KURDS AND ...(ALL IN ONE THREAD)

[Sam Ghandchi]

*********************PART IX*********************
The following is Part IX

Part I-----Mahd Dynasty to Arab Invasion.
Part II----Arab Invasion to Moghol Invasion.
Part III---Moghol Invasion to Downfall of Safavid Dynasty.
Part IV---Kurds in Modern Iran (Till Nadir Shah).
Part V----Kurds in Modern Iran (Nadir Shah-Mashrootiat).
Part VI---Shia Clergy in Mashrootiat (A Brief Note).
Part VII--Kurds in Modern Iran (Mashrootiat-Reza Shah).
Part VIII-Kurds in Modern Iran (Reza Shah-IRI).
Part IX---The Theory of Greater Kurdistan.
Part X----Tribes and Tribalism
Part XI---Final Word

Appendix---Kurdistan's Agriculture

- Sam Ghandchi

**********************************************************
KURDS AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN IRAN (Part IX)
The Theory of Greater Kurdistan

Here I am making a diversion to explicate a theory that is
sometimes heard from some uninformed Iranian Kurds as a
solution to the problems of Kurdistan.

Actually the Unity of Greater Kurdistan has been a demand
mostly desired by the Turkish and Iraqi Kurds and except for
some uninformed individuals, the Iranian Kurds have never
had such desire.

The reason is because the Iranian and Ottoman Kurdistan have
separated since the time of Shah Ismaiil (War of Chaldoran), as
I noted before, and that is about four centuries ago. And even
the result was that the Iranian Kurdistan became a semi-
independent state ruled by Ardalans. So the Iranian Kurds
were as free as one could be and had no interest to join the
other part of Kurdistan. They are as separate as the Austrians
and Germans.

But the Ottoman part of Kurdistan was divided between
Turkey, Iraq, and Syria in 1920 [actually between the then
Ottomans, British, and French], following the end of World War
I. This is why those sections of Kurdistan are yearning for
reunification. They had lived together in their primitive
capitalist development which actually forms nation-states. But
Iranian Kurdistan has done that development with the rest of
Iran, rather than with the rest of Kurdistan, as I have shown it
in this series.

Whether it is realistic or not for the Turkish and Iraqi Kurds to
reunify is really not my interest here. It depends on many
factors. But for Iran, it is definitely a bad plan. I am just
emphasizing here that Iranian Kurdistan is as Iranian as all the
other parts of Iran. Only being Sunni and under religious and
cultural oppression, some uninformed Kurds may sigh for the
Greater Iranian Kurdistan as a nice dream, but the informed
Kurds know that it is more of a nightmare than a sweet dream
where tribal chiefs will destroy all the progress that has
already, belatedly, been made in Kurdistan.

Finally the issue of autonomy of Kurdistan has nothing to do
with the "Unity of Greater Kurdistan". Both Iraqi and Turkish
governments have recognized autonomy for their Kurdistans.
That means cultural, religious, and limited political autonomy
similar to Spanish nation in US. Such rights are actually needed
for all nationalities, religious minorities, and ethnic groups in
Iran.

It is really unfortunate that neither the Shah's government nor
IRI have recognized such rights for Iran's Kurdistan and other
regions of Iran such as Azarbayjan or Baluchestan or other
religions such as the Baha'is or Jews, etc. Why should a
Armenian kid be forced to learn how to do voozo or read
namaz? Why should an Azari child not have a choice to take
Turkish literature class at school?

These things have nothing to do with separation or Greater
Kurdistan. These are rights that all Iranian minorities demand.
I think the Iranians who have spent 20 years in US, may
demand English class for their kids if they go to school in Iran.
I think any political group and the Iranian state should
recognize these rights. These are not secessionism or forming
Greater Kurdistan, Greater Azarbayjan, Greater Armenia,
Greater Assyria, etc.

Finally I think the Turkish Kurds and Iranian Kurds share a
language and culture just like Americans and the British. So
they watch the same movies without sub-title but sincerely I
think that is where the commonalty ends. The Kurds of Iran
have a lot of stake in Iran and I doubt it if they would ever
give it up..

End of Part IX

*********************************************************

[Sam Ghandchi]

******************PART X*****************
The following is Part X. This part discusses "Tribes and
Tribalism in Kurdistan". This section is based on different
sources including a study published by Amir Hooshang
Keshavarz and Mir Seyyed Ali Nazem Razavi entitled "ASHAYER
VA MASAYEL-E TOWSE' AH [Tribes and Problems of
Development], published Tir, 1355, by Faculty of Social Sciences
and Cooperation, Tehran University.

Part I-----Mahd Dynasty to Arab Invasion.
Part II----Arab Invasion to Moghol Invasion.
Part III---Moghol Invasion to Downfall of Safavid Dynasty.
Part IV---Kurds in Modern Iran (Till Nadir Shah).
Part V----Kurds in Modern Iran (Nadir Shah-Mashrootiat).
Part VI---Shia Clergy in Mashrootiat (A Brief Note).
Part VII--Kurds in Modern Iran (Mashrootiat-Reza Shah).
Part VIII-Kurds in Modern Iran (Reza Shah-IRI).
Part IX---The Theory of Greater Kurdistan.
Part X----Tribes and Tribalism
Part XI---Final Word

Appendix---Kurdistan's Agriculture

- Sam Ghandchi

**********************************************************

KURDS AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN IRAN (Part X)
Tribes and Tribalism

In a study by two Iranians (noted above*), tribes in Iran have
been classified into "big" and small ones. Big tribes include
Turkmans, Shahsavans, Bakhtiaris, Buyer Ahmadis, Qashghaiis
one-or-two tribes in Kurdistan, and . These tribes in turn are
divided into three types according to their mode of life and
production:

1) Tribes of which about %80 are mobile and have summer and
winter abodes as well as migration routes, such as the
Bakhtiaris.

2) Tribes of which about %50 migrate back and forth, and the
rest, a greater portion lives in Summer Places, and a smaller
portion in Winter Places; such as the Buyer Ahmadi in
Kohgiluyeh.

3) Tribes which dwell in one place but have to move their
herds from place to place for grazing and feeding. Such are the
Turkmen and Kurdish tribes.

Tribal mode of life and ownership was dealt a severe blow
during the reign of Reza Shah, but was revived in the turbulent
years of 1941-53, owing partly to the weakening of central
government and partly due to the joint efforts of imperalism
and domestic reaction to frustrate the all-Iranian democratic-
revolutionary movement.

Tribal chiefs carried out plunder with backing of the British in
that period. For example, Mohammad Rashid Khan Baneh-i
became an important figure in the area by defeating Mahmud
Khan-e Kani Sanan in Mariwan.

Mohammad Rashid Khan and the like appeared as supporters
of the Mahabad Republic (1945-46), but withdrew as soon as
the central government forces attacked Mahabad and in the
later years, they worked hand in hand with the British to
suppress the people's movements in these areas.

