@@ History of Iranian Islands in Persian Gulf @@
Arash
Musa Islands
A summary of the text of speech by Professor Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh
(pirouzmoj...@hotmail.com) to the international symposium on Modern
Boundaries of Iran - University of London - October 9-10
Introduction
British Government's announcement in January 1968 of the decision of
terminating Pax-Britannica in the Persian Gulf caused a sense of urgency for
closer cooperation among regional states. Settlement of territorial and
boundary differences, thus, became a necessity, especially in the offshore
areas where exploitation of new oilfields was expanding rapidly.
With an average depth of about 50 metres, the whole of the Gulf is an
extended continental shelf, and its curved rectangular shape, puts Iranian
territories on the opposite side of territories of most Arab states of the
southern side.
Iran had in 1965 negotiated with Britain for delimitation of maritime
areas, which established the median line of the sea as a principle upon
which the continental shelf between Iran and her Arab neighbours was to be
divided. It was on the basis of this principle that the subsequent maritime
delimitation agreements were achieved.
In anticipation of existence of oil structures across maritime
boundaries, Iran decided to enforce a provision in her continental shelf
agreements with the states on the opposite side preventing inappropriate
exploitation of such structures. According to this provision, which appears
in all continental shelf boundary agreements, if a petroleum structure
extends across the boundary and could be exploited from the other side,
there should be no sub-surface well completion within 125 metres of the
boundary without the mutual agreement of the two parties. The area of
drilling prohibition is 500 metres with Saudi Arabia.
Ignoring United Arab Emirates' internal boundaries, the eight states
littoral to the Persian Gulf need, at least, sixteen continental shelf
boundaries among them. Of these only seven have been negotiated of which
four are related to Iran. Two of the most complicated border issues settled
in this period were those of late 1968 between Iran and Saudi Arabia and the
1971 settlement between Iran and Sharjah on Abu Musa Island. These were
followed by a number of other settlements such as: continental-shelf
boundary division of 1970 between Iran and Qatar; 1972 between Iran and
Bahrain; 1975 between Iran and Oman and the river and inland boundary
settlement between Iran and Iraq in that same year. Maritime boundaries
between Iran and Kuwait, at the head of the Gulf, was covered by a draft
agreement between the two sides which came about in 1962, but it is not in
force because of Iraq's continued territorial disputes with Iran and Kuwait.
In all, maritime boundaries in two areas of the Persian Gulf have not
been settled. These are the north-west areas between Iran, Kuwait, and Iraq,
which will be examined by Mr. Asgari: and the area between Iran and UAE
because of uncertainties concerning Tunb and Abu Musa islands.
The issue of Tunbs and Abu Musa islands
In late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the British occupied
a number of Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf, either directly or through
assumed sovereignty for the so-called Trucial Emirates. These included Tunbs
and Abu Musa as well as Qeshm, Hengam and Sirri islands.
A War Office map, presented by the British Minister in Tehran to the
Shah in 1888 confirmed all these islands, as Iranian owned. Iran's case was
further strengthened with the publication in 1892 of Lord Curzon's Persia
and the Persian Question in which the map also showed the islands as Iranian
territory.
British fear of a Russian encroachment in the Persian Gulf intensified
at the turn of the twentieth century. In 1902 a secret meeting at the
British Foreign Office decided that the strategic islands at or near the
Strait of Hormuz should be occupied. This decision was communicated to
British political administrators in India and the Persian Gulf in a
memorandum dated July 14th 1902. A year later the government of India
sanctioned occupation of the islands of Tunb and Abu Musa in the name of the
Sheikh of Sharjah.
Iran was on the brink of civil war and the authority of the central
government was at its weakest. It took the Iranians about one year to
realise what had happened. During his tour of southern ports and islands in
April 1904, Director of Iranian Customs found out that the Iranian flag was
replaced in Tunb and Abu Musa by the flag of the Sheikh of Sharjah. He
lowered that flag and ordered the Iranian flag to be re-hoisted. He also
commissioned two armed guards at Abu Musa. The Iranian flag was lowered
again and the two sides decided to maintain status quo pending further
negotiations.
