come to depend on them, too.
Gordon Fitch
| >I think you're making excessively large assumptions about
| >how the nervous system works here. While I would agree that
| >the brain manipulates experiences at least partly in symbolic
| >form, it may also do other things; specifically, it may
| >construct non-symbolic models of the universe. (I assume we
| >all agree that a model is not (necessarily) a symbol.)
OGD...@caedm.et.byu.edu (Christopher Ogden):
| Isn't it? a non-symbolic model seems like an oxymoron.
No. I can make a scale model of a structure for the purpose
of seeing how it will look or whether things will fit into
it. It must have the same proportions as the "real"
structure, because it must function mechanically. I can
also make an ideograph to mean "structure" looking some-
thing like a bird, because I am writing Chinese. The latter
is less useful for studying geometric relationships but is
more useful for writing; it is also a symbol, because it is
arbitrary; other markings would do as well. The generic
name for both models and symbols might be "mapping" or
"representation." Those who have slogged through solid
trigonometry can tell you that it is often hard work to make
symbols perform as models.
gcf:
| >My
| >guess is that there is a continuous interchange between
| >sense perception, non-symbolic models, and symbol-using
| >processes, another case of level leakage without which the
| >biological systems underlying mentation wouldn't work.
co:
| But your "guess" is just an ontology game, since "non-symbolic models" are
| just as unobservable (by definition) as a quark's armpit. If you could
| observe it, it would become a sign.
But some signs point to signs, and others point to non-
symbolic models. At some point in dereferencing pointers
we can come to different objects. We can tell they are
different because they leak differently.
Malgosia Askanas
>"Aesthetics" as in having to do with sense perceptions generally,
>not narrowly as in taste and preference. I put reflex stimuli
>(someone throws a rock at your head) into the imperative group,
>and I said they were imperative because you don't have an option
>of response.
First of all, thanks for the summary. Although you presented
non-rebuffal as if it was imperative, I believe you elected it
optionally.
I personally would _not_ say that reflex stimuli are dictated
by aesthetics (I think). However, I disagree with generalizing
(as Arnold seems to have done in his latest post) things that
can or cannot be said about reflex stimuli to survival in general.
We _do_ have a choice of survival vs non-survival. One can choose
to immobilize oneself and prevent oneself from ducking at the
approach of the rock. People have done this, for various reasons,
and the choice is aesthetic. We in this country have a cult of
survival, an aesthetics of primacy of survival. There is nothing
imperative about this, though.
Is the choice between life and death arbitrary, subjective,
whimsical? Well, on a certain level it is; but on others
it is not. Even choosing curtains is not such an obvious
example. If one is choosing curtains for a theatrical
performance, a film, a political convention, a state funeral,
the home of a severely depressed person, it may become
a grave matter.
gerry harbison
>In article <2jed86$o...@crcnis1.unl.edu> harb...@unlinfo.unl.edu (gerry harbison) writes:
>>Rubbish. There are three primary colors because there are three
>>types of color vision photoreceptors in the human eye. It's purely
>>physiological, culture has nothing to do with it. We can choose
>>primairy colors which approximate the absorbtion maxima of these
>>photoreceptors (RGB) or we can take linear combinations (CMY), but
>>*any* arbitrary mixture of lights of different wavelength can be simulated by
>>three colors as far as our visual system is concerned.
>You've completely missed the point.
The point was that you said the *number* of primary colors was
culturally defined. It isn't.
>You've justifying your worldview by
>appealing to your worldview. According to you, the words "primary colors"
>are defined as being exactly those wavelengths of light that match pigments in
>the eye.
Not at all. I'm saying the primary colors could be a set of lineraly
independent linear combinations of RGB, but that you cannot create a
color which I can't match to the human eye by using a mix of three
primary colors. Four is too many, and two is not enough.
[...]
>-----------------------------
>Christopher Ogden
>ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
Gerry Harbison UNL
Gordon Fitch
batc...@nssdca.gsfc.nasa.gov (Dave Batchelor, Space Phys. Data Facil. 301/286-2988):
| Yeah, I'm sure that before a particular age, if I went to
| the doctor for an inoculation, I must have experienced
| uncontrolable terror at the sight of the hypodermic
| needle. That is a non-optional aesthetic impression, not
| an abstract judgment.
I think that's an abstract judgment. As a newborn
you would have had no experience of needles. Subse-
quently, you would learn from experience and be told
that long, thin, sharp metallic objects could do harm.
This would be an abstraction of a set of perceptions.
| At some later age, my mom could
| explain to me that it wasn't dangerous, would only hurt a
| little and then stop, be a "big boy", etc. Now I get the
| flu shot every year and seeing the needle insertion is not
| even scary. I have control over my aesthetic responses
| that I did not have as an infant.
Now the abstraction is overlaid with yet further
experiences and abstractions, including second- and
higher-order abstractions, and formerly unrelated
material such as prestige. I would guess that the
reactions are still there, but I'm not a psycholo-
gist. In any case, this an example of the efface-
ment of an unwanted, deleterious reaction. The
same sort of thing can be applied to all aesthetic
responses. In most people it is applied to enough of
them so that, unlike those Neolithic hunters and
death-camp inmates, they come to believe that the
aesthetic is marginal and unimportant and they have
no time for it.
| There's a clear distinction
| to be noted here, and it's at the heart of Ogden's fallacy.
| He has maintained that all aesthetic judgments pertaining to
| the foundations of science are optional matters of taste. I
| and numerous other posters have argued instead that there are
| irresistible judgments, connected with observation of
| survival-related physical phenomena. I regard the
| foundations of science as accumulated wisdom about non-
| optional aesthetic judgments.
Well, I think Malgosia has already noted that science
seems to flourish more in an atmosphere of leisure
and curiosity, than under dire necessity. What if the
optional taste is for, say, reliability? This is one
of the meanings of the word _true_. This taste could
subsequently prove to have practical implications and
grow in repute, but remember that before science and
reason start there is no scientific, rational motive
for pursuing them. It wouldn't detract from the valid-
ity of science if its roots were intuitive and emotion-
al, that is, aesthetic; it wouldn't add to it either,
at least not if you look at the situation empirically.
gerry harbison
>Dave Batchelor wrote:
>>"Aesthetics" as in having to do with sense perceptions generally,
>>not narrowly as in taste and preference. I put reflex stimuli
>>(someone throws a rock at your head) into the imperative group,
>>and I said they were imperative because you don't have an option
>>of response.
>First of all, thanks for the summary. Although you presented
>non-rebuffal as if it was imperative, I believe you elected it
>optionally.
>I personally would _not_ say that reflex stimuli are dictated
>by aesthetics (I think). However, I disagree with generalizing
>(as Arnold seems to have done in his latest post) things that
>can or cannot be said about reflex stimuli to survival in general.
>We _do_ have a choice of survival vs non-survival. One can choose
>to immobilize oneself and prevent oneself from ducking at the
>approach of the rock. People have done this, for various reasons,
>and the choice is aesthetic. We in this country have a cult of
>survival, an aesthetics of primacy of survival. There is nothing
>imperative about this, though.
Challenge: do it! (and have someone else post the result here). I
maintain you can't. Even baseball players who made a partial career
of being hit by pitches flinch and protect their heads.
