International Crisis Group: Sid Harth
Sid Harth
From: International Crisis Group (notifi...@crisisgroup.org)
Sent: Fri 1/29/10 11:01 AM
for the week of 25 January 2010
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République centrafricaine : relancer le dialogue politique
Briefing Afrique N°69
12 janvier 2010
This briefing is also available in English.
SYNTHESE
L’échec du président François Bozizé et de son entourage à concrétiser
les engagements pris lors du Dialogue politique inclusif en décembre
2008 risque d’aggraver la situation sécuritaire en République
centrafricaine (RCA) et provoquer l’écroulement du processus de
réconciliation nationale. Ces pourparlers ont utilement contribué à
une réduction du niveau de violence et permis la programmation de
réformes structurelles de long terme. Le début de l’intégration des
dirigeants rebelles au sein de la vie politique, les prises de
décisions par consensus ainsi qu’une série d’accords concrets –
notamment sur le désarmement des groupes rebelles et la réforme du
secteur de la sécurité – ont été des étapes décisives dans la
stabilisation de la situation politique. Afin de s’assurer que ces
gains ne soient pas réduits à néant par une nouvelle crise, le
président doit abandonner l’intransigeance dont il a fait preuve
pendant la majeure partie de 2009, et le gouvernement doit
impérativement résoudre les nouveaux conflits dans le Nord-Est et
préparer des élections crédibles. Faute de quoi, les donateurs devront
retirer au régime leur soutien financier.
Depuis le coup d’Etat de François Bozizé en mars 2003, la RCA s’est
montrée incapable de briser le cercle vicieux entretenant conflit et
pauvreté dont elle souffre depuis si longtemps. Les élections de 2005,
jugées relativement libres et équitables, n’ont pas pu empêcher des
rébellions d’éclater peu après dans le Nord du pays. Il aura fallu
deux ans de négociations difficiles entrecoupées de périodes de
violences pour préparer le Dialogue politique inclusif. L’événement
s’est en lui-même bien passé. La participation du camp présidentiel,
des opposants politiques, de la plupart des groupes rebelles, de la
société civile et de l’ex-président Ange-Félix Patassé, a joué un rôle
essentiel dans la réconciliation de ces camps depuis longtemps
antagonistes. Les principaux participants, qui avaient pour objectif
la conservation ou l’acquisition du pouvoir, sont finalement parvenus
à une position commune pour la reconstruction politique et économique
du pays.
Les partis d’opposition ont abandonné l’espoir de voir un véritable
changement de régime se matérialiser et se sont contentés de réformes
institutionnelles et politiques, parmi lesquelles la création d’un
nouveau gouvernement de consensus. Les groupes rebelles ont accepté de
se désarmer en échange de positions dans les institutions publiques.
Le régime a accepté de démocratiser la gestion des affaires de l’Etat
et a permis aux autres partis d’avoir leur mot à dire dans
l’organisation des élections législatives et présidentielles. Ange-
Félix Patassé, désireux de rejoindre la scène politique nationale, a
pour la première fois reconnu la légitimité de son ancien chef d’état-
major, François Bozizé, comme président élu.
Malheureusement, cette démonstration d’ouverture politique s’est
arrêtée en début d’année 2009. Ayant apparemment jugé que la tenue des
pourparlers lui donnait suffisamment de légitimité, en particulier vis-
à-vis des bailleurs, François Bozizé a choisi de former un
gouvernement aussi inféodé à son pouvoir que son prédécesseur et a
fait modifier unilatéralement la loi électorale, pour favoriser sa
réélection. L’opposition a quant à elle mené un combat difficile tout
au long de l’année afin de sauvegarder les concessions obtenues lors
du dialogue, et maintenir un minimum d’influence au sein de la
Commission électorale indépendante (CEI). L’entêtement manifesté d’un
côté comme de l’autre a finalement provoqué le report de la création
de la CEI et risque de rendre la tenue d’élections en début d’année
2010 techniquement impossible.
Le dialogue politique avait prévu un programme de désarmement,
démobilisation et réinsertion (DDR) en vue de mettre fin aux
rébellions dans le nord, mais les intérêts personnels des chefs
rebelles ont fini par retarder la mise en œuvre du programme et
provoquer la frustration des combattants sur le terrain. Dans le Nord-
Ouest, les affrontements restent rares mais les populations continuent
de souffrir et sont incapables de reprendre leurs activités
quotidiennes. Dans le nord-est, la décision du gouvernement de
déléguer la tâche du maintien de la sécurité à l’Union des forces
démocratiques pour le rassemblement (UFDR) de Zacharia Damane, a
ravivé d’anciennes rivalités ethniques et provoqué la création de deux
nouveaux groupes armés. On assiste ainsi à une recrudescence des
violences car les rebelles veulent renforcer leurs positions à la
table des négociations tandis que le gouvernement continue pour sa
part à privilégier une solution strictement militaire.
Toutes les parties présentes aux négociations avaient convenu qu’une
profonde réforme du secteur de la sécurité (RSS) était indispensable
pour donner à l’Etat les moyens de protéger sa population. Les
nouvelles incursions de l’Armée de résistance du Seigneur (Lord’s
Resistance Army, LRA) – à l’origine une insurrection ougandaise – en
RCA depuis le mois de mai 2009, ainsi que son accès quasiment libre au
Sud-Est du pays, ont à nouveau illustré l’incapacité des forces armées
à faire régner l’ordre sur l’ensemble du territoire. Le régime Bozizé
semble trop soucieux du sort que lui réserveront les prochaines
élections et trop peu concerné de ce qui se passe en dehors de la
capitale, Bangui, pour investir le temps et les efforts nécessaires à
la stabilisation du pays. Tant que le gouvernement continuera à ne pas
respecter l’esprit et la méthode du consensus qui ont caractérisé le
dialogue inclusif, et tant qu’il maintiendra son refus de changer son
mode actuel de gouvernance, la reforme du secteur de la sécurité
demeurera bloquée et le manque de sécurité continuera d’entraver les
efforts menés pour rétablir l’autorité de l’Etat et la tenue
d’élections transparentes et crédibles.
Afin de tirer profit des résultats obtenus lors du Dialogue politique
inclusif, le gouvernement et ses partenaires étrangers devraient se
concentrer sur les priorités suivantes:
•L’organisation d’élections sur la base d’un consensus national
devrait être la priorité des premiers mois de l’année 2010. La CEI, le
gouvernement et les donateurs doivent œuvrer à la tenue d’élections en
avril. Si les progrès des préparatifs techniques et de la situation
sécuritaire sont jugés insuffisants au mois de mars, les acteurs
nationaux devraient alors envisager un report des élections. Le
gouvernement devra alors engager un dialogue avec les rebelles, les
leaders d’opposition et la société civile, afin de trouver un accord
préalable sur le processus permettant d’éviter un vide
constitutionnel, si un report était nécessaire.
•En vue d’encourager la pratique du dialogue politique et la prise de
décisions par consensus, Paulin Pomodimo, ex-archevêque de Bangui
devenu médiateur de la République, devrait mettre en place un cadre
permanent de concertation avec les acteurs politiques et sociaux du
pays pour parvenir à un mode de gouvernement consensuel avant et après
les élections.
•Afin d’atténuer la recrudescence des violences dans le Nord-Est et
créer des conditions favorables au bon déroulement du DDR et des
élections, le gouvernement devrait sans plus attendre entamer des
pourparlers avec la Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la
paix (CPJP) afin d’intégrer ce groupe rebelle au processus de
réconciliation nationale. Avec le soutien de la MINURCAT, la Mission
des Nations unies en République centrafricaine et au Tchad, le
gouvernement devrait également agir en tant que facilitateur du
dialogue entre l’UFDR à majorité Goula et le groupe armé Kara d’Ahamat
Mustapha.
•Le gouvernement et le Programme des Nations unies pour le
développement (PNUD) doivent reconsidérer les plans de réinsertion des
rebelles dans la vie civile et forces armées afin que ces ex-
combattants aient la possibilité, une fois désarmés, de participer à
des projets de développement aux côtés des populations locales. Les
chefs rebelles, le PNUD et le secrétariat permanent du comité
sectoriel RSS doivent s’entendre sur le nombre d’ex-combattants qui
seront intégrés dans les services de sécurité.
•Le gouvernement devrait préparer une deuxième table ronde sectorielle
RSS, mais les donateurs devraient financer les réformes à moyen terme,
seulement si celui-ci démontre une réelle volonté d’appliquer le
calendrier en cours. La RCA ne sera en mesure de contrer la menace des
groupes armés nationaux et étrangers, y compris la LRA, qu’en
déployant une armée entièrement professionnalisée étendant l’autorité
de l’Etat à l’ensemble du territoire national.
•Compte tenu du fait que le développement rural accéléré est une
condition sine qua non pour sortir de la crise humanitaire et créer un
climat favorable au bon déroulement du programme DDR et des élections,
la Commission de consolidation de la paix des Nations unies devrait
mobiliser les donateurs afin qu’ils apportent un soutien sans
conditions au projet des « pôles de développement » de la Commission
européenne qui vise à stimuler les activités génératrices de revenus
et restaurer les infrastructures de base autour des villes de
province.
•Le paiement régulier des salaires des fonctionnaires constitue l’une
des plus fortes sources de popularité de Bozizé à Bangui. Les pays et
institutions financières internationales donatrices devraient
clairement indiquer qu’ils cesseront de fournir les fonds qui y sont
nécessaires, à moins que le gouvernement ne fasse preuve de son
engagement à créer un environnement sûr et propice à des élections
crédibles, y compris en négociant avec le dernier groupe rebelle de la
RCA.
French
"Ein kritisches Jahr für Bosnien",
Srecko Latal in Der Tagesspiegel
25 January 2010
Der Tagesspiegel
Nach fünfzehn Jahren intensiver internationaler Bemühungen bricht
Bosnien auseinander. Bosnische Serben drohen mit einem Unabhängigkeits-
Referendum, Kroaten fordern einen separaten Gliedstaat innerhalb
Bosniens und die bosnischen Muslime verlangen eine neue Verfassung.
Zudem entfaltet sich zunehmend eine wirtschaftliche und soziale Krise.
Um ein Zusammenbrechen des Staates zu verhindern, müssen sich die
bosnischen Entscheidungsträger überlegen, wie ihr Land in Zukunft
aussehen soll. Und Bosniens internationale Partner müssen einen
effektiveren Weg finden, das Land auf seinem Weg dorthin zu
unterstützen.
Milorad Dodik, Premierminister der serbisch dominierten Republika
Srpska (RS), eines der beiden bosnischen Gliedstaaten, sprach sich
letzten Monat dafür aus, im Frühling ein Referendum abzuhalten. Er
forderte die Wähler dazu auf, eine Entscheidung des Hohen
Repräsentanten zu verwerfen. Die Entscheidung von Bosniens
internationalem Gouverneur betrifft die Verlängerung der Mandate der
internationalen Angestellten in Bosniens Sondereinheit für
Kriegsverbrechen.
Dies ist die bislang wichtigste Herausforderung für das 1995
abgeschlossene Friedensabkommen von Dayton, welches Bosniens Krieg
beendet und dem Land seine Verfassung gegeben hat.
Angst vor Unabhängigkeitsreferenden
Angesichts der wahrgenommenen internationalen Schwäche haben die
Anführer der bosnischen Kroaten wiederholt für die Schaffung eines
dritten föderalen Gliedstaates plädiert, in welchem sie die Mehrheit
stellen würden.
Unter der Mehrheit der Bosniaken, der bosnischen Muslime, beleben
diese Schritte der bosnischen Serben und Kroaten die Ängste über
Unabhängigkeitsreferenden wieder. Sowohl serbische, als auch
kroatische Politiker nutzen die größere Bevölkerungszahl der Bosniaken
und ihre Dominierung der staatlichen Institutionen, um eigene Ziele zu
verfolgen.
Die nationalistische und spaltende Rhetorik wird von einer sich
verschärfenden sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Krise verschlimmert, was
einen schmutzigen Wahlkampf für die Wahlen im kommenden Oktober
verspricht. Heute fühlt sich jeder in Bosnien verletzlich und
ungerecht behandelt, und dieser Eindruck der Verfolgung treibt alle
Beteiligten in einen Teufelskreis der Konflikteskalation. Dies lässt
nichts Gutes erahnen. Den Politikern könnte ihre Kontrolle über die
Massen entgleiten. Eine weitere Radikalisierung der politischen
Rhetorik kann also verheerende Konsequenzen nach sich ziehen.
Nur leere Worte
Die Führungspersönlichkeiten der RS sagen, dass sie Dayton
respektieren. Doch dies sind nur leere Worte solange die RS ignoriert,
dass der Hohe Repräsentant die Autorität besitzt, das Friedensabkommen
von Dayton zu interpretieren und zu bewahren. Die Verfassung von
Dayton ist weit davon entfernt, ein totes Stück Papier zu sein - sie
ist ein lebendiges Dokument, dessen Bedeutung sich zusammen mit
Bosnien weiterentwickelt hat. Die Befugnisse des Hohen Repräsentanten
sind nun ein Teil davon.
Dem Staat Bosnien-Herzegowina, seinen Gliedstaaten, Kantonen und sogar
Gemeinden sollte es erlaubt werden, durch Umfragen und Referenden die
öffentliche Meinung zu für sie wichtige Angelegenheiten einzuholen.
Die internationale Gemeinschaft täte gut daran, nicht in die Hände
derer in der RS zu spielen, die ein Referendum androhen, um eine
Konfrontation zu provozieren. Die RS hat definitiv keine Kompetenz,
die Entscheidungen des Hohen Repräsentanten zu verwerfen. Dies ist
eine Staatsangelegenheit. Bosniens Verfassungsgericht kann und sollte
jeglichen Schritt in diese Richtung auf schnellstem Wege für nichtig
erklären.
Die Anführer der RS müssen auch verstehen, dass ihre radikalen
Äußerungen die eventuell vorhandenen realen Argumente überschatten und
gerechtfertigte Ängste bei lokalen und internationalen Staatschefs
schüren. Die kontinuierliche Verschlechterung ihrer Beziehungen mit
der internationalen Gemeinschaft würde sowohl die Politiker, als auch
die Bürger der RS mit großer Sicherheit teuer zu stehen kommen. Nur
innerhalb der legalen und territorialen Grenzen Bosnien-Herzegowinas
werden sie jemals so viel Autonomie und eine reale Perspektive für
eine bessere Zukunft durch EU und NATO-Mitgliedschaft besitzen.
Internationale Gemeinschaft muss Vorsicht walten lassen
Bosniaken und bosnische Kroaten haben ebenfalls viel zu verlieren,
wenn sie ihren gegenwärtigen Kurs weiterverfolgen.
Die Bosniaken müssen verstehen, dass sie bei den anderen Volksgruppen
Besorgnis und Angst auslösen, wenn sie als größte ethnische Gruppe des
Landes ihre achbarschaftlichen Manieren in der Politik verlieren und
ihre Nachbarn immer wieder überstimmen. Wenn die Bosniaken eine
bessere Zukunft wollen, sollten sie aufhören, die rechtschaffenen
Opfer zu spielen und anfangen, die Sorgen anderer Gemeinschaften zu
berücksichtigen. Partnerschaften, die auf dem Mehrheitsprinzip und der
forcierten Durchsetzung von Rechtsvorschriften beruhen, können auf
Dauer nicht überleben, egal wie gut diese Vorschriften auch sein
mögen.
Bosnische Kroaten können ihr nationales Interesse nur durch
Verhandlungen und Kompromisse wahren. Die einseitige Ausrufung eines
dritten Gliedstaates würde der schrumpfenden kroatischen Gemeinschaft
nur weitere Marginalisierung und weiteren Kummer bereiten.
Die internationale Gemeinschaft und der Hohe Repräsentant sollten
ebenfalls vorsichtig auftreten. Der Hohe Repräsentant stellt Angriffe
auf sich mit Angriffen auf den Staat gleich. Dadurch riskiert das Büro
aber, neben sich selbst auch den Staat mit zu Fall zu bringen. Die
internationale Gemeinschaft muss akzeptieren, dass das Büro des Hohen
Repräsentanten, trotz aller Legitimität, sein Verfallsdatum weit
überschritten hat und schließen muss. Die Europäische Union, mit
starken internationalem Rückhalt auch der Vereinigten Staaten, sollte
den Bosniern eine starke Garantie geben, dass ihr vereintes, aber
dezentralisiertes, Land überleben und seinen Platz innerhalb der
europäischen Familie einnehmen wird.
Srecko Latal ist Analyst für Sarajevo, Bosnien und Herzegowina der
International Crisis Group
Der Tagesspiegel
German
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6508&l=1
"Depuis un an, la diplomatie américaine fait du surplace au Proche-
Orient",
Robert Malley in Le Monde
23 janvier 2010
Le Monde
Au Proche-Orient, la présidence de Barack Obama fut d'emblée marquée
par un paradoxe. Autant M. Obama aura profité du peu d'estime dans
lequel le monde arabe tenait son prédécesseur, autant il aura été la
proie des espoirs qui furent placés en lui. Le jeune président a
aisément franchi la barre que George Bush avait située bien bas. Il a
suffi d'évoquer le nom du nouvel hôte de la Maison Blanche ou qu'il
prononce son discours du Caire pour que la région perçoive les Etats-
Unis sous un jour nouveau.
Mais le verdict de l'opinion arabe sur M. Obama ne pouvait longtemps
dépendre de la seule comparaison avec son prédécesseur ; c'est à
l'aune des immenses espérances qu'il avait éveillées et dont il ne
pouvait se dérober qu'il allait être jugé. Il aura ainsi suffi d'une
année médiocre et sans relief pour que le climat bascule. Bénéficiaire
de l'immense désillusion engendrée par M. Bush, M. Obama est désormais
victime des illusions démesurées qu'il a lui-même suscitées. Le
désenchantement - voire, dans certains cas, l'hostilité - à son
encontre est à bien des égards injustifié.
De par son parcours, sa conception du monde et ses instincts, le
président élu a tout de l'anti-Bush. Convaincu de l'importance du
conflit israélo-palestinien et du rôle central qu'ont à jouer les
Etats-Unis dans sa résolution, et dédaignant une grille de lecture
simpliste dominée par le prisme de la "guerre contre le terrorisme",
M. Obama symbolise, si ce n'est une rupture franche, du moins un
retour à une tradition plus pragmatique. Dans la pratique, pourtant,
difficile de discerner nombreux motifs de satisfaction.
Les efforts consentis dans l'arène israélo-palestinienne, aussi
intenses soient-ils, n'ont guère été récompensés. Les objectifs avoués
étaient de geler les colonies de peuplement, enclencher un processus
de normalisation israélo-arabe, renouer les pourparlers de paix,
renforcer les soi-disant modérés, ainsi que de rétablir la crédibilité
américaine. Pour l'instant, c'est tout le contraire qui s'est produit.
Effets désolants mais inévitables : les Palestiniens perdent confiance
dans la nouvelle administration, les Arabes doutent et les Israéliens
voient en Barack Obama un néophyte qui ne leur inspire ni respect ni
estime.
Trois déficits expliquent ce bilan. Déficit tactique tout d'abord :
choix d'objectifs douteux et irréalistes (gel complet des colonies de
peuplement, but louable mais auquel même un gouvernement israélien de
gauche aurait rechigné) ; puis reniement aussi brutal qu'inexpliqué
(qualification du gel très partiel d'initiative "sans précédent") et,
enfin, pressions à répétition exercées sur Mahmoud Abbas, président de
l'Autorité palestinienne (afin qu'il accepte de rencontrer le premier
ministre israélien Benyamin Nétanyahou et qu'il reporte le débat sur
le rapport Goldstone concernant la guerre de Gaza). Victime principale
de cette valse diplomatique, le dirigeant palestinien, que
l'administration s'était juré de renforcer. Depuis, l'Amérique semble
obnubilée par le seul souci de renouer les négociations alors que leur
échec coûterait à tous bien plus que leur ajournement. Entre-temps,
l'administration n'aura rien fait ou presque pour rassurer l'opinion
publique israélienne. De tels errements tactiques dénotent une
méconnaissance plus profonde - et inquiétante - des ressorts
politiques aussi bien palestiniens qu'israéliens.
Déficit de vision stratégique ensuite : à l'inverse d'autres
chantiers, le processus de paix n'a pas (encore) eu la faveur d'un
engagement présidentiel poussé. En dépit de fortes pressions internes
et externes, et quoi qu'on puisse penser des choix qui ont été faits,
Washington a maintenu le cap sur la question iranienne, renouvelant
ses appels à un dialogue avec le régime ; c'est que le président s'est
emparé de ce dossier et lui a imparti cohérence et continuité. Rien de
tel jusqu'à présent dans le cas israélo-palestinien. Là, hormis la
proclamation de vagues principes - centralité du conflit, importance
du rôle américain, illégitimité des colonies de peuplement -, M. Obama
ne semble pas savoir précisément où il veut aller et au prix de quels
risques politiques. Cela peut se comprendre. De la réforme du plan de
santé au redressement économique en passant par l'Afghanistan ou
l'Irak, l'hôte de la Maison Blanche fait face à des épreuves autrement
prioritaires. Mais au sein d'une administration plus présidentielle
que celles de ses prédécesseurs, l'absence de direction claire
provenant du bureau Ovale est inévitablement génératrice de
flottement. L'indécision se sent. Les acteurs locaux en profitent.
Le troisième déficit, le plus grave, concerne le manque d'ajustement à
la nouvelle donne régionale. Depuis 2000, date à laquelle les
démocrates étaient précédemment au pouvoir, le contexte, les repères
et même les protagonistes ont radicalement changé. Les traditionnels
relais de l'influence américaine - Egypte, Jordanie ou Arabie saoudite
- sont essoufflés. D'autres acteurs ont, depuis, approfondi leur
présence dans l'arène palestinienne et pèsent de tout leur poids au
sein de l'opinion publique : c'est le cas de l'Iran, de la Syrie ou
même de la Turquie.
Conséquence en grande partie des choix désastreux du président George
Bush, les Etats-Unis ne sont pas ceux qu'ils étaient naguère, ayant
dilapidé prestige et autorité. La scène palestinienne s'est
considérablement émiettée, politiquement, idéologiquement et
géographiquement. Impossible dorénavant de bâtir une stratégie
crédible fondée exclusivement sur la Cisjordanie, le Fatah, l'Autorité
palestinienne ou ses dirigeants.
Quant à l'outil américain de préférence - négociations bilatérales
entre Israël et l'OLP sur un statut final -, il est de plus en plus
désuet et discrédité. Palestiniens et Israéliens s'accordent chaque
jour davantage pour ne plus croire qu'elles puissent déboucher sur une
paix véritable ou qu'un éventuel accord puisse satisfaire à leurs
besoins les plus profonds. Il est temps de changer de méthode et,
même, d'objectif. Quand bien même il se voulait candidat du
changement, M. Obama reste otage du passé, captif involontaire d'un
legs politique qui limite sa marge de manoeuvre et de concepts
idéologiques qui restreignent ses capacités d'action.
La méprise n'a rien d'inhabituelle - on se convainc de pouvoir mieux
faire ce que son devancier avait fait mal, sans se rendre compte que
les fondements eux-mêmes étaient erronés et non pas seulement la
manière. Division de la région entre "modérés" et "radicaux", appui
aux uns et boycottage des autres, désintérêt envers Gaza et son drame
humanitaire, exhortations creuses pour la paix : de tout cela découle
un écart frappant entre ce que font les Etats-Unis et ce qui se fait
au Proche-Orient.
De là cette impression de surplace, contrecoup d'une diplomatie
américaine qui s'agite dans le vide. Que Barack Obama ait passé l'an I
de sa présidence à vérifier la pertinence de conceptions périmées n'a
rien de surprenant. On ne se défait pas facilement d'un héritage
politique ou idéologique. C'est maintenant, alors que l'administration
achoppe sur des réalités en décalage avec sa vision, que commence
l'épreuve de vérité. Parmi les innombrables défauts de la présidence
de George Bush, la principale sans doute était son incapacité à se
renouveler et à adapter ses dogmes aux réalités du terrain. Au nouveau
président de prouver qu'il peut faire mieux, et autrement.
Robert Malley est directeur du programme Moyen-Orient de
l'International Crisis Group, ancien conseiller du président Clinton
pour les affaires israélo-arabes.
Le Monde
French
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6497&l=
Sri Lanka: "Zweikampf unter Nationalisten",
Chris Patten in Die Zeit
25. Januar 2010
Die Zeit
Ex-Armeechef gegen Amtsinhaber: In Sri Lanka ist Präsidentenwahl.
Ausgerechnet der harte einstige General wurde zum Hoffnungsträger der
Liberalen.
Die Wähler auf Sri Lanka können einem Leid tun. Bei den
Präsidentschaftswahlen am 26. Januar haben sie die Wahl zwischen zwei
Kandidaten, die sich gegenseitig öffentlich der Kriegsverbrechen
beschuldigen.
Die Vorwürfe zwischen dem pensionierten General Sarath Fonseka und dem
gegenwärtigen Präsidenten Mahinda Rajapaksa sind für die Sri Lanker
sicherlich verwirrend. Viele singhalesische Sri Lanker sind der
Meinung, dass es eben diesen beiden zu verdanken ist, dass der
terroristischen Rebellengruppe Tamil Tigers ein Ende gesetzt wurde,
auch wenn dies hohe menschliche Verluste in den letzten Monaten des
lang andauernden Bürgerkrieges mit sich brachte. In ihren Augen sind
beide Kriegshelden, nicht Kriegsverbrecher.
Präsidentenwahl in Sri Lanka
Da sich die Stimmen nationalistischer singhalesischer Wähler
gleichmäßig auf beide Lager verteilen, konzentrieren sich die
Kandidaten auf den Stimmenfang innerhalb der tamilischen Minderheit.
Dies ist ohne Zweifel eine der verwunderlichsten politischen Ironien
des Jahres. Denn sowohl General Fonseka als auch Rajapaksa haben den
30-jährigen blutigen Konflikt auf Kosten der tamilischen
Zivilbevölkerung beendet.
Anfang Mai 2009, als der Krieg zu Ende war, waren laut Schätzungen der
Vereinten Nationen rund 7.000 Zivilisten gestorben und mehr als 10.000
verwundet worden. Allein in den letzten zwei Wochen des Krieges
starben Tausende Zivilisten, sowohl durch die Hände der Armee als auch
der Rebellen.
Doch die Misere der Tamilen war nach dem Krieg nicht zu Ende. Die
Regierung internierte über 250.000 vertriebene Tamilen in
Flüchtlingslagern und missachtete damit sowohl sri-lankisches Recht
als auch internationales Völkerrecht. Die Bedingungen in den Lagern
waren entsetzlich, der Zugang für Internationale Organisationen stark
eingeschränkt, und unabhängigen Journalisten wurde der Zutritt
verwehrt. Stacheldraht und militärische Wachen stellten sicher, dass
die Menschen die Lager nicht verlassen oder mit jemanden über ihre
Situation sprechen konnten.
Mehr zum Thema
Bis Ende 2009 wurden die meisten der Vertriebenen umgesiedelt, doch
noch immer befinden sich fast 100.000 Tamilen in den vom Militär
geleiteten Lagern. Immerhin steht ihnen nun eine gewisse
Bewegungsfreiheit zu - ein wichtiger Schritt, der dank internationalen
Drucks und dem Streben nach den Stimmen der Tamilen in der kommenden
Wahl zustande kam. Dennoch, ein Großteil der mehr als 150.000
Menschen, die vor Kurzem aus den Lagern entlassen wurden, konnte nicht
wirklich nach Hause zurückkehren, sondern wird in sogenannten
"Übergangszentren" in ihren Heimatbezirken festgehalten.
Nun versetzen Sie sich in die Lage eines Tamilen, der entscheiden
muss, für wen er bei der Präsidentschaftswahl stimmen wird: Wählen Sie
entweder den Regierungschef, der die Angriffe gegen Sie und Ihre
Familie befahl, oder lieber den Armeechef, der diese Befehle
durchführte.
Am 4. Januar hat die Tamil National Alliance, die wichtigste
tamilische politische Partei, ihre Wahl getroffen und sich für General
Fonseka ausgesprochen. Die Entscheidung kam, nachdem Fonseka einem 10-
Punkte-Programm der Versöhnung, Entmilitarisierung und
‚Normalisierung’ des weitgehend tamilischen Nordens zugesagt hatte.
Sein Plan ist hoffentlich ein Zeichen dafür, dass nach den Jahrzehnten
eines brutalen ethnischen Konflikts Sri Lankas Eliten nun einsehen,
dass dauerhafter Frieden nur entstehen kann, sofern die singhalesisch
dominierten Parteien größere Schritte in Richtung eines
demokratischeren Staats für alle Bewohner Sri Lankas unternehmen.
Mehr als jedwedes Wahlversprechen zählt jedoch, was der Gewinner
tatsächlich machen wird, wenn er einmal im Amt ist. Angesichts ihrer
bisherigen Leistungen ist es im Falle beider Kandidaten schwer
vorstellbar, dass sie die erforderlichen Verfassungsänderungen
vornehmen werden, um die Marginalisierung der Tamilen und anderer
Minderheiten, also die Wurzeln des seit Jahrzehnten andauernden
Konfliktes, wirklich zu beenden. Werden die Demütigung und die
Frustration der Tamilen nicht adressiert, könnte das zu erneuter
Radikalisierung führen.
Während der sri-lankische Wähler vor einer schwierigen Entscheidung
steht, muss die Wahl der internationalen Gemeinschaft eindeutig sein.
Wer auch immer gewinnt, die Außenwelt muss alle vorhandenen
Instrumente einsetzen, um die Regierung davon zu überzeugen, die
grundlegenden Probleme richtig anzugehen. Nur so kann ein
Wiederaufflammen der Massengewalt vermieden werden. Im Interesse eines
dauerhaften Friedens und der Stabilität sollten Geberländer und
Internationale Institutionen ihre Hilfeleistungen nutzen, um Reformen
zum Schutz demokratischer Rechte zu unterstützen, ihre Hilfe von der
ordnungsgemäßen Umsiedlung der Vertriebenen abhängig machen und den
Sri Lankern bei der Ausarbeitung eines Wiederaufbauplans für den vom
Krieg verwüsteten und stark militarisierten Norden beratend zur Seite
stehen. Sowohl UN- als auch Nichtregierungsorganisationen müssen
uneingeschränkten Zugang zu den Projekten bekommen, um sicherstellen
zu können, dass das internationale Geld an richtiger Stelle ankommt
und dass die grundlegenden Freiheiten derjenigen, denen geholfen wird,
respektiert werden.
Kurz gesagt: Colombo sollte kein Geld für Wiederaufbau und Entwicklung
bekommen, wenn nicht klar ist, wofür dieses Geld ausgegeben wird.
Werden die Hilfen nicht wie versprochen eingesetzt, müssen sie
eingestellt werden.
Auch wenn es zwischen den Kandidaten nicht viel zu wählen gibt, hat
die Kluft zwischen ihnen zumindest die Möglichkeit für Reformen auf
die Agenda gesetzt. Internationaler Druck kann, wenn korrekt
eingesetzt, dazu beitragen, dass es zu einem Wandel kommt, der die
Demokratisierung und Entmilitarisierung herbeiführt. Nur dann kann Sri
Lanka endlich seinen schrecklichen Krieg und bitteren Frieden
bewältigen.
Lord Patten is co-chair of the International Crisis Group and a former
European commissioner for external affairs.
Die Zeit
German
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6499&l=1
Haiti: "End nation's vulnerability",
Mark Schneider in The Miami Herald
24 January 2010
The Miami Herald
Within a week after a devastating earthquake struck Haiti, the death
toll had mounted to the worst from any natural disaster in recorded
history in the Americas. The country's famous 'radio jol', or word-of-
mouth, carries the same sad news hour after hour of family that has
been lost and of homes destroyed. E-mails continue to pour in telling
us of friends and colleagues who were killed, and of those who somehow
managed to survive.
The challenge the world now faces is to quickly assess the damage with
the Haitian authorities and then ensure a coordinated international
response equal to the magnitude of the disaster. They must help Haiti
build back stronger and better, and partner with Haiti's leaders and
communities to work to end the country's environmental, economic,
social and political vulnerability.
In 1999, when Hurricane Mitch struck Central America, 9,000 lives were
taken in a space of two days. Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and
Guatemala suffered $6 billion in damage. Less than eight weeks later,
the United States organized a donors' conference at the International
Development Bank in Washington and secured $6.3 billion in commitments
for the next three years.
Four months later, Sweden organized another donors' conference where
Central American governments, business and civil society organizations
agreed on detailed reconstruction plans, with ways to improve
development opportunities and new mechanisms for joint monitoring.
Haiti today needs a similar compact, fully founded on an understanding
of the dire situation even before this devastating earthquake. For
Haiti to recover, those with power and influence will have to agree to
address the country's destabilizing poverty and end the restricted
access to the most basic services.
Before the earthquake, Haitian women died in childbirth at 70 times
the rate of women in the United States. One out of every eight
children died before their fifth birthday. About 40 percent of school-
aged children were not in school, and some 80 percent of those who
were, received poor quality education in private, nearly unregulated
but expensive schools. What comes next has to be better.
Partisan battles in Washington have been symbolically put to rest with
the teaming up of former Presidents Clinton and Bush in pursuing help
for Haiti.
Before the earthquake struck, Haiti already had agreement on a post-
hurricane poverty reduction strategy, which included jobs creation,
private sector investment and a public infrastructure package. Donors
agreed it was a good plan, but it only offered $353 million in new
money. Starting from scratch doesn't mean jettisoning that work; it
means offering additional opportunities.
New physical infrastructure investments should be environmentally
sound, hurricane- and earthquake-resistant, with new and enforced
building codes. Haitians should be trained and employed to do this
work.
As school buildings are reconstructed, so, too, must the public
education system be rebuilt to offer free, quality schooling to
children, with teacher training, standards for private schools and a
conditional cash-transfer program to help impoverished families keep
their children in school.
There is also an important message to take from the hurricane victims
from Port-au-Prince, who have lost their houses and are now returning
to their home villages in the countryside. This is an opportunity to
invest in regional development centers around Haiti, spreading the
jobs, schools and health centers, and giving Haiti a better balance
for its economic and political future. Investing in small farmers is
part of that regional development. Not too long ago, Haiti did not
depend on foreign rice or food aid.
The Haitian government and U.N. mission were building a civilian
police force that respected its citizens. The last poll showed 60
percent popular approval -- a far cry from when a corrupt, repressive
force was feared and despised. This must continue.
Not only have ministry buildings been destroyed by the earthquake, but
sadly many of its officials did not survive either. Haiti's civil
service is going to require international triage, ministry by
ministry, where international experts work side-by-side with Haitian
officials not just to reconstruct what once stood but to offer more:
modern communications systems and equipment, logistics, management and
training.
To do all this, Haiti will need much more than the $6 billion raised
for Central America a decade ago. Implementing a reconstruction
strategy and coordinating the projects across sectors are going to
require a supreme effort at coordination by the UN, International
Development Bank, World Bank, Organization of America States and a
host of donors, including the United States, the European Union,
Canada, France, and regional partners.
Only a long-term, unified, multi-billion dollar strategy will
transform Haiti's future.
Mark L. Schneider is a Senior Vice President and Special Advisor on
Latin America at the International Crisis Group.
The Miami Herald
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6488&l=1
"BiH pred ključnim izazovima u 2010",
Srećko Latal in Nezavisne novine
Јануар 23, 2010
Nezavisne novine
Nakon petnaest godina intenzivnog međunarodnog djelovanja Bosna i
Hercegovina (BiH) se počinje slamati. Srbi prijete referendumom za
neovisnost, Hrvati traže odvojeni entitet u okviru šire države,
Bošnjaci zahtijevaju novi ustav, a ekonomska i socijalna kriza se
pogoršavaju.
Da bi se izbjegao slom, bh. lideri moraju odabrati kakvu državu žele,
a njihovi međunarodni partneri moraju naći efikasniji način kojim bi
im u tome pomogli.
Milorad Dodik, premijer Republike Srpske (RS), jednog od dva bh.
entiteta, prošlog mjeseca se odbio povinovati ozbiljnim upozorenjima
međunarodne zajednice i najavio da će održati referendum u proljeće,
tražeći od glasača da odbiju autoritet i odluke visokog predstavnika,
međunarodnog upravitelja BiH, da produži mandat međunarodnom osoblju
koje radi u Specijalnom odjelu Suda BiH za ratne zločine. Dodik je
izjavio da će se "jednog dana" održati i referendum o tome "da li će
Republika Srpska ostati unutar granica Bosne i Hercegovine ili ne".
Ovo je do sada najozbiljniji izazov za Dejtonski mirovni sporazum iz
1995. kojim se završio rat u Bosni i Hercegovini i kojim je BiH dobila
Ustav.
Osjećajući slabost međunarodne zajednice, lideri Hrvata su nakon ovoga
obnovili zahtjeve za uspostavljanjem trećeg federalnog entiteta u kome
bi oni bili većinska skupina.
Ovi potezi Srba i Hrvata kod većine Bošnjaka ponovo oživljavaju
strahove od referenduma za otcjepljenje, koji su podijelili zemlju i
bili uvod u krvavi rat od 1992. do 1995.
Mnogobrojnost Bošnjaka i njihova dominacija u državnim institucijama
se koristi kako od strane srpskih lidera kao obrazloženje za traženje
referenduma za zaštitu njihovih nacionalnih interesa, tako i od strane
hrvatskih lidera za uspostavljanje odvojenog entiteta. Kao reakciju na
ove poteze bošnjački političari još više pokušavaju dominirati
državnim institucijama i većim federalnim entitetom koji dijele sa
Hrvatima.
Dok god bošnjački predstavnici u izvršnim i zakonodavnim tijelima
nastave pokušavati nadglasati srpske i hrvatske zvaničnike, biće teško
spoznati da li su srpske i hrvatske inicijative motivisane njihovom
stvarnom zabrinutošću za nacionalne interese ili obnovljenim
separatističkim porivima. Ova slika se dalje iskrivljuje zbog slabe
opozicije i grube nacionalističke retorike koja često zasjenjuje
konkretne argumente i pojačava tenzije.
Ova nacionalistička i divizionistička retorika se čini još gorom u
situaciji u kojoj vlada duboka socijalna i ekonomska kriza, koja će se
prema očekivanjima i dalje pogoršavati, i u kojoj se očekuje nova
žestoka kampanja pred oktobarske opšte izbore.
Danas se svako u BiH osjeća ranjivim i tretiranim nefer i taj osjećaj
progonjenosti dovodi sve u začarani krug eskalacije konflikta.
Međuetnički incidenti su u porastu, od mjesečnog prosjeka od sedam
incidenata u 2007, devet u 2008, sve do mjesečnog prosjeka od skoro 13
incidenata u 2009. Ovo je zlokoban znak. Lokalni političari bi mogli
izgubiti kontrolu nad masama. Dalja radikalizacija političke retorike
može imati razorne posljedice.
Lideri RS tvrde da poštuju slovo Dejtona. Ovo je isprazna tvrdnja dok
god RS ignoriše autoritet visokog predstavnika u interpretiranju i
zaštiti Dejtonskog mirovnog sporazuma, što je uloga tog ureda od 1997.
Dejtonski ustav je daleko od mrtvog slova; to je živi dokument čiji je
značaj evoluirao zajedno sa BiH. Ovlasti visokog predstavnika su sada
dio te cjeline.
Država BiH, njeni entiteti, kantoni, pa čak i opštine bi trebalo da
budu u stanju da kroz referendume i istraživanja ispituju mišljenja
javnosti o bitnim pitanjima iz njihovih nadležnosti. Međunarodna
zajednica ne bi trebala ići na ruku onima u RS koji žele da iskoriste
prijetnju referenduma kako bi provocirali konfrontaciju. Odbijanje
odluke visokog predstavnika o državnom sudu očigledno nije u
nadležnosti RS, već državno pitanje. Ustavni sud BiH može i treba
hitno anulirati bilo kakav sličan potez.
Lideri u RS bi trebalo da shvate da njihove radikalne izjave
zasjenjuju bilo kakve stvarne argumente koje imaju i podižu opravdane
strahove među drugim lokalnim i međunarodnim liderima. Dalje
pogoršavanje njihovih odnosa sa međunarodnom zajednicom bi zasigurno
moglo imati visoku cijenu za političare i stanovnike RS. Nigdje osim u
pravnim i teritorijalnim granicama Bosne i Hercegovine neće imati
toliko autonomije kao i stvarnu perspektivu za svjetliju budućnost
kroz EU i NATO integracije.
Bošnjački lideri i lideri Hrvata također mogu puno izgubiti ako
nastave trenutnim putem.
Bošnjaci bi trebalo da uvide da kada se najveća etnička skupina u
zemlji prestane ponašati u duhu dobrosusjedskih odnosa u politici i
počne preglasavati svoje susjede, to stvara zabrinutost i strahove kod
drugih. Ako Bošnjaci žele da se pokrenu prema boljoj budućnosti,
trebali bi napokon prestati živjeti u prošlosti i igrati ulogu
pravedne žrtve, te početi uzimati u obzir zabrinutost drugih
zajednica. Niti jedno partnerstvo koje je zasnovano na vlasti većine i
prisilnoj implementaciji pravne regulative ne može opstati, bez obzira
koliko dobra ta regulativa bila. Stavovi partnera se moraju poštovati
ne samo kada oslikavaju uzajamne stavove, nego i kada se razlikuju.
Hrvati mogu zaštititi svoje nacionalne interese samo kroz pregovore i
kompromise. Jednostrano proglašenje trećeg entiteta, za šta se neki
zalažu, dovelo bi samo do dalje marginalizacije i nevolja sve manjoj
hrvatskoj zajednici.
Međunarodna zajednica i visoki predstavnik također treba da budu
oprezni. Umotavajući se u plašt Dejtona i izjednačavajući napade na
sebe sa napadima na samu državu, Ured visokog predstavnika rizikuje da
zajedno sa sobom sruši državu.
Međunarodna zajednica bi trebalo da prihvati da je ulozi visokog
predstavnika, bez obzira na legitimnost, već odavno istekao rok
trajanja i da ona mora završiti sada, prije nego što postane toliko
kontroverzna da razori BiH. Evropska unija, uz snažnu podršku
međunarodne zajednice, uključujući Ameriku, treba dati jake garancije
ljudima u BiH da će njihova država, ujedinjena ali decentralizirana,
preživjeti i zauzeti svoje mjesto u evropskoj obitelji.
Srecko Latal is Crisis Group's analyst in Bosnia & Herzegovina
Nezavisne
Slovenia
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6501&l=1
"Sécurité, justice, politique : tout ce que Haïti doit reconstruire",
Mark Schneider in Rue 89
22 janvier 2010
Rue 89
Plus encore que toutes les catastrophes humaines ou naturelles
précédentes, le séisme qui a dévasté Haïti menace la stabilité du
pays.
La nation caribéenne peut elle passer de la survie à la
reconstruction ? Une vieille question pour ce pays ruiné par deux
siècles de mauvaise gouvernance, divisé par les inégalités sociales,
touché par les cyclones et les tremblements de terre, et situé sur la
route du trafic de cocaïne.
Seule une petite moitié de la police est fonctionnelle
Alors que l'agenda humanitaire se tourne vers la reconstruction, la
sécurité apparaît comme un défi majeur. Les murs des prisons se sont
effondrés et les prisonniers courent en liberté. Seule une petite
moitié de la toute jeune Police nationale d'Haïti est fonctionnelle.
Œuvrer pour la stabilité ne revient pas seulement à remplir les rues
de policiers, c'est aussi instaurer un état de droit dans un pays dont
les systèmes judiciaire et pénitentiaire fonctionnaient à peine même
avant le tremblement.
Dans un premier temps, une grande partie des tâches de secours et de
maintien de l'ordre tomberont sous la responsabilité des forces
internationales. L'Union européenne est prête à déployer 150 membres
de sa nouvelle Force de gendarmerie européenne.
Malgré les pertes tragiques subies par les Nations unies, le Conseil
de sécurité a autorisé l'envoi de 3 500 hommes supplémentaires pour sa
mission de maintien de la paix (MINUSTAH), amenant la taille de son
contingent à plus de 12 500 personnes.
Les Etats-Unis vont déployer plus de 13 500 soldats et la République
dominicaine a annoncé qu'elle enverrait 800 hommes.
La coalition devra compter avec une gouvernance haïtienne opaque
Les difficultés de coordination auxquelles sont confrontées cette
coalition ad hoc sont monumentales.
Parallèlement, ils devront compter avec une gouvernance et une société
haïtienne dont l'opacité a déjà mis à mal les efforts internationaux.
Sans une coopération étroite avec le gouvernement et la police du
pays, la difficulté de contrôler les semeurs de troubles sera accrue.
Ces dernières années, la Police nationale d'Haïti a développé de
nouvelles compétences. Les efforts restent incomplet, mais un sondage
montrait que près de 60 pour cent des Haïtiens approuvaient les
performances de la police, loin donc de l'appréhension qui prévalait à
l'encontre des anciennes forces de sécurité.
Le siège de la police haïtienne et plusieurs postes locaux ont été
détruits. Beaucoup de policiers sont morts. Ceux qui ont survécu ont
souvent perdu dans leur maison effondrée leur uniforme ou leur arme.
Reste que pour une force comptant à peine quatre ans d'existence sous
un nouveau dirigeant, le fait de disposer de près de la moitié de ses
8 000 hommes déployés cette semaine est un signe encourageant.
L'investissement dans la police et les infrastructures doit être
accompagné d'un engagement en faveur de réformes judiciaires.
L'administration Préval a promu des lois qui établissent une académie
de justice, des exigences pour la sélection des juges et la mise en
place d'un organe de supervision indépendant.
Ces étapes, ainsi que la reconstruction de la Cour suprême, doivent
être des priorités. La réforme des prisons, surpeuplées et violentes,
est un autre impératif.
La sécurité en Haïti va de paire avec une reconstruction politique
Cependant, la sécurité en Haïti est aussi une reconstruction
politique. Il semble évident que les élections parlementaires du 28
février ne pourront pas avoir lieu.