Meanwhile, Iran continued struggles for the recovery of its islands as
Iranian customs office wrote to the government in July 1927, demanding
action against illegal trade by establishing observation posts on the three
islands. A small fleet of Iranian navy was sent to recover Abu Musa and the
two Tunbs and to put an end to the problem there.
The Anglo-Iranian Negotiations of 1928-
When Iran prepared in 1928 to take her territorial dispute with
Britain to the League of Nations, the British agreed to negotiate the status
of the Tunbs, Abu Musa and Sirri islands. These negotiations began in
January 1929 and continued until mid-spring 1929 without much progress.
Baldwin's Conservative government was replaced in May that year by a Labour
government, and Arthur Henderson replaced Chamberlain as Foreign Secretary.
Henderson showed a more protective line towards Britain's colonial role in
the Persian Gulf and brought Clive's negotiations with the Iranians on the
issue of the Tunbs and Abu Musa to an abrupt end. This led the Iranians to
try to recover the island in the 1930s through a series of actions.
Sheikh of Ras al-Kheimah returns the Tunb Island
In 1934 Governor of Bandar Abbas and other Iranian officials visited
Greater Tunb. This visit was the result of a secret Iranian arrangement with
the Sheikh of Ras al-Kheimah according to which the Sheikh lowered his flag
in Greater Tunb and the Iranian flag was hoisted instead. Earlier, an
Iranian warship in Tunb's territorial waters seized a Trucial Coast dhow.
These activities attracted the attention of the British who vigorously
protested against what was going on in that island. The Iranian government
was also orally informed that the British Government would as a last resort
protect the interests of the Trucial Sheikhs by force. They intervened at
the end of this episode and reversed that development.
Further Developments
When, at the end at the end of 1948, the Iranians expressed a wish to
place administrative offices on Tunb and Abu Musa, the British ignored it.
In 1949 there were rumours, first that Iran was preparing to refer the case
to the United Nations, later that they intended to occupy the islands by
force. The Iranian government subsequently received a note from the British
Embassy in Tehran reminding them of 'clear attitude' of the British
Government in that respect. The Iranians in return erected a Flagstaff on
Lesser Tunb in August that year, which the Royal Navy promptly removed.
Iran's protests and actions for the recovery of these islands
continued until the British began withdrawing from the region. The issue
however, was settled through negotiations that lasted throughout the year
1971 between Iran and Britain the latter acting on behalf of its
protectorate emirates. This was the outcome of about 68 years of Iranian
protests and demands for the return of the islands. Unlike claims by some
sources, this was not an occupation but a negotiated settlement. Otherwise
the British at least should have issued a statement of protest against the
signing of the MoU between Iran and their protectorate Emirate of Sharjah
concerning status of Abu Musa island and against Iran's seizure of the two
Tunbs.
Renewal of Claims on the islands
Iranian authorities were reported in April 1992 to have prevented a
group of non-nationals from Sharjah from entering Abu Musa. The High Council
of the UAE met on May 12th to discuss the issue and agreed that commitments
of each member states before 1971 were to be treated as commitments of the
Union as a whole.
Again reports on 24 August indicated that Iranian authorities refused
entry to Abu Musa of one hundred people of different nationalities. Iranian
sources made it clear that the reason for their action was that lately
suspicious activities were seen in the Arab part of Abu Musa involving a
number of armed individuals from other countries, including Western states.
The UAE, on the other hand, without officially denying these serious
charges of breach of the 1971 MoU, accused Iran of preventing UAE nationals
from entering Abu Musa demanding visas from them.
Tension began to ease towards the end of 1992, but in late December,
the closing statement of the 13th summit of the Gulf Co-operation Council,
announced in Abu Dhabi, called on Iran to terminate 'occupation' of the Tunb
islands.
