@@ U.S. proliferation rhetoric and reality @@
Arash
July 18, 2005
U.S. Proliferation Rhetoric and Reality
What's fine for India is forbidden Iran
Dr. James Gordon Prather
Nuclear weapons physicist
Nuclear bomb tester at Lawrence Livermore
Technical director of nuclear bomb testings at Sandia
Chief scientist of the U.S. Army
U.S. Navy veteran
Last year, President Bush made a number of proposals to "strengthen" the
existing weapons of mass destruction proliferation-prevention regime.
He proposed expanding his Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to
interdict what he deems to be illicit transfers by "proliferation
networks." He urged the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution
criminalizing such illicit international transfers, thereby presumably
legitimizing his PSI.
The president specifically urged the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/nsg) to close a loophole in the Treaty
on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons by arbitrarily limiting
transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technology by NSG members to
those states that already possess them.
Established in 1975, the Nuclear Suppliers Group is comprised of 44
nuclear-supplier states, including China, Russia, and the United States,
that have voluntarily agreed to coordinate their export controls
governing transfers of civilian nuclear material and nuclear-related
equipment and technology to non-nuclear-weapon states.
NSG members are expected to forgo nuclear trade with governments that do
not subject themselves to the International Atomic Energy Agency
Safeguards regime. The IAEA has accepted the responsibility for
verifying that NSG exports are not used by the importing state for any
military purpose.
The NSG has two sets of guidelines listing the specific nuclear
materials, equipment, and technologies that are subject to export
controls.
Part I comprises materials and technology designed specifically for
nuclear use, including fissile materials, nuclear reactors and
associated equipment, and nuclear material reprocessing and enrichment
equipment.
Part II comprises dual-use equipment that could have nuclear
applications.
To be eligible for importing Part I items from an NSG member, states –
irrespective of whether they are NPT signatories or not – must have in
place a comprehensive IAEA Safeguards Agreement covering all their
nuclear activities and facilities.
In the case of Part II equipment, IAEA safeguards are only required for
the specific nuclear activity or facility where the NSG import will be
employed.
India's Prime Minister comes to Washington this week to meet with
President Bush with the hope – engendered by Condi Rice's recent visit
to New Delhi – that Bush will intercede with the NSG and get them to
relax the current requirement that they make subject to a full-scope
IAEA Safeguards Agreement all their nuclear equipment and facilities –
including that in India's nuclear weapons program.
Condi had whizzed down to New Delhi earlier this year to prevent India
from finalizing technical and commercial contracts for a $4.5 billion
natural-gas pipeline that will provide Iranian natural gas mostly to
India.
What carrot did Condi offer the Indians to prevent their finalizing the
Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline deal?
You guessed it.
The possibility the U.S. would lift sanctions imposed on India as a
result of the 1998 nuclear weapons tests, supply India with additional
nuclear power plants and the fuel therefor, and waive NSG guidelines on
those exports.
The Indians have taken several steps to assure the U.S. and the NSG that
they will not divert any of the fissile materials, nuclear reactors, and
associated equipment they are allowed to import to a military purpose.
India also enacted the Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery
Systems Act to "provide an integrated legislative basis to India's
commitment to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction." The
act applies to the export, transfer, re-transfer, transit, and
transshipment of material, equipment, or technology relating to weapons
of mass destruction or their means of delivery.
Now, the U.S. had put great pressure on Russia to apply the NSG
guidelines to the construction of the first two nuclear power plants at
Koodankulam. Russia successfully argued that the original contract was
signed in 1988, before the new and more stringent NSG guidelines came
into force in 1992.
The U.S. even attempted to prevent refueling of the Tarapur atomic power
station. Russia was only able to supply low-enriched uranium to the
U.S.-built plant in 2001 on the basis of "safety" considerations.
Hence, Russia is effectively unable to supply India any more reactors or
more low-enriched uranium fuel. India apparently is in desperate need of
both.
Well, Condi failed in her mission; the Iran-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India
pipeline project appears to be on track.
So, it looks like we'll find out this week how much Bush wants to
isolate Iran.
If the EU-Iranian negotiations fail, and Iran turns to Russia or China
for assistance with its nuclear programs, will Bush continue to press
the NSG – which includes Russia and China – to deny Iran its INALIENABLE
RIGHTS under the NPT, all the while flouting NSG guidelines himself, to
provide Westinghouse nuclear power plants and the fuel therefor to
India?
Dr. Prather's radio interviews
May 7, 2005
http://www.weekendinterviewshow.com/audio/prather4.mp3
May 4, 2005
http://www.charlesgoyette.com/archive/media/2005-05-04-Charles-01.mp3
April 9, 2005
http://www.weekendinterviewshow.com/audio/prather3.mp3
February 16, 2005 (Part 1)
http://www.charlesgoyette.com/archive/media/2005-02-16-Charles-04.mp3
February 16, 2005 (Part 2)
http://www.charlesgoyette.com/archive/media/2005-02-16-Charles-05.mp3
February 5, 2005
http://www.weekendinterviewshow.com/audio/prather2.mp3
December 4, 2004
http://www.weekendinterviewshow.com/audio/prather.mp3
* Physicist James Gordon Prather has served as a policy implementing
official for national security-related technical matters in the Federal
Energy Agency, the Energy Research and Development Administration, the
Department of Energy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
Department of the Army. Dr. Prather also served as legislative assistant
for national security affairs to U.S. Sen. Henry Bellmon, R-Okla. --
ranking member of the Senate Budget Committee and member of the Senate
Energy Committee and Appropriations Committee. Dr. Prather had earlier
worked as a nuclear weapons physicist at Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (http://www.llnl.gov) in California and Sandia National
Laboratory (http://www.sandia.gov) in New Mexico.
http://www.antiwar.com/prather
Komin
no free trade in Nuclear materials ?
Kavik Kang
news:JbUCe.8195$EP2....@newscontent-01.sprint.ca...
> AntiWar
> July 18, 2005
>
>
> U.S. Proliferation Rhetoric and Reality
>
> What's fine for India is forbidden Iran
You are starting to understand... Maybe there is hope for you, yet...
Komin
the Iranians will no doubt get their own Iranian Nuclear bombs .