The mobilization by the British, American, and domestic
reaction of the Quashghaii and other tribes in the South (1944-
46), the use of Arab tribesmen in Khuzestan in an armed clash
with the striking oil workers in the Summer of 1946, the
instigation of the Bakhtiari tribes in Central Iran and the
Javanrudis in Kermanshah in 1952-53 are further examples of
the reactionary role played by tribalism in the recent history of
of Iran.

Having contributed its share to the reestablishment of a police
state with the coup d'etat of August 1953, tribalism suffered
another setback; for now the central government was severely
in the hands of reaction and imperilaism, and the servicxes of
the chiefs were no longer needed.

However, in the border regions of Kurdistan, and in Dezli,
Javanrood, Sardasht, etc., the Shah's regime could not dispense
with such services. In those regions armed tribesmen served
as "government militia".

The Shakkak tribe, the most important in Northern Kurdistan,
the Malekshais, the Ghalkhanis, etc., now comprise the nomadic
tribes of Kurdistan. These have not been satisfactorily studied
as yet. What is certain is that in the Southmost and Northmost
areas of Kurdistan and also in the border areas, the tribal social
and economic life still alive.

Moreover, many of the villages, where small landownership
prevails, are still largely under the sway of tribal customs and
tradtions: blood revenge is observed in some small villages of
Kamyaran, "clan heads" in Sardasht, where small
landownership predominates, still wield great influence and
even keep bands of armed attendants, the kidnapping of girls
for marriage is still practiced (this practice was very common
in many old cultures of the world).

Since the downfall of the Pahlavi regime in February 1979,
tribal chiefs of Kurdestan have shown various politcal stands.
Some have shown loyalty to the central government, Islamic
Republic of Iran; but this "loyalty" to a Shia state is neither
strong nor likely to become so. Some others, notably those of
Javanrud, Pawa, and Uraman in the south, and of Khoi, Salmas,
and Eshnuya in the north, have tended toward "independence".
Still others have become supporters of the Kurdistan
Democratic Party. For example, Rashid Khan-e Baneh-i, the
murderer of Kurdish Revolutionary Sharifzadeh became a
Kurdistan Democratic Party after the 1979 Revolution in Iran.
Some other clan heads have become agents of the Ba'th
government in the violent suppression of the Kurdish people's
movements. Finally some have joined it.

The armed group the "Razgary Army" has been an especially
venomous expression of tribalism. It has combined tribalism
with the religious attachment of the Naghshbandi Mystics. To
my knowledge, it was created as a base for the Iraqi
government.

Then there is the remnants of the Barzani army, which had fled
to Iran in 1975. They were called "Qiada-ye Mowaghat", Soon
they dropped the "Mowaghat" (provisional) from their name
and called themselves Hizb-e Democrat-e Kurdistan-e Iraq. It
was led by the sons of Mola Mostafa Barzani and was
supported by IRI and the US. THeir base was in Ushnavieh and
Dezli.

In summary, the autonomy that the tribal chiefs want is very
different from the autonomy desired by the Kurdish people.
The former want anrachy, fiefdom, isolationism and destruction
of Kurdistan whereas the latter just want a decent respect for
their cultural heritage within the totality of Iran.

End of Part X

*********************************************************

[Sam Ghandchi]

***********************PART XI*******************
The following is Part XI (Final). This my "Final Word" for now.

Part I-----Mahd Dynasty to Arab Invasion.
Part II----Arab Invasion to Moghol Invasion.
Part III---Moghol Invasion to Downfall of Safavid Dynasty.
Part IV---Kurds in Modern Iran (Till Nadir Shah).
Part V----Kurds in Modern Iran (Nadir Shah-Mashrootiat).
Part VI---Shia Clergy in Mashrootiat (A Brief Note).
Part VII--Kurds in Modern Iran (Mashrootiat-Reza Shah).
Part VIII-Kurds in Modern Iran (Reza Shah-IRI).
Part IX---The Theory of Greater Kurdistan.
Part X----Tribes and Tribalism
Part XI---Final Word

Appendix-Kurdistan's Agriculture (posted separately)

- Sam Ghandchi

**********************************************************
KURDS AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN IRAN (Part XI)
Final Word

Finally I would like to note that I have not reviewed the
intellectual and peasant uprisings during the end of the Shah
and the rise of IRI periods. I think the former is not really
much different from the rest of Iran and should be studied as
part of the review of Iranian intellectual thought and the latter
is beyond the scope of this treatise. Here my intention was
simply to investigate the presence of Kurds in the Iran's
Central Government.

As far as IRI is concerned, I do not have any detailed
knowledge of the Iranian elite at this time and so I really
cannot judge what the ethnic make-up of IRI is. I know some
clergy like Mofti-Zadeh in Kurdistan supported IRI and some
like Sheikh Ezzedin Hosseini did not. But whether any of them
is part of Iran's elite, I would seriously doubt that.

I do not know what IRI and the different social, cultural, and
political groups are working for in Iran's Kurdistan at this time.
I just know that the lack of tolerance at the beginning of IRI
caused a lot of killings of innocent people from both IRI
supporters and its opponents.

I hope that these articles that I have posted and other
educational efforts can help the growth of the dialogue
between different peoples of Iran and thus help the
improvement of tolerance and diversity of the present and
future central governments of Iran. Kurds, Azaris, Baluches,
Arabs, Lors, Bakhtiaris, Ghashghais, Assyrians, Armenians,
Jews, Zorastrians, Sunnis, Baha'is, Women, and all other ethnic,
national, cultural, or religious groups make what is called Iran
today.

If any central government in Iran, at present or in the future,
does not recognize the rightful aspirations of these diverse
groups, I really doubt it if that government can claim to be
representing what we call Iran.

End of Part XI

*********************************************************

[Sam Ghandchi]

*****KURDS AND THE CENTRAL ... ONE THREAD*****

Dear Friends,

I have been getting many Email from people who have not
received some sections of my KURDS AND THE CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT IN IRAN series. I am now reposting
them all in one thread. Please ignore if you have already
seen them and excuse me for causing you
this the inconvenience:.

Part I-----Mahd Dynasty to Arab Invasion.
Part II----Arab Invasion to Moghol Invasion.
Part III---Moghol Invasion to Downfall of Safavid Dynasty.
Part IV---Kurds in Modern Iran (Till Nadir Shah).
Part V----Kurds in Modern Iran (Nadir Shah-Mashrootiat).
Part VI---Shia Clergy in Mashrootiat (A Brief Note).
Part VII--Kurds in Modern Iran (Mashrootiat-Reza Shah).
Part VIII-Kurds in Modern Iran (Reza Shah-IRI).
Part IX---The Theory of Greater Kurdistan.
Part X----Tribes and Tribalism
Part XI---Final Word

[Sam Ghandchi]

*****************PART I***************************

The following is a research work of mine on the history
of presence of Kurds in Iran's central governments from
the time of Mahd Dynasty. Someone else translated it to
English but did not want to be noted. This is part I
which covers the topic untill the Arab invasion. Please
note that this is a very long posting.

