Google Groups no longer supports new Usenet posts or subscriptions. Historical content remains viewable.
Dismiss

The Mother of all Discussions 1

0 views
Skip to first unread message

The Aggressor

unread,
Jan 30, 2000, 3:00:00 AM1/30/00
to
The Mother of all Discussions


In light of past discussions in this and other newsgroups, notably the
discussion chain titled “The Bottom line”, I have decided to put together
all findings and results I had had the opportunity to research, and
clarified, that deal with all the events that preceded the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait. This is to include the claims and accusations made by Iraq, which
are in most cases the focal point of an argument of no proper conclusion
besides the reference to initial sentiments and opinions that began with
these discussions.
Please note that all ideas and opinions expressed in this post are
solely my own, unless stated otherwise. I do not represent any government or
private entity, faction or organization, nor do I speak for anyone else
beside myself.

In 1990, Iraq accused Kuwait of the following;
1) Increasing its Oil production quota and thereby weakening Iraq’s economic
position.
2) Stealing Oil from the “Rumeila” Oil field, which lies in a disputed area
between Iraq and Kuwait. In addition, establishing agricultural, military
and Oil-related structures along the disputed area.
3) Kuwait was an integral part of the Ottoman Empire and therefore, a part
of Iraq, the Empire’s inheritor after its fall.
4)Iraq was to equally distribute the Arab wealth, contrary to Kuwait’s
corrupted throughout the entire Arab world.
5) Iraqi troops were ‘invited’ by revolutionary elements of the Kuwaiti army
that was attempting a coup d’etat inside Kuwait, and it was assisting this
movement within the framework of freedom and justice.

These accusations, as well as statements made by the Iraqi leadership,
gave way to a ‘justified’ Iraqi invasion, occupation, and annexation of
Kuwait on August 2nd, 1990, as some put it. I will discuss these issues in
detail in the hope of shedding some light on some major issues, as well as
some minor ones that make up the ‘overall picture’ of this discussion which
has been the root of many arguments.

1>Let us first place a foundation of agreed opinions here; It is a known
fact that the GCC states, like all other Arab countries, place their prime
interest in their oil wealth, before any other party or entity. These states
are first and foremost concerned with the realization of this target, and
so, their economic profit from achieving fair oil prices seems obvious, more
so than their decisive role in achieving such prices. This is ascertained
from reading these countries’ indicators of their respective shares in oil
revenue, reserves, production and exports.
Now, it was claimed that Kuwait and the UAE have exceeded their
production quotas, fixed by OPEC, it is a well-known and established fact
that several other OPEC members have exceeded their quotas as well. For more
that two years prior to the first Gulf War Iraq itself exceeded its quota,
until finally, OPEC concurred to Iraq’s repeated request for parity with
Iran. Furthermore, Iraq abandoned its stiff attitude in demanding higher
prices for OPEC oil. During its war with Iran, in addition, it adopted a
moderate stance, and conceded to lower oil prices.
In addition, when the Jeddah meeting of July 10th 1990 was attended by
the GCC states, Kuwait agreed to cut back it’s production averages down to a
quota of 1.5 million barrels per day, this was also accepted by the UAE. In
the subsequent meeting of July 26, Kuwait and the UAE declared their
adherence to this quota, which was endorsed in the new agreement for the
production quotas of OPEC members. Therefore, the topic of accusing Kuwait
and the UAE of overproduction should have reached a satisfactory conclusion
for the Iraqi regime, and would have attained some desirable results had it
been given ample time. However, just one week after the last OPEC meeting,
Iraq invaded Kuwait, with this issue on top of it’s accusations list.
What seems strange to me is that Iraq, after criticizing Kuwait and the
UAE for having exceeded their production quotas, ‘which resulted in a
worldwide drop of oil prices and affecting Iraq’s economy’, offered Iraqi
oil, free of charge, to ‘needy Third world countries’ after the economic
embargo was enforced during it's occupation!


