@@ Jew boy & his lies @@
Arash
February 13, 2005
The Institute for Contemporary Affairs (ICA), founded jointly with the
Wechsler Family Foundation
JERUSALEM ISSUE BRIEF
Volume 4, Number 17
Will Washington Support Democracy in Iran?
http://www.politicalfriendster.com/images/1046.gif
By Michael Rubin (American Enterprise Institute)
Email: MRu...@aei.org
Phone: 1-202-862-5851
Fax: 1-202-862-4877
Info on Michael Rubin
http://rightweb.irc-online.org/ind/rubin/rubin.php
1. After a first term marked by schizophrenic Iran policy initiatives,
the Bush White House will soon develop a coordinated policy to promote
peaceful regime change in Iran. The Bush administration is heartened by the
apparent success of the Iraqi election and believes that Iranians are ready
to exert their democratic rights.
2. Bush policy is motivated by the grave and growing threat from the
Islamic Republic's nuclear weapons program, and the realization that neither
Iran nor the European Union are sincere in preventing Iran's acquisition of
nuclear weaponry. The Islamic Republic's potential threat to American
security emanates from Tehran's determination to develop satellite launching
capability which could well substitute as an intercontinental ballistic
missile delivery system as well as from the regime's continued sponsorship
of terrorists.
3. A new U.S. policy will also recognize that the dichotomy within Iran
is not one of reformers versus hardliners within the Islamic Republic, but
rather proponents of democracy versus proponents of theocracy. Even if
Iranian acquisition of nuclear capability is inevitable, the threat comes
from the nature of the regime rather than from the Iranian people.
4. As hardline ideologues consolidate power in Tehran, Iran will mark a
number of important anniversaries which might spur ordinary people to
agitate against their government and for democracy as they call for a new
national referendum on the future of Iran.
A Stalemated Iran Policy
In his January 20, 2005, inaugural speech, President George W. Bush
declared, "America will not pretend that jailed dissidents prefer their
chains, or that women welcome humiliation and servitude." Less than two
weeks later, Bush argued in his State of the Union address that "the victory
of freedom in Iraq will...inspire democratic reformers from Damascus to
Tehran." Such statements are not mere rhetoric, but mark a new willingness
to advance democracy in Iran.
During Bush's first term in office, the U.S. government lacked an Iran
policy. The State Department, Pentagon, Central Intelligence Agency, and
Treasury Department twice failed to reach consensus on a National Security
Policy Directive. Neither then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice
nor the President forced the issue. As a result, American policy was
schizophrenic. While Bush labeled Iran as part of the "Axis of Evil" in his
January 2002 State of the Union Address, Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage described Iran as a "democracy."1
With no clear White House policy direction, Senate Republicans likewise took
contradictory positions. While Arlen Specter (Pennsylvania) dined with the
Iranian ambassador to the United Nations,2 Sam Brownback (Kansas) introduced
an Iran Freedom and Democracy Support Act which would have created a $50
million fund to support opposition satellite stations and civil society.
State Department lawyers, meanwhile, argued that non-interference clauses in
the 1980 Algiers Accords, the agreement which had led to the release of the
U.S. embassy hostages, prohibited funding of opposition media. Retired
National Security Advisors, though, disputed the State Department's line.3
In recent weeks, the White House legal office has opined that nothing in the
Accords prevents assistance to Iranian democrats.
New National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley's decision to remove Richard
Haass protégé Meghan O'Sullivan from the Iran portfolio (she retains her
position as senior director for Iraq at the National Security Council) also
bodes well for a more activist policy, especially as the new National
Security team again reviews Washington's policy - or lack thereof - toward
Tehran. O'Sullivan had long been both dismissive of Iranian dissidents and a
proponent of engaging the Islamic Republic.
Why Now?
The Bush administration's new focus on Iran is a reflection not only of the
President's sincere conviction that the Iranian people deserve freedom and
liberty, but also of the belief that the United States cannot live with a
nuclear Islamic Republic of Iran. While many European officials and American
academics describe Iranian politicians like former president and current
Expediency Council chairman 'Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as a pragmatist,4
U.S. policymakers do not dismiss his December 14, 2001, threats to initiate
a nuclear first strike against Israel,5 nor do they dismiss as rhetoric
banners reading "Israel must be uprooted and erased from history," draped
over medium-range Shihab-3 missiles in a September 22, 2003, military
parade.6
The Islamic Republic's potential threat to American security is just as
serious, though, both because of Tehran's determination to develop satellite
launching capability which could well substitute as an intercontinental
ballistic missile delivery system,7 and because of the regime's continued
sponsorship of terrorists.