Part I-----Mahd Dynasty to Arab Invasion.
Part II----Arab Invasion to Moghol Invasion.
Part III---Moghol Invasion to Downfall of Safavid Dynasty.
Part IV---Kurds in Modern Iran (Till Nadir Shah).
Part V----Kurds in Modern Iran (Nadir Shah-Mashrootiat).
Part VI---Shia Clergy in Mashrootiat (A Brief Note).
Part VII--Kurds in Modern Iran (Mashrootiat-Reza Shah).
Part VIII-Kurds in Modern Iran (Reza Shah-IRI).
Part IX---The Theory of Greater Kurdistan.
Part X----Tribes and Tribalism
Part XI---Final Word

Appendix---Kurdistan's Agriculture

- Sam Ghandchi

*****************************************************************
KURDS AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN IRAN (Part I)
A Brief Historical Review

"One of the earliest civilizations of the world developed in
kurdistan. With the formation of the Median State in the first
millennium BC., this region became especially important. The
area which is now Iranian Azerbayjan and Kurdistan formed
the Western part, that is, one of the three parts of the Median
territory and was called 'Mahd Atro-paten" [History of Mahd,
A.M. Diakonov, Keshavarz Trans., P.79]. Production in these
areas was more advanced than the northern and western parts
of Median territory. [ibid P.182]. According to Diakanov, the
Russian historian, in the Western Media, a non-Iranian
language called "Kutie" was spoken from the ninth to the
seventh century, B.C., ... and Iranian language prevailed only in
the Eastern parts, which included the present-day Tehran area
(Rey) and Isfahan. The "Kutie" language is regarded by other
historians as one of the Iranian languages, from which the
Kurdish language has stemmed [ibid, P.146].

The tribes inhabiting Western Media played an important role
in the Median civilization and it seems that since the time of
the founding of Mahd Dynasty, the Kurdish people have not
had such a strong presence in the central governments of Iran.

In 550 B.C., Ekbatana (where now Hamadan is), the capital of
the Mahd Dynasty, was taken by Cyrus, the Achaemenian, and
thus ended the reign of the Mahd. From the formation of the
Achamenian State, with Cyrus as its first chief, to the Muslim
invasion of Iran (642, A.D.), that is, for one thousand years, it is
the tribes of central Iran, particularly the Pars's (Persian
proper) who occupied the dominant position in the central
governments. According to Herodotus, the Greek historian, the
Persians had chafed at the Median rule long before they came
into positions of leadership and overthrew it" [History of Iran,
Pigolovskay et al, Keshavarz Trans P.16].

Pigolovskay writes that in the new, Achaemenian government,
the Medians continued to hold important positions along with
with the Persians, that Ekbatana also served as the capital of
the (FIRST) Persians, and it was further reinforced and made
into an exceppent fortress [ibid, P16].

With invasion of Iran by Alexander of Macedonia (330 B.C.),
the "FIRST PERSIANS" (Achaemenians) fell and 83 years of
Greek rule (Selokids) started. This rule ended in 250B.C., with
creation of the Ashkonid State. The Ashkanis (Parthians) were
North-Iranians, who enjoyed popular support in fighting the
Selokid. During the reign of Parthians, the western part of Iran
found more significance and after the conquering the Central
Asia, this dynasty became a world power and Hamadan was
their summer capital The Ashkanic rule disintegrated 474
years after it was founded, presumably under repeated
invasions from Romans, in 224 A.D., the Sasanid Dynasty was
founded. The Sasanids have also been called THE SECOND
PERSIANS. [ibid P.56]

Ardashir Papakan (or Babakan, son of Babak), the first Sasanid
king, was grandson to Sasan, related to the Achamenian royal
family and Guardian of the Annahita Temple. With the
accession of Ardeshir to the thrown, the Persians again became
the mainstay of the central government. In this period, too,
which ends with the Muslim conquest of 642 A.D. western Iran
continues to be an important region of the Iranian empire.
During the reign of Sasanids, the dominance of Par's in Iran's
central government became more and more established. Seven
main families of Sasan, Karen, Mehran, Zanj, Ahkenids, and
Sooren were at the head of Iranian state. The capital of the
Sasanids was Tisfun, or Madayen, near where Baghdad is
situated.[ibid P.522]

Thus from the time of the fall of Mahd Dynasty till the victory
of Arabs (642 AD), the central government of Iran was mainly
compsed of Par's, but the western part of Iran (including
Kurdistan) was nonetheless one of the main regions of Iranian
civilization and most of Iranian capitals were located in that
region.

End of Part I

*****************************************************************

[Sam Ghandchi]

*********************PART II*********************
The following is part II Please note that this is a very long
posting. I finished the Part I with the following paragraph:

"Thus from the time of the fall of Mahd Dynasty till the victory
of Arabs (642 AD), the central government of Iran was mainly

composed of Par's, but the western part of Iran (including

Kurdistan) was nonetheless one of the main regions of Iranian
civilization and most of Iranian capitals were located in that
region."

Part I-----Mahd Dynasty to Arab Invasion.
Part II----Arab Invasion to Moghol Invasion.
Part III---Moghol Invasion to Downfall of Safavid Dynasty.
Part IV---Kurds in Modern Iran (Till Nadir Shah).
Part V----Kurds in Modern Iran (Nadir Shah-Mashrootiat).
Part VI---Shia Clergy in Mashrootiat (A Brief Note).
Part VII--Kurds in Modern Iran (Mashrootiat-Reza Shah).
Part VIII-Kurds in Modern Iran (Reza Shah-IRI).
Part IX---The Theory of Greater Kurdistan.
Part X----Tribes and Tribalism
Part XI---Final Word

Appendix---Kurdistan's Agriculture


- Sam Ghandchi

*****************************************************************
KURDS AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN IRAN (Part II)

Following the Arab Invasion, at the time of Khalif Omar, the
state power based on the tribal Arab aristocracy was formed in
Iran. The power passed into the hands of the Omayid, and Iran
became dependent on them. The Omayid rule signified total
Arab domination of Iran. On the other hand, it served as a
stimulus to popular uprisings as well as rebellions by Iranian
feudals. Iranians played an effective role in the overthrow of
the Omayid rule (133H.) and the bring into power of Abbasids.
The rebellion of Abu Moslem Khorasani in this period is very
well-known.

The Abbasid founded Baghdad near the ruins of Tisfun and
made it the capital of their empire. During the Abbasid period,
Iranians contributed significantly to the development of
Islamic culture. The Abbasid Khalifs adopted governmental
traditions of the Sasanid; Iranians, such as the famous House of
Barmak, gained high rank and status in the government.

However, by the end of this period (early third century of
Hijra) popular movements broke out all-over the Iranian soil.
Also, a number of old feudal families began to regain their
former positions as the disintegration of the Abbasid rule
proceeded. The feudal princes that came into power and
formed dynasties were of diverse origins:

1) The old feudal families in various regions of Iran; such as
the Taheris in Khorasan (206-260 of Hijra), the Samanid in
Middle Asia (204-390 H.), the Ziyaris in Gorgan (316-434 H.),
the House of Booyeh (324-447 H.) in the west of Iran and Iraq
(Euphrates) , etc.