Since you are the sole means your genome has to propagate its
collection of genes, it's made damn sure that even if you get fool
philosophical ideas in your head, your body will keep you out of
serious danger.
And if reflexes exist and are non-aesthetic, why can't other aspects
of the need to survive be non-aesthetic? The fact that you can
suppress them hardly proves anything. You can suppress a knee-jerk
reflex by tying your leg down, too.
Go on, take one for the team. To be fair, make sure it's a big rock,
and thrown reasonably hard.
Gerry Harbison
Roger Lewis
>gcf:
>Are you sure? Observing infants and small children has
>convinced me that we are born with will and values. And
>apparently an ability to process language; I've observed
>elementary language comprehension in a four-month-old.
There are studies that show newborns rest better when the language of
their mother is spoken around them than when foreign languages were.
Apparently, during the 9 months in the womb they overheard conversations
and grew used to certain sounds at the very least.
--
rle...@isi.edu Power to the People!
Malgosia Askanas
>Challenge: do it! (and have someone else post the result here). I
>maintain you can't. Even baseball players who made a partial career
>of being hit by pitches flinch and protect their heads.
I said: "One can choose to immobilize oneself". I didn't say it
had to be by sheer will power. One could use rope.
>And if reflexes exist and are non-aesthetic, why can't other aspects
>of the need to survive be non-aesthetic? The fact that you can
>suppress them hardly proves anything.
I don't quite understand what is being argued here. I believe that
the choice between satisfying or not satisfying the need for survival
is made on aesthetic grounds. I never tried to supply any proof of
this; I am not sure what such a "proof" could possibly look like.
arnold v. lesikar
>
>>I personally would _not_ say that reflex stimuli are dictated
>>by aesthetics (I think). However, I disagree with generalizing
>>(as Arnold seems to have done in his latest post) things that
>>can or cannot be said about reflex stimuli to survival in general.
>>We _do_ have a choice of survival vs non-survival. One can choose
>>to immobilize oneself and prevent oneself from ducking at the
>>approach of the rock. People have done this, for various reasons,
>>and the choice is aesthetic. We in this country have a cult of
>>survival, an aesthetics of primacy of survival. There is nothing
>>imperative about this, though.
>
>Challenge: do it! (and have someone else post the result here). I
>maintain you can't. Even baseball players who made a partial career
Gerry: Thanks for your comment. Myself I have been listening to this
discussion with only half an ear. I have been reading just
sporadic posts of the thread.
I find this material to be generally of little interest to me except
that Ogden's attempt to use aesthetics as a tool to deny the
universality of science is rather frustrating.
My intuition is, that while science does have it's game-like aspects -
e.g. politics! - there is a deep seriousness to it because ultimately
survival is at issue. It seems to me that what science has done is to
systematize the tools and techniques that can be found in the
behaviors that natural organisms have evolved to survive in a changing
and often hostile environment.
Organisms seek pleasure and avoid pain. Generally speaking,
experiences like sex produce pleasure because they contribute to the
survival of the genes. So there is a deep serious too to enjoying
oneself. And the learning capacity of human beings complicates the
mix. We can learn to experience pain as pleasure..... And culture can
teach us to sacrifice ourselves for ideas.
Now to the extent that the subject of aesthetics is the experience of
pleasure and pain, it can be argued that aesthetics itself is serious
in the deep sense of concern with survival. But such a usage is an
ideosyncratic sense of the word, it seems to me. The common usage is
that aesthetic pleasures, such as the music of Mozart, are contrasted
with cruder pleasures such as drinking gallons of beer in the
neighborhood bar. Thus aesthetic pleasure is merely one entry in a
wider spectrum of pleasures.
We have to beware here. The postmodernist game seems to be one of
removing distinctions from words. By making major choices matters of
aesthetics important questions can be written off as matters of taste.
Ogden's game here seems deeply dishonest to me. By labeling choice as
aesthetic in character, he can count on the action of an unspoken
"mere" in the mind of the hearer. Thus such a choice is merely an
aesthetic choice making it just a matter of taste, in which all the
options are equal.
The game looks like a rhetorical ploy to me, that is, using a word
because of the emotional effect of its connotations to influence the
behavior and or beliefs of the audience. Communication is about
influencing behavior and belief. But rhetoric can be used to short
circuit the cognitive centers and play on the emotions directly.
Ogden seems to have little except rhetoric to offer. His refusal to
presume any kind of ontology whatsoever deprives his writing of
cognitive content it seems to me. In other words there is very little
meaning there. What his sentences represent are rhetorical tokens
strung together in a fashion to produce an effect. I see no reason to
take his writing seriously.
arnold v. lesikar
>
>>And if reflexes exist and are non-aesthetic, why can't other aspects
>>of the need to survive be non-aesthetic? The fact that you can
>>suppress them hardly proves anything.
>
>I don't quite understand what is being argued here. I believe that
>the choice between satisfying or not satisfying the need for survival
>is made on aesthetic grounds. I never tried to supply any proof of
>this; I am not sure what such a "proof" could possibly look like.
What you are saying then is that your claim is something that you
believe because you believe it. It's like a belief in God or a belief
in flying saucers; you are unprepared to offer any evidence in support
of this belief.
I am beginning to think that the God analogy is not out of place here.
Many claim a belief in God without being able to specify very well
exactly what this God is that they believe in. It is beginning to seem
that others instead have a belief in "aesthetics" the motivating
factor in the behavior of human beings without being able to specify
very well exactly what is the nature of that factor or how that factor
operates.
It is begining to look as if language for the postmodernist is nothing
more than rhetoric, that is, verbal tokens strung together in accord
with grammatical rules in order to produce an effect. But to associate
a cognitive content with these verbal structures is to make
metaphysical assumptions, an activity frowned upon in the
postmodernist world.
What this suggests is that postmodernists are unnecessary! After all
we already have computer software that is quite capable of producing
random prose, and the Eliza program is available to simulate
conversation. What do we need postmodernists for?
Dave Batchelor, Space Phys. Data Facil. 301/286-2988
(Malgosia Askanas) writes...
>Dave Batchelor wrote:
>
>>"Aesthetics" as in having to do with sense perceptions generally,
>>not narrowly as in taste and preference. I put reflex stimuli
>>(someone throws a rock at your head) into the imperative group,
>>and I said they were imperative because you don't have an option
>>of response.
>
>non-rebuffal as if it was imperative, I believe you elected it
>optionally.
;-)
MA>I personally would _not_ say that reflex stimuli are dictated
>by aesthetics (I think). However, I disagree with generalizing
>(as Arnold seems to have done in his latest post) things that
>can or cannot be said about reflex stimuli to survival in general.
>We _do_ have a choice of survival vs non-survival. One can choose
>to immobilize oneself and prevent oneself from ducking at the
>approach of the rock. People have done this, for various reasons,
>and the choice is aesthetic.
Sigh. Rule number 1: no rule always works. Although someone can
submit to death or commit suicide, in healthy people it is very
difficult to do. The difficulty indicates that there is a strong
force against it. The fact that the force can in rare instances
be overcome does not dismiss the instinctive force into nonexistence.
