@@ Filthy JEW "Edward Nicolae Luttwak"; your "ethnic" weapon will fail, but we will finish you off sooner than you think - DEATH TO ISRAEL @@
Arash
anti-Iran terrorists for many years. Now comes the old bloodthirsty Jew "Edward
Nicolae Luttwak", the Coup d'Etat-loving guru
(http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0674175476), who also said "We" [the Jews] are
going to bomb Iraq into the 'Stone Age' (http://www.rense.com/general68/prac.htm).
Luttwak is now recycling the same old JEW plan of using the so called "ethnics" as a
weapon to dismantle Iran.
Luttwak, like his Jew-buddies, Ari Ben-Menashe aka Menashe Amir
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ari_Ben-Menashe), Michael Ledeen
(http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/1261), Michael Rubin
(http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/1345), Reuel Marc Gerecht
(http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/1191), Danielle Pletka
(http://comunistibergamaschi.interfree.it/iraq2004/pletka.jpg), Richard Perle
(http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/1315), Douglas Feith
(http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/1146), Frank Gaffney
(http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/1183), Daniel Pipes
(http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/1316), Elliott Abrams
(http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/969), and Eleana Benador
(http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/1030), who have been spending a lot of money
and efforts at this plan for decades, are really pushing this plan now, since they
believe it can work by bombing Iran and weakening the government and the Iranian
armed forces. Wishful thinking of course; we have survived for more than 10,000 years
as a civilization, and we certainly are not going to let bunch of dirty JEW push us
around.
http://www.peakoil.net/images/luttwak.jpg
http://italy.indymedia.org/images/Luttwak3.jpg
http://www.piomanzu.com/piomanzu/vecchio%20sito/img/el00.jpg
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/crash/art/luttwak.jpg
http://www.girodivite.it/IMG/jpg/prev12.jpg
http://www.capripress.com/gallery/Giornalismo/s_luttwak1.jpg
Filthy Jew "Edward Nicolae Luttwak"
Who is Edward Luttwak?
JINSA (http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/1508), author of 1968 book "Coup
d'Etat, A Practical Handbook". Edward Luttwak is a senior fellow at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC. His books include "The Grand
Strategy of the Roman Empire" and, more recently, "Strategy: The Logic of War and
Peace". Luttwak is an Israeli citizen and teaches in Israel. He frequently writes for
Israeli and pro-Israeli newspapers and journals. Luttwak's main theme in many of his
articles is the necessity of the U.S. waging war on Iraq. WINEP's (Washington
Institute for Neat East Policy) Board of Advisors includes: Edward Luttwak. The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy was founded by Martin Indyk, a research
director of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). While AIPAC focused
its lobbying on the U.S. Congress, WINEP was founded as a think-tank that would
primarily interact with the executive branch to set U.S. policy toward Israel and the
Middle East. http://www.rense.com/general68/prac.htm
Excerpts From Coup d'Etat: A Practical Handbook
http://www.subliminal.org/news/coup.html
Iran and America: the secret friendship
The First Post magazine
http://www.thefirstpost.co.uk/index.php?menuID=1&subID=91
Review of “The Truth About Global Oil Supply”
http://www.peakoil.net/Luttwak.html
Edward Luttwak, "Give War a Chance", Foreign Affairs, July 1999.
http://tinyurl.com/dov8b
Edward Luttwak has served as a consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
the National Security Council, the U.S. Department of State, and the U.S. Army, Navy,
and Air Force. He is a frequent lecturer at universities and military colleges in the
United States and abroad and was the 1988 Nimitz lecturer at the University of
California, Berkeley, and the 1989 Tanner lecturer at Yale University. In 2004 he was
awarded an honorary degree by the University of Bath (UK). Luttwak is the author of
numerous articles, contributions to collected works, research monographs, and 19
books. He received his Ph.D. from the Johns Hopkins University, and he speaks Hebrew,
French, Italian, and Spanish.
Luttwak was born in Arad, Romania. Luttwak spent many years in Italy, between
Palermo, in Sicily, and Milan, as a refugee. Later he attended the London School of
Economics and Johns Hopkins University, where he received a doctorate. His first
academic post was at the University of Bath. Luttwak serves on the editorial boards
of the Geopolitique (France), the Journal of Strategic Studies, and the Washington
Quarterly (http://www.twq.com/info/archives.cfm).