2> In reference to a letter by the Iraqi Foreign minister, Tareq Aziz, which
was sent to the General-Secretary of the League of Arab Nations, dated on
July 15, 1990, he states that Kuwait has stolen Oil from Iraqi Oilfields,
worth over $2400 million during the period between 1980 and 1990. Kuwait
responded to this statement with a correction to a fact that was omitted by
the Iraqi minister, and that is the name of the actual area of exploitation.
Kuwait stated that it conducted oil extraction operations in the ‘Rutqa’
area to the North of Kuwait. This area is the southernmost tip of the
Greater “Rumeila” oilfield of Iraq. I have found an excerpt from the Energy
Information Administration on the web, which states

“Once thought to be an independent reservoir, Ratqa is actually a southern
extension of Iraq's super-giant Rumaila field. During the weeks preceding
Iraq's August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, Iraq had accused Kuwait of stealing
billions of dollars worth of Rumaila oil, and had refused to negotiate a
sharing or joint development arrangement for Ratqa and southern Rumaila. In
its 1994 recognition of Kuwait's border, Iraq acknowledged a 1,919-foot
extension of Ratqa further to the north.”

(This is not to exclude other references I have found in books that deal
with the history of Kuwait.)
The “Rutqa’ area had always been a favored area for Bedouin travelers
that either live in or frequent Kuwait, since it is rich in water reserves
and a reasonably arable land. Therefore, by definition, Kuwait never touched
Iraqi soil, and never infringed on Iraqi borders at any time, unless one
counts anti-smuggling activities that pursue smugglers heading towards Iraq
from Kuwait and cutting them off at the border, resulting, in some cases,
setting up a temporary staging area just south of the Iraq-Kuwait border for
the Kuwaiti security forces.
Upon questioning some workers in the Kuwait Oil Company, some of whom,
in addition to Kuwaitis, are Egyptians, Indians, Japanese and Americans,
they all conclude with me a couple of facts I heard some time ago concerning
the geographic buildup of the ‘Ratqa’ Oil field. All agree that it is the
Southern extension of the greater ‘Rumeila’ Oilfield in Southern Iraq, much
like the ‘Wafra’ Oilfield situated in the neutral zone in Southern Kuwait,
which is jointly ventured with KOC and the Saudi Oil Company. All agree that
this particular extension has a basin that ‘slants naturally towards Kuwaiti
grounds’, facilitating an ease in oil extraction by not having to dig as
deep into the ground, or run into as much natural gas and other natural
deposits to extract crude oil. This is not the case in the Rumeila oilfield,
where oil workers must dig twice as deep, twice as long, at twice the
expense, to extract crude oil.
Perhaps it’s convenient to state here that Iraq owed ‘in excess’ of $15
billion to Kuwait, a sum that Kuwait never claimed repayment in any of the
sources I researched, contrary to many claims made by independent persons
within Iraq as well as abroad. Iraq, on the other hand, never referred to
any Kuwaiti claims for repayment in any of its public pronouncements. In
addition, Iraq owed an estimated $30 billion to the other GCC states as well
As for some claims that Kuwait had sold its debt bonds to foreign
entities prior to the commencement of hostilities, that, let us assume, for
the sake of argument, that this accusation holds some truth. It is well
within Kuwait’s legal rights to do so, as well as economically viable. Iraq
was drowning in its debts, sums of which I stated earlier, which it wanted
written off without consideration, expressing such views as Iraq’s ‘battle
for the Arabs’ and tagging it with the amount it owed these same Arabs as
well as by the GCC states. Kuwait wanted-I would presume-to safeguard it’s
interests, especially since it was clear that Iraq had no way of returning
it’s debts totally. An estimated $80 billion in total amounted after Iraq’s
war with Iran.
In addition, Saddam Hussein told Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak that
it wanted an additional $10 billion to be given to him by the GCC states, on
account of the fact that Iraq was fighting for all the Arabs in it’s
protection of the “Eastern Front”, and dispatched Deputy Prime Minister
Saadoun Hammadi to tour the GCC states and ask them to gather up $10 billion
and reduce Oil production to allow for a price increase to $25 per barrel,
instead of the OPEC-sanctioned $18. Quoting from the book ‘The Iran Iraq War
’ by M.S. EL Azhari, Saddam reiterated that his was a ‘One Man’s War’, and
aptly named it “Qadisyat Saddam” or Saddam’s Qadisiya. (This was in simile
to the Battle of Qadisiya in AD636, in which the Persian Sassanids were
defeated by the Arab armies under General Saad bin Abi Waqqas.) Therefore,
it is safe to say, that according to Saddam Hussein, His was his own war,
and that he alone will enjoy it’s victory, or suffer it’s defeat. If that
were true, it is illogical for him to say, “This is my war, but you have to
help me!”
Having said that, in all my research in the matter concerning Kuwait’s
selling of it’s bonds to foreigners, I have not found any evidence that
supports this fact. I have, on the other hand, been referred to a great
wealth of information taken from books written by authors that clearly
showed a hard-line support to the Iraqi regime, discussing conspiracy
theories, rumors, accusations and so on, some of them sounding somewhat
valid, I might add! They remain as they are, unproven and undocumented by
any credibly responsible governmental entity like the UN, OPEC, GCC or the
Arab League.

