Google Groups no longer supports new Usenet posts or subscriptions. Historical content remains viewable.

Dismiss

@@ Iran refuses to jump another nuke hoop - UN opens a Pandora's Box of "Iran exceptionalism" @@

6 views

Skip to first unread message

Arash

unread,

Sep 6, 2005, 11:16:10 AM9/6/05

Asia Times
September 7, 2005

Showdown as Iran refuses to jump another nuke hoop

Under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran has every right to process uranium
into reactor fuel. But what's OK for other countries is forbidden to Iran, according
to the U.S. and the EU's negotiating trio. For Iran, the bar keeps being raised, and
until the weekend it had jumped every time. Now the stage is set for a showdown
following the latest - rejected - demands by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) chief and the EU. On September 19, the IAEA decides whether to refer Iran to
the UN Security Council, where it faces the possibility of sanctions, over what
amounts to no more than a failure to continue implementing "legally-non-binding"
measures.

ElBaradei's report deconstructed

Dr. Kaveh L. Afrasiabi

Two years ago, Mohammad ElBaradei, the chief of International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), repeatedly insisted that Iran should sign the intrusive, but voluntary,
Additional Protocol to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) [1] .

Now he has gone on record as stating that Iran must comply with other measures "well
beyond the Additional Protocol".

Clearly, the sky is the limit and the IAEA has been pressured to make unreasonable
demands on Iran well beyond the purview of its agreements with that country.

The European Union - three of whose countries, Britain, France and Germany (EU-3) are
negotiating with Iran on its nuclear program - on Saturday pressed Iran to halt its
resumed conversion activities before September 19, the date when the IAEA will hold
its Board of Governors' meeting.

Europe's ultimatum came soon after ElBaradei submitted a comprehensive report on
Tehran's nuclear program, which criticized Iran for failing to keep its suspension on
uranium-enrichment activities and defined Tehran's cooperation with the agency on its
nuclear issue as "overdue".

In his report (http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/GOV_2005_67.pdf) of September 3,
ElBaradei, after a restatement of his previous reports on Iran listing the areas of
cooperation and non-cooperation, demanded that Iran's "transparency measures should
extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional
Protocol and include access to individuals, documentation related to procurement,
dual-use equipment, certain military-owned workshops and research and development
locations" (Item 50).

This raises a curious question: can Iran, short of giving up all its military secrets
and revealing sensitive military information to the West via the IAEA, ever appease
the IAEA and its increasingly demanding chief? Probably not, at least not as long as
Western pressure to dispatch Iran's nuclear dossier to the UN Security Council is on.

All eyes are now set on the September 19 meeting, and in light of ElBaradei's report
that Iran had failed to heed the IAEA's request to suspend its resumption of uranium
conversion activities in Isfahan, there is a great likelihood that the IAEA will
follow the EU-US's guide to action by complaining against Iran to the Security
Council with a view to having sanctions instituted against Tehran.

However, Russia said on Monday that it opposed sending Iran's case to the Security
Council, potentially putting itself on a collision course with the U.S. as Moscow
holds a veto in the council.

While it remains to be seen if the express train to the Security Council can be
somehow slowed by the combined pressure from countries of the Non-Aligned Movement
(NAM) that are members of the IAEA Governing Board and Washington's preoccupation
with the natural disaster caused by hurricane Katrina, currently a critical
evaluation of ElBaradei's report, to gauge the strength of case against Iran, is
called for.

Titled "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of
Iran", the IAEA chief's report cites "good progress" in Iran's "corrective measures"
since October 2003 (Item 43), resulting in the IAEA's verification of certain aspects
of Iran's declarations, particularly on the "outstanding issue" of the sources of
contamination of Iran's equipment with HEU (highly enriched uranium), which turns out
be none other than Pakistan (Item 12).

The report reiterates the earlier finding, in November 2004, that "all the declared
nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and therefore such material has not
been diverted to prohibited activities" (Item 51).

