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Arash

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Jul 12, 2004, 9:38:21 AM7/12/04
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AntiWar
July 12, 2004


Déjà Vu, ElBaradei?

By James Gordon Prather
Nuclear weapons physicist
gpra...@worldnetdaily.com

Mohamed ElBaradei - director general of the International Atomic Energy
Agency - was in Israel last week pursuing a nuke-free Middle East.
Now, ElBaradei has already certified Iraq to be nuke-free. And Iran. So,
isn't the Middle East already nuke-free?

Well, not according to Mordechai Vanunu. Vanunu was a technician at the
Israeli nuclear facilities at Dimona for eight years. He fled to England,
taking with him documents and photographs, including a photo of a plutonium
"pit" for a thermo-nuke "primary" and a photo of a facility producing
lithium-6 - a critical material in a thermo-nuke's "secondary."

The London Sunday Times had Vanunu's photos and documents "vetted" by
British nuke scientists and published Vanunu's story on Oct. 5, 1986.

But even before publication, Vanunu had been kidnapped and taken back to
Israel. He was held captive - and incommunicado - until this April, when he
was semi-released. He is not allowed to leave Israel, and his movements and
communications are severely restricted.

Nevertheless, Vanunu heard about ElBaradei's visit and managed to make
public a suggestion that ElBaradei "should demand that the Israeli
government let him go inside Dimona, to be part of the IAEA inspection of
Dimona - as the IAEA demanded from Iran, Iraq - to report to all the world
what every state is doing in secret."

It is extremely unlikely that Prime Minister Sharon will allow that, or that
ElBaradei would even make such a "demand."

You see, Israel is a charter member of the IAEA, which was established by
United Nations statute in 1957 to facilitate the spread of nuclear energy.

But Israel is not a "party" to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which
entered into force in 1970.

The IAEA is not a "party" to the treaty, either, but has been made the
international "safeguards" inspectorate under Article III of the NPT.

Each non-nuclear-weapon state party to the treaty undertakes to accept
safeguards - as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded
with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute
of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards
system - for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its
obligations assumed under the treaty with a view to preventing diversion of
nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices.

But, if Israel is not an NPT signatory, why is ElBaradei in Israel?

Well, as El-Baradei put it, "I'd like to see Israel supporting the
Non-Proliferation Treaty through maybe concluding an Additional Protocol
with the agency."

ElBaradei would "like" Israel to agree to do what we - at the urging of the
Israelis - have just forced Iran to do? Elbaradei would "like" Israel to
sign an Additional Protocol to an IAEA Safeguards Agreement, authorizing
IAEA inspectors unrestricted and unannounced access to all "suspicious"
sites and facilities in Israel?

Get outta here!

Now, the IAEA can negotiate Safeguard Agreements and Additional Protocols
with any nation-state - NPT signatory or not - when asked.

And, if the IAEA concludes that any nation-state - NPT signatory or not - is
"cheating" on its Safeguards Agreement, it may report that to the UN
Security Council for appropriate action.

In fact, we demanded that the Iranians sign an Additional Protocol because
we were fairly certain the Iranians would refuse and that refusal might
cause the IAEA to refer the matter to the Security Council.

Either way, the Israelis would have an "excuse" to launch pre-emptive
attacks on Iranian "nuclear" facilities, destroying the not-yet-operational
Russian-supplied Bushehr reactor, just as they destroyed, back in 1981, the
not-yet-operational French-supplied Osiraq reactor in Iraq.

But the Iranians didn't refuse. They made a deal. Iran would sign an
Additional Protocol if - and only if - UK-France-Germany would guarantee
their "inalienable" rights under Article IV of the NPT.

All the parties to the treaty undertake to facilitate - and have the right
to participate in - the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials
and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy.

However, as ElBaradei was urging an Additional Protocol on Israel, Secretary
of State Colin Powell and Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom emerged
from a meeting in Washington to claim that "European foreign ministers" had
concluded that Iran had reneged on their Additional Protocol deal with
UK-France-Germany.

It seems Israeli spies and Iranian expatriates have "intelligence" - not to
be made available to the IAEA - that Iran is pursuing a "nuclear weapons
program" at sites that ElBaradei can never find.

Déjà vu, ElBaradei?

* Physicist James Gordon Prather has served as a policy implementing
official for national security-related technical matters in the Federal
Energy Agency, the Energy Research and Development Administration, the
Department of Energy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
Department of the Army. Dr. Prather also served as legislative assistant for
national security affairs to U.S. Sen. Henry Bellmon, R-Okla. -- ranking
member of the Senate Budget Committee and member of the Senate Energy
Committee and Appropriations Committee. Dr. Prather had earlier worked as a
nuclear weapons physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in
California and Sandia National Laboratory in New Mexico.

http://www.antiwar.com/orig/prather.php?articleid=3012


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