@@ Iran is in full compliance with NPT & IAEA @@
Arash
September 6, 2004
Bush Wins, We Invade Iran
By Dr.James Gordon Prather
Nuclear weapons physicist
gpra...@worldnetdaily.com
If not getting nuked in your jammies is high on your priority list, then
maybe your best bet is to vote for John Kerry.
Kerry has just endorsed last October's Brit-French-German agreement with
Iran, whereby they pledged to facilitate "the fullest possible exchange of
equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy" if Iran agreed to sign and abide by an
additional protocol to their existing Safeguards Agreement with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
But the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) already requires such
transfers. Why was the Brit-French-German-Russian pledge necessary? Because
for more than 20 years, the United States has prevented - and still seeks to
prevent - such transfers to Iran.
Even before Bush declared "victory" in Iraq, the neo-crazies had begun
making the same unsubstantiated charges about illicit nukes in Iran they had
so effectively made about Iraq, hoping, thereby, to scare you soccer-moms
into endorsing an invasion of Iran.
Next week the Bush Administration will try to convince the IAEA Board of
Directors to refer the alleged Iranian nuke program to the UN Security
Council for "action." Bush wants a Security Council resolution - similar to
the one he used as an excuse to invade Iraq - warning Iran of "serious
consequences" if they are unable to convince him that they have no nuke
ambitions.
However, reflecting upon what Bush did to Iraq, the Board is unlikely to
refer the alleged Iranian nuke program to the Council. And even if they did,
there is no way the Council would give Bush a resolution he could misuse to
invade Iran.
There can be no doubt that Bush's invasion of Iraq - allegedly to keep nukes
that never existed out of the hands of terrorists - has vastly increased the
probability that terrorists will acquire real nukes. Kerry - in endorsing
the Brit-French-German agreement with Iran - is essentially saying he
realizes that an invasion of Iran could have similar results.
Of course, after seeing what Bush did to no-nuke Iraq, the Iranians would be
crazy if they didn't harbor nuke ambitions. But they insist they don't and
have made - as the Brit-French-German agreement required - what they claim
is a complete disclosure of their "nuclear programs."
The IAEA has been checking out that disclosure statement for months and has
found some discrepancies. But they have - as yet - found no indications of a
nuke program. Iran is currently in full compliance with its existing
Safeguards Agreement.
In particular, the Iranians insist they have not yet produced highly
enriched
uranium-HEU(http://web.ead.anl.gov/uranium/glossacro/dsp_wordpopup.cfm?word_id=278)
at the production or even pilot-plant stage, and have never enriched
uranium - even in the laboratory - to as much as 20% HEU, much less to the
90% HEU required for nukes.
When the IAEA took some swipes from Iranian equipment that indicated the
presence of HEU, the neo-crazies went ballistic. The Iranians had been
lying! They had been producing "weapons-grade" uranium!
Well, in the first place, the IAEA didn't find any Iranian-produced HEU.
They found microscopic traces of HEU on equipment the Iranians had imported.
And just this week, after talking to the exporters, the IAEA concluded that
the Iranian claim that the equipment was contaminated when they imported it
was "plausible."
What about the advanced P-2 centrifuges the neo-crazies claimed Iran had
left off their 2003 disclosure?
Well, the IAEA has concluded the Iranians haven't imported any P-2
centrifuges, nor have they been able to produce any of their own.
Back in 1995 the Iranians did acquire "from a foreign intermediary" the
plans for a centrifuge similar to the Urenco P-2.
(http://www.forrelease.com/D20031128/nyf016.P2.11282003075223.22530.html)
However, they were unable to produce the maraging-steel rotors required
(http://www.key-to-steel.com/Articles/Art103.htm). They did manage to
produce several carbon-composite rotors, and by the time the research
program ended in June 2003, they had performed some mechanical tests.
However, they had not done any tests with uranium-fluoride gas. There are no
plans to produce quantities of these Iranian-developed centrifuges.
What about the Iranian disclosure this week to the IAEA of their plans to
convert 37 tons of uranium-oxide - yellowcake - into uranium-hexafluoride?
According to the neo-crazies, that yellowcake contains enough fissile
material to make one or two nukes like the one we dropped on Hiroshima.
Well, that's a bit like charging that your neighbor's fish pond contains
enough water to drown one or two children.
So, what's the bottom line? Well, if Bush wins, we invade no-nuke Iran and
the chances of terrorists getting their hands on Korean or Pakistani nukes
goes way up. But if Kerry wins? Stay tuned.
* Physicist James Gordon Prather has served as a policy implementing
official for national security-related technical matters in the Federal
Energy Agency, the Energy Research and Development Administration, the
Department of Energy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
Department of the Army. Dr. Prather also served as legislative assistant for
national security affairs to U.S. Sen. Henry Bellmon, R-Okla. -- ranking
member of the Senate Budget Committee and member of the Senate Energy
Committee and Appropriations Committee. Dr. Prather had earlier worked as a
nuclear weapons physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in
California and Sandia National Laboratory in New Mexico.