3>When dealing with the historic point of view in this discussion, one has
to look carefully at the events that preceded Kuwait before it’s
establishment, before it’s recognition and before it’s independence.
First off, Kuwait was never a part of the Ottoman Empire, nor was it a
part of Basra, nor any other area in the region, save one, The lands of the
Arabian Peninsula. This has been proven time and again, by travelers,
geographers, letters, books, references, and even by Iraq itself! It had,
however, recognized the Ottoman’s presence and religious leadership in the
region, as the inheritor of the Islamic empire. Let’s begin with how Kuwait
came to be;
According to Arab geographers like al-Hamadani, al-Istakhri, ibn-Hawlaq,
al-Bakri and al-Idrisi, what is now Kuwait is shown as an integral part of
the Arabian peninsula that had it’s borders extending to the southernmost
tip of theTigris river, and not associated with “Al Sawad” or Iraq, as it
was called at that time, in which what is now Iraq, Syria and Jordan was
called “Mesopotamia”. Iraq was called ‘Al Sawad” or ‘the Black Earth” in
reference to it’s dark-colored soil. The difference is characteristic
between Mesopotamia’s agricultural stability and the grazing nomadic life of
the shepherds of the Arabian peninsula.
Famous wars were fought before, during and after the Islamic expansion
after the Prophet Mohammed’s death, on lands which today belong to what is
recognized as the political establishment of State of Kuwait, some of them,
I might add, are somewhat near-but not within-what is today the Iraqi
borders. An example would be in AD 623, when the Muslim Arabs defeated the
Persians at the battle of ‘Al-Salassel’ in the ‘Kathima’ area, just off the
north-western coast of Kuwait Bay.
Then, when dealing with The Greater Islamic state of the Ottoman Empire,
the responsible historian rules out any talk of ‘political boundaries’ or
‘national soil’. Instead, this concept is addressed in terms of two areas,
“Dar al Islam’ or ‘House of Islam, and ‘Dar al Firinja’ or House of the
foreigners. In such nations, which are founded on religious affiliations,
the policies pursued by the leaders entertain the ambition of expansion
together with the spread of religion. Thus they overrule any argument of
having an inalienable national soil. On the basis of this concept, the
Ottoman state has no political boundaries, as this would imply that the
state has abandoned it’s primary mission of spreading Islam, which was it’s
most important function.
In 1670, the Amir of the bani-Khalid tribe, Shaikh Barrak bin Ghurair,
expelled the Ottoman Pasha in the Al-Ahsa region of the Arabian Peninsula,
and declared himself ruler of Al-Ahsa and Qatif by right of conquest. Later
on, he extended his sphere of influence to cover the entire peninsula,
reaching north into Basra, and south into what is now Oman. He built a small
fortress in the area called “Grane”, at the northern tip of the Arabian
Gulf, and what is now Kuwait. The fortress was similar architecturally to
those he build in Al Ahsa, according to Ibn-Alwan, and in their tribal
language, these fortresses were called “Koot(s)”. Since the fortress in the
Grane was smaller in comparison to the ones in the other lands of Shaikh
Barrak, it was linguistically ‘shrinked’ to be named “Kuwait”, a smaller
name for ‘koot” hence the present name of this land today.
Kuwait developed into a trading seaport, and was handed over to the
Utub branch of the “Eniza” tribe, comprising of the Al-Sabah, Al Khalifa and
Al Jalahma families. This was a show of gratitude for the Utub’s aiding the
Bani-Khalid in their war with the Ottomans, and was conceded to the Utub in
the usual tribal fashion in 1752.
The emirate developed around the city of Kuwait, which was settled early
in the 18th century. Kuwait was nominally under Ottoman Turkish rule until
1899, when the reigning emir asked for, and obtained, British protection
from renewed Ottoman attempts at subjugating Kuwait to Ottoman rule. By
1961, it asked for, and obtained full independence from Britain. During it’s
rise under the Al Sabah dynasty, it maintained a singular, independent
stance when dealing with external affairs, and was exempt from paying taxes
or duties to the Ottoman State in Basra.
It is perhaps convenient to say here that Kuwait was a refuge for rebels
against the Ottoman authorities in Baghdad. Examples in this respect are; in
1787, both the sheikh of the al-Muntafiq and Mustafa Agha, the Mutasallem
(in charge of) of Basrah sought refuge with Shaikh Abdulla al-Sabah, the
ruler of Kuwait (1762-1815) following their rebellion against Soleiman
Pasha, the Mameluk Wali of Baghdad who defeated them. Another example was
when the Shaikh of the Bani Ka’ab of Arabistan in Persia sought refuge in
Kuwait following the ocupation of Muhammarah by the Ottomans in 1837.
On another note, not only did Kuwait have no allegiance to the Ottoman
State’s Pashas in the Iraqi Wilayets, but it also went as far as to refuse
any form of trusteeship over it’s foreign relations, whether exercised by
the State itself or by it’s representatives. This was portrayed by the
transfer of the British Agency, which was affiliated to the British East
India Company, from Basrah to Kuwait in 1793 following a dispute between the
Ottoman authorities and the Agency’s director, Mr. Manisty, and his
assistants.
Following this period, there was an ‘exchange of interests’ in the
nature of the Ottoman-Kuwaiti relations, whereby Kuwait used the Ottoman
Empire’s position as a superpower to counteract British attempts to
subjugate Kuwait into signing the treaty of Maritime Truce, by hoisting the
Ottoman flag on Kuwaiti trade ships, and in return for Kuwaiti help in
facing growing Egyptian influence in the region. This exchange lasted until
the early 1870’s (Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, the Historical
Section, Vol. III)
In addition, in 1845 the Ottoman Empire requested the Kuwaiti Navy to
move to protect Basrah from Egyptian attacks, in return for annual salaries
paid from the treasury of the Wilayet. This arrangement by istelf greatly
refutes any claims that Kuwait belonged to Ottoman Iraq, since in normal
practice, the subordinate is paid by the principal, not vice-versa.