Furthermore, the report cites several Iranian "transparency measures" even beyond the
Additional Protocol, such as allowing inspection access to Iran's military bases
(Item 37), and Iran's submission of comprehensive declarations with respect to its
nuclear facilities, including design information (Item 5).

It states that other than a tardiness in providing the latter, "No additional
failures have been identified" (Item 8).

Interestingly, the report makes a passing reference to the Subsidiary Agreement
between Iran and the IAEA, and yet somehow overlooks that in light of Iran's entry
into this agreement in the 1990s, Iran was under no legal obligation to report some
of its activities nowadays branded as "breaches of obligation".

The fact that the IAEA chief overlooks such a delicate and yet significant matter
casts a long shadow on his credibility as fair and objective. It is important to see
the nuance here, to distinguish between "clandestine" and "illegal" in light of the
so-called "loopholes" in Iran's Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA whereby Iran was
entitled to withhold information to the IAEA for a specified period prior to the
introduction of nuclear material at its facilities.

Western media are awash with oversight of this important distinction, and yet one
naturally expects a little more nuanced understanding from the IAEA chief.

On the other hand, the report makes clear that Iran's uranium enrichment facilities
at Natanz remained suspended, that the converted uranium had been relocated to safe
storages, and that UF6, ie, uranium hexafluoride, the feed material that flows
through the centrifuges in the enrichment process, "remained under agency seals"
(Item 59).

This, in turn, raises the question: what is the ground for the present Western panic
about Iran as long as Iran has not abrogated its agreement with its European
counterparts for maintaining a suspension of centrifuges?

After all, as long as Natanz remains shut down, there is actually little to worry
about uranium conversion operations in Isfahan, which serve as the initial phases in
the nuclear fuel cycle, and which have been under full IAEA monitoring since 2000.

The bottom line, contrary to the hue and cry of the Europeans, is that the Paris
Agreement is still alive and has not been breached by Iran, except incrementally and
benignly, hardly warranting the panic reactions it has solicited in Europe and the
US. Under the Paris Agreement of November 2004, Tehran agreed to voluntarily suspend
nuclear work under a deal with the EU-3.

Again, Western media are partly to blame.

A case in point: reports from both Reuters and the New York Times on ElBaradei's
latest report make outlandish claims that the report says Iran's nuclear program is
"shrouded in mystery", when, in fact, a glance at the report clearly shows not only
the absence of such an adjective, but also plenty of ammunition to think otherwise,
that is, a pattern of greater and greater transparency culminating in putting to rest
key anxieties of the IAEA about the nature of Iran's nuclear program.

Of course, ElBaradei slams Iran for "lack of full transparency", but then again, Iran
is not alone and per his own admission, dozens of IAEA member states are similarly
guilty of lack of full cooperation, including Brazil and South Korea, a point aptly
made to ElBaradei by a reformist Iranian parliamentarian two years ago in a letter to
the IAEA.

The nub of the problem with the IAEA is, per ElBaradei's own admission, that "the
agency's legal authority to pursue the verification of possible nuclear
weapons-related activity is limited" (Item 49).

This is a built-in, structural problem of the non-proliferation regime transcending
Iran applied to Iran specifically, and unreasonably so, giving rise to the question:
how in the world can the IAEA ever give Iran's nuclear program a clean bill of
health. That is, confirming the absence of a nuclear-weapons program, short of
inspecting every inch of the country, as was demanded of Iraq prior to the 2003
invasion?

By setting the bar so high, the IAEA opens a Pandora's Box of "Iran exceptionalism",
following the logic of diminishing returns whereby the more Iran cooperates, the less
satisfied the IAEA becomes due to its limitless demands not set by its own parameters
(enshrined in the Additional Protocol).

On a related note, the IAEA's own findings about Iran's bargains with Pakistani
nuclear blackmarketeers, such as turning down offers of nuclear-weapons drawings and
parts in the 1980s, simply reinforce the Iranian position that it is not interested
in acquiring nuclear weapons.