People sometimes sacrifice themselves to save someone else, such as
a child, but they are generally doing something then that they feel
forced to do by the circumstances, and they wouldn't or couldn't do
it outside the circumstances. I think we are considering the clash
of two involuntary urges and arguing because one can sometimes
overrule another. This doesn't mean they don't exist.
>We in this country have a cult of
>survival, an aesthetics of primacy of survival. There is nothing
>imperative about this, though.
This is rather ingenuous. A cult? Survival instinct is a cult?
The creatures that have survived tend to have it, but admittedly
there are some creatures that have less strong survival urge or
poorer luck, and don't succeed. We may encounter them,
recognizing that they are more or less doomed by what is
missing or insufficient in their makeup.
>Is the choice between life and death arbitrary, subjective,
>whimsical? Well, on a certain level it is; but on others
>it is not. Even choosing curtains is not such an obvious
>example. If one is choosing curtains for a theatrical
>performance, a film, a political convention, a state funeral,
>the home of a severely depressed person, it may become
>a grave matter.
Regards,
Malgosia Askanas
Arnold Lesikar writes:
> I find this material to be generally of little interest to me except
> that Ogden's attempt to use aesthetics as a tool to deny the
> universality of science is rather frustrating.
> ...
> Now to the extent that the subject of aesthetics is the experience of
> pleasure and pain, it can be argued that aesthetics itself is serious
> in the deep sense of concern with survival. But such a usage is an
> ideosyncratic sense of the word, it seems to me.
It may be an ideosyncratic use, but if that is the way _Ogden_ uses
the word, then at least he is not denying _seriousness_ to science
when he calls it a matter of aesthetics. It seems to me that
Ogden's "opponents" automatically assume that when he makes
his claim about the aesthetic nature of science, he is saying
that science is as serious as choosing a pink plastic drinking
cup over a blue one. But does this indeed reflect Ogden's use of
the word "aesthetics"?
I find it interesting, by the way, that the examples of "aesthetic
decisions" given by Ogden's "opponents" all have to do with
the process of consumption rather than production: with choosing
which symphony to listen to rather than with _writing_ a symphony.
But the most obvious territory of aesthetics is _creation_, no?
This in itself should infuse it with _some_ measure of seriousness.
> We have to beware here. The postmodernist game seems to be one of
> removing distinctions from words. By making major choices matters of
> aesthetics important questions can be written off as matters of taste.
> Ogden's game here seems deeply dishonest to me. By labeling choice as
> aesthetic in character, he can count on the action of an unspoken
> "mere" in the mind of the hearer. Thus such a choice is merely an
> aesthetic choice making it just a matter of taste, in which all the
> options are equal.
I don't think Ogden can be accused of dishonesty because _you_
associate the word "mere" with the word "aesthetics". It would
never occur to me, for instance, to make this association.
It would never occur to me to "write things off" because they
are a matter of aesthetics. Is Ogden "writing science off"?
I don't know. Do you?
But the most essential thing in what you say is that you perceive
some deep danger in Ogden's approach. You suspect that Ogden,
and the people you call "postmodernists", are playing a dangerous
game for some dangerous purpose. I would like to ask you to
articulate, if possible, what you think this danger consists in.
Russell Turpin
In article <CLA00...@inmet.camb.inmet.com>,
Malgosia Askanas <m...@bogart.camb.inmet.com> wrote:
> It may be an idiosyncratic use, but if that is the way _Ogden_ uses
> the word, then at least he is not denying _seriousness_ to science
>
> But the most essential thing in what you say is that you perceive
> some deep danger in Ogden's approach. You suspect that Ogden,
> and the people you call "postmodernists", are playing a dangerous
> game for some dangerous purpose. I would like to ask you to
> articulate, if possible, what you think this danger consists in.
I have not been Malgosia Askanas's interlocutor in this thread,
nor have I read Ogden. Nonetheless, I will attempt to formulate
an answer to the question.
The view expressed is dangerous because aesthetic preferences are
slippery and subjective in ways that the hard truths of science
are not. Whether Hardy is a seminal novelist or not really that
interesting depends on one's literary stance, on what one has
read before and since, and on one's preferences. (I choose
Hardy because I have heard that academic views of him have
shifted quite a bit over the decades.) In contrast, whether the
tides will ebb and flow according to the ephemeral tables does
*not* depend on such subjective bias and preferences. Like good
King Canute's counselor, one can go to the shore and say "in my
world view, the tides will not come in today," but nonetheless,
one will have to deal with wet feet. (Was Canute the the first
anti-postmodernist? In which case, from whence should we date
postmodernism?)
The followers of and those influenced by the French philosophic
fog (I hesitate to call this postmodernism) do not confine
themselves to lit crit. They also influence decisions that
affect us all; witness the common practice today of referring to
people's *perceptions* of a thing and basing political decisions
on that, rather than on measures of the thing itself. (This is
not to say that perceptions are unimportant, but that they should
not be confused with the facts they interpret.) Because of its
increasing influence in important decisions, this confusion is
dangerous. Now it is all our feet that get wet, because some
academic counselors think that the tides must respect their
perceptions of tides and kings.
Malgosia Askanas
>Although someone can
>submit to death or commit suicide, in healthy people it is very
>difficult to do. The difficulty indicates that there is a strong
>force against it. The fact that the force can in rare instances
>be overcome does not dismiss the instinctive force into nonexistence.
>People sometimes sacrifice themselves to save someone else, such as
>a child, but they are generally doing something then that they feel
>forced to do by the circumstances, and they wouldn't or couldn't do
>it outside the circumstances. I think we are considering the clash
>of two involuntary urges and arguing because one can sometimes
>overrule another. This doesn't mean they don't exist.
I don't think I ever denied the existence or strength of the
survival instinct. What I am arguing is that the existence of
this instinct does not mean that survival is "imperative" as
opposed to "optional". The demands of the instinct can be
overruled by other factors -- not necessarily "involuntary
urges". People have sacrificed themselves for religions,
countries, honor, kings, ideologies, and so on -- cultural
entities. Individuals and groups _do_ have the option of
non-survival.
ma:
>>We in this country have a cult of
>>survival, an aesthetics of primacy of survival. There is nothing
>>imperative about this, though.
db:
>This is rather ingenuous. A cult? Survival instinct is a cult?
No, the instinct itself is not a cult. But I believe we have
a cult of this particular instinct. Many non-instinctive things
are justified by the supposedly imperative need to survive.
I believe that the argument that science has some kind of
absolute superiority over religion because science helps one
survive is in this category.
Hans M Dykstra
Russell Turpin <tur...@cs.utexas.edu> wrote:
>-*----
>In article <CLA00...@inmet.camb.inmet.com>,
>Malgosia Askanas <m...@bogart.camb.inmet.com> wrote:
>> But the most essential thing in what you say is that you perceive
>> some deep danger in Ogden's approach. You suspect that Ogden,
>> and the people you call "postmodernists", are playing a dangerous
>> game for some dangerous purpose. I would like to ask you to
>> articulate, if possible, what you think this danger consists in.
>The followers of and those influenced by the French philosophic
>fog (I hesitate to call this postmodernism) do not confine
>themselves to lit crit. They also influence decisions that
>affect us all; witness the common practice today of referring to
>people's *perceptions* of a thing and basing political decisions
>on that, rather than on measures of the thing itself. (This is
>not to say that perceptions are unimportant, but that they should
>not be confused with the facts they interpret.) Because of its
>increasing influence in important decisions, this confusion is
>dangerous. Now it is all our feet that get wet, because some
>academic counselors think that the tides must respect their
>perceptions of tides and kings.