4> I wish to point out a couple of points before discussing details.
Firstly, the Oil wealth owned by GCC states is not subject to any
distribution among the Arab states. Never and nowhere before did countries
and people share their wealth! What happens is either an exchange of
bounties or an usurpation of wealth by force. No state in our contemporary
world offers it’s wealth free of charge. It merely extends assistance,
invests funds or exchanges goods, with the aims of exchanging benefits and
privileges. All economic regimes which emerged after the primitive practice
of 'communal ownership' did not establish their foundations on such a
principle as distribution of wealth. Even Capitalism and Socialism knew no
re-distribution of wealth. Both ideologies were based on respecting property
rights, whether private or collective.
Having said that, GCC states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, have
extended unprecedented developmental assistance to other non-oil Arab
states. They alone have contributed almost 50% of the total Arab Official
Development Assistance (ODA). Recipient Arab states received more than 50%
of the same total. In the 1980’s these two countries contributed almost
98.3% of Arab ODA’s through Arab and international miltilateral
institutions. Concerning Arab institutions, this rate rose to 91.8% between
1984 and 1988.
In contrast, Iraq’s participation in Arab ODA’s was limited in size and
short-lived in nature. The Iraqi fund began it’s actual activities in
1976,and ceased financial activities in 1983. It’s contributions never
exceeded 6.0% of the cumulative total of financial operations of the Arab
development institutions between 1962 and 1989. The Kuwaiti Fund began
operations in 1962 (and remains to this day the most active participant) and
by comparison, contributed for 20.5%to the total, as opposed to 19.8% of
Saudi contributions during this same period.
The Kuwait fund for Arab Economic Development was the first Arab
assistance fund to be established in the Arab world. Until 1973 it was the
only donor of the sum total of Arab ODA, whereas the rest of the Arab funds
were established and went into operation in the wake of the oil price boost
of 1974. (Unified Arab Economic Report, 1990. Secretariat-General of the
Arab League) (The World Bank, World Development Report, 1990)
The fable of ‘distributing’ Arab wealth by the RCC was the bait that
lured the common people of Palestine, Jordan, Sudan, Yemen, Morocco and
Algeria, the people who are so emotional in their desire to live an
honorable and financially safe life. These people were targeted by Saddam
Hussein and his RCC as being the ‘unfortunate Arabs’ who were stripped of
their rights to a slice of the Gulf wealth, in order to lure their
governments into backing his invasion with these false promises that were
exactly tuned to their deepest desires. In effect, Saddam Hussein has
captured the Arab’s “Achilles heels” and has used this exploit to justify
his invasion. Words may twist facts, but numbers do not.


