@@ U.S. officials sang a different tune on Iranian nukes @@
Arash
March 27, 2005
Past Arguments Don't Square With Current Iran Policy
By Dafna Linzer
Lacking direct evidence, Bush administration officials argue that Iran's nuclear
program must be a cover for bomb-making. Vice President Cheney recently said,
"They're already sitting on an awful lot of oil and gas. Nobody can figure why they
need nuclear as well to generate energy".
Yet held key national security posts when the Ford administration made the opposite
argument 30 years ago.
Ford's team endorsed Iranian plans to build a massive nuclear energy industry, but
also worked hard to complete a multibillion-dollar deal that would have given Tehran
control of large quantities of plutonium and enriched uranium -- the two pathways to
a nuclear bomb. Either can be shaped into the core of a nuclear warhead, and
obtaining one or the other is generally considered the most significant obstacle to
would-be weapons builders.
Iran, a U.S. ally then, had deep pockets and close ties to Washington. U.S.
companies, including Westinghouse (http://www.westinghousenuclear.com) and General
Electric (http://www.ge.com/nuclear), scrambled to do business there.
"I don't think the issue of proliferation came up", Henry A. Kissinger, who was
Ford's secretary of state, said in an interview for this article.
The U.S. offer, details of which appear in declassified documents reviewed by The
Washington Post, did not include the uranium enrichment capabilities Iran is seeking
today. But the United States tried to accommodate Iranian demands for plutonium
reprocessing, which produces the key ingredient of a bomb.
After balking initially, President Gerald R. Ford signed a directive in 1976 offering
Tehran the chance to buy and operate a U.S.-built reprocessing facility for
extracting plutonium from nuclear reactor fuel. The deal was for a complete "nuclear
fuel cycle" -- reactors powered by and regenerating fissile materials on a
self-sustaining basis.
That is precisely the ability the current administration is trying to prevent Iran
from acquiring today.
"If we were facing an Iran with a reprocessing capability today, we would be even
more concerned about their ability to use plutonium in a nuclear weapon", said [JEW]
Corey Gay Hinderstein, a nuclear specialist and deputy director of the Institute for
Science and International Security (http://www.isis-online.org). "These facilities
are well understood and can be safeguarded, but it would provide another nuclear
option for Iran".
Nuclear experts believe the Ford strategy was a mistake. As Iran went from friend to
foe, it became clear to subsequent administrations that Tehran should be prevented
from obtaining the technologies for building weapons. But that is not the argument
the Bush administration is making. Such an argument would be unpopular among parties
to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which guarantees members access to nuclear
power regardless of their political systems.
The U.S.-Iran deal was shelved when the Shah was toppled in the 1979 revolution that
led to the taking of American hostages and severing of diplomatic relations.
Despite the changes in Iran, now run by a clerical government, the country's public
commitment to nuclear power and its insistence on the legal right to develop it have
remained the same. Iranian officials reiterated the position last week at a
conference on nuclear energy in Paris.
Mohammad Saeidi, a vice president of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, told the
conference that Iran was determined to develop nuclear power since oil and natural
gas supplies were limited.
U.S. involvement with Iran's nuclear program until 1979, which accompanied
large-scale intelligence-sharing and conventional weapons sales, highlights the
boomerang in U.S. foreign policy.
Even with many key players in common, the U.S. government has taken opposite
positions on questions of fact as its perception of U.S. interests has changed.
Using arguments identical to those made by the Shah 30 years ago, Iran says its
nuclear program is essential to meet growing energy requirements, and is not intended
for bombs.
Tehran revived the program in secret, its officials say, to prevent the United States
from trying to stop it.
Iran's account is under investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency,
which is trying to determine whether Iran also has a parallel nuclear weapons
program.
Since the energy program was exposed, in 2002, the Bush administration has
alternately said that Iran has a secret nuclear weapons program or wants one. Without
being able to prove those claims, the White House has made its case by implication,
beginning with the point that Iran has ample oil reserves for its energy needs.
Ford's team commended Iran's decision to build a massive nuclear energy industry,
noting in a declassified 1975 strategy paper that Tehran needed to "prepare against
the time -- about 15 years in the future -- when Iranian oil production is expected
to decline sharply".
Estimates of Iran's oil reserves were smaller then than they are now, but energy
experts and U.S. intelligence estimates continue to project that Iran will need an
alternative energy source in the coming decades.
Iran's population has more than doubled since the 1970s, and its energy demands have
increased even more.
The Ford administration -- in which Cheney succeeded Rumsfeld as chief of staff and
Wolfowitz was responsible for nonproliferation issues at the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency -- continued intense efforts to supply Iran with U.S. nuclear
technology until President Jimmy Carter succeeded Ford in 1977.
Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz endorsed Iranian plans to build massive nuclear
industry in 1975.
That history is absent from major Bush administration speeches, public statements and
news conferences on Iran.
In an opinion piece on Iran in The Washington Post on March 9, 2005 Henry Kissinger
wrote that "for a major oil producer such as Iran, nuclear energy is a wasteful use
of resources". White House spokesman Scott McClellan cited the article during a news
briefing, saying that it reflected the administration's current thinking on Iran.
