The Role of the Failed Islamic States

[fenceerx]

World War III?
by Peter Schwartz
http://www.gbn.org/public/gbnstory/articles/ex_worldwar.htm

If it is true as many are arguing that World War III has begun then it is
critical to understand what the war is about, and where it might take us. Is
it really a war? What are its origins? Why is the U.S. the target? What is
the short-term political and military situation? And what are the resulting
long-term scenarios?

The Role of the Failed States

It is convenient and easy to blame one madman, Osama bin Laden, as the
villain of the story. If we get him the struggle is over. Unfortunately it
is not that simple. He can carry out his evil deeds because he is the
expression of a much bigger problem. He exists because throughout the
Islamic world, from Pakistan to the Middle East and North Africa, there are
very few successful nation states. Most of them have failed to deliver good
government, progress, and prosperity for their people and they need an enemy
to justify their failure. The forms of failure vary, but all have to do with
the internal struggle within the Islamic world that gets turned outward from
time to time, as it has now. These leaders have only succeeded in convincing
large numbers of their people that the source of their ills is the West, in
general, and America, more particularly. America is hated both by those who
envy what we have and by those who are repelled by it.

In most of the Islamic countries the key struggle is between some form of
modernism and some form of fundamentalism. As GBN's Jay Ogilvy has rightly
observed, fundamentalism is not traditionalism but an extreme reaction to
modernism. Even among the modernists there is a kind of love-hate
relationship with the West. They like many of the benefits, such as modern
medicine and material comfort, while often disliking Western values. In some
of the more successful countries of the Islamic world, such as the United
Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Morocco, the balance has favored the modernists.
But even there they do not wish to become like Europe or America. They want
their own brand of modernization. In this respect they have more in common
with their Islamic brothers in Malaysia or Indonesia then with the others in
the Arabic world.

The true fundamentalists are simply the most current expression of a long
struggle between Islam and Christianity that reaches back to the Crusades
and more recently, colonialism. For most of the last millennium it is fair
to say that Europe has tried to dominate the Arabic world, with some
success. Essentially all of North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia
were part of a European colonial empire, with Britain being the most
significant power. With the end of overt colonialism in the '50s and '60s
the new villain became the Western economy, with all its temptations
creating a new kind of colonialism.

For some of the fundamentalists and fanatics it would almost be enough if
the West would simply leave the Islamic world alone to fight its civil wars.
(Were it not for the issue of Israel many would see it this way.) Many
Islamic countries simply want the right to control their societies without
interference and to withdraw from the modern Western-dominated world. They
rightly believe that the West has sided with the modernists. The modernists
and we believe that their people will be better off enjoying the benefits of
prosperity, tolerance, and democracy. The fundamentalists, however, believe
that the virtues of simplicity, absolute truth, and the wisdom of authority
are the path to a better life for their people. In their view, we have
supported the modernists in their own societies, violated their taboos
(e.g., our forces in Saudi Arabia), and corrupted their youth with our
satanic temptations.

The U.S., of course, is the biggest and most successful example of Western
economic values and has become the clearest symbol of the new oppression.
For the fundamentalists it is our secular and materialist life style and
values that are at issue, despite the fact that we claim to be a religious
nation. They see our expressions of faith undermined by our lifestyle and
economic behavior. For the true fundamentalists, faith supersedes all else
and anything less than true belief is hypocrisy. The fanatics see us as the
symbol of decadent, secular Western power. They want nothing from us, other
than to demonstrate our moral inferiority. We are the source of their
poverty and exclusion. We do not hear their voices, they rightly believe.

For the failed Islamic nations, identity has become bound up with the
struggle against the West. They have been able to demonize the West and
especially the U.S. as the source of all their problems. Furthermore because
they have a long history of nomadic and warrior cultures, struggle as an
identity has a strong historical resonance. They have become addicted to
struggle and success in war is a powerful indicator of virtue: Allah must be
on our side if we win. (In a similar vein it is worth noting the bizarre
comments of our own religious crazies, Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson, who
said that the attacks on New York and Washington succeeded because God
removed his protection from the overly secular U.S. Their hateful mentality
is akin to those who make war on us.)

There are at least ten key countries, in three groups, that need to be dealt
with in any broad campaign against terrorism, but they are all different.
The first group of nations are those that today cannot be influenced and
whose own legitimacy at home is open to challenge. We have nothing to offer
these governments, which include Afghanistan, Sudan, and Yemen. The second,
larger group comprises countries that actually want something from the U.S.
and can potentially be moved. They include Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
Iran, and just possibly Syria and the Palestinians. Iraq is in a category by
itself. Our strategy needs to be different for each group of countries.