I've only occasionally peeped in on this thread, but I was struck
by the relevance of Russell's comments to a bit of controversy
we're having here at UMass.
It seems that the Black Student Union here has invited the
good Rev. Farrakhan to speak here, and naturally there are
a number of groups up in arms about this. Here is a quote
from our good Chancellor, Dr. David Scott:
"`I appreciate those who say they want to hear the messages
of the Nation of Islam because some messages empower
African-Americans...,' Scott said." [Mass. Daily Collegian, 2/15/94]
Well, I appreciate the freedom of these people to listen to
whatever they want. But I think this "empowerment" business
is a cruel hoax being played on minorities and historically
oppressed groups in general. These people's energies are
being channeled into activities that make them *feel*
"empowered", but which in fact leave them exactly where they
were to begin with. In fact, quite possibly worse off, given
the amount of hostility which Rev. Farrakhan quite intentionally
raises on both sides of the issue. Will the "power" that
they get from this source help them to find a job, overcome
discrimination, find a place in the general society? Or will
it just make them that much more alienated and angry?
The idea that *feelings* of empowerment can help to balm the
scars of very real disempowerment is a dangerous one that leads
to pointless and even counterproductive activity, while much
more serious problems go unrecognized. Yet it is precisely
this kind of thing that badly thought out forms of post-
modernism support.
***
hmd
Christopher Ogden
>The point was that you said the *number* of primary colors was
>culturally defined. It isn't.
All numerical systems are numerically defined, and so are the words "primary
colors". If our culture didn't define these ideas, who did?
>>You've justifying your worldview by
>>appealing to your worldview. According to you, the words "primary colors"
>>are defined as being exactly those wavelengths of light that match pigments in
>>the eye.
>Not at all. I'm saying the primary colors could be a set of lineraly
>independent linear combinations of RGB, but that you cannot create a
>color which I can't match to the human eye by using a mix of three
>primary colors. Four is too many, and two is not enough.
Four is not too many--the more, the merrier. And two is not too few if I'm
color-blind or I don't like the colors red and orange, or if I re-define the
numbers four and two, or if I disagree with your metaphysical definition of
"color".
-----------------------------
Christopher Ogden
ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
Christopher Ogden
>And if reflexes exist and are non-aesthetic, why can't other aspects
>of the need to survive be non-aesthetic? The fact that you can
>suppress them hardly proves anything. You can suppress a knee-jerk
>reflex by tying your leg down, too.
Be more specific. Exactly what other survival behaviors are you talking about?
-----------------------------
Christopher Ogden
ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
Christopher Ogden
>My intuition is, that while science does have it's game-like aspects -
>e.g. politics! - there is a deep seriousness to it because ultimately
>survival is at issue. It seems to me that what science has done is to
>systematize the tools and techniques that can be found in the
>behaviors that natural organisms have evolved to survive in a changing
>and often hostile environment.
And what is your definition of "survival"? Was it not science that, among
other things, brought upon us the nuclear arms race and threatened the very
existence of human life on the planet for the first time in history? And
going back to the Hundred Years War was it not science that led to the
invention of gunpowder that made warfare no longer an upper-class pasttime?
Was it not science that led to the industrial revolution that smogged our
cities, burned our rain-forests, and thus threatened the long-term
renewability of our planetary resources?
Though science has indeed concerned itself--sometimes--with survival, I think
it is a gross overgeneralization to conclude that science is merely amplified
human survival instincts. Indeed, many other cults and cultures place high
priority on survival and have an equal claim upon the inheritance rights of
animalistic survival instincts.
>Now to the extent that the subject of aesthetics is the experience of
>pleasure and pain, it can be argued that aesthetics itself is serious
>in the deep sense of concern with survival. But such a usage is an
>ideosyncratic sense of the word, it seems to me. The common usage is
>that aesthetic pleasures, such as the music of Mozart, are contrasted
>with cruder pleasures such as drinking gallons of beer in the
>neighborhood bar. Thus aesthetic pleasure is merely one entry in a
>wider spectrum of pleasures.
It's significant that you used the example of Mozart here, because you betray
the metaphysical Enlightenment separation between "high" and "low" art that
later became exaggerated until late modernist music became, self-consciously,
ultra-elitist in nature. It is true that such long words as "aesthetic" have
been used to apply specifically to elitist art. And the matter was not helped
by Science's self-serving claim to be an-aesthetized, followed by late
modernist art's own claim to be an-aesthetized. The result was that we became
a culture of an-aesthesiologists.
Well, the operation's over now, and though we're still a little groggy,
hopefully the an-aesthetics are beginning to leave the bodys of art and
science.
>We have to beware here. The postmodernist game seems to be one of
>removing distinctions from words. By making major choices matters of
>aesthetics important questions can be written off as matters of taste.
>Ogden's game here seems deeply dishonest to me. By labeling choice as
>aesthetic in character, he can count on the action of an unspoken
>"mere" in the mind of the hearer. Thus such a choice is merely an
>aesthetic choice making it just a matter of taste, in which all the
>options are equal.
I don't see how I'm dishonest. It seems to me that the scientist who bases
her/his actions on metanarratives yet denies the aesthetic nature of her/his
actions is the one who is truly disonest with her/himself.
>Ogden seems to have little except rhetoric to offer. His refusal to
>presume any kind of ontology whatsoever deprives his writing of
>cognitive content it seems to me. In other words there is very little
>meaning there. What his sentences represent are rhetorical tokens
>strung together in a fashion to produce an effect. I see no reason to
>take his writing seriously.
Perhaps it's beginning to sink in that all discourse {is} empty of essential
meaning, and that ontology {is} just a word game.
-----------------------------
Christopher Ogden
ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
Christopher Ogden
>more than rhetoric, that is, verbal tokens strung together in accord
>with grammatical rules in order to produce an effect. But to associate
>a cognitive content with these verbal structures is to make
>metaphysical assumptions, an activity frowned upon in the
>postmodernist world.
It's not that metaphysical assumptions are frowned upon; rather, metaphysical
assumptions are re-cognized for what they {are}, not totalized, and accepted
self-consciously. Lack of any metaphysical assumptions is nihilism.
-----------------------------
Christopher Ogden
ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
gerry harbison
>gerry harbison wrote:
>I said: "One can choose to immobilize oneself". I didn't say it
>had to be by sheer will power. One could use rope.
>>And if reflexes exist and are non-aesthetic, why can't other aspects
>>of the need to survive be non-aesthetic? The fact that you can
>>suppress them hardly proves anything.
>
>I don't quite understand what is being argued here. I believe that
>the choice between satisfying or not satisfying the need for survival
>is made on aesthetic grounds. I never tried to supply any proof of
>this; I am not sure what such a "proof" could possibly look like.
You stated originally that reflex actions were not choices made on
aesthetic grounds (and a good thing too, becasue most reflexes don't
depend on higher brain function at all). You stated that other
actions made with the goal of survival *were* aesthetic choices,
becasue they can be suppressed. However, reflexes can also be
suprressed by voluntary action (and rope). Therefore the fact
that a survival-oriented action can be suppressed is not a sufficient
criterion for its being an aesthetic choice.