---------------------------
Los Angeles Times
February 10, 2006
Would Iranians rally 'round the flag'?
Fractured Iran won't rally around the Persian regime
Resentments are the rule among oppressed groups
Various ethnic and religious factions might see little to gain in supporting Tehran
if the country's nuclear facilities were bombed.
By Edward Luttwak
eluttwak[AT]csis.org
Tel: 1-301-656-1972
There may be good reasons to oppose an air attack on Iran's nuclear installations at
this time, but one of the arguments that is advanced most often is seriously flawed.
The argument is based on a familiar axiom that ruling regimes, even unpopular ones,
are "strengthened" by such attacks because the bombarded nation rallies around its
rulers. But this does not apply to Iran. It's true that when Germans, Japanese and
Serbs, among others, were bombed, they did indeed support their leaders all the more
because the attacks increased their sense of national solidarity.
Iran, however, is not a nation-state but rather a multinational empire dominated by
Persians, much as the Soviet Union was once dominated by Russians. Except that in
this case, the Persians only account for just over half the population of Iran
(making them a smaller proportion than the Russians were even in the final days of
the Soviet Union).
No scholar who studies Iran would dispute that there is a very strong Persian
identity and pride of ownership in ruling Iran among the Persians, but only a very
weak sense of Iranian participation among non-Persians.
Iran is not like Lebanon, where the different communities often fight each other.
Instead, Iran's minorities each resist the Persian-dominated central government. Just
in the last month, guerrillas of Baluch nationality kidnapped soldiers in southeast
Iran. Arabs of Khuzistan province next to Iraq detonated bombs in Ahvaz, and Kurds
clashed with the rural police.
To the extent that the different nationalities each have their own identities and
oppose the essentially Persian regime, they are likely to applaud external attacks on
the nuclear installations rather than rally to the defense of their rulers.
So how does factional solidarity in Iran break down?
The Kurds, who account for about 9% of the population, have been encouraged by the
example of virtual Kurdish independence in Iraq next door. Their demands for autonomy
are becoming more forceful, and something of an insurgency seems to have started.
Very few Kurds are likely to rally around their Persian overlords.
Smaller nationalities that are known to be disaffected because of recent examples of
violent resistance include the Arabs at 3% of Iran's population and the Baluch at 2%.
Little is known of the intensity of the national sentiments of the Turkmen and Lurs
(2% each), and still less of the Gilaki and Mazandarani (8% in all), who may be
politically more assimilated simply because they speak Persian dialects.
Along with the Kurds, all the smaller nationalities amount to only a quarter of
Iran's population; but Turkic-speaking Azaris add another 24% all by themselves. Many
Azari families in Tehran especially are believed to be thoroughly assimilated, but
the more numerous Azaris farther north are not, and national revival and separatist
groups have become increasingly active among them.
Since Azarbaijan just across the border gained its independence from the Soviet
Union, the Azaris have a national home of their own, and it is not Iran.
The religious extremism of Iran's regime has further fractured the nation's
solidarity by discriminating not only against the non-Muslim Bahais, Christians, Jews
and Zoroastrians who amount to only 2% of the total population, and are of yet
smaller political significance, but also against the 9% or more who are Sunnis (who
are not even allowed to have their own mosque in Tehran, where 1 million of them
live).
So, all in all, at least half the population is unlikely to be motivated by feelings
of solidarity with their rulers.
Only among the Persians are many likely to react to an attack as the axiom
prescribes; others might welcome the humiliation of their oppressors.
The bombing of Iran's nuclear installations may still be a bad idea for other
reasons, but not because it would strengthen the hold of its rulers.
One may hope that Iran's rulers are not misled by their own propaganda and will
therefore accept a diplomatic solution rather than gamble all on an irrelevant axiom.
* Edward Nicolae Luttwak (http://tinyurl.com/8pjhz) is a senior fellow at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington.