Les Haïtiens devraient également envisager de repousser l'élection
présidentielle de novembre. En combinant les élections
présidentielles, parlementaires et locales, ils économiseraient de
l'argent et encourageraient la participation de communautés
fragilisées.
Ces questions devraient être abordées lors d'une réunion de
préparation de la conférence des donateurs le 25 janvier au Canada. La
rencontre, organisée rapidement après le désastre et caractérisée par
beaucoup de volonté politique, est encourageante.
Pour que reconstruction il y ait, la communauté internationale doit
apporter un soutien massif - suivant une perspective définie par les
Haïtiens eux-mêmes.
" Tèt kolé ", l'appel à l'unité lancé par la population créole
Les Haïtiens doivent s'unir autour d'un nouveau contrat social
dépassant les divisions de classe, de race et d'idéologie. Les
fondements de ce corps ont déjà émergé il y a un an.
Une consultation nationale avait débouché sur l'adoption de stratégies
de reconstruction et mis l'accent sur la santé et l'éducation de base,
la petite paysannerie, la protection de l'environnement et le
développement rural.
" Lespwa ", " l'espoir ", tel est le nom que le président René Préval
a donné au mouvement social qui lui a permis de remporter les
élections de 2006. Aujourd'hui, c'est cette croyance et le " Tèt kolé
", l'appel à l'unité lancé par la population créole du pays, que la
communauté internationale doit embrasser. Telle est la condition pour
qu'Haïti ne survive pas seulement mais émerge de ses ruines en une
nation moderne.
Mark Schneider est Vice-président senior et conseiller spécial sur
l'Amérique latine de l'International Crisis Group.
Rue 89
French
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6496&l=1
"Wie Haiti den Wiederaufbau schaffen kann",
Mark Schneider and Bernice Robertson in Die Zeit
22. Januar 2010
Die Zeit
Das Erdbeben hat Haiti bis ins Mark erschüttert. Keine natürliche oder
von Menschenhand erzeugte Katastrophe hat die fragile Stabilität des
Landes derart in Gefahr gebracht wie das Beben vom 12. Januar. Während
Haiti noch seine Toten begräbt und die obdachlosen Überlebenden nach
Wasser, Nahrung, Unterkunft und Medikamenten rufen, stellt sich die
Frage, ob der Karibikstaat bloß um das Überleben kämpft - oder
tatsächlich vollständig genesen kann.
Es ist keine neue Frage für eine Nation, die von zwei Jahrhunderten
Misswirtschaft gepeinigt wurde, von starken Kontrasten zwischen Arm
und Reich gespalten ist, seiner Wälder beraubt wurde, jährlich von
Wirbelstürmen heimgesucht wird, auf einer seismisch labilen Zone
beheimatet ist und an einer bevorzugten Route für Kokainhändler liegt.
Aber es ist eine Frage, die nun, nach der schlimmsten Naturkatastrophe
dieser Hemisphäre, an tragischer Bedeutung erlangt.
Nachdem die humanitäre Hilfe allmählich die Bedürftigen erreicht, ist
die nächste große Herausforderung, Sicherheit herzustellen. Einige
Menschen wurden bereits erschossen und gelyncht. Nur knapp die Hälfte
der haitianischen Polizei ist momentan einsatzfähig, Gefängniswände
sind eingestürzt, Gefangene sind entkommen und die Angst unter den
Menschen nimmt zu. Um ihnen Sicherheit zu vermitteln, ist es nicht
damit getan, haitianische und internationale Polizisten auf die Straße
zu schicken. Entscheidend ist, ob es gelingt, Rechtsstaatlichkeit in
einem Land herzustellen, in dem das Justiz- und Strafvollzugssystem
schon vor dem Erdbeben kaum funktionierten.
Anfangs wird ein Großteil der Aufgaben von den internationalen Kräften
erledigt werden müssen. So wird die Friedenstruppe unter
brasilianischer Führung auf fast 9000 Soldaten und die UN-Polizei auf
mehr als 3500 Sicherheitskräfte aufgestockt. Die USA haben rund 13.500
Soldaten, Matrosen und Piloten in die Krisenregion geschickt. Sie sind
auf dem Festland und auf fünf Schiffen vor Haitis Küsten, darunter
einem Flugzeugträger, stationiert. Weitere befinden sich auf dem Weg
in Richtung Inselstaat. Auch die Dominikanische Republik wird eine 800
Mann starke Truppe entsenden. Andere Nationen der Region folgen diesem
Beispiel. Kanada hat 1000 Soldaten zugesagt und die EU stellte 150
Polizisten der European Gendarmerie Force bereit.
Diese Ad-hoc-Koalition zu koordinieren ist eine monumentale
Herausforderung. Jedes beteiligte Land muss seinen nationalen Stolz
und seine Interessen hinten anstellen und die Koordinierung der UN
unterstützen. Die Undurchsichtigkeit der haitianischen Staatsführung
und ihrer Gesellschaft haben schon einmal Frustration unter den
Friedenstruppen ausgelöst. Ohne eine enge Zusammenarbeit mit der
haitianischen Regierung und der Kreolisch sprechenden und
straßenerfahrenen haitianischen Polizei, wird es kaum Sicherheit geben
können, vor allem nicht im riesigen Elendsviertel Cite Soleil.
In den vergangenen Jahren hatte die Polizei, nachdem sie Beamte, die
Menschenrechtsverletzungen begangen hatten, aus ihren Reihen verbannt
hatte, ihre eigentlichen Befugnisse wiederentdeckt. Und obwohl der
Umbau der Polizei noch gar nicht abgeschlossen war, ergab eine Umfrage
vor dem Erdbeben, dass 60 Prozent der Bürger die Aktionen der Polizei
anerkennen – ein weit besseres Ergebnis als in der Vergangenheit, in
der die Sicherheitskräfte unter den Haitianern zu Recht gefürchtet
waren.
Haitis Polizeipräsidium und viele lokale Polizeistationen sind durch
das Erdbeben zerstört worden. Jedoch ist es ein bemerkenswertes
Zeichen, dass die Polizei, die seit vier Jahren unter neuer Führung
steht, berichtet, dass fast die Hälfte der 8000 Sicherheitskräfte seit
dieser Woche wieder auf den Straßen patrouilliert. Viele der Beamten
sind ohne Uniform unterwegs, da diese durch die Zerstörung ihre
eigenen Häuser verloren ging. Andere sind noch auf der Suche nach
Familienangehörigen und wieder andere haben keine Waffen. Aber sie
sind langsam wieder auf den Straßen präsent.
Die Lehren aus der Vergangenheit zeigen, dass der Wiederaufbau des
Polizeiapparates parallel mit Reformen im Bereich der Justiz erfolgen
muss. Die Regierung von Präsident Préval hatte vor dem Beben bereits
einen Anfang gemacht. So sollte eine juristische Hochschule gegründet,
Standards für die Überprüfung von Richtern eingeführt und ein
unabhängiger Rat, der den Prozess überwachen sollte, eingesetzt werden
Gemeinsam mit dem Wiederaufbau ihres Obersten Gerichts und der
Benennung neuer Richter, müssen diese Schritte nun als Erstes auf der
Prioritätenliste stehen. Die Reform der berüchtigten haitianischen
Gefängnisse, Orte massiver Überbelegung und
Menschenrechtsverletzungen, muss einen vergleichbaren Stellenwert
erhalten. Vor allem dann, wenn die Polizei die geflohenen Insassen
wieder einfängt.
Mit Polizei, Gerichten und Gefängnissen ist es allerdings für die
Sicherheit Haitis noch nicht getan. Sie hängt auch von der
Regierungsführung und der wirtschaftlichen Erholung und Entwicklung
ab, alles wichtige Elemente einer Stabilisierungsstrategie nach der
Katastrophe. Die Parlamentswahlen, ursprünglich für den 28. Februar
geplant, können nicht stattfinden. Eher sollten die Haitianer erwägen,
auch die für November vorgesehenen Präsidentschaftswahlen zu
verschieben, zumindest bis stabilere Bedingungen im Land herrschen.
Die Zusammenlegung der Präsidentschafts-, Parlaments-, und
Kommunalwahlen würde Geld sparen und zur Verbesserung der Beteiligung
der Gemeinden führen, welche massive Wiederaufbaumaßnahmen benötigen.
Diese Fragen müssen auf der Wiederaufbaukonferenz für Haiti am 25.
Januar in Kanada behandelt werden, bevor sie an eine offizielle
Geberkonferenz in den nächsten Monaten gerichtet werden. Es ist gut,
dass die Konferenz in Kanada kurz nach dem Erdbeben stattfindet. Der
Wiederaufbau braucht eine massive Reaktion der internationalen
Gemeinschaft und eine langfristige Vision, erarbeitet von den
Haitianern selbst.
In dieser hochgradig zerstörten politischen, wirtschaftlichen und
sozialen Umwelt müssen die Haitianer zu einem neuen sozialen Pakt
zusammenkommen, der sich über die breite Kluft der Klassen, Ethnien
und Ideologien hinwegsetzt. Die Grundlage für diesen neuen
Zusammenschluss entstand bereits vor einem Jahr, als neue
Armutsbekämpfungs- und Hurrikan-Strategien angewandt wurden, die sich
vor allem auf gesundheitliche Grundversorgung, Bildung,
kleinbäuerliche Landwirtschaft, Umweltschutz und die Entwicklung des
ländlichen Raums konzentrierten.
Präsident René Préval nannte die soziale Bewegung, die ihn zum
Wahlsieg im Jahr 2006 antrieb, L'Espoir - Hoffnung. Heute muss es das
Vertrauen der Haitianer sein, einhergehend mit "Tet Kole", dem
haitianisch-kreolischen Appell für Einigkeit, die das Land und die
internationale Gemeinschaft zusammenführen. Nur dann ist es möglich,
dass Haiti nicht einfach nur überlebt, sondern aus den Ruinen als
funktionierende Nation auferstehen wird.
Mark L. Schneider is a Senior Vice President and Special Advisor on
Latin America at the International Crisis Group. Bernice Robertson is
Senior Analyst in Haiti at the International Crisis Group.
Die Zeit
German
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6500&l=1
Konflikte
Crisis Group: Seismograf des GrauensPhilippinen, Honduras, Guinea,
Ukraine – und jetzt natürlich auch Haiti: Die International Crisis
Group in Brüssel ist eine Art privates Weltaußenministerium. Sie warnt
vor drohenden Konflikten und hat Einfluss wie kaum eine andere
Organisation.
Anzeige
Brennpunkt Sri Lanka. Überall sammelt die Crisis Group Informationen,
an die oft nicht mal Regierungen herankommen. - Foto: AFP Von Harald
Schumann, Brüssel
26.1.2010 0:00 Uhr Von Harald Schumann, Brüssel
26.1.2010 0:00 Uhr
Guinea, „das ist heute das heiße Thema“, sagt die junge Frau und
beugt sich wieder über die Papiere auf ihrem Schreibtisch. Die
Militärjunta des westafrikanischen Staates hat ein Massaker unter
unbewaffneten Demonstranten angerichtet, und nun haben konkurrierende
Militärs einen Anschlag auf den Diktator verübt. Informanten berichten
von Waffenlieferungen aus der Ukraine und der heimlichen Rekrutierung
von Söldnermilizen.
Jetzt muss die junge Analystin bis zum Abend einen Lagebericht
fertigstellen. Im Zimmer nebenan schreibt ein Expertenteam ein
„Briefing“ für den Abteilungschef, bevor dieser nach Moskau reist, um
mit der russischen Regierung unter anderem über das Engagement des
Aluminiumkonzerns Rusal in Guinea zu sprechen. Währenddessen feilen
Fachleute in den anderen Räumen der Büroflucht an Analysen über den
Aufstand in Süd-Thailand oder den Machtkampf um die Wahlen in
Somaliland. Und ein Dutzend weiterer Mitarbeiter erstellt den
wöchentlichen Nachrichtenüberblick über die übrigen Konfliktherde der
Welt von den Philippinen bis Honduras.
Informantennetze, Konfliktanalysen, Regierungsberatungen – was anmutet
wie die Arbeit in einer Geheimdienstzentrale ist in Wahrheit das
Kerngeschäft einer höchst ungewöhnlichen Friedensorganisation. Denn
hier, in der Dachetage eines Bürogebäudes an der Avenue Louise hoch
über dem Brüsseler EU-Viertel residiert die Zentrale der
„International Crisis Group“ (ICG), einer nichtstaatlichen
Organisation, die sich der „Verhinderung und Lösung von gewalttätigen
Konflikten“ verschrieben hat. Das gleiche Ziel verfolgen
Friedensinitiativen in aller Welt. Doch keine arbeitet so wie die ICG,
und keine hat auch nur annähernd so viel Einfluss. Die Berichte der
„Crisis Group“ seien „besser, als das meiste, was ich aus dem
Regierungsapparat bekomme“, sagt etwa Richard Holbrooke,
Sonderbotschafter der Regierung Obama in Afghanistan. Die Vorschläge
der ICG seien vielfach „direkt in die Verhandlungslösungen“
eingeflossen, bestätigt auch Ex-Außenminister Joschka Fischer.
Eine private Lobbygruppe zur Kriegsverhütung, die Gehör bei den
Regierenden findet – das scheint wie eine Geschichte aus einer anderen
Welt. Aber das Geheimnis dahinter ist einfach: Die Mehrzahl der
Repräsentanten und Mitarbeiter kommt aus der Welt der Diplomaten und
die nach außen hin rein private Organisation ist selbst ein Produkt
der Politik.
An ihrem Start im Jahr 1995, so heißt es in der Selbstdarstellung,
stand „die Verzweiflung über das Versagen der internationalen
Gemeinschaft in Somalia, Ruanda und Bosnien“. Dort starben Anfang der
90er Jahre Hunderttausende in Bürgerkriegen, bevor die Weltmächte
eingriffen. Gegen diese Trägheit wollte der frühere US-Botschafter und
damalige Chef der Carnegie-Friedensstiftung, Morton Abramowitz, ein
Frühwarnsystem installieren. Fachleute sollten in Konfliktregionen
unabhängig Informationen sammeln und rechtzeitig Vorschläge
entwickeln, wie die Bevölkerung vor Gewalt zu schützen ist. Auf dieser
Grundlage sollte ein mit einflussreichen Politikern besetzter Vorstand
für Gegenmaßnahmen werben, „Advocacy“ betreiben, wie es im
amerikanischen Politjargon heißt.
Mitgründer waren der spätere UN-Vizegeneralsekretär und britische
Minister Mark Malloch Brown und der damalige US-Senator der
Demokraten, George Mitchell. So prägte von Beginn an das Weltbild vom
reichen Westen, der sich um den armen Rest der Welt kümmert, die
Arbeit der Organisation – ein Ansatz, der durchaus umstritten ist.
In den ersten Jahren kam das Unternehmen über ein Zwei-Mann-Büro in
London und ein paar Rechercheure in Westafrika und der Balkanregion
aber nicht hinaus. Erst als Gareth Evans, der frühere australische
Außenminister, im Jahr 2000 den Vorsitz übernahm, ging es voran. Evans
gelang es, den Hedgefonds-Milliardär George Soros für das Unternehmen
zu gewinnen, und mit ihm kamen mehr Sponsoren, mehr Geld und mehr
Reichweite. In den neun Jahren bis zu seinem Ausscheiden im
vergangenen Juni baute Evans die ICG so zu einer Art privatem globalen
Außenministerium aus. Das beschäftigt heute 130 Experten aus 50
Nationen und wird geführt von der früheren UN-Kommissarin für
Menschenrechte, Louise Arbour. Ihr zur Seite steht ein 40-köpfiger
Vorstand aus der globalen Politikprominenz von Ex-UN-Generalsekretär
Kofi Annan bis zum früheren Nato-Kommandeur Wesley Clark. Sie
verwalten ein Budget von gut 15 Millionen Dollar im Jahr, und die
damit finanzierten neun Regionalbüros berichten derzeit über rund 60
Länder, in denen Krieg und Gewalt herrschen oder drohen. Ein neuer
Schwerpunkt wird Haiti sein, wo es gilt, den in den Vorjahren mühsam
erkämpften inneren Frieden zu erhalten. Dies werde für die
internationale Gemeinschaft eine Aufgabe für „mindestens ein
Jahrzehnt“, erwartet Bernice Robertson, ICG-Bürochefin in Port-au-
Prince.
Die globale Präsenz schlägt sich nieder in bis zu 80 ausführlichen
Reports jährlich sowie hunderten von Interviews und Artikeln. Darum
bietet die Website (www.crisisgroup.org) ein unvergleichliches
Kompendium über alle Krisenregionen. Und Medien in aller Welt, auch
der Tagesspiegel, zitieren gut 6000 Mal im Jahr die ICG-Experten, wenn
es gilt, komplexe Konfliktlagen einzuschätzen
Das zeigt an, woher die Stärke der Organisation rührt: Ihre Fachleute
vor Ort liefern Informationen, über die mangels Zugang nur die
wenigsten Regierungen und kaum ein Journalist verfügen. So erklärt
etwa der jüngste Kongo-Bericht detailliert mit namentlicher Nennung
von verantwortlichen Bandenführern und Armeeoffizieren, warum der
gemeinsame Feldzug der kongolesischen und der ruandischen
Regierungsarmeen gegen die im Ost-Kongo marodierenden Hutu-Milizen im
vergangenen Frühjahr ein Fehlschlag war. Oder das Pakistan-Team
erklärt, wie die korrupte Militärbürokratie in den Grenzprovinzen zu
Afghanistan selbst zur Stärkung der militanten Taliban beiträgt, die
Pakistans Generäle auf Druck der US-Regierung mit Gewalt niederwerfen
sollen. Und stets sind die Analysen verbunden mit handfesten
Vorschlägen. So wird für den Kongo empfohlen, die UN-Truppen nur noch
zum Schutz der Bevölkerung und nicht zur Unterstützung der
Regierungstruppen einzusetzen. Und für Pakistan fordern die ICG-
Experten, die US-Entwicklungsgelder an radikale Verwaltungsreformen zu
knüpfen.
Dabei müssen die Rechercheure zuweilen große Umwege gehen. Die Lage im
Süden Somalias zum Bespiel sei nur noch über Interviews mit reisenden
Händlern und Abgesandten der verschiedenen Konfliktparteien in Kenia
zu erkunden, erzählt am Telefon Ernst Jan Hogendoorn, Leiter des
Projekts „Horn von Afrika“ in Nairobi. Auch im Sudan sei derzeit keine
offene Arbeit mehr möglich. Stets laufen die Informationssammler damit
Gefahr, als ausländische Agenten angesehen zu werden. Gegen dieses
Vorurteil helfe, so Hogendoorn, nur „strikte Unparteilichkeit“ beim
Abfassen der Berichte.
Die hohe Qualität der ICG-Analysen bestätigen auch kritische Geister
wie die „Zeit“-Reporterin Andrea Böhm, eine ausgewiesene Kennerin der
afrikanischen Konfliktregionen. Die ICG liefere „die Grundnahrung“ für
die Berichterstattung. Die aufwendig recherchierten Berichte „füllen
eine riesige Informationslücke“, meint auch Nicholas Whyte, der in
Brüssel kleinere Staaten vertritt, die sich keinen außenpolitischen
Apparat leisten können. Viele Regierungen, gerade auch in der EU,
hätten gar nicht die Mittel, um sich aus eigenen Quellen zu
informieren. „Gleichzeitig wollen aber alle in den EU- oder UN-Gremien
mit entscheiden, was zu tun ist“, sagt Whyte.
In der Folge greife eben so manches Außenministerium auf die ICG-
Analysten zurück. Daneben verfüge die Gruppe über einen weiteren
großen Vorteil, erklärt Deutschlands Ex-Chefdiplomat Fischer, der
ebenfalls dem Vorstand angehört: „Die reden auch mit den bad guys“,
etwa der Hisbollah im Libanon, was den offiziellen Diplomaten meist
verwehrt sei. So bekomme man „ein vollständiges Bild“.
Handelt es sich also eigentlich um eine Privatisierung von klassischen
Regierungsaufgaben? „Das hoffe ich doch“, entgegnet Präsidentin Arbour
offensiv. In Zeiten „schrumpfender Budgets und diplomatischer
Kapazitäten“ sei es gut, dass „die Zivilgesellschaft“ die Lücke fülle,
sagt sie, während sie ihren Blick instinktiv den Glaspalästen der EU
hinter ihrem Panoramafenster zuwendet. Ganz so zivil ist die
Finanzierung freilich nicht. Gut die Hälfte des Budgets tragen 17
Regierungen, angeführt von Kanada und Norwegen bis hin zur Türkei.
Auch das Auswärtige Amt überweist 200 000 Euro im Jahr, und selbst die
US-Regierung ist mit einer halben Million Dollar dabei. Gemessen an
den Finanzquellen und der personellen Zusammensetzung der Führung ist
die ICG also ein rein europäisch-amerikanisches Projekt. Das hat
jedoch nicht nur Vorteile, sondern beschränkt auch die Perspektive.
Der größte Nutzen ist gewiss die Nähe zu den westlichen Entscheidern.
Für Alain Délétroz etwa, den Leiter der „Advocacy“-Arbeit für Europa,
ist die Beratung der Spitzendiplomaten tägliches Geschäft. Der 45-
jährige gebürtige Schweizer ist flüssig in sechs Sprachen von Quechua
bis Russisch und hat zwei Jahrzehnte Erfahrung mit Konfliktprävention
in Asien und Lateinamerika. Soeben kommt er von einem Gespräch mit dem
schwedischen Botschafter, der den Vorsitz im sicherheitspolitischen
Komitee der EU führt, dem Steuerungsgremium für die Außenpolitik der
Union. Am nächsten Tag trifft er Beamte in Moskau, und auch im
Berliner Außenamt ist er häufig zu Gast. „Die Leute verschwenden mit
mir keine Zeit“, versichert Délétroz.
Aber führt die Arbeit der ICG tatsächlich zu weniger Krieg und Gewalt?
Délétroz zögert. „Frustrierend“ sei, dass die Empfehlungen „zu selten
befolgt werden.“ Aber es gebe auch große Erfolge. So habe die ICG 2003
gewarnt, „dass Rebellentruppen in der Kongo-Provinz Ituri die
Bevölkerung mit einem Genozid bedrohten“. Daraufhin habe der damalige
Präsident Evans UN-Chef Annan alarmiert. Dieser habe die ICG-Warnung
dem Sicherheitsrat vorgetragen, worauf Frankreichs damaliger Präsident
Jacques Chirac entschied, eine Interventionstruppe zu schicken.
„Damals haben wir viele Menschenleben gerettet“, glaubt Délétroz.
Auch die Entscheidung der EU, dem Kosovo den Weg in die Unabhängigkeit
zu öffnen, sei wesentlich von Lageeinschätzungen der ICG getragen
gewesen. „Wir wussten aus unseren Quellen, dass auch die serbische
Regierung das eigentlich wollte, nur konnte sie das nicht öffentlich
sagen“, erinnert sich der ICG-Europachef. Darum habe Evans die 27
Regierungschefs der EU per Brief gedrängt, eine EU-Mission für den
Staatsaufbau nach Pristina zu senden, und dies habe sich letztlich
auch als beste Form der Gewaltvermeidung erwiesen.
François Grignon, der langjährige Direktor des Afrika-Programms
wiederum sieht das größte Verdienst darin, „dass wir in den
Krisenländern Debatten anstoßen, die es ohne uns nicht gäbe“. So sei
etwa im Tschad der ICG-Bericht über die Unterschlagung von Öleinnahmen
so eingeschlagen, dass die Regierung „gar nicht anders konnte, als
gegen die Korruption vorzugehen“. Ähnlich werde nun im Sudan sehr
ernst über den Vorschlag der ICG diskutiert, die im kommenden Frühjahr
vorgesehenen Wahlen zu verschieben, um ein Wiederaufflammen des
Bürgerkriegs zu verhindern. Belegen lassen sich solche Erfolge
freilich nur über die Anerkennung, die viele amerikanisch-europäische
Außenpolitiker der Organisation zollen.
Der Preis für diese Nähe ist freilich, dass die ICG stets nur deren
traditionelle Denkmuster bedient. Über die Agrarpolitik der EU und der
USA etwa, die mit ihren Dumpingexporten in Afrika Millionen Bauern um
ihr Einkommen bringt, findet sich in den ICG-Berichten kein Wort. Dass
die ungezügelte Spekulation an den Rohstoffmärkten vergangenes Jahr
ganze Regionen in Hungerrevolten trieb, darüber berichten die ICG-
Experten nicht. Die Verheerungen, die der von der US-Regierung
gesteuerte Internationale Währungsfonds mit seinen Kreditbedingungen
in Pakistan anrichtete, kommen nicht vor.
Insofern sei die Organisation lediglich mit „politischer
Symptombekämpfung“ befasst, indem sie „zeitnahe Informationen zu
akuten Krisen bereitstellt“, kritisiert die Hamburger Krisenforscherin
Berit Bliesemann. So erleichtere sie „lediglich die Art der reaktiven
Notfallpolitik“, auf die sich die Regierungen des Nordens gerne
beschränken. Das gleiche Defizit sieht auch Boris Wilke,
Südasienexperte der Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, die im Auftrag
der Bundesregierung im Prinzip die gleiche Arbeit macht. In der
aktuellen politischen Analyse seien die „Konkurrenten“ der ICG „zum
Teil besser als wir“, gesteht er. Doch zugleich ignoriere die
Organisation „zu oft die wirklichen Bedürfnisse der Bevölkerung“, in
Pakistan etwa die ungerechte Landverteilung.
Louise Arbour, der Chefin der Brüssler Krisenaufklärer, ist diese
Kritik nur allzu vertraut. Der Widerspruch habe sie schon während der
Arbeit als UN-Kommissarin für Menschenrechte begleitet, sagt sie. Der
Norden rede von politischen Freiheiten, während die Menschen des
Südens wirtschaftliche Grundrechte fordern. „Aber wir können nicht
alles machen, unser Job bleibt das Konfliktmanagement“, beteuert sie,
und die Flut der schlechten Nachrichten gibt ihr recht.
Zum Beispiel aus Guinea, wo jeden Tag der Bürgerkrieg ausbrechen kann.
Während die Afrikanische Union versuche, die Rückkehr zu einer zivilen
Regierung zu erzwingen, seien es ausgerechnet die Vetomächte des UN-
Sicherheitsrates, deren Rohstoffkonzerne die Generäle „weiter mit Geld
versorgen“. Da müsse eben die ICG „der Weltgemeinschaft ihren eigenen
Anspruch wieder und wieder vorhalten“, sagt Afrika-Direktor Grignon.
Er wird dafür sorgen, dass Guinea ein heißes Thema bleibt.
(Erschienen im gedruckten Tagesspiegel vom 26.01.2010)
Sie interessieren sich für dieses Thema
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http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/international/Crisis-Group;art123,3011973
The International Role in Promoting Democratic Governance and Economic
Recovery in Zimbabwe,
Donald Steinberg
Testimony for House of Commons International Development Committee by
Donald Steinberg, Deputy President, International Crisis Group, 26
January 2010
Mr. Chairman:
Thank you for the opportunity to address the International Development
Committee on the challenges facing the international community in
supporting democratic transformation and economic recovery in
Zimbabwe. As an international non-governmental organization committed
to preventing and ending deadly conflict, Crisis Group welcomes the
committee’s travel next week to Zimbabwe to highlight the challenges
ahead for the British government in this effort. We believe that
Zimbabwe now has its best chance in a decade to put behind it the
divisions, abuses, and self-implosion that has plagued the country.
The combination of an inclusive government; a re-emerging civil
society; an educated population and work force; manufacturing,
agricultural and mining sectors primed for recovery; and the good will
of countries in its region and beyond can help Zimbabwe open the door
to post-conflict recovery. This would benefit both its long-suffering
people and the broader southern African region.
Nonetheless, major threats could still derail the process, including
the resistance of intransigent senior security officials; fractious
political in-fighting, especially within the with Zimbabwe African
National Union (ZANU-PF); a growing gap between the political class
and civil society; a battered economy unable to address a 90 percent
unemployment rate and meet the immediate expectations for a peace
dividend; and the capricious and ever-dangerous whims of President
Robert Mugabe.
MDC's Entry into Government
When Morgan Tsvangirai and his Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)
party formed a unity government with ZANU-PF a year ago under the
Global Political Accord, skeptics gave the new formation little chance
of success and predicted that Tsvangirai and the MDC would fall prey
to Mugabe's "divide, rule, co-opt and destroy" strategy. While even
some within the MDC shared this views, others believed there was no
option. Mugabe and his hard-line allies and security forces held a
monopoly on force, was prepared to repress and abuse its political
opponents, and had the obsequious support of most regional leaders,
charged by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to
negotiate a solution to the long-standing electoral and political
crisis. The MDC calculated that its capacity to affect change would be
greater within government than outside it.
The new government started out reasonably well. Schools and hospitals
re-opened. Civil servants were paid a small stipend and returned to
work. As the Zimbabwe dollar was shelved, goods returned to empty
store shelves. A cholera epidemic was brought under control; and a
bipartisan parliamentary committee was formed to reform the
constitution. Human rights activists reported a significant drop in
government abuses. An ambitious yet pragmatic reconstruction program
– the Short-Term Economic Recovery Programme – called for about $8.5
billion in resources, including foreign assistance and investment, and
was generally well-received by foreign donors and the Bretton Woods
institutions. Prime Minister Tsvangirai, Finance Minister Tendai Biti
and the MDC received much of the credit for these developments – even
from the rank-and-file army – and new hope returned to Zimbabwe.
But from early on, there were ample signs of concern. Farm seizures
continued virtually unabated. While human rights abuses declined,
hardline security forces continued to arrest and detain activists and
MDC parliamentarians. ZANU-PF partisans Reserve Bank Governor Gideon
Gono and the Attorney General Johannes Tomana were unduly reappointed,
top generals boycotted the new national security establishments and
showed public disdain for Tsvangirai, and ZANU-PF delayed or ignored
key commitments under the GPA. The constitutional reform process
stalled as ZANU-PF insisted that the so-called Kariba draft serve as
the basis for a new constitution. Some old regime elements,
especially hard-line generals and other Mugabe loyalists, actively
thwarted the new government, and undermined it by refusing to
implement its decisions.
The Formal Challenges Ahead
Looking ahead, Zimbabwe faces several challenges, including completing
the GPA, fashioning a new constitution, and moving toward new
elections. On the GPA, there has been some positive movement since
the temporary suspension of the MDC’s participation in the unity
government last fall and the subsequent SADC re-engagement at and
since the Maputo Summit.. Among these steps are the formation of
national councils to address issues of the media, human rights, and
forthcoming elections. The land audit may soon commence, which would
not just be a surveying exercise but an attempt to lay the groundwork
for addressing the most sensitive issue of land reform and ownership.
Regrettably, the agriculture minister has reportedly said that it is
“too soon” to proceed with this vital exercise, which is intended to
flush out multiple land owners, find and allocate idle land, and
determine the need for assistance to new farmers -- There has been a
decline in arbitrary and politically motivated detentions and arrests,
but such actions must cease entirely and the onerous public order act
(POSA) must be amended soon. The appointment of governors, the
installation of Roy Bennett as Deputy Agriculture Minister, and the
regular functioning of the National Security Council in place of the
infamous Joint Operations Command must take place as well.
The constitutional reform process must be given greater impetus as
well. There is a growing recognition that this process cannot be the
exclusive reserve of the executive and legislative committees, but
must be a national exercise with full participation of civil society.
This is essential especially to the MDC, since some worry that the
party is losing contact with its popular base as civil society
activists and unions have complained that this process is being driven
by political elites for their own purposes. Equally positive, it is
increasingly accepted that the Kariba draft cannot serve as a
reference for the new constitution, as it incorporates a number of
anti-democratic principles and further entrenches executive powers.
The constitutional reform process seems destined to produce an
acceptable draft by the end of 2010.
Finally, there must be preparations for new elections. Many in
Zimbabwe are discussing a delay of such elections for several years,
perhaps until 2013, in order to take politics out of the equation as
the country faces massive economic and social requirements.
Politically, many in the MDC believe that the party still has not
built up enough of a record in government, and are also concerned over
the military reaction to a potential MDC victory. By contrast, many
ZANU-PF stalwarts worry that their party would be swept aside in new
elections, with popular support now judged very low in recent polls.
While it is still possible that Mugabe will dissolve the government in
an attempt to catch the opposition off-guard and proceed to another
undemocratic election accompanied by repression and fraud that secures
his ”victory,” such an approach seems increasingly less likely, given
increased international scrutiny, resolve and engagement.
Political, Security and Economic Challenges
Even if Zimbabwe can complete GPA, adopt a new democratic constitution
and address electoral processes, however, the transition will face
broader challenges.
First, there must be a maturation of the political system to ensure
that the ZANU-PF and the MDC engage as both competitors in the
political arena and partners in the unity government. This will be
difficult to achieve, especially under the divisive Mugabe, but other
ZANU-PF leaders, including a faction led by Vice President Joice
Mujuru, know that their party is reeling, has lost much of its popular
support, and needs a generational shift to rejuvenate its leadership.
Meanwhile, the MDC knows that it must still demonstrate to the country
that it is a viable custodian of the state, showing itself to be
competent, clean, and capable of preserving social change since
independence. It is responding seriously – as it must – to recent
allegations of untoward practices by some regional councils and recent
entrants into government. It must also keep faith with its broad
following by ensuring that civil society – including trade unions,
human rights groups, and women’s organizations – are fully engaged in
the process of governance.
Equally challenging are security issues. Many observers fear that a
dozen or so so-called “securocrats” hold de facto veto power over
transition. This topic was so sensitive that it was not even
addressed in the GPA negotiations. These generals and other senior
security officials are motivated by differing factors: fear of a loss
of power and its financial benefits; possible prosecution for their
crimes, including Matabeleland killings in the 1980s; hatred of
Tsvangirai and the MDC; and a belief that they are the guardians of
the country's liberation. Many Zimbabweans believe it is necessary to
achieve their retirement, even at the cost of a “soft landing”
allowing them to keep their assets and gain domestic impunity from
possible prosecution. Similarly, the living conditions and salaries
of the rank and file military must be improved, and security sector
reform must ensure an apolitical military and police force respectful
of human rights.
The devastated economy is an equally daunting challenge. While Finance
Minister Biti has won good marks for helping restore confidence and
stability to the economy, the prospects for rapid recovery are weak,
given years of agricultural decline, infrastructure neglect, anti-
business policies, and a weak international economy that rules out
large new aid or investment packages. There is a broad consensus
among labour and business leaders to reverse the negative impact of an
“indigenisation” policy, formally adopt a stable foreign currency to
permanently replaced the Zimbabwe dollar, ensure foreign donors that
the Multi-Donor Trust Fund will be a clean and transparent mechanism
for aiding the country, and secure the departure of reserve bank
governor Gideon Gono, whose record of biased and tainted practices
have discouraged new donors and investors. Not only were so-called
“quasi-fiscal” measures used to divert government resources into pet
projects benefitting the politically connected in the past, but as
recently as this year, the IMF has reported that up to $16 million was
transferred from statutory reserves into such areas as funding
presidential scholarships, Air Zimbabwe, and diplomatic missions.
The Risks of International Disengagement
During his visit to London, other European capitals and Washington
last summer, Tsvangirai was met with luke-warm encouragement, much
skepticism, and little cash. In addition to donors’ reluctance to
support a government including Mugabe, Zimbabwe's timing is awful. It
is seeking massive foreign aid and private investment at a time when
donors are cutting aid budgets and foreign investors are seeking safe
havens in the stormy global economy. Tellingly, no one called for a
"Marshall Plan” for Zimbabwe.
In fact, this stance risks thwarting the very changes the
international community is seeking, both by weakening the hand of the
MDC and moderates in ZANU-PF, and by undercutting popular support for
the reform process. The humanitarian situation remains dire, with
reluctant donors hard-pressed to address the demands to ward off
disease and hunger. The UN and non-governmental organizations have
warned of a potential new cholera outbreak ahead of the rainy season.
Moreover, doctors and teachers have gone on strike off-and-on to
demand real pay.
While the primary tasks ahead rest with Zimbabweans themselves, the
international community has a vital role to play. SADC must take its
role as guarantor of the GPA seriously, as it did during its meeting
in Maputo in early November. In particular, the advent of South
African President Jacob Zuma and his pledge to stay on top of the
brief must convey the message that the region will abide no
alternative to the current process. President Zuma’s appointment of
three of his most respected and trusted advisers to monitor the
Zimbabwe account was a welcome indication that he will press a tougher
stance vis-à-vis Mugabe on outstanding GPA obligations, respect for
rule of law, and cessation of repressive actions by the security
forces under his control.
The broader international community, especially the UK, U.S., the EU
and China, should support and complement SADC’s efforts by a careful
calibration of trade, aid, and investment to encourage progress, and
maintenance of sanctions on the intransigent parties. The outside
world should provide new recovery and development assistance only
through “clean” and official mechanisms, and new engagement from the
IMF, World Bank and African Development Bank.
Targeted Sanctions; Targeted Assistance
The international community should stand firmly against those
thwarting democratic transformation in Zimbabwe. Tough targeted
sanctions against such individuals and the companies they control
should remain in place to secure the commitment of the recalcitrant
parties to their commitments under the GPA. At the same time, the
international community must recognize and encourage changes now
occurring. One tangible step would be to consider lifting sanctions
of certain entities, such as the Agricultural Bank of Zimbabwe, that
help revitalize key sectors of the economy without overly benefitting
the intransigent parties. The U.K. and EU should make clear to
Zimbabwe the specific steps it needs to see in order to lift these and
other sanctions.
Further, targeted reconstruction and development assistance –
channeled through fully transparent, credible and accountable
mechanisms and institutions – is essential now. Such mechanisms
exist, such as the Multi-Donor Trust Fund. The International Monetary
Fund has ensured responsible use of the one-time expansion of special
drawing rights to Zimbabwe equivalent to a $500 million loan for the
purpose of building and repairing schools, hospitals, roads, railways
and communication networks.
International donors should assist revival of education, agriculture,
water, health and sanitation, including support for the Government
Works Program. Particular attention should be given to assisting
women, including reproductive health care and girls' education.
Donors should also help empower a functioning civil service and
legislature, and help reform politicized government institutions,
including the judiciary. Civil society must be strengthened, given
that groups of women, academics, journalists, lawyers, farmers, and
others were fractured and polarized in recent years by Mugabe's
tactics. Finally, innovative programs should encourage new trade and
foreign investment in Zimbabwe to address the country's massive
unemployment rate and promote the return of millions Zimbabwean
migrants who are increasingly the target of xenophobic attacks in
South Africa and elsewhere in the region.
British Interests in Zimbabwe's Recovery
At a time when more urgent and higher-profile crises fill the in-boxes
of British policy-makers, it would be easy to move the slow-simmering
crisis in Zimbabwe to the back-burner. Neither the MDC nor ZANU-PF
consorts with global terrorists, and collapse of the unity government
will not lead to jihadi training camps in rural areas. Zimbabwe
neither supplies nor traffics in illegal drugs, arms or persons. Its
refugees are not flooding into the UK. Zimbabwe has no oil, and many
of its minerals face weak global demand. No exotic diseases threaten
pandemic: Zimbabwe suffers from "just" cholera, malaria and HIV/AIDS.
The country straddles no sea lanes and has no pirates.
But there are strong motivations for broad British engagement. Just
because the global effects of Zimbabwe's implosion have so far been
modest, this could change rapidly. Transnational threats incubate in
unexpected ways in the hothouse of instability and weak governance.
What if the H1N1 virus had emerged in Harare and swept through a
country where the health infrastructure had been ravaged?
Zimbabwe's recovery is of major regional importance. If Zimbabwe is a
smallish country of 12 million people, the southern African region –
with a market of 200 million, growing oil production, peacekeepers
throughout Africa, and a location along key shipping lanes – is by
contrast of great strategic, commercial and political importance to
the UK. A prosperous Zimbabwe could be an engine of growth for the
region, providing key links to regional communications, transport and
electricity grids. Zimbabwe has long been considered a potential
breadbasket for the region, based on what used to be efficient
agriculture, albeit needing serious and responsible land reform and
new capital inputs.
By contrast, instability in Zimbabwe is profoundly destabilizing to
its neighbors. Zimbabweans fleeing economic hardship and political
abuses have flooded across borders, overwhelming the social services
and the good will of South Africa, Botswana, and other neighbors.
Notwithstanding its stellar record for stability and human rights,
Botswana has built an electrified fence and resorted to detention and
expulsions to keep desperate Zimbabweans out.
Some worry that a strategy of engagement would prematurely reward
Mugabe and his hard-line supporters, or somehow reduce the pressure on
them to cooperate with the reform process. In truth, political
engagement and targeted assistance through credible and transparent
channels would strengthen the hands of moderates and make it more
difficult for the extremists to again seize power.
Put simply: to sideline those who are thwarting the democratic
transformation in Zimbabwe, the world should embrace the unity
government now.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6505&l=1
The articles, aforementioned, are in German, French, and English.
Those who cannot understand these languages and are still interested
in knowing the contents may use the Bing Translation utility provided
beow and enjoy.
http://www.microsofttranslator.com/Default.aspx
...and I am Sid Harth
Sid Harth
Haiti’s horror
JOHN CHERIAN
The human tragedy that followed the January 12 earthquake is among the
worst in recorded history.
EDUARDO MUNOZ/REUTERS
Bodies of earthquake victims lying outside the Port-au-Prince General
Hospital.
THE United Nations has described the humanitarian disaster that
followed the January 12 earthquake that struck Haiti as the worst
since the founding of the organisation. The Haitian government has
said that it fears more than 200,000 people have already perished.
More than 300,000 people have been rendered homeless. Health Minister
Alex Larsen said that the death toll from the earthquake could
eventually reach half a million, with another 250,000 injured. The
quake measured 7.0 on the Richter scale and had the force of 500,000
tonnes of TNT (trinitrotoluene).
Even as aid efforts were continuing, Haiti was hit by a strong
aftershock measuring 6.1 on the Richter scale on the morning of
January 20.
The U.N. itself was badly hit. Five hundred of its peacekeepers were
missing a week after the quake. Forty-six U.N. personnel, including
Hedi Annabi, the head of the U.N. mission in the capital Port-au-
Prince, were confirmed dead by the third week of January.
Haiti has been under virtual U.N. guardianship since 2004 after
governance in the Caribbean country collapsed. The U.N. mission
comprised 9,000 peacekeepers and 2,000 civilian administrators. The
tremor completely or partially destroyed most of the government
offices, the presidential palace and the U.N. premises. The houses of
the comparatively well-off Haitians, located on the hills surrounding
the capital, were mostly unscathed. It was the poor who bore the brunt
of the quake.
Both the U.N. and the government of President Rene Preval have been
rendered even more powerless by the force of the quake. Even at
relatively normal times, the U.N. peacekeepers were finding it
difficult to maintain law and order.
There is no Haitian army to lend a helping hand in the rescue and
relief operations. The army was disbanded in 1994 by President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide because of its undisciplined ways and its penchant
for staging coups and backing right-wing figures. The local police
force, underpaid and numbering a few hundred, is in no position to
cope with the magnitude of the disaster.
If the casualty figures are accurate, the earthquake that hit Haiti
will go down as one of the 10 deadliest quakes ever recorded. In all,
40,000 bodies have been buried – most of them in common landfills.
Bodies have been rotting on the streets of the cities. A week after
the disaster, international agencies estimated that 100,000 corpses
had yet to be recovered from the rubble. Besides the thickly populated
capital city, the three major towns of Leogane, Carrefour and Gressier
were badly impacted. They have very few buildings left standing.
Most of the hospitals and clinics have collapsed. Even at the best of
times, medical care was an elusive facility for the average Haitian.
The 300,000 people affected by the earthquake have to look for food
and water too. The power grid collapsed immediately after the quake
struck.
The senior adviser to the Save the Children Fund warned the
international community that the situation “can go from dire to
absolutely catastrophic if we don’t get enough food and medicine”.
The international community led by the United States could have been
quicker in responding to the disaster. The U.S. had a moral obligation
to lead the humanitarian efforts as it has played a significant role
in the politics of the country since the early 20th century. Most
historians ascribe Haiti’s underdevelopment and poverty to U.S.
policies. Twenty years ago, Haiti used to produce enough rice to feed
its own population. Today the country of 10 million people is the
largest importer of rice from the U.S. Aristide was overthrown in U.S.-
backed coups twice, in 1991 and 2004, despite having the backing of
the majority. Aristide, who is currently exiled in South Africa, told
the media after he heard about the devastation that he wanted to
return to “share in their suffering, help rebuild the country, moving
from misery to poverty with dignity”.
U.S. President Barack Obama got relief operations moving a couple of
days after the quake by ordering the deployment of 13,000 American
troops to the country. The U.S.-backed Haiti government virtually
handed back the sovereignty of the country to its big neighbour. The
U.S. Army has taken control of the only airport in the country. It
took its time to deploy its forces all over the capital city and other
urban centres to help in the distribution of aid and in the
maintenance of law and order. There were reports of widespread looting
in many parts of the country a week after the U.S. troops landed. In
one incident in the capital, angry citizens piled up corpses to be
used as barricades against the police. U.N. peacekeepers had to resort
to firing tear gas and rubber bullets to keep desperate crowds from
storming the airport when planes laden with food and other essentials
started arriving.
The Haitian authorities declared a state of emergency on January 18 as
the situation threatened to get out of control, arming themselves with
draconian powers. The decision to declare a state of emergency came
after the visit of U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to Port-au-
Prince. She told the media during the visit that the decree would give
the government “an enormous amount of authority, which in practice
they would delegate to us”. For all practical purposes, Haiti now is
under American military rule. Obama has signed an executive order
mobilising military reserves for possible deployment in Haiti.
AFP
The destruction wrought by the massive tremor on January 12.
According to The Washington Post, a man yelled “We don’t need military
aid. What we need is food and shelter” when U.N. Secretary-General Ban
Ki-moon visited the Haitian capital on January 17.
French Cooperation Minister Alain Joyandet compared the U.S. actions
in Haiti to occupation. “It is a matter of helping Haiti, not
occupying Haiti,” he told the media. The Minister was angry after a
French plane carrying essential supplies was turned away from the
airport.
