Changing Aus-Indon Relations
Lev Lafayette
Our relationship with Indonesia has to change
Date: August 8 2003
The shameful policies of the past must be buried - for the sake of
both countries, writes Damien Kingsbury.
The latest terrorist bombing in Jakarta has confirmed yet again that
Indonesia is of critical importance to Australia. And as Tony
Parkinson noted on this page yesterday, Australia has responded
inadequately.
Australia's drifting relationship with Indonesia was also noted on
this page on Monday by former Australian ambassador Richard Woolcott.
But Woolcott's contribution did little more than recall Australia's
shameful policy towards Indonesia under Soeharto.
Australia-Indonesia relations during the Woolcott years were
characterised by the view that Indonesians are too poor for good
government, do not have the right history, or come from the wrong type
of culture.
Imagine the uproar if he had said this about Australia's indigenous
population.
The second Woolcott position was so-called realism, exemplified by
Australia endorsing Indonesia's occupation of East Timor, and
accepting corruption, military domination of politics and so on.
Despite Woolcott's prescriptions, Australian relations with Indonesia
were poor, only achieving weak rapprochement in the mid-1990s, when
prime minister Paul Keating and president Soeharto formed a close
relationship. Being personalised, the relationship collapsed after
both men lost office. The chasm yawned again in 1999.
In classic shoot-the-messenger style, Woolcott responds to a policy
failure he helped develop by saying that Australia should eschew
"megaphone diplomacy". However, after diplomatic communication, the
value in public communication is the guarantee that representations
have been made.
Many Australians reasonably believe that if nothing is said publicly,
then little or nothing has been said at all, a conclusion for which
there has been considerable evidence in the case of Indonesia.
Australia could have said more about terrorism in Indonesia when
Indonesia's political leaders were still in public denial, until the
Bali bombing, after which it was too late.
Interestingly, for a diplomat who damped down Australia's possible
objections to the 1975 invasion of East Timor and who endorsed the
secret Australia-Indonesia defence treaty of 1995, Woolcott now calls
for transparency in government over Australia's Iraq policy.
Transparency is certainly necessary to any genuine democracy, but
applies as much for near neighbours as far countries. The history of
Australian diplomacy on Indonesia has largely lacked transparency.
But perhaps most troubling, Woolcott now suggests that Australia
should renew its ties with Indonesia's military, the TNI. The TNI
remains part of the problem, not part of the answer. In particular its
special forces, Kopassus, practise state terror and have close links
to a range of terrorist and militia groups.
The TNI is again politically powerful; it is the power behind the
President. It has used the "war on terror" to legitimise unrelated
activities, including the renewed war in Aceh and human rights abuses
in Papua, while effectively censoring media reporting of such events.
Even former Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans has recently
admitted that working with the TNI failed to improve its respect for
human rights or the rule of law.
While on a steep learning curve, Indonesia's police and their Gegana
anti-terrorist squad are at least under civilian control, representing
a much more reliable option for combating terrorism, for both
Australia and Indonesia.
So here are some suggestions, rather different to Woolcott's, to
revitalise the Australian-Indonesian relationship:
1. Employ transparent foreign policy consistent with domestic policy,
to accurately reflect Australian values and to remove the possibility
of surprises as a consequence of contradictory policy positions (for
example East Timor). For its part, Indonesia should recognise that
regional countries do not owe it greater obeisance due to their
proximity.
2. Australia-Indonesia military co-operation should be kept off the
agenda until the TNI is thoroughly reformed, including closing its
business and criminal networks, and it is brought under full civilian
authority.
3. Instead, increased police-to-police links, under civilian control,
are a more appropriate response to the threats that face both
Australia and Indonesia.
4. Build strong institutional relationships, including of the
judiciary and police, that survive changes of government.
5. Enhance funding for people-to-people contacts, including lawyers,
jurists, journalists, academics and students.
6. Broaden the membership of the main funding body, the
Australia-Indonesia Institute, to reflect a genuine plurality of
Australian perspectives.
7. Renew official support for Indonesian language education.
Australia's responsibility as a good neighbour and a good
international citizen is, where it can, to assist Indonesia's
faltering efforts to reform, develop and curb threats to us all.
But Australia's capacity to help or influence is limited, and
Indonesia's military remains stubbornly recidivist.
Australia must conduct an honest, accountable good neighbour policy
with Indonesia, supporting accountable, civilian-controlled
institutions.
But harking back to the bad old days, and supporting the TNI, is in
neither Australia's nor Indonesia's interests.
Dr Damien Kingsbury is the head of philosophical, political and
international studies at Deakin University and the author of Power
Politics and the Indonesian Military (RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).