There, i've run rings around you. logically :-)
Maybe we should set follow-ups to a.s.b.?
Gerry
Malgosia Askanas
>What you are saying then is that your claim is something that you
>believe because you believe it. It's like a belief in God or a belief
>in flying saucers; you are unprepared to offer any evidence in support
>of this belief.
I have a great many beliefs for which I am unprepared to offer
evidence. Do you believe that you have no such beliefs? Offer
evidence for that.
>It is begining to look as if language for the postmodernist is nothing
>more than rhetoric, that is, verbal tokens strung together in accord
>with grammatical rules in order to produce an effect. But to associate
>a cognitive content with these verbal structures is to make
>metaphysical assumptions, an activity frowned upon in the
>postmodernist world.
This paragraph is a complete non-sequitur unless you believe that
I am a postmodernist and that I don't associate a cognitive content
with my verbal structures. Offer evidence for these beliefs.
Russell Turpin
I do hope that Malgosia Askana does not mind me interjecting
answers to questions he asks of others, for he seems to be the
one asking interesting questions.
In article <CLA9z...@inmet.camb.inmet.com>,
Malgosia Askanas <m...@bogart.camb.inmet.com> wrote:
> I have a great many beliefs for which I am unprepared to offer
> evidence. Do you believe that you have no such beliefs? ...
I suspect I do have such beliefs. After all, for much of my
life, I was a child, and I came to beliefs as a child, largely
accepting many things I was told because of who told them to me
and because of the social context in which they were told. There
was a time when I believed George Washington chopped down his
father's cherry tree, and then took his strapping rather than lie
about it. Since, I have learned that this story originates (as
far as it can be traced) in myth, in a morality fable.
Not being able to enumerate my beliefs (nor having the time) I
have no doubt that some are unexamined. BUT -- and this is a big
but -- when such a belief comes to the fore and its importance
warrants (as when someone else asks) I *will* examine that belief
and reject it if I have no evidence for it.
I am no longer a child and no longer come to belief as a child.
(Is this not what separates most religious nonbelievers from
believers?) This does not mean that I have purged myself of all
childish beliefs resting in the corners of my mind. But it does
mean that when such beliefs are uncovered, they become former
beliefs rather than articles of faith. I know this in the same
way that I know I eat breakfast: I have done it regularly in the
past and I plan to do it regularly in the future.
Dave Batchelor, Space Phys. Data Facil. 301/286-2988
>All numerical systems are numerically defined, and so are the words "primary
>colors". If our culture didn't define these ideas, who did?
Of course the first numbers are lost in history, and the idea of number
was not defined by our culture. Maybe that other culture that bequeathed
it to us had a non-aesthetic motivation for doing so? Nah... ;-)
Dave Batchelor, Space Phys. Data Facil. 301/286-2988
>In article <1994Feb15....@lamont.ldgo.columbia.edu>
les...@TIGGER.STCLOUD.MSUS.EDU (arnold v. lesikar) writes:
>>My intuition is, that while science does have it's game-like aspects -
>>e.g. politics! - there is a deep seriousness to it because ultimately
>>survival is at issue. It seems to me that what science has done is to
>>systematize the tools and techniques that can be found in the
>>behaviors that natural organisms have evolved to survive in a changing
>>and often hostile environment.
>
>existence of human life on the planet for the first time in history?
No. It was the military culture that chose to apply the scientific
discoveries of nuclear physics to weaponry. The scientific discoveries
would have been no less valid if they had been made in pacifist cultures.
CO>
>Though science has indeed concerned itself--sometimes--with survival, I think
>it is a gross overgeneralization to conclude that science is merely amplified
>human survival instincts. Indeed, many other cults and cultures place high
>priority on survival and have an equal claim upon the inheritance rights of
>animalistic survival instincts.
True.
Donald J. Byrd
WRITING AND ELECTRONIC SPACE
CYBORG PERFORMANCE AND AND POETICS
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Although we are interested in adventuresome uses of the
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literature has become. It is so comfortably contained in print. It is
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We are not interested in work which exemplifies the
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The Editors
_THE LITTLE MAGAZINE_
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(Email to DJ...@csc.albany.edu)
gerry harbison
>In article <2jp8m0$1...@crcnis1.unl.edu> harb...@unlinfo.unl.edu (gerry harbison) writes:
>>The point was that you said the *number* of primary colors was
>>culturally defined. It isn't.
>All numerical systems are numerically defined, and so are the words "primary
>colors". If our culture didn't define these ideas, who did?
Afraid not. Read Bertrand Russell and get back to me on this.
>>>You've justifying your worldview by
>>>appealing to your worldview. According to you, the words "primary colors"
>>>are defined as being exactly those wavelengths of light that match pigments in
>>>the eye.
>>Not at all. I'm saying the primary colors could be a set of lineraly
>>independent linear combinations of RGB, but that you cannot create a
>>color which I can't match to the human eye by using a mix of three
>>primary colors. Four is too many, and two is not enough.
>Four is not too many--the more, the merrier. And two is not too few if I'm
>color-blind or I don't like the colors red and orange, or if I re-define the
>numbers four and two, or if I disagree with your metaphysical definition of
>"color".
This is a self-contradiction. If we can't agree on a common
definition of color, we're wasting our time, and communication is
pointless. And color-blindness can hardly be viewed as an aesthetic
choice, can it?
Whether or not you like red, your eyes see it (or
you're colorblind). To deny you can see it is a lie. To suggest that you could
deny it is to suggest the possibility that you could be a liar. And I
presume you've worked out the consequences of the statement 'I am a
liar'? OK, so let's try "I might be a liar".
>-----------------------------
>Christopher Ogden
>ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
Dave Batchelor, Space Phys. Data Facil. 301/286-2988
>
>batc...@nssdca.gsfc.nasa.gov (Dave Batchelor) wrote:
>| Yeah, I'm sure that before a particular age, if I went to
>| the doctor for an inoculation, I must have experienced
>| uncontrolable terror at the sight of the hypodermic
>| needle. That is a non-optional aesthetic impression, not
>| an abstract judgment.
>
>you would have had no experience of needles. Subse-
>quently, you would learn from experience and be told
>that long, thin, sharp metallic objects could do harm.
>This would be an abstraction of a set of perceptions.
Well, I don't think an involuntary reaction is less real even
if it derives from experience. The abstract judgment is
stored somewhere in the cognitive parts of the brain, but
painful experiences condition reactions in more primitive,
reflex-oriented brain regions. And children experience
pain and depression during prolonged painful treatments for
diseases, even if they are instructed and comforted about
how it will make everything better eventually.
DB>| At some later age, my mom could
>| explain to me that it wasn't dangerous, would only hurt a
>| little and then stop, be a "big boy", etc. Now I get the
>| flu shot every year and seeing the needle insertion is not
>| even scary. I do have some control over my aesthetic responses
>| that I did not have as an infant.