The Americans have been very strict about giving permission for
landing owing to the limited capacity of the airport. Flights from
Brazil, Italy and other countries were diverted to the neighbouring
Dominican Republic.
President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela said that the U.S. was occupying
the Caribbean state under the guise of providing relief. “It appears
that the U.S. is occupying Haiti militarily, taking advantage of the
tragedy,” he said on his weekly radio programme. Nicaraguan President
Daniel Ortega also expressed his “deep concern” over the deployment of
U.S. troops.
The Caribbean Community’s (CARICOM) assessment mission to Haiti, which
comprised many heads of state, was not allowed to land. Jamaica’s
Prime Minister Bruce Golding, who headed the mission, said that he was
aware of the chaos in Haiti’s only airport but pointed out that Haiti
was a member of CARICOM and, therefore, the leaders of the community
should have been allowed in. “The truth is that there is hardly a
functioning government in Haiti,” he said.
Chavez also clarified that he did not mean to cast aspersions on the
humanitarian efforts of the Obama administration but was only
expressing his concerns about the heavily armed military deployment.
Pictures of heavily armed troops taking over the damaged presidential
palace and securing its compound while hungry Haitians were milling
around have sent the wrong signals to the international community.
The U.S. is giving priority to flights bringing its military personnel
into the country and escorting stranded American citizens and aid
workers out. The other important objective is to prevent desperate
Haitians from commandeering boats and fleeing to Florida. The U.S.
Homeland Security Secretary, Janet Napolitano, warned Haitians that
they would be deported immediately if they landed on U.S. shores. The
Department of Homeland Security is said to be preparing prisons for
potential refugees from Haiti. Only Cuban refuge-seekers who manage to
reach U.S. shores will continue to have the privilege of staying on
and becoming citizens.
The overland route through the Dominican Republic takes an extra nine
hours to reach the Haitian capital.
The European Union (E.U.) is said to be unhappy with the U.S.’
handling of the situation in Haiti. The E.U. has increased its aid to
Haiti to $500 million, which is five times more than what the U.S. has
pledged.
AFP
Haitian President Rene Preval and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton at the Toussaint Louverture airport on January 16.
A significant amount of the aid for Haiti is coming from individual
donations from the U.S. and other Western countries. It is remarkable
that many Americans have chosen to contribute liberally to the
disaster-hit country despite the recession and the 10 per cent
unemployment rate at home. A week after the earthquake struck, more
than $200 million was raised by individuals and private charities.
Only $43 million had come from corporate donors.
Leonel Fernandez, the President of the Dominican Republic, said that
it would take $10 billion and five years to rebuild the shattered
country.
The U.S. has sent in the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson to supply
essentials such as water, food and medicine. However, Haitians in need
of urgent medical attention have not been allowed on board the
aircraft carrier, which has a fully equipped hospital capable of
taking in up to 1,000 patients at a time. U.S. Defence Secretary
Robert Gates said that the primary aim was to distribute aid as
quickly as possible “so that people don’t, in their desperation, turn
to violence”. It took nearly a week for essential supplies to trickle
down to the capital from the airport.
The U.S. is blaming the security situation for the delays. “We need a
safe and secure environment to be successful,” said General Ken Keen
of the U.S. Southern Command, which is in charge of the Haiti
operations. Keen has warned of increasing security-related incidents
as the relief measures are implemented. Brazilian Defence Minister
Nelson Jobin has also expressed concerns about the security situation.
If the three million hungry and homeless people of Port-au-Prince take
the law into their own hands, it will be difficult for the American
forces and the Brazilian-led U.N. peacekeepers to control the
situation.
Cuba’s gesture
JUAN BARRETO/AFP
U.S. paratroopers try to secure the damaged presidential palace on
January 19.
More than 30 governments around the world have started responding with
aid for the Haitians. Neighbouring Cuba was always there for Haiti.
More than 400 Cuban doctors and health care workers have been working
in the most impoverished areas of Haiti for several years. They are
present in 227 of the country’s 337 communes. Four hundred Haitians
have been trained as doctors in Cuban universities.
As soon as the news of the disaster came in, the Cuban authorities
despatched an additional team of 30 doctors. Cuban leader Fidel Castro
wrote a few days after the earthquake that another 1,000 Cuban doctors
and health care experts could be easily mobilised if there was a
demand for their expertise from states “that wish to save the lives of
the Haitian people and rehabilitate the injured”. “We feel a wholesome
pride for the cooperation that, in these tragic instances, Cuban
doctors and young Haitian doctors who trained in Cuba are offering our
brothers and sisters in Haiti,” he added.
As a gesture of solidarity with the Haitian people, Cuba opened up its
airspace for American relief supplies to be flown into Port-au-Prince.
Under normal circumstances, the U.S. planes would have had to take a
detour that would have meant an additional hour of flying time. Some
leading American policymakers have even suggested that the U.S. should
work in tandem with Cuba to help the Haitian people in their hour of
need. Laurence Korb, a former Assistant Secretary of State for
Defence, told The Christian Science Monitor that the U.S. should
“consider tapping the expertise of neighbouring Cuba”, which had “some
of the best doctors in the world – we should see about flying them
in”.
Venezuela has sent several planes with doctors, humanitarian aid and
soldiers. Chavez has promised to provide as much petrol as needed for
Haiti so that power generation and the transport system could be
revived quickly. The U.N. has said that the shortage of fuel has
become a “critical issue” and is stalling relief efforts.
More than a week after the earthquake struck, only around 73,000
people have received emergency rations. U.N. officials say that one-
third of the nine million people are in need of assistance. In the
capital, people have been digging into debris for food and money.
Volume 27 - Issue 03 :: Jan. 30-Feb. 12, 2010
INDIA'S NATIONAL MAGAZINE
from the publishers of THE HINDU
http://www.frontlineonnet.com/stories/20100212270303300.htm
Sid Harth
Plan of death
VIJAY PRASHAD
The United States stretches its hands out to help Haiti, but not
without conditions.
OLIVER LABAN-MATTEI/AFP
A Haitian family trying to flee quake-hit Port-au-Prince.
Though fallen thyself, never to rise again,
Live and take comfort. Thou hast left behind
Powers that will work for thee: air, earth,
and skies;
There’s not a breathing of the common wind
That will forget thee; thou hast great allies;
Thy friends are exultations, agonies,
And love, and man’s unconquerable mind.
– William Wordsworth,
“To Toussaint Louverture”, 1803.
HAITI is in agony. The largest earthquake in two centuries, measuring
7.0 on the Richter scale, shook its capital city, Port-au-Prince, and
took with it at least a hundred thousand lives. The devastation is
complete. Infrastructure, preciously built, is ruined; bodies remain
below debris; starvation and frustration among the survivors rise to
the surface. The weak government of Rene Preval does its best to
deliver the basics in a situation where it was unable to act even
before the quake.
The best of Atlantic liberalism emerges. The United States dispatches
its Caribbean arsenal; aircraft carriers fasten their bombs and send
forth bundles of ready-to-eat food. Crews of disaster relief
specialists fly in to unburden the city of its chaos. An emergency
room doctor from my hometown hastens onto the next flight to Haiti.
She wanted to go and help after the 2004 tsunami, but the distance to
Asia was too much. Haiti is closer. She takes her skills to the scene
of desperation. A Facebook friend reports that his grandmother,
herself a refugee from Vietnam to the U.S., has assembled her friends
into a fund-raising group. It is not the Red Cross, but it is
something. Established aid agencies report that the donations are at
record levels. The disaster touched a chord.
Would that the good feelings of these thousands of people who
represent the best of Atlantic liberalism be the policy of their
governments! But it is not so. Their concern for Haiti mirrors the
words of Wordsworth, drawn as he was to the great tremor from the
Caribbean when Haiti under Toussaint threw itself out of the slavery
machine. The Haitian revolution of 1791-1803 redeemed the false
promises of the French Revolution of 1789; the latter had proclaimed
the rights of man but said nothing about the slavery that continued to
sustain France from its colonies. Haiti’s actions put pressure on the
Atlantic liberals of the 19th century, such as William Wilberforce,
whose moral exhortations only then had any force. When Wilberforce
spoke of the abolition of slavery, the memory of Port-au-Prince’s
rebellion made his option reasonable. It was Haiti’s example from 1791
that pushed the world to abolish slavery, and it is this that
Wordsworth celebrated in song. It is this tradition, from Wilberforce
onwards, that moved Atlantic liberalism to stretch its hands out to
the island.
From the murky corners of American conservatism comes another
reaction. Here, there is largely silence about the tragedy (Fox News
almost ignored it) or else there is scorn for it. The radio
personality Rush Limbaugh has had a long track record of off-colour
remarks about the island. In 1994, Limbaugh pilloried Haitian
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide as a zombie, a figure in Haiti Vodou
(“I think he blinks once every five minutes,” Limbaugh told his vast
radio audience, alluding to the idea that zombies don’t blink). When
former U.S. President Bill Clinton was appointed the Special Envoy to
Haiti by President Barack Obama, Limbaugh said, “I’m just gonna tell
you, if I was named envoy to Haiti, I’d quit government. Envoy to
Haiti? You can’t even pick up a prostitute down there without genuine
fear of AIDS.” If this is not enough, after the earthquake, Limbaugh
offered his view that the Obama administration conjured it up to help
its slipping ratings. Why provide more aid to Haiti, Limbaugh pointed
out; “we’ve already donated. It’s called the U.S. income tax.”
GREGORY BULL/AP
Quake survivors waiting for the supply of water.
Limbaugh was not alone. The tele-evangelist and former Republican
presidential candidate Pat Robertson went one step further. Robertson
has a history of peculiar statements, from his view that the September
11 attacks should be blamed on “the pagans and the abortionists and
the feminists and the gays and the lesbians” to his belief that
Hurricane Katrina was retribution for legal abortion. With Haiti,
Robertson went back to the revolution.
“Something happened a long time ago in Haiti, and people might not
want to talk about it.” Robertson went on to blame the earthquake on a
“pact with the devil” made by Haitians to throw off the French yoke in
1791. The end to slavery, then, required a deal between the slaves and
the devil; God would have been on the side of the slavers. This is a
tradition of thought that goes back to the U.S. reaction to the
Haitian revolution. South Carolina Senator Robert Hayne put it plainly
in 1824, “Our policy with regard to Hayti is plain. We never can
acknowledge her independence. The peace and safety of a large part of
our Union forbids us even to discuss it.” Haiti was a challenge to
U.S. slavery; its freedom could not be allowed. George Washington’s
government sent $400,000 to support the white planters.
Robertson and Limbaugh provide the hidden transcript of official U.S.
policy. The U.S. government, since 1804, has never allowed Haiti to be
independent. In the last century, it treated Haiti with contempt. Its
army occupied Haiti from 1915 to 1934, and in the process destroyed
the Cacos Rebellion led by Charlemagne Peralte (1919). From 1957 to
1986, the U.S. provided unconditional support for the dictatorship of
the Duvaliers, the most brutal regime in the Caribbean.
It was in this period that the Haitian economy fell apart, open to
U.S. agricultural imports that crushed the last remaining independent
Haitian peasantry. They fled to the cities, into overcrowded slums
with no employment. It was in these slums that the Lavalas (avalanche)
movement grew, led by Aristide, then a priest.
The Lavalas wanted to reinvigorate agriculture, introduce land
reforms, reforest the countryside and regulate the vast export
processing zones. The programme was too radical. Aristide would be
removed twice, once in 1991 and again in 2004. Both times he had to go
on Washington’s say-so. Clinton reinstated him in 1994 only when the
congressional Black Caucus and others put immense pressure on the
White House. Aristide returned to implement a neoliberal agenda, not
the Lavalas programme. That was the Clinton bargain. It was worse than
Robertson’s imputed pact with the devil. Haitians called it the “plan
of death”.
No wonder that about three million of the nine million Haitians live
in Port-au-Prince. U.S. agricultural imports have destroyed Haiti’s
rural economy. Miserable wages in the sweatshop industry did not help.
The HOPE II (Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership
Encouragement) Act of 2008 from the U.S. Congress pushed for more
sweatshops, a drive backed by United Nation’s Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon in 2009. (Ban praised the HOPE legislation as “a golden
opportunity to bring in investors and create hundreds of thousands of
jobs”.) The harsh economic environment is responsible for the creation
of mostly substandard housing, which crumbled when the earth shook.
The earthquake was a natural disaster of the highest magnitude, but it
did not help that the social order was ill-prepared to withstand its
shocks.
A moderate conservative, David Brooks, came along this grain. “This is
not a natural disaster story,” he wrote in The New York Times (January
15). “This is a poverty story. It’s a story about poorly constructed
buildings, bad infrastructure and terrible public services.” But
rather than go into the recent history of why this is so, Brooks took
refuge in culture. Sure, Haiti suffered from colonialism and
dictatorship, but so did Barbados and the Dominican Republic, he says.
What marks Haiti is “the influence of the voodoo religion, which
spreads the message that life is capricious and planning futile”. But
if Haiti were solely driven by voodoo’s fatalism, it would not have
been able to generate the Lavalas movement, nor the Cacos rebellion,
nor indeed the original Haitian revolution.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton hastened to Port-au-Prince,
intoning the rhetoric of the best of liberalism. On her aircraft is
the head of U.S. aid efforts, Rajiv Shah, a man given over to the
Second Green Revolution (biotechnology, especially genetic
modification, and private capital investment: both elements of a U.S.
push to continue its domination of the world’s agriculture). Nothing
in this Second Green Revolution will give the land back to the Haitian
people.
The Obama team has not shifted the century-long U.S. policy vis-a-vis
Haiti. Promotion of tourism and sweatshops, increase in debt and rural
flight: all this will continue. A $100 million in aid is minuscule,
almost insulting. It was Obama’s first tranche for Haiti. More will
come, but with substantial conditions, more along the plan of death.
These are inevitable, and they will set the stage for further
suffering. The earthquake and its aftermath will draw in some relief
money and the good feelings of Atlantic liberalism. But little more.
Volume 27 - Issue 03 :: Jan. 30-Feb. 12, 2010
INDIA'S NATIONAL MAGAZINE
from the publishers of THE HINDU
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Sid Harth
Haiti’s recovery should start with debt cancellation
Supachai Panitchpakdi
The talk of a new Marshall Plan raises the hope that the international
community is serious about Haiti and its long-term needs.
— PHOTO: AP
CRISIS-RIDDEN: Haitians crowd near approaching food relief trucks in
Port-au-Prince on Thursday. Given the scale of the earthquake damage,
social and economic recovery in Haiti will take time.
The massive response of the international community to the devastating
earthquake has been directed towards saving lives and providing
immediate relief to the victims. This will continue for some time.
However, even at this stage it is necessary to think about the
measures required to rebuild the Haitian economy, put its people back
to work and provide a more hopeful future.
Given the scale of the damage and disruption, social and economic
recovery in Haiti will take time. The government must be given the
policy space necessary to undertake the reforms and adjustments needed
to bring back a semblance of normalcy and create a viable economy. It
will also need massive investments, which will depend on multilateral
funding along the lines of the Marshall Plan, as has recently been
suggested by IMF head Dominique Strauss-Kahn.
The Marshall Plan is all too readily evoked in the wake of large-scale
disasters. But the parallel is particularly apposite for Haiti, given
the scale of the devastation, the potential for political instability
if recovery fails to take hold, and the prolonged period of
reconstruction that will inevitably engage the international
community. Moreover, given that close international involvement prior
to the earthquake had failed to establish a viable development path
for one of the world’s poorest countries, talk of a new Marshall Plan
raises the hope that this time around, the international community is
serious about Haiti and its long-term needs.
Vicious cycle
A good starting point for the long-term objective is an immediate
cancellation of Haiti’s $1 billion external debt, a crippling legacy
of years of dictatorships and mismanagement, augmented in recent years
by recurrent natural disasters. The United Nations Conference on Trade
And Development (UNCTAD) has estimated that natural disasters add an
average 24 percentage points to the debt-to-GDP ratio in the three
years that follow such an event. Shocks on such a scale can lead to a
vicious cycle of economic distress, external borrowing, burdensome
debt servicing, and insufficient investment to mitigate future shocks.
Marshall was concerned with just such a vicious cycle gripping post-
war Europe. It has been a constraint on Haitian development for over
two centuries.
Despite having benefited from debt relief in 2009, Haiti was still at
high risk of debt distress prior to the earthquake, thanks in large
part to the successive external shocks that hit the country over the
past decade. Considering the large direct cost of the earthquake
(conservative estimates put this at 15 per cent of GDP) and the lack
of any meaningful national capacity to service its own debt, in the
absence of radical action by the international community a new debt
crisis is all but assured, along with any hope of sustainable
recovery.
The way to proceed is to declare an immediate moratorium on debt
servicing, followed by its cancellation as quickly as possible.
Several countries that were hit by the tsunami of December 2004
benefited from a debt moratorium on bilateral Paris Club loans.
It was encouraging to see that soon after the earthquake, several of
Haiti’s bilateral creditors announced a similar initiative. However, a
significant part of Haiti’s outstanding debt is owed to multilateral
creditors (primarily the Inter-American Development Bank). To the
extent that these institutional lenders do not have the resources or
mandate to fully and unilaterally cancel Haiti’s debt obligations,
their membership will need to provide the requisite political and
financial support.
It will be equally important, as assistance shifts from emergency aid
to development financing, that continued multilateral support takes
the form of grants and not loans, in order to avoid any future build-
up of new debt as recovery gets under way.
Discussing the technicalities of long-term debt sustainability may
seem premature in the face of the immediate human suffering. But
cancelling the debt would serve not only to break with past
development practice but also to signal the intention of the
international community to stay engaged with Haiti over the longer
haul. Indeed, if past experience with such disasters is any guide, the
big challenge will be to connect relief and recovery efforts to the
creation of an institutional framework capable of fashioning an
inclusive national agenda that is not only broader and longer-term
than in the past, but also able to repair trust in public institutions
and authority.
A sustainable recovery will also depend on the revival and creation of
state capacities to handle public finance, implement an emergency
housing programme, create jobs and strengthen public security. The
large financing gap — several billions of dollars annually for the
foreseeable future — means that the involvement of the international
community will be essential and unavoidable, but it is imperative that
local capacities are mobilised as quickly as possible and that local
ownership of the policy agenda is guaranteed from the outset. This
last point was also a key feature of the Marshall Plan, but one that
has tended to be overlooked in recent decades or obscured by the
language of “absorptive capacity,” “good governance,” and so forth.
Marshall recognised that sensitivity to complex and cumulative
economic and political forces was key to any long-term reconstruction
effort when he called for a policy for Europe “directed against
hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos” and aimed at “the revival of a
working economy so as to permit the emergence and social conditions in
which free institutions can exist”. Haiti needs its own George
Marshall, and soon.
(Supachai Panitchpakdi is Secretary-General of UNCTAD.)
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Saturday, Jan 30, 2010
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Sid Harth
Haiti’s big chance
Ban Ki-moon
Haiti’s own problems often appear insuperable. Yet, in fact, it stands
a better chance than almost any emerging economy.
It is easy to visit Haiti and see only poverty. But when I visited
recently with the former U.S. President, Bill Clinton, we saw
opportunity.
Yes, Haiti remains desperately poor. It has yet to fully recover from
last year’s devastating hurricanes, not to mention decades of malign
dictatorship. Yet we can report what President René Préval told us:
“Haiti is at a turning point.” It can slide backwards into darkness
and deeper misery, sacrificing all the country’s progress and hard
work with the United Nations and international community. Or it can
break out, into the light toward a brighter and more hopeful future.
Next week (13-14 April), major international donors will gather in
Washington to consider further help for this unfortunate land, so
battered by forces beyond its control. Outwardly, there seems little
cause of optimism. The financial crisis has crimped aid budgets.
Haiti’s own problems — runaway population growth, acute shortages of
food and life’s basic necessities, environmental degradation — often
appear insuperable.
Yet in fact, Haiti stands a better chance than almost any emerging
economy, not only to weather the current economic storms but to
prosper. The reason: new US trade legislation, passed last year,
throws open a huge window of opportunity.
HOPE II, as the act is known, offers Haiti duty-free, quota-free
access to U.S. markets for the next nine years. No other nation enjoys
a similar advantage. This is a foundation to build on. It is a chance
to consolidate the progress Haiti has made in winning a measure of
political stability, with the help of the U.N. peacekeeping mission,
and move beyond aid to genuine economic development. Given the
country’s massive unemployment, particularly among youth, that means
one thing above all else: jobs.
My special adviser on Haiti, the Oxford University development
economist Paul Collier, has worked with the government to devise a
strategy. It identifies specific steps and policies to create those
jobs, with particular emphasis on the country’s traditional strengths
— the garment industry and agriculture. Among them: enacting new
regulations lowering port fees (among the highest in the Caribbean)
and creating the sort of industrial “clusters” that have come to
dominate global trade.
In practical terms, this means dramatically expanding the country’s
export zones, so that a new generation of textile firms can invest and
do business in one place. By creating a market sufficiently large to
generate economies of scale, they can drive down production costs and,
once a certain threshold is crossed, spark potentially explosive
growth constrained only by the size of the labour pool.
That may seem ambitious in a country of nine million people, where 80
per cent of the population lives on less than $2 a day and half of the
food is imported. Yet we know it can work. We have seen it happen in
Bangladesh, which boasts a garment industry supporting 2.5 million
jobs. We have seen it happen in Uganda and Rwanda.
President Clinton and I saw many good signs during our trip, both
large and small. One day we visited an elementary school in Cité
Soleil, a slum in Port au Prince long controlled by violent gangs
before U.N. peacekeepers reclaimed it.
It did my heart good to see these children. They were well-fed, thanks
to the U.N. World Food Programme. Even better, they were happy and
they were learning — as children should. It was a sign of more normal
times.
We visited a second school, as well — this one for gifted students
called HELP, short for the Haitian Education Leadership Programme.
With money raised privately in the United States, it provides
scholarships to the very poorest Haitian children who could not
otherwise dream of attending university. All these young people go on
to lead productive careers. They make good salaries. They embark upon
lives of promise — and virtually all of them stay in Haiti.
I told these young people that I thought of them as “seeds of hope,”
for they represent a better tomorrow.
To an outsider, it is striking how modest the obstacles are in
relation to Haiti’s potential. Visiting a clean and efficient factory
in the capital, we met workers earning $7 a day making T-shirts for
export — vaulting them into the Haitian middle class. Under HOPE II,
the owner figures he can double or triple production within a year.
All this is why, in Washington, we will be asking donors to invest in
Haiti, to step beyond traditional humanitarian aid. This is Haiti’s
moment, a break-out opportunity for one of the poorest nations to lift
itself toward a future of real economic prospects and genuine hope. —
Courtesy: U.N. Information Centre, New Delhi
(The writer is Secretary-General of the United Nations.)
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Sid Harth
A nation in chaos
JOHN CHERIAN
The exit of President Bertrand Aristide highlights the need for the
international community to intervene effectively in order to prevent
Haiti's descent into total chaos.
YURI CORTEZ/AFP
Haitian refugees who returned to the capital Port au Prince after
their boat was interdicted by the U.S. Coast Guard on February 28.
THE going into exile of President Bertrand Aristide on February 29
following a virtual ultimatum given by the Bush administration marks
the end of yet another chapter in the tumultuous history of the
impoverished Caribbean nation. The White House, in a statement issued
on February 28, had asked Aristide to quit the presidency as American-
backed rebels were preparing for an assault on the capital.
The Democratic frontrunner for President in the United States, Senator
John Kerry, had strongly criticised the Bush administration's handling
of the crisis in Haiti. The tragedy fast unravelling in Haiti could
have been averted if the international community had cared enough. The
island-nation, situated not too far away from the most powerful nation
in the world, seems to be on its way to joining the list of "failed"
states. Meanwhile, the Bush administration's priority seems to be to
prevent the tide of Haitians fleeing the anarchy at home from reaching
U.S. shores. In the last week of February, a ship carrying Haitian
refugees bound for the U.S. was intercepted on the high seas and sent
back.
President Aristide, the democratically elected leader of Haiti, tried
to rally his supporters to confront the rebel forces. The remnants of
the former military dictatorship, members of the former secret police,
the drug mafia, and mercenaries pouring in from across the border from
the Dominican Republic, played an important role in the uprising. One
of the leaders of the uprising is Lois Jodel Chamblain, who ran a
death squad when Haiti was under a military dictatorship during
1991-94. Another leader is Jean Tatoune, who was sentenced to life
imprisonment in 1990 for his role in the murder of 15 people in the
mid-1980s. Guy Philippe, who has emerged as the most prominent leader
of the rebels, was involved in an abortive attack on the Presidential
Palace in 2001. He is said to have links with the international drug
cartel.
Only in the last week of February, the Organisation of American States
(OAS) and the Caribbean Community (Caricom) proposed a compromise
involving a power-sharing deal between Aristide and the opposition.
Under the plan, a three-party commission was to have been set up to
appoint a new Prime Minister and a government of national unity with
Aristide remaining President. The President accepted the deal but the
Opposition was quick to reject it. The latter demanded that Aristide,
whose term in office was to expire only in 2006, resign from the
presidency.
Aristide, who made his reputation as a radical Catholic priest working
in the impoverished areas of the Haitian capital, Port au Prince, is
no stranger to the vicissitudes of the region's politics. In 1991, the
Haitian people gave him a landslide victory after his party, Lavalas
(avalanche), led the fight to overthrow the corrupt and cruel
dictatorship of the Duvalier family. The1991 elections were supervised
by international monitors. However, as Aristide went about
implementing the radical reforms he had promised to the poor, he was
ousted within months of assuming office, in a coup led by the Army
with the tacit support of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the
U.S. After more than three years of brutal rule, the right-wing
military government was forced to quit, under intense international
pressure, which included punitive economic sanctions. Aristide
returned to Haiti after President Bill Clinton sent in American troops
to stabilise the situation.
During his second stint in office, Aristide seemed to have mellowed
politically. He had left priesthood at the advice of the Pope and had
become a family man. Aristide was also in a way indebted to Washington
for its part in restoring democracy and paving the way for his return
to Haiti. More than 20,000 troops were in Haiti in the early 1990s to
supervise the conduct of the elections held after the ouster of the
military dictatorship. The American troops, however, did not disarm
the thugs and the right-wing militia leaders who had run riot in the
intervening years. The same bunch has now re-emerged to terrorise the
populace in the Haitian countryside. During his second stint in power,
starting in April 2000, Aristide was careful not to rub Washington the
wrong way. The prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the World Bank were implemented without much fuss. American
agricultural products flooded Haitian markets, devastating local
producers. When the Haitian government fined American rice exporters
for evading customs duty, the Bush administration responded by
withholding $30 million in much-needed aid.
ANDREW WINNING/REUTERS
President Jean Bertrand Aristide, who has gone into exile.
Almost immediately after the 2000 elections, Opposition leaders
started demanding the ouster of Aristide saying that he was a dictator
in the making. Many Opposition leaders had links with the ousted
military dictatorship. Some of the militia leaders involved in the
current fighting are known to have links with the Latin American drug
mafia; Haiti is an important trans-shipment point for the drug trade.
The international aid that had been promised to Haiti after the
restoration of democracy did not materialise. The small amount of
American aid that eventually reached Haiti was deliberately channelled
through various non-governmental organisations close to the Republican
Party of President George W. Bush. The Aristide government was
deliberately sidelined.
When the crisis in Haiti seemed to be getting out of hand, the Caricom
asked for United Nations peace-keepers to be sent to the country. Two
of the major cities, Gonaives and Cap Haitien, were taken over by the
armed rebels in late February, and this gave them control over the
country's heartland.
Gonaives was where the country's freedom from France was declared on
January 1, 1804. President Aristide went to the port city to mark the
bicentennial of the historic occasion this year. In a speech, he said
that he was the true heir of the mantle of Haiti's slave soldiers who
defeated the French colonialists. The Haitian uprising was inspired by
the French revolution and was led by a freed slave, Toussaint
L'Ouverture. It was the first military defeat suffered by a colonial
power no less mighty than France under Napoleon. That defeat
effectively ended Napoleon Bonaparte's dream of building a French
empire in the Americas. The Haitian revolution, led by liberated black
slaves, also lent a helping hand to Simon Bolivar in the liberation of
Latin America in the 19th century.
THONY BELIZAIRE/AFP
At a rally held to mark Aristide's third anniversary in office on
February 7 in Port au Prince.
Napoleon, however, had his revenge by recapturing Haiti briefly and
exacting reparations worth 150 million gold francs, worth about $10
billion today. So, from the very outset, Haiti was at a tremendous
disadvantage. In the first half of the 19th century, the U.S. too
supported France and in fact refused to recognise Haiti's
independence. In 1915, the U.S. invaded Haiti and stayed on until
1934.
The movement to destabilise the Lavalas party government led by
Aristide started in right earnest in late 2003. President George
Bush's envoy for Western Hemisphere Initiatives, Otto Reich, was in
Port au Prince in November last along with other diplomats
representing the OAS in order to broker peace between the Lavalas and
the Opposition. Though Aristide had tempered his fiery anti-American
rhetoric in recent times, the Bush administration remained deeply
suspicious of him. The presence of Reich, a right-winger with a known
history of involvement in destabilising progressive governments in the
region, was an ominous sign for the Aristide government.
The main Opposition grouping in Haiti, known as the Democratic
Convergence (CD), was propped up by Washington. The United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) had set up a "democracy
enhancement programme" in Haiti. "The State Department's democracy
enhancement programme was specifically designed to fund those sectors
of the Haitian political spectrum where opposition to the Aristide
government could be encouraged."
WALTER ASTRADA/AP
At a rally organised by the rebels in the city of Gonaives on February
19.
The Western media also went out of their way to portray Aristide and
the Lavalas party as being isolated from the Haitian populace. The
numbers of people attending Opposition rallies were invariably
inflated, while massive pro-Aristide rallies, which have been taking
place since November, were glossed over. Aristide was pictured as
living in an ivory tower, isolated from his people.
RODRIGO ABD/AP
Rebel leader Guy Phillippe in front of the presidential palace in Port
au Prince on March 1.
Aristide's supporters had a single demand - allow the President to
complete his five-year-term for which he had got a massive mandate.
Despite the paucity of funds, the government did try to help the
impoverished masses. Houses and mansions belonging to henchmen of the
military regimes, who had fled the country, were turned into schools
for children of the shanty towns. Despite budgetary constraints, the
government ran a literacy programme for the benefit of the needy.
Those attending the programme were also given highly subsidised meals.
The Cuban government sent around 400 doctors to cater to the medical
needs of the poor at the request of the Haitian government. Such
programmes have ensured that Aristide and his party remain popular
among the poor in Haiti. The barricades put up in Port au Prince by
the supporters of Aristide in the last week of February to prevent a
violent takeover, symbolise the support he continues to enjoy.
There have been reports in the American media that those currently
involved in the military operations against the Haitian government are
armed, trained and employed by the intelligence services of the U.S.
Many of the paramilitary leaders leading the campaign against Aristide
were prominent figures in the American-backed campaign to sideline
Aristide in the mid-1990s. One of the leaders of the present right-
wing insurrection is Lois Jodel Chamblain, who led a death squad
involved in the killing of many prominent Haitians close to Aristide
during 1993-94. Chamblain and his group of heavily armed fighters had
crossed over from the neighbouring Dominican Republic, where many anti-
Aristide exiles have set up base. The rebels are armed with
sophisticated weapons originating from the U.S. In comparison, the
30,000-strong Haitian police force under Aristide is poorly armed. Yet
another chaotic chapter in Haiti's history is in the offing.
Volume 21 - Issue 06, March 13 - March 26, 2004
India's National Magazine
from the publishers of THE HINDU
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2106/stories/20040326001705300.htm
Sid Harth
Global News / Markets
UN chief shocked by Haiti earthquake
UNITED NATIONS: UN chief Mr Ban Ki-moon on Wednesday expressed deep
sympathy for Haitians who have been hit by massive earthquake that has
destroyed several buildings, including the headquarters of the United
Nations peacekeeping mission in the country.
The Secretary-General’s office said that the former US President, Mr
Bill Clinton, the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Haiti, called
the Secretary-General to exchange initial information on the disaster
and agreed to talk again on Wednesday morning .
“My heart goes out to the people of Haiti after this devastating
earthquake. At this time of tragedy, I am very concerned for the
people of Haiti and also for the many United Nations staff who serve
there,” Mr Ban said.
“I am receiving initial reports and following developments closely,”
he added.
The powerful earthquake of 7.0 magnitude rocked Haiti followed by
aftershocks of 5.9 and 5.5 magnitude. A hospital reportedly collapsed
and the presidential palace was also badly damaged.
A statement released later by Mr Ban’s office said: “He is shocked at
the scale of devastation in Port-au-Prince, at the headquarters of the
United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) headquarters
and at other UN buildings. He is anxiously awaiting further news about
missing UN staff and about the people of Haiti.” — PTI
Business Daily from THE HINDU group of publications
Wednesday, January 13, 2010
http://www.hinduonnet.com/businessline/blnus/10131101.htm
Sid Harth
Haiti’s poor eat mud cookies
London: Cookies made of mud – that is what the poor in Haiti are being
forced to eat, thanks to rising food prices in the Caribbean nation.
The biscuits, made from dried yellow clay mixed with water, salt and
vegetable shortening or margarine, have become a staple for Haitians
who are unable to afford even a plate of rice, The Daily Telegraph
reported.
The cookies, known as “terre,” taste smooth but suck out the moisture
from the mouth as soon as they touch the tongue, leaving an unpleasant
earthy aftertaste that lingers for hours.
The Food and Agriculture Organisation recently declared a state of
emergency in Haiti. According to the U.N. agency, food prices have
gone up by almost 40 per cent in the wake of floods and crop damage
caused by hurricanes.
Haitian doctors say people who depend on the biscuits for sustenance
risk malnutrition. Dr. Gabriel Thimothee, executive director of the
Health Ministry, said: “Trust me, if I see someone eating those
cookies, I will discourage it.” — PTI
Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Thursday, Jan 31, 2008
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Sid Harth
Haitian tragedy and imperial farce
AIJAZ AHMAD
The latest intervention by the United States in Haiti brings to the
fore a centuries-old confrontation: between the imperial savagery of
the `civilisation mongers' and the powerlessness of the colonised.
Haitians taunt U.S. Marines patrolling the streets of Port au Prince
on March 5.
A NEW chapter in active U.S. interventionism has been opened, this
time close to American shores, in the Caribbean and Central America.
Haiti has been swiftly occupied. Venezuela is in the sight of the
guns.
Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a Catholic priest deeply committed to
liberation theology whom The New York Times contemptuously called a
"left-leaning nationalist", was the first elected President in 200
years of Haitian history. He had been re-elected in 2000 with over 90
per cent of the vote in a voter turnout estimated at around 65 per
cent in the countryside and close to 100 per cent in the capital Port
au Prince. Haiti itself is a tiny country comprised of half the island
of Hispaniola (the Dominican Republic accounts for the other half),
the poorest in the Western hemisphere and the fourth poorest in the
world, with a literacy rate of 50 per cent. (While three-fourths of
its population lives on less than a dollar a day, 1 per cent owns half
the country's wealth.) Aristide was the President elected by the vast
impoverished majority, against the Opposition, powerful in wealth and
means of violence, but with no roots among the people. (A poll taken
at the time of the elections of 2000 showed that only 8 per cent of
the people of Haiti supported the Opposition.) Under the
circumstances, President Aristide could hardly be accused of
manufacturing weapons of mass destruction, sponsorship of terrorism,
links with Al Qaeda, Islamic belief or dictatorial tyranny.
None of it has deterred the U.S. Since at least the advent of the
George W. Bush administration, which came to power thanks to a dubious
ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court just about the time of Aristide's
landslide electoral victory in Haiti, the U.S. has been nurturing
armed squads comprised of former military and police officers,
professional assassins and their criminal gangs that had fled Haiti at
the time of Aristide's return to power in 1994 and had re-assembled,
with U.S. assistance, in the neighbouring Dominican Republic and on
U.S. soil itself, in Miami, very much on the pattern of the terrorist
"contras" which the U.S. had assembled, trained and assisted in El
Salvador for counter-revolutionary warfare in Nicaragua against the
socialist Sandanista government. These were the terrorist squads,
armed with sophisticated U.S. weapons, that entered Haiti in early
February and got dubbed in the Western media as "rebels" and
"insurgents", as if there was a genuine home-grown insurgency.
Meanwhile, the media - CNN, BBC, The New York Times and others - also
busied themselves in manufacturing a picture of Haiti as a country
ruled by a rather deranged megalomaniac against whom much of the
population had risen in revolt. Meanwhile, a racist discourse
portrayed the people of Haiti as simply lawless and given to killing
one another. None of these media bothered to ask who the so-called
"rebels" were, who led them and where they had come from.
As these terror squads, entering from the Dominican Republic next
door, started terrorising town after town, the U.S. stationed 2,000
Marines in three ships off the shores of Haiti and sent in fresh
squads of Marines on the pretext of providing "security". France, the
old colonial power in Haiti, which had offended the U.S. by opposing
the invasion of Iraq, now re-built its bridges to the supreme imperial
power and emerged as a firm and vocal ally of the U.S. in the
occupation of Haiti, sending a contingent of its own troops, again on
the pretext of providing "security". Canada, which too had stayed out
of the Iraq invasion but has economic interests of its own in the
sweatshops of Haiti, moved swiftly to occupy the position of the "most
allied ally" that Blair had occupied in the case of Iraq. It too sent
in a contingent of troops. The United Nations Security Council, which
had already provided legal cover for the lawless U.S. occupation of
Iraq and was now preparing for a sizable role for the U.N. in that
occupied country, swiftly authorised the formation of an international
security force for Haiti. All this in a matter of three weeks!
ONE should have thought that in a country where a democratically
elected President was under siege by terror squads led by assassins
and drug-merchants well-known to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
and other Western agencies, "security" would mean, above all, security
for a President commanding a massive mandate. The reason why Aristide
was so defenceless against these terror-squads was itself ironic. He
had been first elected with a huge margin in 1990 and was then
overthrown within seven months, in 1991, through a coup d'etat carried
out by officers of the Haitian Army who had been loyal to the
preceding, murderous dictatorships of Duvalier and his son, Papa Doc.
Upon returning to power in 1994, Aristide had simply disbanded that
Army, dismissed the police officers allied with the Army and had built
a new police force for law and order purposes. This was as much to
prevent the possibility of further military takeovers as it was in
keeping with Aristide's own deep, spiritually motivated commitment to
re-build Haiti's fractured civil society with as few means of violence
as possible. Those disgruntled ex-officers of the Army and police,
along with leaders of the assassination squads that dated back to the
years of the military dictatorship (1991-94), were now leading the
armed squads which were portrayed in the media as "rebels". The police
force at the disposal of President Aristide was no match for these
former officers and their gangs with their newly acquired U.S. weapons
and other supplies. In turn, when the U.S. authorities spoke of
"security" they hardly meant security for a President whom they
despised and mistrusted as a nationalist firebrand, against the
"rebels" the U.S. itself had nurtured. The "rebellion" itself had been
unleashed in order to promote a social collapse that could then be
portrayed in the media as a prelude to a "bloodbath" and could be
used, then, as justification for a "humanitarian intervention", a
concept made popular in the Western imagination by the Human Rights
industry.
Thus it is that with troops from the U.S., France and Canada already
in Haiti, and the rampaging terror squads closing in on the capital,
the U.S. Embassy turned down Aristide's request to provide security
for the Presidential Palace, forbade him to expand the number of his
own guards, and then dismissed him on the night of February 28, amidst
a chorus emanating from Washington, Paris, Ottawa and other Western
capitals that, for the "security" of Haiti, its democratically elected
President must simply "go". The whole process of this ouster, from the
beginning of the reign of terror to the departure of Aristide, took
barely three weeks.
What happened on that fateful night of February 28 and the morning of
the next day? The American version is that Aristide called the U.S.
Ambassador in Haiti, James Foley, and asked for more security. In
turn, Foley told him that "rebels" were going to enter the capital
within hours and a "bloodbath" would ensue in which thousands, perhaps
tens of thousands, shall be killed, unless Aristide resigned
immediately and agreed to leave the country. U.S. authorities say that
Aristide eventually agreed, that a civilian group from the U.S.
Embassy was then sent to his residence which took him to the airport
where Aristide handed in his resignation and he, along with his wife
and three aides, was put on a plane for safe passage to the Republic
of Central Africa across the Atlantic. The State Department also
claimed that Aristide had wanted to seek asylum in South Africa but
the latter refused; the South African government has denied that it
received any such request. It is quite clear even from this account
that Aristide resigned under U.S. pressure, that his own Prime Minster
was not part of any such negotiations and that the resignation was
submitted directly to the U.S. Embassy and not to any Haitian
authority, such as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court who was
constitutionally the successor in case the President were to suddenly
die or otherwise relinquish office. It is also known that when that
Chief Justice was sworn in as provisional head of state by the
Americans the popularly elected President had already been put on a
plane by them and the Prime Minister was not even invited to the
ceremony. Thus, even by U.S. account, the coup was carried out not by
any Haitian force but by the U.S. Embassy itself.
AFP
Jean-Claude `Baby Doc' Duvalier with his father Francois `Papa Doc'
Duvalier.
The problem for the U.S., by hindsight, is that it did not kill
Aristide and its African clients have been unable to shut him up. It
is a problem for the U.S. because, unlike Saddam Hussein, Aristide has
not been charged even by the U.S. of any crimes, sponsorship of
terrorism and so on. Its self-proclaimed right to oust him rests
solely on the claim that it - and the so-called "international
community, that is, Western powers - has the right to decide whether
or not a popularly elected Third World leader has the right to rule
his country in accordance with the mandate given to him by his people.
This claim has no basis in international law and no moral authority
outside the discourses of Western racism. This problem is compounded
for the U.S. by the fact that Aristide is a man of unusual courage and
eloquence, and has been able to speak on his own behalf.
President Aristide's account is of course quite different from that of
the U.S. authorities. He says that a large number of armed men -
"white" as well as Haitian - came to the Presidential Palace in the
dark of the night, kidnapped him, extracted a resignation from him
with threats of death and bloodbath, whisked him off to the airport
and put him on the plane without disclosing his destination, and that
when he arrived on African soil he had no idea where he was, whether
in a hotel, a prison or a palace. His account has been confirmed, in
the meanwhile, by the security guards of the Presidential Palace who
witnessed the event, spoke to trusted foreign journalists and are now
in hiding, fearful of the terror squads.
Somehow - and one does not really know how - he managed to have a
mobile telephone, spoke to some of his friends in the U.S. and
eventually issued an eloquent address, "To the Haitian People and the
World", delivered in Creole, through a Haitian radio operator. The
address begins and ends with references to Toussaint L' Ouverture, the
legendary black slave who organised the revolutionary movement that
overthrew colonial rule and established a republic in Haiti 200 years
ago:
"In the shadow of Toussaint L'Ouverture, the genius of the race, I
declare that in overthrowing me they have uprooted the trunk of the
tree of peace, but it will grow back because its roots are
L'Ouverturian... during the night of the 28th of February 2004, there
was a coup d'etat. One could equally say that it was a geopolitical
kidnapping. I can clearly say that it was terrorism disguised as
diplomacy... the 28th of February, at night, suddenly, American
military personnel who were already all over Port au Prince descended
on my house in Tabarre to tell me that... the foreigners and Haitian
terrorists alike, who are loaded with heavy weapons, were already in
position to open fire on Port au Prince. And right then, the Americans
precisely stated that they will kill thousands of people and it will
be a bloodbath; the attack is ready to start, and when the first
bullet is fired nothing will stop them and nothing will make them wait
until they take over, therefore the mission is to take me dead or
alive...
"It was more serious than a bluff. The National Palace was surrounded
by white men armed to their teeth... The airport of Port au Prince was
already under the control of these men... we were already under an
illegal foreign occupation ready to drop bodies on the ground, to
spill blood, and then to kidnap me dead or alive...
"It was not until 20 minutes before we landed in the Republic of
Central Africa that I was given the official word that this is where
we would be landing...
JEAN MAX BENJAMIN/AP
Jean-Bertrand Aristide, originally a Catholic priest deeply committed
to liberation theology, preaching at the St. Jean Bosco Church in a
suburb of Port au Prince. A file photo.
"I ask that everyone who loves life to come together to protect the
lives of others. If we stand in solidarity we will stop the spread of
death and we will help life flourish. The same thing that happened to
a President who was democratically elected can happen any time, in any
other country too. So, therefore, that's why, solidarity is
indispensable to protect a democracy that works together with life...
"The Constitution is the source of [Haiti's] life. It's the guarantee
of life. Let's stand under the Constitution in solidarity so that it
is life that unfolds... we have not forgotten what Toussaint
L'Ouverture has said, and that's why we saluted all of Africa... and
we are saluting all Haitians everywhere with the conviction that the
roots of the tree of peace, with the spirit of Toussaint L'Ouverture
inside, are alive."
So we have yet again, in a nutshell, that centuries-old confrontation:
between the imperial savagery of the "civilisation-mongers" (a phrase
that Friedrich Engels coined for colonisers) and the powerlessness,
but also a certain moral authority, of the colonised.
BUT why Haiti, and why so direct an intervention prepared through
elements so disreputable? To answer this question, we have to take
into account several factors. The first is the historical one. Two
hundred years ago, when colonialism and slavery were overthrown and a
republic established in Haiti, Thomas Jefferson, in whose name the
U.S. calls itself a "Jeffersonian democracy", refused to recognise the
Republic - and so it remained, unrecognised, until 1862 - like the
Cuba of today. The history of U.S. military interventions in Haiti
dates back to mid-19th century, and the U.S. Navy entered Haitian
waters 24 times between 1849 and 1913 to save "American lives and
property". In 1914, the liberal U.S. President Woodrow Wilson deployed
the Marines to Haiti "to maintain order during a period of chronic and
threatened insurrection", almost exactly the excuse under which the
Bush administration has now sent in the Marines about a century later.
