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@@ What non-compliance, you old cunt @@

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Arash

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Mar 7, 2005, 11:35:04 AM3/7/05
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March 7, 2005


What Noncompliance?


Dr. James Gordon Prather
Nuclear weapons physicist


Addressing the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency
in Vienna last week, [Old smelly cunt] 'Jackie Sanders'
(http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/27684.htm), the U.S.
representative, warned the panel
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A160-2005Mar2?language=printer)
that it "cannot ignore forever its statutory obligation to report this
matter to the United Nations Security Council."

What matter?

Well, it seems that IAEA Deputy Director General Pierre Goldschmidt
(http://www.iaea.org/About/DGC/goldschmidt_bio.html) had just provided the
Board an update on the comprehensive report made last November verifying
Iran's compliance with (a) its Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Safeguards agreement, (b) its voluntary adherence to an Additional Protocol,
and (c) its voluntary suspension – as a confidence-building measure – of
enrichment-related and reprocessing-related activities.

Goldschmidt began by noting that "Iran has facilitated in a timely manner
Agency access to nuclear material and facilities under its Safeguards
Agreement and Additional Protocol."

He also reported that the IAEA "has continued its activities to verify all
elements of Iran's voluntary suspension of all enrichment-related and
reprocessing activities."

So far, so good.

But, in an effort to be "completely transparent" about its current and past
nuclear programs, Iran has voluntarily provided the IAEA all sorts of
information about its past activities.

In particular
(http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/DDGs/2005/goldschmidt01032005.html):

"During a meeting on 12 January 2005 in Tehran, Iran
showed the Agency a handwritten one-page document reflecting an offer said
to have been made to Iran in 1987 by a foreign intermediary. While it is not
entirely clear from the document precisely what the offer entailed, Iran has
stated that it related to centrifuge-technology acquisition. This document
suggests that the offer included the delivery of: a disassembled sample
machine (including drawings, descriptions, and specifications for
production); drawings, specifications and calculations for a 'complete
plant'; and materials for 2,000 centrifuge machines. The document also
reflects an offer to provide auxiliary vacuum and electric drive equipment
and uranium re-conversion and casting capabilities. Iran stated that only
some of these items had been delivered, and that all of those items had been
declared to the IAEA. This information is still being assessed. The Agency
has requested that all documentation relevant to the offer be made available
for the Agency's review."

Now, some of you may recall that, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, the IAEA
had discovered a one-page memo, dated Oct. 6, 1990, summarizing a meeting
between members of the Mukhabarat – the Iraqi intelligence service – and an
intermediary who said he represented the Khan network.

Metallurgist A.Q. Khan had worked for a subsidiary of Urenco
(http://www.urenco.com), the European uranium-enrichment consortium. Khan
had stolen Urenco supplier lists and Urenco designs for a first-generation
gas centrifuge, returned to Pakistan, and established an international
procurement network for creating in the early 1980s the Pakistani
gas-centrifuge uranium-enrichment program.

In 1990, the Khan network was apparently offering – for a price – to help
"Iraq establish a project to enrich uranium and manufacture a nuclear
weapon."

So now the Bush-Cheney administration and the [Anglo-Jewish funded
terrorists] National Council of Resistance of Iran (MKO/MEK/NCRI) – the
political arm of the Mujahedin-e-Khalq
(http://library.nps.navy.mil/home/tgp/mek.htm), a U.S.- and
European-designated "terrorist group" – are charging that the offer made
three years earlier to provide Iran with uranium "casting capabilities"
amounted to an offer by the Khan network to help Iran manufacture a nuclear
weapon.

Now, bear in mind that after almost two years of go-almost-anywhere,
see-almost-anything inspections, the IAEA has found no evidence whatsoever
that Iran has – or ever had – a nuclear weapons program.

Nevertheless, Jackie baby warned the Board that it "cannot ignore forever
its statutory obligation to report this matter to the United Nations
Security Council."


What obligation?


Here is what the IAEA statue has to say (noncompliance being defined
elsewhere in the statue as the use of NPT-proscribed materials and
facilities "in such a way as to further any military purpose"):

"The inspectors shall report any noncompliance to the
director general, who shall thereupon transmit the report to the Board of
Governors. The Board shall call upon the recipient State or States to remedy
forthwith any noncompliance which it finds to have occurred. The Board shall
report the noncompliance to all members and to the Security Council and
General Assembly of the United Nations."

Wow! It's a good thing for Iran that the IAEA inspectors have not found any
instances of Iranian "noncompliance." Because, if they had, "in the event of
failure of the recipient State or States to take fully corrective action
within a reasonable time," the IAEA Board may "suspend any noncomplying
member from the exercise of the privileges and rights of membership."

Listen to a recent interview with Dr. Prather
http://www.weekendinterviewshow.com


* Physicist James Gordon Prather has served as a policy implementing
official for national security-related technical matters in the Federal
Energy Agency, the Energy Research and Development Administration, the
Department of Energy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
Department of the Army. Dr. Prather also served as legislative assistant for
national security affairs to U.S. Sen. Henry Bellmon, R-Okla. -- ranking
member of the Senate Budget Committee and member of the Senate Energy
Committee and Appropriations Committee. Dr. Prather had earlier worked as a
nuclear weapons physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in
California and Sandia National Laboratory in New Mexico.

http://www.antiwar.com/prather


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