@@ West's repeated violations of "Article IV & I" against Iran @@
Arash
April 23, 2005
NPT in Trouble?
Dr. James Gordon Prather
Nuclear weapons physicist
Recently, Ambassador Jackie Sanders (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/27684.htm), Special
Representative of the President for the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons has been
asking herself (http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/rm/42599.htm) this question – How should
"we" deal with noncompliance with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation
(http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/text/npt2.htm) of Nuclear Weapons?
The problem is; nowhere in the NPT is "noncompliance" defined. The term "noncompliance"
doesn't even appear.
It is a little clearer what constitutes a "violation" of the NPT.
Under Article I we have "undertaken" to not transfer control over our nukes – directly or
indirectly – "to any recipient whatsoever." But the NPT is silent about what happens to us
if we violate the "undertaking" of "Article I" and transfer indirect control over our
nukes to one of our NATO allies, for example.
Under "Article IV", we "undertake" to facilitate "the fullest possible exchange of
equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy" with Iran, for example. We "shall" also cooperate with Russia, for
example, when it attempts to supply nuclear power plants to Iran.
But the NPT is silent about what happens to us when we violate "Article IV" and do
everything in our power – as we have done – to prevent Russia supplying those plants to
Iran.
However, our repeated violations of "Article IV" – and perhaps "Article I" – are not what
concerns Ambassador Jackie Sanders!
At the 2005 NPT Review Conference next month she wants the Conferees to "insist on a high
standard of compliance with Article II". Furthermore, she wants the Conferees to clearly
establish "what constitutes a violation of Article II".
Article II
"Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the
transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not
to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices".
Of course, there is no "standard of compliance" – high or low – for any article in the
NPT. But, how much clearer could Article II be about what constitutes a "violation"?
For example, it would be a violation of "Article II" for Iran to accept nukes from
Pakistan. It would also be a violation for Iran to manufacture nukes, with or without the
assistance of Pakistan.
But, two years ago, Iran voluntarily signed an Additional Protocol to its existing
International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Agreement required by "Article III".
Since then, the IAEA inspectors have gone-anywhere and seen-everything – including Iran's
import and export records – they had some reason for wanting to go-see.
They have repeatedly reported to the IAEA Board of Directors that they have found no
evidence that Iran has, ever had, or intends to have a nuclear weapons program.
Those IAEA reports are rejected out-of-hand by U.S. Ambassador Jackie Sanders and the
neo-crazies.
U.S. Ambassador Jackie Sanders just "knows"! – despite all evidence to the contrary – that
Iran has a nuke program.
"It is dangerous and foolish to wait until a non-nuclear-weapon state has finished
assembling a nuclear weapon – or until unassailable proof of weaponization work has been
disclosed – to cry foul and enforce Article II's prohibitions. By then it would be too
late.
"An international community that cares about nonproliferation must learn to recognize
the warning signs. There are activities that can demonstrate a purpose to acquire nuclear
weapons, including the pursuit of clandestine programs for reprocessing and enrichment,
and which thus make clear an Article II violation.
"In our view, the RevCon should note that the totality of the circumstances
surrounding certain nuclear and nuclear-related activities in a non-nuclear-weapon state
can provide sufficient information to allow states parties to reach a determination of an
Article II violation."
For U.S. Ambassador Jackie Sanders, the "failure to report" "clandestine efforts to
acquire fuel cycle facilities" – even if those efforts are not required to be reported –
and "the pursuit of enrichment or reprocessing capabilities that are economically
unnecessary" are "indicative of a violation of Article II".
But the NPT assigns the IAEA – not U.S. Ambassador Jackie Sanders – the responsibility for
"verifying the fulfillment of the obligations" assumed by a no-nuke Party to the NPT.
And it is the IAEA Statute – not the NPT, itself – that proscribes what actions the IAEA –
not U.S. Ambassador Jackie Sanders – is to take in the event a violation of Article II is
discovered.
According to Ambassador Jackie Sanders – because the IAEA is not-to-be-trusted – the NPT
is in trouble, and has to be fixed by the Conferees next month. Or else.
Dr. Prather's radio interviews
April 9, 2005
Audio (45 minutes)
http://www.weekendinterviewshow.com/audio/prather3.mp3
February 5, 2005
Audio (45 minutes)
http://www.weekendinterviewshow.com/audio/prather2.mp3
December 4, 2004
Audio (45 minutes)
http://www.weekendinterviewshow.com/audio/prather.mp3
February 16, 2005
Audio part 1 (20 minutes)
http://www.charlesgoyette.com/archive/media/2005-02-16-Charles-04.mp3
Audio part 2 (20 minutes)
http://www.charlesgoyette.com/archive/media/2005-02-16-Charles-05.mp3
* Physicist James Gordon Prather has served as a policy implementing official for national
security-related technical matters in the Federal Energy Agency, the Energy Research and
Development Administration, the Department of Energy, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the Department of the Army. Dr. Prather also served as legislative assistant
for national security affairs to U.S. Sen. Henry Bellmon, R-Okla. -- ranking member of the
Senate Budget Committee and member of the Senate Energy Committee and Appropriations
Committee. Dr. Prather had earlier worked as a nuclear weapons physicist at Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory (http://www.llnl.gov) in California and Sandia National
Laboratory (http://www.sandia.gov) in New Mexico.
http://www.antiwar.com/prather