Then the U.S. directly occupied Haiti in 1915 and ruled it for 19
years, leaving only when it was able to hand power over to the
murderous National Guards which it had created, and only after it had
imposed upon it a Constitution that gave the U.S. corporations
unrestricted access to its resources, markets and labour force. In
1956, Francois Duvalier (Papa Doc) took over with firm U.S. backing
and the dictator, in turn, granted to the U.S. corporations such
"incentives" as no customs duties, a minimum wage by far the lowest in
the western hemisphere, the suppression of labour unions, and the
right to repatriate their profits. This dictatorship was then
continued by the son, `Baby Doc' Duvalier, who was to be overthrown in
1986 by a massive grassroots uprising and was flown out of Haiti to
Florida on a U.S. Air Force plane, with all his dollars. In the
elections that ensued, Aristide represented the spirit of that popular
craving for liberty, democracy and development, sweeping the polls
with 67.5 per cent of the vote, against 14.2 per cent for Marc Bazin,
a former World Bank official who was backed by the U.S. There has been
no love lost between the U.S. and Aristide since then.
The coup which overthrew Aristide in 1991 and the military
dictatorship of the next three years were then used to suppress unions
and other democratic forces as well as to assassinate some 3,000
progressive people and thus to emasculate the newly flourishing civil
society in Haiti. Emmanuel Constant and Jodel Chamblain, who have
emerged as two of the three key leaders of the current "rebel" army,
were CIA employees and leaders of the paramilitary forces during that
dictatorship. They, together with Guy Philippe, who has emerged as the
main leader of this new "rebel" force and was a notorious police
officer during the military dictatorship, had been previously trained
by the American Special Forces in Honduras. Ironically, however,
economic refugees and other Haitians fleeing from the reign of terror
then started arriving on U.S. shores in a huge flux - the famous
phenomenon of the Haitian "boat people" - since the two countries are
geographically close. It was to stem this tide of refugees, and only
after extracting from him the promise that he would implement the IMF
"conditionalities", that President Bill Clinton helped Aristide return
to Haiti in 1994 while stationing U.S. Marines on Haitian soil for the
well-known purpose of "protecting American lives and property". The
U.S. authorities at the time also removed thousands of documents from
Haitian Army and paramilitary headquarters to the U.S., thus taking
away evidence against the coup makers as well as the paramilitary
personnel who had carried out assassination campaigns during those
three years. Leading lights of that terror regime were likewise given
safe havens in the U.S. and its dependencies in the Caribbean, notably
the Dominican Republic.
JENNIFER SZYMASZEK/AP
A protest in New York against the U.S. intervention, on March 6.
The backbone of the Haitian economy consists of plantations,
sweatshops and export processing plants owned largely by U.S., French
and Canadian firms and a handful of their Haitian friends - the 1 per
cent who own 50 per cent of the country's wealth. As pointed out
earlier, Haiti has by far the lowest paid work force in the Western
hemisphere, and every U.S. intervention since early 19th century,
including the present one, is designed to keep it that way. The main
anti-Aristide group in Haiti, `Convergence for Democracy', is, for
example, financed and otherwise supported by the ruling Republican
Party of the U.S. through the National Endowment for Democracy and the
International Republican Institute, two well-funded U.S.-based
organisations that openly fund and assist a variety of rightwing
forces around the world. When the Republicans took control of the U.S.
Congress in 1995 they forced the Clinton administration to discontinue
the little development aid that had been going to Haiti and re-
channeled it to the anti-Aristide non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) and business groups. Overthrow of the Aristide government has
been a prime objective of the Bush administration ever since it came
into office, just about the time Aristide was re-elected. While the
U.S. successfully pressured the Inter-American Development Bank to
cancel the more than $650 million that had been contracted already in
development assistance and approved loans, it got the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to tighten the screws of their
"structural adjustment" diktats. All this led to much suffering in
Haiti, just as the sanctions did in Iraq. However, there was no
appreciable decline in support for Aristide. The present intervention
has taken so blatant and murderous a form, transparently organised
abroad and executed directly by the U.S. Embassy in Haiti, mainly
because the U.S. had been unable to put together any viable electoral
alternative to Aristide and also lacked any social base for inciting a
mass insurrection.
THE first set of factors that account for the current U.S. crimes in
Haiti, for the form all this has taken, and the support it has
received from France and Canada are thus historical, economic and
social in nature. Then there is the key geo-political factor. Haiti is
geographically not only close to the U.S. but also midway between Cuba
and Venezuela. In fact, as deliveries of large quantities of weapons
and munitions began arriving from the U.S. to the Dominican Republic,
many observers concluded that they were intended for intimidation, and
perhaps even invasion, of Cuba. In Venezuela, the U.S. had sought to
engineer a similar coup-through-social-collapse in 2002 and Hugo
Chavez was indeed out of power for two days, though he did return to
power triumphantly when the coup collapsed. Now, the swift seizure of
Haiti is designed to be a warning, serving as a `demonstration
effect', for Venezuela: This is how blatantly we can do it - just as
the occupation of Iraq has served as a very effective warning to Iran
and Syria!
Aside from this `demonstration effect', the U.S. is now unlikely to
vacate its aggression in Haiti and has been already anointed by the so-
called `international community', that is, France, the U.N. and so on.
Rather, it is quite possible that Haiti shall now be used as a major
military and intelligence base - again on the model of Iraq which
already has more than 100,000 troops stationed there indefinitely and
the largest CIA station in the world comprised of 500 or more
operatives already, larger than any CIA station since Saigon at the
height of the Vietnam War. All this will then intersect with the drug
mafias. Fifty tonnes of Colombian heroin is said to have been
transiting illegally through Haiti annually even during the hapless
Aristide regime. This is likely to increase several fold, drawing
Haiti into the web of drug wars and covert counter-revolutionary
operations of the kind we have been witnessing in Colombia.
It is unlikely that the terror squads that were unleashed as a prelude
to the coup and kidnapping of the popular President shall be assigned
governmental power. We are likely to see two quite different, but
parallel movements. Those squads shall be made to spread through the
cities and the countryside to suppress unions, assassinate progressive
leaders and break up the organised movement loyal to the departed
President. All this shall have U.S. backing and supervision, but shall
be portrayed in the bourgeois media as regretful manifestation of the
violent nature of Haitian society, which can be controlled only in the
long run, patiently, through the civilising mission of the occupiers.
Alongside this, a democratic facade shall also be devised, as it has
been devised for Afghanistan and is being farcically rehearsed in Iraq
at present. The vast majority of the Haitians shall not believe in it,
vast majority of people in the Third World who pay attention to Haiti
shall not believe in it, but the European Union, the U.N. and so on
will - and that is what matters for the U.S. Behind that democratic
facade - capped by the panacea of controlled elections - all the
fundamental structures of the brutal Duvalier dictatorship of
yesteryear shall be resurrected.
Such are the hopes the U.S. seems to nurse. Will they succeed? It is
too soon to tell. Too much truth is known already. Inside the U.S.,
Secretary of State Colin Powell, himself a Black man of Jamaican
origins, had assured the Black Democratic Caucus (comprised 23 Afro-
American Congresspersons) only a week before the coup that the U.S.
was not going to undermine Aristide's regime. Since the coup, Aristide
himself has spelled out the truth. This truth is likely to solidify
the black vote behind the Democratic Party candidate in the
forthcoming elections. While 1,600 foreign troops - all from the West
- occupy Haiti and many more may soon arrive, the 15-nation Caribbean
Community, Caricom, has refused to contribute troops. Instead it
demanded an independent international inquiry into the circumstances
of Aristide's ouster even before the details of Aristide's current
location became available. South Africa has endorsed this demand and
pressure is now mounting within the U.S. for precisely such an inquiry
by the U.S. Congress and by independent commissions. The leading
Democratic Party candidate for the next Presidential elections, John
Kerry, has already denounced Bush's Haitian adventure. Will those who
ousted Aristide themselves be ousted?
The moral claims of empire collapse day by day. Lie after lie after
lie that was told about Iraq has been nailed and more get nailed as
the heap of lies rises. The same shall happen about Haiti. The emperor
has his guns, but is fast losing his clothes.
Volume 21 - Issue 06, March 13 - March 26, 2004
India's National Magazine
from the publishers of THE HINDU
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2106/stories/20040326005613000.htm
Sid Harth
U.S. for political solution in Haiti
By Sridhar Krishnaswami
WASHINGTON, FEB. 20. Against the backdrop of the rapidly worsening
situation in Haiti, the U.S. State Department has asked Americans to
leave that country. The Pentagon has announced that it is sending a
small team to assess the security of the embassy and prepare for a
possible evacuation.
The U.S. is making it known that it is pushing for a political
solution to the crisis and that envoys from the U.S., Canada, France,
Latin America and the Caribbean will meet the President, Jean-Bertrand
Aristide, to impress him to seek political accommodation with his
rivals. The Assistant Secretary of State, Roger Noreiga, will take
part in the meeting.The Pentagon says the small team has nothing to do
with any plan for a major military intervention; and that the team has
come after a specific request from the American Ambassador there,
James Foley. The U.S. has been maintaining, at least publicly, that it
is not for a military solution.
Washington says forcing Mr. Aristide out is not on the agenda. But
that Mr. Aristide himself might agree to step down ahead of his tenure
— February 2006. The Opposition leaders in Haiti have been demanding
that Mr. Aristide step down immediately. .
Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Saturday, Feb 21, 2004
http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2004/02/21/stories/2004022102181400.htm
Sid Harth
Haiti telethon draws glitterati
Los Angeles: Some of the biggest names from Hollywood and music world
came together to pledge their support to earthquake ravaged Haiti at
“Hope for Haiti Now” telethon, which was led by actor George Clooney
and Haitian rapper Wyclef Jean.
Clooney started the two-hour long event by donating $1 million in Los
Angeles and also got friends Leo DiCaprio, Matt Damon, Angelina Jolie,
Brad Pitt and Sandra Bullock to do the same. Twilight star Robert
Pattinson led the U.K. leg of the event and shared stories from the
aftermath of the earthquake.
The event saw celebrities like Jay-Z, Madonna, Beyonce, Alicia Keys,
Rihanna and Justin Timberlake performing while Cindy Crawford, Reese
Witherspoon, Drew Barrymore, Julia Roberts, Bradley Cooper, Vanessa
Hudgens took to the phones to accept donations.
The telethon, which saw some 200 celebrities uniting for the cause,
was beamed around the globe on television, on mobile and Internet. The
event is expected to raise $1 billion for the victims of the Haiti
earthquake.
Some other celebrities who have pledged their support for the massive
fundraiser are Jack Nicholson, Jennifer Aniston, Penelope Cruz, Billy
Crystal, John Cusack, Stevie Wonder and Bill Clinton and many others.
— PTI
Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Sunday, Jan 24, 2010
ePaper | Mobile/PDA Version
http://www.hindu.com/2010/01/24/stories/2010012452261200.htm
Sid Harth
January 24, 2010 -- Updated 1609 GMT (0009 HKT)
Haitian children watch a U.S. helicopter January 20 as the American
mission to aid the earthquake-stricken country continues.
STORY HIGHLIGHTS
Haiti aid operation continues tradition of U.S. helping around the
world, says Bob Greene
He says there were criticisms of the speed of the aid
Greene says that the response shows that Americans are eager to
contribute and to help
He says Americans can still aspire to be the hope of the world
Editor's note: CNN contributor Bob Greene is a bestselling author
whose new book is "Late Edition: A Love Story."
(CNN) -- There was a phrase, or so we have long been told, that was
heard in occupied Europe during World War II.
It was often said as a whisper, the story goes. It had the sound of a
prayer.
The words were so simple, but to people who were feeling utterly
abandoned and who needed help, those words meant so much.
Four words:
"The Americans are coming."
Sometimes we forget about the power of those words, and about how, for
so long, they defined the real meaning of what this country, at its
best, could be.
Sometimes, in the midst of all the bad news, in the midst of the
mistakes this country inevitably makes, we lose sight of how much the
people of the United States are counted on by those in need.
Which is why the humanitarian efforts in Haiti this month, in the wake
of the earthquake, have been a reminder of who we are when we strive
to find our finest selves.
The relief efforts have been an international undertaking; the
heartache on the streets of Haiti has summoned compassionate and
heroic assistance from around the globe, all of it deserving of praise
and gratitude.
But the United States has been at the forefront, as it has so often
seemed to be in so many places when hope was in short supply. It is
almost beyond imagining to think what has been in the terrified minds
of the citizens of Haiti who have been without water, without food,
without a way to rescue their trapped and dying children. When there
is nothing left to depend on, when all is desolation and despair, what
must the hungry and the hurt wish for as they look into the empty
distance?
Someone to care.
Someone to travel many miles, with the will and the means to heal.
The slowness with which medical supplies and water and heavy equipment
have reached the people of Haiti has been thoroughly reported. Some of
the results of the relief effort have been troubling, beset by
bottlenecks and breakdowns under arduous conditions. But this is not
about the frustrations in getting the job done. It is about the
American impulse to help.
There is nothing particularly controversial, these days, about
pointing out the failings of the United States. You can say just about
any derogatory thing about the U.S., and it's not especially shocking.
We're used to hearing it.
Already, as the tragedy in Haiti continues to unfold, there have been
pockets of harsh criticism of America's efforts to help. French
Cooperation Minister Alain Joyandet alluded to the United States
"occupying" Haiti instead of assisting it. It is not the first time
the United States has been chastised, and it will not be the last. The
history of the U.S. involvement in Haiti has not always been a happy
or unsullied one.
But perhaps we can take just a moment to think about the honor that is
inherent in being the ones who, at junctures like this one, are
counted on -- the ones who show up, every time.
During World War II, those four words -- "The Americans are coming" --
referred to the armed forces who had traveled across the ocean to
liberate the people the Nazis had enslaved. In times of natural
disaster, the context is different.
In Haiti the words refer to the 82nd Airborne, yes, but they also
refer to the American doctors who are volunteering their time and
risking their own safety to soothe the pain of people they had never
before met. The words refer to the American volunteers assisting at
Haitian orphanages, not giving up on the children who have no families
to comfort them. The words refer to the American search-and-rescue
teams who work past the point of exhaustion as they seek signs of the
living among the rubble, and they refer to the Americans back home
who, during difficult economic times in the U.S., have donated their
money to help people who, for now, have no way to say thank you.
The focus of the news will shift soon enough -- that shift has already
started. There will be other crises, other major stories. We, as a
country and as individuals, will continue to be imperfect.
There will be political squabbles and high-decibel partisan fights. We
will at times focus on the trivial and the coarse.
At such times, we might do well to pause and recall the sound of those
four words.
And to let the words remind us that, when we set our souls to it, we
still can aspire to be the hope of the world.
The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of Bob
Greene.
http://edition.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/01/23/greene.haiti.american.aid/index.html
bademiyansubhanallah
Amid the ruins Haiti spots a golden prize
While Port-au-Prince struggles to recover, the north hopes to lure the
tourists that now visit Labadee Nord
Tony Allen-Mills in Cap-Haitien
FROM the crumbling balconies of his dusty office in the heart of
Haiti’s second city, Michel St Croix, the mayor of Cap-Haïtien, looks
out over ruined streets, a battered port and an impoverished
population swollen by refugees fleeing the earthquake zone to the
south.
Sitting on an ancient leather sofa beneath busts of long-dead Haitian
kings and emperors, St Croix acknowledged last week that he is
scarcely a stranger to chronic adversity. Starved of funds by a
corrupt and malevolent central government in Port-au-Prince, the mayor
has long been powerless to reverse the tide of numbing poverty that
suffocated all hope and ambition along Cap-Haïtien’s once-thriving
waterfront.
Yet suddenly St Croix leant forward, speaking quickly and earnestly.
“This is a moment like never before for Haiti to start again,” he
said. “Everyone understands that this tragedy is also an
opportunity.”
It is a refrain heard often among officials, businessmen and foreign
agents who are already scouting investment opportunities along Haiti’s
spectacular northern coast.
“The earthquake has opened the door to a changing of old attitudes,”
said Jean-Bernard Simonnet, proprietor of Cap-Haïtien’s Cormier Plage
hotel and head of the regional tourist association. “The potential up
here is tremendous, but our problem has always been that the interest
from Port-au-Prince has been small.”
For decades, successive governments have centralised political and
economic power, partly as a means of controlling revenues and partly
to defuse provincial revolt.
St Croix pointed to the most damaging example of calculated neglect:
along the coast from Cap-Haïtien sits Labadee Nord, the private
peninsula leased by Royal Caribbean cruises as a port of call for
500,000 passengers a year.
Outsiders may have recoiled at the thought of tourists sunning
themselves while Haitians were engulfed by misery, but St Croix views
the visitors as crucial to the future of his city — if only he had the
power to share in their benefits.
“Under the old deal with Royal Caribbean, they paid a $6 [£3.70] tax
for every tourist,” said St Croix. “Two dollars went to the National
Treasury, $2 to the Ministry of Tourism and $2 came to us.
“After 2004 [when the military seized power in a coup], everything
stopped. Now the government charges $10 a tourist and we don’t get a
sou.”
When I asked another middle-class Haitian why the mountainous highway
north to Cap-Haïtien was in a state of such bone-rattling disrepair he
replied: “If they spent the money on roads, then how would the
ministers’ girlfriends be able to go shopping in Paris?”
His cynicism was understandable: weeks before the earthquake, Haiti’s
ruling class was shaken by a scandal over the apparent disappearance
of $197m (£122m) from a fund earmarked for emergency hurricane relief.
The money came from a subsidised-petrol deal with Venezuela.
“Only in Haiti can you not account for a sum that big,” said a
prominent political figure in the capital.
The destruction in Port-au-Prince has stirred hopes that international
donors will be reluctant to finance a resumption of thievery-as-usual
in a government that Transparency International ranks among the
world’s most corrupt.
“It’s important to understand that the provinces are not suffering
because of simple negligence,” said Dominique Carvonis, a tourism
consultant whose family runs several hotels. “It was government policy
to concentrate on Port-au-Prince. But now that Port-au-Prince is in
ruins, the provinces must organise themselves.”
For Cap-Haïtien’s mayor, a brighter future is tantalisingly close. In
the mountains above his city stands the magnificent Citadel of
Laferrière, a fortress built by Henri Christophe, the former hotel
waiter who proclaimed himself Haiti’s king in 1811. Close by are the
ruins of Sans Souci, a palace that Henri modelled on the Prussian
residence at Potsdam.
It is St Croix’s dream that one day the thousands of passengers who
pour off Royal Caribbean’s ships each week will drive up the mountain
by the busload, showering Cap-Haïtien with dollars on the way.
“We had a study done by a Dominican Republic firm, which estimated
that we need to spend $7m [£4.3m] on roads and infrastructure to be
able to receive tourists,” said St Croix.
“So we had a meeting with the prime minister and he said, ‘There’s no
money; where can we get that kind of money?’ I said, ‘The money’s
right here’.” St Croix waved in the direction of Labadee as another
shipload of tourists was pouring tax revenues into the ministry
coffers of Port-au-Prince.
How to help
To make a donation to the DEC Haiti Earthquake Appeal go to
dec.org.uk, call 03706 060 900 or visit any post office or high-street
bank; or send a cheque made payable to ‘DEC Haiti Earthquake Appeal’
to PO Box 999, London EC3A 3AA.
Print
Email
Your Comments
2 Comments(
James Dowling wrote:
It's curious that the Dominican Republic, which has a land border with
Haiti, seems to have played such a small part in the rescues. Don't
they get on with their neighbours?
January 31, 2010 8:01 AM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk Recommend?
(1)
Yesh Prabhu wrote:
Let Mr. Michel St Croix, the mayor of Cap-Haïtien, appoint a committee
to investigate how could the huge amount, $197m (£122m), vanish from a
fund earmarked for emergency hurricane relief. That money would be
more than enough to renovate the entire run-down town, and the
crumbling highways too. In addition to the international aid, what
Haiti desperately needs now are a few honest politicians who don't
pilfer its national treasury.
Yesh Prabhu, Plainsboro, NJ
January 31, 2010 12:44 AM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk
Recommend? (3)
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article7009611.ece
bademiyansubhanallah
'They have come to forget their troubles,' Gabriel Theagene, the owner
of the cockfighting pit said
Image :1 of 2
Martin Fletcher in Port-au-Prince
The entrance is a narrow back alley blocked by a man at a table
charging 25 gourdes, or about 75p, to enter. Beyond, in a large dirt
yard covered with a tin roof and enclosed on three sides by high
breezeblock walls, a packed crowd is gathered in a circle, looking
inwards, yelling, cheering and gesticulating wildly.
Less than three weeks after the earthquake that devastated their
capital and left more than 150,000 dead, Haitians have resumed their
national pastime: cockfighting. The participants are unapologetic.
“Many people have lost their houses and families. They have come to
forget their troubles,” said Gabriel Theagene, 83, the rheumy-eyed,
gold-toothed, second-generation owner of this particular pit in
Plaine, a wretched township on the northern edge of Port-au-Prince.
“People need this as a distraction to forget the earthquake,” says
William Cherry, 40, who said that his house had been crushed. “This is
the only place we can come and have fun,” said Dominique Joseph, 43,
who lost a sister, aunt and uncle.
In truth, they would be here anyway, for cockfighting — cok gages to
give it its Creole name — is a national passion, imported from France
and Britain long before Haiti became the first black republic in 1804.
It is a means by which Haitian males — women neither attend nor
necessarily approve — inject a little passion and excitement into
lives of relentless hardship and monotony, and it is perfectly legal.
On this particular afternoon more than 100 men had gathered for the
thrice-weekly fights, and by the time The Times arrives halfway
through the afternoon the pit is already spattered with blood and
feathers.
Cocks in various states of health or distress are tied to posts or
bicycle wheels around the yard’s perimeter. One man hawks an evil-
smelling moonshine called bois cochon from two filthy plastic
containers. Another takes bets on a card game. People urinate against
the walls.
The excitement builds as the next contest approaches. The owners take
the hoods off their black-and-brown birds and parade them around the
pit. They cut off their combs and trim their neck feathers with knives
so that there is less to grab hold of. One owner takes sips of water
and blows them deep into the feathers of his bird to keep it cool in
the afternoon heat.
Men who profess to be unemployed and penniless produce wads of soiled
banknotes from their pockets. Soon they are shouting and wagering 10,
20, 50 gourdes. A whistle blows. The pit is cleared. The spectators
crowd around standing on the concrete benches that encircle it.
The owners thrust the two cocks at each other to provoke them, then
let them go and they fly up in a blur of wings and feathers. “Mangez,
mangez bien!” the spectators roar. “Frappez, frappez!” More bets are
laid. even as the fight continues.
Finally, after nearly 15 minutes, one bird loses the will to fight and
the judge stops the contest before it is pecked to death.
The owner of the victorious bird dances a jig of delight. He has just
earned himself about 1,000 gourdes — a lot of money in a country where
80 per cent of the population live below the poverty line. The secret,
he says, is to feed the cock good food — eggs, bananas, lemon juice.
The loser throws his half-dead bird into the dirt.
By the time the seventh fight ends the light is fading. The pit has no
electricity, so the crowd departs. It manifestly does not occur to
them that their sport is cruel. Why should it? In Haiti life is and
always has been cruel — for humans as well as animals.
(Displaying 1-4)
Judy Walton wrote:
Curtis Mike
The answer to that is yes. Any animal fighting is entirely repulsive
and panders to a blood lust which can only belong to the less evolved
as far as I'm concerned.
January 30, 2010 11:52 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk
Recommend? (4) Report Abuse Permalink
Curtis Mike wrote:
@ Judy Walton:The pastime you described as revolting has its root from
Britain and France.What can you say about dog fights that are still
very common in many western countries-A sign of primitivism?
January 30, 2010 10:51 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk
Recommend? Report Abuse Permalink
Judy Walton wrote:
A revolting pastime which signifies a very primitive society.
January 30, 2010 6:07 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk Recommend?
(3) Report Abuse Permalink
Kim Righetti wrote:
This despicable "sport" is illegal in The US. Sanctions and aid should
stop from all countries until this horrific activity is ended.
January 30, 2010 4:59 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk Recommend?
(2)
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article7009047.ece
Haiti: in one street's apocalyptic ruin, the story of a nation
(Ben Gurr/The Times)
Idammante Eigore stands in front of the remains her former home on
Pescaye Street
Image :1 of 4
Martin Fletcher in Port-au-Prince
In the first house in Ruelle Pescaye a woman lives with her aunt and
child. It is the only one of the street’s 26 homes still intact and
occupied.
Next door, workmen dig in the rubble of what used to be Fred Manigat’s
three-storey home, searching for the corpse of a friend who was
visiting the middle-aged civil servant when the earthquake struck.
They are guided by the stench of decomposed flesh. The bodies of Mr
Manigat’s father, two sisters and a cousin were retrieved a week ago.
Nobody has dared to tell Mr Manigat’s mother, who is having dialysis
treatment in Miami, that her husband and two daughters are dead.
Ruelle Pescaye used to be a pleasant street — quiet, elevated, flanked
by comfortable homes with private gardens and views of green mountains
— a far cry from the filthy slums that make up much of Port-au-
Prince.
Today it is an apocalyptic sight, its homes almost all collapsed or
damaged beyond repair. Debris and crushed cars litter the road. Some
residents have moved away. The rest are living in their yards or on
the road; most are desperately short of water, food and money. They
have received no aid, and are unlikely to in the foreseeable future.
They have no chance of repairing their homes before the rains start in
April and have no plans beyond an unshakeable faith in God’s
providence. They merely sit and wait, day after day, living in limbo
amid the ruins of their former lives.
Ruelle Pescaye is by no means an extreme example, however. Compared
with thousands of other streets in Port-au-Prince it escaped quite
lightly.
Idammante Bigord, 25, a student, now lives with her two brothers on a
sofa and a mattress retrieved from the shattered concrete and twisted
steel that was their home. Idammante’s parents and younger sister were
crushed. “It’s very, very sad,” she said quietly, but the tears no
longer flow.
Outwardly, she has become hardened, impassive, a child of the street.
“I can’t kill myself. I just have to go on, but it’s very difficult,”
she said.
Ms Bigord agreed to guide The Times around Ruelle Pescaye.
A one-storey house with a corrugated iron roof was still partially
intact. Mirlande Dophin, a Haitian-American raised in California,
lived there with his girlfriend and cousin. All survived. Mr Dophin
was a cocaine dealer, he said without embarrassment, but business had
dried up. Home is now an old school bus.
The fifth house was flattened, but Leonne Hypolite and her two
children somehow escaped with minor injuries and are living on the
street. The sixth house, a handsome whitewashed affair with grilles
and window boxes, looked untouched, illustrating what a lottery the
earthquake was. The owner, however, had taken fright and fled.
The street’s most venerable home, a fine wooden house half a century
old, was still standing, but so precariously that Christiani François,
an English teacher, and his extended family of 17 were living beneath
a breadfruit tree in the yard.
“The Bible said we would have an apocalypse before the coming of Jesus
Christ,” Mr François said. “Jesus is coming back. We don’t know when
or how, but we are praying all the time and trying to do good
things.”
World News US & Americas News MY PROFILE SHOP JOBS PROPERTY
CLASSIFIEDS The tenth house, unoccupied when the earthquake struck
was, perversely, unscathed. The roof of the 12th had caved in and the
walls bulged out so far that it resembled a reflection in a distorting
mirror, but its five occupants had escaped unhurt. Inside, a wedding
picture still hung from a nail in what was a kitchen.
The top floor of the next house crashed on to the one below, killing
Annie Labissière’s sister. She camps in the yard with a few
possessions and is angry, not for herself, but for the poorest
Haitians. “Where is all the international assistance?” she demands.
The last house was partially destroyed. Its occupants — a mother and
child — had vanished. Only their dog remained, pining on the steps
that led up to where the front door once stood.
Outside, a street vendor, Immacula Baptiste, one injured leg wrapped
in filthy bandages, sat beneath a faded parasol hawking tiny packets
of charcoal, salt and sugar. In several hours she had sold only 50
cents’ worth.
On the south side, the top floor of No 14 had crushed the ground
floor, but the occupants had the good fortune to be evicted before the
earthquake for not paying the rent. Next door a family of nine, five
of them children, sat in the road on plastic chairs. Asked their
plans, Nesida Pinchinat, a teacher, held out her hands, palms upwards.
“We’re just waiting. We don’t know what for, but we have faith in
God,” she replied.
An extended family of 21 were camping beneath a crude shelter of
wooden beams and corrugated iron. On a small fire Marie Lourde was
cooking yams, the family’s meal for the day.
Solange Jean Jules, her husband and their two children, were living —
existing is perhaps a better word — in what was left of their home.
Half a dozen occupants of No 21 had survived but a girl of 24 perished
and the grandmother had broken her leg.
Ms Bigord fell silent as we approached the wreckage of the next house.
Her friend Michaelle, 24, and her aunt, were buried inside, the smell
of their decomposing bodies lingered in the air. “She was a cool girl,
very kind,” Ms Bigord murmured, before asking whether she could return
with us to Britain.
The last house was still standing, but too weakened to use. Outside
stood a rudimentary shelter where, surreally, a young woman named
Darlene Duvilene was giving another woman a pedicure.
Her own house had been destroyed so she had returned to Ruelle
Pescaye. The pedicures were free, she said. They were her gift — a way
of easing the street’s misery.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article7007142.ece
From The Times January 29, 2010
Hear the rumble of Christian hypocrisy
The evangelist who says the Haiti earthquake is retribution for sin is
at least true to his religionRichard Dawkins
395 Comments
Recommend? (191)
We know what caused the catastrophe in Haiti. It was the bumping and
grinding of the Caribbean Plate rubbing up against the North American
Plate: a force of nature, sin-free and indifferent to sin,
unpremeditated, unmotivated, supremely unconcerned with human affairs
or human misery.
The religious mind, however, hubristically appropriates the blind
happenings of physics for petty moralistic purposes. As with the
Indonesian tsunami, which was blamed on loose sexual morals in tourist
nightclubs; as with Hurricane Katrina, which was attributed to divine
revenge on the entire city of New Orleans for organising a gay rally;
and as with other disasters going back to the famous Lisbon earthquake
and beyond, so Haiti’s tragedy must be payback for human “sin”.
The Rev Pat Robertson, infamous American televangelist, sees the hand
of God in the earthquake, wreaking terrible retribution for a 1791
pact that the Haitians made with the Devil, to help to rid them of
their French masters. 1791? Ah, but don’t forget “I the Lord thy God
am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the
children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me”.
Needless to say, milder-mannered faith-heads fell over themselves to
disown Robertson, just as they disowned those other pastors,
evangelists, missionaries and mullahs at the time of the earlier
disasters.
What hypocrisy. Loathsome as Robertson’s views undoubtedly are, he is
the Christian who stands squarely in the Christian tradition. The
agonised theodiceans who see suffering as an intractable “mystery”, or
who see God in the help, money and goodwill that is now flooding into
Haiti, or (most nauseating of all) who claim to see God “suffering on
the cross” in the ruins of Port-au-Prince, those faux-anguished
hypocrites are denying the centrepiece of their own theology. It is
the obnoxious Pat Robertson who is the true Christian here.
Where was God in Noah’s flood? He was systematically drowning the
entire world, animal as well as human, as punishment for “sin”. Where
was God when Sodom and Gomorrah were consumed with fire and brimstone?
He was deliberately barbecuing the citizenry, lock, stock and barrel,
as punishment for “sin”.
“Oh but that’s the Old Testament. No one believes those stories
literally any more. The New Testament is all about love.” Dear modern,
enlightened, theologically sophisticated, gentle Christian, you cannot
be serious. Your entire religion is founded on an obsession with
“sin”, with punishment and with atonement. Where do you find the
effrontery to condemn Pat Robertson, you who have signed up to the
odious doctrine that the central purpose of Jesus’s incarnation was to
have himself tortured as a scapegoat for the “sins” of all mankind,
past, present and future, beginning with the “sin” of Adam, who (as
any modern theologian well knows) never even existed?
Yes, I know you hate the word “scapegoat” (with good reason, because
it is a barbaric idea) but what other word would you use? The only
respect in which “scapegoat” falls short as a perfect epitome of
Christian theology is that the Christian atonement is even more
unpleasant. The goat of Jewish tradition was merely driven into the
wilderness with its cargo of symbolic sin. Jesus was supposedly
tortured and executed to atone for sins that, any rational person
might protest, he had it in his power simply to forgive, without the
agony. Among all the ideas ever to occur to a nasty human mind (Paul’s
of course), the Christian “atonement” would win a prize for pointless
futility as well as moral depravity.
Even without the stark heartlessness of Pat Robertson, tragedies like
Haiti are meat and drink to the theological mind. To quote the
president of one theological seminary, writing in the On Faith blog of
the Washington Post: “The earthquake in Haiti, like every other
earthly disaster, reminds us that creation groans under the weight of
sin and the judgment of God. This is true for every cell in our
bodies, even as it is for the crust of the earth at every point on the
globe.”
You nice, middle-of-the-road theologians and clergymen, be-frocked and
bleating in your pulpits, you disclaim Pat Robertson's suggestion that
the Haitians are paying for a pact with the Devil. But you worship a
god-man who — as you tell your congregations, even if you don’t
believe it yourself — “cast out devils”. You even believe (or you
don’t disabuse your flock when they believe) that Jesus cured a madman
by causing the “devils” in him to fly into a herd of pigs and stampede
them over a cliff. Charming story, well calculated to uplift and
inspire the Sunday School and the Infant Bible Class.
Robertson may spout evil nonsense, but he is a mere amateur at that
game. Just read your own New Testament. Pat Robertson is true to it.
But you?
Educated apologist, how dare you weep Christian tears, when your
entire theology is one long celebration of suffering: suffering as
payback for “sin” — or suffering as “atonement” for it? You may weep
for Haiti where Pat Robertson does not, but at least, in his hick, sub-
Palinesque ignorance, he holds up an honest mirror to the ugliness of
Christian theology. You are nothing but a whited sepulchre.
Richard Dawkins’s latest book is The Greatest Show on Earth. His
charitable foundation, RDFRS, is co-ordinating Non-Believers Giving
Aid (NBGA)(givingaid.richarddawkins.net)
(Displaying 1-10)
David Leech wrote:
Wow the woo is strong on these comment pages. All right lets forget
science, evidence and reason as none of you christians put any stock
in it anyway.
This world has invented over 2,500 gods to date. We know the muslims
have a holy book which they can quote scriptures just as easy as you
can. Are they not just as devoted to allah as you are to your god. Do
they not feel allah in their hearts like you do. The same arguments
used for your god can easily be adapted to show theirs exists as well.
What about the the Jews after all you worship their god, They where
around at the time off Jesus and found his claims wanting. They where
there and you where not isn't that arrogant to claim you know better
than them.
So these are all the Abraham's god but the differences of doctrine
means they are not the same religion.
What of these Hindu's gods and holy texts, because they are many does
that make them any less true. Don't Hindus feel their god in their
hearts as much as you. Don't Hindus have personal experiences with
their gods.
Zeus, Wotan and Jupiter were once revered as much the same piety.
How do you know your god is the one true god, don't the muslims also
have a hell, shouldn't you make sure you haven't picked the wrong god.
Have you really thought about the god you worship, might this god just
be the god of your parents or culture you where brought up in. Their
seems to be serious consequences for getting it wrong judging by the
threats we atheist have to put up with daily.
OK stay/become rational.
Love and kisses. Dave.
January 31, 2010 1:34 AM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk Recommend?
(8)
John Menzies wrote:
Poor old Dawkins. I hope he can get some sleep after this hysterical
writing
January 31, 2010 12:59 AM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk
Recommend? (1)
Simon Newbold wrote:
@ G. Lorriman.
Your latest uninformed rant defies belief!!!
January 31, 2010 12:54 AM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk
Recommend? (2)
Geraldine Mitchell wrote:
You can sense a desperation in the posts of 'believers'. So much is at
stake, if they dare to see the logic in Dawkins aurgument. Belonging
to that special group of 'better than thou'. All that nice dressing up
on a Sunday and unchallenged retoric to churn out to their kids about
how to live and what is right and wrong. All decided, no need to think
for yourself.The threat of terrible vengence brought to bear on any
sheep who decide not to follow, either by natural disaster or by hell
fire and brimstone - conveniently in an after life which noone comes
back from to tell the tale. Well,outside of the 'zoo' we aethiest
animals think for ourselves, endeavour to treat others as we would
like to be treated and try to work out what is really and wrong as we
go along. Its exhilerating and energising and the world is a wonderful
place to live your one short life. Make the most of every precious
minute and shake yourself clear of any dogma that tells you how to
interpret the world. Don't be afraid.
January 31, 2010 12:15 AM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk
Recommend? (9)
Richard Warden wrote:
If I have read this article correctly, Richard Dawkins says that any
Christian who disagrees with Pat Robertson's view of Christian
theology is in the wrong. To quote, 'It is the obnoxious Pat Robertson
who is the true Christian here.'.
In that case well done Dawkins for creating another variant of the No
True Scotsman fallacy.
January 30, 2010 11:20 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk
Recommend? (3)
Scooby Doo wrote:
"To those haunted by a sense of guilt the Gospel is , "good news."
However, as a society we have been trained to believe that whatever
goes wrong with the world is someone else's fault- the Capitalists',
the Government's, the Nazi's , the General's etc. We approach God
Himself ad His judges. We want to know, not whether we can be
acquitted for sin, but whether He can be acquitted for creating such a
world."
C.S. Lewis "Christian Apologetics"(Adapted)
January 30, 2010 11:14 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk
Recommend? (4)
G Lorriman wrote:
Dawkins"We know what caused the catastrophe in Haiti [nature not a
supreme being]."
Dawkins 'knows' but on the basis of his non-argument of "not a shred
of evidence". Logically that isn't even enough to be of a strong
opinion that there is no god, as lack of evidence tells us nothing
despite Dawkins' claim to the contrary, let alone being enough to
'know'. It also contradicts his claim of being 95% atheist because of
the "infinitesimal possibility of a god"[Dawkins]. He really is an
irrational atheist (believing without proof), after all, if he is
willing to make these strong anti-religious statements.
Religions claim the supreme being, whose defintion they share (ie.
it's the same god) reveals himself (ie. proves its own existence) in a
manner that gives objective knowledge solving the atheist objection of
"voices in the head". So it's a bit rich for Dawkins to be pitting his
unprovable position against the possibility of a god that might well
be proving its own existence; so explaining why there are so very many
believers even despite the sufferings and unpleasantnesses of this
life.
Dawkins position is really just a huge act of presumption, and so by
definition arrogance.
God may well be punishing Haiti, particularly for its voodoo, but
perhaps also for presuming upon a faultline in defiance of reason,
rather like Dawkins.
January 30, 2010 10:18 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk
Recommend? (3)
Timothy Gormley wrote:
The comments section of the times is just so depressing. So much
magical thinking, so much unfounded assertion, so much faith -
impervious to reason, logic or fact.
My children are going to have to inherit this intellectual and
cultural pool, and just too many people are polluting it. I can't help
but wonder it a dark ages has arrived. Intellectual retreat and
stagnation seems to be the order of the day.
Citizens of western civilization, descendants of Einstein, Democritus,
Archemedes, Sagan, Darwin, Curie and Fermi - your nation and culture
demands more of you. By embracing logical contortions to reconcile
science with bronze age magical thinking - you abandon our children to
the next dark age.
You can, you must and you WILL do better.
January 30, 2010 8:51 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk Recommend?
(21)
Michael Larkin wrote:
(continued because truncated) I think it is perfectly possible to
follow the Christ way as a member of any faith, or none at all. Jesus
didn’t actually found a religion: human beings did that, and their own
confusions became embodied in it and its many sects.
“Sin”, as I see it, is simply a metaphor for separation from Source.
If one adheres to certain standards, quite well expressed in the Ten
Commandments, separation will decrease. But if one lies, cheats,
envies, hates or murders, it will increase in proportion to the
inherent nastiness of the act. God doesn’t “punish”: it’s more that we
sometimes make free choices for separation. Anything that increases
separation is “evil” and leads to “hell”; anything that decreases it
is “good” and leads to “heaven”. Other definitions of good and evil
are largely culture/religion-based, and may or may not align with
actual good or evil.
We are all on our way back to Source, to self-discovery in God’s game
of hide-and-seek with Himself. This is expressed delightfully in Alan
Watts’ short essay: “What to tell children about God”. Just Google it
and have a five-minute read – as an adult: as such, you are the
product of billions of years of evolution which has refined you to a
staggering degree of nobility.
You haven’t that far to go now. Your science is one means you are
using to get you there, and other people are using other techniques
which are equally noble and worthwhile. They’re just as bright as you
are, and some of them, perhaps, brighter. Einstein was an example you
might relate to: he had a great scientific mind, but also a deep
awareness of the beauty and wonder of the universe. Beauty and
wonderfulness are a couple of the attributes of God, and I suspect
that trying to understand the universe, impelled by an appreciation
of, and attraction to, these attributes, is how you as a scientist
perform your worship and make your daily prayer.
January 30, 2010 8:06 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk Recommend?
(1)
Charles Croll wrote:
Continued from a previous posting:
There is, though, a downside to this freedom. People do choose to do
unloving things that harm others and harm God’s creation, and this has
unfortunate consequences. It is when we try to understand what this
means that the creation story - the first four chapters of Genesis,
including the Fall and the sad tale of Adam and Eve’s children -
suddenly makes sense: it turns out not to be about HOW God made the
world, but sets out to answer an altogether different question: WHY do
bad things happen in this world when the creator is good and loving?
The story is that God made the world a moral place which suffers when
people do bad things. Sometimes there is a direct correlation between
the sin and the suffering – as with Cain and Abel - but mostly it is
indirect, i.e. creation suffers therefore we all, as part of creation,
suffer.
This suffering is, in general, a random thing: it is an exception for
God to intervene. And again, this is because of God’s love. The reason
is that if God intervened in such a way that good people were
protected from suffering and bad people had a harder time it would not
take long for people to work out that it is better to be good, but
they would be good for self-interested reasons and not because it is
the loving thing to do. God wants us to be motivated by love and not
selfishly motivated. We come back to God’s love again!
God is a loving sovereign not a controlling dictator.
January 30, 2010 7:52 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk Recommend?
(3)
(Displaying 11-20)
John Symes wrote:
Oh Doctor Dawkins
You're rather a bore
With your rage against God, Jehovah,
And more.
What I can't understand -
Perhaps you're just yaller? -
Why do you never rage against Allah?
January 30, 2010 7:52 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk Recommend?
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Charles Croll wrote:
Christians use the word ‘sovereign’ when talking about God, as in “God
is sovereign.” As UK citizens we should understand this word for our
sovereign neither controls all we do, nor does she have no effect on
our lives. In a similar manner, God also neither controls everything
(as Muslims profess), nor is everything out of his control. He is
neither a control freak nor an incompetent spectator
This has to be said because Christian thought is often presented in
one or other of these terms by people like Richard Dawkins, who do it
because it is easy for them to mock such thinking. It is a cheap shot.
While there are some Christians on the fringes who talk as if God is
one of these things, it is wrong to represent all Christian thought as
being this way.
The truth, as you might suspect, is not so simplistic. It is more
subtle and nuanced and beautiful.
The loving God, making us in his image, made us to be loving beings.
But, to be loving we have to be free to choose – after all, if it is
not a free uncoerced choice it cannot be true love. In other words, he
surrendered a bit of his sovereignty to us: we are free beings. God is
sovereign but he does not control all we do, although he is, of
course, interested in our lives and does get involved in our lives –
albeit in a way that does not trample on our all important freedom. We
are free citizens in the Kingdom of God, not slaves in a dictatorship.
This comment is continued in a second posting
January 30, 2010 7:51 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk Recommend?
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Steve Zara wrote:
"One old crazy christian says something dumb and an arm chair European
paints all christians as hipocrits with legions of Europeans writing
in to agree."
No. What happened was that other Christians first tried to deny that
what Pat Robertson said was truly Christian. That was the hypocrisy.
The reason why Christians can't escape that accusation is clear. If
mankind needs to be saved, then there must be some concept of absolute
morality, of a universal standard of sin that can be used to judge all
people. There is no getting away from this, and it is seen every day
in even supposedly moderate Christian denominations. It's astonishing
that in the UK in 2010, in a country that has progressed so far, a
major national institution - the Church of England - is still
discussing whether or not female or gay Bishops are acceptable, and
whether or not gay weddings are to be tolerated. What is the supposed
authority for such bigotry? A combination of the bible and personal
feelings about absolute moral standards. Anglican Bishops are judging
people using exactly the same methods as Pat Robertson is, just coming
to different conclusions. It is undeniable hypocrisy to condemn
Robertson when you have no more foundation for your beliefs than he
does, and when you are spreading bigotry and hatred of others just
like he does, just a bit more diluted. Hatred is a strong word, but it
is justified. Supporting the idea that your fellow humans, be they
female, gay (or both) are less deserving because of some universal
standard is encouraging prejudice and even hatred.
There is no such thing as moderate Christianity, as the fundamental
principles of the religion are so dreadful, and so corrosive of
liberal democracy, of freedom and of equality. There are simply
moderate Christians who manage to ignore and dilute those principles
enough to be decent human beings.
January 30, 2010 7:30 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk Recommend?
(13)
Michael Larkin wrote:
Ah, Richard.
The God you don't believe in is the same one I used to believe in, and
so I became an atheist, too: hard to understand why anyone wouldn’t.
But then I came to a different appreciation of God, good and evil, and
so on, and now suspect that your current idea of God is, and my
erstwhile one was, a straw man.
I can understand your wanting to beat the living daylights out of this
straw man. He’s a pretty nasty character. But the very fact that you
do so indicates to me that you are, unbeknownst to yourself, built
closer to the image of what God is really like. You might be even more
so if you weren’t so angry sometimes.
The fact is, many - perhaps most - people are much better than the
idea of the God they worship. The ones who aren’t can become the
intolerant tub-thumpers and even terrorists of this world. They’re the
ones who arrogate for themselves the characteristics of the straw man
so that they can excuse and justify their own nasty behaviour.
As I see it, God as He really is manifests through the agency of you
and me, and every other phenomenological form, each of which is simply
another way for Him to explore and express His own potential. The
universe is His playground, and He experiences everything, whether we
call it good or evil, for Himself:
“...Christ plays in ten thousand places,
lovely in limbs, and lovely in eyes not his
to the Father through the features of men’s faces.”
(Gerard Manley Hopkins)
This is, for me, part of the inner significance of the Christ motif.