American officials continue to blame Iranian intelligence for planning the
1996 bombing of an American military barracks in Khobar, Saudi Arabia.8 The
9/11 Commission's bipartisan intelligence review found that the Iranian
regime lent passive support to many of the 9/11 hijackers, between eight and
ten of whom transited Iran in the year before the attack.9 Washington also
takes seriously reports that Iranian authorities have sheltered senior
al-Qaeda figures in Revolutionary Guard bases near the Caspian town of
Chalus.10
While some editorialists and politicians argue that Washington should
support the diplomacy of the European Union troika of London, Paris and
Berlin, many European diplomats and analysts privately acknowledge that they
believe Tehran's acquisition of a nuclear bomb to be inevitable, a tacit
admission that European diplomacy is a charade.
American officials may not be so blunt, but many believe their European
counterparts care more about the preservation of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty than they do about Iran going nuclear. If the
European Union allows the Islamic Republic to negotiate acquisition of
nuclear capability, then they need not admit the emptiness of the current
non-proliferation regime.
Even if Iran's acquisition of the bomb is inevitable, to American
strategists, the question is not whether the United States can live with a
nuclear Iran, but rather whether the United States can live with a nuclear
Islamic Republic of Iran.
To many Bush administration officials, the danger is not necessarily that
the Islamic Republic would use its nuclear weapon against the United States,
but rather that the feeling of immunity from retaliation that a nuclear
capability might lend regime ideologues would lead to an increase in
terrorism in the Middle East and Europe, and violent attempts to subvert
Iraq and Afghanistan.
Iranian authorities, for example, ignored numerous Turkish diplomatic
demarches, and only scaled back support for Kurdistan Workers Party [PKK]
terrorists operating in Turkey after the Turkish Air Force bombed the
Iranian border town ofPiranshahr.11
Had the Islamic Republic enjoyed a potential nuclear retaliation capability,
Turkish authorities could likely have not forced an abandonment of Tehran's
PKK support. Meanwhile, American authorities are increasingly concerned by
the resurgence of the Revolutionary Guards within the Islamic Republic's
political class. Revolutionary Guard influence has been most recently
evidenced by their effective veto of Turkish commercial involvement in the
communications sector and Tehran's new airport.12
Such concerns - and the unwillingness to assume that regime ideologues will
not try to act upon their deeply-held beliefs about the United States and
Israel - are responsible for the current debate about the efficacy of
military action. While targeted strikes on nuclear and ballistic missile
sites might not eliminate the Islamic Republic's capability, the question is
whether they could delay Tehran's nuclear ambitions beyond the lifespan of
the Islamic Republic.
Are Iranians Ready for Democracy?
The best option from an American point of view would be a peaceful
transition of power leading to an Iranian abandonment of the Islamic
Republic's more threatening convictions. The relevant question therefore
becomes whether the Iranian people are ready for democracy and, if so, when
they might rise up and demand real rather than cosmetic rights. No one in
Washington seeks to use military force to oust the Iranian regime, and
rumors that the U.S. government even considered lending support to the
Mujahidin al-Khalq are without basis. Democracy advocates within the Bush
administration are likely to ask whether they can take any actions which
would catalyze the Iranian people's ability to replicate last year's
peaceful revolutions in Georgia and the Ukraine.
Both anecdotal and statistical evidence indicate the Iranian people are
ready for change. While some outside analysts continue to speak of a
dichotomy between hardliners and reformers, most Iranians now accept that
the political tension within Iran is between regime and dissident. On
December 6, 2004, students heckled Mohammad Khatami, chanting "Shame on you"
and "Where are your promised freedoms?"13
In August 2002, the Tarrance Group, a professional polling outfit, conducted
a survey of Iranian public opinion. They randomized the last four digits of
every Tehran telephone exchange, and surveyed residents rich and poor. Just
21 percent of the statistically-representative sample of more than 500
people said that the Guardian Council represented the will of the Iranian
people, while only 19 percent supported a politically-active clergy. The
poll also found significant economic malaise, perhaps motivating the
disillusionment with their leadership. Only 16 percent felt that their
economic situation had improved during the Khatami years, while 68 percent
said their family's financial situation had declined since the Islamic
Revolution.14
A quarter century of theocracy has moderated the Iranian people. While
studying in Iran in 1996 and 1999, many Iranians told me they supported
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini less out of an endorsement of his views than out
of a reaction to the dictatorship of the Shah. While American and European
intellectuals may criticize Bush's "Axis of Evil" rhetoric as simplistic,
the fact remains that there is a correlation between Bush's moral clarity
and the willingness of Iranians to take to the street, as they did en masse
in July 1999,15 October 2001,16 November 2002,17 and July 2003,18 and at a
number of more localized demonstrations.19
Historic Opportunity: The Call for a Referendum
Iranians, inheritors of a 2500-year-old culture, are far more historically
aware than many in the West. Recent democratic developments in Iran coincide
with a number of symbolic anniversaries. December 2005 marks the hundredth
anniversary of the start of Iran's Constitutional Revolution when merchants,
liberals, clergy, and nationalists rose up to demand basic rights in the
face of an autocratic ruler. After a year of struggle, the Shah granted the
Iranian people a constitution. In December 2006, Iranians may ask why their
forefathers had rights today's Iranians no longer enjoy.