2) Rulers who arose from peasant movements and
subsequently formed feudal states. Such are the Saffarid in
Siestan (247-288 H.), the Alavis in Mazandaran and Gorgan
(250-316 H.), Ismaiilis, etc.

3) Former turk slaves of the Abbasid or local courts; such as
the Gaznavi (351-432 H.) turks in Khorasan and Afghanistan,
the Seljuk turks (430-530 H.) from Central Asia who wrested
power from the Gaznavis and set up a geographically extensive
government in Iran, and the Khwarazmshahis in Central Asia
(530-627 H.)

What was common to all these local governments was:

1) Their efforts to extend their domains in opposition to Arab
Rule. The Deylamis, a ruling dynasty from the Caspian
province of Gilan, conquer Baghdad, and the Seljukis advanced
as far as Syria.

2) They were all served by Iranian dignitaries of government
and culture, and used the same language- Dari, or modern
Persian. The Gaznavi court is famous for its encouragement of
Persian literature, and the famous Shahnama of Ferdowsi was
composed in this period. It was apparently the consummation
of efforts to revive the Persian language. Such efforts were
centered in Khorasan.

In reality formation of these dynasties can be considered as
expressing efforts by the various peoples of Iran to overthrow
the Arab rule. THE CONQUEST OF POWER BY EACH NEW ETHNIC
GROUP MEANT RATHER THE INTEGRATION OF THE VICTOR AND
THE VANQUISHED THAN THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE LATTER.
IN THIS WAY DOES THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
PROGRESSIVELY BECOME THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
FEUDALS AND CHIEFS OF THESE PEOPLES.

IN THIS PERIOD OF RE-IRANIANIZATION, UNLIKE THE PRE-
ISLAMIC TIMES, CENTERS OF IRANIAN POWER AND
CIVILIZATION SHIFTED FROM THE WEST (WHERE THE ARABS
WERE STILL POWERFUL) TO THE EAST AND NORTH.

IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT EVEN THE DEVASTATING INVASION
BY THE MOGHOLS DID NOT CREATE ANY BIG CHANGES IN THE
ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENTS IN IRAN. THE
SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL CONTINUITY OF WHAT IS
COMMONLY CONSIDERED AS "PERSIAN" CULTURE WAS
RETAINED AND "PERSIAN" ACQUIRED THE CONNOTATION OF
"ELITE" RATHER THAN A STRICT ETHNIC MEANING.

This is how Iran looked on the eve of the Moghol Invasion. In
the next part I will discuss Moghols, the local nature of power
in Kurdistan and the formation of Safavid dynasty.

End of Part II

*****************************************************************

[Sam Ghandchi]

**********************PART III*********************
The following is part III Please note that this is a very long
posting:

Part I-----Mahd Dynasty to Arab Invasion.
Part II----Arab Invasion to Moghol Invasion.
Part III---Moghol Invasion to Downfall of Safavid Dynasty.
Part IV---Kurds in Modern Iran (Till Nadir Shah).
Part V----Kurds in Modern Iran (Nadir Shah-Mashrootiat).
Part VI---Shia Clergy in Mashrootiat (A Brief Note).
Part VII--Kurds in Modern Iran (Mashrootiat-Reza Shah).
Part VIII-Kurds in Modern Iran (Reza Shah-IRI).
Part IX---The Theory of Greater Kurdistan.
Part X----Tribes and Tribalism
Part XI---Final Word

Appendix---Kurdistan's Agriculture

=============================================
I will repeat the last three paragraphs of Part II
before starting the part III:

In reality formation of these dynasties [post-Arab rule]

can be considered as expressing efforts by the various peoples

of Iran to overthrow the Arab rule. The conquest of power by
each new ethnic Group meant rather the integration of the
victor and The vanquished than the disappearance of the
latter. In this way does the central government progressively
become the representative of the Feudals and chiefs of these
peoples.

In this period of re-Iranianization, unlike the pre-Islamic
times, centers of Iranian power and Civilization shifted from
the west (where the Arabs were still powerful) to the east and
north.

It is noteworthy that even the devastating invasion By the
Moghols did not create any big changes in the ethnic
composition of governments in Iran. The spatial and temporal
continuity of what is commonly considered as "Persian" culture
was retained and "Persian" acquired the connotation of "elite"
rather than a strict ethnic meaning.

This is how Iran looked on the eve of the Moghol Invasion. In

The next part ,I will discuss Moghols, the local nature of power
In kurdistan and the formation of Safavid dynasty.

- Sam Ghandchi

*****************************************************************
KURDS AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN IRAN (Part III)

During the period from Moghol Invasion (617 H.) till the
founding of the Safavid Dynasty (907 H.), Iran's production is
wiped out and the society retrogresses. In the governments
which were set up by descendants of the Moghol conquerors,
Holakoois, Aljatioon, and Teymooris, not only did Iranians
gained strictly important role, but the process of re-
Iranianization was speeded up due to popular uprisings and
feudal rebellions. The uprising of the Sar-be-daran, Horoofieh,
and other popular uprisings, are examples of the former and
feudal rebellions of Choopanis, Jalayeris, etc., are instances of
the latter. The re-Iranianization found concrete expression in
the Persian language as the official literary discourse, the Shia
religion as the official religion, the system of taxation and the
civil law.

The Safavid State, founded in 907 H. by Gezelbash Turks, who
had fled the Ottoman territory, especially promoted the
ascendancy of the "Persian" element in the central government.
They first moved their capital from Tabriz to Gazvin in their
preference of central Iran and then in the same intention
moved it from Gazvin to Isfahan. Shah Abbas, the greatest
Safavid King, is alleged to have given considerable tax
concession to Isfahan and other parts of central Iran to that
end [ibid P.522]. Shiism was formally upheld as the official
religion of Modern Iran.

Shiism, rather than "Persianism," became the vehicle of
supremacy; and thus we observe the discrimination of other
ethnic and national groups to show a religious color.
Discrimination of the Sunnis due to the excesses of some
members of Shia clergy in the Royal Court causes the
maltreatment of the Sunni population in Kurdistan,
Turmanistan, Shirvan, Afghanistan, etc. that in turn evoked
popular uprisings. And finally the overthrow of the decaying
Safavid Dynasty was effected by the rebellious Sunni Afghans
who, led by Mahmud-e Afghan, took the capital city of Isfahan.

I broke this part into two separate parts for ease of posting.
Thus in the next part, I will discuss how the power structure of
Kurdistan was in this same period.