5>In a documented interview posted on the PBS website on a ‘Frontline/BBC’
interview with Iraqi Foreign minister Tariq Aziz, the following was
exchanged;
Q:When was the final decision [made] that the troops will go to Kuwait?
Aziz: When our delegation, headed by our Vice President, returned from
Jeddah, on the 1st of August, telling us that the Kuwaitis were arrogant,
and didn't show any sign of reconciliation. So we thought it was futile to
wait. We held a meeting of the Revolution Command Council, and reached the
conclusion that the diplomatic efforts have failed and we gave the green
light to the military action.”
Therefore, essentially ‘there was no revolution’ in Kuwait on the night
of August 1st, 1990, that would have incited an Iraqi intervention. There
was no ‘provisional government’ set up by ‘Free Kuwaiti Army officers’, and
there was no party, within Kuwait or without-save the RCC-that asked for a
merger with Iraq to transform Kuwait into the 19th province of Iraq. It was
entirely a fabricated charade, designed way back in time, and used the
5000-strong Iraqi labor force in Kuwait, who were mostly, by their own
admission, Iraqi intelligence operatives and/or officers who reported on
Kuwaiti officers, Government officials, members of the ruling family, the
Kuwaiti infrastructure, highways, shortcuts, military installations,
civilian support systems.
What happened in the first week of the Invasion was that some Kuwaiti
army officers were captured, told to wear the Kuwaiti official national
attire, and present themselves in front of TV cameras, led by a man named
“Ala’a Hussein Ali al Khaffagi, as members of the revolution that took
place, shaking Saddam Hussein’s hands and showing a feeling of great
appreciation towards Saddam Hussein.
After the war had ended, all members of the ‘Kuwaiti Revolutionary
movement’ returned to Kuwait and gave themselves up to the authorities. They
all said that they were forced to agree to what they did, and were promised
to be released with ticket to anywhere of their choice, as well as a US$50’
000 reward for their services. They all chose Kuwait as their country of
choice. Upon returning to Kuwait, they gave themselves up to the
authorities, handed over the money they were given by the Iraqi authorities
and accepted to be put on trial in a Kuwaiti court of Law. They were all
returned to their former positions in the Kuwaiti Army. The ringleader “Ala’
a” however, was still at large.
Recent events in Kuwait show that “Ala’a Hussein Ali al Khaffagi”, who
was working in the Kuwaiti Army, after been sentenced in absentia to death
for treason, returned to Kuwait by his own free will. Using a European
passport, he informed some Human Rights organizations that he was returning
to Kuwait to face whatever the Kuwaiti government threw at him. Apparently,
his story goes that he was forced, as were the others who collaborated with
him, to put on the charade in return for the promise of US$50’000, and a
ticket to any country of his choosing. After battling a life in a foreign
country he could not help but return to Kuwait, as he put it.