Some of the UAE Arguments
The following two are the main points argued by the United Arab
Emirates and Iran's response to them:
1-Priority in occupation:
The first is the argument of 'priority in occupation'. This claim is
vague and ignores the following facts:
A- Whereas the emirates appeared on the political map of the region
only in 19th century, Iran was an ancient nation and was the only government
in the vicinity of these islands at the time. All historical documents
verify that all islands of northern half of the Persian Gulf have always
belonged to Iran.
B- Ras al-Khaimeh did not exist at the turn of 20th century, and
Sharjah was not, at the time, an emirate of territorial dimension to be able
to claim offshore territories. The Shaikh was a tribal chief under British
protection, whose authority was to the tribal people without territorial
definition. One should not ignore the fact that British pretext for taking
control in the Persian Gulf was to suppress the activities of the same
tribes, then referred to by them as 'pirates' of no political entity, let
alone territorial dimension.
C- In the nineteenth century, Iran had lease arrangements with Oman,
according to which Fath Ali Shah in 1811 and Naser ad-Din Shah in 1856
granted the Sultan lease title to Bandar Abbas, Minab and southern Gulf
coastal areas from east to west as far as Bahrain. If all these areas
belonged to Iran, the islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs situated in its
geographical centre could not have been 'unoccupied'.
D- Iran's sovereignty and ownership of these islands, as well as all
other offshore and inland areas of the country, were traditionally
established without the display of flags of identity. Marking occupation or
ownership of territory by hoisting flags was a new concept introduced to the
region by European powers.
E- Nevertheless, in 1887 Iran hoisted flags in Sirri and Abu Musa to
mark her ownership of these islands after dismissing the Qasemi deputy
governors of Bandar Lengeh.
F- Geographical documents from Arab & Islamic historians of the
post-Islamic era confirm that all islands of the Persian Gulf belonged to
Iran.
G- Prime Minister Haji Mirza Aqasi's 1840s proclamation of Iran's
ownership of all islands in the Persian Gulf was not challenged by any
government then or at any time thereafter.
H- An official British document verifies that after the establishment
of one branch of the Qasemi family at Lengeh, the family occupied the
Iranian islands, probably in the 'confused period subsequent to the death of
Nadir Shah'. This story is an admission that Tunbs, Abu Musa and Sirri
islands belonged to Iran and were illegally occupied at a time when Iran in
practice was leaderless.
I- More than 25 official or semi-official British maps of 18th and
19th centuries discovered by this author confirm Iran's ownership of these
islands.
J- Sir E. Beckett, legal expert of British Government at the Foreign
Office (who later served as a judge at the International Court of Justice)
ruled in 1932 that the Iranians possessed sovereignty over Tamb and Abu Musa
in 1887-88.
2-Nineteenth-century correspondence
Apart from resorting to these old and long exhausted arguments put
forward by the British during the colonial era, the UAE bases its claims
over these islands on a number of letters exchanged between the Qasemis of
Bandar Lengeh, Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimeh. Some of these letters date as far
back as 1864. They are contradictory and make fanciful claims on various
localities up and down the region.
The most important of these letters was written by Shaikh Yusef
Al-Qasemi of Bandar Lengeh to the Shaikh of Ras al-Khaimeh, in which the
latter states: 'the island of Tunb actually or in reality is for you'. There
is little doubt about the nature of this sentence as a standard oriental
compliment. A few lines below this statement, Shaikh Yusef adds a further
compliment: 'and the town of Lengeh is your town'. No one has ever been
under any illusion, then or at any other time, that Port Lengeh had ever
belonged to any country but Iran. When this reference to Lengeh as belonging
to the Shaikh of Ras al-Khaimeh has never been and cannot be taken as
anything other than a courtesy/compliment, one must ask, how could a similar
reference to Tunb Island be taken literally? Certainly the expression mi
case es su casa ought not to be.