Similarly, with regard to Iran's experiment with plutonium separation there is a
dispute as to when exactly these experiments occurred - early or mid-1990s, and a
final answer is awaiting further lab analysis. Yet no one at the IAEA is even
suggesting that Iran has continued this experiment into the 21st century, this while
admitting that Iran's explanation of the time discrepancy, that the plutonium found
in a bottle in 1995 had been "purified" as a result of experiments, is "plausible".

ElBaradei's report repeatedly states that in light of Iran's steady cooperation and
increasing transparency, resolving the outstanding concerns cited above, Iran's
nuclear issue "would be followed up as matters of routine safeguards" (Item 6),
hardly the signpost to a nuclear crisis requiring an emergency gathering at the
Security Council mandated to deal with clear and present dangers of war and potential
conflict, let alone invoking Chapter 7 and imposing sanctions on Iran - for what,
failure to comply with a confidence-building and "legally-non-binding" request of the
IAEA? Clearly, the legal ground for Security Council action is pretty thin, if not
lacking.

The excesses and various flaws of ElBaradei's report and management of Iran's nuclear
issue cited above may in the end come to haunt the IAEA in view of Iran's past threat
to exit the NPT treaty if its case is referred to the Security Council.

That would spell doom for the troubled non-proliferation regime and, instead of full
transparency, ElBaradei may find Iran back in the "black hole" of information it was
prior to 2003, whereas a prudent approach would build on the present cooperation and
avoid excess demands not justified by the IAEA's framework.

For the moment, however, a necessary corrective to the IAEA's excesses may be none
other than an Iranian declaration that from now on no more measures beyond the
Additional Protocol will be even contemplated, let alone implemented.

Lest we forget, President George W Bush in his speech at the National Defense
University on February 11, 2004 stated, "I propose that by next year, only states
that have signed the Additional Protocol be allowed to import equipment for their
civil nuclear programs".

Given the fact that ElBaradei's report confirms that Iran has been implementing the
Additional Protocol as if it had been ratified, and the Bush administration's stated
support for the latest European initiative toward Iran, promising nuclear cooperation
with Iran, one wonders why the White House is reluctant to take the next logical step
and promise concrete steps with regards to existing Iran sanctions that prevent such
cooperation with Iran by foreign companies (if and when the issue of objective
guarantee is somehow settled)?

Concerning the latter, various experts, such as [JEW] David Albright
(http://www.isis-online.org/about/staff/dalbright.html), a former IAEA nuclear
inspector, have maintained that it is possible to verify Iran's enrichment process.
In a recent article in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, David Albright writes: "As
long as safeguards are in place, the IAEA would know if such an increase in
enrichment level occurs".

Even French President Jacques Chirac in his June meeting with Iran's then top nuclear
negotiator, Hassan Rowhani, consented to exploring an IAEA-led option of ascertaining
the issue of objective guarantee, albeit fleetingly as Chirac and his foreign
minister were subsequently forced to retract their statements because of external
pressure, principally by London.

In conclusion, with reports of European disarray over Iran, and clear signs of
growing division between Great Britain on the one hand and France and Germany on the
other, the roadmap to the Security Council is paved with confused intentions and no
amount of diplomatic facade at unity can hide the core problem of an illogical,
paranoid resistance toward the option of a monitored, contained enrichment process in
Iran. This resistance may be melting in some quarters in Europe, but it is
simultaneously hardened by a determined U.S. effort to stop Iran's nuclear program
one way or another.