The Christ symbolises the sentient being that has realised what it
really is, and thereby found its way back to the Source regardless of
any difficulties along the way. By following the inner narrative arc
of the Christ story, one achieves “redemption”, which is the meaning
of being “saved through Christ”.
Everyone can only achieve redemption this way, but that doesn’t mean
one has to be an avowed Christian, or even needs to have heard of
Christ. I think it is perfectly po
January 30, 2010 7:29 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk Recommend?
(1)
Chris r wrote:
Mike Rooke wrote: "Viewed in totality Jesus fulfilled hundreds of
prophesies. No other person in history can claim that."
Given that the gospels were written around 100 years after the death
of Jesus there was plenty of time for embellishment!! Thats rather
like me writing a biography of Queen Victoria; try to imagine how
accurate that would be .....
January 30, 2010 7:09 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk Recommend?
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Isobel Whittaker wrote:
I find it strange that the notion of a personified, male God is
propagated and rarely questioned or challenged. Yet the major
religious texts appear to agree that God is everything, alpha and
omega, the beginning and the end, God is in everything, the air, the
sky, the sea, not a character with a face or body or human weakness
and emotions. Modern society has made God a man in a sad mockery of
itself.
January 30, 2010 6:51 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk Recommend?
(1)
Robin of Loxley wrote:
Mike Rooke - [chuckling] well that does demonstrate that the Bible is
a well structured piece of propaganda with a clear central narrative.
January 30, 2010 6:10 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk
M F wrote:
Having read many of the comments to this article, it is clear to see
many prisoners of their own culture, which ironically is an
evolutionary product.
January 30, 2010 5:59 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk Recommend?
(4)
Timothy Gormley wrote:
Mr Padley
You quote selflessness, goodness and altruism in the life of Jesus as
evidence for god. If you are open to an alternative and better
explanation for these things, you should look into nature, rather than
the divine, which has only been posited by men and is not subject to
investigation. If god were all powerful, we could have free will AND
freedom from evil. Note also, suffering is not the same as evil. That
an all powerful god allows both suggests that he is in fact often VERY
evil, and is counters the untestable and ultimately inferior god
hypothesis.
A better explanation for altruism and goodness actually lies in
sociobiology, behavioral science and games theory among allies. Why
else would our compassion diminish with distance ? Why else would
fairness diminish as the potential reciprocity vanishes. I would give
my child my life, but will not yield a parking space to a stranger.
Statistical variation explains outliers. The god hypothesis explains
none of this.
To better understand the hearts that times readers have, you really
must use your mind. The heart is not diminished by understanding. Read
a bit of Dawkins and Sagan. There you will find powering great minds
to be great hearts that love the truth, life and humanity so much they
insist on understanding.
January 30, 2010 5:54 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk Recommend?
(10)
Mike Rooke wrote:
Robin of Loxley wrote:
The Old Testiment is basically full of Jewish myths and legends. The
New Testiment is the officially sanctioned 'word of god' carefully
constructed to align with existing 1-3rd century beliefs.
Psalm 22 which describes the prophesies the crucifixion of Jesus was
found in Hebrew at Qumram and dates from around 200BC. This is the
same as in the Greek Septuagint.
January 30, 2010 5:46 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk Recommend?
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(Displaying 21-30)
Cathy Beck wrote:
The ad hominem attacks on Prof. Dawkins are disingenuous and betray
their authors' inability to cope with any challenge to their childish
beliefs.
The idea that Christianity is a Good Thing because Christians have
repeatedly rushed to give aid to the afflicted is a red herring. All
that proves is that many Christians are very caring people, which is
an indisputed fact. It does not, however, prove that God exists.
IMO the professor's arguments are elegant and logical, and that's all
they need to be. It's irrelevent whether or not he has read every
theological tome ever written. I've noticed umpteen books about
spiritualism and angels in my local bookshop; I don't need to read a
single one of them to have the right to declare myself an atheist with
regard to such nonsense.
Belief in the existence of anything requires reasonable proof, and I'm
afraid a 'feeling' doesn't quite do the job. In what other sphere is
emotional reasoning given respect?
I'm sorry if such remarks risk taking away people's hope, but the
issue is God's existence, not whether or not a belief in God is
comforting (I'm quite sure it is).
January 30, 2010 5:21 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk Recommend?
(10)
Mike Rooke wrote:
Robin of Loxley wrote:
The Old Testiment is basically full of Jewish myths and legends. The
New Testiment is the officially sanctioned 'word of god' carefully
constructed to align with existing 1-3rd century beliefs.
Psalm 22 which describes the prophesies the crucifixion of Jesus was
found in Hebrew at Qumram and dates from around 200BC. This is the
same as in the Greek Septuagint.
January 30, 2010 5:10 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk Recommend?
(3)
William C wrote:
I seen plenty of religious people and organizations flooding Haiti
with aid and compassion. Many times they bypass the UN red tape to
deliver aid to people who would have died a slow starving death. I
dont see the haitians throwing them out or complaining about them. One
old crazy christian says something dumb and an arm chair European
paints all christians as hipocrits with legions of Europeans writing
in to agree. Yet where is the Religion of Peace in all this? Where is
the Red Cresent or aid from the rich oil states? Not a peep about them
stated. Let it be a christian or even worse a jew and European pundits
cant find enough fault. I am no bible thumper but the from claiming
the USA is invading, stealing children, withholding air, messing up
the airport and now blaming christians its getting obvious where the
unfounded bias lays and its not with the christians. Hating jews and
christians seems to have become the relgion of choice for Europeans
who react with such poison and hatred in their manic desire to debate
the historical accuracy of a religious book that has nothing to do
with helping those in need.
January 30, 2010 4:56 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk Recommend?
(4)
Rain Birmingham wrote:
You may or may not be interested in reading the same question being
asked in Christianity Today an excellent online article in response to
the searching question of Haiti - cursed or blessed? by Gerald Seale.
It's provides further questions and an alternative answer to both
Richard Dawkins and Pat Robertson's response.
January 30, 2010 4:52 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk Recommend?
(2)
Mike Rooke wrote:
Chris r wrote:
I remember pointing out to my RE teachers back in Catholic primary
school that if you read about a prophesy in advance, and then set out
deliberately to fulfill it, that doesn't prove anything other than
your ability to read!!
==
Reply
That partly true. It is true that after his baptism by John Jesus was
led by the Spirit into the wilderness where he fasted for forty days
and nights and was tempted by the devil. Jesus then returned in the
power of the spirit into Galilee
Luke 4:
16 And he came to Nazareth where he had grown up and he went according
to his custom into the synagogue on the Sabbath day. He stood up to
read ;
17 and was handed a scroll of the prophet Isaiah. He unrolled the
scroll and found where it was written [ Isaiah 61:1]
18 The Spirit of the Lord God is upon me, because he has anointed me
to bring glad tidings to the poor. He has sent me to proclaim liberty
to the captives and recovery of sight to the blind, to let the
oppressed go free,
19 to proclaim a year acceptable to the Lord.
20 Rolling up the scroll, he handed it back to the attendant and sat
down, and the eyes of all in the synagogue looked intently at him.
21 He said to them, "Today this scripture passage is fulfilled in your
hearing."
However the were also prophesies fulfilled concerning his birth and
the coming of the Magi and others concerning his crucifixion. Psalm 22
in particular prophesies that he would be executed by crucifixion,
having his hands and feet pierced. Viewed in totality Jesus fulfilled
hundreds of prophesies. No other person in history can claim that.
January 30, 2010 4:51 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk Recommend?
(5)
Rain Birmingham wrote:
With the greatest of respect Pat Robertson is wrong. In Luke 13:1-5
Jesus clearly teaches that tragedy is not necessarily the consequence
of greater sin for then none of us would escape. Regarding prophesy,
John the Baptist was the last of the Old Testament prophets. Jesus was
the first of the New Testament. But John had to come and bow the knee,
which is the Old Testament model bowing the knee to the New Testament
model. So think of it this way: Do you think Jesus was punished enough
for sin? Do you think the Father judged Jesus thoroughly? Did He spend
every last ounce of anger and wrath on Christ on the cross?
Absolutely! So then there's no judgment left, no anger left, no
punishment left. God is fully satisfied. Between Calvary, which was
judgment on Christ, and the Judgment Day when all the books will be
opened, there is no place for judgment in this world.You cannot say on
the one hand the price has been paid and be reconciled to God and then
be judging people for their sin on the other hand. If all the judgment
has been put on Christ, there is no judgment for us to enter into..
It's the goodness and kindness of God that brings people to
repentance. That's the power of the gospel, grace and mercy and the
heartache over our independence from him, that is the nature of the
Father.
January 30, 2010 4:45 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk Recommend?
(3)
Robin of Loxley wrote:
Paul and Diana - the Bible is a work of historical fiction, written by
committees in the 2-4th centuries AD, then re-translated several
times.
I always laugh when Christians start quoting it. All their doing is
badly parroting ancient theologians who wrote it for their own agenda
- divinely inspired indeed! The modern Church and bible bares very
little resemblance to the original Christian movement.
The Old Testiment is basically full of Jewish myths and legends. The
New Testiment is the officially sanctioned 'word of god' carefully
constructed to align with existing 1-3rd century beliefs.
Still if that's the rock you want to build your beliefs on then go for
it - just don't expect anyone to take you too seriously.
January 30, 2010 4:24 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk Recommend?
(6)
Nigel Bretherton wrote:
Pual Padley wrote To quote Gandalf in Lord of the Rings, all we have
to do is decide what to do with the time which is given to us.
Great that you quoted from another work of fiction, what a muddled
mind.
January 30, 2010 3:55 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk Recommend?
(5)
Paul Padley wrote:
Dear David Leech, the theory of evolution is indeed fact. But the
evidence for God is also to be found in behaviour which emulates his
son. I'll warrant that a trip to Helmand would provide such evidence
quite promptly. John 15:13 Greater love hath no man than he lays down
his life for a friend. In civilian life we find thousands of unsung
carers sacrificing there own pleasure tending for loved ones who are
well past their generative years and have no obvious evolutionary
contribution other than to teach love. Just because Times readers have
a mind does not mean they do not have a heart too. We all have God's
gift of free will, Richard Dawkins included. To quote Gandalf in Lord
of the Rings, all we have to do is decide what to do with the time
which is given to us.
January 30, 2010 3:25 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk Recommend?
(3)
David Leech wrote:
I find it strange that so many Times readers are god botherers. I bet
when you invest your money you don't go to an astrologer for advice
and if your accountant invested your money in a alchemy lab you would
soon sack him/her. Yet you seem to invest so much in mythology.
This is my problem with faith schools if you indoctrinate the young
they find it hard to break free when they are adults.
Richard Elms: You must find it hard to go about your daily activities
with your eyes closed, ears covered and spouting "I see no evidence
for evolution." As you seem well versed in using the internet, you did
post a comment on times online after all. Just google evidence for
evolution you will find loads. Evolution is a fact, the process under
which it operates is the theory.
Their is no observable evidence for your god and you seem to have no
problem with that, interesting.
Love and kisses. Dave
January 30, 2010 2:40 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk Recommend?
(8)
(Displaying 31-40)
Michael E wrote:
Adam Hill wrote:
"Dawkins' picture is of a cold and totally heartless Universe. Anyone
who wants to pursue this can do, but they risk becoming the same.
Let's not forget that untrammeled application of the survival of the
fittest led to the worst excesses of eugenics in the last century.
This alone should put anyone off the theory."
Adam, the universe IS cold an heartless. That doesn't mean that humans
are.
Also, you can't disprove a theory simply because some people use the
knowledge for evil purposes. Do we go off the idea of fusion fueling
the sun since some have chosen to use that knowledge to build nuclear
weapons?
January 30, 2010 2:23 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk Recommend?
(8)
Paul Padley wrote:
Let's not make this contradiction thing too complicated. It's all
about bringing good out of evil. For example this morning Jonathan
Ross was off sick so I could listen to Radio 2!
January 30, 2010 2:14 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk Recommend?
(1)
Paul Padley wrote:
Let's not make this contradiction thing too complicated. It's all
about bringing good out of evil. For example this morning Jonathan
Ross was off sick so I could listen to Radio 2!
January 30, 2010 2:05 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk Reco
Paul Padley wrote:
To Chris R, I am surprised you say the Bible is not factual in any
sense. I understand the majority of the Old Testament to be a written
record of the history of actual Jewish people and events, with an
ongoing spiritual commentary; plus the poetry of the Psalms and the
practical guidance for living of Proverbs and Wisdom. Certainly Jesus
and the Apostles were real people. What makes the Bible divinely
inspired is the combination of the history of people's lives and
events combined with the way the texts were selected for inclusion -
by groups who met in the presence of the Holy Spirit. And just because
a person has never experienced the Holy Spirit does not mean it does
not exist! The Koran is rather more problematic, personally I think it
is just plagiarism.
January 30, 2010 1:36 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk Recommend?
(5)
Diana Jones wrote:
@ Chris r - I did as you asked and I have a comeback for some of the
points I picked up from the first website that came up when I googled
'bible contradictions'. Some I note are not really contradictions like
this one....
War or Peace?
EXO 15:3 The LORD is a man of war: the LORD is his name.
ROM 15:33 Now the God of peace be with you all.
This is not really a contradiction since God does/is both. Exodus 15
is a song by the children of Israel after God had just delivered them
from Pharoah so it is them calling him a man of war. To them God arose
on their behalf to free them, thus he was/is a God of war. David wrote
"Contend, O LORD, with those who contend with me; fight against those
who fight against me. Take up shield and buckler; arise and come to my
aid. Lift up your spear and javelin against those who pursue me. Let
me hear you say, “I will give you victory!”
Romans 15 is a greeting by Paul to the christians in Rome but as Psalm
29:11 says "The LORD gives strength to his people; the LORD blesses
his people with peace".
Now does peace mean no troubles whatsoever. No! David still had a heap
of trouble but he had the assurance that God was with him to see him
through any situation as John 14:27 says “I am leaving you with a gift—
peace of mind and heart. And the peace I give is a gift the world
cannot give. So don’t be troubled or afraid".
Some quote when Jesus said "Do not suppose that I have come to bring
peace to the earth. I did not come to bring peace, but a sword. For I
have come to turn a man against his father...man's enemies will be the
members of his own household". Matt 10:24-26 But I think the verse is
clear seeing that we are all on here debating and are divided. The
word of God always causes a stir. Paul describes it as 'living and
active. Sharper than any double-edged sword, penetrating even to
dividing soul and spirit, joints and marrow judging the thoughts and
attitudes of the heart' (Heb 4:12)
Do I understand
January 30, 2010 1:29 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk Recommend?
(2)
Miles Rowley wrote:
There is not a single alleged Bible contradiction or error, excepting
obvious copyists' errors, that has not been shown to be imaginary.
In the Old Testament, calamities were the clear result of
faithlessness. In the New, they were not, and were not even seen as
ultimately bad. Jesus said that what happens to bodies is nothing
compared to what happens to souls that are unsaved. Rather than give
warnings through calamities, God in Jesus waits patiently for people
to accept him. This is very clear in the NT, and all preachers are
aware of it.
January 30, 2010 12:46 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk
Recommend? (4)
Chris r wrote:
Diana Jones wrote: " ..Well I choose to believe that it (the bible) is
divinely inspired.."
Try googling "bible contradictions" and then come back and tell us why
we should regard the bible as anything other than an interesting
cultural artefact, certainly not something we should take as factual
in any sense.
It works for the koran as well.
January 30, 2010 12:13 PM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk
Recommend? (8)
Richard Elm wrote:
I too learnt about Christianity as a near 40 year old, not 4 y.o, with
quite a scientific & rational background.
It is hard to shed the preconceived ideas you have as a non believer;
there are things indoctrinated by schooling and opinion, themselves
based on faith in science. Look at evolution- lack of observable
evidence, transitional fossils, cladograms that are drawn up entirely
subjective to the opinion of the scientist etc. Look at cosmology-
where up to only 3 decades ago, the prevailing "science" taught that
the universe was infinitely old. The big bang (ie a finite beginning)
is now universally accepted & provable. Non believers; go back,
examine history & explain away the resurrection, fulfilled prophecy &
that the bible was written over centuries by 40 different authors
(from shepherd to King)and the dozens of other evidenced & provable
things enlightened Christians can tell you about - then you have won
the argument.
The existence of God outside the space and time that science works in
is impossible to prove. You could then move on to the probabilities
for habitable planets, abiogenesis & fulfillment of biblical
prophecy.....
Mr Dawkins is using Haiti & an outfield preacher to deflect from the
inability to counter his rational opponents views unfortunately . The
bible asks for man to test and question; blind faith is not an option
to those who wish to understand and be born again into new life with
God. I wish the same could be said of other belief systems: whether
the sanctity of darwinism or residents in Saudi Arabia.
January 30, 2010 11:56 AM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk
Recommend? (7)
jo mcclane wrote:
All I can say to other christians is to turn the other cheek. Let
Dawkins strike you with all his vain and pointless anger and pray for
him to have peace.
How dare any believer assume to know the will of God, who is always
Just and Loving! Not even the Pope does that. We must the accept
scientific facts without rising to the bait of this Man, whose
objective is to sow discord and ostracise believers.
January 30, 2010 11:55 AM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk
Recommend? (6)
Diana Jones wrote:
@ Terry Collmann
Well I choose to believe that it is divinely inspired, that God
divinely influenced the human authors in such a way that what they
wrote was the very Word of God. In the context of the Scriptures, the
word “inspiration” simply means “God-breathed.”
2 Timothy 3:16 says "All Scripture is inspired by God and is useful to
teach us what is true and to make us realize what is wrong in our
lives. It corrects us when we are wrong and teaches us to do what is
right".
Even if it's just something that men have made up, it's still valid
for today. I understand that not all believe but I don't understand
the need to bring down others who do.
January 30, 2010 11:53 AM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk
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(Displaying 41-50)
Edward Smith wrote:
Glyn Reed
The hatred is not so much of Christianity but of evangelism as
dishonesty claiming a nautural disaster as a punishment when whe know
how it really happens is simply dishonest and im sure the bible says
something about that aswell
January 30, 2010 11:46 AM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk
Recommend? (2)
Terry Collmann wrote:
"The bible says …" - Diana Jones, the Bible was written by men trying
to understand a hard-to-understand world. Anyone who told you it was
"divinely inspired" is lying, to themselves and/or to you. It's a
human artifact, and it's wrong.
January 30, 2010 11:27 AM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk
Recommend? (10)
Diana Jones wrote:
- Where do you find the effrontery to condemn Pat Robertson.
- Because no one can judge accurately the cause and source of such
massive natural human disaster especially as we know that "Old/New
Testament" God does not desire that any should perish. If God takes
pleasure in human destruction he would not have given the people of
Ninevah the chance to repent when even Jonah wanted them wiped off the
face of the earth for they way they had lived. Jonah complained to God
"Didn’t I say before I left home that you would do this, Lord? That is
why I ran away to Tarshish! I knew that you are a merciful and
compassionate God, slow to get angry and filled with unfailing love.
You are eager to turn back from destroying people".... Then the Lord
said, “You feel sorry about the plant, though you did nothing to put
it there. It came quickly and died quickly. But Nineveh has more than
120,000 people living in spiritual darkness,not to mention all the
animals. Shouldn’t I feel sorry for such a great city?” (Jonah 4)
If God relished the 'barbecuing of the citizenry of Sodom and
Gomorrah, lock, stock and barrel, he would not have allowed Abraham to
bargain with him over not destorying it. And unlike Sodom and Gomorrah
I know that there are more than 10 righteous people in Haiti.
The God of the Old testament is the same God of the New testament just
as he told the children of Israel "I am a jealous God who will not
tolerate your affection for any other gods. I lay the sins of the
parents upon their children; the entire family is affected—even
children in the third and fourth generations of those who reject me.
But I lavish unfailing love for a thousand generations on those who
love me and obey my commands", the same still applies today. The link
between the Old and New Testament which is Jesus needs to be clearly
understood. God didn't change but his covenant did. I suggest a
through read of Romans.
January 30, 2010 11:20 AM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk
Recommend? (6)
Denis Wong wrote:
The trouble with Dawkins is that he has no sense of human history and
cultural origins. What we now call "modern" science developed through
(amongst other things) theodicy, the study of God's will. Of course,
we have moved on, but to violently dismiss these old theories, which
is what Dawkin's does, says more about Dawkin's character than it does
about this serious topic.
January 30, 2010 11:13 AM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk
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Diana Jones wrote:
- It's not strange that Christians claim all that is good in human
nature as a monopoly and it's the heathens and heretics that cause all
the problems.
- Christians do not claim a monopoly on all that is good in human
nature as we are not God. As humans we constantly make mistakes but
God is 'faithful and just to forgive us'.
- The notion that we are all, even as newborn babies, so inherently
wicked that we deserve an eternity of torment in hell is disgusting
enough.
- You should understand that the bible says that every person is born
into sin because of Adam's fall. (Rom 5:12-16 - When Adam sinned, sin
entered the world. Adam’s sin brought death, so death spread to
everyone, for everyone sinned.For the sin of this one man, Adam,
brought death to many. But even greater is God’s wonderful grace and
his gift of forgiveness to many through this other man, Jesus Christ.
And the result of God’s gracious gift is very different from the
result of that one man’s sin. For Adam’s sin led to condemnation, but
God’s free gift leads to our being made right with God, even though we
are guilty of many sins.) Isn't it funny how we have to teach children
to be good, to share. We tell them not to touch something and they do
it anyway. The negative is inherent from birth but the positive has to
be learned.
January 30, 2010 10:29 AM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk
Recommend? (3)
Alex Brown wrote:
Having read most of the comments on this article There simply is not
time or space to write detailed responses to all the errors made by
the religious believers with regard to the article and Dawkins in
general. Just reinforces the observation that all they need is belief
without thought.
January 30, 2010 10:28 AM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk
Recommend? (8)
Tom Porter wrote:
Christopher White wrote: "Religion needs to exist in human minds as a
means to explain the unknown. Science attempts to explain this but
admits it doesn't known - what else is to fill the void?" The point
you need to understand Christopher, is that for a very long time all
of our knowledge was inaccurate and the world totally misunderstood.
The fact is that science has made enormous strides to fill in those
gaps in our knowledge and continues to fill in more all the time. Is
there anyone left who worships the sun now that we know it is simply a
ball of gas burning away in the solar system? The Bible explains
absolutely nothing scientifically, is contradictory as a moral guide
and offers few insights that can't be found in other less violent
works of art and philosophy. I am convinced that those who truly
believe the Bible and Christianity are superior moral guides for the
world have simply not looked properly at the alternatives.
January 30, 2010 10:22 AM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk
Recommend? (7)
Glyn Reed wrote:
The hatred of Christianity that is coming across in these postings is
chilling. Christianity, whether you like it or not, has shaped our
society and culture for centuries and we owe a great deal to it. I am
sure that anyone can list the historic wrongs of the church and fuel
any argument with endless criticisms but I for one am grateful to have
been born into a part of the world that has evolved under a benign
Christian ethos. I could have been born into atheist Communist Russia
under the rule of Stalin, murderer of tens of millions, and thrown
into a gulag or worse for following any form of spiritual calling
other than the worship of the state. The same would be the case had I
been born into brutal, Maoist China. Perhaps, I could have been born
into a country where another religion rules and where one is not even
allowed to be a non-believer let alone follow a faith other than that
prescribed by the state. Christian culture evolved and is the
foundation on which our constantly evolving society it built on,
something no one can change but perhaps should be thankful for.
The blind vitriol and bigotry of RD and some of his followers is as
repugnant as the bigotry of any.
January 30, 2010 10:12 AM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk
Recommend? (11)
Brian Nesbitt-Clarke wrote:
Adam Hill, are you suggesting that Love, Compassion, altruism, etc
didn't exist until Jesus came along. It's not strange that Christians
claim all that is good in human nature as a monopoly and it's the
heathens and heretics that cause all the problems.
January 30, 2010 10:00 AM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk
Recommend? (8)
Brian Nesbitt-Clarke wrote:
Adam Hill, are you suggesting that Love, Compassion, altruism, etc
didn't exist until Jesus came along. It's not strange that Christians
claim all that is good in human nature as a monopoly and it's the
heathens and heretics that cause all the problems.
January 30, 2010 10:00 AM GMT on community.timesonline.co.uk
Recommend? (4)
There are more comments of the same kind...
Sid Harth
STAFF WRITER 17:10 HRS IST
Port-Au-Prince, Jan 31 (AFP) Haiti's injured earthquake victims have
suffered a potentially deadly setback after the US military said it
had suspended evacuation flights because of a dispute over medical
care costs.
Flights that have carried more than 500 people with spinal injuries,
burns and other wounds ended after the governor of Florida asked the
government to share the financial burden on his state's hospitals.
"Apparently, some states were unwilling to accept the entry of Haitian
patients for follow-on critical care," US Transportation Command
spokesman Captain Kevin Aandahl told AFP.
"Without a destination to fly to, we can't move anybody."
Aid groups warned the row over money could cost lives.
"People are dying in Haiti because they can't get out," Barth Green of
Project Medishare for Haiti, a nonprofit group which has been
evacuating about two dozen patients a day, told The New York Times.
http://www.ptinews.com/news/493717_US-airlift-halt-sparks-fears-for-Haiti-victims
bademiyansubhanallah
AP, 2 February 2010, 05:24am IST
PORT-AU-PRINCE, Haiti: Haiti's prime minister said Monday that 10
Americans who tried to take a busload of undocumented Haitian children
out of the country knew that ``what they were doing was wrong,'' and
could be prosecuted in the United States.
Prime Minister Max Bellerive also told The Associated Press that his
country is open to having the Americans face U.S. justice, since most
government buildings, including Haiti's courts, were crippled by the
monster earthquake.
``It is clear now that they were trying to cross the border without
papers. It is clear now that some of the children have live parents,''
Bellerive said. ``And it is clear now that they knew what they were
doing was wrong.''
If they were acting in good faith, as the Americans claim, "perhaps
the courts will try to be more lenient with them,'' he said.
U.S. Embassy officials would not say whether Washington would accept
hosting judicial proceedings for the Americans, who are mostly from
Idaho. For now, the case remains firmly in Haitian hands, State
Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said in Washington.
``Once we know all the facts, we will determine what the appropriate
course is, but the judgment is really up to the Haitian government,''
he said.
Haitian officials insist some prosecution is needed to help deter
child trafficking, which many fear will flourish in the chaos caused
by the devastating Jan. 12 quake. The government and aid groups are
still struggling to get food, water, shelter and basic health care to
hundreds of thousands of survivors, and many parents are desperate to
get help for their children.
U.S. diplomats have had ``unlimited'' access to the 10 detainees, and
will monitor any court proceedings, said Crowley. They have not yet
been charged.
Members of the church group insisted they were only trying to save
abandoned and traumatized children _ but appeared to lack any
significant experience with Haiti, international charity work or
international adoption regulations.
After their arrest Friday near the border, the church group members
were placed in two small concrete rooms in the same judicial police
headquarters building where ministers have makeshift offices and give
disaster response briefings.
``There is no air conditioning, no electricity. It is very
disturbing,'' Attorney Jorge Puello told the AP by phone from the
Dominican Republic, where the Baptists hoped to shelter the children
in a rented beach hotel.
One of the Americans, Charisa Coulter of Boise, Idaho, was treated
Monday at a field hospital for either dehydration or the flu. Looking
pale as she lay on a green Army cot, the 24-year-old Coulter, was
being guarded by two Haitian police officers.
``They're treating me pretty good,'' she said. ``I'm not concerned.
I'm pretty confident that it will all work out.''
Investigators have been trying to determine how the Americans got the
children, and whether any of the traffickers that have plagued the
impoverished country were involved.
Puello said they came from a collapsed orphanage. Their detained
spokeswoman, Laura Silsby, said they were ``just trying to do the
right thing,'' but she conceded she had not obtained the required
passports, birth certificates and adoption certificates for them, a
near impossible challenge in the post-quake mayhem.
Bellerive said that without the documents, the children were unlikely
to reach the United States, as some of their families might have
hoped.
The 33 kids, ranging in age from 2 months to 12 years, arrived with
their names written in tape on their shirts at a children's home where
some told aid workers they have surviving parents. Haitian officials
said they were trying to reunite them.
``One (9-year-old) girl was crying, and saying, 'I am not an orphan. I
still have my parents.' And she thought she was going on a summer camp
or a boarding school or something like that,'' said George Willeit, a
spokesman for SOS Children's Village, which runs the orphanage where
they were taken.
The prime minister said some of those parents may have knowingly given
their kids to the Americans in hopes they would reach the United
States _ a not uncommon wish for poor families in a country that
already had an estimated 380,000 orphans before the quake.
Haiti's overwhelmed government has halted all adoptions unless they
were in motion before the earthquake amid fears that parentless or
lost children are more vulnerable than ever to being seized and sold.
Sex trafficking has been rampant in Haiti. Bellerive's personal
authorization is now required for the departure of any child.
The arrested Americans' churches are part of the Southern Baptist
Convention, America's largest Protestant denomination, which has
extensive humanitarian programs worldwide, but they decided to mount
their own ``rescue mission'' following the earthquake.
Also Monday: US Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano said the
U.S. military would fly critically ill quake survivors to patients in
several states to avoid overloading Florida. The flights had stalled
for five days due to concerns over space and costs in U.S. hospitals.
Earlier, in Haiti, U.S. Army Col. Gregory Kane said the flights had
resumed Sunday night. But the military later said there were no
flights until Monday.
* In Washington, the American Red Cross said a waiting list of 1,000
flights for Haiti's airport is limiting delivery of relief supplies.
* In Haiti's first organized political demonstration since the quake,
hundreds of people demanded that President Rene Preval resign.
Participants called for the return of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the
former priest who was ousted in a 2004 rebellion. The rally was
organized by Aristide supporters.
* A US Navy carrier left Haiti after delivering about 500 tons of
humanitarian aid. The USS Carl Vinson arrived off the Haitian coast
three days after the quake. Its personnel evacuated 435 patients and
its 19 helicopters flew more than 1,000 hours to support the relief
operation. Ten of those choppers will remain in Haiti.
* Haiti announced ``Operation Demolition,'' an effort to demolish all
collapsed buildings _ public and private, commercial and residential.
The declaration by Aby Brun, an architect and member of the
government's reconstruction team, followed comments by President Rene
Preval that Haiti can take advantage of the catastrophe to reverse the
trend of migration to Port-au-Prince. ``We will destroy in an orderly
and secure manner,'' Brun said.
* Many schools in Haiti's outlying provinces, which were not as
affected by the quake, reopened Monday, and more provincial schools
will reopen Feb. 8, the government said. It could take months for
classes to resume in the hard-hit capital, where the disaster may have
ended formal education altogether for many youngsters.
"They've cut off my leg,'' said Billie Flon, 9. He said he can't go
back to school because his house was destroyed and he needs to beg for
money.
bademiyansubhanallah
PTI, 19 January 2010, 10:12am IST
WASHINGTON: A week after the devastating earthquake hit Haiti killing
tens of thousands, charities, companies, individuals and celebrities
across the US have rallies to raise more than $210 million for relief
work in this Caribbean nation - much more than that of Tsunami.
"The pace of giving for Haiti is running ahead of the amount donated
in the same period after the Asian tsunamis in 2004, but slower than
the outpouring of gifts after the flooding caused by Hurricane Katrina
in 2005," reported The Chronicle of Philanthropy, a daily covering non-
profit bodies.
"In the six days after the flooding started in New Orleans, Americans
gave at least $457-million for relief efforts. In the nine days after
the Asian tsunamis, major US relief groups raised $163-million," the
newspaper said, according to which in the first six days after the
quake in Haiti more than $210 million has been raised.
The figure is based on a survey of 25 charities contributing the
largest amounts of money to Haiti. According to the newspaper, the Red
Cross tops the list with $112 million of which it has raised $21
million through the unique $10 gifts through mobile text messaging.
"That's a record for the group in terms of text messages. In contrast,
it raised $200,000 from texts during the 2008 hurricane season," the
newspaper said.
The US Fund for UNICEF had raised $18.2 million as of Monday and
Catholic Relief Services had received $13.1 million in gifts and
pledges, the paper said.
bademiyansubhanallah
AFP, 24 January 2010, 09:39am IST
PORT AU PRINCE: UN troops fired warning shots and sprayed tear gas on
Haitian quake survivors after a food delivery to hundreds of them
spiralled out of control in the capital.
The distribution of food, soybean oil, water and radios at a former
military airfield began calmly, with two long lines of people waiting
patiently across the field, a photographer saw yesterday.
Brazilian troops missed small early scuffles for aid by many who had
seen no help since the massive January 12 earthquake reduced their
homes to rubble, and were eventually forced to resort to tear gas and
firing into the air.
Nevertheless, as order broke down and crowds poured out of the lines,
the peacekeepers finally abandoned a pile of radios and other aid for
people to fight over, as they stood by.
It was unclear if the delivery by the World Food Programme and the
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was finally
completed.
The UN Security Council voted unanimously Tuesday to send 3,500 extra
UN troops and police to quake-hit Haiti to help maintain order and
protect humanitarian convoys.
The UN mission in Haiti, deployed in the impoverished nation since
mid-2004, currently has roughly 7,000 troops, 2,000 police and about
2,000 civilian personnel.
bademiyansubhanallah
FEBRUARY 2, 2010.
Haiti Allows Adoptions, Queries Missionaries
.
By MIRIAM JORDAN AND DAVID GAUTHIER-VILLARS
PORT-AU-PRINCE—Haiti resumed allowing orphans already in the adoption
pipeline to leave the country, as it continued its child-trafficking
investigation of 10 American missionaries arrested Friday for
allegedly attempting to ferry 33 children out of the country.
In an email to the United Nations on Monday, an American human-rights
activist recounted meeting the leader of the missionaries before they
entered Haiti and warning that the group's plan to collect 100 Haitian
orphans was illegal because they lacked proper authorization.
View Full Image
UPI/Kevin Dietsch
U.S. military personnel division talk to children last week at an
orphanage in Port-au-Prince.
.Separately, the U.S. military resumed medical evacuations from Haiti
to the U.S., with the first transport plane to arrive in Florida
Monday night, according to the White House. Evacuations had been
suspended since Wednesday.
Florida hospitals were expecting 20 Haitian patients initially, said
Jaime Caldwell, vice president of the South Florida Hospital &
Healthcare Association. The federal government said Monday it will
reimburse hospitals through the National Disaster Medical System for
treating critically ill Haitian earthquake victims, after Florida Gov.
Charlie Cristcomplained last week that the state's health-care system
was overwhelmed.
Over the weekend, the government of Haiti agreed to the departure of
165 orphans to the U.S., a State Department official said. About 95
arrived over the weekend in Florida, according to the Department of
Homeland Security. A few dozen more were due to leave Haiti on a
flight late Monday.
Concerned about child predators, the government of Haiti 10 days ago
barred minors from leaving the country unless authorities had signed
off on their cases. That led to an abrupt halt of a Washington policy
designed to expedite the adoption of about 1,000 children who had been
assigned to U.S. families before the Jan. 12 earthquake.
"These are children who had been identified as orphans long before the
earthquake and their adoptive parents had been through a careful
screening process," said Michele Bond, a deputy assistant secretary of
state overseeing the effort.
Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive addressed the case of the 10
missionaries, telling The Associated Press that "it is clear now that
they knew what they were doing was wrong.'' But he added that the
courts might be "more lenient" if they were acting with good
intentions. Mr. Bellerive also said that his country might allow the
missionaries to be tried in the U.S. since Haiti's courts were
devastated by the earthquake.
Mazar Fortil, the prosecutor in Port-au-Prince who is handling the
case, said the 10 missionaries face charges of abduction of underage
minors, human trafficking and conspiracy. He said that the
investigation had been delayed because an official translator for the
investigating magistrate had not been sworn in. Mr. Fortil said the
missionaries said consistently that they were only trying to help and,
from their point of view, had done nothing wrong. He said it was too
early to say whether Haiti would consider extraditing them to the U.S.
Alejandro Puello, a Dominican lawyer who is representing the detained
Americans, said, "These people belong to charitable organizations who
were hoping to help alleviate the situation of those children." He
added, "It's possible that because of a lack of information they
forgot about some requisites, and this situation has happened as a
result. We are trying to show that their intentions were always to
help."
Mel Coulter, father of one of the detained Americans, Charisa Coulter,
also said legal procedure probably wasn't primary in the minds of his
daughter and her colleagues. "Whether or not they went to the policy
manual and checked off all the things that needed to be checked off, I
don't think that was their primary concern," he said. "I think their
primary concern was to help children who were helpless and homeless."
New light was shed on the early activities of the missionaries by Anne-
christine d'Adesky, a writer and human-rights activist from a
prominent Haitian family who is a U.S. citizen. She emailed several
U.N. authorities and said she met Laura Silsby, the leader of the
American group, on Jan. 24 in a hotel in the Dominican Republic.
Ms. Silsby said her authorization to collect Haitian orphans and bring
them to the Dominican Republic was from an unnamed Dominican official,
according to Ms. d'Adesky's email. "I informed her that this would be
regarded as illegal even with some 'Dominican' minister authorizing,
since the children are Haitian," Ms. d'Adesky wrote, adding that she
directed Ms. Silsby to U.N. agencies helping the Haitian government
handle orphans and adoptions. In a telephone interview, Ms. d'Adesky
said she recalled Ms. Silsby's response: "We have been sent by the
Lord to rescue these children, and if it's in the Lord's plan we will
be successful."
Ms. d'Adesky also told the U.N. officials that Ms. Silsby had planned
to bring children back to the Dominican Republic on Jan. 25, four days
before the group was arrested. She therefore urged the U.N. officials
to "check on the orphanage" in the Dominican Republic because children
might have been brought there before the group was arrested.
"The implications of what she wrote are highly relevant to the status
of this case before the Haitian courts," Fabrizio Hochschild, the top
U.N. official addressed in Ms. d'Adesky's email, said in an interview.
Mr. Puello, Ms. Silsby's lawyer, said he knew nothing about the
alleged meeting with Ms. d'Adesky and his client.
—José de Córdoba, Jeffrey Ball and Mark Schoofs
contributed to this article
Discuss: There are 5 comments
Sid Harth
for the week of 1 February 2010
Crisis Group reports published this week:
CrisisWatch N°78
1 February
Two actual or potential conflict situations around the world
deteriorated and two improved in January 2010, according to the new
issue of Crisis Group’s monthly bulletin CrisisWatch.
Crisis Group commentary:
Central African Republic: "Relancer le dialogue politique"
Edward Dalby, AllAfrica, 2 février
"Haïti, où les meilleures intentions échouent"
Donald Steinberg, Le Figaro, 1 février
"Le Turkménistan et les droits de l'homme"
Alain Délétroz, Les Echos, 1 février
"Leaderless Nigeria could spin out of control"
Louise Arbour and Ayo Obe, Financial Times, 1 February
more Crisis Group commentary
Crisis Group speeches:
Haiti: Building Back Better - and Beyond
Mark Schneider, Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee
hearing on International Development and Foreign Assistance, Economic
Affairs, and International Environmental Protection on Haiti's
Reconstruction: Smart Planning Moving Forward, Washington DC, 4
February.
Tackling State Fragility: The New World of Peace-building
Donald Steinberg, Keynote address to the Commonwealth Parliamentary
Association Conference on Peace-building, London, 1 February.
more Crisis Group speeches
Crisis Group podcasts:
CrisisWatch N°78
1 February
This month’s podcast features an interview with Mark Schneider, Crisis
Group’s Senior Vice President and Special Adviser on Latin America,
about the security situation in Haiti following its devastating 12
January earthquake. The podcast also looks at the highlights from this
month's CrisisWatch bulletin.
Crisis Group quote:
"There is a clear cyclical pattern in the international community's
approach to Guinea, of reform and then retrenchment. The international
community has to be cautious, but be in for the duration."
Richard Moncrieff, Crisis Group's West Africa Project Director,
Deutsche Welle, 29 January.
Crisis Group contacts:
Andrew Stroehlein (Brussels) +32 2 541 16 35
Kimberly Abbott (Washington) +1 202 785 1602
Visit Crisis Group's website: www.crisisgroup.org
The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-
profit, non-governmental organisation covering over 60 crisis-
affected countries and territories across four continents , working
through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and
resolve deadly conflict.
CrisisWatch N°78, 1 February 2010
CrisisWatch N°78
1 February 2010
Two actual or potential conflict situations around the world
deteriorated and two improved in January 2010, according to the new
issue of the International Crisis Group’s monthly bulletin
CrisisWatch, released today.
In Haiti, up to 200,000 people are feared dead and several hundred
thousand displaced after a devastating earthquake struck the country
on 12 January. The earthquake inflicted major damage on infrastructure
in and around Port-au-Prince and has reversed much of the recent
progress in strengthening the country’s institutions. International
troops were deployed, including some 13,500 from the U.S. and
additional UN forces, although the security situation appeared to
stabilise towards the end of the month.
The situation also deteriorated in Nigeria, where a fresh outbreak of
violence between Muslims and Christians in the northern city of Jos
claimed at least 320 lives, possibly many more, and sparked fears of
reprisal attacks. In the fragile Niger Delta, dominant militant group
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta announced an end to
their three-month ceasefire amidst continuing delays in promised
reintegration and regional development.
Events in Nigeria come in the context of a deepening political crisis
at the centre, grounded in President Yar’Adua’s continued
hospitalisation abroad, accusations of a rising governance deficit,
and fierce debate over his fitness to remain in office. CrisisWatch
identifies risks of a serious deterioration in security in the Niger
Delta region over February.
Prospects for an end to extended military rule in Guinea improved,
after talks between the country’s junta leaders and regional mediator
Blaise Campaoré resulted in a breakthrough deal on a transition
roadmap. The “Ouagadougou Agreement”, approved on 15 January, provides
for the creation of a unity government and elections within six months
in which junta members are barred from standing. A new civilian prime
minister, opposition figure Jean-Marie Doré, was sworn in in
accordance with the deal on 26 January. CrisisWatch identifies
opportunities for a further easing of tensions over coming weeks
Hopes for sustainable peace in Nepal increased as Maoists called off
threatened nation-wide strikes, after the government announcement that
it would set up a high-level panel to “speed up” the peace process.
The panel, to include Nepali Congress president Girija Prasad Koirala
and Maoist leader “Prachanda”, would also address issues surrounding
the drafting of the country’s new constitution.
January 2010 TRENDS
Deteriorated Situations
Haiti, Nigeria
Improved Situations
Guinea, Nepal
Unchanged Situations
Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Armenia/Turkey, Azerbaijan,
Bangladesh, Basque Country (Spain), Belarus, Bolivia, Bosnia, Burundi,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chechnya (Russia), Colombia,
Côte d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Egypt,
Eritrea, Eritrea/Ethiopia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guatemala, Honduras,
India (non-Kashmir), Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel/Occupied
Palestinian Territories, Jordan, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kosovo,
Kuril Islands/Northern Territories (Russia/Japan), Kyrgyzstan,
Lebanon, Liberia, Macedonia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Moldova,
Myanmar/Burma, Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan), Niger, North Caucasus
(non-Chechnya), Northern Ireland, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines,
Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Somalia, Somaliland, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Syria, Taiwan Strait, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkey,
Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Western Sahara,
Yemen, Zimbabwe
February 2010 OUTLOOK
Conflict Risk Alert
Nigeria
Conflict Resolution Opportunity
Guinea
*NOTE: CrisisWatch indicators - up and down arrows, conflict risk
alerts, and conflict resolution opportunities - are intended to
reflect changes within countries or situations from month to month,
not comparisons between countries. For example, no "conflict risk
alert" is given for a country where violence has been occurring and is
expected to continue in the coming month: such an indicator is given
only where new or significantly escalated violence is feared.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/crisiswatch/cw_2010/cw78.pdf
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6510&l=1
Central African Republic: "Relancer le dialogue politique",
Edward Dalby in AllAfrica
2 février 2010
AllAfrica
Les prochaines élections en République centrafricaine pourraient faire
parler de ce pays méconnu, mais pas pour les bonnes raisons.
Différents groupes armés continuent en effet de contrôler certaines
zones dans le Nord, et le gouvernement semble réticent à laisser les
élections se dérouler sur un pied d'égalité. Dans ces conditions, le
vote, actuellement prévu pour avril, pourrait déclencher une nouvelle
crise politique, avec des répercussions potentiellement violentes.
Pour éviter le pire, le gouvernement devrait de toute urgence négocier
une trêve avec les rebelles restants et faire un véritable effort pour
associer l'opposition dans le processus électoral.
Les coups d'Etat et les nombreuses mutineries qui ont déchiré la
Centrafrique depuis l'indépendance ont fait de ce pays un Etat
fantôme, dépourvu de capacité institutionnelle significative, et
relégué à la 179ème place sur 182 dans l'Indice de développement
humain onusien. Le président actuel, François Bozizé, a lui-même pris
le pouvoir par la force en 2003. Depuis qu'il a remporté les élections
en 2005, l'aide internationale a sensiblement augmenté, mais de
nouvelles rébellions, inspirées par la réussite de l'ancien chef
d'état-major, ont émergé peu après le vote dans le nord. La prédation
de ces groupes et la réponse brutale des forces de sécurité ont eu
pour conséquence la mort de centaines de civils et la fuite de
plusieurs milliers d'autres.
Des négociations de paix chancelantes ont abouti en décembre 2008 au
Dialogue politique inclusif auquel ont participé presque tous les
groupes rebelles et un large éventail d'acteurs politiques et sociaux.
Au minimum, ce dialogue a permis d'amener les combattants à la table
des négociations et d'engager le gouvernement à faire des réformes
politiques et socio-économiques, ainsi qu'à organiser des élections
sur la base d'un consensus national.
Plus d'un an après, les résultats ne sont cependant guère probants.
Les ex-rebelles de plus en plus frustrés n'ont pas encore été désarmés
et un nouveau groupe établi dans le Nord-est et désireux de
revendiquer une part plus large des ressources nationales, la
Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la paix (CPJP), a démontré
sa capacité de nuisance. Par ailleurs, le gouvernement s'est montré
réticent, voire a explicitement refusé, de changer ses méthodes
opaques de gouvernance tentant même de manipuler la loi électorale à
son avantage.