End of Part III

*****************************************************************

[Sam Ghandchi]

************************PART IV*********************
The following is part IV Please note that this is a very long
posting:

Part I-----Mahd Dynasty to Arab Invasion.
Part II----Arab Invasion to Moghol Invasion.
Part III---Moghol Invasion to Downfall of Safavid Dynasty.
Part IV---Kurds in Modern Iran (Till Nadir Shah).
Part V----Kurds in Modern Iran (Nadir Shah-Mashrootiat).
Part VI---Shia Clergy in Mashrootiat (A Brief Note).
Part VII--Kurds in Modern Iran (Mashrootiat-Reza Shah).
Part VIII-Kurds in Modern Iran (Reza Shah-IRI).
Part IX---The Theory of Greater Kurdistan.
Part X----Tribes and Tribalism
Part XI---Final Word

Appendix---Kurdistan's Agriculture

- Sam Ghandchi

*****************************************************************
KURDS AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN IRAN (Part IV)
Kurds in Modern Iran (till Nader Shah)

Its favorable, mountainous situation allowed Kurdistan a self-
sufficient economy. This, together with its geographical
position amidst Arabs, Turks, and Persians, enabled Kurdistan
to enjoy relative independence. Feudal families ruled
Kurdistan for a long time, and the rule of the Ardalans, began
before the fall of the Abbasid, continued during and after the
Moghol domination of Iran.

About the Ardalans' rule over Kurdistan, what Amir Sharaf
Khan El Badlisi writes in his Sharafnameh may be of some
value. He writes" A man named Baba Ardalan dwelt for some
time among the Guran tribe, and toward the end of the reign of
the Genghisi Kings brought under his sway the province of
SHAHRA ZOOL, which came to be famed as SHAHR-E-ZOOR; and
he [renamed] himself GHOBADIN-E-FIRUZ-SASANI; and that the
reason for the epithet SHAHR-E-ZOOR [Forceville], is, according
to Hamdullah Mostowfi, that although this city always had Kurd
rulers but at different times, he who had the greater force
became the ruler." [Sharaf-Nameh P.118]. {In other words
something like some European feudal cities which had
extensive history of fiefdom. I think the strength of Ashayer
in Kurdistan also explains this particular form of feudalism and
fiefdom.}

Although Kurdish feudals ruled Kurdistan for more than six-
hundred years, they would be under vassalage now for the
Arabs, now for the Moghols, or of the Safavids and the Qajars.
In 920 H., when Shah Ismaiil Safavi's army was defeated by
the Ottomans in the Battle of Chaldoran, a treaty was made
between the Shah and Sultan Saleem of Ottoman Empire (now
Turkey), according to which Kurdistan was divided between
the two countries.

From that date on, the Ardalans principally ruled in the Iranian
Kurdistan, and Sanadaj was the seat of their government.

In the reign of Shah Sultan Hossein, the last Safavi King, a
fanatical Shia governer was appointed to this all-Sunni
province. Misdeeds committed by the governor evoked a
popular rebellion, and the Ardalans returned to government
[Tarikh-e Kurd va Kurdistan, Sheikh Mohammad Mardookh,
P114]

However, the process of centralization of governments in Iran
continued in spite of various setbacks, and it was to engulf
Kurdistan in spite of her resistance and self-sufficiency. This
process was primarily determined by the speed and quality of
Iran's development of industrial society of which will be said
later.

The fall the Safavi dynasty was accompanied with the invasion
of Iran by the Afghans, the Russians and the Ottomans
simultaneously. This was a test of cohesion for the "united"
Iran that had been found by the Safavis, and there was a
concerted effort by the peoples and fighting forces of Iran to
repulse the aggressors. Thus, Nadir came into prominence as
outstanding general and national hero, who became king after
the war.

In the next section I will follow on Iran and Kurdistan under
Nader Shah and after his reign.

End of Part IV

*****************************************************************

[Sam Ghandchi]

********************PART V*******************
The following is part V

Part I-----Mahd Dynasty to Arab Invasion.
Part II----Arab Invasion to Moghol Invasion.
Part III---Moghol Invasion to Downfall of Safavid Dynasty.
Part IV---Kurds in Modern Iran (Till Nadir Shah).
Part V----Kurds in Modern Iran (Nadir Shah-Mashrootiat).
Part VI---Shia Clergy in Mashrootiat (A Brief Note).
Part VII--Kurds in Modern Iran (Mashrootiat-Reza Shah).
Part VIII-Kurds in Modern Iran (Reza Shah-IRI).
Part IX---The Theory of Greater Kurdistan.
Part X----Tribes and Tribalism
Part XI---Final Word

Appendix---Kurdistan's Agriculture

- Sam Ghandchi

*****************************************************************
KURDS AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN IRAN (Part V)
Kurds in Modern Iran (Nadir Shah to Constitutional Movement)

Nadir was of the Sunni Afshar tribe which dwelt in Khorasan.
P. Petroshevsky writes that in fifteenth century, the (military)
arms of the Safavi rule consisted of nomadic Turkish tribes
from various regions that spoke Azari language, and had
migrated to Azarbayjan and elsewhere in Iran from Central
Asia because they disliked the Ottoman Sultans and their policy
of absolute Centralism . At the beginning there were seven of
these tribes: Shamlu, Rumlu, Ustajlu, Takelu, Afshar, Qajar, and
Zolghadr.

From these seven tribes only Shamlu and Rumlu, completely
obeyed the Safavis." (Tarikh-e Iran, Petroshevsky, P.471).
Later the Afshar tribe and Zand tribe (from a Lor origin) and
finally the Qajar tribe raised the flag of the unification of Iran
and founded central governments of Iran. They formed
"Persianized" dynasties and converted to Shiism, be it noted,
was the ideological form of "Persianization" until modernism
ushered in by Constitutional Movement.

At the turn of the 19th century, the reformation of the famed
Mirza Taghi Khan Amir Kabir, aimed at the bougeoisification of
the Iranian State from above. The effort cost him his life, due
to court intrigue, but the trend continued, so that in Reza Shah's
regime one finds a marriage, so to speak, between it and the
modernism of the constitutional movement.

The "bougeoisification from above," of course, was a belated
attempt to hasten and guide a process that had been going on
even since the founding of the Safari state. In this respect,
Azerbayjan as a region was, relatively, the most advanced,
while Kurdistan was one of the undeveloped regions on the eve
of the constitutional movement

As the appointment of governors to provinces from Tehran
became regular practice with the reign of Nassered Din Shah
(by whose order the Chancellor was put to death), the rule of
the Ardalans and the independence of the Kurds ended. On 4th
of Zighadeh 1284 H.G., prince Motamedodoleh Farhad Mirza, the
uncle of Nassered Din Shah was assigned as the governor of
Kurdistan. [Tarikh-e Kurd va Kurdistan, Sheikh Mardookh,
P.186]. Thus this is the date when the separateness of
Kurdistan political life from the rest of Iran is ended. The
resistance of the Kurdish people to the central government also
dates back to this time.

But this resistance, at a time when the Kurds had NOT
developed into a NATION, took the form of peasant uprisings,
which were mostly utilized by chiefs and feudals to revive
their own rule and weaken the central government.