Note
[1] The Additional Protocol substantially expands the IAEA's ability to check for
clandestine nuclear facilities by providing the agency with authority to visit any
facility - declared or not - to investigate questions about or inconsistencies in a
state's nuclear declarations.
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1998/infcirc540corrected.pdf

* Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, holds a Ph.D. in political science from Boston University. He
has completed post-doctoral studies at Harvard University and UC Berkeley, and he has
collaborated with the UN Program on Dialogue Among Civilizations
(http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2001/issue2/0102p54.htm). Dr. Afrasiabi is author
of several books and numerous articles, including "After Khomeini: New Directions in
Iran's Foreign Policy"
(http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0813321158/102-7616745-8791338),
"Iran's Foreign Policy Since 9/11", Brown's Journal of World Affairs, co-authored
with former deputy foreign minister Abbas Maleki, No 2, 2003
(http://www.caspianstudies.com/article/Iran's%20Foreign%20Policy.pdf). Dialogue of
Theologies As Dialogue of Civilizations (Global Scholarly Press, forthcoming),
"Communicative theory and theology", Harvard Theological Review, and many articles in
the New York Times, Telos, Brown's Journal of World Affairs, UN Chronicle
(http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2003/issue1/0103p75.html), Middle East Journal,
International Herald Tribune, and the San Francisco Chronicle. He recently
co-authored "Negotiating Iran's Nuclear Populism", The Brown Journal of World
Affairs, Volume XII, issue 2, Summer 2005, with Mustafa Kibaroglu. Dr. Afrasiabi
teaches political science at Tehran University.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GI07Ak05.html

Related:
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)
http://www.aeoi.org.ir/NewWeb/default.asp

Technical History of Iran’s Nuclear Activities Since 1970” (Keyhan - April 27, 2005)
http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/Technical_History_of_Irans_Nuclear_Activities_Since_1970.pdf

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in Iran (Sep. 2, 2005)
http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/GOV_2005_67.pdf

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in Iran (Nov.15, 2004)
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-83_derestrict.pdf

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in Iran (Sep.1, 2004)
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-60.pdf

Iran: Countdown to showdown
David Albright & Corey Hinderstein
http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=nd04albright_037

Iran’s the Gchine uranium mine and mill, near Bandar Abbas, and Saghand, near Yazd.
http://www.iranwatch.org/international/IAEA/iaea-goldschmidt-statement-061305.pdf

No wonder the West is so mad at Iran
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/83e63797f1a1af3b?hl=en

America's plan to undermine the high-level event
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/9927bb4f65924e34?hl=en

JEW media sycophants & 36% HEU - IRAN told the truth, yet JEW keeps lying
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/f90a6eef507f10a0?hl=en

Past Arguments Don't Square With Current Iran Policy
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/f53d3a05bc5403c1?hl=en

The fuel behind Iran's nuclear drive
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/2fcf81313deb4ae0?hl=en

The U.S. and Iran: Democracy, Terrorism, and Nuclear Weapons
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/0d0dcf76abbaafb1?hl=en

NO Nuclear double standards
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/8e41f4a8a1a3e04c?hl=en

Backlash Builds Against Cheney's 'Guns of August'
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/8286b2b389247d0a?hl=en

An offer Iran MUST refuse
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/743b96400831f8a1?hl=en

Zero Tolerance
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/1641ae424fde5b89?hl=en

Sino-Russian Guarantees?
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/bd8f5389ab0e8956?hl=en

More neo-crazy media sycophant LIES about Iran
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/d3fe84a9b64d20bc?hl=en

What The Neo-Crazies Knew
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/6b45fabf57726a03?hl=en

EU vs. Iran - Who's Right?
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/cbce70a3093360fb?hl=en

Iran should refer U.S. to Security Council for violating UNSCR-984
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/0d54ef8e41b971bf?hl=en

Castration of NPT - U.S. instantly tore up NPT for India, so why should Iran obey a
torn up agreement!
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/2c234f4a148cd298?hl=en

U.S. ripped NPT into pieces; Iran must withdraw from this annulled treaty
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/fbf55e939908b2c2?hl=en

U.S. proliferation rhetoric and reality
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/7d8c268ee51c07be?hl=en

Ambassador Bolton's Agenda
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/1ca916601b7a7bc8?hl=en

Iran's INALIENABLE RIGHT to uranium enrichment
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/245f6081b4e3d019?hl=en

A Palliative for Neo-Crazy Lies
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/1b7968f98173938d?hl=en

