@@ U.S. keeps lying about Iran again & again @@
Arash
November 29, 2004
Lying About Iran
Dr. James Gordon Prather
Nuclear weapons physicist
The neo-crazies - in and out of government - lied to you last year about
Iraq's "nuclear programs," and this year they're lying to you about Iran's.
What constitutes lying? Well, either making an untrue statement with intent
to deceive, or deliberately creating a false impression.
The neo-crazies told you right up till the eve of President Bush's
"preemptive strike" that Iraq had reconstituted - deep underground and
widely dispersed - the uranium-enrichment facilities totally destroyed back
in 1991. That was an untrue statement, made with intent to deceive you.
They also told you that a uranium-enrichment capability was a necessary and
sufficient condition for Iraq to have nukes within a year or two. That was
an untrue statement, made to create a false impression.
You see, if you want to make a gun-type nuke, a uranium-enrichment
capability is certainly necessary. And, if you have two 60-pound
sub-critical pieces of weapons-grade enriched-uranium, all you have to do to
make a gun-type nuke is bang them together.
But if you want to make an enriched-uranium implosion-type nuke - which is
what Saddam was attempting to make - a uranium-enrichment capability is by
no means sufficient.
Mohamed ElBaradei had reported to the UN Security that, as of March 2003,
there had been no attempt whatsoever to reconstitute Iraq's
uranium-enrichment capability. Furthermore, the CIA's Iraq Survey Group
spent a billion dollars in the year following the invasion, searching
everywhere and interviewing all the "usual suspects."
Result? Not only was ElBaradei right about there being no reconstituted
uranium-enrichment capability, but there had also been no attempt since 1991
to design or test the high-explosive system absolutely required for an
implosion-type nuke.
Well, now the neo-crazies would have you believe that Iran has an
underground, widely dispersed uranium-enrichment capability. And that that
uranium-enrichment capability is a sufficient condition for Iran to have
nukes in a year or two.
But while the neo-crazies have been making that claim, Iran has been
allowing ElBaradei to conduct in Iran the same sort of go-anywhere,
see-anything inspection he conducted in Iraq.
Result? ElBaradei has concluded that all nuclear material in Iran has been
accounted for and has not been diverted to activities prohibited by the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Hence, there is no NPT issue for the IAEA Board to refer to the UN Security
Council.
Furthermore, ElBaradei has found no evidence that Iran has yet introduced
nuclear material into the uranium-enrichment facilities under construction.
That's important, because until nuclear material was actually introduced,
Iran was under no obligation to report to the IAEA the construction of the
gas-centrifuge plants at Natanz.
Obligated or not, Iran has placed "all essential components of centrifuges
as defined by the Agency" under IAEA seals, except for 20 sets of centrifuge
components to be used "for R&D purposes." Even then, Iran also offered to
provide the IAEA with access to that R&D program "if requested."
Well, the neo-crazies promptly went bonkers. They charged that this R&D
"exception" proved the Iranians had no intention of abiding by the agreement
they made with Germany, France, and Great Britain to "suspend" all
uranium-enrichment related activities and that this latest Iranian perfidy
had to be brought immediately before the UN Security Council for action.
But don't let those neo-crazy charges create a false impression.
You see, Iran also stated that the "AEOI [Atomic Energy Organization of
Iran] is not intending to use nuclear materials in any of the tests
associated with the said R&D."
Gas centrifuges are not used exclusively for uranium isotope separation.
Cascades of gas centrifuges are used to separate - in kilogram quantities
for commercial sale - the isotopes of zinc, tungsten, molybdenum, krypton,
xenon, germanium, iron, sulfur, oxygen, and carbon.
For example, large quantities of zinc-acetate-dihydrate are used as an
additive in water-cooled, water-moderated nuclear power plants -
particularly those burning plutonium-uranium mixed-oxide (MOX) fuels - to
reduce corrosion and cracking of key components. However, the use of
naturally occurring zinc would result in increased radiation exposure to
plant workers, because Zn-64 - constituting 48% by isotopic concentration in
naturally occurring zinc - is transformed into radioactive Zn-65 in the
reactor environment. Hence the lucrative market for large quantities of
"depleted" zinc-acetate-dihydrate wherein the Zn-64 isotopic concentration
is reduced to less than 1%.
So, until IAEA Safeguarded "nuclear materials" are actually introduced into
them, the origin of the centrifuges, the construction of cascades, and the
operation thereof is none of the IAEA's beeswax. And who knows? Maybe the
Iranians' secret plan all along has been to take over the depleted zinc
market.
* Physicist James Gordon Prather has served as a policy implementing
official for national security-related technical matters in the Federal
Energy Agency, the Energy Research and Development Administration, the
Department of Energy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
Department of the Army. Dr. Prather also served as legislative assistant for
national security affairs to U.S. Sen. Henry Bellmon, R-Okla. -- ranking
member of the Senate Budget Committee and member of the Senate Energy
Committee and Appropriations Committee. Dr. Prather had earlier worked as a
nuclear weapons physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in
California and Sandia National Laboratory in New Mexico.
http://www.antiwar.com/prather
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