End of Part V

*****************************************************************

[Sam Ghandchi]

***************************PART VI******************
The following is part VI

Part I-----Mahd Dynasty to Arab Invasion.
Part II----Arab Invasion to Moghol Invasion.
Part III---Moghol Invasion to Downfall of Safavid Dynasty.
Part IV---Kurds in Modern Iran (Till Nadir Shah).
Part V----Kurds in Modern Iran (Nadir Shah-Mashrootiat).
Part VI---Shia Clergy in Mashrootiat (A Brief Note).
Part VII--Kurds in Modern Iran (Mashrootiat-Reza Shah).
Part VIII-Kurds in Modern Iran (Reza Shah-IRI).
Part IX---The Theory of Greater Kurdistan.
Part X----Tribes and Tribalism
Part XI---Final Word

Appendix---Kurdistan's Agriculture

Before I post my next section of Kurds in Modern Iran, I am
posting this short note about the role of Shia clergy in the
Constitutional Movement; because I refer to it many times. I
have written scattered notes on the role of Shia in
contemporary Iran, in other postings as well. The following is
not really a treatise on the topic of Shia in Mashrootiat or
Iranian 1979 Revolution, it is just a short note to help with
discussion of the main topic.

- Sam Ghandchi

*****************************************************************
KURDS AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN IRAN (Part VI)
A Brief Note on the role of Shia clergy in Mashrootiat

The Shia clergy were divided into two opposite camps during
the Constitutional Revolution (Mashrootiat). One mainly
consisting of the lower-rank clergy, supported it along with the
rest of the Constitutionalists; while the other, headed by Sheikh
Fazlullah Nuri and under the banner of "Shari'at" opposed it,
siding with the despotic King Mohammad Ali-Shah.

A compromise was apparently reached by including in the
constitution an article which allowed five "first-rank"
ecclesiastics to be elected to the National Council to verify that
the laws enacted did not conflict with Islam. Also, Shiism was
proclaimed as the official religion of the country.

From the reign of Reza Shah in 1925 till the revolutionary-
democratic movement of 1978, religion in general did not play
any significant role as a socio-political ideology. The revivalism
that Iran has since then experienced is an extremely important
and interesting subject by itself, which lies beyond the scope of
this treatise.


End of Part VI

*****************************************************************

[Sam Ghandchi]

************************PART VII*****************
The following is Part VII

Part I-----Mahd Dynasty to Arab Invasion.
Part II----Arab Invasion to Moghol Invasion.
Part III---Moghol Invasion to Downfall of Safavid Dynasty.
Part IV---Kurds in Modern Iran (Till Nadir Shah).
Part V----Kurds in Modern Iran (Nadir Shah-Mashrootiat).
Part VI---Shia Clergy in Mashrootiat (A Brief Note).
Part VII--Kurds in Modern Iran (Mashrootiat-Reza Shah).
Part VIII-Kurds in Modern Iran (Reza Shah-IRI).
Part IX---The Theory of Greater Kurdistan.
Part X----Tribes and Tribalism
Part XI---Final Word

Appendix---Kurdistan's Agriculture

- Sam Ghandchi

**********************************************************

KURDS AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN IRAN (Part VII)
Kurds in Modern Iran (Mashrootiat)

In contrast to Azarbayjan, there was no mass participation by
Kurds in the Constitutional Revolution. The reason for this lack
of participation should be obvious. The modernist aims of the
revolution and its goal of power-sharing could not touch a
region that had lived in isolation from the rest of Iran for
centuries, a region where feudalism and tribalism held
complete sway.

Following the end of Ardalan rule, the elements of modern
capitalism were just starting to form in connection to the the
rest of the Iranian market, but these elements were very weak
and vulnerable by fiefdom and tribal relations. And still the
general direction of Kurdistan was determined by the feudal
and tribal chiefs who were still dreaming to return to the days
of isolation and semi-independence. They were far from
understanding the strength of the Constitutional Movement and
thus did not even recognize their own self-interest to work for
power-sharing in the Central Iranian State, the self-interest
that some other tribal chiefs of Iran such as Bakhtiari had
realized correcty .

It is interesting that the Bakhtiari tribe was mobilized and
brought to Tehran after the defeat of the despotic Mohammad
Ali-Shah. No doubt, the intention of the Bakhtiari chiefs was
not to extend democracy and defend constitutionalism, but to
gain a place in the new government that was forming and
would be partly pro-capitalist. They knew that it is important
to be part of the formation of the new central state and
recognized the winning power of democratic capitalism,
although they themselves were only interested to be part of
the power and not the new ways of life.

The feudals of most parts of Iran had learned that to further
their own interest, they had to participate in the elite of the
central government rather than to buy isolationism from the
central government. Unfortunately, an opposite stand of
Kurdish feudal, clergy, and tribal chiefs is why, the Kurdish
tribesmen were used against the Constitutional fighters of
Azarbayjan. Their feudal lords were hoping to regain their lost
isolation and semi-independence.

In the first part of Mashrootiat, there was no movement in
Kurdistan. Most of the landlords and their dignatories received
the Mashrootiat as though it were no more than a mere shift in
the upper echelons of Iran's central government.

Before Mohammad Ali-Shah openly declared Estebdad
(Despotism) by bombarding the Parliament, a pro-
Constitutional Governor was sent to Kurdistan from Tehran. He
was Mirza Ismaiil Khan Seghatol-Molk who contacted Kurdish
influential religious and feudal dignatories in Sanandaj for the
purpose of promoting Constitutionalism. Accordingly, popular
councils, which had originally sprung up in Tabriz, Tehran,
Rasht, etc, were set up. Here is the story as narrated by Sheikh
Mardookh himself.

Ayatolah Mardokh, the author of Tarikh-e Kurd va Kurdistan,
cooperates with Constituationalists at first and even
participates in Anjoman-e Sedaghat (1425 Zighadeh). With the
start of Estebdad-e Saghir (Despotism), the previous pro-
Mashrooteh governor (i.e. Seghat-ol Molk) is called back and
Prince Zafar-ol Saltaneh is assigned as the governor of
Kurdistan.

This new governor (i.e. Zafar-ol-Saltaneh) was pro-Estebdad (pro-
Despotism) and shut down the Sedaghat, Kargaran, Haghighat,
Salahat, Okhovvat, and other associations. At this time,
Ayatolah Mardookh who was seemingly a pro-Mashrootiat
signs a secret agreement with Moshir Divan( pro-Despotism).
This is his agreement in his own words:

"The night of 16th of Ramazan 1326 met secretly with Moshir
Divan and agreed that if dolat (government) wins, he protects
us and if mellat (Constitutionalists) win, we protect him"
[Tarikh-e Kurd va Kurdistan, Sheikh Mardookh, P. 248]

Mardookh is a symbol of the right wing Kurdish landlord and
clergy who signed pacts with Sheikh Fazlullah-Nuri and
Mohammad Ali-Shah at one time, became Constitutionalist at
another time, then cooperated with Salared-dolleh and the
Russians, compromised with Germans and Ottomans, and finally
became subservient to Reza Shah and the British. His book is a
good example of how the vacilations of fiefdom is reflected in
politics.