Inalienable right without discrimination
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/5012a673328fa044?hl=en

U.S. doesn't want to disarm even though it promised to do so
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/c0b86cad11cb9413?hl=en

UN Referral – Not
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/bddc928154c8c96a?hl=en

What Iranian obligations? What breaches? America's lies, lies, lies...
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/9535c4a90df98471?hl=en

Memo to slimy senators
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/7065ffd57b51a959?hl=en

U.S. promised in 2000, to get rid of it's nukes!
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/1e23bafecdac9e82?hl=en

U.S. has violated Iran's NPT rights!
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/02f1f48fafcac2b6?hl=en

Iran's diplomatic masterpiece
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/f532352654efee1d?hl=en

Bush to sabotage NPT
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/6386adef83860d3e?hl=en

West's repeated violations of "Article IV & I" against Iran
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/0123ceb12dd47321?hl=en

Israel guns for Iran - Why?
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/2c0274540f3957b7?hl=en

U.S. wants definition of NPT 'noncompliance' changed!!!
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/2abab5a7b8bce4c5?hl=en

NTP for dummies
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/f317bb918ca244da?hl=en

CNN's Wolf Blitzer & David Albright: Jews global campaign against Iran
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/44fcd2a53218eb52?hl=en

The Real Threat From John Bolton
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/16fb61c3cca32703?hl=en

81-mm smoking rockets
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/fb2c580ba00d79a6?hl=en

U.S. plans to destroy NPT
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/760abaff1d8ac7c2?hl=en

Nuts to Bush
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/de936f823b4dfb11?hl=en

Iran's logic proven correct to the entire World
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/a5798de678dad2a9?hl=en

Sandbagging the NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group)
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/238000abe8fe032e?hl=en

What Noncompliance?
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/32f537772749ecc2?hl=en

Sandbagging the EU
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/bb437d1ee00ad1e9?hl=en

Bye-Bye, NPT
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/eb8e9f617d0e0867?hl=en

Jew tells Bush to lie about Iran
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/c96849f55f92353e?hl=en

Targeting Non-existent Nukes?
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/e25e86754767e3ef?hl=en

Blindly Backing Israel Against Iran
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/ca49370dcc1f41a4?hl=en

Condi Desperate to Stop EU-China-Iran Chain Reaction
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/26e6a24b43339654?hl=en

The Impossible Dream in the State of the Union Address
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/74938ea7958d0764?hl=en

Targeting Iran
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/dbb46af7ff3f0b66?hl=en

Bay of Pigs part 2, CIA-Israeli-MEK
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/b58f2a1d8b2290ff?hl=en

Threatening Iran - despite the evidence
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/ce6e09919da68cbb?hl=en

Virtual Nukes
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/c245e595ad17ae57?hl=en

Iran's having the capability to enrich uranium is not even tantamount to having the
capability to produce the essentially pure uranium-235 required to make a nuke
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/303c3ca53b67c0a7?hl=en

Dangerous Delusions About Iran
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/42c57f2ae0cdb3b0?hl=en

Thwarting the Neo-Crazies
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/66c79d721fd588d4?hl=en

Trashing the IAEA Again
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/f8c610f6cc9e1fda?hl=en

U.S. keeps lying about Iran again & again
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/e9f480b192bd425e?hl=en

Iran's Stealthy Nukes
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/e47cc87d2b268368?hl=en

Uranium-Enrichment Myths Busted
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/f7ebc6f4bed9d13a?hl=en

Iran Plays by the Rules - No Fair!
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/25be300601cc8984?hl=en

Nuclear Bait and Switch
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/0a0dc80ca3b8e98f?hl=en

The myth of Iranian nukes
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/bf78503a661673e9?hl=en

North Korea has what Iraq didn't
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/56f613221080276e?hl=en

Iran has absolute right to enrich uranium
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/0a8ac2dc599976ba?hl=en

Iran is in full compliance with NPT & IAEA
http://groups.google.ca/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/737b74e86ba897cb?hl=en