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Arash

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Oct 30, 2005, 10:19:47 AM10/30/05

New York Times
October 29, 2005

Indictment Gives Glimpse Into a Secretive Operation

By Douglas Jehl

Washington D.C. -- Over a seven-week period in the spring of 2003, Vice President
Dick Cheney's suite in the Old Executive Office Building appears to have served as
the nerve center of an effort to gather and spread word about ambassador Joseph C.
Wilson IV (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_C._Wilson) and his wife, a CIA
operative. http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Valerie_Plame

Irv Lewis "Scooter" Libby (http://rightweb.irc-online.org/ind/libby/libby.php), the
vice president's chief of staff, is the only aide to Dick Cheney who has been charged
with a crime. But the indictment alleges that Dick Cheney himself and others in the
office took part in discussions about the origins of a trip by ambassador Wilson to
Niger in 2002; about the identity of his wife, Valerie Plame Wilson
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Valerie_Plame); and whether the information could be
shared with reporters, in the period before it was made public in a July 14, 2003,
column by Robert D. Novak.
http://www.townhall.com/opinion/columns/robertnovak/2003/07/14/160881.html

The indictment identifies the other officials only by their titles, but it clearly
asserts that others involved in the discussion involved David Addington, Cheney's
counsel; John Hannah (http://www.dailykos.com/story/2005/10/18/13563/180), deputy
national security adviser; and Catherine Martin
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/cmartin-bio.html), then Cheney's press
secretary.

Marc Grossman (http://www.cohengroup.net/team-mg.html), John Hannah
(http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=John_Hannah), David S. Addington
(http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=David_S._Addington) and Catherine Martin
have all declined to comment, citing legal advice. The fact that they were not named
in the indictment suggests that they will not be charged, but all can expect to be
called as witnesses in any trial of Lewis Libby, setting up a spectacle that could be
unpleasant for the administration.

That Dick Cheney and his office sparred with the CIA before the invasion of Iraq has
never been a secret. Dick Cheney and Lewis Libby made repeated trips to CIA
headquarters in Langley, Virginia, in the months before the American invasion in
March 2003, and Lewis Libby was often on the phone with senior CIA officials to
challenge the agency's intelligence reports on Iraq. A principal focus, former
intelligence officials say, was the question of whether al-CIA-duh (al-Qaeda) had had
a close, collaborative relationship with Saddam's Iraqi government, an argument
advanced publicly by Dick Cheney but rejected by the CIA intelligence analysts.

The antipathy felt by Dick heney and Lewis Libby toward ambassador Wilson, in the
aftermath of the invasion, has also long been known. But the events spelled out in
the 22-page indictment
(http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/iln/osc/documents/libby_indictment_28102005.pdf) suggest a
far more active, earlier effort by the vice president's office to gather information
about him and his wife.

The indictment provides a rare glimpse inside a vice presidential operation that,
under Dick Cheney, has been extraordinary both for its power and its secrecy. It
tracks a period in the spring of 2003, at a time when the American failure to find
illicit weapons in Iraq meant that the administration's rationale for war was
beginning to unravel, and when early reports about ambassador Wilson's 2002 trip,
which had not yet identified him by name, raised questions about whether the White
House should have known just how weak its case been, particularly involving Iraq and
nuclear weapons.

By any measure, the indictment suggests that Lewis Libby and others went to unusual
lengths to gather information about ambassador Wilson and his trip. An initial
request on May 29, 2003, from Lewis Libby to Marc Grossman
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marc_Grossman), the undersecretary of state for
political affairs, led Marc Grossman to request a classified memo from Carl W. Ford
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carl_Ford), the director of the State Department's
intelligence bureau, and later for Marc Grossman to orally brief Lewis Libby on its
contents.

Later requests appear to have prompted CIA officials to fax classified information to
Dick Cheney's office about ambassador Wilson's trip, on June 9, 2003 Dick Cheney
himself is alleged to have shared details about the nature of Valerie Plame Wilson's
job with Lewis Libby, on June 12, 2003 The indictment says that Lewis Libby first
shared information about ambassador Wilson's trip with a reporter, Judith Miller
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judith_Miller_%28journalist%29) of The New York Times,
on June 23, 2003; but it also describes discussions involving Lewis Libby, David
Addington, John Hannah, Catherine Martin and White House officials, about whether the
information could be shared with reporters.

Among the discussions, the indictment says, were one on June 23, 2005, in which Lewis
Libby is said to have told John Hannah that there could be complications at the CIA,
if information about ambassador Wilson's trip was shared publicly. It is also not
clear how Dick Cheney may have learned "from the CIA" that Valerie Plame Wilson
worked in the agency's counterproliferation division, a fact that meant she was part
of the CIA's clandestine service, and that she might well be working undercover.

