@@ Dr. Prather thwarting the Neo-Crazies @@
Arash
December 6, 2004
Thwarting the Neo-Crazies
Dr. James Gordon Prather
Nuclear weapons physicist
On Dec. 18, 2003, Iran signed an Additional Protocol to their Safeguards
Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Although not required
to do so until the Iranian Parliament "ratifies" it, Iran volunteered to act
"in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol, as a
confidence building measure."
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty requires all signatories not already
having nuclear weapons to negotiate and conclude a Safeguards Agreement with
the IAEA, with a view to preventing diversion of "source or special
fissionable material" - whether it is being produced, processed, or used in
any principal nuclear facility or outside any such facility - from peaceful
uses to nuclear weapons.
The IAEA employs periodic on-site inspections and continuous on-site
monitoring to verify the correctness of signatories' reports of "declared"
nuclear material and activities.
At the end of the Persian Gulf War, the IAEA discovered that its inspections
of "declared" sites were insufficient to detect clandestine nuclear programs
at other sites. It turned out that Iraq had a multi-billion dollar
broad-based "undeclared" program to enrich uranium that had gone undetected.
So, to increase the IAEA's capability for detecting such clandestine
programs, the international community developed the Model Additional
Protocol. This protocol - which enhances the authority of the IAEA-NPT
Safeguards regime - is to be used as a "model" for an Additional Protocol,
to amend each existing IAEA Safeguards agreement.
The Additional Protocol provides for much easier access and far greater
transparency to nuclear programs and nuclear-related activities, enabling
the IAEA not only to verify the non-diversion of "declared" nuclear
material, but also to provide assurances of the absence of undeclared
nuclear material and of any prohibited activities in a state.
In particular, the original safeguards agreement merely required the
disclosure of information on new facilities handling safeguarded nuclear
materials a few months before the nuclear materials were actually
introduced. The Additional Protocol now requires disclosure of that design
information as soon as Iranian authorities decide to construct, authorize
construction, or modify such a facility. From then on, the IAEA has the
continuing right to verify the design and construction information over the
facility's life cycle, including decommissioning.
The Additional Protocol also provides for "voluntary reporting on imports
and exports of nuclear material and exports of specified equipment and
non-nuclear material."
Last week, the IAEA Board of Governors heard a progress report from Director
General Mohamed ElBaradei, whereupon the Board passed a unanimous IAEA
Resolution on the implementation of its Safeguards agreement with Iran.
The Board noted "specifically the Director General's assessment that all the
declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and that such
material is not diverted to prohibited activities."
And, while recognizing "the right of states to the development and practical
application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes" and recognizing that it
was "a voluntary, non-legally-binding, confidence building measure," the
Board welcomed "the fact that Iran has decided to continue and extend its
suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities."
Needless to say, the IAEA resolution - essentially praising Iran for its
unprecedented cooperation - wasn't praised by the neo-crazies.
In fact, the New York Times reported that the U.S. representative to the
IAEA , Jackie Sanders, at a meeting of the Board last week, raised questions
about Iranian efforts to obtain equipment "in the nuclear military area" and
demanded a specific list of Iran's purchases "so we can make our own
decisions about Iran's intentions."
But recall that the Additional Protocol merely provides for "voluntary"
reporting of certain imports and exports. Furthermore, it requires the IAEA
to take into account "the need to avoid hampering the economic and
technological development of Iran" and "to take every precaution to protect
commercial, technological, and industrial secrets as well as other
confidential information coming to its knowledge."
To that end, the IAEA "shall maintain a stringent regime to ensure effective
protection against disclosure of commercial, technological and industrial
secrets and other confidential information coming to its knowledge,
including such information coming to the Agency's knowledge in the
implementation of this Protocol."
Sanders is apparently demanding that ElBaradei provide her the list of
imports Iran has voluntarily provided him in confidence. She wants to
overrule the IAEA Board's "inaction" and take Iran's alleged nuke program
directly to the UN Security Council.
ElBaradei came close to thwarting the neo-crazies' invasion of Iraq last
year. He may well thwart their invasion of Iran next year.
He might as well. Whatever he does, the neo-crazies will see to it he
doesn't get appointed for another term.
*Physicist James Gordon Prather has served as a policy implementing official
for national security-related technical matters in the Federal Energy
Agency, the Energy Research and Development Administration, the Department
of Energy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of the
Army. Dr. Prather also served as legislative assistant for national security
affairs to U.S. Sen. Henry Bellmon, R-Okla. -- ranking member of the Senate
Budget Committee and member of the Senate Energy Committee and
Appropriations Committee. Dr. Prather had earlier worked as a nuclear
weapons physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California
and Sandia National Laboratory in New Mexico.
http://www.antiwar.com/prather
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/archives.asp?AUTHOR_ID=35
Kavik Kang
news:_6Ysd.431$Kf6....@newscontent-01.sprint.ca...
Of course, the Iranians aren't fooling anyone and the whole world knows that
they are trying to build a nuclear weapon. The IAEA is only the first line
of defense, and has no actual authority. The authority rests solely with
the United States, who absolutely guarentees that Iran will never have a
nuclear weapon. The Iranians are wasting their time. Oh, and it is not
possible for the IAEA to "twart" the US, since we can do anything we want to
do with regards to nuclear weapons. We are the final authority and the only
authority.
--
22: 40. Permission to take up arms is given to those against whom war is
made, because they have been wronged and Allah, indeed, has power to help
them. - Holy Qur'an