On April 1, 2004, Iranians marked a more recent anniversary - the 25-year
anniversary of Khomeini's declaration of an Islamic Republic. On that day,
Khomeini announced the results of a referendum asking a simple question: "Do
you want an Islamic Republic." Ninety-eight percent of Iranian voters said
"Yes." "By casting a decisive vote in favor of the Islamic Republic,"
Khomeini told an enthusiastic crowd, "you have established a government of
divine justice." Increasingly, though, a growing and disparate number of
Iranian groups are suggesting that Iran is ready for a new referendum.20
Many Iranians suggest a simple question, "Theocracy or democracy." The
Tarrance Group poll found that 71 percent of Iranians would favor such a
poll.21 While it is not likely that the Islamic Republic's leadership would
ever consent to an internationally-supervised referendum - they understand
the contempt with which most of their charges view them - such a referendum
would better focus international attention on the fundamental issue of the
Islamic Republic's lack of legitimacy and moral bankruptcy.
Into this tinderbox was inserted the success of Iraq's January 30, 2005,
elections, that country's first free poll in a half century. It is a
juxtaposition Iranians - many of whom believe themselves to be culturally
superior to their Arab neighbors - cannot miss. In June 2005, Iranians will
march to the polls to elect a president. Under the terms of the Islamic
Republic's constitution, the new president will have only limited power and
will remain subordinate to the unelected Supreme Leader, Ayatollah 'Ali
Khameini. While the unelected Guardian Council in Iran severely limits the
choice of candidates in Iran, Iranians have already noted the full range of
candidates allowed to compete in Iraq's elections. Many European, American,
and Arab commentators sought to correlate voter turnout with election
legitimacy in Iraq. The same standards might be applied to Iran, where many
Iranians may choose to stay home as Iranian pilgrims in Iraq estimated that
80 percent of their compatriots did during the February 2004 Majlis
elections.
After four years of policy ambiguity, the Bush administration will finally
make a concerted approach to change the status quo in Iran. European
officials may calculate they can live with a nuclear Islamic Republic of
Iran, but they are wrong. If the current regime goes nuclear, Iran will
unleash a new and potentially devastating wave of terrorism which will end
any hope for stabilization in Iraq and Afghanistan, and peace in the Middle
East. The White House is right to pursue democratization as a solution.
Europe would be wise to hope for its success because the alternative for
Washington might not be acceptance of a nuclear Iran, but rather military
action.
Notes
1. Robin Wright, "U.S. Now Views Iran in More Favorable Light; a Top
Official Makes a Distinction between the regime in Tehran and those of
fellow 'axis of evil' members North Korea and Iraq," Los Angeles Times,
February 14, 2003.
2. Robin Wright, "Activity Heats Up as U.S. and Iran Flirt with Closer
Ties," Washington Post, February 1, 2004.
3. Michael Ledeen, "Act on Iran," Wall Street Journal, October 23, 2002.
4. Reuel Marc Gerecht, "Going Soft on Iran," Weekly Standard, March 8, 2004.
5. Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, December 14, 2001.
6. Ron Kampeas, "As Palestinian Picture Improves, Ominous Signs About
Iranian Nukes," Jewish Telegraphic Agency, November 22, 2004.
7. "Iranian 'Sputnik' Could be Trojan Horse for Tehran's Ballistic Missile
Program," Aviation Week Group, November 28, 2004.
8. The 9-11 Commission Report, p. 60.
9. The 9-11 Commission Report, p. 240. Also see: "Iran's Link to al-Qaeda:
What the 9-11 Commission Found," Middle East Quarterly (Fall 2004).
