Waziristan Operation ?Some Ground Realities
PakistanPal
South Waziristan, given a combination of forbidding terrain and
entrenched presence of the hardcore elements of TTP and al-Qaeda
fighters, is a tough military nut to crack. The situation has been
building up for a considerable time and as the Pakistan Army moves
ahead to eliminate and flush out some of the most feared al-Qaeda
fighters along with their TTP henchmen and destroy their
infrastructure, the enormity of the challenge is not lost on any one.
It is the largest ever anti-terrorist operation that has been mounted
on either side of the Pak-Afghan border, in which 30,000 Pakistani
troops have been committed. Its outcome is bound to have a deep impact
on the war against terror not only in the region but also on security
of metropolises around the globe.
The objective of the operation is to break the stranglehold of al-
Qaeda, who in close collaboration with TTP, is holding the Mehsud
tribesmen to ransom in their own land. It is a measure of the
desperate situation that centuries' old traditional hierarchy of
tribal authority lies wasted and warlords, in most cases Taliban
upstarts, now call the shots and hold sway in the badlands of
Waziristan. Such vacuum of authority has thrown up a string of
maverick Taliban commanders aligned with al-Qaeda, including Nek
Muhammad, Abdullah Mehsud, Baitullah Mehsud and now Hakeemullah
Mehsud, who have turned the South Waziristan area into the heart of
darkness feeding destructive instability into entire Fata region and
beyond.
Terrorists of all hue, involved in acts of terrorism, have sought
refuge here. The trails of all major acts of terrorism in and outside
Pakistan inevitably lead to this fountainhead of terrorism. Battle
hardened foreign fighters; Arabs, Chechen particularly Uzbeks, have
thrived here under the umbrella of al-Qaeda. The threat level has made
an operation inevitable and costs are estimated to be high.
Even as the operation moves forward in face of tough and determined
resistance, some elements in foreign media have raised the issue of
Pak Army's 'understanding' with tribal chiefs Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz
Gul Bahadar; Taliban commanders in Northern Waziristan, who have
agreed not to interfere with operations in Southern Waziristan. This
certainly is a pragmatic political move, which not only provides a
greater freedom of movement to the Pak Army against TTP and al-Qaeda
but also reduces opposition to the conduct of operations in South
Waziristan. Taliban movement has many factions and it is important
that the campaign against TTP and al-Qaeda in South Waziristan remains
proscribed to the intended scope.
It is important for Pakistan to ensure that Taliban resistance in
Afghanistan should not combines with TPP and al-Qaeda to join the
fight in South Waziristan. Such a contingency may suit other players
in the game but this scenario needs to be avoided by Pakistan at all
cost. The 'understanding' serves to emphasize the ideological divide
in the Taliban movement and should be seriously considered by US and
NATO forces that tend to treat the resistance in Afghanistan as
monolithic and are routinely tempted to bite more than what can be
chewed.
It is good that US for the present have accepted the aims and
objectives of Rah-i-Nijat in an understanding spirit. "We have a
shared goal here and the shared goal is fighting violent extremism,"
State Department spokesman said at a briefing.
It is however the Indian response that, coming at a time when Pak Army
is seized with the campaign in South Waziristan, should prove
instructive in understanding the Pakistani threat perception vis-à-vis
India. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, while making a veiled
reference to Pakistan, during his address the top commanders of the
three services, said that the situation in India's immediate
neighborhood had worsened and expressed deep concern over intelligence
reports of "imminent terror attacks" in the country.
To many Pakistani observers what he meant to communicate was that any
terrorist incident occurring on Indian soil may see a repetition of
the 2001 -2002 confrontation that followed the attack on the Indian
Parliament on 13 Dec 2001. Why should he raise the possibility of a
terrorist strike in India and by implication hold Pakistan responsible
for it should be of interest to US military leadership which tends to
scoff at the Pakistani assertions that even in the current state of
affairs the major threat to Pakistan's security emanated from India.
The veiled threat may be attributed to the Indian anxiety caused by
dismantling of al-Qaeda/TPP terror network in which it has invested
heavily. India has not lacked in motivation to build up the menace of
TPP in a relentless proxy war. It is also worried that a defeat of her
protégés will make its position in Afghanistan difficult to sustain.
For Pakistan severing of the umbilical cord that links TPP with the
Indian bases in Afghanistan should remain a top priority. Sealing of
border with Afghanistan thus emerges as an imperative of the campaign
in which US and NATO forces should play an active part.
Operation Rah-i-Nijat has taken a good start and is well onto its way
to success. It should, God willing, come to a completion within the
six to eight weeks period before the onset of a freezing winter which
will limit the conduct of large scale operations. Its focus must
remain on isolating the al-Qaeda, TPP and a clutch of other terror
outfits from the local population of Mehsuds, followed by annihilation
in detail. While holding onto the cleared land will remain important,
to prevent a comeback by terrorists, initiation of political and
developmental initiatives to utilize the window of opportunity
provided by Operation Rah-i-Nijat is paramount so that the militants'
hold over Fata can be effectively broken. A humane and well-organized
care of the IDPs should prove a good starting point in launching a
campaign for the hearts and minds of the local populace, which remains
the ultimate objective of the campaign in South Waziristan.
Article Source : http://www.opinion-maker.org/navigation.do?mode=showArticles&id=1015