In 1975, as secretary of state, Henry Kissinger signed and circulated National
Security Decision Memorandum 292, titled "U.S.-Iran Nuclear Cooperation", which laid
out the administration's negotiating strategy for the sale of nuclear energy
equipment projected to bring U.S. corporations more than $6 billion in revenue. At
the time, Iran was pumping as much as 6 million barrels of oil a day, compared with
an average of about 4 million barrels daily today.
The Shah, who referred to oil as "noble fuel", said it was too valuable to waste on
daily energy needs. The Ford strategy paper said the "introduction of nuclear power
will both provide for the growing needs of Iran's economy and free remaining oil
reserves for export or conversion to petrochemicals".
Asked why he reversed his opinion, Henry Kissinger responded with some surprise
during a brief telephone interview. After a lengthy pause, he said: "They were an
allied country, and this was a commercial transaction. We didn't address the question
of them one day moving toward nuclear weapons".
Charles Naas, who was deputy U.S. ambassador to Iran in the 1970s, said proliferation
was high in the minds of technical experts, "but the nuclear deal was attractive in
terms of commerce, and the relationship as a whole was very important".
Documents show that U.S. companies, led by Westinghouse, stood to gain $6.4 billion
from the sale of six to eight nuclear reactors and parts.
Iran was also willing to pay an additional $1 billion for a 20 percent stake in a
private uranium enrichment facility in the United States that would supply much of
the uranium to fuel the reactors.
Naas said Cheney, Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld all were in positions to play significant
roles in Iran policy then, "but in those days, you have to view Henry Kissinger as
the main figure". Requests for comment from the offices of Cheney, Wolfowitz and
Rumsfeld went unanswered.
"It is absolutely incredible that the very same players who made those statements
then are making completely the opposite ones now", said Joseph Cirincione
(http://www.carnegieendowment.org/experts/index.cfm?fa=expert_view&expert_id=10), a
nonproliferation expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "Do they
remember that they said this? Because the Iranians sure remember that they said it",
said Cirincione, who just returned from a nuclear conference in Tehran -- a rare trip
for U.S. citizens now.
In what Joseph Cirincione described as "the worst idea imaginable", the Ford
administration at one point suggested joint Pakistani-Iranian reprocessing as a way
of promoting "nonproliferation in the region", because it would cut down on the need
for additional reprocessing facilities.
Gary Sick (http://www.columbia.edu/cu/sipa/RESEARCH/bios/ggs2.html), who handled
nonproliferation issues under presidents Ford, Carter and Reagan, said the entire
deal was based on trust. "That's the bottom line".
"The Shah made a big convincing case that Iran was going to run out of gas and oil
and they had a growing population and a rapidly increasing demand for energy", Sick
said. "The mullahs make the same argument today, but we don't trust them".
* Researcher Robert E. Thomason and staff writer Justin Blum contributed to this
report.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A3983-2005Mar26.html?nav=rss_topnews
========================================
Gerald Ford, 38th President of the United States (1974-1977)
The documents were found on the website of the Gerald R. Ford Library and Museum in
Ann Arbor, Michigan (http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov).
Two documents in particular, dated April 22, 1975 and April 20, 1976, show that the
United States and Iran held negotiations for cooperation in the peaceful use of
nuclear energy and the United States was willing to help Iran by setting up uranium
enrichment and fuel reprocessing facilities.
http://www.ford.utexas.edu/library/document/nsdmnssm/nsdm292a.htm
http://www.ford.utexas.edu/library/document/nsdmnssm/nsdm292b.htm
http://www.ford.utexas.edu/library/document/nsdmnssm/nsdm324a.htm
http://www.ford.utexas.edu/library/document/nsdmnssm/nsdm324b.htm
http://www.ford.utexas.edu/library/document/nsdmnssm/nssm219a.htm
http://www.ford.utexas.edu/library/document/nsdmnssm/nssm238a.htm
http://www.hangitonthewall.com/MASTER/AmericanPresidency/NewAdditions/page/image35.html
http://www.hangitonthewall.com/MASTER/AmericanPresidency/NewAdditions/page/image39.html
http://www.hangitonthewall.com/MASTER/AmericanPresidency/NewAdditions/page/image38.html
Shah & Ford in the Oval office on May 15, 1975.
http://www.hangitonthewall.com/MASTER/AmericanPresidency/NewAdditions/page/image40.html
President Gerald Ford and the Shah of Iran review the troops during a State Arrival
Ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House, on May 15, 1975.
http://www.hangitonthewall.com/MASTER/AmericanPresidency/NewAdditions/page/image6.html
President and Mrs. Ford on the South Portico of the White House with the Shah and
Shahbanu of Iran, May 15, 1975.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammad_Reza_Pahlavi_of_Iran
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/images/0212/823309b370d60640e0dc.jpeg
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/images/0212/c0039cfbd2542fcaac35.jpeg
Henry Kissinger enjoying kosher food