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Message from discussion Belief vs. Conviction: A Primer
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Robert  
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 More options Aug 15 2002, 4:23 pm
Newsgroups: soc.culture.jewish.moderated
From: "Robert" <judaismf...@yahoo.com.spammenot>
Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2002 20:21:27 +0000 (UTC)
Local: Thurs, Aug 15 2002 4:21 pm
Subject: Re: Belief vs. Conviction: A Primer
The following message is forwarded from Prof. David Levene:

Old Text:

> But even if there *were* no counterexamples, the Kuzari's argument would
> still be fatally flawed, because, as I said, it depends on a set of
> erroneous underlying assumptions:

> (1) It assumes that the factual status of texts remains constant across
> time. But in fact a text that was written and originally regarded as a
total
> or partial fiction may gradually be regarded with greater reverence and
> status across the generations, until it is seen as fully factual. In which
> case people *would* have heard about the story from their parents, but
would
> not know of its imperceptible drift from the way in which it had been
> regarded by their ancestors. There are many examples both ancient and
> modern, from Homer to the so-called "Angel of Mons".

> (2) It assumes a society in which texts and information are widely
> distributed, such that people, when receiving a new text or story, will
> *know* that it is new. In fact, however, this was often not the case in
> ancient societies: people often would have only the vaguest knowledge of
> their own family or national pasts, and they were aware that information
> might well be in slow circulation about which they knew nothing. If an
> individual learned of what appeared to be such information, it would be
> welcomed, not questioned.

> (3) It assumes that texts predate practices; in fact religious practices
> often predate texts. If a text then emerges that in part provides apparent
> aetiologies for pre-existing practices, that very fact is a major factor
in
> validating the text for its readers. The history of the "Sibylline Books"
at
> Rome is an instructive example.

> (4) It assumes a simple introduction of a unitary text in a set form. But
in
> fact texts can circulate in multiple formats for generations, and even
more
> if they are supplemented by shifting oral traditions. When a final format
> emerges, it will be validated by its similarity to things that have been
> around for a long time; and the very fact of the tradition's prior
> polyvalency means that no one can have a firm basis for questioning
> particular details within it.

New addition from Prof. Levene:

In subsequent discussion I acknowledged that the example of the Thebans
which I gave in this post was a poor one, and that I later offered others
that I thought were better.  A couple of examples, which you are welcome to
transmit in my name if you want, are the following:

(1) At the Battle of Lake Regillus at the beginning of the Roman Republic,
the gods Castor and Pollux were believed to have appeared to the Roman army
and helped them in the battle; they then appeared to the people waiting at
Rome and announced the victory.  The story appears in historians describing
the events, especially Dionysius of Halicarnassus, "Roman Antiquities" 6.13.

We can be pretty sure that the Romans generally believed it, because it is
quoted by Cicero, "On the Nature of the Gods" 2.6 as part of a *proof* of
the gods' existence - a proof that only makes sense if the story was
believed.  There is then a response to it by a Sceptic (3.11-13) - but this
is "Scepticism" in its technical philosophical sense of denying the
possibility of proof, and accordingly the Sceptic agrees that he *believes*
in all these stories (3.5-6), but denies that the believer can *prove* them.
Hence this part of the argument likewise assumes general belief in the
story.

(2) My second example is a story that not only was believed in the ancient
world, but which people *still* believe.  Before the Battle of  the Milvian
Bridge in 312 CE, thousands of people - the entire army of Constantine the
Great - allegedly had a vision of a giant fiery cross above the sun.  And in
case one thinks that this was just some sort of meteorological phenomenon,
the cross (allegedly) had *written* on it the words "be victorious by this
sign".

Accordingly, the soldiers all painted crosses on their shields, and, though
greatly outnumbered, won the battle.  It was as a result of this that
Constantine decided to make Christianity the official religion of the Roman
Empire.  The story is reported - and clearly believed - by a contemporary
source (Eusebius, "Life of Constantine" 1.28), and is still believed by many
Christians to this day.  Obviously (I assume) no one on S.C.J.M. is likely
to accept it, but it might give some pause to those who claim that there are
no parallels from other societies.

Not that (as I said in the original post) the existence of counterexamples
really matters for the argument anyway, since the whole thing is based on
false reasoning from the start, but people tend in practice to get fixated
on them, and so it's probably worth having the correction made.

David Levene

School of Classics

University of Leeds


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