Therefore, it is evident from the very beginning of the crisis, back in
July 1990, that the entire affair was an Iraqi plot to achieve the following
goals;
a)Delete, or otherwise reduce, the debt Iraq had accumulated during it’s war
with Iran,
b)Show the region that it is an Arab Superpower, and an emerging Arab
leader,
c)Show the world that Iraq is stronger than it ever was,
d)Cover up the fact that it was attempting to join the Nuclear Club,
e)Tell the US that it’s grip on Arab Oil is no longer valid.

To achieve these goals, Iraq’s RCC devised the most cunning plan ever to
bloom in the History of Arab politics; It created and headed the Arab
Co-operation Council, comprising of Jordan, Yemen, the PLO and Sudan,
withing the famework of Arab co-operation and financial aid and security.
This was done to initiate a political backing of Iraqi regional policy, and
to counteract the GCC. It moved some of it’s Army elements closer to the
Kuwait borders to back up it’s accusations and claims, while at the same
time it reasoned that this was ‘normal and routine military maneuvers’. It
further reinforced it’s Army whenever it’s rhetoric got stronger and
stronger. Once the die was cast, it instigated it’s plan to begin
hostilities by connecting them with a fabricated revolution in Kuwait, and
revealing the fact that it was ‘invited’ by the revolutionaries to help them
oust the Kuwaiti government.
What concluded was the biggest and most blasphemous lie the world has
ever been told. Saddam Hussein was filmed shaking hands with Kuwaiti free
officers and later on, admitting Kuwait into Iraq as the 19th province and
telling the world that Kuwaitis 'chose' Iraq to be their saviour from the
Al-Sabah family, and that Kuwait was always an integral part of Iraq, which
was torn by the clutches of British colonialism, imperialism and Zionism. At
the same time, Kuwaitis were forcibly and systematically stripped of their
identity with ever passing day of it's occupation, subjected to torture and
military administrative force and constant fear.
In my opinion, had he calculated things correctly, Saddam Hussein should
have invaded those areas that were to focal point of dispute, namel the
"Rutqa" oilfield, the "Warbah" and Boubiyan" islands, and stopped there to
resume negotiations from an ever-stronger foundation. Only then would he
force the Kuwaiti government into submission, one way or another, to his
demands, thereby proving his strength and extent of his wrath and just
causes, if any were present at all. There would be an Arab resolve to the
conflict, and Western intervention would be minimized only to mediation and
ratification within the framework of the UN.
Sadly, this was not the case, and the result is a nation of starving,
dying, helpless people, headed forcefully by a dictatorial regime deaf,
blind and dumb to their basic needs. A regime that thrives on half-truths,
falsified facts and emotional Pan-Arab Nasseristic rhetoric. Saddam Hussein
has played into the very heart of the Zionist protocol of worldwide
dominition in his turning against his own brothers in the Arab world, and
the result is millions of Oil dollars wasted on feeble and needless military
upgrades and expenditures, while the West continues to forcefully and
economically dominate the region by firms headed by known Jewish affiliates.

0 new messages