Lawyers in the case say that notes taken by Lewis Libby indicate that detail was
provided to Dick Cheney by George J. Tenet
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Tenet), then the director of central
intelligence, but several former intelligence officials say they do not believe that
George Tenet was the source of the information.

Many questions remain unanswered in the indictment. The special counsel, Patrick J.
Fitzgerald (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patrick_Fitzgerald), said that Valerie Plame
Wilson's affiliation with the CIA had been classified, but he did not assert that
Lewis Libby knew that she had covert status, something the prosecutor would have had
to prove to support a charge under the Intelligence Identities Protection Act
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intelligence_Identities_Protection_Act).

It is not clear, for example, what guidance, if any, Dick Cheney gave to Lewis Libby
about whether or how to share information about Valerie Plame Wilson's trip with
reporters. Among their discussions, lawyers in the case have said, was one on July
11, 2003, on a trip to Norfolk, Virginia, that preceded by a day what two reporters,
Judith Miller and Matthew Cooper (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matthew_Cooper) of
Time magazine, have said were conversations in which Lewis Libby mentioned ambassador
Wilson's wife.

Beyond Dick Cheney's office, some of the government officials involved in the
discussions have yet to be identified. It is not clear from the indictment, for
example, who faxed the "classified information from the CIA" about ambassador
Wilson's trip to the vice president's office on June 9, 2003 or which "senior CIA
officer" provided further information to Lewis Libby on June 11, 2003.

Another question is whether Lewis Libby (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lewis_Libby)
made appropriate use of the briefings provided to him by the CIA, a privilege
afforded to only eight or nine other members of the Bush administration. The
indictment says that Lewis Libby complained to a CIA briefer on June 14, 2003 that
CIA officials were making comments critical of the Bush administration, and that he
mentioned, among other things, "ambassador Joe Wilson" and "Valerie Plame Wilson" in
the context of ambassador Wilson's trip to Niger.

Also still unclear is how Catherine Martin, the press secretary, may have learned in
June or early July that ambassador Wilson's wife worked at the CIA The indictment
says that Catherine Martin learned the information from "another government official"
and shared that information with Lewis Libby.

Marc Grossman (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marc_Grossman), who served under Colin L.
Powell (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colin_Powell), left the government in January
and is now a private consultant. David Addington, still Dick Cheney's counsel, has
been a major participant in debates within the administration about the treatment of
suspected terrorists, including questions surrounding interrogation rules, and
whether those held at the American facility in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp_X-Ray), should face military tribunals. John
Hannah, a Middle East specialist, was a main liaison between the vice president's
office and Ahmad Chalabi, who as an Iraqi exile was a major force in urging the
administration toward war.

John Hannah and Lewis Libby were also the main authors of a 48-page draft speech
prepared in January 2003 that was intended to make the administration's case for war
in Iraq before the United Nations. The draft was provided to Colin Powell, in advance
of his speech to the Security Council on February 5, 2003
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html), but most of its
contents were cast aside by Colin Powell and George Tenet, who during several days of
review at CIA headquarters rejected many claims related to Iraq, its weapons program
and terrorism as exaggerated and unwarranted.

It has long been understood that Lewis Libby, Dick Cheney and others felt hostility
toward ambassador Wilson by July 6, 2003, the day the former ambassador emerged
publicly, in an Op-Ed article in The New York Times
(http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0706-02.htm) and an appearance on "Meet the
Press" on October 5, 2003 (http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3131258) and May 2, 2004
(http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4880116), to describe his trip to Niger and to criticize
the administration.

Ambassador Wilson suggested that he had taken the trip at the behest of Dick Cheney's
office, and that the office had been briefed on his findings. Neither assertion was
strictly accurate (the CIA had dispatched ambassador Wilson on its own, after
questions from Dick Cheney about a possible uranium deal between Iraq and Niger
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yellowcake_forgery); and his findings, briefed orally
to the agency, were never shared with Dick Cheney's office). After ambassador
Wilson's public appearance, the White House worked aggressively to challenge his
statements.

But the indictment shows that, within Dick Cheney's office, the pushback against
ambassador Wilson began far earlier, at a time when the only news accounts about his
trip had referred to him only as a "former ambassador." Nicholas D. Kristof
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicholas_D._Kristof) of The New York Times wrote about
ambassador Wilson on May 6, 2003, without naming him. But the timeline spelled out in
the indictment suggests that it was a second round of news media inquiries, this time
from Walter Pincus
(http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/july-dec03/wmd_7-11.html) of The
Washington Post with CIA ties, whose article appeared on June 12, 2003
(http://www.independent-media.tv/item.cfm?fmedia_id=1160&fcategory_desc=Under%20Reported),
that set Lewis Libby and the vice president's office on the path toward digging out
the information that is now at the heart of the case against Lewis Libby.
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/30/politics/30indict.html?pagewanted=print