@@ A Palliative for Neo-Crazy Lies @@
Arash
June 13, 2005
A Palliative for Neo-Crazy Lies
Dr. James Gordon Prather
Nuclear weapons physicist
Nuclear bomb tester at Lawrence Livermore
Technical director of nuclear bomb testings at Sandia
Chief scientist of the U.S. Army
U.S. Navy veteran
Because Bush-Bolton and the neo-crazies have legions of sycophants ensconced at all major
media outlets, feeding you a daily diet of lies, misrepresentations, and false innuendo
about – among other things – Iran's nuclear programs, you're probably in need of this
palliative.
Recall that Iran
1. has been a member state of the International Atomic Energy Agency since 1958
2. has been a signatory to the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons since 1968
3. has had an IAEA Safeguards Agreement in force since 1974.
In 2003, Iran signed an Additional Protocol to its existing Safeguards Agreement, and has
since "VOLUNTARILY" cooperated with the IAEA as though the protocol were actually in
force – which it is not.
Furthermore, in order to build further confidence that Iran's nuclear programs are
strictly peaceful, Iran "VOLUNTARILY" suspended all uranium-conversion,
uranium-enrichment, and plutonium-separation activities.
Since Iran had already "VOLUNTARILY" made these activities subject to IAEA Safeguards, the
IAEA was notified of this "VOLUNTARILY" suspension and "INVITED" to verify and monitor it.
Okay?
Now, for the last decade, the neo-crazies and their media sycophants have been charging
that Iran has been pursuing a nuclear weapons program – right under the "MULTIPLE SENSORS"
of IAEA inspectors – in violation of the NPT.
Recently, Bush-Rice-Bolton have been demanding that Iran's "violation of the NPT" [what
violation!] be brought before the UN Security Council for punitive action.
If that is not done, the neo-crazies have been threatening to preemptively "take out" all
facilities they suspect of being associated with that alleged nuclear weapons program,
including the IAEA Safeguarded nuclear power plant at Bushehr now nearing completion by
the Russians.
Bear in mind that IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei and his inspectors have been
conducting HIGHLY INTRUSIVE "GO-ANYWHERE, SEE-ANYTHING" inspections in Iran for the past
two years and have yet to find any indication that Iran now has, ever had, or intends to
have a nuclear weapons program.
Nor, for that matter, has ElBaradei found any indication that Iran has violated its
"VOLUNTARILY" suspension of its Safeguarded uranium-conversion, uranium-enrichment, and
plutonium-separation activities.
Now, contrary to Bush-Rice-Bolton misrepresentations – if not lies – the NPT has no
enforcement provision or mechanism.
For example, suppose Libya sought – or accepted – assistance from Pakistan on how to
design or produce a nuclear weapon. Libya would be in violation of Article II of the NPT.
But the NPT doesn't even suggest what other NPT signatories could have done about it under
the NPT.
Ah, but there's Article III of the NPT, which required Libya and other no-nuke NPT
signatories to subject themselves to bilateral IAEA Safeguards agreements "with a view to
preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons".
If Libya had refused to conclude an IAEA Safeguards agreement, that would have been a
violation of Article III of the NPT.
But Libya didn't refuse.
So Libya hasn't violated Article III.
But Article III goes on to say "procedures for the Safeguards required by this article
shall be followed."
Aha!
But who decides whether or not those procedures are followed?
And who decides what action to take if they aren't?
Well, according to Article XII of the IAEA Statute, IAEA's staff of inspectors will
"determine whether there is compliance with the [statutory] undertaking against use in
furtherance of any military purpose".
The IAEA inspectors "shall report any [statutory] noncompliance to the Director General
who shall thereupon transmit the report to the Board of Governors".
The IAEA Board "shall report the [statutory] noncompliance to all members and to the
Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations".
So by requiring no-nuke NPT-signatories – such as Libya and Iran – to conclude a bilateral
Safeguards agreement with the IAEA, the NPT incorporates the already existing IAEA
inspection and verification system, as well as its statutory enforcement mechanism.
In 2003, Libya also signed an Additional Protocol, and IAEA inspectors soon discovered
that IAEA-proscribed materials and facilities were being "used in furtherance of" a
"military purpose", in violation of the IAEA Statute.
Not the NPT. The IAEA Statute.
But even then, because Libya remedied its statutory noncompliance forthwith, the IAEA
Board did not even ask the Security Council to invoke sanctions for violations of the IAEA
Statute.
So even if Condi succeeds this week in seducing or blackmailing ElBaradei into reporting
to the IAEA Board exactly what the neo-crazies dictate, they are unlikely to get UN
authorization to "take out" Bushehr and other IAEA-Safeguarded facilities in Iran.
Don't you feel better already?
Dr. Prather's radio interviews
May 7, 2005
http://www.weekendinterviewshow.com/audio/prather4.mp3
April 9, 2005
http://www.weekendinterviewshow.com/audio/prather3.mp3
February 5, 2005
http://www.weekendinterviewshow.com/audio/prather2.mp3
December 4, 2004
http://www.weekendinterviewshow.com/audio/prather.mp3
February 16, 2005
Part 1
http://www.charlesgoyette.com/archive/media/2005-02-16-Charles-04.mp3
Part 2
http://www.charlesgoyette.com/archive/media/2005-02-16-Charles-05.mp3
* Physicist James Gordon Prather has served as a policy implementing official for national
security-related technical matters in the Federal Energy Agency, the Energy Research and
Development Administration, the Department of Energy, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the Department of the Army. Dr. Prather also served as legislative assistant
for national security affairs to U.S. Sen. Henry Bellmon, R-Okla. -- ranking member of the
Senate Budget Committee and member of the Senate Energy Committee and Appropriations
Committee. Dr. Prather had earlier worked as a nuclear weapons physicist at Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory (http://www.llnl.gov) in California and Sandia National
Laboratory (http://www.sandia.gov) in New Mexico.
http://www.antiwar.com/prather