GF>Now the abstraction is overlaid with yet further
>experiences and abstractions, including second- and
>higher-order abstractions, and formerly unrelated
>material such as prestige. I would guess that the
>reactions are still there, but I'm not a psycholo-
>gist. In any case, this an example of the efface-
>ment of an unwanted, deleterious reaction. The
>same sort of thing can be applied to all aesthetic
>responses. In most people it is applied to enough of
>them so that, unlike those Neolithic hunters and
>death-camp inmates, they come to believe that the
>aesthetic is marginal and unimportant and they have
>no time for it.
Now I see what you meant about "effacement."
DB>| There's a clear distinction
>| to be noted here, and it's at the heart of Ogden's fallacy.
>| He has maintained that all aesthetic judgments pertaining to
>| the foundations of science are optional matters of taste. I
>| and numerous other posters have argued instead that there are
>| irresistible judgments, connected with observation of
>| survival-related physical phenomena. I regard the
>| foundations of science as accumulated wisdom about non-
>| optional aesthetic judgments.
These are not just preferences
as Ogden's original use of the term aesthetics implied.
GF>Well, I think Malgosia has already noted that science
>seems to flourish more in an atmosphere of leisure
>and curiosity, than under dire necessity. What if the
>optional taste is for, say, reliability?
As long as there is conscious thought, people want a
full stomach every day. I don't see how the reliability
of that is an optional taste among humans. ;-)
GF> This is one
>of the meanings of the word _true_. This taste could
>subsequently prove to have practical implications and
>grow in repute, but remember that before science and
>reason start there is no scientific, rational motive
>for pursuing them.
Oh, people just didn't differentiate them from skills
developed at hunting, gathering, or making clothing.
GF> It wouldn't detract from the valid-
>ity of science if its roots were intuitive and emotion-
>al, that is, aesthetic; it wouldn't add to it either,
>at least not if you look at the situation empirically.
The roots of science are clearly practical and adaptations
for survival, like cultivation and calendar-making, not
arbitrary choices, IMHO. They are conditioned by the
environment, and people had to adapt or die. They
couldn't assume the year was 10 days, for example, or
that their children didn't need to be fed.
Feeding yourself is job #1, and you're forced into
learning reliable hunting/gathering/cultivation skills
thereby.
>
> )*( Gordon Fitch )*( g...@panix.com )*(
Malgosia Askanas
a certain statement of his is a non-sequitur. I don't think it is
fair to expect me to do these things for free. What are the
going prices these days for definitions and proofs?
arnold v. lesikar
>
>>Four is not too many--the more, the merrier. And two is not too few if I'm
>>color-blind or I don't like the colors red and orange, or if I re-define the
>>numbers four and two, or if I disagree with your metaphysical definition of
>>"color".
>
>
>This is a self-contradiction. If we can't agree on a common
>definition of color, we're wasting our time, and communication is
>pointless. And color-blindness can hardly be viewed as an aesthetic
>choice, can it?
>
If you have put your finger on the nub of it Gerry. Without commonly
accepted definitions, any statement whatsoever can be defended as
sensible. And if language is reality, as has been stated in these
threads, then reality becomes whatever you want it to be.
I cannot help but see a deep dishonesty in this enterprise.
Malgosia Askanas
>You stated originally that reflex actions were not choices made on
>aesthetic grounds (and a good thing too, becasue most reflexes don't
>depend on higher brain function at all). You stated that other
>actions made with the goal of survival *were* aesthetic choices,
>becasue they can be suppressed.
No. I stated that they can be suppressed, and also that I believed
that their suppression was an aesthetic choice. There was no "because".
Xian the Desk Lizard
...Arnold wants me to define "believe", and to prove that
...a certain statement of his is a non-sequitur. I don't think it is
...fair to expect me to do these things for free. What are the
...going prices these days for definitions and proofs?
Not being ridiculed and ignored as yet another sad wanker who can't justify
his arguments...?
Malgosia Askanas
>I do hope that Malgosia Askana does not mind me interjecting
>answers to questions he asks of others, for he seems to be the
>one asking interesting questions.
I don't and thank you.
>Not being able to enumerate my beliefs (nor having the time) I
>have no doubt that some are unexamined. BUT -- and this is a big
>but -- when such a belief comes to the fore and its importance
>warrants (as when someone else asks) I *will* examine that belief
>and reject it if I have no evidence for it.
I assume you do this -- correct me if I am wrong -- because you
believe that one should not hold beliefs that one has no evidence
for. What evidence do you have for _that_ belief?
>I am no longer a child and no longer come to belief as a child.
>(Is this not what separates most religious nonbelievers from
>believers?)
You regard belief, I think, as if it never departed much from the
type of belief on has -- or does not have -- in various types of
factual information. This, of course, is in harmony with the
position you articulated in our conversation about philosophy.
But my view is that much of one's relationship to the world,
the way one is and acts in the world, is informed
by beliefs which are _not_ similar to beliefs
in factual information. I am referring to questions such as
whether, in the absence of all data about a person, one should
or should not treat them as if they had good will; whether it is
acceptable to kill in self-defense; whether something is or is not
worth one's effort; whether art can be important in society;
whether one should give to charity.
A person could not act in the world if he did not
have some belief system which made him assume certain stances
on such issues; and yet I don't think that these beliefs are,
or can be, based on _evidence_ in any useful sense of the word.
Rather, when people are cornered and asked to support evidence
for such beliefs, they desperately try to furnish "data" that
support the view they already have on other grounds, grounds
that, in my opinion, have little to do with "data". Occasionally,
some very powerful datum forces itself upon one's consciousness
and wreaks havoc with one's beliefs; but this is rare and one
has many resources to protect oneself from such catastrophies.
Benjamin J. Tilly
harb...@unlinfo.unl.edu (gerry harbison) writes:
I am sorry about taking so long to get back on this but I have been
rather sick.
> Benjamin...@dartmouth.edu (Benjamin J. Tilly) writes:
>
> >In article <2jb489$h...@crcnis1.unl.edu>
> >harb...@unlinfo.unl.edu (gerry harbison) writes:
>
> >> Benjamin...@dartmouth.edu (Benjamin J. Tilly) writes:
> >>
> [...]
> >I assume that you agree with the fact that religeon is a social
> >institution. The reason why I would call science a social institution
> >are similar. Science is a community activity. Without a scientific
> >community no individual would be really capable of doing science. Sure
> >there might be an occasional Leonardo da Vinci, but even those like him
> >are not really capable of really doing science. It is just too big.
> >Therefore science is carried out in a communal fashion. Therefore it is
> >a social activity. Now it is a fact, perhaps an unpleasant one, but a
> >fact that the doing of science has been institutionalized in several
> >types of institutions. Therefore it is accurate to analyze science as a
> >social institution.
>
> I don't disagree that we *can* analyze science as a social
> institution.
> I disagree with the generalization that science is too big to be done
> by individuals. Some science is, some isn't. I also disagree that
> even in a collective endeavor, science can be fully described as the
> interactions of those individuals. Most scientists share a common
> picture of an abstract ideal of science, or of a way of doing what
> they do, which they call science. That ideal or that method can be
> discussed in the absence of social context, IMO.
>
I am glad that you agree that we can analyze science as a social
institution. I would like to clarify something. Some parts of science,
especially sciences that do not have a tremendous amount of formalism
built up, can be done by individuals. But even where the idea or the
work is done by an individual, the result is not part of science until
it has been talked about. For example Newton conducted research into
both physics and metaphysics. He considered the two equally important.