For the first group our goal ought to be to oust the illegitimate regimes.
In the case of Afghanistan it ought not to be to conquer the nation but
rather to remove the Taliban and place a new group in power. This cannot be
accomplished by a massive bombing campaign. The Russians already did that;
destruction was the only the outcome. We need to send in ground forces to
fight alongside willing Afghanis and capture or kill all the Taliban
leaders. Furthermore, we must define and accept only good behavior on the
part of the new leaders we install so that we don't simply replace one
dreadful government with another. The message to Sudan and Yemen should be
clear: if they do not change their ways we will come for them, too. Indeed
there are already signs that the Sudanese are getting the message.

All of the nations amenable to influence are important. In the short run
Pakistan is most important, but Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran all bear
responsibility for the terror network. Each is torn by conflict between the
modernists and the fundamentalists and each has its share of true fanatics
like Osama bin Laden. The more progressive elements in these countries need
to find a way to be part of the West without enraging their more
conservative populations to the degree that an uprising brings them down.
Domestically, all of these countries need to act against the radical
extremes, both homegrown and visitors. Syria and the Palestinians have much
to gain from stronger ties to the West. Obviously Israel is critical to any
progress with respect to these two nations.

When it comes to Iraq, the possibilities are much more ambiguous. That they
have been engaged in supporting the terror network is clear, but what to do
about it is less so. We were not prepared to take out Saddam before and it
does not appear that we are today. We may want to postpone action on Iraq
until we are in a stronger position.

War Aims

Most of all, this is a moral war. The radical fundamentalists believe they
are fighting for the soul of the world and that America is the arm of Satan;
therefore, to hurt America is to hurt Satan. While broad responses across
military, political, and social fronts are important it is the moral
dimension that is most central to the war aims. The U.S. and the West, more
broadly, must demonstrate our moral superiority to the current and
prospective followers of bin Laden and his compatriots. We cannot engage
those who have made hate their identity, but we can win adherents from the
larger population to our side, based on how we deal with this crisis.

For Osama bin Laden, triggering a war between the West and the Islamic world
would be the biggest possible success. His hope is to provoke us into an
indiscriminate and excessive response. His attack on the United States was
intended to demonstrate to his followers that Allah is on his side and
supports his aims. He also believes that he can terrify the American people
whom he views as weak, decadent, and afraid to fight.

Thus, the U.S. must also pursue a moral victory. Our response must be
precise, measured, and supported by a wide community of nations. Best of all
it would be carried out by that community in concert with America. Not only
must it bear the moral dimension; it actually should destroy the capacity of
the terror network to do more harm. Our targets must be both the terror
network and the governments that support it. We must punish the evil doers
by eradicating them to demonstrate that such behavior will result not in
victory but in the end for their cause. We cannot fail in these aims; if we
do it will only invite more attacks.

A Multidimensional Strategy

Swords then plowshares must be the essence of the West's strategy. The
military response will come first but then we must act boldly and generously
to address the causes which create such fertile soil for fanatics. We must
win a military-intelligence victory and then help build successful nations
out the collection of failed societies and lead in building a more
legitimate international order.

Any strategy we pursue is best done in concert with a broad anti-terrorist
alliance that includes Europe, Russia, China, and as many Islamic nations as
we can get to join. Unilateral action needs to be the last resort if
collective will fails. This is an opportunity to reinforce and reinvigorate
old and creaky alliances. It is also an opportunity for Russia and China to
join the West. And for some of the Islamic nations that have tried to play
both sides of the fence it is an opportunity to cast their lot with the
West. It may even be possible to win over former enemies such as Iran and
Syria. It appears that Colin Powell is devoting himself to this task, which
bodes well for success.

Military victory not only involves coalition building but also finding the
right military strategy. While high-tech weapons such as cruise missiles
almost certainly will play a role, the main action will be fought on the
ground-in some cases, literally hand-to- hand. It will be fought by Special
Forces and covert operatives and in the end by conventional soldiers. The
objective is not conquest but the elimination of regimes that support and
enable terror and the destruction of as much of the terror network as
possible. Because we are dealing with a tangled network rather than a
hierarchical army, victory will necessarily involve many small battles over
a long time rather than a huge battle that ends swiftly. John Arquilla and
David Ronfelt described this new conflict well in their study The Advent of
Netwar, in which networks of highly capable small teams rather than massed
armies, are the key fighting units. In his Washington Post article
"Disconnecting the Dots" Joel Garreau identified what it takes to
successfully challenge a well-prepared network.

