@@ Dr. Prather on lies of Jew-cons @@
Arash
January 29, 2005
Targeting Iran
Dr. James Gordon Prather
Nuclear weapons physicist
Pulitizer Prize Winner Seymour Hersh first revealed - and neocrazy
sycophants at the New York Times, Washington Post, CNN and UPI reluctantly
confirmed - that the Bush-Cheney Administration has been conducting secret
"reconnaissance" missions inside Iran since at least last summer.
"Much of the focus is on the accumulation of intelligence and targeting
information on Iranian nuclear, chemical, and missile sites, both declared
and suspected. The goal is to identify and isolate three dozen, and perhaps
more, such targets that could be destroyed by precision strikes and
short-term commando raids."
Now, Iran is a signatory to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and to the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons.
Each convention requires that certain activities and sites be declared by
each party to the conventions. Each also provides for the reporting of the
suspicions by one party - the US for example - of activities and sites that
should have been declared by another party, but weren't.
NPT
Iran has been a signatory to the NPT since 1970. More than a year ago, Iran
voluntarily subjected itself to an intrusive go-anywhere see-anything
Additional Protocol to their Safeguards Agreement with the International
Atomic Energy Agency. Under the Additional Protocol, activities and sites
that formerly did not need to be declared at all, or only after operations
involving "special nuclear materials" began, must now be declared while
still in the planning stage.
If IAEA inspectors were to discover that Iran was violating its Safeguards
Agreement, they would report those violations to the IAEA Board of
Governors. If and only if the Board decided the violations amounted to a
violation of the NPT, itself, the Board would refer the matter to the UN
Security Council for possible action.
The IAEA has now visited every site the Iranians have declared under the
Additional Protocol, as well as at least two sites the US suspected ought to
have been declared, but weren't. Result? The IAEA has found no indication
that Iran is now pursuing - or ever has pursued - a nuclear weapons program.
CWC
Iran has been a party to the CWC ever since it entered into force on April
29, 1997.
The CWC is implemented by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons. The OPCW receives states-parties' declarations, which detail
chemical weapons-related activities or materials and relevant industrial
activities.
After receiving declarations, the OPCW inspects and monitors states-parties'
facilities and activities, including chemical weapons-related facilities and
chemical industry facilities to verify the content of declarations and to
confirm that activities are consistent with CWC obligations.
But the OPCW can also conduct "challenge inspections" at any facility or
location in states-parties to clarify questions of possible noncompliance.
If the US suspects that Iran is engaged in prohibited activities at any
site, it is their duty to report that to the OPCW.
If the OPCW determines that the Iranians are engaged in activities that
could result in "serious damage" to the CWC, the OPCW could recommend to
other parties that collective punitive action - such as economic sanctions -
be taken. If the prohibited activities are of "particular gravity," the OPCW
is required to bring the issue before the UN Security Council for possible
action.
BTWC
Iran has been a signatory of BTWC since it entered into force on 26 March
1975.
Each State Party to the BTWC undertakes to never develop, produce, stockpile
or otherwise acquire or retain:
a.. Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin
or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no
justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;
b.. Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or
toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.
The BTWC does not provide for verification or monitoring of compliance.
However, "Any State Party to this convention which finds that any other
State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions
thereof may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United
Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming
its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security
Council."
Operation Iranian Freedom
So, the U.S. is effectively required to report any "suspicious" activities
and sites their recon teams find in Iran to the IAEA or OPCW or directly to
the UN Security Council for possible action.
But, the Brits have already warned Bush: "If you launch Operation Iranian
Freedom, you'll have to go it alone."
* Physicist James Gordon Prather has served as a policy implementing
official for national security-related technical matters in the Federal
Energy Agency, the Energy Research and Development Administration, the
Department of Energy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
Department of the Army. Dr. Prather also served as legislative assistant for
national security affairs to U.S. Sen. Henry Bellmon, R-Okla. -- ranking
member of the Senate Budget Committee and member of the Senate Energy
Committee and Appropriations Committee. Dr. Prather had earlier worked as a
nuclear weapons physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in
California and Sandia National Laboratory in New Mexico.
http://www.antiwar.com/prather