But there were also democratic forces. Seyyed Yunis and
Sheikh Ebrahim who had a group called "Social Democrat"
[Darbareh Mobarezat-e Kurdistan, Hamid Moomeni, P.24].
But these forces were very weak. The undeveloped state of
Kurdistan' s market economy, its isolation from the mainstream
of Iranian history and its tribalism and fiefdom were the
reasons why, contrary to Azarbayjan, such democratic forces
(e.g. the social-democratic group) did not gain support in
Kurdistan. The weakness of Kurdistan's Bazar, as I said, was
due to persistence of feudalism and fiefdom in Kurdistan and
the isolationism and seclusion of that region from the rest of
Iran. Thus Salared Doleh and Mohammad Ali-Shah considered
Kurdistan as their stronghold.

A notable expression of retrogressive role of tribal chiefs in
Kurdistan is the rebellion of the Shakkak Tribe, led by Ismaiil
Agha Simku, with the massacre of Assyrians and Armenians in
Khoi and Salmas in North-Western Azarbayjan. Of the "banner
of Kurdistan Liberation" which Ismaiil Agha had presumably
raised, Ahmad Kasravi, the prominent historian of the
Constitutional Movement writes:

"Now Simku is prepared for and hoisted the banner of
'Kurdistan liberation'. And what has he been doing? Has he
assembled the Kurds to prepare them for a free life and self-
government? Is he writing a constitution for Kurdistan? Is he
making an effort to do away the divisions among the Kurds? ...
No, he does not consider such things as 'liberation of
Kurdestan'...He plunders villages, tramples upon sown land,
demands money of the robbed and destitute people in
Lackestan... that is what the 'liberation of Kurdestan' means,
and that is the result the European politicians desire."
[Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh-e Azarbayjan, Vol2 P. 831]

Thus was the nomadic state of tribal life at the time of
decaying of feudalism in Iran exerting a severer pressure than
elsewhere on the development of capitalism in Kurdestan.
Actually Sheikh Mardookh in his aforementioned book gives a
good picture of the anarchy created by the tribal chiefs and
tells how hazardous they had made the business of commerce
and transportation in Kurdistan.

The emergence of Reza Shah's dictatorship in 1925 meant the
unfolding of a new period in Iranian history which will be in
the next part of this series.

End of Part VII

*********************************************************

[Sam Ghandchi]

*********************PART VIII**************
The following is Part VIII

Part I-----Mahd Dynasty to Arab Invasion.
Part II----Arab Invasion to Moghol Invasion.
Part III---Moghol Invasion to Downfall of Safavid Dynasty.
Part IV---Kurds in Modern Iran (Till Nadir Shah).
Part V----Kurds in Modern Iran (Nadir Shah-Mashrootiat).
Part VI---Shia Clergy in Mashrootiat (A Brief Note).
Part VII--Kurds in Modern Iran (Mashrootiat-Reza Shah).
Part VIII-Kurds in Modern Iran (Reza Shah-IRI).
Part IX---The Theory of Greater Kurdistan.
Part X----Tribes and Tribalism
Part XI---Final Word

Appendix---Kurdistan's Agriculture

- Sam Ghandchi

**********************************************************

KURDS AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN IRAN (Part VIII)
Kurds in Modern Iran (Reza Shah-IRI)

The emergence of Reza Shah's dictatorship in 1925 meant the

unfolding of a new period in Iranian history. The centralized,
"modernizing" administration had subsumed the progressive
aims of the Constitutional Movement in one of the earliest
types of neo-colonial societies.

Feudalism in agriculture remained, but big landownership
became increasingly free and could pass into the hands of rich
merchants. Within the framework of disintegrated feudalism
and dependence, commerce and industry experienced
unprecedented (for Iran) development. Looked at
superficially, it appeared that "national unity", "modernization",
and "nationalism" or "Iranian Renaissance" were safely and
rapidly materializing.

The dominant imperialist power in the region was Britain, and
it, too, was quite satisfied with this arrangement, which
safeguarded all it major interests. The new form of Iranian
state was able to avoid the type of conflicts and clashes that
occurred between Iran and British imperialism during and
after First World War, because it was doing away with fiefdom
and anarchy which was prevalent at the end of Qajar dynasty.

The birth of the Soviet Union was one more reason for the
British to favor a strong centralized state in Iran. Ahmad Shah
was too weak and disinterested to ever accomplish what was
expected from him by the British. Seyd-Zia failed in his efforts
to rise to power and so the choice for early neo-colonialist
experiment of the British in Iran was noone but Reza Khan who
succeeded in his coup. Thus the British supported Reza Khan.

Rebellion chiefs and tribes were easily eliminated or sub-dued
by Reza Shah's armed forces. Among these were Ismaiil Agha
Shakkak (Simku) and his men, who were apparently put to use
by the British in Musol for the purpose of acquiring the oil-rich
region.

In the "calm and security" provided by Reza Shah's
dictatorship, the Kurdish capitalists, in close connection with
the capitalists of Kermanshah, Azarbayjan, and elsewhere,
started to make a new growth. But due to Kurdistan's limited
participation in the general primitive formation of capitalism in
Iran, it has been PURELY commercial, whereas the Iranian
capitalists as a whole were MAINLY commercial. Moreover, the
absence of Kurdish elite in the Iran's power structure was
another disadvantage at the time of capitalist growth for
Kurdistan.

Thus, if the bourgeoisification of Kurdistan means at the same
time the formation of the Kurdish nation, and vice versa, this
process has, since 1925, been linked with the all-Iranian
development of capitalism. It should be no doubt that the
capitalist and modern constituent in Kurdistan is not in favor of
secession and isolationism from Iran. Because the Kurdish
capitalist and modernists are well aware that in the absence of
armed forces of the central government, the revival of
tribalism, the anarchy of fiefdom, the supremacy of chiefs and
feudals, and the loss of security is inevitable.

In the days following the fall of Reza Khan (after Shahrivar
1320) and the general chaos in Iran, during 1945-46, the
Kurdish capitalists accepted separation from Iran to some
extent, but only because on one hand Iran as a whole was very
unstable and secondly the presence of the Red Army deterred
tribal-feudal anarchy and economic relations with the Soviet
Union had temporarily replaced those with the rest of Iran.

But when the Red Army left, following the Stalin-Ghavam pact,
and when economic relations with the Soviets narrowed,
Kurdish capitalists were frightened at the prospect of
separation. More so because they saw the chiefs and feudals
gaining power in the Democratic Party of Kurdistan. The
conciliation/agreement in 1946 between Qazi Mohammad, the
Party leader and the Central Government has to be reviewed in
this light, rather than as a deceptive tactic by Premier
Ghavamus Saltana.

Another factor contributing to the alienation of the Kurdish
capitalists from the Democratic Party Leadership was the
presence of the Barzani Peshmarga as the main armed force of
the Mahabad Republic, for it not only suggested separation, but
also the idea of "The Unity of Greater Kurdistan" which the
Kurdish capitalists would never welcome because they have
inseparable interests in the rest of the Iranian market.