When in 1929 King Abdul-Aziz of Saudi Arabia wrote to the Sheikh of
Bahrain complaining about the treatment of his subjects there, received a
letter of from the Sheikh who states that "Bahrain, Qatif, Hasa and Nejd
were all one and "belong to Your Majesty". Certainly inclusion of Bahrain in
that list could not have been but pure compliment.
International Reaction
International reaction to the UAE claims to the Iranian owned islands
of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs has been one of impartiality in spite of ten
years of campaign by Abu Dhabi for politicising and internationalising the
issue. Despite the issue of routine statements by the Arab League and the
GCC in support of UAE position, Arab states on the whole remain impartial
and privately apologise to the Iranian authorities for 'having to sign'
those statements. This hypocrisy clearly represents Arab scepticism of these
claims, especially at a time when Arab-Iranian cooperation is high on the
political agenda of both sides in the Persian Gulf.
Of the major powers in the West none has taken side in this dispute.
Politicians from time to time tried to murmur support for Abu Dhabi but
stopped playing games as soon as they were reminded of their government's
impartiality in the matter. This was particularly true of former UK Foreign
Office Minister, Late Derrick Fatched. He stopped all the activities he had
started in support of Abu Dhabi as soon as I wrote and reminded him that it
was his government that negotiated and legally settled the issue of these
islands with Iran in 1971.
Similarly, a recent Gulf 2000 (of Columbia University) publication,
Security in the Persian Gulf, edited by Gary Seek and his deputy, Dr.
Lawrence Potter, show indication of partiality in favour of UAE claims.
While Iranian contribution to this book is deliberately arranged to be from
non-specialist sources, Dr. Al-Alkim, the over zealous promoter of Abu Dhabi
's territorial claims against Iran is given the opportunity in his chapter,
to launch even a personal attack on my contribution to the academic debate
on the issue. He declared my works in proving Iran's "claims" to Tunb and
Abu Musa islands as ineffective and useless. This is done despite the fact
that I wrote to Dr. Potter in advance of this publication, reminding him, in
no uncertain terms, that partiality of their approach to the issue was paten
tly obvious. Moreover, normally there is no need for any reference to a
useless or ineffective work in an academic book. Not only does such remarks
put academic impartiality of the book in doubt, but also implies displeasure
with the effectiveness of my works, which has secured UAE's political
isolation in the region to the extend that Abu Dhabi had to abandon its
anti-Iranian policies in 2002. I doubt very much that Dr. Al-Alkim has read
any of my works in this regard. Once in a seminar in London I gave him a
copy of my collection of facts and documents 'The Islands of Tunb and Abu
Musa' (CNMES/ SOAS 1995), but he declined reading it. Had he read that book
or any other academic work on Iran's position vis-à-vis these islands, he
would know that Iran does not "claim" these islands; Iran owns them and they
are under Iranian sovereignty and control. It is only Abu Dhabi that claims
these islands.
Finally, by referring to the issue as "the unfinished business", Gary
Sick and Lawrence Potter make their partiality in their treatment of the
issue of UAE claims to Tunbs and Abu Musa islands blatantly clear at the
beginning of their book. Considering the fact that Iran and Britain legally
settled the issue through negotiations in 1971, one wanders what unfinished
business they refer to? As the legal guardian of the emirates at the time,
Great Britain completed the business by negotiating the legal instrument of
1971 MoU between Iran and Sharjah on Abu Musa, and by agreeing to the
unconditional return of the two Tunbs to Iran. What they conveniently ignore
here is the fact that if the business was unfinished in any way, Great
Britain had the legal obligation of launching an official protest against
Iran. Rather, we all know that UK's permanent representative at the United
Nations declared on December 9, 1971 the overall settlement of the issue of
these islands as a model agreement for the settlement of similar territorial
differences elsewhere in the world.
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