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-luttwak10feb10,0,3661131.story?coll=la-news-comment-opinions
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/editorial/outlook/3656743.html
----------------------------
Wall Street Journal
February 8, 2006
Attack on Iran workable - would remove nuclear threat for years
In a Single Night
By Edward Luttwak
Many commentators argue that a pre-emptive air attack against Iran's nuclear
installations is unfeasible. It would not be swift or surgical, they say, because it
would require thousands of strike and defense-suppression sorties. And it is likely
to fail even then because some facilities might be too well hidden or too strongly
protected. There may well be other, perfectly valid reasons to oppose an attack on
Iran's nuclear sites. But let's not pretend that such an attack has no chance of
success. In fact, the odds are rather good.
The skeptics begin sensibly enough by rejecting any direct comparison with Israel's
1981 air attack that incapacitated the Osirak reactor, stopping Saddam's first try at
producing plutonium bombs.
Iran is evidently following a different and much larger-scale path to nuclear
weapons, by the centrifuge "enrichment" of uranium hexafluoride gas to increase the
proportion of fissile uranium 235. It requires a number of different plants operating
in series to go from natural uranium to highly enriched uranium formed in the
specific shapes needed to obtain an explosive chain reaction. Some of these plants,
notably the Natanz centrifuge plant, are both very large and built below ground with
thick overhead protection.
It is at this point that the argument breaks down. Yes, Iraq's weapon program of 1981
was stopped by a single air strike carried out by less than a squadron of
fighter-bombers because it was centered in a single large reactor building. Once it
was destroyed, the mission was accomplished.
To do the same to Iran's 100-odd facilities would require almost a hundred times as
many sorties as the Israelis flew in 1981, which would strain even the U.S. Air
Force. Some would even add many more sorties to carry out a preliminary suppression
campaign against Iran's air defenses (a collection of inoperable anti-aircraft
weapons and obsolete fighters with outdated missiles). But the claim that to stop
Iran's program all of its nuclear sites must be destroyed is simply wrong.
An air attack is not a Las Vegas demolitions contract, where nothing must be left but
well-flattened ground for the new casino to be built. Iran might need 100 buildings
in good working order to make its bomb, but it is enough to demolish a few critical
installations to delay its program for years -- and perhaps longer because it would
become harder or impossible for Iran to buy the materials it bought when its efforts
were still secret. Some of these installations may be thickly protected against air
attack, but it seems that their architecture has not kept up with the performance of
the latest penetration bombs.
Nor could destroyed items be easily replaced by domestic production. In spite of all
the claims of technological self-sufficiency by its engineer-president, not even
metal parts of any complexity can be successfully machined in Iran.
More than 35% of Iran's gasoline must now be imported because the capacity of its
foreign-built refineries cannot be expanded without components currently under U.S.
embargo, and which the locals cannot copy.
Aircraft regularly fall out of the sky because Iranians are unable to
reverse-engineer spare parts.
The bombing of Iran's nuclear installations may still be a bad idea for "other
reasons" [Could be because Jews like Luttwak will suffer too much due to Iran's
retaliations against Jews around the world], but not because it would require a huge
air offensive. On the contrary, it could all be done in a single night.
One may hope that Iran's rulers will therefore accept a diplomatic solution rather
than gamble all on wildly exaggerated calculations.
http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=28448
------------------------
Telegraph UK
January 23, 2005
The scariest prospect of all: Iran with the bomb
By Edward Luttwak
President Bush, during his inauguration speech last week, promised that he would
"spread freedom to the darkest corners of the world". There were some among his
world-wide audience to whom that sounded like a threat: we will invade your country
unless you change your government to one which we think supports freedom.
The Iranians probably head the list of those feeling threatened. Relations between
the United States and Iran, never exactly warm, have been freezing since 2002 when
the Iranians were caught concealing from the International Atomic Energy Authority
(IAEA) large parts of their program to build a nuclear bomb.
Vice President Richard Cheney followed up the President's address by insisting that
Iran was "at the top of the world's trouble spots". He added that "everybody would be
best suited if we could deal with the problem of Iran diplomatically". But he left
the strong impression that if diplomacy failed, military action would follow.
There are certainly good reasons for believing that the Bush administration is
considering the possibility of air strikes.
Iran is ruled by fiercely reactionary clerics under the "supreme guide" Ayatollah
Khameini. Between them, they have reduced the elected civilian government of
President Khatami to almost total impotence. Khameini is pushing Iran down a more
radically fundamentalist path than even Ayatollah Khomeini, the architect of the
Islamic revolution in Iran, ever contemplated.