La création plus que tardive de la Commission électorale a empêché la
tenue des élections locales prévues en 2009. Même avec le soutien de
l'ONU, l'organisation d'élections présidentielles et législatives pour
avril représente un immense défi. La compilation de listes électorales
fiables, l'acquisition du matériel nécessaire et la formation du
personnel électoral prendra inévitablement du temps. Et nous ne
mentionnons ici que des contraintes techniques. Après la mise en place
par la Commission électorale, en collusion avec le gouvernement, de
comités électoraux locaux acquis au régime, les représentants des
partis d'opposition et des groupes rebelles se sont retirés et ont
appelé à la démission de son président Joseph Binguimalé. La
Commission a déclaré qu'elle poursuivra de toute manière ses
activités. Cependant, sans les freins et le contrepoids de
l'opposition, les élections manqueront de la crédibilité nécessaire
pour asseoir la légitimité du nouveau président et des législateurs.
Dans le nord, où les armes légères circulent librement à partir du
Tchad et du Soudan, rebelles, coupeurs de routes et milices ethniques
font également régner un climat guère clément à la tenue d'élections.
Le processus de désarmement pourrait commencer en février, mais les
rebelles ne déposeront pas les armes tant que d'autres groupes armés
constituent une menace, et le gouvernement ne semble pas pressé
d'agir.
Pour réduire la violence dans le Nord-est et créer des conditions
propices aux élections et au désarmement des combattants rebelles, le
gouvernement devrait rapidement négocier avec les rebelles de la CPJP
et obtenir son engagement au processus de paix. Avec le soutien de
l'ONU, le gouvernement devrait aussi faciliter le dialogue entre le
groupe rebelle à dominance ethnique Gula de Zacharia Damane et le
groupe armé Kara, mené par Ahamat Mustapha.
Durant les prochains mois, la Commission électorale, le gouvernement
et les donateurs devraient faire tout leur possible pour organiser,
sur la base d'un consensus national, la tenue d'élections crédibles en
avril, comme prévu. Toutefois, si en mars les progrès faits dans la
préparation technique et dans l'amélioration de la situation
sécuritaire sont insuffisants, un report des élections devrait alors
être envisagé. Le gouvernement devrait aussi engager un dialogue avec
les rebelles, les leaders d'opposition, et la société civile, pour
trouver un accord préalable qui éviterait un vide constitutionnel et
une crise politique, si un report était nécessaire.
Les partenaires internationaux devraient également clairement indiquer
qu'ils cesseront d'apporter l'assistance financière vitale au
gouvernement, à moins que celui-ci ne fasse preuve de son engagement à
créer un environnement sûr et propice à la tenue d'élections
crédibles, y compris en négociant avec le dernier groupe rebelle.
Edward Dalby est analyste à International Crisis Group
AllAfrica
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6515&l=1
Haïti, où les meilleures intentions échouent
Donald Steinberg in Le Figaro
1 février 2010
Le Figaro
« Rappelle-toi qu’en Haïti les meilleures intentions échouent ». Tel
est l’avertissement que m’a donné un expert lorsque j’ai pris mon
poste comme coordinateur spécial Haïti pour l’administration Clinton
en 1999.
Le monde a répondu au désastre survenu en Haïti avec générosité. Alors
que les défis passent de l’aide d’urgence à ceux, plus larges, de la
reconstruction politique et économique, les dirigeants du monde – les
dirigeants américains en particuliers – devraient se souvenir de cette
leçon. Pour les Etats-Unis, Haïti a été en effet un cimetière de
bonnes intentions.
Trois principes ont été particulièrement malmenés au cours de
l’histoire. Le premier est celui de Thomas Paine, soutenant qu’une
colonie ne doit pas devenir elle-même une puissance coloniale. Le
second est celui de James Monroe selon lequel l’hémisphère occidental
devrait régler ses problèmes lui-même, et rester libre de la tutelle
européenne. Le troisième est le principe de Woodrow Wilson, spécifiant
que l’engagement américain dans des régions pauvres doit promouvoir la
paix, la prospérité et la démocratie dans ces pays plutôt que
l’intérêt national des Etats-Unis.
L’engagement américain en Haïti pendant la première moitié du XX
siècle a fait voler en éclat ces nobles principes. En 1915, les
marines américains arrivèrent sur l’île sous prétexte de protéger les
vies et les propriétés de leurs concitoyens. Ils initièrent 19 années
d’occupation militaire permanente. En 1934, la puissance américaine
utilisa son statut suzerain pour promouvoir son intérêt économique,
maintenir les Allemands à l’écart. Elle imposa la stabilité par les
armes et brisa un mouvement nationaliste qu’elle considérait comme une
menace à sa suprématie. Les Haïtiens apprirent que la meilleure façon
d’aller de l’avant était de s’attirer les bonnes grâces de l’occupant.
Parmi les héritages de la présence américaine en Haïti, on compte une
structure politique, économique et sociale plus polarisée et inégale
encore qu’elle ne l’avait été auparavant, et le renforcement de
divisions de classes qui subsistent jusqu’à nos jours. L’autre
héritage est le renforcement du principe de pouvoir sur celui de la
loi. Les abus grotesques de « Papa Doc » et « Baby Doc » Duvalier,
leurs Tontons Macoutes brutaux et la vision messianique d’une
libération à tout prix promue par Jean-Bertrand Aristide en sont
autant d’exemples.
Le monde a beaucoup changé en 75 ans. Pour éviter de répéter les
vieilles erreurs en Haïti, il serait sage d’appliquer les leçons plus
récentes.
D’abord, la fragilité et la faillite de l’Etat ont des implications
globales. L’absence de stabilité et d’une gouvernance responsable
n’affectent pas seulement la population d’un pays, elles créent
également un espace propice au développement de camps terroristes, aux
trafics de personnes, d’armes et de drogue. Elles encouragent les flux
de réfugiés à travers les frontières et les océans, perturbent le
commerce et les investissements internationaux, facilitent
l’incubation de maladies pandémiques, voir même encouragent la
piraterie.
De façon similaire, nous devons nous souvenir que les importantes
ressources financières et humaines mobilisées pour l’aide d’urgence
doivent être accompagnées d’un engagement équivalent ou supérieur en
faveur de la construction d’un avenir meilleur pour les Haïtiens.
L’histoire nous enseigne, par ailleurs, que la construction d’une
société stable va bien au-delà de la seule reconstruction physique.
Elle passe par la restauration de l’Etat et de la sécurité humaine, la
création d’un cadre politique et judiciaire fonctionnel, le démarrage
rapide de l’économie et la promotion des institutions de la société
civile. Le principe d’appropriation locale devrait être une partie
intégrante de chacun de ces défis.
Bien que la stabilité et la croissance économiques aient augmenté
pendant ces cinq dernières années, le niveau de sécurité, la qualité
de la gouvernance et l’économie laissaient encore plus qu’à désirer
même avant le tremblement du 11 janvier. Par conséquent, il est
impossible de se contenter de reconstruire, il faut d’abord poser les
fondations.
Pour prendre l’exemple de la sécurité, les 25 000 casques bleus qui
affluent aujourd’hui vers Haïti peuvent servir de tampon, mais la
Police nationale d’Haïti doit rapidement reprendre en main le maintien
de l’ordre au quotidien. Ce passage apparaît comme un défi immense.
Une petite moitié seulement de la police nationale est opérationnelle.
Les craintes de la population augmentent alors que l’on compte les
premiers meurtres et lynchages de pillards et que des prisonniers
dangereux sont en liberté. Une coopération étroite avec la force de
police haïtienne, qui connaît le créole et la loi de la rue, est
essentielle pour parvenir à contrôler les semeurs de troubles. Cela
est vrai en particulier dans le quartier densément peuplé de la Cité
Soleil.
En outre, les partenaires étrangers doivent soutenir un pouvoir
exécutif transparent, ainsi qu’un législatif et un judiciaire capables
de lui faire contrepoids. Pour le moment, les Haïtiens doivent mettre
la politique de côté, notamment en retardant les élections
parlementaires et présidentielles prévue pour cette année. Ils doivent
en outre faire en sorte que la distribution du pouvoir ne s’effectue
plus selon le principe du gagnant remporte la mise
Le renouveau économique d’Haïti exige plus que la reconstruite des
routes, des cliniques, des écoles, des réseaux électriques et des
maisons. Il exige la mise en place des fondements pour un
développement durable et équitable. L’agriculture doit être relancée,
le pays doit devenir attractif pour les investisseurs locaux et
étrangers. Il faut œuvrer à l’égalisation des revenus et à la création
d’emplois. L’un des points clefs de ces efforts sera une stratégie de
réduction de la pauvreté qui mette l’accent sur la santé et
l’éducation fondamentale, la petite paysannerie, la protection
environnementale, le développement rural et l’allègement de la dette
extérieure.
Le gouvernement doit faire cause commune avec la société civile. Il
doit s’appuyer sur les groupes d’universitaires, d’avocats,
d’enseignants, de femmes et sur les syndicats. Ces groupes, qui
maintiennent la cohésion sociale et servent d’exutoire à la pression
sociale, sont aujourd’hui polarisés, souvent en raison de la stratégie
du « diviser pour régner » mise en œuvre par les leaders nationaux ou
régionaux.
Ces observations suggèrent une dernière leçon. Les Haïtiens et la
communauté internationale doivent s’unir autour d’un nouveau contrat
social qui transcende les divisions de classe, de race et d’idéologie.
Les querelles sur la nationalité des avions autorisés à se poser sur
l’aéroport de Port-au-Prince doivent faire place à la compréhension
mutuelle des défis, et à une volonté de coordonner les efforts. Les
Etats-Unis, l’Amérique latine, l’Europe et les autres Etats doivent
réaliser qu’un effort global sera nécessaire pour aborder les
difficiles problèmes politiques, sécuritaires, humanitaires,
économiques et sociaux à venir.
Un bon départ consisterait à renforcer les Nations unies en leur
assurant un rôle directeur. Aussi traumatisée qu’elle ait été par ses
pertes tragiques en Haïti, l’organisation doit être à la hauteur du
défi de la reconstruction.
Un premier test de notre sérieux survient alors que le monde se
prépare pour une conférence formelle des donateurs. La venue annoncée
de personnalités prééminentes de la politique haïtienne et
internationale est un signe encourageant. Si ces acteurs parviennent à
adopter une vision commune et des mécanismes de coordination qui
maximisent leur contribution propre, leurs bonnes intentions pourront
se réaliser dans un futur plus stable, sûr et prospère pour le peuple
haïtien.
Donald Steinberg, Vice-président de l’International Crisis Group, a
été le coordinateur spécial Haïti de l’administration Clinton entre
1999 et 2001.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6516&l=1
Double attentat anti-chiites au Pakistan
S.B. (lefigaro.fr)
05/02/2010 | Mise à jour : 17:51 |
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L'une des victimes du premier attentat
Au moins 25 personnes ont été tuées et une centaine blessées vendredi
dans la grande ville de Karachi lors de deux attaques coordonnées : un
premier kamikaze a visé un autobus qui transportait des chiites, et un
second l'hôpital qui recevait les blessés de la première attaque.
Un double attentat sanglant a frappé vendredi Karachi, la deuxième
ville du Pakistan. Au moins vingt-cinq personnes sont mortes dans deux
explosions, qui ont également fait plus d'une centaine de blessés. A
travers ces deux attaques, c'est visiblement la minorité chiite qui
était visée, et ce pour la deuxième fois depuis décembre.
Le scénario de cette double attaque est machiavélique : un kamikaze a
d'abord précipité sa moto bourrée d'explosifs sur un bus transportant
des personnes qui se rendaient à la procession de clôture de Muharram,
le mois le plus sacré pour les musulmans chiites. Douze personnes sont
mortes dans la déflagration, en majorité des femmes et des enfants.
Peu de temps après, un autre terroriste a lui aussi fait exploser sa
moto devant l'entrée des urgences de l'hôpital où étaient soignées les
victimes du premier attentat. Treize personnes ont alors été tuées.
«Une explosion assourdissante»
«J'étais venu essayer de retrouver mon cousin blessé dans le premier
attentat et j'ai entendu une explosion assourdissante, des brancards
ont été projetés dans les airs», raconte Azam Ali. Selon lui, «la
plupart des blessés et tués du second attentat étaient aussi des
chiites». Le ministre de la Santé de la province a précisé que quinze
personnes se trouvaient entre la vie et la mort.
La minorité chiite représente 20 % de la population pakistanaise. Elle
est régulièrement la cible d'attaques qui sont généralement le fait de
groupes extrémistes sunnites. Depuis la fin des années 80, plus de
4.000 chiites ont été tués dans des violences interconfessionnelles.
Mais le 28 décembre dernier, des talibans pakistanais avaient
revendiqué un attentat-suicide qui a causé la mort de quarante-trois
personnes lors d'une procession chiite. Jusqu'à présent, le Mouvement
des Talibans du Pakistan, allié d'al-Qaida, concentrait la plupart de
ses attaques sur les forces de l'ordre et les symboles du
gouvernement, à Islamabad.
Ces souvenirs qui hantent les sauveteurs d'Haïti
Tanguy Berthemet et Cyrille Louis
05/02/2010 | Mise à jour : 08:58
| Commentaires 3 |
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Au total, les hommes de la Sécurité civile française ont extrait des
décombres15 des 134 survivants retrouvés depuis le séisme. Crédits
photo : AP
Confrontés au dénuement des victimes et à la mort omniprésente, ils
ont aussi découvert leurs propres limites.
À l'autre bout du fil, on le devine, l'adjudant-chef Éric Dubois vient
de ravaler un sanglot. «Je crois que le plus dur, aujourd'hui, ce sont
les souvenirs de l'orphelinat…» À défaut de le connaître, on imagine
ce gradé de l'escadron de gendarmerie mobile d'Antibes en solide
gaillard rompu aux rudesses du maintien de l'ordre. Il n'empêche : le
militaire n'a rien oublié de l'épreuve vécue le 18 janvier dernier
dans les décombres d'une pouponnière de Port-au-Prince. Ce jour-là, il
avait reçu l'ordre de sécuriser l'intervention des sauveteurs
français. Sous ses yeux , soixante-huit petits cadavres ont été
extraits des décombres. «Depuis, je m'efforce de passer à autre chose,
explique-t-il, pudique. Après tout, ce genre de scènes fait partie du
métier.»
Après quinze jours à Haïti, nombre des 550 sauveteurs de la Sécurité
civile et des 108 gendarmes, dépêchés dès le lendemain du séisme, sont
rentrés en France. Ils seront reçus lundi par le premier ministre.
Beaucoup, à l'instar de l'adjudant-chef Dubois, confessent avoir été
confrontés à des scènes et des émotions d'une violence peu commune.
«C'était un peu comme dans un film de guerre» , relate le colonel
Franck Louvier qui, issu du corps départemental des pompiers du Val-
d'Oise, a coordonné pendant deux semaines l'intervention des médecins
français dans les quatre hôpitaux de Port-au-Prince. Tout aussi
secoué, un gendarme évoque «un spectacle comparable à celui des villes
détruites par les bombardements de la Seconde Guerre mondiale» .
D'autres encore décrivent «un chantier gigantesque par sa
superficie» ,«des blessures épouvantables» ,«un véritable cauchemar» …
Engagés de 7 heures du matin à 20 heures et plus chaque jour depuis
leur arrivée, souvent novices, certains militaires ont parfois peiné à
dissimuler leur fatigue. Rencontré le 15 janvier au pied des ruines de
l'hôtel Montana, un capitaine médecin avait par exemple renoncé à
retenir ses larmes. Il y avait là de la fatigue, de la frustration et
une vraie tristesse. Dans ce petit matin, l'officier dut avouer son
impuissance. La jeune femme qu'il avait tenté durant huit heures de
sauver des décombres était morte. Il avait pourtant tout tenté,
restant à genoux sous des tonnes de bétons pour faire une anesthésie
générale. «Une partie de son corps était écrasée par des débris,
expliquait-il. Elle n'a pas survécu à son extraction.»
Expert en sauvetage-déblaiement, le lieutenant Christophe Carrier,
affecté à l'unité d'intervention de Nogent-le-Rotrou, tempère : «C'est
vrai que c'est difficile de passer plusieurs jours à sonder les
décombres sans parvenir à trouver des survivants. Parfois, on en vient
même à se dire qu'on n'a pas bien fait le boulot… Et puis, fort
heureusement, on trouve l'énergie de repartir chaque matin et ça finit
par payer.» Au total, les hommes de la Sécurité civile française ont
extrait des décombres 15 des 134 survivants retrouvés depuis le
séisme. Le 28 janvier, soit quinze jours après le tremblement de
terre, ils ont notamment sauvé une jeune fille de 16 ans qui se
trouvait dans un état d'extrême déshydratation. «Sur le moment, on
était tellement concentré sur la nécessité d'aller vite qu'on n'a pas
bien pris la mesure de ce miracle, raconte le lieutenant Carrier.
C'est seulement au bout d'un quart d'heure que j'ai soudain été
parcouru de frissons…»
Une «énorme cohésion»
Responsable de l'hôpital de campagne aménagé dans les jardins de
l'ambassade de France, où près de 140 interventions chirurgicales
lourdes ont été effectuées depuis le 17 janvier, le médecin-colonel
Michel Orcel estime que l'«énorme cohésion» de son unité représente
son principal atout. «Bien sûr, on a tous un coup de mou lorsqu'on
perd une patiente de 20 ans pour laquelle on s'est battu pendant des
heures en mobilisant tous nos moyens de réanimation, confie-t-il. Mais
dès que l'un d'entre nous flanche vraiment, il est aussitôt pris en
charge par les autres.» Moins catégorique, un jeune sauveteur confie
qu'en dépit d'années d'entraînement, il ne s'attendait pas totalement
à «ça» - c'est-à-dire aux milliers de cadavres rencontrés sur son
chemin depuis son arrivée en ville. «Chaque fois que l'on rentre dans
des ruines on en croise un ou deux. À la fin cela devient dur.» La
prise de conscience de ses propres limites a également constitué une
épreuve. «On devait prendre du temps, se reposer, c'est humain. Mais
on savait aussi qu'il y avait des dizaines d'Haïtiens, des enfants
peut-être, qui étaient coincés sous les ruines, qui nous attendaient
et qui n'avaient guère de temps…»
Confrontés à un flot inédit de fractures ouvertes, de plaies profondes
et autres membres broyés, les médecins français se sont souvent
raccrochés aux «beaux moments de la vie» surgissant ici ou là. «Nous
avons fait plusieurs accouchements qui, à chaque fois, nous
redonnaient un peu de force» , sourit le colonel Louvier. Christophe
Carrier témoigne avoir été «stupéfait» par «la capacité de ce peuple à
rebondir en rouvrant de petits marchés un peu partout - alors que sur
les bords de routes, on trouvait encore des chiens et des cochons en
train de manger des restes humains.» Un militaire, enfin, salue
l'«immense dignité des Haïtiens face à leur douleur physique» .
«Grâce à leur entraînement, nous avons pour l'heure le sentiment que
nos personnels ont plutôt bien encaissé le coup» , indique Damien
Deluz, le psychologue des sapeurs-pompiers du Val-de-Marne. À toutes
fins utiles, tous les militaires engagés se sont vu imposer un
«débrief» de 24 heures à Fort-de-France. Un suivi psychologique
individualisé leur a également été proposé. «Pour nous, les
militaires, ce n'est pas évident de faire appel à ce type de soutien
» , estime cependant l'adjudant-chef Éric Dubois.
Haïti : le combat d'Hubert Schmitt, sauveur de vies
Katia Clarens - Envoyée spéciale à Port-au-Prince
19/01/2010 | Mise à jour : 21:37
| Commentaires 15 |
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Hubert Schmitt en mission à Haïti au milieu des décombres :
«Lorsqu'ils sortent, leur premier regard se pose sur vous. Ce regard-
là, c'est notre récompense». Crédits Photo : Roch/Sécurité civile
Depuis jeudi dernier, il sillonne les décombres de Port-au-Prince la
dévastée.
Il vient de s'engouffrer dans une brèche, une cavité parmi les ruines
d'un immeuble effondré. Féroce odeur de charogne. Le caporal-chef
Hubert Schmitt, 29 ans, appelle parmi les décombres. Ce matin, alors
qu'il était sur un autre «chantier», deux hommes sont venus. Ils
avaient entendu une voix, faible, comme une expiration issue des
décombres.
Un petit groupe est détaché pour aller vérifier. Trois déblayeurs, un
médecin, un gendarme responsable de leur sécurité. Tous membres de
l'unité d'instruction et d'intervention de la sécurité civile 7. Des
pompiers militaires spécialisés dans les catastrophes naturelles ; les
premiers secouristes français arrivés à Port-au-Prince après le
tremblement de terre. Presque une semaine qu'ils se démènent. «Quand
on arrive, on sait que les chances de sortir des personnes vivantes
sont importantes, alors on fait abstraction du reste, les corps dans
les rues, la misère qui demeurera après notre départ ; on se concentre
sur notre mission», raconte-t-il.
C'est un homme fin, au visage aquilin. Regard bleu pâle. Ici, les
premières 72 heures furent sans sommeil. Il est de ceux qui ont
extrait six personnes de l'hôtel Montana, dont les murs, fauchés par
la secousse, ensevelirent près de 200 personnes.
«Une bonne inconscience»
«Durant toute l'opération, on est restés à côté du trou, à leur dire
qu'on allait les sortir de là. Lorsqu'ils sortent, leur premier regard
se pose sur vous. Ce regard-là, c'est notre récompense.» Le lendemain,
l'une des personnes secourues, une Haïtienne, est revenue pour serrer
contre elle ceux à qui elle devait la vie : «C'est un moment que je
n'oublierai jamais», témoigne-t-il, ému. Puis il est parti vers
d'autres missions.
Au cours de l'une d'elles, alors qu'il était avancé sous les gravats,
la terre a tremblé de nouveau. Une réplique. Le plafond effondré s'est
affaissé plus encore, retenu par un meuble de bois qui a grincé sous
l'assaut. «Je me dis parfois que nous sommes inconscients mais lorsque
je vois le résultat, je me dis que c'est une bonne inconscience.» Que
l'on appelle courage, non ? Son regard se perd.
Hubert Schmitt a toujours voulu être pompier. En 2001, il s'engage
dans la Sécurité civile pour faire ses classes. «J'ai vécu
d'intéressantes missions les premières années, il y a eu AZF puis les
feux ravageurs de l'été 2003.» Il est resté.
Encore de l'espoir
Depuis jeudi dernier, il sillonne les décombres de Port-au-Prince la
dévastée. Ce matin, deux parmi les plus jeunes de son équipe ont
craqué. Pleuré, longtemps. Depuis quelques jours, rares sont les
missions où l'on sauve des vies. Et son unité a été affectée au
déblaiement d'écoles. Un à un, ils ont sorti les petits corps en très
mauvais état.
Mais l'espoir existe encore. Mardi, deux vivants ont été remontés, par
une équipe américaine, à la surface du supermarché Carabïan. Alors
lorsque ces hommes ont raconté qu'ils avaient entendu des voix, ses
yeux se sont éclairés. Il les appelle désormais, englouti dans une
brèche. Mais les voix se sont tues. Le caporal-chef Hubert Schmitt
pose son casque et ses gants, respire en fermant les yeux. Puis se
remet en route vers une autre mission. L'espoir au ventre.
En Haïti, le vaudou est toujours debout
De notre envoyé spécial à Port-au-Prince, Thierry Oberlé
03/02/2010 | Mise à jour : 19:11
| Commentaires 30 |
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Une croyante en transe durant les célébrations du jour des morts dans
un cimétière d'Haïti, en novembre dernier. Crédits photo : AFP
Les vaudouistes de l'«île magique», qui baigne dans le syncrétisme,
veulent profiter des bouleversements provoqués par le tremblement de
terre pour sortir de l'ombre et obtenir leur reconnaissance.
L'histoire court d'une tente de fortune à l'autre sur le Champ de
Mars, la grande place de Port-au-Prince transformée en camp de
réfugiés. La nuit, dans l'obscurité du bivouac dénué d'électricité, un
loup-garou vient sucer le sang des rescapés endormis. La rumeur n'a
rien de surprenant dans un pays où l'imaginaire vagabonde. En Haïti,
un homme peut enlever sa peau pour se transformer en dindon avant de
reprendre son allure ordinaire le lendemain. Et un chauffeur peut
donner un brusque coup de volant pour éviter un zombie qui traverse la
route. «Ici, personne ne décède de mort naturelle. Il y a toujours une
explication magique», constate avec amusement le professeur Jean
William Pape, le patron du centre antisida de la capitale.
Les raids du loup-garou du Champ de Mars ont en revanche le don
d'énerver Max Beauvoir, le «chef suprême de la religion vaudoue en
Haïti». «Cette fable est importée par les évangélistes occidentaux,
tonne-t-il. Il n'y a jamais eu de loup sur notre île, ni en Afrique
d'où nous venons.» Max Beauvoir a de la prestance. Les cheveux gris,
il porte un boubou sur son pantalon et chausse des mocassins de
qualité. C'est un hougan, un grand prêtre. On l'appelle aussi ati.
«Cela veut dire le grand arbre de la forêt dont l'ombre protège les
petits. Ses grandes branches servent de reposoir aux oiseaux qui le
souillent, mais heureusement la pluie le lave», développe le grand
prêtre.
Les grands jours, il endosse son costume d'apparat. Les dernières
fêtes, celles de Makaya, remontent à fin décembre. Elles étaient
consacrées aux bains. Une occasion de se purifier pour l'année à
venir. Les prochaines, celles de Papa Loco, sont prévues en mars. On
rendra hommage à l'esprit qui administre le «péristyle de Mariani», le
lieu de culte fondé par Max Beauvoir.
«La justice divine est implacable »
Mais ce calendrier bien ordonné est bouleversé par le tremblement de
terre. Une partie du temple s'est effondrée. Par chance, le potomitan,
le sanctuaire où se déroule le rituel, est intact. Le prêtre vaudou
permet au visiteur de le traverser. «Il est désacralisé hors
cérémonie», précise-t-il. Le «labo», comme l'appelle Max Beauvoir,
chimiste de formation, a également pris un coup. Le hougan soigne dans
cette pièce, par des techniques mystérieuses, l'âme de ses visiteurs.
Il guérit par exemple un patient par le transfert de sa maladie à un
animal. Il procède aussi à des offrandes. Mais la volière s'est
disloquée. Les blanches colombes qui servent aux sacrifices se sont
envolées.
Assis sur les marches du temple, un artisan restaure une statue abîmée
par le séisme. Elle représente un homme courbé à tête de bouc portant
sur ses épaules un macaque. «Elle est très dangereuse», prévient-il.
«Il voulait dire que la justice divine est implacable», rectifie le
hougan sans s'étendre sur le sujet. Il préfère parler de l'effigie en
bois de cousin Zaka, la divinité du travail, d'Ogou, le dieu des
cataclysmes et de Dambala, la canne en bois représentant le dieu
serpent. Ce dernier présente la particularité de priver de la parole
ou de l'usage de ses jambes la personne qu'il «possède».
«On se considère comme fortunés. Les temples vaudous ont mieux résisté
que les églises et la cathédrale. Ils sont toujours debout. J'ai
présenté mes condoléances aux représentants catholiques et protestants
qui ont tellement souffert», déclare Max Beauvoir en rappelant que ses
homologues, l'archevêque de Port-au-Prince et le pasteur des églises
protestantes, ont péri dans la catastrophe. Le hougan attribue la
résistance des lieux de culte vaudou à leur rusticité, mais aussi à
une sélection naturelle. «La nature a remis les choses à flot en nous
frappant, estime-t-il. Nous avons une société injuste depuis la mort
de l'empereur en 1806 ( le général Dessalines, premier chef de l'État
après l'indépendance, NDLR). Le Vatican et les grandes puissances
occidentales se sont ligués pour que les chrétiens travaillent à
l'effacement du vaudou, la religion des origines. Tout cela doit
changer. Le tremblement de terre marque le début d'une nouvelle ère.»
Max Beauvoir prend souvent un ton et des postures de tribun. Il se
considère, à l'instar des évêques, comme le haut représentant d'une
communauté religieuse qu'il veut imposer sur la scène nationale. En
quête de notoriété, il aime montrer la galerie de photos qui décore la
salle de réunion de sa communauté. Sur l'un des clichés, il pose aux
côtés de Ban Ki-moon, le secrétaire général des Nations unies. Lundi,
le président René Préval l'a reçu dans son bureau pour préparer avec
lui les cérémonies œcuméniques d'hommage aux victimes prévues le 12
février, un mois jour pour jour après le séisme. «Nous organiserons en
parallèle des célébrations de recueillement autour des divinités du
courage, de la force et de l'amour», annonce le hougan.
Max Beauvoir s'inscrit dans un courant réformateur du vaudou. Il veut
faire d'une pratique occulte éclatée en de multiples communautés et
familles une institution comme les autres. Une démarche contestée,
voire redoutée par de nombreux observateurs. «Ce choix fait entrer le
“vaudouisme” sur le marché des religions en concurrence avec le
christianisme, l'hindouisme ou l'islamisme, relève Guy Maximilien,
historien des religions. Beauvoir est un hougan qui a suivi une
initiation, mais il est à sa manière un usurpateur, car le vaudou a
toujours fonctionné sans direction unique.»
Le vaudou est la survivance des manifestations rituelles des anciens
esclaves déportés d'Afrique. C'est un culte plutôt complexe, avec son
panthéon de divinités, les lwa. «Ces entités mystérieuses et
puissantes procèdent du premier émerveillement et du premier effroi de
l'individu devant la nature. Elles éveillent encore aujourd'hui les
parties archaïques de l'homme auxquelles poésie et religion
s'adressent», explique Guy Maximilien, qui est aussi un spécialiste du
sanscrit.
Mesurer l'influence du vaudou sur la société est, selon lui,
impossible. Car il faudrait marier les contraires. Confession de
l'ombre, il attire et repousse. «Je crois que bien peu de Haïtiens
redoutent d'adhérer au vaudou en tant que religion, mais qu'ils ont
peur de sa magie», résume William Seabrook dans L'Ile magique, un
livre culte paru en 1929 et préfacé par Paul Morand. C'est que le
vaudou ouvre la boîte aux fantasmes avec ses personnes transformées en
zombies, sa magie noire, ses empoisonnements, ses poupées plantées
d'aiguilles, ses coups de poudre. Ses défenseurs se considèrent comme
les victimes d'une entreprise de diabolisation. «Satan est une
création chrétienne. Nous n'avons rien à voir avec ça», tranche Max
Beauvoir.
Religion de l'intime
Plasticien renommé, Patrick Vilaire a exposé voici quelques années à
la Fondation Cartier à Paris. En 2008, il a présenté à Amsterdam une
œuvre prémonitoire intitulée : Le Potomitan ou l'échelle de Richter.
La sculpture en métal montre l'axe central du sanctuaire d'un temple
ébranlé. La colonne qui fait la liaison entre le serviteur et le Dieu
est maintenue par des mains tendues. «En réalisant cette œuvre, je
voulais dire qu'on allait vers un gros problème. Il y a chez nous un
déséquilibre dans notre culture dû à une politique et à une économie
qui ont conduit au désastre», dit-il. Il ajoute : «Le séisme a détruit
le bâti physique et moral. Il a écrasé les lieux de culte. Il est vécu
par la masse des croyants comme une punition divine. Les gens pensent
que les dieux vaudous ont exprimé leur colère.»
Patrick Vilaire est une sorte d'athée mystique. Au lendemain du
tremblement de terre, il est allé avec quelques amis dans les
charniers pour sortir des corps des fosses communes et leur donner une
sépulture plus acceptable. Il extrayait des cadavres, les enveloppait
et les portait en terre. Puis il plantait une croix sur le monticule.
Dans le rite vaudou, les défunts sont considérés comme une enveloppe
charnelle qui mérite le respect. Leur départ doit se faire dans la
dignité. Selon la tradition, l'esprit des morts rejoint la mer. À en
croire Max Beauvoir, qui a construit son temple sur la côte, «une âme
revient seize fois sur la terre pour huit vies en homme et huit vies
en femme. Puis elle devient un pur esprit qui circule à la vitesse de
la lumière et protège les vivants».
Les vaudouistes sont convaincus que certains disparus de la tragédie
du 12 janvier vont se réincarner en novembre, mois dédié au culte des
ancêtres. Ce sera l'occasion pour les défunts de faire passer des
messages et pour les vivants de poser des questions. Les pratiquants
se réuniront en famille. Le revenant prendra possession d'un
participant. Comme chaque année, ces fêtes des morts seront présidées
par Baron Samedi, la divinité des morts, et sa femme, Grande Brigitte.
Elles seront animées par les guédés. «Ce sont des êtres insupportables
qui ne souffrent pas les règlements. Ils orchestrent des danses
lascives que les catholiques désavouent», note Élisabeth, l'épouse du
hougan de Port-au-Prince. Dans le temple, une statue symbolise ces
retrouvailles : elle représente une femme enlaçant un squelette.
http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/seisme-en-haiti.php
"Le Turkménistan et les droits de l'homme",
Alain Délétroz in Les Echos
1 février 2010
Les Echos
Le Président du Turkménistan effectue une visite d’Etat en France. Ne
placer sa visite que sous l’angle commercial serait une erreur indigne
de la République.
Gurbanguly Malikkulievich Berdimukhamedov vient à Paris cette semaine…
Le Président du Turkménistan nous fait l’honneur de répondre à une
invitation de Nicolas Sarkozy et gratifie la France d’une visite
d’Etat.
Ce n’est évidemment pas la patrie de la Déclaration des droits de
l’homme et du citoyen qu’il vient visiter, mais celle des grands
groupes industriels qui ont su s’implanter dans cette république
gazifière au fonctionnement ubuesque. Faire des affaires au royaume de
M. Berdimukhamedov relève de la gageure. Il faut savoir y manier l’art
de la révérence et du lustrage de bottes bien mieux que dans n’importe
quelle autre république de Françafrique…
Et il est impressionnant de voir à quel point les grands groupes
français ont su s’installer dans les sables riches en gaz de l’un des
pays les plus fermé de l’ex-Union Soviétique. Bouygues, par exemple, a
construit le palais présidentiel, le parlement, le stade olympique,
l’immense mosquée Kipchak dont la coupole, couverte d’or, est l’une
des plus grande d’Asie, et comme personne ne manque d’humour sous le
soleil turkmène, le groupe français a également construit la « Maison
de la presse libre » à Ashkhabat ! Il n’est pas sans savoir que la
moindre ligne « libre » dans un journal turkmène aboutit à
l’emprisonnement immédiat de son auteur et à l’envoi en exil intérieur
de sa famille. Car les châtiments collectifs sont à la mode au
Turkménistan en ce début de 21ème siècle : déplaisez à M.
Berdymukhamedov et c’est toute votre famille qui en paiera le prix.
Si le ridicule tuait, le Turkménistan indépendant serait probablement
le plus grand cimetière de PDG de grands groupes industriels au monde.
Du temps du président Niyazov, mort fort opportunément dans la nuit du
20 au 21 décembre 2006 d’un arrêt cardiaque, alors que son cardiologue
allemand venait de partir en vacances de Noël, nos PDG se
précipitaient pour réciter les louanges de ce grand penseur qui se fit
appeler Turkmenbashi, père des Turkmènes et même prophète. Son livre,
la «Ruhnama », un condensé d’aphorismes et de ses réflexions
simplistes sur la vie, le monde et le rôle messianique de la nation
Turkmène dans l’histoire de l’humanité, a été traduit dans plusieurs
langues européennes par des groupes industriels désireux d’obtenir de
juteux contrats. Pour le français, ce fut Bouygues qui devança les
autres et pour l’allemand, Daimler Chrysler, dont les goûts
littéraires furent immédiatement récompensés par l’achat exclusif de
Mercedes comme voitures de fonction du gouvernement turkmène… La
Ruhnama fut imposée comme ouvrage d’étude central pour toutes les
classes du secondaire et pour les universités avec des effets
désastreux sur la qualité de l’enseignement. La présentation de la
traduction française de l’ouvrage donna lieu à une grande cérémonie
publique en septembre 2006 à Ashkhabat durant laquelle le vice-
président de Bouygues, M. Aldo Carbonaro n’hésita pas à qualifier la
Ruhnama d’ouvrage de « haute valeur artistique et scientifique » !
Gageons que ni lui ni aucun membre du conseil d’administration de
Bouygues n’en imposera la lecture à ses enfants ! La plupart des
groupes qui ont décroché de grands contrats d’Etat sont passés par les
fourches caudines de la Ruhnama. Mais le danger reste limité : le
ridicule, là-bas, ne tue que l’avenir intellectuel des jeunes
turkmènes.
On ose espérer que le président de la République saura élever la
visite du président Turkmène au-dessus des comptoirs de marchands. Car
derrière les relations commerciales et le nécessaire positionnement
européen sur le marché du gaz turkmène (l’Union européenne voit dans
le Turkménistan le principal fournisseur pour son projet de gazoduc
Nabucco, sans toutefois que les experts ne s’accordent sur la
faisabilité de ce projet) doit s’accompagner d’un dialogue clair sur
les dérives les plus graves du régime turkmène.
Médecins Sans Frontières vient d’être jeté à la porte du Turkménistan
après dix ans d’efforts remarquables. Avec le départ des courageux
docteurs, plus aucune ONG internationale n’est présente dans le pays.
MSF gérait, entre autres, un projet important de formation à la
détection des pandémies comme le SIDA par exemple, et au suivi des
malades. Le gouvernement ayant décrété que le SIDA n’existe pas au
Turkménistan, non seulement il devient extrêmement dangereux pour un
médecin d’annoncer que l’un de ses patients est séropositif, mais
encore de le traiter ! Obsédé par les statistiques reluisantes, le
gouvernement turkmène empêche son corps médical de faire son travail.
Près de 90 pour cent des médecins turkmènes on été harcelés par la
justice pour avoir osé notifier l’apparition de symptômes de maladies
que le gouvernement a déclarées inexistantes dans le pays. Nicolas
Sarkozy doit soulever cette question avec son homologue turkmène. Les
conséquences de politiques aussi aveugles, à notre époque globalisée,
vont bien au-delà du seul pays qui les applique.
L’étouffement total de la société civile est un autre sujet de
préoccupation. Les obstacles que le gouvernement oppose à la création
d’associations ou à l’enregistrement d’ONG sont tels que la société
civile est dépourvue de moyens légaux d’action. Aucune organisation
indépendante locale ou internationale ne peut faire un suivi de la
situation des droits de l’homme sans risquer l’arrestation immédiate.
En condamnant à six ans de prison le militant écologiste, Andrei
Zatoka, finalement relâché mais forcé de quitter le pays et de
renoncer à la nationalité turkmène, le gouvernement de M.
Berdymukhamoedov démontre qu’il ne tolère aucun questionnement sur
quelque sujet que ce soit.
Enfin, l’accès à des informations fiables est un problème quotidien
pour une population turkmène soumise à une propagande d’Etat constante
et au culte de la personnalité du Président Berdymukhamedov qui, mieux
ciblé et moins rocambolesque, semble toutefois n’avoir plus rien à
envier à celui de son prédécesseur. Des sites internet comme Youtube
ou Livejournal viennent d’être bloqués. Plus de cent-soixante jeunes
turkmènes qui étudiaient à l’étranger se sont vu notifier
l’interdiction de quitter le pays après leurs vacances d’été l’an
dernier…
Il est essentiel que Nicolas Sarkozy soulève ces questions épineuses
avec son homologue turkmène. Il devrait demander la libération sans
conditions de tous les défenseurs des droits humains incarcérés sur la
base d’accusations mensongères. Ne placer la visite du président
turkmène que sous l’angle commercial serait une erreur indigne de la
république.
Alain Délétroz, Vice-président pour l’Europe de l’International Crisis
Group
Les Echos http://www.les-cercles.fr/economie/
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6514&l=1
"Leaderless Nigeria could spin out of control",
Louise Arbour and Ayo Obe in Financial Times
1 February 2010
Financial Times
Nigerians have not seen their president for more than two months and
tensions are mounting, with huge security implications for the oil-
producing giant and the wider region. If Abuja does not resolve the
impasse over its leadership and return governance to a clear
constitutional track very soon, it will spell disaster.
Even at the best of times, good governance in Africa’s most populous
state is rare. Public officials feel little compulsion to respect the
constitution or respond to citizens’ demands. Governments tend to be
long on promises, chronically short on performance.
As a system of corruption and impunity limits the central government’s
capacity to manage and resolve conflicts, violence continually simmers
in the Niger delta and erupts recurrently in the north, as riots in
the city of Jos in January made all too clear.
But the current constitutional crisis multiplies the country’s
troubles tenfold. President Umaru Yar’Adua’s long hospitalisation in
Saudi Arabia since late November, his failure to hand over power to
Goodluck Jonathan, the vice-president, and the government’s deception
of the public on the true state of his health have created serious
threats to security and peace in Nigeria and further afield in West
Africa.
First, the leadership crisis created by Mr Yar’Adua’s absence is
deepening Nigeria’s north/south political rivalry. The conflict
between constitutional provisions that make Mr Jonathan, a southerner,
the successor in the event of the president’s incapacitation, and the
political agreement that brought Mr Yar’Adua, a northerner, to power,
carry the risk of escalating tensions along the country’s chief
political faultline.
Second, the Niger delta peace process is in danger of unravelling. The
government’s programme for rehabilitating and retraining delta
militants has stalled. Attacks on oil installations have resumed after
a long break and criminal gangs are once again seizing foreign oil
workers for ransom. On Saturday the main militant group, the Movement
for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, announced an end to a three-
month ceasefire. The signs could not be more ominous.
Third, accountability has taken a holiday. Because it is not formally
answerable to the vice-president, the Federal Executive Council – the
cabinet of federal ministers – is acting without supervision and
possibly bending the rules. State spending continues under a dubiously
signed supplementary budget that runs counter to previous presidential
pledges.
The growing public perception that corruption has accelerated and that
nobody can call anybody to order leads to the fourth threat: if the
constitutional confusion deepens, ambitious military officers have a
pretext to stage a coup, erasing the country’s democratic gains.
Fifth, the lack of Nigerian leadership in the region, in particular
through the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas), has
slowed efforts at resolving the problems in Guinea and Niger. Failure
to sustain peace and democracy efforts could lead to a deterioration
of the political and security situations in both countries.
Sixth, mass protests initiated by opposition leaders and civil society
organisations on January 12 could degenerate into violence and state
repression. Though demonstrators and police have co-operated to an
admirable and almost unprecedented degree to keep protests peaceful,
the longer these mass events continue the greater the risk of a clash
with security forces.
Avoiding these threats must begin with a return to constitutional
order. Nigeria’s Senate has now called upon Mr Yar’Adua to comply with
the constitutional provision that requires the president to inform the
National Assembly when he is “proceeding on vacation or otherwise
incapable of discharging the functions of his office”.
The president should respect this. Members of bodies such as the
National Council of State, which includes all the country’s former
leaders, civilian and military, should prevail upon him to do so. With
that action, Mr Yar’Adua would automatically and formally cede
presidential authority to Mr Jonathan.
If Mr Yar’Adua is unfit to make such a decision, it must be taken by
others. Unfortunately, the Executive Council seems to be moving in the
opposite direction, passing a resolution last week claiming the
president is fit, apparently without any medical input whatsoever. The
Council’s position is clearly out of step with the contention of most
Nigerians, now expressed through numerous channels daily, that Mr
Yar’Adua has not been able to provide any leadership since he left the
country in November.
The next days and weeks will determine whether Nigeria’s politicians
are able to restore constitutional order. For the sake of the country
– and the whole of West Africa – Nigeria’s friends must insist that
all parties, including the military, respect the constitution and its
provisions for managing this kind of crisis. In the longer term, the
Nigerian people must, through the constitutional review process,
decide for themselves what succession arrangements truly reflect their
political sensitivities, in order to avoid unhealthy tensions in the
future.
Louise Arbour is President of the International Crisis Group. Ayo Obe,
a legal practitioner in Nigeria, is a Crisis Group Board member.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6513&l=1
Haiti: Building Back Better - and Beyond
Mark Schneider
Testimony by Mark L. Schneider, Senior Vice President, International
Crisis Group to the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee hearing on
International Development and Foreign Assistance, Economic Affairs,
and International Environmental Protection on Haiti's Reconstruction:
Smart Planning Moving Forward, 4 February 2010, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, let me express my
appreciation for the opportunity to offer testimony today on the
immediate and long-term consequences of the earthquake in Haiti – for
its people, its democracy and its neighbours.
First, I want to express my condolences to the people of Haiti for the
enormous loss of human life – far more victims than in any other
natural disaster in the history of this hemisphere – ever. We already
know that some 150,000 people were killed, 200,000 were injured and
one million more lost their homes. After all the collapsed buildings
are finally removed, this earthquake may be among the three or four
worst disasters ever recorded anywhere on earth in terms of loss of
life and injury.
For many of us, there are faces and names we recall with a deep sense
of loss. I first went to Haiti in 1978 with then Ambassador Andrew
Young to raise concerns about human rights abuses under the Duvalier
dictatorship. With PAHO/WHO, USAID, Peace Corps and now the Crisis
Group, I have worked with Haitians desperately trying to achieve a
better future for their families.
Second, let me express my deep sadness at the deaths of men and women
from the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSTAH) including its leaders Hedi
Annabi, Luis da Costa, and Gerardo LeChevallier, along with Philippe
Dewez from the IDB, and all of the others who were working with the
government of President René Préval to improve conditions in Haiti.
Finally, let me express my own enormous pride in the generous response
of citizens from this and other countries -- the volunteer doctors,
nurses, NGO’s and search and rescue teams, as well as the rapid and
robust response from the Obama Administration, particularly USAID,
State and the U.S. military, but also from Canada, Brazil, Mexico,
Cuba, and others in this hemisphere and France, the EU, Spain, China
and other countries outside the hemisphere.
Mr. Chairman, the important questions that you posed with respect to
planning, managing and implementing Haiti’s reconstruction have been
the subject of much discussion in Port au Prince, at the Montreal
donors preparatory session last week, at the World Economic Forum in
Davos, at the UN, the EU, and the OAS. Many have looked at examples
from the past – the Tsunami in Southeast Asia, Hurricane Mitch in
Central America, post conflict reconstruction measures in Kosovo, El
Salvador and Liberia. Each of those experiences offers lessons about
relief and reconstruction, which have already helped improve the
relief measures in Haiti. For just one example, Mitch taught USAID’s
OFDA that pre-positioning basic supplies in Florida and the Caribbean
could alleviate the need for lengthy procurement procedures, and that
pre-approved agreements with the Southern Command could speed
transportation logistics.