The thing that makes his work in physics science and his work in
metapysics not is the consensus of the scientific community. He
considered the two to be equal.
This is important. I am not saying that individuals cannot come up with
science. I am saying that it is not a part of science until it has
become part of the body of ideas that we call science.
> I'm not competent to discuss religion. I was once a catholic, and
> threfore presumably subscribed to the idea that that was the One True
> Faith. I am no longer anything. But based on my recollection of
> catholicism, I doubt that a catholic theologian would describe the
> church as a social institution. More like 'the bride of Christ' I think.
> Enforced celibacy tends to make their imagery rather lurid :-)
>
I would feel sorry for you if it were not for the fact that it would
probably make you feel guilty. :-)
[...]
> >As long as we can label the scientific community it is not circular. In
> >fact we can not only label it, but we can even characterize a good deal
> >of how it works. Therefore I do not think that the definition is really
> >that circular, although it does move the problem to one of how we can
> >recognize a scientific community.
>
> Yes, it does. Define 'scientific community' without using the word
> 'science'! And don't paraphrase 'science', because I'll claim that in
> doing so, you've defined it!
>
I (for obvious reasons) do not want to try to give a precise definition
of this, or basically any other word, because it is too hard to be
precise. But I am glad to characterize what a scientific community is.
A scientific community is a community of people who are trying to
elucidate some area of knowledge. In the long run (note, not in the
short run, and these will not hold for all individuals in the
community) the pattern that the theories of this community have are
marked by the following characteristics:
1) A willingness to throw out existing theories for ones that fit the
data better.
2) And ongoing search for data of a kind that is meant to clarify
existing theories, but which could raise problems.
3) A reliance on data from "experiments" as the ultimate source of
validity for theories.
Note that I have put experiments in quotes. What I mean by an
experiment is a systematic recording of data, preferably under
controlled circumstances. This definition is sufficiently broad to
include particle accelerators, archeological digs, and field
observations in ecology. However it differs from how the word is often
used in that the experimenter does not have to be the one setting it
up.
Furthermore a detailed study of the groups that we call scientific
communities would show other common charateristics. For example a
mechanism of giving a variety of rewards (in terms of respect, tenure,
pay, and so on) to individuals based on what ideas (quantity and
quality) they manage to get priority for, with priority being
established mainly by publishing them. And so on.
> >Secondly it is far less exclusive than you indicate. Membership in the
> >community essentially means that you are an active participant in the
> >community. It is true that there are certain symbols that have been
> >developed to help label people, but to some extent these are
> >artificial. Therefore, with this definition of membership, it can
> >include all of the people that you indicate. OTOH it is true that this
> >definition will exclude those who, like Leonardo, who are not part of
> >the general scientific community but who are learning about the world.
> >This is unfortunate, but it is also true that ideas that are not being
> >thought about by the scientific community are not considered part of
> >science, no matter how good they are.
>
> In the long term, they will be. Was Gregor Mendel elevated to being a
> member of the scientific community post mortem? That seems an awkward
> consequence of your definition. I have problems with a
> definition of science that includes disinterment (except of course in
> Frankenstein movies.) 8-[
>
It is an awkward consequence of the definition. However this is like
people who have elevated Archimedes to the rank of scientist post
mortem. The position certainly did not exist in his day. Or calling
Newton a scientist or a physicist. Moving on to another field, in a
struggle for independence a country is not a country until it is
recognized as such. So Eritrea was not a country for something like 15
years despite the fact that its government had control over most of its
area, and undertook substantial steps to make improvements in its
citizen's lives. Or you could ask whether an individual is a hero or a
traitor. In many cases this will depend on a detail such as whether you
are living in, for example, North or South Korea.And so on. There are
many situations where whether someone or something is called one thing
or another depends on context, and outside society. Why should the rank
of scientist be different?
> >[...]
>
[...]
> >I would not put down their work. OTOH if you asked an expert biologist
> >10 years after Mendel did his research if these ideas were part of
> >science, you would have been told that they were not. I *do* think that
> >it is fair to say that, until Mendel's work was reviewed by scientists,
> >it was not science.
>
> So what made it science was its discovery by other biologists? This
> is getting really awkward. What was Mendel's work before its
> recognition magically made it science? (Shades of the ugly duckling
> here) It seems your definition requires us to have two words
> for exactly the same body of work, one before it's recognized, one
> after.
>
So? before it was accepted it was a theory that did not happen to be
part of science.
> As i said it's only a definition, and a better definition is merely one
> that describes reality more efficiently. It seems in this case you are
> needlessly multiplying entities
>
Is the pholostigon theory part of science? The answer that most would
agree on is that it is not. OTOH historians are unanimous that it was
part of science at an earlier date. I could have used practically any
theory that has been discarded from science here, such as the steady
state model, the ether, creationism, and so on. So it is possible to
make something that is part of not a part of science. Tell me, what has
happened? What has changed about the theory? How can the status of an
idea change from science to not-science? What is it once it is no
longer part of science?
The "multiplication of realities" that you are talking about is purely
linguistic, and already happens without bothering anyone. So how did
that happen?
> >[...]
>
> >So if you do not like it then it is not science, but if you do then it
> >is science? In fact Gould's book is about a rather broad selection of
> >topics, all of which were considered part of science in their day.[...]
>
> >I strongly advise you to read the book. He focuses on how science has
> >been used to justify racism, but his claims about biases are quite
> >valid regardless.
>
> Yes I agree that this is a problem. Without too much entity
> multiplication, perhaps we can have 'bad' science and 'good' science,
> good science being bathed in the pure light of the scientific method,
> bad science being stained by the sins of political motivation,
> prejudice, etc. (Sorry, residual catholicism showing here!)
>
The problem is that at the time there is often no litmus test that
would have told them apart. With the benefit of hindsight we can
identify which was which. So any distinction like this is not very
enlightening for me.
> And I will check out Gould's book, next trip to the library.
I hope that you like it.
[...]
> >Incidentally I have deleted the cross-posting since I feel that this is
> >specifically interesting only to people in soc.culture.scientists since
> >it is no longer about religeon...
>
> Just as I was gearing up to reminisce about the good times I has as an
> altar boy. Damn!
Such language from a former alter boy. I am shocked! :-)
And I could talk about being an atheist singing in an Anglican church.
(I like the music, I can live without the religeon.)
Ben Tilly
Russell Turpin
I wrote:
>> Not being able to enumerate my beliefs (nor having the time) I
>> have no doubt that some are unexamined. BUT -- and this is a big
>> but -- when such a belief comes to the fore and its importance
>> warrants (as when someone else asks) I *will* examine that belief
>> and reject it if I have no evidence for it.
In article <CLBq2...@inmet.camb.inmet.com>,
Malgosia Askanas <m...@bogart.camb.inmet.com> wrote:
> I assume you do this -- correct me if I am wrong -- because you
> believe that one should not hold beliefs that one has no evidence
> for. What evidence do you have for _that_ belief?
No, this is not the reason.
To a large extent, I am not sure that I have much choice in the
matter. How does one decide to believe an assertion when one
lacks any evidence for it? Other people claim to do this, and
seem to be able to do this, but somehow the trick escapes me.