10. "Nearly 400 al-Qaeda members and other terror suspects in Iran," Agence
France Presse, July 15, 2004.
11. "Iran Accuses Turkish Jets of Bombing its Territory," Associated Press,
July 18, 1999.
12. Karl Vick, "Politics on Collision Course at Shuttered Iranian Airport,"
Washington Post, August 10, 2004.
13. "Students Heckle Iranian President," BBC News, December 6, 2004;
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4072887.stm
14. Public Opinion Survey in Iran, August 23-28, 2002, Tarrance Group.
15. "Fateful Moment in Iran," New York Times, July 14, 1999.
16. "Tehran Gripped by Pro-Western Street Violence," Independent, October
27, 2001.
17. "Iranian Student Protestors Call Referendum on Hard-Line Rulers," New
York Times, November 29, 2002.
18. "Student Leaders Seized by Vigilantes in Iran," New York Times, July 10,
2003.
19. See reporting, for example, of the Student Movement Coordination
Committee for Democracy in Iran, www.daneshjoo.org
20. Eli Lake, "Iranian Democrats Establish a United Front," New York Sun,
December 7, 2004.
21. Public Opinion Survey in Iran, August 23-28, 2002, Tarrance Group.
* Michael Rubin, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute
(http://www.aei.org/scholars/filter.all,scholarID.83/scholar.asp), is editor
of the Middle East Quarterly. He served as an Iran and Iraq staff advisor to
the Office of the Secretary of Defense between 2002 and 2004.
http://rightweb.irc-online.org/ind/rubin/rubin.php
The Institute for Contemporary Affairs (ICA) is dedicated to providing a
forum for Israeli policy discussion and debate. Email: jce...@jcpa.org
Dore Gold, Publisher; Yaakov Amidror, ICA Program Director; Mark Ami-El,
Managing Editor. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (Registered Amuta), 13
Tel-Hai St., Jerusalem, Israel; Tel: 972-2-5619281, Fax: 972-2-5619112,
Email: jc...@netvision.net.il
In U.S.A.: Center for Jewish Community Studies, 5800 Park Heights Avenue,
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http://www.jcpa.org
http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief004-17.htm
Riain Y. Barton
The Real Riain
THIS IS A FORGERY DONE BY GORDON RADAVICH A SERBIAN CRIMINAL IN LONDON!
Yes, all of your forgeries GORDON, you Serbian filthy criminal
paedophile!
ATTN: Anyone living in Battersea LONDON, mind your passports and your
children, ye have a theft and a paedophile living in your area -- His
name is Gordon Radavich! He also goes by "The Rev'd" on Usenet.
THIS IS THE FORGED ID: "Riain Y. Barton" <rfa...@gmail.com>
THIS IS MY ID: "Riain" <ri...@riain.com> I will never have a gmail
account!
http://www.anglican.org/nutjob.html
------------------------------------------------
Arrest made in Tiscali case
As reported by the Wandsworth Borough News:
"Police have arrested a Serbian national following a lengthy
investigation into anti-semitic activities. Gordon Radavich, 51, a
satellite system installer, was arrested at his home in Albert Bridge
Road, Battersea, and charged with various offences under the Public
Order Act (1986) and Computer Misuse Act (1990). Several computers
and a number of foreign passports were removed from the premises for
forensic examination. After a preliminary hearing before Wandsworth
magistrates yesterday he was remanded in custody until 16th August."
He is known on Usenet as:
The "Reverend" Terrence Fformby Smythe
"Riain Y. Barton" <rfa...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:1108479925.9...@g14g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
The Real Riain
NAZI
"Tommy" <nos...@nospam.com> wrote in message
news:2339714.9ixreHm5oF@FreeBSD...
: The Real Riain wrote:
:
: > NOTE THAT THIS IS NOT A MESSAGE FROM RÍAIN Y. BARTON!!!!
: >
: > THIS IS A FORGERY DONE BY GORDON RADAVICH A SERBIAN CRIMINAL IN
LONDON!
: >
: > Yes, all of your forgeries GORDON, you Serbian filthy criminal
: > paedophile!
: >
:
: This is from the fake Riain Y. Barton...... The fake Riain is now
going by
: the name "The Real Riain"
Susan Cohen
"The Real Riain" <ri...@riain.com> wrote in message
news:lqWdnSiD4Yp...@comcast.com...
> Like anyone would ever believe you, a liar, a criminal, an idiot, and a
> NAZI
It's pretty much the reason he's bolstering the phony rev's crap.
Susan