At this point I am going to make a digression from history and
discuss the issue of Greater Kurdistan and Autonomy of
Kurdistan in the NEXT part.

But before ending this part, I need to mention that both during
Reza Shah, and during the Mohammad Reza Shah's reign, the
presence of the Kurds in the Iranian central elite has been
extremely limited and it is because of the historical reasons
that I have written in this series and so any government in
Iran should pay particular attention to encouraging the Kurdish
participation in the central government.

But both during the Reza Shah and Mohammad Reza Shah's
reign the Kurdish isolationism was more and more replaced
with closeness with the rest of Iran. The current aspirations of
modernists and Kurdish people are more cry for religious and
national freedom than a desire to be isolated by. Kurds are
Shafei Muslim and it bothers them to hear insults to Omar!
This simple!

Movements such as Sharif-Zadeh and Molla Avareh at the time
of the Shah did not contribute to any change in the status of
Kurds in the Iranian Central Government. This is why I am not
discussion them. They were part of the general Iranian
movement against the Shah's dictatorship.

Actually Shaif-Zadeh (1345) and his group were predecessors
to other Iranian opposition group and their work was literally
continued in other parts of Iran. These movements more and
more showed that Kurdistan is really not a separate feudal
state anymore and it is sharing the good and bad of whatever
the rest of Iran is experiencing.


End of Part VIII

*********************************************************

[Sam Ghandchi]

****************APPENDIX********************
This is an appendix to the KURDS AND THE CNETRAL
GOVERNEMNT IN IRAN series about Kurdistan's AGRICULTURE.

Part I-----Mahd Dynasty to Arab Invasion.
Part II----Arab Invasion to Moghol Invasion.
Part III---Moghol Invasion to Downfall of Safavid Dynasty.
Part IV---Kurds in Modern Iran (Till Nadir Shah).
Part V----Kurds in Modern Iran (Nadir Shah-Mashrootiat).
Part VI---Shia Clergy in Mashrootiat (A Brief Note).
Part VII--Kurds in Modern Iran (Mashrootiat-Reza Shah).
Part VIII-Kurds in Modern Iran (Reza Shah-IRI).
Part IX---The Theory of Greater Kurdistan.
Part X----Tribes and Tribalism
Part XI---Final Word

Appendix---Kurdistan's Agriculture

================================================

KURDISTAN'S AGRICULTURE
10 YEARS AFTER ENGHELAB-E SEFID
Let's focus on one area of Iran, namely the Kurdistan's
country side, more than ten years after the Enghelab-e Sefid
and see how the agriculture was moving at that time in
comparison to the rest of Iran:

The data is from the "Natayej-e Amargiri Keshavarzi
Marhal-e Dovom Sar-Shomari 1353" published by Sazmaneh
Barnameh Iran in 1355.

I) THE GROWTH OF WAGE-LABOR:

# of agricultural families 112,129.
85% of these families lived off the land.
of the above

>>>57% did all the work by themselves
>>> 40% most work was done by themselves.
>>> 3% most work done by wage-laborers

For the whole of Iran, the same figures were 66%, 29%, and
5%. In other words the whole Iran was not much different
from Kurdistan and the wage-labor had hardly existed
even more than ten years after Enghelab-e Sefid. This
shows how stagnant has been the development of
agriculture in Iran.

II) THE SALE OF WHEAT AND BARLEY

In Kurdistan:
66.1% of products were not sold.
22.3% less than half was sold.
11.6% half or more is sold.

For the Whole country:
the same figures are 51.o%, 26.7%, and 22.3%.

Again the regions such as Gonbad are compensating pulling
up the national average a bit higher than a region like
Kurdistan but the figures are not much different. It shows
that the agriculture was still not producing for sale which
shows again the amazing stagnancy in the development of
Iran's agriculture at the time.

III) THE SALE OF BEEF AND LAMB

In KURDISTAN (Beef):
90.3% not sold.
8.8% less than half sold.
0.9% half or more sold.

For the WHOLE country:
The same figures are 80.3%, 16.0%, and 3.7%

In KURDISTAN (Lamb):
56.8% not sold
39.0% less than half sold.
4.2% half or more sold.

For the WHOLE country:
The same figures were 53.9%, 36.9%, and 10.2%.

Again the figures are not that different between Kurdistan
and the rest of the country and the figures show that animal
husbandry is essentially not for sale.

IV) .WATERING

In KURDISTAN:
17.5% use watering system.(Abi)
82.5% rain (Deim-i)

For the WHOLE country:
the figures are :37% and 63%.

Again this shows how backward the agriculture was that
about 70% was deim-i.

V) FERTILIZERS

Only 4% in Kurdistan and 39% in the whole country
used fertilizers. This shows that Kurdistan in this
area was at a real disadvantage but still the figures
for the whole country are way below any industrial
agriculture.

VI) TECHNOLOGY

Only 5% of Iran's tractors and 12% of Iran's combines were
in Kurdistan which is even less than the number used in the
city of Esfahan (the number was 1859 tractors and 295
combines). There could also be another reason. Kurdistan is
more rocky in many areas and the dasht-e obato is deim-i
and also around Sanadaj, the well-to-do farmers mostly
bought tractors rather than rent. So this discrepancy is not
by itself indicative of anything. But the numbers are so low
that it shows the stagnancy of agriculture again.

VII) THE RETURN OF THE LAND

The return of land in Kurdistan for wheat was 223
Kilo/Hectare which was lower than everywhere else in Iran
except for Zanjan. The Iran's average was 483. The number
for Yazd was 1913 and for Mazandaran was 1538. These
discrepancies show how undeveloped the agriculture is that
because of deim, there is such a drastic difference between
different areas.

It is interesting that the numbers for bigger lands were
much smaller. For example, for a 10 Hectare land the
number was 1103K/Hectare whereas for a 100 Hectare land,
it was 147K/Hectare . If the agriculture had developed, the
reverse should have been the case. This shows that the
bigger lands were not big using modern agriculture, but
were the remainders of arbab-va-raiiti relations in the
forms of bagh-e arbabi, etc.

Only in Mazandaran, because of the modern areas around
Gonbad-e Ghaboos, the numbers show a reverse order. The
10 Hectar land has 1402 K/Hectare whereas the 100 Hectare
land shows 1999K/Hectare. In Kurdistan the return of a big
land was 750% lower than the small land and this means a
very strong remainder of arbab-va-raiiti relations (and
molukultavaiif and Ashyar relations).

VIII) SUMMARY

Even ten years after the Enghelab-e Sefid, Iran's agriculture
had very low percentage of wage-labor, very small
production for market (less than 40%), daimi watering, little
growth of technology in the countryside, absence of modern
techniques and finally the extremely low return of the land.
So the residents had no place to go back to if the city could
not provide them with a living. This is why the hashi-e
neshins stayed in halabi-abads of Tehran and other major
cities but did not go back to the countryside. There was no
place for them in the country.