(Strangely, they seem incapable of doing this with arbitarily
chosen, neutral assertions, so perhaps something else is going
on.) When I have tried to do this myself, I cannot forget that I
am trying to somehow WILL myself to believe, despite a lack of
evidence, and this memory undermines such belief.
It is true that were I capable of this, I would not desire to do
it often, maybe once or twice with with some neutral assertions,
just to convince myself that I can, but no more. Like some
mind-altering drugs, I might find an experiment interesting, but
I am leary of the consequences from careless or habitual use. In
some sense, you might say that I believe I should not do this
(too much or for important assertions). But I should warn you:
every such claim I will interpet so that it comes back to my
preferences and choices about life, and to my beliefs about the
practical consequences of certain actions. I have *no* belief
about *ought* or *should* that cannot be reduced to such choices,
commitments, preferences, and beliefs about consequences. So I
am not stuck needing evidence for such assertions. (Note that
wants and preferences and commitments and choices are *not*
assertions that evidence can reveal as true or false. You might
not like my choice to exercise every morning, but it is *not*
something that is true or false.)
> You regard belief, I think, as if it never departed much from the
> type of belief one has -- or does not have -- in various types of
> factual information. This, of course, is in harmony with the
> position you articulated in our conversation about philosophy.
Exactly.
> But my view is that much of one's relationship to the world,
> the way one is and acts in the world, is informed
> by beliefs which are _not_ similar to beliefs
> in factual information. I am referring to questions such as
> whether, in the absence of all data about a person, one should
> or should not treat them as if they had good will; whether it is
> acceptable to kill in self-defense; whether something is or is not
> worth one's effort; whether art can be important in society;
> whether one should give to charity.
At the bottom of these decisions are wants, preferences,
commitments, and choices that are *not* like beliefs. Hume
made this clear two centuries ago, and his reasoning still
stands. The problem is that normative views cannot be grounded.
Why not lie? A Christian might answer: because my god says
to tell the truth. But this only pushes the question back
further: why do what your god demands? Very soon the answers
are either circular (because god says so, and that's all) or
preferential (because I love my god, because doing what my god
demands brings "the peace that surpasseth all understanding,"
etc.) Since circular reasoning is merely stupid, I will focus
on the latter. It is, at bottom, what Christians accuse (with
horrified voice) others of doing, with high-falutin (and largely
meaningless) phrases like "situational ethics" and "subjectivist
morality." But (in the sense I describe above): that is all
there can be. No one has shown the possibility of anything else.
Hume was right.
I should note that this is not such a dire thing. It does not
have any of the unfortunate consequences claimed by those who
fool themselves into thinking they have an "absolute morality" (a
phrase that is never adequately defined, and a claim that is
never justified).
> A person could not act in the world if he did not
> have some belief system which made him assume certain stances
> on such issues; ...
No. "A person could not act in the world" unless she *took*
stances and *made* choices and *had* preferences. But this
requires *no* new beliefs, except in a trivial sense. (For
example, once a person decides to do something, they usually
will remember having so decided, and will hold the true belief "I
have decided to do this.")
> ... and yet I don't think that these beliefs are, or can be,
> based on _evidence_ in any useful sense of the word.
Hume was right.
> Rather, when people are cornered and asked to support evidence
> for such beliefs, they desperately try to furnish "data" that
> support the view they already have on other grounds, grounds
> that, in my opinion, have little to do with "data". ...
Given this, you might consder what I wrote above: that viewing
the normative as a matter of belief, rather than as a matter of
positive beliefs mixed with normative stances (which are *not*
beliefs), leads to confusion. Witness the "desparation" with
which people discuss normative beliefs when "cornered."
gerry harbison
>Gerry Harbison:
No problem. Do you believe choices made with the goal of survival are
aesthetic choices?
If so, then you had better come up with another way of
distinguishing highly motivated survival behaviors from reflexes.
If not, then
you may find your set of aesthetically motivated actions rather small,
since most human actions may *possibly* or *in part* involve the
instinct to survive.
It seems to me that it would be more efficient to include other
motivations besides aesthetics. Some possible additions: ethics,
logic, self-interest, survival.....
But then of course we wouldn't have a philosophy which attributed all
action to a single cause!
Gerry Harbison
Malgosia Askanas
Russell Turpin wrote:
> The view expressed is dangerous because aesthetic preferences are
> slippery and subjective in ways that the hard truths of science
> are not. [...]
> Whether the
> tides will ebb and flow according to the ephemeral tables does
> *not* depend on such subjective bias and preferences. Like good
> King Canute's counselor, one can go to the shore and say "in my
> world view, the tides will not come in today," but nonetheless,
> one will have to deal with wet feet. (Was Canute the the first
> anti-postmodernist? In which case, from whence should we date
> postmodernism?)
> The followers of and those influenced by the French philosophic
> fog (I hesitate to call this postmodernism) do not confine
> themselves to lit crit. They also influence decisions that
> affect us all; witness the common practice today of referring to
> people's *perceptions* of a thing and basing political decisions
> on that, rather than on measures of the thing itself.
I would have expected others who know more about postmodernism
than I do to respond to this; but since this hasn't happened yet,
I'll give it a try. I have redirected the followups to go to
alt.postmodern only.
I doubt that Ogden would deny the usefulness of the ephemeral
tables in trying to avoid wet feet; but he can correct me.
I believe that Ogden's argument is directed not against the
usefulness of science in matters like preventing one's feet
from getting wet, but rather against what he perceives as
science's false authority in this society. To the extent
to which his campaign is against false authority in general,
it can be considered dangerous only by those who in some way
profit from the false authority of one thing or another.
To the extent to which he makes false statements, he can be
considered dangerous only if he is trying to establish
_himself_ as an authority.
I would be interested to know how the French fog-makers can be
said to influence any important political decisions in this
country; the example you give, of giving primacy to _perceptions_
seems to have been a trend in this country's political life
for quite a while without any help from the French
(witness the importance of the politicians' public images,
of opinion polls, of mass media).
Hans Dykstra's example seems to me a simple -- or maybe not
so simple -- instance of feeding people's despair and
frustration with various kinds of illusions for various
political purposes. This is hardly an invention of
philosophers, postmodern or not. In fact, one might argue
that Dykstra is here performing a deconstruction of this
fake notion of "empowerment" and it is him, not the
perpetrators of this fake notion, who is aligning himself with
the notorious French project.
Malgosia Askanas
Even is just fine by me.
Ray Ingles
[deletions]
>But my view is that much of one's relationship to the world,
>the way one is and acts in the world, is informed
>by beliefs which are _not_ similar to beliefs
>in factual information. I am referring to questions such as
>whether, in the absence of all data about a person, one should
>or should not treat them as if they had good will;
Ever hear of tit-for-tat and the Prisoner's Dilemma?
> whether it is
>acceptable to kill in self-defense; whether something is or is not
>worth one's effort; whether art can be important in society;
>whether one should give to charity.
I think all of these can be derived from 'factual information', including
the fact that one has desires. Would you like me to email you my "semi-FAQ"
on the topic? I'm looking for comments on it anyway...
Sincerely,
Ray Ingles ing...@engin.umich.edu
"An apple every eight hours keeps three doctors away." - B. Kliban