All of those cases had several things in common:
•The victims never felt that relief was coming as fast as they needed
it;
•The transition from relief to reconstruction was neither smooth nor
untroubled;
•Maintaining international engagement and international coordination
was a constant struggle; and
•The challenge of ensuring that the host government was strengthened
rather than weakened was not fully met.
Given the magnitude of Haiti’s destruction, the fragility of its
institutions before the quake and the depth of its poverty, overcoming
these challenges to effective reconstruction will pose an even more
daunting challenge to Haiti and to the international community.
Mr. Chairman, the International Crisis Group has issued fifteen
reports about Haiti over the past five years. The most recent, Saving
the Environment, Preventing Instability and Conflict (April 2009) was
unfortunately all too prescient in identifying the additional risks to
stability and complications in urban planning, construction, and
infrastructure design posed by Haiti’s historical disregard for the
environment and vulnerability to natural disasters.
There is a mantra now that we must help Haiti to build back better, to
ensure that recovery and reconstruction leave Haiti less vulnerable to
the consequences of natural disasters. That should be done. But it is
also impossible to completely eliminate Haiti’s vulnerability given
its incredibly hazardous geologic and geographic location precariously
positioned along a ghastly seismic fault line, in the annual hurricane
path from Africa, and caught between the small plane and fast boat
cocaine routes from Colombia and Venezuela.
However, Haiti’s vulnerability also stems from its failure to overcome
two centuries of bad governments, inequitable and centralized
political and economic power structures in Port au Prince, and not-
always-benign foreign interventions. Many point to the billions in
aid that Haiti received over the last five decades and say it was all
for naught, that there is no hope today.
I argue the contrary. In June, I met with several government
representatives, including President Preval, and the former and
current prime minister. In December, I held discussions with the late
Hedi Annabi and others from the UN, IDB, WB and the representatives
from President Clinton’s envoy office to assess progress and examine
the challenges for 2010. There were concerns, of course, but there
also was a degree of optimism:
•Reforms were taking hold within the civilian police; in fact a 2009
poll showed over 70 percent of the population approved of their
performance, a far cry from the past.
•The first glimmers of judicial reform in 50 years were seen with the
opening of an academy to train judges, and passage of key laws to set
merit-based standards and salaries for judges and to establish a
monitoring commission to vet existing judges and provide professional
assessment of their performance.
•The first class of trained corrections officers had graduated and a
plan to build new and restructure older jails was underway.
•The HOPE II legislation had boosted employment by close to 25,000 and
recruitment by former President Clinton had brought investors to
Haiti. The transition from showy pledges to actual capital
investment projects underway, including on a $55 m. Royal Caribbean
Cruise expansion of the Labadee resort and a new industrial park on
the outskirts of Port au Prince, thanks to a $25 m. commitment from
George Soros, a member of Crisis Group board of trustees.
•Haiti had a fully functioning legislature, which after risking
stability by ousting a competent prime minister Michele Pierre Louis,
at least demonstrated a marked readiness to act by approving the new
Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerives, his slate of ministers and their
program in record time, when the same process last spring took
months.
•Haiti’s budget for the current fiscal year -- contrary to that of the
United States -- was actually passed on time; the previous budget had
not been approved until eight months into the fiscal year.
•In October, the United Nations extended its mandate for another year
and Latin American nations swiftly reaffirmed its leadership,
contributing some 4000 of MINUSTAH’s 7000 formal military members.
•For three years, the Preval administration had met its fiscal
targets, reduced inflation, and maintained a stable monetary
structure. Despite the devastation caused by four consecutive storms
in 2008 and the global economic crisis, Haiti was one of two countries
in the region to post positive economic growth (2.4 percent) in 2009.
The progress prompted the IMF and World Bank to endorse the
cancellation of $1.2 billion of Haiti’s multilateral debt, more than
half. The earthquake not only justifies -- but truly demands – that
the last half of Haiti’s debt be written off.
Despite myriad problems -- some self-inflicted -- the Preval
administration advanced these reforms in concert with MINUSTAH. The
administration sought to engage the business community, opposing
parties and civil society in developing a common vision of the
future. Preval had named five ad hoc commissions, including some of
his opponents and independent scholars, to identify and develop
recommendations on critical issues, including the politically
contentious issue of constitutional reform.
With the leadership of the current Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerives,
who was then minister of planning, the Preval administration had also
partnered with local communities and multiple sectors with the support
of the World Bank and UN to formulate a national consensus for poverty
reduction. The result was a Haitian National Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper, which was also endorsed by donors. After the 2008
hurricanes, the strategy was developed to include a job creation plan
with a primary focus on jobs in rural agriculture, decentralized
tourism, and the factory apparel industry. Donors gave their blessing
to that program last April.
Those plans and strategies give Haiti a huge advantage today because
they can serve as a foundation for reconstruction. In addition, some
of the ideas that could not be put forward before the earthquake now
can and must be considered for Haiti to transform its future.
Starting with the premise that the first phase of Haiti’s
reconstruction will require a decade, and the second, a generation, I
offer these suggestions for five principles of successful
reconstruction that could transform Haiti’s political institutions and
economic options.
•Forge a new Haitian Social Compact for reconstruction. A unified
Haiti under its currently elected government – not any superimposed
protectorate – has to be in the lead on Haiti’s recovery if the effort
is to be successful. Haiti’s history has been defined by a small
economic elite who dominated economic and political power until the
1990’s, opposed tax levels needed to finance adequate state services
and, in many cases, eluded their personal tax obligations as well. For
Haiti’s recovery to succeed, the elite must share in the sacrifice,
especially since they will inevitably benefit from any success.
Changing that equation will require the kind of inclusion that created
the PRSP and drove a successful national advocacy campaign for Hope
and HOPE II. Reconstruction has to be led by Haiti’s elected
government and represent all of Haiti and have the participation of
the private sector. The full engagement of Haitian civil society –
like the process that underpinned the PRSP – also must be generated.
Communal leaders like those in NDI’s Initiative committees are also
potential allies in this process. Upcoming parliamentary elections
have been postponed. The social compact hopefully will find a way,
endorsed by all, to agree to hold the presidential, parliamentary and
local elections together next November, if humanly possible, with the
Constitutionally-mandated parliament remaining in office until the
newly elected members take office next January.
•Build a modern Haitian state. Haitian government has always been
starved for resources and its ministries have never been able to keep
up with growing public needs. The reconstruction of Haiti must be
aimed at transforming the country in a way that leaves a modern
functioning state able to sustain public services and guarantee the
rule of law. Modern communications, information technology and
management systems have bypassed government ministries to some degree
and denied them the capacity to actually deliver fundamental services
to regional departments and municipalities. Modern data information,
communications systems, and planning and evaluation capacity were all
lacking in the ministries before their buildings were destroyed.
Rebuilding those ministries on modern terms is essential to avoid
Haiti becoming a failed state.
•Ensure economic and political decentralization. Ending centralization
of virtually all economic investment in the capital is essential to
reducing extreme poverty in its rural departments, and to rebuilding
Port au Prince. A growing percentage of the capital’s population, now
estimated at close to 400,000, has returned to families in their
original villages and towns, a third going to the Artibonite,
originally the heart of Haiti’s rice farming. Now may be the first
time that Haiti’s constitutional call for decentralization can
actually be attempted. If regional economic development poles can be
generated around the country – for instance by implementing HOPE II in
a way that encourages the construction of industrial sites in other
departments with access to ports, such as Cape Haitien in the North,
Port-de-Paix in the North West and St. Marc in the Artibonite – it
will also help to stem the flow of migrants to Port-au-Prince. That
also will give the capital a better chance for more rational
reconstruction and avoid a replication of the slum communities of the
past.
•Use environmental protection and disaster preparedness standards for
all reconstruction projects. Haiti has gone from a country with 80%
forest cover centuries ago, to about 20% in the 1940s, to two percent
today. Its hillsides are mudslides waiting to happen. Every
reconstruction project should be judged in part by whether it advances
environmental protection, and every construction project should be
judged on whether it incorporates both hurricane and earthquake
resistance elements.
•Guarantee massive, coordinated assistance. The U.S. and international
response must be bigger and better coordinated than ever before. The
U.S. has already committed nearly $400 million to relief, and
hopefully it will show leadership in formally committing to a decade-
long reconstruction and development plan at the upcoming March
pledging conference at the UN. While the detailed assessment of damage
and reconstruction costs have yet to be completed, early estimates
suggest the damage could go well beyond $10 billion. A broad group of
NGOs – including the International Crisis Group – has recommended an
early emergency supplemental of $3 billion as essential to Haiti’s
recovery. The sooner it is approved, the more likely other countries
and institutions will seek a matching commitment. To put this in some
perspective, in this hemisphere, the U.S. has pledged between 30-65
percent of the reconstruction aid totals following natural disasters
like Hurricane Mitch or peace accords in Nicaragua and El Salvador.
For that effort to be successful, each key U.S. agency, particularly
USAID, State and DoD, must designate full-time Haiti Reconstruction
Coordinators. Ideally, the President should name a single Haiti
Reconstruction Coordinator to serve as an overall U.S. government
policy czar for Haiti reconstruction and empower him or her with the
necessary authority to ensure an all-of-government response. That
would ensure a greater degree of overall strategic coordination,
guarantee inter-agency coherence and reduce potentially
counterproductive delays.
However, the United States also must commit by example to a similar
international coordinating reconstruction effort. There is already a
UN peacekeeping mission on the ground. Even before the earthquake, the
Secretary General’s Special Representative was unable to ensure that
independent UN agencies, within their competence, responded to the
priorities defined by the Security Council. That needed to be changed
earlier. Now it is absolutely essential. The UNSRSG also should be the
interlocutor with the Government of Haiti with respect to security,
rule of law and political reform and coordinate all international
reconstruction assistance. In other areas, he or she should still co-
chair along with the Haitian Prime Minister or the designee of the
President and the Prime Minister, a technical and financial
reconstruction committee, that will have the authority to review
projects deemed contrary to the major objectives of the UN mandate and
the goals of the Haiti reconstruction and transformation plan.
Obviously the World Bank, IDB, US, EU, and others would sit on the
committee with the SRSG and the Haiti government. The committee should
be the mechanism of international coordination and oversee progress
toward implementing the reconstruction plan and hopefully pressure
each other to make good on donor pledges.
In addition, a critical Haitian government-wide procurement mechanism
should be considered, in partnership with the international community,
to oversee large-scale infrastructure projects proposed by Haiti for
its transformation – from planning to procurement to construction to
completion. Inclusion of measures of transparency and accountability
in that agency will be vital not only for donor satisfaction but to
avoid inevitable suspicion from Haitian constituencies as well.
Let me suggest five priority areas where many of those principles
should be applied.
•First, for reconstruction to succeed, both security and the rule of
law are required. Reconstruction planning must incorporate a clear and
critical path toward the completion of police, justice and prison
reforms that were initiated before the earthquake, and deploy them
across the country.
Fortunately the presence of the UN peacekeeping mission – and
temporary U.S. military forces – guarantees the physical stability of
the state. The past has shown us that gangs in Port-au-Prince are
capable of quickly reorganizing. It appears that is what is happening
now in Cite Soleil and other areas, where there are reports that
criminals – many from among the 5000 prisoners who escaped the
crumbled penitentiary – are resuming their criminal armed
activities. The UN peacekeeping mission has been authorized for a
reinforcement of 2000 more troops and 1500 more police. They will need
more police, to be sure, well beyond 2011, while police stations are
rebuilt and equipped and the training of new police continues. To put
it in perspective – about 1000 of the 4000 police who worked in Port-
au-Prince have not shown up for work or are believed to have died,
although the large majority, despite their own losses in many cases,
are back on the streets.
The U.S. can also respond to President Preval’s pleas for help in
fighting drug trafficking by boosting the interdiction capability of
the Haitian coast guard and the Haiti National Police (HNP) on an on-
going basis. The U.S. could also second more Haitian-American police,
prosecutors and judges to the UN to assist Haiti in building its own
justice infrastructure.
•Second, for reconstruction to succeed, Haiti must be supported in
building a nationwide system of free public elementary and secondary
education – not just in Port-au-Prince but across every department.
Before the quake, nearly 40% of Haiti’s children were not in school.
Of those in school, an estimated 80% were in private schools, most of
which were unregulated, offered poor quality education, and charged
exorbitant fees. The Haitian diaspora can offer unique support,
particularly with teacher training. Creole-speaking former Peace
Corps volunteers can play a role, and the Peace Corps already is
gathering a skills-data base to link into the reconstruction effort.
Supplemental funding to fund this effort should be provided.
•This is also an opportunity to offer Haiti’s young people a chance to
participate in their country’s own recovery. The concepts of
AmeriCorps and the Civilian Conservation Corps should be introduced to
produce jobs for the unemployed that contribute to Haiti’s
reconstruction.
•Third, renewing Haitian agriculture may be the best way to keep the
migrants from Port-au-Prince in their communities of refugee. They
must have access to credit and fertilizer, assistance with marketing
and perhaps even guaranteed prices for their first harvest. If that
occurs, the capacity of Haitian farmers to once again be the major
source of food for the population, as it was before the 1970s, would
be enhanced, particularly with respect to rice. Before the 1970s,
Haiti produced nearly all of its rice. Once tariffs were removed, its
farmers could not compete with subsidized and large-scale rice farmers
in the U.S. and they nearly disappeared, as 70 percent of Haiti’s rice
is now imported. Haiti has shown that it has the potential to meet
modern marketing demands with mango and coffee crops. When agriculture
is linked to environmental protection with protection of watersheds,
terracing and reforestation, there is a win-win outcome.
•Fourth, meeting Haiti’s energy requirement will be essential in any
reconstruction environment and now may be the moment when an historic
shift away from charcoal – as fuel for cooking and for small business
energy generation – can be achieved. It would not only remove the
constant threat to the nation’s remaining forest cover, including in
its national parks, but also enable reforestation to have some chance
for success. This will require Haitian leadership with international
technical and financial support in a single, unified program that
subsidizes impoverished Haitians in making the transfer. This is
essential along with continued reform of Haiti’s electric utility,
EDH.
•Finally, the Haitian Social Compact should clearly engage the Haitian
diaspora in the reconstruction effort. This could include providing
avenues for remittances for development, with matching contributions
by donors for community projects. In addition, the same concept of
direct transfer of resources from a diaspora Haitian-American or
Haitian-Canadian to a family member – which now surpasses official
development assistance – should be used as a model for accelerating
the use of conditional cash transfers to the poor, with the sole
condition being that their children are immunized and attend school.
Using the Brazilian, Mexican and other models, an income supplement
can reach impoverished Haitian families when they need it the most.
Helping Haiti recovery from this natural disaster constitutes an
obligation for every nation of this hemisphere and beyond. It is not
only the right thing to do in helping neighbours, it is the only thing
to do.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6517&l=1
Tackling State Fragility: The New World of Peacebuilding,
Donald Steinberg
Keynote by Donald Steinberg, Deputy President, International Crisis
Group to the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Conference on
Peacebuilding, 1 February 2010
Your Excellencies: It is an honour to address the opening session of
the International Parliamentary Conference on Peacebuilding. I would
like to begin by thanking the CPA UK branch for bringing together 80
international parliamentarians from three dozen countries for this
important conference on tackling state fragility.
Our discussion here today is given added urgency by recent events
around the world – whether a devastating earthquake in Haiti, the
Afghanistan donors’ conference here in London last week, an on-going
constitutional crisis in Northern Ireland, or the new threats of
terrorism emanating from fragile and failing states around the Red
Sea, such as Yemen and Somalia. Each month, International Crisis
Group publishes an update on some 70 situations of ongoing or
potential conflict, which regrettably demonstrates that deadly
conflict is not an aberration affecting only a few countries.
My presentation will provide an overview for other sessions this week
by reviewing the challenges of modern peacebuilding and stabilization
efforts. I will begin by addressing changes in the global environment
that enhance and impede our efforts at peacebuilding, and then go on
to consider the factors associated with instability, conflict and
fragility. I will conclude by outlining what I consider are the six
interlocking challenges facing these societies and their international
partners, including restoring security, building a responsive
political framework, kick-starting the economy, ensuring a balance of
reconciliation and accountability, promoting civil society, and
getting the regional context right.
New Realities in Addressing State Fragility
I start from the premise that the traditional dividing line between
“hard” issues of national security and “soft” issues of human security
have become hopelessly and permanently blurred. Today, there are no
"hard" and "soft" issues: crises no longer remain in their separate
and distinct boxes, any more than they respect national borders.
There is a broad and growing recognition that conflict prevention,
conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction form the bedrock
of diplomacy and the promotion of international security interests
around the world. You cannot achieve or even adequately address the
fundamental goals of promoting governance, sustainable development,
and international stability and cooperation in the presence of mass
violence.
Further, the stakes of game have risen dramatically, as global
implications of state fragility and failure have become more
profound. Failure to consolidate peace and democratic governance in
Afghanistan, Colombia, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, and beyond no longer
just impacts on people of those countries, but opens door to training
camps for global terrorists; permits new routes for trafficking of
persons, arms and illegal drugs; spawns a flood of refugees across
borders and even oceans; disrupts international trade and investment;
facilitates incubation of pandemic disease; and even brings piracy.
In addition, resources to address these concerns are simply not as
plentiful as before. The proliferation of peacekeeping missions –
roughly 100,000 personnel under UN missions and 70,000 under other
regional organizations – has largely tapped out the supply of troops
and civilians, while the global financial and economic crisis has
essentially closed the assistance larder for peacekeeping missions and
post-conflict reconstruction alike. When was the last time anyone
talked about a new Marshall Plan for a specific reconstruction effort,
be it for Afghanistan or Zimbabwe or any country in between?
While the international community provides vast amounts of disaster
assistance once conflicts emerge, regrettably, we struggle to find
resources to prevent these emergencies from occurring or to rebuild
societies. Too often, we seem to say: "billions for relief, but very
few pennies for prevention or rebuilding."
Gone, too, are the days when the international community believed it
could ignore or run roughshod over the priorities of its domestic
partners. Too frequently in the past, it seemed as if bilateral
donors and international financial institutions treated developing
countries as laboratories to test out their latest theory of
development. In fact, we have found that local ownership is the sine
qua non for success, in the form of executive, legislative and
judicial branches of government, community councils, institutions of
civil society, and the people themselves. This does not mean ignoring
vital universal principles, such as transparent governance,
accountability and basic human rights. But it does mean that the
donor community cannot substitute its priorities for those of the
country itself.
Factors Associated with Fragility and Conflict
This reality places premium on anticipating where conflict will emerge
and addressing its root causes. In assessing where to put our ounce
of prevention, the science of predicting where conflicts will emerge
has become a cottage industry. Research has identified a number of
prime "associated" factors. Among the most salient are:
•Is there responsive governance, rule of law, and opportunities for
political participation? Societies must have safety valves to permit
the peaceful redress of grievances.
•Is the economic system accommodating rapid urbanization and
population pressure? A quick route to conflict is when alienated
urban youth do not see opportunities within their societies and are
susceptible to fanatics or zealots.
•Do institutions of civil society draw populations together across
religious, ethnic, class or political divisions? Such institutions
are often the first victims of “divide-and-rule” polarization that
characterizes conflict situations.
•Is the country located in a stable region? Countries in bad
neighborhoods risk spill-over from armed combatants, refugees and arms
flows; those in good neighborhoods receive a powerful dampening effect
on potential violence.
•Has violence become normalized in the society? Aspects to consider
here are the role of the military in political life, rates of domestic
violence and rape, and the proliferation of small arms.
•Is the society open, internally and internationally? Closed
political systems, economies, and media environment are dangerous.
Conflicts are like mushrooms: they grow best in darkness.
•Has there been upheaval during the past 15 years? Contrary to the
warning you get on an investment prospectus, past record is an
indicator of future performance.
Interlocking Challenges
These are among the factors we need to monitor as indicators and
potential triggers of conflict. In studying more than two dozen
successful and failed peacekeeping efforts since World War II, we have
found that six key challenges must be addressed nearly simultaneously,
since each of these challenges feeds into the others. Again, these
challenges are to restore state and human security, to build a
responsive political framework, to kick-start the economy, to balance
national reconciliation and the need for accountability, to promote
civil society, and to address the regional context. I would like to
address each of these challenges briefly.
On security front, international peacekeepers can provide a buffer,
but credible local security forces – both defense forces and polices –
must quickly take over to provide stability, normalcy and rule of law
to everyday life. International support for security sector reform
is usually essential to ensure that forces are well-trained,
disciplined, and adequately paid so that they do not exploit and abuse
the populations they are supposed to protect. There must be effective
programs to disarm, demobilise, and reintegrate ex-combatants,
including militias. Child soldiers must put down their AK-47s and
pick up schoolbooks.
The second challenge is to restore a legitimate political framework.
We must help build credible governance at national and local levels;
transform armed movements into political parties; and ensure that
effective legislatures and judiciaries counter-balance the power of
the executive, which grows during conflict periods. The quick-fix of
creating a government of national unity including all competing forces
is rarely a viable long-term solution. Similarly, the premature
holding of elections can create a winner-take-all power dispensation
that is itself a prelude to new conflict from disempowered
minorities. A culture of accountability and transparency must emerge
in government, along with an effective system to protect human
rights. Decentralization and local empowerment must be balanced
against need for strong central authority in fragile states.
Economic renewal is often defined in strictly physical terms as the
rebuilding of roads, clinics, schools, power grids, and houses. In
truth, long-term development means reviving agriculture, creating
conditions needed to attract local and foreign investment, ensuring
greater equality in income distribution, and creating jobs. In
societies facing massive youth unemployment, it is little surprise
that renegade leaders have lured disaffected young people with a siren
song that offers quick if venal empowerment.
The fourth challenge is coming to grips with past abuses and
atrocities. Nations and individuals who have suffered from grievous
treatment must balance accountability and national reconciliation, but
too often, peace agreement provide blanket amnesties in which men with
guns forgive other men with guns for crimes committed against women
and children. There is no one-size-fits-all approach to transitional
justice: whether it is action by local courts, the International
Criminal Court, a truth and reconciliation commission like in South
Africa, the gacaca community court system in Rwanda, or ad hoc
international tribunals in cases where local courts are inadequate,
ensuring accountability is essential to rebuilding rule of law and
eliminating a culture of impunity.
A fifth challenge, often ignored, is re-creating of civil society.
Groups of academics, lawyers, teachers, unions, and women are the glue
that holds society together and serve as safety valves to permit the
peaceful redress of grievances. Such groups are frequently polarized
during conflict, often due to conscious "divide-and-rule" strategies
by national or factional leaders. Women in particular are not only
the primary victims of conflict, but a key to peace consolidation.
Bringing women’s groups to peace table improves the quality of
agreements reached, and involving them in post-conflict governance
reduces the likelihood of returning to war. The single best
investment to revitalize agriculture, restore health systems, and
improve other social indicators after conflict is girls' education. It
has been said: "educate a boy and you educate an individual; educate a
girl and you educate a community."
The final challenge is getting regional context right. Comprehensive
peace-building must recognize differing yet often synergistic roles to
be played and interests to be pursued by neighboring countries, each
with its special relationships and contacts with key actors. It is
often useful to have formal structures: ad hoc "friends groups" or
conflict resolution committees of such regional and sub-regional
organizations can serve this purpose.
Building the Domestic Constituency for Engagement
Minister Fraser-Moleketi will speak in a moment on the specific role
of parliamentarians in these processes. In addition to questions of
insisting on government accountability, holding the pursestrings,
helping strengthen parliaments and political parties in post-conflict
nations, and using new EU structure to encourage good policies in that
context, parliamentarians are vital to building a domestic
constituency for national efforts to stabilize fragile societies and
ensure successful transitions from conflict to lasting peace.
In this regard, I want to suggest that we too frequently underestimate
the ability of our fellow citizens to understand and support the
multiple purposes served by such engagement, and I will conclude with
a final story. In October 1993, I was serving as deputy White House
press secretary at the time of the “Black Hawk Down” disaster in
Somalia. In response to the deaths of 18 American servicemen in
Mogadishu, there was a firestorm of calls from Washington politicians
for the immediate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Somalia. While
President Clinton resisted this call, he did decide on a six-month
timetable for their removal.
In March of the following year, when the troop withdrawal was
complete, President Clinton traveled to Fort Hood, New York, from
where the troops had originally come. In a private meeting with the
families of servicemen, one woman stood up and asked in a very
aggressive manner, “Mr. President, what explanation would you have for
a wife whose husband died in Mogadishu?” As the President started to
respond by citing America’s strategic interest in the Horn of Africa,
another woman got up and said, “Mr. President, I can answer that. You
should say that the woman’s husband died a hero, in the finest
tradition of the U.S. military and the United States, helping save the
lives of hundreds of thousands of starving Somalis who couldn’t save
themselves.” When she finished, the whole room broke out in
applause.
Our fellow citizens get this agenda. They can connect the dots –
frequently better than we can – between our strategic, security, and
humanitarian interests. We underestimate their commitment and concern
at our peril. Thank you.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6512&l=1
http://www.microsofttranslator.com/Default.aspx
chhotemianinshallah
By Kari Luu, Staff Writer
Updated: Tuesday, February 9, 2010
MCT Campus
Testing new water sports, shopping at local craft vendors and sipping
margaritas in a hammock are all typical activities on a pristine and
private beach in Labadee, Haiti.
Although this country may never be the same considering the Jan. 12
earthquake, which flattened Port-au-Prince, Royal Caribbean
International cruise line has been continuing with business as usual.
Currently, this nautical company is sifting through a sea of
controversy as it continues to dock its ships at Labadee, which is a
private resort about 90 miles away from the devastated Port-au-Prince.
However, passengers who purchased tickets prior to the earthquake are
all facing an ethical question of whether or not it’s wrong to enjoy
themselves. Critics are outraged and disgusted by the thought of
tourists playing in beaches while bodies continue to pile up in Port-
au-Prince. However, Royal Caribbean insists on its positive influence
by generating tourism for Haiti in the present and future.
According to www.cnn.com, Royal Caribbean has been one of Haiti's
largest foreign investors for almost 30 years and has spent $50
million developing Labadee.
"The idea to relax so close to the death and destruction was
definitely awkward," passenger Daniel Melleby said in an article in
Newsweek. “But it became clear pretty quickly that the people there
were very happy and relieved to see us.”
Cruise line officials have been trying to reassure customers who are
reconsidering going on a trip that includes a stop in Haiti.
"My view is it isn't better to replace a visit to Labadee — or for
that matter, to stay on the ship while it's docked in Labadee — with a
visit to another destination for a vacation," Adam Goldstein,
president and CEO of Royal Caribbean International, said on his blog.
"Why? Because being on the island and generating economic activity for
the straw market vendors, the hair-braiders and our 230 employees
helps with relief while being somewhere else does not help."
Nonetheless, according to Newsweek, passengers still support Royal
Caribbean’s choice as 85 percent of guests who docked at Labadee
ultimately went ashore.
According to its Web site, Royal Caribbean has made humanitarian
efforts by donating $1 million to Haiti and used its ships to bring
supplies such as rice, dried beans, powdered milk, water and canned
goods. Royal Caribbean also stated on its site that 100 percent of the
company's net revenue from the destination will be contributed to the
relief effort.
In spite of this, opponents argue that Royal Caribbean is making an
unethical choice by continuing to visit Haiti and that it could be
doing more to help the country. Dr. Jess Ponting, a hospitality and
tourism management assistant professor at San Diego State, believes
now is not the time for such recreation and the company could offer
more of its resources.
“There are assets Royal Caribbean has and could bring to the country
to restore order such as use the ships to house people, provide
hospital service or even house relief workers,” Ponting said.
“As they come in, they take away valuable resources needed. Cruise
ships have even been used to house (Hurricane) Katrina victims.”
He also said the company’s contribution to the Haitian economy is very
minimal.
“The nation receives 800 percent more taxes from a regular visitor
compared to cruise visitors who come for a day,” Ponting said. “The
regular tourist pays more taxes for drinks and different things they
purchase, whereas cruise ships are profitable because (the passenger’s
money) doesn’t go into the economy, the money goes back to cruise.”
Most of his Ponting’s research came from the Center for Responsible
Travel and he found that the Labadee beaches need extensive security
to protect tourists. He said this is diverting much needed guards who
can help restore order in Port-au-Prince.
“I don’t want to kick Royal Caribbean, but they don’t contribute to
the economy,” he said. “They have been helping, but they continue with
business as usual and it’s clearly not (enough).”
1 comments
Anonymous Tue Feb 9 2010 16:21 RCCL is party to a lease with the
Haitian "government" for the Labadee property. I have heard that this
lease is through the year 2050. They also pay a per capital fee for
each passenger. What needs to be understood is how much is being paid
and who is benefitting. It could be the Haitian people, or most
unethically it could be going to the goverment "officials" and then
into their Swiss bank accounts.
http://www.thedailyaztec.com/features/travel-adventure/ethics-questioned-in-haiti-tourism-1.2145141
The Hilltop
Beautiful Scenery Hides Poverty, Debt Faced by Caribbean Islands
By CHAZZTEN PETTIFORD
Contributing Writer
Published: Monday, November 24, 2008
Updated: Monday, November 24, 2008
Sun, sand and crystal blue oceans are characteristics of the Caribbean
that make it a go-to destination for tourists. But for many who call
the Caribbean home, life is more than a day at the beach. Poverty,
debt and hunger are a harsh reality.
Dora Currea, general manager of the Caribbean Country Department,
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), delivered the keynote address
on “Poverty and Marginalization in the Caribbean” at the Ralph J.
Bunche International Affairs Center.
Alternate executive director of the Inter-American Development Bank,
Richard Bernal, introduced Currea.
“She has an in-depth knowledge of the Caribbean. She proves that a
single person can make a difference,” Bernal said.
Currea delivered a lecture on the IDB’s role in the Caribbean with
emphasis on Haiti and Jamaica and the food crisis.
According to its Web site, the IDB provides solutions to development
challenges in 26 countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.
The IDB lends money and provides grants. It also offers research,
advice and technical assistance to improve key areas like education,
poverty reduction and agriculture.
Currea presented an informative presentation that showed images and
graphs representing growth, debt and economic development in Haiti and
Jamaica.
“The majority of [Haiti’s] population is in extreme poverty,” Currea
said.
According to the CIA World Factbook, Haiti is the poorest country in
the Western Hemisphere, with 80 percent of the population living under
the poverty line.
“The 2008 hurricane season has made it particularly difficult for
Haiti,” said Currea.
Four back-to-back hurricanes, crippling the country’s economy, left an
estimated 800,000 homeless and over 800 dead in Haiti.
Jamaica’s economy is characterized by extremely high debt, but has
managed impressive gains despite chronic low growth. Jamaica reduced
poverty from 20 percent in 2002 to 14.5 percent in 2007, according to
Currea.
Grace Virtue, senior writer and executive communications manager at
Howard University, coordinated the event.
“The Caribbean is an integral part of the African Diaspora. Our
history and our destinies are all connected,” Virtue said.
Virtue established the Virtue Institute, a faith-based organization
dedicated to relieving the suffering of the marginalized by promoting
values and peace and reducing conflict.
Currea displayed a chart depicting the rise in the price of food.
“World food prices have soared over the past two years. The Caribbean
is one of the regions most impacted by the phenomenon,” Currea said.
“We, at the IDB, are exploring how to increase nutritional benefits
for children,” Currea said.
Students, faculty, staff an http://christmas.newarchaeology.com/holly.gif
d members of the community filled every chair in the room/center for
the lecture.
“I learned a lot about the severity of poverty in the Caribbean,
specifically in Jamaica and Haiti. I’ve learned enough to be prompted
to do further research,” said Prentyce Owens, a senior psychology
major.
The lecture was co-sponsored by the departments of African studies,
African-American Studies and the Ralph J. Bunche International Affairs
Center.
America’s declining economy and how it will affect the Caribbean was
also discussed.
“As bad as things get here, things in the Caribbean will be even
tougher,” said Dr. Scott, Jr., deputy director of the Ralph J. Bunche
Center.
“The islands may be struggling economically, but they have
unbelievably beautiful and vibrant cultures, rich heritage and
traditions of scholarship that are among the best in the world,” said
Virtue.
A question-and-answer portion followed the lecture.
The Hilltop > Nation & World
Haitian Immigrants Fight for Equal Rights
Children of illegal immigrants in the Dominican Republic fight for
citizenship
By OSCAR AVILA-Chicago Tribune (MCT)
Published: Friday, October 10, 2008
Updated: Thursday, December 25, 2008
HAINA, Dominican Republic - Officially, Carlos Noel does not exist.
Although his French last name is a giveaway that his family roots go
back to neighboring Haiti, Noel is not an illegal immigrant living in
the shadows like his parents. Noel was born in the Dominican Republic
and according to the constitution, entitled to citizenship.
But under a strict new policy, the Dominican Republic government has
refused to issue ID cards to Noel and tens of thousands of others
whose parents were illegal immigrants.
That policy, which flouts a ruling by the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, essentially leaves Noel without a country. The dispute
is another example of how countries, including the U.S., are debating
how to treat the children of illegal immigrants.
The more pressing concern, according to human-rights advocates, is
that the Caribbean nation is fostering a permanent underclass of
Haitian descent, residents who will forever feel like outsiders in
their homeland. That could provoke social unrest on an island that
sends thousands of migrants to the U.S. looking for economic
opportunities.
Noel, 27, sounds more resigned than bitter when he talks of his
situation.
"It takes away your motivation," he says. "When I look ahead to my
future, I see a future that is uncertain, limited."
As the hemisphere's poorest nation and one grappling with political
unrest so severe that UN peacekeepers have been deployed, Haiti has
sent workers to the Dominican Republic for decades. The migrant flow
initially headed for the sugar cane fields but now is also drawn to
the island's construction boom and vibrant tourism industry.
No accurate count exists, but non-governmental organizations estimate
there are about 500,000 Haitian migrants in the country, more than
five percent of the population. With growth has come a backlash.
The Dominican Constitution says anyone born in this country is a
citizen except those whose parents are "in transit," or in the country
temporarily.
Under a new strict interpretation, Dominican officials call anyone
without a legal ID card "in transit." Observers say that
interpretation would include Haitian migrants living in the country
illegally for decades.
Gloria Amezquita, a coordinator with Jesuit Refugee and Migrant
Services in the capital of Santo Domingo, said Dominican registrars
have been ordered not to process ID applications if parents cannot
produce residency cards. Even more troubling, she said, the government
is applying the new policy retroactively and stripping citizenship
from some Dominicans of Haitian descent.
Without ID cards, those of Haitian descent can only attend public
school through 6th grade. Lacking education and a work permit, they
typically are destined for menial jobs. They also are denied public
health insurance.
"You are condemning them to this cycle of poverty," Amezquita said.
Noel's mother sells coffee on street corners, but he had dreams of
attending college and someday running a hotel. Instead, he ended up
following her path and spent his days selling empanadas on the
sidewalk. He now toils as a janitor and maintenance man.
As in many countries, the new get-tough approach on illegal immigrants
has proven popular. The National Private Enterprise Council, an
influential business organization, unveiled a migration plan this
month that backs the denial of citizenship to the children of illegal
immigrants.
The organization calls the migration boom a threat to Dominican-born
workers. "We have to find a solution to the 'Haitian issue' with new
public policies," said Francisco Jose Castillo, the group's vice
president.
In contrast to the Dominican approach, those born in the U.S. are
automatically citizens regardless of their parents' legal status.
Marselha Goncalves Margerin, advocacy director for the Washington-
based Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights, said seeking
Haitian citizenship is not feasible for most people born in the
Dominican Republic.
Besides the legal issues of citizenship, there is a fundamental
question of identity, Goncalves Margerin said.
"They play baseball, they speak Spanish, they dance the bachata," she
said. "These are Dominicans."
Noel, for example, says he knows almost nothing about Haitian history
and can barely speak Creole.
"I think it is just a minority, a fringe, who are racist. The racism
comes from above, in the government policies. That is what hurts,"
Noele said.
Although the U.S. State Department has decried state-sanctioned
discrimination against Dominicans of Haitian descent, Goncalves
Margerin says she believes the U.S. should be more aggressive in
lobbying a country that has trade privileges of the Central American
Free Trade Agreement.
Fritz Cineas, Haiti's ambassador to the Dominican Republic, was also
skittish about publicly criticizing a policy that is "an internal
matter." But Cineas said the dispute speaks to a wrongly held
perception that Haitians are a threat.
"If the Haitians decided to go home tomorrow, there would be many
activities that would be paralyzed," he said. "We are contributing to
the development of this country, not taking away from it."
http://www.thehilltoponline.com/nation-world/haitian-immigrants-fight-for-equal-rights-1.1147940
The Hilltop > Nation & World
Haiti Gets Humanitarian Aid, Awaits Justice After Storm
By Austin Thompson
Published: Wednesday, September 17, 2008
Updated: Thursday, December 25, 2008
After being hit by four major hurricanes in recent weeks, Haiti is
looking for answers. With as many as 1 million people now homeless and
1,000 dead, the government of the first free black republic is
desperately trying to get basic necessities like food and water to its
people. Prior to the storm, Haiti was the poorest nation in the
Western Hemisphere, plagued by a history of U.S. interference,
regressive military dictatorships and government corruption.
In April, a devastating food crisis created a wave of popular protests
against the government leading to the resignation of the Prime
Minister, Jacques Edouard Alexis. Haiti was once self-sufficient in
rice production but after pressure from the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund, it is now importing more than 80 percent
of its rice from abroad.
This Hurricane season's storms have compounded the social turmoil
knocking out bridges, power lines and washing away vital roads. The
storms have left multitudes in the Haitian city of Gonaives hungry,
without clean drinking water or shelter.
Geraldine Augustine is a Haitian-American sophomore international
business major from Philadelphia who recently came back from Haiti in
August. She is shocked by the mayhem the storms have made in such a
short time period.
"I know a lot of friends and family's homes have been hit and been
completely destroyed," Augustine said. "They are living in medical
centers where they can get access to minimal assistance. There aren't
proper roads so it's hard to get help to the people who need it the
most."
In the wake of the catastrophe, a large-scale humanitarian effort is
underway. The Red Cross has sent $250,000 in supplies and hopes to see
that amount increase. International aid organizations have also joined
relief efforts in cities like Genovie.
Haitian-American singer Wyclef Jean and actor Matt Damon have made a
special effort finding mission to Haiti in order to raise awareness
about the desperate plight of the Haitian people after the devastating
storms.
However, some people agree that handing out food and clothing in Haiti
are short-term solutions to institutional problems on the macro level.
The lack of emergency planning, shelters and sustainable
infrastructures provided by the government will make the Haitian
people perennial victims of tropical storms and hurricanes. Roberte
Exantus, a Haitian international student studying political science
says the government clearly has no control over the country.
"The government isn't doing anything. My father was shocked to find
orphanages filled with water and no government officials present," he
said. Exantus believes that the government is not concerned with the
poor and lower class citizens of Haiti.
"With Haiti you can never know how many died. Along the way, they find
more and more people," Exantus said. "The favilas in the mountains
that are washed down from storms belong to the underclass. They lose
everything hoping tomorrow will be better."
Haiti's lack of emergency preparation is in stark contrast to it's
neighbor Cuba whose government orchestrated highly organized
evacuations of people in danger and converted schools, convents and
government buildings into make shift shelters. Eugene Puryear, history
major and political activist, says that the catastrophe in Haiti is
similar to that of Katrina - Mother Nature is only partially at
fault.
"The current government has taken minimal action to resolve the
underlying crisis of poverty in Haiti. American style "Free Trade"
agreements and programs, have ravished Haiti since the days of
Dictator Duvalier. The disaster following the Hurricane is a direct
result of the horrendous nature of infrastructure, the economy and
social services presently in Haiti."
In response to the disaster many Howard students are asking what they
can do to help. Josh Myers, senior co-President of Kwame Ture Society
believes Howard University students as members of the Pan-African
community are partially responsible for the future in Haiti.
"It is the explicit responsibility of the Pan-African community to
support Haiti and facilitate the allocation of needed resources to
meet the needs of the people there. We should be there first to enter
and the last leave." HAfter being hit by four major hurricanes in
recent weeks, Haiti is looking for answers. With as many as 1 million
people now homeless and 1,000 dead, the government of the first free
black republic is desperately trying to get basic necessities like
food and water to its people. Prior to the storm, Haiti was the
poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere, plagued by a history of U.S.
interference, regressive military dictatorships and government
corruption.
In April, a devastating food crisis created a wave of popular protests
against the government leading to the resignation of the Prime
Minister, Jacques Edouard Alexis. Haiti was once self-sufficient in
rice production but after pressure from the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund, it is now importing more than 80 percent
of its rice from abroad.
This Hurricane season's storms have compounded the social turmoil
knocking out bridges, power lines and washing away vital roads. The
storms have left multitudes in the Haitian city of Gonaives hungry,
without clean drinking water or shelter.
Geraldine Augustine is a Haitian-American sophomore international
business major from Philadelphia who recently came back from Haiti in
August. She is shocked by the mayhem the storms have made in such a
short time period.
"I know a lot of friends and family's homes have been hit and been
completely destroyed," Augustine said. "They are living in medical
centers where they can get access to minimal assistance. There aren't
proper roads so it's hard to get help to the people who need it the
most."
In the wake of the catastrophe, a large-scale humanitarian effort is
underway. The Red Cross has sent $250,000 in supplies and hopes to see
that amount increase. International aid organizations have also joined
relief efforts in cities like Genovie.
Haitian-American singer Wyclef Jean and actor Matt Damon have made a
special effort finding mission to Haiti in order to raise awareness
about the desperate plight of the Haitian people after the devastating
storms.
However, some people agree that handing out food and clothing in Haiti
are short-term solutions to institutional problems on the macro level.
The lack of emergency planning, shelters and sustainable
infrastructures provided by the government will make the Haitian
people perennial victims of tropical storms and hurricanes. Roberte
Exantus, a Haitian international student studying political science
says the government clearly has no control over the country.
"The government isn't doing anything. My father was shocked to find
orphanages filled with water and no government officials present," he
said. Exantus believes that the government is not concerned with the
poor and lower class citizens of Haiti.
"With Haiti you can never know how many died. Along the way, they find
more and more people," Exantus said. "The favilas in the mountains
that are washed down from storms belong to the underclass. They lose
everything hoping tomorrow will be better."
Haiti's lack of emergency preparation is in stark contrast to it's
neighbor Cuba whose government orchestrated highly organized
evacuations of people in danger and converted schools, convents and
government buildings into make shift shelters. Eugene Puryear, history
major and political activist, says that the catastrophe in Haiti is
similar to that of Katrina - Mother Nature is only partially at
fault.
"The current government has taken minimal action to resolve the
underlying crisis of poverty in Haiti. American style "Free Trade"
agreements and programs, have ravished Haiti since the days of
Dictator Duvalier. The disaster following the Hurricane is a direct
result of the horrendous nature of infrastructure, the economy and
social services presently in Haiti."
In response to the disaster many Howard students are asking what they
can do to help. Josh Myers, senior co-President of Kwame Ture Society
believes Howard University students as members of the Pan-African
community are partially responsible for the future in Haiti.
"It is the explicit responsibility of the Pan-African community to
support Haiti and facilitate the allocation of needed resources to
meet the needs of the people there. We should be there first to enter
and the last leave." He and members of the Howard University Student
Association are planning to coordinate a course of action and
awareness campaign in solidarity with the Haitian nation.
Roberte Exantus wants African-American students to understand how
important Haiti is to the history of liberation and independence and
support them now. "We need the help of African-Americans leaders and
students. You could do so much but you choose to ignore the things
that happen around the world."e and members of the Howard University
Student Association are planning to coordinate a course of action and
awareness campaign in solidarity with the Haitian nation.
Roberte Exantus wants African-American students to understand how
important Haiti is to the history of liberation and independence and
support them now. "We need the help of African-Americans leaders and
students. You could do so much but you choose to ignore the things
that happen around the world."
bademiyansubhanallah
for the week of 8 February 2010
Conflict areas and subjects covered
in this week's update:
Reports: Burundi
Commentary: Zimbabwe, Sudan, Nigeria, Haiti, Iraq
Website: Afghanistan, DR Congo, Iraq, Zimbabwe
Announcement: From the Ground news feed
Crisis Group reports published this week:
Burundi: Ensuring Credible Elections
12 February
Burundi's escape from its long civil war can only be solidified if all
political forces, including government, opposition parties, civil
society and media ensure that this year's series of elections is truly
democratic.
more Crisis Group reports
Crisis Group commentary:
"Zimbabwe's Unity Government at One Year: Much to
Celebrate, Much to Do"
Donald Steinberg, The Guardian, 11 February
Sudan: "The right terms for a wrong engagement"
Alain Délétroz, European Voice, 11 February
"Nigerias Staatskrise eskaliert"
Louise Arbour & Ayo Obe, Die Zeit, 10. Februar
Haiti: "Hundert Jahre Grausamkeit"
Donald Steinberg, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 9. Februar
"Playing with fire in Iraq"
Joost Hiltermann, The National, 28 January
Crisis Group website:
Crisis Group has updated four online conflict histories:
Afghanistan
DR Congo
Iraq
Zimbabwe
Announcement:
From the Ground news feed
Brussels/New York, 12 February 2010: The International Crisis Group
and Human Rights Watch are pleased to announce the launch of
FromtheGround.net, a new website pooling information and breaking news
from major, field-based NGOs.
As news organisations rapidly cut down on their foreign-based staff,
the role of field-based NGOs has become more important than ever.
FromtheGround.net (FtG) is an attempt to gather all the material these
organisations produce on a single site, and to make it more
accessible.
On the FtG website you can browse the output of all the organisations
as a single feed or divided into regions. The website also has a map
that visualises news “hotspots”, graphs showing trends in news on a
particular topic, and an easy sharing function to repost stories on
social networks like Twitter or Facebook. All the news is available on
Twitter, and as both global and regional RSS-feeds.
