@@ Castration of NPT - U.S. instantly tore up NPT for India, so why should Iran obey a torn up agreement! @@
Arash
July 25, 2005
Emasculating Nonproliferation
Dr. James Gordon Prather
Nuclear weapons physicist
Nuclear bomb tester at Lawrence Livermore
Technical director of nuclear bomb testings at Sandia
Chief scientist of the U.S. Army
U.S. Navy veteran
Perhaps President Bush had decided even before taking office to replace the existing
nuke-proliferation-prevention regime – largely our creation – because the regime no longer
automatically did our bidding.
In particular, when the Security Council discovered in the immediate aftermath of the
Second Persian Gulf War (1991) that Iraq had been attempting to enrich uranium for use in
nukes, the International Atomic Energy (IAEA) Action Team on Iraq – which reported
directly to the Security Council – was asked to develop and execute a plan "for the
destruction, removal, or rendering harmless as appropriate of all nuclear-weapons-usable
material or any subsystems or components or any research, development, support, or
manufacturing facilities related to the above".
To the consternation of President Clinton – who was determined to effect "regime change"
on Iraq – IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei reported to the Security Council in 1998
that there "were no indications that there remains in Iraq any physical capability for the
production of amounts of weapons-usable nuclear material of any practical significance".
You see, the key to preventing nuke proliferation is the international control of the
production, processing, transformation, and disposition of certain nuclear materials. A
principal function of the IAEA – established in 1957 – is
"To establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable
and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by
the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a
way as to further any military purpose".
When the IAEA's inspectors report non-compliance with a safeguards agreement, the IAEA
Board of Directors can then decide – by a two-thirds majority – whether or not the
"noncompliance" furthers "any military purpose" and should be reported to the UN Security
Council for possible action.
The Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1970 took advantage of the existing
IAEA verification and reporting mechanism, requiring each no-nuke signatory to the treaty
to enter into a bilateral safeguards agreement with the IAEA "with a view to preventing
diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons".
So the IAEA verifies nonproliferation by importers of special nuclear materials, services,
equipment, facilities, and information. What about exporters?
Enter the Nuclear Suppliers Group, NSG (http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org).
Established in 1974, the 40-plus member NSG was created because the 1974 test by India –
not then, or now, an NPT signatory – of a nuclear device demonstrated that "especially
designed or prepared" nuclear technology as identified by the NPT, transferred for
peaceful purposes to non-NPT signatories, could be misused.
NSG "Guidelines for Nuclear Transfer" (http://www.ornl.gov/sci/risk/TriggerGuidelines.htm)
have long required the acceptance by the recipient state – NPT signatory or not – of IAEA
safeguards on certain imported items.
But, as a consequence of what the IAEA found in Iraq in the aftermath of the Second
Persian Gulf War, the NSG soon promulgated new guidelines.
Since 1992, if "INDIA" or "PAKISTAN" or "ISRAEL", for example, seek to acquire "special
fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, and facilities" – such as nuclear
power plants or fuel therefor – from any NSG member, NSG guidelines require that the
member require them to subject "ALL" of their nuclear programs – not just their civilian
nuclear programs – to a full-scope intrusive IAEA safeguards agreement
(http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/guide.htm).
"ALL" Indian nuclear programs – civilian or otherwise!
Hence, the enforcement mechanism for preventing nuke proliferation by importers is
provided by the IAEA statute, and the enforcement mechanism for preventing nuke
proliferation by exporters is provided by the coordinated export controls of NSG members
themselves.
President Bush is proposing to emasculate the IAEA-NPT-NSG nuke-proliferation-prevention
regime.
Bush announced this week that "as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology,
INDIA should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states".
Translation?
Even though INDIA has refused to sign the NPT, India should nevertheless "acquire the same
benefits and advantages" that the IAEA-NPT-NSG regime bestows on the U.S., UK, France,
Russia, and China!
Since current U.S. law specifically prohibits that, Bush said he would ask Congress to
"ADJUST" those laws, repealing among other things the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1994
and certain provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
Bush also promised to work to "adjust international regimes" to enable – among other
things – the "expeditious consideration of fuel supplies for safeguarded nuclear reactors
at Tarapur".
Until this week, Bush had done everything in his power to prevent the Russians from
supplying that fuel.
Now Bush is going to supply it himself, and will NOT require – as NSG guidelines do –
India to subject "ALL" its nuclear programs to the IAEA-NPT-NSG
nuke-proliferation-prevention regime.
Will "Pakistan" be next?
Or "Israel?"
Dr. Prather's radio interviews
July 23, 2005
http://www.weekendinterviewshow.com/audio/prather5.mp3
May 7, 2005
http://www.weekendinterviewshow.com/audio/prather4.mp3
May 4, 2005
http://www.charlesgoyette.com/archive/media/2005-05-04-Charles-01.mp3
April 9, 2005
http://www.weekendinterviewshow.com/audio/prather3.mp3
February 16, 2005 (Part 1)
http://www.charlesgoyette.com/archive/media/2005-02-16-Charles-04.mp3
February 16, 2005 (Part 2)
http://www.charlesgoyette.com/archive/media/2005-02-16-Charles-05.mp3
February 5, 2005
http://www.weekendinterviewshow.com/audio/prather2.mp3
December 4, 2004
http://www.weekendinterviewshow.com/audio/prather.mp3
* Physicist James Gordon Prather has served as a policy implementing official for national
security-related technical matters in the Federal Energy Agency, the Energy Research and
Development Administration, the Department of Energy, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the Department of the Army. Dr. Prather also served as legislative assistant
for national security affairs to U.S. Sen. Henry Bellmon, R-Okla. --ranking member of the
Senate Budget Committee and member of the Senate Energy Committee and Appropriations
Committee. Dr. Prather had earlier worked as a nuclear weapons physicist at Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory (http://www.llnl.gov) in California and Sandia National
Laboratory (http://www.sandia.gov) in New Mexico. http://www.antiwar.com/prather