There is also an economic dimension to victory. We have to be able to
sustain our own war effort in the short run. This means effective economic
management in a near-war setting. It is not implausible that more attacks
will come and that the economic damage could be much higher. Imagine if more
airliners are brought down or the Western power grid seriously disrupted.
Can we imagine a well functioning economy without airlines and reliable
electricity? Policies like tax cuts, infrastructure spending, and government
R&D all take on new meanings in this context. Our economic strategy ought to
aim to hurt our enemies in the short run and rebuild and develop them in the
long run. We may need a "Marshall" Plan for the poor and disenfranchised of
the world.

Finally there is a social dimension to our strategy. Most of all we need to
take the cultures of these antagonistic countries seriously and recognize
their grievances. We must convince them that we are listening to them at
last. We must help them find their place in the modern world. We have argued
that they are undemocratic regimes, but democracy and its handmaiden,
transparency, are almost absent in the global arena. We need to make global
institutions such as the IMF and the WTO more transparent and democratic. In
addition we need to create new kinds of global regulatory mechanisms to
serve our individual nations such as in the areas of environment and
finance. But all of this depends upon them wanting to join.

The Short-term Military Situation

Terrorism has moved from the criminal to the military arena and from the FBI
to DoD and the clandestine services. This was a military act by a non-state
actor. They have been playing war while we were playing cops and robbers. We
've talked about this possibility for a long time, but didn't really take it
seriously until now.

It is highly likely that the attacks on New York and Washington were not the
last on our soil. With a few weeks or months there may be another equally
deadly attack on other highly visible and symbolic targets. Imagine, for
example, the release of poison gas at the World Series. Such an incident
would only demonstrate further that there is no meaningful defense against
such attacks. There is only coping after the fact and going on the
offense-hitting them so hard that they cannot hurt us any longer and then
helping to reduce the causes that underlie their grievances.

The war itself could be quick and limited, but that seems unlikely. More
plausible is a lengthy and deep war along many fronts. Damaging a network is
hard. We can be fairly confident that Osama bin Laden did not act alone and
that even if we get him others will rise to challenge us. Indeed, if he
really trained over 10,000 men in his camps in Afghanistan and then
scattered them around the world then there are many hundreds of cells still
waiting to attack. Like the war on drugs, this war could drag on for a long
time. Even so, the risk of a Vietnam-like quagmire appears to be low. The
NLF did not attack the U.S. and popular support for war in America is much
higher today than it was in the Vietnam era.

There also appears to be little risk of using oil as a weapon. OPEC has
already announced that it will increase production if necessary to keep
prices from soaring in the face of conflict. However, if this conflict
destabilizes the pro-American Saudi regime then the price of oil could soar,
because almost all the marginal supply is in their oil fields.

The Long-term Geopolitical Situation

This crisis is an opportunity for the Bush administration to repair the
damage it has done to our alliances and strategic relationships in the first
months of its rule. If it leads effectively in building a new anti-terror
coalition and helps initiate a new Marshall plan for the Islamic world then
this horror could yet have a positive outcome. If Russia and China choose to
join the West, if India and Pakistan find an accommodation, and if former
foes like Iran and Syria cooperate, then this crisis could lead to a
positive geopolitical scenario.

On the other hand, if Kevin Kelly is right, radical Islam may be the "new"
communism, which gives hope to the oppressed and challenges the West. In
this case we could be in for a darker future-a long, very violent, and
highly disruptive future. Imagine a world like Robert Kaplan's "Coming
Anarchy." This is a scenario of a disintegrating world economy,
characterized by environmental decay and perpetual and ubiquitous violence.
The net warriors persist in disrupting the world for years to come.

Finally the U.S. could fail in its leadership role and end up as the "rogue
superpower." We would be confronted by coalitions of denial, all aiming to
constrain U.S. power and action. Fortunately, the signs so far lean toward a
future based on collaboration rather than unilateral power. If this really
is a war then heroic efforts are called for both in the inevitable military
necessities and in addressing the underlying causes of this war.

The implications of these developments for business are likely to be
significant. In the near term, economic recovery has been pushed further
into the future and the downturn is likely to be deeper. It is also not
clear that the historical war economy effects will come into play. This is
not a war that is likely to consume vast numbers of tanks, bombers, and
ships. If the world response produces more effective integration,
governance, and even a rise in the standard of living for the poorest among
us then the long-run economic potential will continue to grow. If, however,
the forces of disintegration and chaos predominate then business could be in
for hard times for years to come.