Ayatollah Khomeini tolerated civilian government. He was not so restrictive in
deciding who could stand for election in Iran's parliament. He never persecuted the
hundreds of thousands of Iran's Muslims who practice a different variety of Shi'ism
to that approved by the ruling orthodoxy. Khameini, however, has declared all those
people heretics, and started bullying them mercilessly. Abroad, the clique around
Khameini funds suicide bombers in Israel and Iraq.
None of this would matter, however, if Ayatollah Khameini wasn't also determined to
acquire a nuclear arsenal.
Some members of the government have even boasted how they would use them: to destroy
Israel. "Islam could survive the retaliation", they insist, "but Israel would be gone
forever".
The thought of Ayatollahs with nuclear bombs should terrify everyone – especially in
Europe, because the Iranians could soon put those bombs on the top of rockets that
could reach European capitals.
The French, the Germans and the British have been trying to use diplomacy to persuade
the Iranians to stop their nuclear program. They have offered Iran technological help
(building non-nuclear power plants, for example) if only it will abandon its project
to build a bomb and agree to unannounced, on-site inspections from the IAEA.
Khameini's men have indignantly responded that it would be "against our principles"
to acquire a nuclear bomb – but refuse to agree to unannounced inspections or to
allow the IAEA to enter their "research reactor" at Parchim near Teheran.
In fact, the Iranians already have a plant which will produce weapons-grade uranium
under construction at Natanz. They have a heavy water facility, a large "nuclear
technology centre" at Isfahan, and another at Parchim.
The mullahs are still negotiating a deal with the Europeans to end their nuclear
programme, but the bellicose rhetoric from America is probably all that keeps them
talking.
If Iran is to be prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons, effective diplomatic or
military action will have to come soon. Production facilities can be bombed but once
actual weapons are assembled, locating and destroying them will become next to
impossible. And Iran will then be in a position to threaten not just Israel, but all
of our oil-producing Arab allies.
When the Israelis bombed Saddam's nuclear research centre at Osirak in 1981, they
were universally condemned. The Americans showed their displeasure by cancelling arms
sales. But the raid on Osirak prevented Saddam from acquiring a nuclear arsenal, a
fact that the Americans and the world fully recognized when weapons inspectors went
into Iraq after the 1991 Persian Gulf war.
If Saddam had had nuclear weapons in 1991, it would have been impossible to dislodge
him from Kuwait. Able to intimidate Saudi Arabia, he would have had decisive power
over Middle East oil. That prospect persuaded America, and most of the world, that
Israel had done the right thing in bombing Osirak in 1981.
Unless European diplomacy obtains real guarantees from Iran, President Bush will soon
have to decide to do to Iran what the Israelis did to Iraq. If he decides to attack,
he will not announce it in advance: just a television broadcast the following morning
announcing a job done. The "international community" will denounce the raid
hysterically in public while approving of it whole-heartedly in private.
Conventional wisdom says that bombing Iran would lead to Iranians rallying round
their government. I am not sure that would happen in today's Iran. Its rulers'
bizarre combination of rigid religious conservatism, blatant corruption and economic
incompetence has made them exceptionally unpopular.
Half of the population is not Persian – and many of them would view an attack on
Iran's nuclear facilities not as an attack upon them, but on their imperialist
rulers.
Even the Persian majority may not want their hated clerical despots to control
nuclear bombs. A raid on nuclear sites, nearly all of which are in remote locations,
may not provoke the population to rally round their rulers but, of course, the
Iranian government would not collapse. Some form of retaliation would be inevitable.
The second Bush Administration wants to repair relations across the Atlantic. Joint
action with Europeans – who offer the carrot, while the U.S. threatens the stick – is
part of that. If European diplomacy fails to persuade the clerics to abandon nuclear
weapons, the American threat might.
And if the Americans end up wavering, the Israelis might well step in and do the job.
The truth is that nuclear- armed Ayatollahs are unacceptable in Europe, America and
Israel.
Even the clerics, in their calmer and more rational moments, must know that accepting
rewards for freezing Iran's nuclear program is a better deal than getting bombed. But
Iran will elect a new president on June 17. The campaign has just started. It is not
the best of times for calm rationality.