Apart from Crisis Group and HRW, FtG currently also features material
from ten other organisations, including Oxfam International, the Open
Society Institute and the Committee to Protect Journalists. We of
course hope to expand this list in future.
Burundi: Ensuring Credible Elections
Africa report Nº155
12 February 2010
To read this report in French, please click here.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Burundi has made much progress in leaving its civil war behind, but
tensions are rising ahead of elections. They could escalate
dangerously in coming months, ruining the electoral process’s
credibility and endangering a fragile democracy and, ultimately, many
gains of the peace process. After strong international pressure was
put on the ruling party, consensus was reached in September 2009 on an
Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) and a new electoral
code. The polls – communal, presidential, then legislative – are
scheduled between May and September, but opposition parties are facing
harassment and intimidation from police and the ruling party’s youth
wing and appear to be choosing to respond to violence with violence.
Both the region and Burundi’s other partners should reinforce election
violence monitoring mechanisms and support deployment of a regional
police mission. A senior regional envoy should be appointed to
facilitate resolution of political disputes and party leaders warned
they face sanctions if they rig elections and possible international
prosecution if they commit serious violent crimes.
Although an electoral framework endorsed by the majority of the
political class is in place, opposition parties still cannot operate
freely. In many parts of the country, local administrations are
controlled by the ruling Conseil national pour la défense de la
démocratie – Forces de défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD). These
local administrations order the police to disrupt opposition party
gatherings and block them from opening local offices. At the same
time, civil society organisations and some media are harassed for
denouncing the ruling party’s authoritarian tendencies.
The CNDD-FDD youth wing’s physical training, war songs and quasi-
military organisation raise the spectre of militia violence and a
large-scale intimidation campaign. The other former rebels, the Forces
nationales de libération (FNL) and the Front pour la démocratie au
Burundi (FRODEBU) are mobilising their own youth wings to oppose
intimidation tactics. The police have remained passive or become
accomplices to the ruling party’s abuses. There are thus legitimate
fears they could become further politicised, similar to the National
Intelligence Service (Service national de renseignement), which is
already trying to destabilise the opposition. Meanwhile, the main
opposition political parties’ election strategies either have yet to
be worked out or, apart from those of a few new players, fail to offer
an alternative political vision. Most parties simply criticise CNDD-
FDD leaders by denouncing suspected corruption and authoritarian
practices.
Given President Nkurunziza’s popularity in rural areas and the
financial and logistical advantages it derives from control of state
institutions, the CNDD-FDD is in a strong position to retain the
presidency. It seems to fear, however, that it could lose its majority
in parliament and dominance over provincial administrations and thus
be forced to form a coalition government, a scenario which party
hardliners, notably military leaders, strongly wish to avoid. This
prospect and the harassment of opposition parties suggest it intends
to win the local and parliamentary elections at all costs.
While the present problems do not make a return to civil war likely,
Burundi’s regional and wider international partners need to urgently
support policies that limit the real risk of serious election violence
that would plunge it into a new political crisis and endanger much of
the recent progress. Civil society organisations should support
creation of efficient electoral violence observation mechanisms, and
the media should document and report incidents. The countries in the
regional initiative on Burundi (Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda in
particular) should boost efforts to improve the training and
operations of the national police by providing a regional police
mission. Embedded within the Burundian force, a few small teams in
each province equipped by donors with their own logistics and
communications could support the planning of election security as well
as advise on and monitor implementation.
This regional police mission should be led by a commissioner working
directly with the director general of the Burundian police and report
to a senior regional special envoy mandated by the regional initiative
and the African Union to help resolve major political disputes arising
from serious security incidents and allegations of electoral
malpractice. The special envoy would also coordinate international
engagement, which has weakened since the dissolution of the
partnership for peace on Burundi and the expulsion of the Special
Representative of the UN Secretary-General at the end of 2009. A
retired head of state from the region familiar with Burundian politics
and respected by all parties would be well suited for this role.
Recommendations
To the Government of Burundi:
1. Remove restrictions on activities of political parties by formally
prohibiting provincial governors, communal administrators and local
police forces from:
a) preventing or disrupting meetings lawfully organised by opposition
parties;
b) preventing the opening of local opposition party offices; and
c) carrying out arbitrary arrests of opposition leaders and
supporters.
2. Sanction local officials who continue to obstruct activities of
the political opposition.
3. Prohibit illegal activities of party youth organisations and
punish those responsible for such activities.
4. Refrain from any verbal or other provocation and the use of
intimidation or force against opposition parties, the media and civil
society.
5. Take all appropriate measures against individuals, groups and
organisations involved in rearming militias.
6. Ensure that political parties have free and equal access to the
public media.
7. Pursue discussions with opposition political parties within the
newly established framework for national political dialogue, aiming at
reaching consensus on the administration of elections and quickly
resolving electoral disputes.
To all political parties:
8. Refrain from verbal or other provocation that could increase
political tensions, including intimidation of rivals, calls to violent
revenge or appeals to ethnic or regional hatred.
9. Stop mobilising youth groups for violent or intimidation purposes.
10. Do not compromise the neutrality of the security services by
mobilising support networks within them.
To the Burundian media:
11. Allow all political parties free and equal access to the air
waves and columns and prohibit inflammatory or malicious reporting.
To Burundian civil society:
12. Establish an observation mechanism on political violence to
document all election-related incidents, monitoring in particular
youth movement activities, groups of demobilised combatants affiliated
to political parties and the security forces.
To the regional initiative on Burundi:
13. Arrange, in cooperation with the government to deploy a regional
police mission composed of small teams embedded within the Burundi
police and mandated to support the planning and implementation of
election security operations and led by a police commissioner working
directly with the national police commander and reporting to a senior
regional special envoy.
14. Appoint a senior regional special envoy of international stature
and conversant with Burundian politics to provide high-level political
facilitation in case of grave incidents of violence or major disputes
over the administration of the electoral process, as well as to
coordinate international political engagement with political actors.
To the donor community:
15. Ensure the early deployment of international election observation
missions.
16. Provide adequate and timely financial and technical support to
the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI).
17. Warn Burundian political leaders that those responsible for
atrocity or other grave political crimes will be prosecuted – by the
International Criminal Court or a special tribunal if necessary – and
that targeted sanctions will be imposed on those resorting to massive
fraud or violence to win the elections.
Nairobi/Brussels, 12 February 2010
Burundi : garantir un processus électoral crédible
Rapport Afrique Nº155
12 février 2010
To read this summary and recommendations in English, please click
here.
SYNTHESE ET RECOMMANDATIONS
Le Burundi a fait de grands pas pour tourner la page de la guerre
civile, mais la tension politique monte dangereusement à l’approche
des élections. Ces tensions pourraient dégénérer violemment dans les
prochains mois, ruinant la crédibilité du processus électoral et
mettant en péril une démocratie fragile et les nombreux acquis du
processus de paix. Après la forte pression internationale exercée sur
le parti au pouvoir, un consensus a été atteint sur la création d’une
Commission électorale nationale indépendante (CENI) et, en septembre
2009, sur un nouveau code électoral. Les scrutins communaux,
présidentiels et législatifs sont programmés entre mai et septembre
prochain.
Les partis d’opposition sont déjà victimes de harcèlements et
d’intimidation de la part de la police et du mouvement de jeunesse du
parti au pouvoir, et semblent vouloir répondre à la violence par la
violence. Les institutions régionales ainsi que les autres partenaires
du Burundi devraient renforcer les mécanismes de surveillance de la
violence électorale, soutenir le déploiement d’une mission de police
régionale, et créer une facilitation politique de haut niveau pour
aider au règlement des différends. Les dirigeants de tous les partis
devraient également être avertis qu’ils risquent des sanctions
personnelles s’ils cherchent à truquer les élections, et seront
passibles de poursuites internationales s’ils commettent des actes de
violence graves.
Bien qu’un cadre électoral approuvé par la majorité de la classe
politique soit en place, les partis d’opposition ne peuvent toujours
pas opérer librement. Dans plusieurs régions du pays, les
administrations locales contrôlées par le Conseil national pour la
défense de la démocratie – Forces de défense de la démocratie (CNDD-
FDD), actuellement au pouvoir ordonnent à la police d’interrompre
les rassemblements des partis d’opposition ainsi que de les empêcher
d’ouvrir des bureaux locaux. Dans le même temps, des organisations de
la société civile et certains médias sont harcelés pour avoir dénoncé
les dérives autoritaires du parti au pouvoir.
L’entraînement physique, les chants guerriers et l’organisation quasi
militaire du mouvement de jeunesse du CNDD-FDD font craindre également
le retour des violences miliciennes et une campagne d’intimidation à
grande échelle. Pour s’opposer à ces tactiques d’intimidation, les
autres ex-rebelles, les Forces nationales de libération (FNL) et le
Front pour la démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU), mobilisent également
leurs propres groupes de jeunes. La police étant souvent restée
passive voire même complice des abus du parti au pouvoir, il est
légitime de craindre qu’elle ne se politise plus encore, et devienne
semblable au Service national de renseignement (SNR), qui a déjà tenté
de déstabiliser l’opposition. En attendant, les principales
stratégies électorales des partis d’opposition, à l’exception de
celles de quelques nouveaux acteurs, n’offrent pas davantage de vision
politique alternative, et se complaisent souvent dans la provocation.
La plupart des partis se contentent en effet de critiquer les
dirigeants du CNDD-FDD en les accusant de corruption ou de pratiques
autoritaires, mais sans rien proposer de crédible.
Étant donné la popularité du président Nkurunziza dans les zones
rurales et les avantages financiers et logistiques qui découlent du
contrôle des institutions étatiques, il est probable que le CNDD-FDD
conserve la présidence de la République. Ce parti pourrait cependant
perdre la majorité au parlement et le contrôle des administrations
provinciales, se voyant ainsi obligé de former un gouvernement de
coalition – scénario que les durs du parti, notamment les chefs
militaires, souhaitent vivement éviter. Cette perspective et le
harcèlement des partis d’opposition suggèrent que le CNDD-FDD cherche
à remporter les élections locales et législatives à tout prix.
S’il n’est guère probable que les tensions actuelles ne provoquent un
retour à la guerre civile, les partenaires régionaux et internationaux
du Burundi doivent rapidement soutenir des politiques de prévention du
risque d’escalade violente. L’escalade de la violence pourrait en
effet plonger le pays dans une nouvelle crise politique et mettre en
péril une grande partie des récents progrès du processus de paix. Les
organisations de la société civile et les média devraient aussi
apporter leur soutien à la création de mécanismes efficaces de
surveillance des violences électorales et documenter et dénoncer ces
incidents. Les pays de l’Initiative régionale sur le Burundi
(l’Ouganda, la Tanzanie, et le Rwanda en particulier) devraient, par
ailleurs, appuyer leurs efforts pour améliorer la formation et les
opérations de la police nationale, en proposant une mission de police
régionale. Incorporées dans chaque province au sein des forces
burundaises, plusieurs petites équipes, dotées par les donateurs de
leurs propres moyens logistiques et de communication, pourraient alors
soutenir la préparation de la sécurisation des élections et conseiller
et surveiller sa mise en place.
Cette mission de police régionale devrait être dirigée par un
commissaire travaillant directement avec le directeur general de la
police burundaise, et placé sous l’autorité d’un envoyé spécial de
haut niveau mandaté par l’Initiative régionale et l’Union africaine.
Le rôle de ce dernier serait d’aider à résoudre les principaux
conflits politiques résultant d’incidents de sécurité graves et les
allégations de fraude électorale. L’envoyé spécial coordonnerait aussi
l’effort international qui s’est sensiblement affaibli depuis la
dissolution du partenariat pour la paix au Burundi et l’expulsion du
Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général des Nations unies à la fin
de 2009. Un chef d’Etat à la retraite de la région, connaissant bien
la politique burundaise et respecté par toutes les parties, serait
bien placé pour jouer ce rôle.
RECOMMANDATIONS
Au Gouvernement burundais :
1. Cesser les entraves au fonctionnement des partis politiques en
interdisant formellement aux gouverneurs de province, administrateurs
communaux et aux forces de police locales :
a) d’empêcher ou de perturber les réunions des partis politiques
d’opposition organisées légalement ;
b) de prohiber l’ouverture de bureaux locaux de partis politiques ; et
c) de procéder à des arrestations arbitraires de responsables locaux
et partisans de partis politiques d’opposition.
2. Prendre des sanctions à l’encontre des responsables locaux qui
continuent de perturber l’activité des partis politiques.
3. Interdire les activités illégales des mouvements de jeunesse des
partis politiques et punir les responsables de telles activités.
4. S’abstenir de toute provocation verbale ou autre, et de l’usage de
l’intimidation et de la force à l’encontre des partis politiques
d’opposition, des médias et de la société civile.
5. Prendre toutes les mesures qui s’imposent contre les personnes,
groupes ou organisations impliqués dans le réarmement des milices.
6. Assurer l’accès libre et équitable des partis politiques aux médias
publics.
7. Poursuivre les discussions avec les partis politiques d’opposition
au sein de la structure nationale nouvellement créée pour le dialogue
politique ; ces discussions ont notamment pour but d’atteindre un
consensus sur la préparation et le déroulement du processus électoral
et de régler rapidement toutes les difficultés liées aux élections.
Aux partis politiques :
8. S’abstenir de toute provocation verbale ou autre qui pourrait mener
à une escalade des tensions politiques, y compris l’intimidation de
rivaux, les appels à la vengeance ou l’apologie de la haine ethnique.
9. Arrêter de mobiliser les mouvements de jeunesse à des fins
d’intimidation ou de violence.
10. S’abstenir de compromettre la neutralité des services de sécurité
en instrumentalisant des réseaux de soutien internes.
Aux médias :
11. Accorder le libre accès de leurs antennes et colonnes à tous les
partis politiques, de manière équitable, et s’abstenir de faire la
propagande déguisée de toute formation ou responsable politique.
A la société civile :
12. Mettre en place un observatoire de la violence politique pour
documenter tous les actes de violence liés aux élections, et
surveiller particulièrement l’action des mouvements de jeunesse des
partis politiques et les groupes de démobilisés affiliés à ceux-ci,
ainsi que le comportement des forces de l’ordre.
A l’Initiative régionale sur le Burundi :
13. Organiser, en collaboration avec le gouvernement, le déploiement
d’une mission de police régionale composée de petites équipes
incorporées à la police burundaise et mandatées pour appuyer la
préparation et l’exécution des opérations de sécurisation des
élections. Cette mission serait menée par un commissaire de police
travaillant directement avec le commandant de la police nationale et
placé sous l’autorité d’un envoyé spécial régional de haut niveau.
14. Nommer un envoyé spécial de stature internationale et familier
avec la politique burundaise, afin de fournir une facilitation de haut-
niveau en cas d’actes violents sérieux ou de différends majeurs liés à
la gestion du processus électoral. Celui-ci devra également coordonner
les efforts politiques de la communauté internationale auprès des
acteurs politiques burundais.
A la communauté internationale :
15. Assurer le déploiement précoce d’une mission internationale
d’observation des élections.
16. Fournir le soutien financier opportun et l’expertise technique
adéquate à la Commission électorale nationale indépendante (CENI).
17. Prévenir les responsables politiques burundais que ceux qui se
rendraient responsables de crimes politiques sérieux seront poursuivis
si nécessaire par les juridictions internationales – Cour pénale
internationale ou tribunal spécial – et que des sanctions ciblées
seront imposées à ceux qui auraient recours à des fraudes massives ou
des violences pour remporter les élections.
Nairobi/Bruxelles, 12 février 2010
Sudan: "The right terms for a wrong engagement",
Alain Délétroz in European Voice
11 February 2010
European Voice
The EU is wrong to be sending observers to Sudan's sham elections. The
EU's challenge now is to retain some credibility.
The decision by the EU's foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, to
send an EU observation mission to monitor Sudan's elections in April
this year is a triumph of hope over experience. Observers will not
prevent the ruling National Congress Party from rigging the process,
and, worse, their presence risks legitimising a regime headed by an
indicted war criminal, Omar al-Bashir.
Ideally, these polls would be delayed to improve the electoral
environment, particularly in the north. But with the key political
parties determined to press ahead and international partners unwilling
or unable to stop them, EU observers should at least understand what
they are walking into.
First, they have to realise they will not deter massive electoral
fraud, since so much cheating has already taken place. The electoral
laws favour Bashir's party, which manipulated last year's census to
inflate the number of constituencies supporting it and engineered
voter registration in Darfur so that only a fraction of that war-
ravaged region's three million displaced people will be able to cast a
ballot. The National Electoral Commission and state electoral
committees, all of which are dominated by Bashir's party, have also
drawn districts throughout northern Sudan that empower Arabs loyal to
the party and exclude tribes that have borne the brunt of Khartoum's
brutality.
The observer mission will struggle to detect new fraud. A group of
about 100 EU observers scattered around the largest country in Africa
is destined to fail. Insecurity and lack of infrastructure will
prevent them from reaching many areas, but even where they can be
deployed, observers unable to speak Arabic or other Sudanese languages
and with no prior experience in the country will be easily outsmarted
by Bashir's National Congress Party. A handful of foreign monitors is
no match for a sophisticated machinery of control over a local
administration that is well-practised in using intimidation and
violence against its opponents.
The European Commission's foreign policy credibility is very much on
the line here. So is Ashton's. Having chosen to send observers to do
an almost impossible task, the EU now has to make the best of a bad
decision. Appointing a strong head of mission with experience of
observing difficult elections would be a start, but the EU also then
has to defend the independence of that mission. There will be pressure
from outside and from within for observers to pull punches and
overlook the glaring flaws in the election process. This must be
firmly resisted.
The key moment will come when the mission has to formally assess the
elections according to international standards and domestic law,
delivering a rapid verdict on the election's credibility. A well-
researched statement grounded in fact can calm post-election tensions
or boost credible claims of malpractice, increasing pressure for such
complaints to be addressed fairly. But a statement based only on a
limited knowledge of the situation risks whitewashing a flawed
process. In Sudan, that would mean endorsing the inevitable re-
election of Bashir and further undermining the stability of the
country.
In both its statement and its subsequent more detailed report, the EU
observation mission will have to give a blunt assessment of all the
election's flaws. It should not simply focus on the polling
irregularities. Observers will have to condemn the skewed playing-
field and the National Congress Party's manipulation of population
data, districting and voter registration. Given draconian security
laws and restrictions on the rights of Darfuri voters, EU observers
should look beyond technical issues and denounce the repressive
environment in which this election is being held.
And if Sudan's opposition parties ultimately reject the rules set by
Khartoum and decide to boycott the elections, the EU should
immediately suspend its operation and demand a review of the electoral
environment.
Sending this observer mission was the wrong decision. But now that it
is going ahead, it must at least avoid undermining the EU's
credibility internationally, and further destabilising an already
shaky Sudan.
Alain Délétroz is Vice President for Europe of the International
Crisis Group
Alain Délétroz
Vice-President (Europe)
Brussels, Belgium
Crisis Group role:
Alain Délétroz concentrates on European policy and advocacy issues,
closely focused on the EU and its member states. He maintains senior-
level contacts and advocates Crisis Group recommendations to officials
in Brussels, Latin America, the EU member states and Russia. He pays
regular advocacy visits to these countries and gives interviews to
their media on the conflicts Crisis Group covers.
Areas of expertise:
•Russia, Northern/Southern Caucasus and Central Asia
•Latin America
•Conflict assessment and conflict resolution
•Democratic reforms, humanitarian assistance
Professional background:
•Director, Open Society Institute, Tashkent, 1986-2001
•International Committee of the Red Cross, Moscow, 1994-1998
•Adult literacy and capacity building projects, Peru, 1986-1991
Publications and media:
•Sudan: "The right terms for a wrong engagement", European Voice, 11
February 2010
•"Le Turkménistan et les droits de l'homme", Les Echos, 1 February
2010
•"La Somalie entre chaos et espoir", in Le Temps, 22 December 2009
•"Una Presidencia sin Miedo al Riesgo", in Foreign Policy Edición
Española, 17 December 2009
•"Die Deutschen machen sich von einem Diktator abhängig", in Die Zeit,
20 October 2009
•"Georgia, la Russia calpesta l’Europa", in Limes, 23 July 2009
•Зачем России нужно воссоздавать взрывоопасную ситуацию в Грузии?, in
Regnum, 1 July 2009
•"Géorgie un an plus tard…", in Les Echos, 25 June 2009
•"Заложники Шри-Ланки", in Vremya Novostei, 2 June 2009
•"Sri Lanka: un massacre sponsorisé?", in Le Temps, 27 mai 2009
•"The EU's role in securing Sri Lanka's peace", with Andrew Stroehlein
in European Voice, 20 May 2009
•"L'étincelle qui menace la poudrière géorgienne", in Le Temps, 9
April 2009
•"Ouvrir la porte de l’OTAN a la Russie l’obligerait a définir mieux
sa politique", with Gareth Evans in Le Temps, 3 April 2009
•"Россия: дверь в НАТО", with Gareth Evans in Vremya Novostei, 3
April 2009
•"Um termômetro dos conflitos mundiais", with Clóvis Brigagão in
Diplomacia & Negocios, 13 January 2009
•"Russia-Georgia: the Aftermath", Parliamentary Brief, 10 November
2008
•"Plaidoyer pour une relation saine entre Russie et Union européenne",
Le Temps, 27 October 2008
•"Россия имела правовое основание отреагировать и разобраться", Vremya
Novostei, 6 October 2008
•"Et pendant ce temps, au Daghestan voisin... " , Le Temps, 27 August
2008
•“Die Affäre Gontard Ist ein Ablenkungsmanöver”, Neue Zürcher Zeitung,
23 July 2008
•"Une décision française plus que bienvenue en Afghanistan", La Croix,
21 April 2008
•"Независимость Косово: в чем трагедия?", Regnum, 14 March 2008
•"Espoir de paix durable au Burundi, si les derniers rebelles hutus y
sont intégrés", Le Temps, 22 November 2007
•"Death of a Director", International Herald Tribune, 22 September
2007
•"Enrayer le cycle de l'impunité en Haïti", with Damien Helly, La
Croix, 22 May 2007
•"Estabilidade dos Balcãs pode ficar em mãos portuguesas", PÚBLICO, 27
March 2007
•"Le statut final du Kosovo est une affaire européenne et Moscou doit
le comprendre", Le Temps, 27 March 2007
•"Hugo Chavez ou la fuite en avant d'un caudillo typiquement sud-
américain", Le Temps, 9 March 2007
•"Europe’s Reasons without Reason", European Voice, 8 February 2007
•"Colombie: la gangrène paramilitaire s'est répandue jusqu'au cœur de
l'Etat", Le Temps, 5 December 2006
•"Usbekistan: Peitsche statt Zuckerbrot", Financial Times Deutschland,
13 November 2006
•"Ouzbékistan, ne pas relâcher les sanctions", Libération, 1 November
2006
•"Asie centrale, gaz et dictateurs", Le Monde, 29 June 2006
•"Elections au Pérou: un coup de frein à l'immixtion vénézuélienne",
Le Temps, 8 June 2006
•"La victoire d'Alvaro Uribe en Colombie est-elle un plébiscite pour
la guerre?", Le Temps, 30 May 2006
•"Ни Армении, ни Азербайджану не выгодна новая война из-за Карабахаé",
interviewed in Vremia Novostei, 18 January 2006
Languages:
•French (native)
•English (fluent)
•Russian (fluent)
•Portuguese (fluent)
•Spanish (fluent)
•German (fluent)
•Quecha (fluent)
European Voice http://www.europeanvoice.com/
"Nigerias Staatskrise eskaliert",
Louise Arbour and Ayo Obe in Die Zeit
10. Februar 2010
Die Zeit
Unruhen mit vielen Toten, ein aufgekündigter Waffenstillstand und ein
erkrankter Präsident – Nigerias Krise wird zur Bedrohung für
Westafrika. Von L. Arbour und A. Obe
Seit zwei Monaten haben die Nigerianer ihren Präsidenten Umaru
Yar'Adua nicht mehr gesehen. Nun haben der Senat und das
Repräsentantenhaus Vizepräsident Goodluck Johnson bis zur Genesung
Yar’Aduas die Führung übergeben. Doch schon werden Stimmen laut, die
die Rechtmäßigkeit dieser Bestimmung bezweifeln. Wenn Nigeria nicht
bald seine Regierungskrise beendet, wird es zu einer Katastrophe
kommen.
Anzeige
Das gegenwärtige System der Korruption und Straflosigkeit verhindert,
dass die zentrale Regierung Konflikte bewältigen, geschweige denn
lösen kann. Die Gewalt brodelt konstant im Niger-Delta und bricht
immer wieder im Norden des Landes aus. Das haben die blutigen Unruhen
in der Stadt Jos im Januar nur allzu deutlich gemacht. Mehrere Hundert
Menschen starben damals bei Auseinandersetzungen christlicher und
muslimischer Gruppen. 40.000 Menschen flohen aus der Region.
Nun verschärft die Verfassungskrise die Probleme um ein Zehnfaches.
Der lange Krankenhausaufenthalt von Präsident Umaru Yar'Adua in Saudi-
Arabien seit Ende November, das Täuschungsmanöver der Regierung
gegenüber der Öffentlichkeit über seinen wahren Gesundheitszustand,
aber vor allem die Tatsache, dass er seinem Vizepräsidenten nicht die
Macht übergeben hat, sind eine ernsthafte Bedrohung für die Sicherheit
und den Frieden sowohl Nigerias als auch der Region Westafrika.
Erstens vertieft die Führungskrise Nigerias die politische Nord-Süd-
Rivalität im Land. Der Konflikt zwischen verfassungsrechtlichen
Bestimmungen, die Jonathan, einen Südländer, bei Ausfall des
Präsidenten zum Nachfolger machen, und die politische Einigung, die
Yar'Adua, einen Nordländer, an die Macht brachte, birgt das Risiko
einer Spannungseskalation.
Zweitens läuft der Friedensprozess des Niger-Delta Gefahr zu
scheitern. Das Regierungsprogramm für die Rehabilitation und
Umschulung der Delta-Kämpfer ist ins Stocken geraten. Ölanlagen
werden wieder angegriffen und kriminelle Banden entführen erneut
ausländische Ölarbeiter für Lösegeld. Erst kürzlich kündigte die
militante Gruppe „Bewegung für die Emanzipation des Niger-
Deltas“ (MEND) ein Ende des dreimonatigen Waffenstillstandes an. Die
Ölgesellschaften müssten sich auf einen "Totalangriff" auf Mitarbeiter
und Einrichtungen einstellen, ließen die Rebellen verbreiten. Die
Zeichen könnten wahrlich nicht bedrohlicher sein.
Drittens existiert keinerlei Rechenschaftspflicht mehr. Der föderale
Exekutivrat – das Kabinett der Bundesminister – handelt ohne Aufsicht
und biegt die Regeln nach Lust und Laune. Staatsausgaben laufen
weiterhin unter einem dubiosen Nachtragshaushalt, im Widerspruch zu
früheren Zusagen des Präsidenten.
Freie Hand für Korruption und fehlende Ordnung führen zur vierten
Gefahr: sollte sich die verfassungsrechtliche Verwirrung vertiefen,
bietet das ehrgeizigen Offizieren einen idealen Vorwand für einen
Putsch. Der wiederum würde jegliche demokratische Errungenschaft des
Landes mit einem Schlag zunichte machen.
Fünftens bremst das Fehlen einer nigerianischen Führung in der Region,
insbesondere über die Westafrikanische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft
(ECOWAS), die Bemühungen zu einer Lösung der Probleme in Guinea und
Niger. Scheitern diese Friedens- und Demokratiebemühungen, könnte es
zu einer Verschärfung der politischen und der Sicherheitslage in
beiden Ländern führen.
Sechstens: die Massenproteste von Oppositionsführern und
Organisationen der Zivilgesellschaft, die am 12. Januar starteten,
könnten in Gewalt und staatlicher Repression ausarten. Zwar bemühen
sich Demonstranten und Polizei gemeinsam darum, dass die Proteste
friedlich ablaufen. Doch je länger diese Großveranstaltungen
weitergehen, umso größer wird die Wahrscheinlichkeit eines
Zusammenstoßes mit den Sicherheitskräften.
Diese Gefahren können mit einer Rückkehr zur verfassungsmäßigen
Ordnung vermieden werden. Nigerias Senat hat Yar'Adua aufgefordert,
sich an die Bestimmung der Verfassung zu halten. Der Präsident hat die
Nationalversammlung zu informieren, wann immer er „in den Urlaub fährt
oder aus anderen Gründen dazu unfähig ist, die Aufgaben seines Amtes
zu erfüllen.“ Diese Bestimmung sollte der Präsident respektieren.
Somit würde er automatisch und offiziell seine Präsidentschaft an
Vizepräsident Jonathan übergeben.
Mehr zum Thema
Die nächsten Tage und Wochen werden zeigen, ob Nigerias Politiker in
der Lage sind, die konstitutionelle Ordnung wiederherzustellen. Im
Interesse des Landes – und der gesamten westafrikanischen Region –
müssen Nigerias Freunde darauf bestehen, dass alle Parteien,
einschließlich des Militärs, die Staatordnung und ihre Bestimmungen
für die Verwaltung dieser Art von Krise respektieren. Auf längere
Sicht muss das nigerianische Volk seine Verfassung überprüfen. Es muss
selbst entscheiden, welche Nachfolgeregelungen seine politischen
Empfindlichkeiten ehrlich reflektieren. Nur so können Spannungen
zukünftig vermieden werden.
Louise Arbour ist Präsidentin der International Crisis Group. Ayo Obe
ist nigerianische Juristin und Vorstandsmitglied der International
Crisis Group.
Louise Arbour
President & CEO
Brussels, Belgium
Extended biography (English)
Extended biography (French)
Louise Arbour has served as President & CEO of the International
Crisis Group since July 2009. Previously she acted as United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights from 2004 to 2008.
Ms. Arbour, a Canadian national, began her academic career in 1974.
In 1977, she was nominated Associate Professor and Associate Dean at
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University in Toronto, Canada. In
December of 1987, she was appointed to the Supreme Court of Ontario
(High Court of Justice) and in 1990 to the Court of Appeal for
Ontario. In 1995, Ms. Arbour was appointed Commissioner to conduct an
inquiry into the Prison for Women in Kingston, Ontario.
In 1996, she was appointed by the Security Council of the United
Nations as Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals
for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. In 1999, she was appointed
to the Supreme Court of Canada.
Ms. Arbour graduated from College Regina Assumpta, Montreal in 1967
and completed an LL.L (with distinction) from the Faculty of Law,
University of Montreal in 1970. Following the Quebec Bar Admission
Course, she was called to the Quebec Bar in 1971 and the Ontario Bar
in 1977. Ms. Arbour has received honorary doctorates from some thirty
Universities and numerous medals and awards and is a member of many
distinguished professional societies and organizations. She is also an
advisor to the Belinda Stronach Foundation.
In 2008, Ms. Arbour was made an Honorary Fellow of the Royal College
of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada and Companion of the Order of
Canada. In June 2009, she became Grande Officière de l’Ordre national
du Québec.
Louise Arbour was born on 10 February 1947 in Montreal, Quebec and has
three children. She is fluent in French and English.
Articles, Speeches and Interviews for Crisis Group
•"Nigerias Staatskrise eskaliert", Die Zeit, 10 February 2010
•"Leaderless Nigeria could spin out of control", Financial Times, 1
February 2010
•"Obama: Keep Aiming High", The International Herald Tribune, 17
December 2009
•"Pour une intervention internationale en Guinée", Le Monde, 14
December 2009
•"El Nobel puede ser poco útil para Obama", El Mundo, 10 December
2009
•"El estancamiento continuo de Bosnia", El País, 1 December 2009
•"Keeping West Africa Stable", The International Herald Tribune, 26
November 2009
•"From Justice to Prevention", GlobalPost, 18 November 2009
•"Bosnia's Continuing Chaos", in Foreign Policy, 18 November 2009
•"Donner une chance à la Bosnie en l'intégrant à l'Europe", in Rue 89,
18 November 2009
•"Bosnien am Scheideweg", in Die Zeit, 18 November 2009
•"L'avenir des opérations de maintien de la paix dans les conflits
contemporains", Address to the University of Montreal, 7 October 2009
•"Civil Society and Public Interest Diplomacy", Address to 28th Annual
Trainor Award for Distinction in the Conduct of Diplomacy, Washington
D.C., 30 September 2009
•Chad: "No Exit?", Foreign Policy, 4 September 2009
Die Zeit http://www.zeit.de/index
Haiti: “Hundert Jahre Grausamkeit”,
Donald Steinberg in Süddeutsche Zeitung
9. Februar 2010
Süddeutsche Zeitung
Als ich im Jahr 1999 meine Stelle als Sonderkoordinator antrat, gab
mir ein alteingesessener Haiti-Experte einen ausgezeichneten Rat. Er
sagte: ,,Vergessen Sie nicht, dass Haiti der Ort ist, an dem die
besten Absichten sterben.‘‘
Die Welt hat schnell und großzügig auf die Katastrophe reagiert.
Jetzt, da nach der unmittelbaren Katastrophenhilfe der wirtschaftliche
und politische Wiederaufbau bevorsteht, sollte man sich dieser
Weisheit entsinnen. Insbesondere für die Vereinigten Staaten ist Haiti
ein Ort, an dem trotz vieler guter Grundsätze immer viel schief
gegangen ist. Der erste Grundsatz stammt von Thomas Paine, einem der
Gründerväter der Vereinigten Staaten: Ein Staat, der einmal Kolonie
war, sollte selbst nie Kolonien haben. Der zweite Grundsatz,
aufgestellt vom fünften US-Präsidenten James Monroe: Die westliche
Hemisphäre muss ihre Probleme selbst lösen, und sollte sich nicht in
europäische Machtpolitik verstricken. Und der dritte Grundsatz, von
Präsident Woodrow Wilson (1913 bis 1921): US-Engagement wird in armen
Ländern Frieden, Wohlstand und demokratisches Regieren fördern, was in
deren wie im amerikanischen Interesse liege.
Diese ehrenvollen Grundsätze wurden in der ersten Hälfte des 20.
Jahrhunderts von den USA in Haiti allesamt erschüttert. Als die
Marines vor fast hundert Jahren Haiti mit der Begründung besetzten,
amerikanisches Leben und Eigentum zu schützen, war dies der Anfang
einer 19 Jahre währenden Militärherrschaft. Bis 1934 nutzten die
Vereinigten Staaten ihre Oberherrschaft über Haiti, um ihre eigenen
geschäftlichen Interessen zu fördern, die Deutschen rauszuhalten,
Stabilität durch Waffengewalt zu erzwingen und nationalistische
Bewegungen zu zerschlagen, die ebendiese Kontrolle bedrohten. Die
Haitianer lernten: Der beste Weg, um voranzukommen, ist, ein gutes
Verhältnis zu den Besatzern zu pflegen.
Ein Erbe dieser Zeit war eine politische, wirtschaftliche und soziale
Struktur mit noch ungleicheren Verhältnissen als zuvor.
Klassenunterschiede und Ausbeutung wurden verstärkt, eine Tendenz, die
bis heute anhält. Ein weiteres Vermächtnis: die Herrschaft der Macht
statt des Rechts. Dies spiegelte sich nicht nur von 1957 bis 1986 im
grotesken Machtmissbrauch der Diktatoren ,,Papa Doc‘‘ und ,,Baby Doc‘‘
Duvalier und ihrer brutalen Tonton Macoutes wieder, sondern auch in
der messianischen Vision einer Befreiung um jeden Preis, wie sie der
Präsident und frühere Armenpriester Jean-Bertrand Aristide in den
neunziger Jahren und zu Beginn des vergangenen Jahrzehnts verfolgte.
Wir müssen Lehren aus den alten Fehlern in Haiti ziehen, wenn wir
verhindern wollen, dass sie sich wiederholen. Erstens hat es globale
Folgen, wenn nichts gegen den Zerfall und das Scheitern eines Staates
unternommen wird. Wenn es weder Stabilität noch eine Regierung mit
Verantwortungsgefühl gibt, schadet das nicht nur dem haitianischen
Volk. Sondern dies eröffnet auch neue Routen für Menschenhandel,
Waffen und illegale Drogen. Ferner verursacht es Flüchtlingsströme
über Grenzen und Meere hinweg, hemmt internationalen Handel und
Investitionen und erleichtert die Ausbreitung von Pandemien. Aus
diesen Gründen muss auf die große finanzielle und personelle
Unterstützung bei der Katastrophenhilfe nun ein ebenso großes oder
sogar noch größeres Engagement für ,,besseren Wiederaufbau‘‘ folgen.
Eine weitere Lehre ist, dass der Aufbau einer stabilen Gesellschaft
nicht nur materiellen Wiederaufbau erfordert, sondern auch die
Wiederherstellung von Sicherheit. Während Haiti in den vergangenen
fünf Jahren erhebliche Fortschritte in den Bereichen politische
Stabilisierung und Wachstum gemacht hat, waren die Bedingungen für
Sicherheit, Regierungsführung und wirtschaftliche Stabilität auch vor
dem Erdbeben immer noch schwach. In diesem Sinne geht es in Haiti
nicht um Wiederaufbau, sondern um Aufbau. Und in Sachen Sicherheit
können die 25000 Friedenstruppen, die nun nach Haiti strömen,
lediglich ein Puffer sein. Haitis Nationalpolizei muss möglichst
schnell die Arbeit übernehmen, um im Alltag Stabilität und
Rechtsstaatlichkeit zu gewährleisten. Angesichts des Umstandes, dass
nicht einmal die Hälfte der Polizisten wieder arbeitsfähig ist, dass
Plünderer bereits erschossen oder gelyncht wurden, gefährliche
Gefangene auf freiem Fuß sind und die Angst unter den Bürgern wächst,
bedeutet dies eine gewaltige Herausforderung.
Ebenso müssen ausländische Partner dem Land beim Aufbau der drei
Staatsgewalten helfen. Das Land braucht ein effizientes Parlament und
eine funktionierende Justiz, die ein Gegengewicht zur Macht der
Regierung bilden. Haiti sollte vorerst die Politik zur Seite legen,
die Parlaments- und Präsidentschaftswahlen verschieben und eine
Machtverteilung nach dem Prinzip ,,Der Sieger bekommt alles‘‘
aufgeben.
Wirtschaftliche Erneuerung wiederum bedeutet mehr als den Bau von
Straßen, Kliniken, Schulen, Kraftwerken und Häusern. Die Haitianer
müssen die Grundlagen für langfristige Entwicklung legen. Durch
Wiederbelebung der Landwirtschaft können sie Investoren anlocken.
Ferner müssen sie für eine gleichmäßigere Einkommensverteilung sorgen
und Jobs schaffen. Dies geht mittels einer Strategie, die Wert auf
medizinische Grundversorgung und Schulbildung legt, aber auch die
Kleinbauern unterstützt, auf Umweltschutz achtet und einen Erlass der
Auslandsschulden anstrebt.
Die Regierung selbst muss mit der Zivilgesellschaft zusammenarbeiten.
Anwälte, Lehrer, Gewerkschaften und Frauen sind diejenigen Kräfte, die
eine Gesellschaft zusammenhalten und sozialen Druck abfedern. Solche
Gruppen sind in Haiti bisher allzu oft nur für ,,Teile-und-herrsche‘‘-
Strategien benutzt worden.
Hieraus folgt die letzte Lektion. So wie die Haitianer neu
zusammenfinden müssen, muss dies auch die internationale Gemeinschaft
tun. Kabbeleien darüber, wessen Flugzeuge am Flughafen Port-au-Prince
landen dürfen, passen nicht zur Größe der Aufgabe. Es braucht eine
globale Anstrengung, auf der Basis einer Vision der Haitianer. Ein
erster Schritt war es, den Vereinten Nationen die Führungsrolle
zuzuweisen. Auch wenn sie angesichts der eigenen Verluste in Haiti
geschockt und traumatisiert sind: Die Organisation muss die Kraft dazu
finden. Es geht darum, beste Absichten in beste Taten umzumünzen.
Donald Steinberg, stellvertretender Chef der International Crisis
Group in Brüssel, war von 1999 bis 2001 Sonderkoordinator der US-
Regierung für Haiti.
Donald Steinberg
Deputy President (Policy)
Brussels, Belgium
Crisis Group role:
Donald Steinberg serves as Deputy President (Policy) and is located in
the Brussels office.
Areas of expertise:
•U.S. National Security Policy
•Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding, and Conflict Resolution
•International organisations
•Gender and Armed Conflict
Professional background:
•Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of
Peace
•U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Angola
•Director of the State Department’s Joint Policy Council,
•Special Representative of Presidents Bush and Clinton for
Humanitarian Demining
•Special Haiti Coordinator for the Clinton Administration
•Principal Deputy Director of the State Department Policy Planning
Staff
•Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and
Migration
•Senior Director for African Affairs, U.S. National Security Council
•Deputy White House Press Secretary
•Council Member of the Initiative for Inclusive Security (Women Waging
Peace)
•Advisory Council to Executive Director of the UNIFEM
•Commissioner with the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and
Children
Education:
•Master’s degree in journalism from Columbia University, New York
City
•Master’s degree in political economy from University of Toronto
•Bachelor's degree in economics from Reed College, Portland, Oregon
Publications and media:
Written extensively on issues relating to Africa, women in conflict,
transitional justice, post-conflict reconstruction, landmines, and
refugees and internally displaced persons, including
•"Hundert Jahre Grausamkeit", in Süddeutsche Zeitung, 9 February
2010
•Orchestrating Sudan's Next Fateful Step, with Fouad Hikmat, The
Boston Globe, 10 December 2009
•UN must stop backing Congo’s disastrous operation against marauding
rebel militias, The East African, 30 November 2009
•"Responsibility to Protect: Coming of Age?", Global Responsibility to
Protect, 18 November 2009
•"UN to Consider New Structure for Women: Making Change Matter",
Global Post, 7 September 2009
•"Zimbabwe’s Slow-Burning Crisis Could Affect Africa", YaleGlobal, 30
June 2009
•"Want to sideline Mugabe? Support Zimbabwe now", in Reuters: The
Great Debate, 22 June 2009
•"UN Resolution on Women, Peace and Security: Anniversary Worth
Celebrating?", Reuters: The Great Debate, 19 June 2009
•"Stopping Mass Atrocities: Responsibility to Protect in Action",
Schlossplatz Review, June 2009
•"Sri Lanka's Death Zone", Reuters: The Great Debate, 23 April 2009
•"Peace Missions and Gender Equality: Ten Lessons from the Ground",
OSCE roundtable, 11 March 2009
•"Peace and Justice in the Real World", 23 February 2009
•"First Lehman Brothers, Next Liberia?", The Globalist, 26 January
2009
•"Zimbabwe: Appoint Neutral Interim Government", allAfrica, 13 January
2009
•"Obama Administration Needs to Take a Stand on Cluster Bombs", The
Huffington Post, 12 December 2008
•"A Clear Vision for US and Africa", The Boston Globe, 12 December
2008
•"Haiti: Affirmative Engagement or Malign Neglect?", Haitian Times, 10
October 2008
•"Zimbabwe: Making the Most of the Deal", with Sydney Masamvu,
allAfrica, 2 October 2008
•"Sierra Leone's Convalescence", International Herald Tribune, 8
August 2008
•"Making Peace Matter: Toward a Concept of Inclusive Security", in G8
Hokkaido Toyako Summit 2008, 7 July 2008
•"Make Forced Marriage a Crime against Humanity", The Christian
Science Monitor, 9 June 2008
•"Which Macedonia?", The Guardian, 1 April 2008
•"Bush in Africa: A Continent Adrift", YaleGlobal Online, 18 February
2008
•"Sierra Leone: Elections Bring Hope for a Former Failed State",
allAfrica.com, 6 August 2007
•"Failing to Empower Women Peacebuilders: A Cautionary Tale from
Angola", PeaceWomen E-News, 25 April 2007
•"US Should Ban Bomblets and Get on the Right Side of History", The
Christian Science Monitor, 30 July 2007
•"Blood Aluminium?", allAfrica.com, 3 April 2007
•"Future of the World Court in Balance", with Nick Grono, YaleGlobal
Online, 7 March 2007
•"When War and Children Collide", The Christian Science Monitor, 27
November 2006
•"Beyond Victimhood: Women’s Peacebuilding in Conflict Situations",
Monday Developments, 11 September 2006
•"The World's Lost People: Neither Refugees nor Citizens", The
Christian Science Monitor, 27 January 2006
Speeches:
•"Tackling State Fragility: The New World of Peacebuilding", keynote
to the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Conference on
Peacebuilding, 1 February 2010
•"The International Role in Promoting Democratic Governance and
Economic Recovery in Zimbabwe", testimony for House of Commons
International Development Committee, International Crisis Group, 26
January 2010
•"Beyond Words and Resolutions: An EU-U.S. Agenda to Combat Sexual
Violence in Conflict", Transatlantic Stratey Forum, 3-4 December 2009
•"Children and Armed Conflict: Protecting the Most Vulnerable", UNICEF
Program on Rehabilitation and Reintegration of War-Affected Children,
Brussels, 22 October 2009
Süddeutsche Zeitung
Conflict history: Afghanistan
New Search - Map
Head of State: President Hamid Karzai, June 2002- (Chairman of Afghan
Interim Authority from December 2001; indirectly elected President
Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan June 2002; popularly elected
President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, October 2004, re-
elected November 2009).
Current Afghan boundaries determined 1893 treaty with Britain,
splitting Pashtun ethnic group between Afghanistan and British India,
later permanent factor in Afghan-Pakistan relations.
Ethnic groups present including: Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Aimak,
and Turkmen. Afghan independence granted under Treaty of Rawalpindi
1919 after long period of struggle for influence between Britain and
Russia over 19th century. Britain retained influence and interest
until independence of India and Pakistan 1947. Afghanistan became
subject of both U.S. and Soviet bids for influence after 1945.
Political instability from late 1960s followed by coups in 1973 and
1978. Latter coup led by Communist People’s Democratic Party installed
Nur Mohammed Taraki as president, Hafizullah Amin as deputy. Increased
role of Soviets in Afghan army and government followed; Taraki signed
friendship treaty with Moscow 1978. Power struggle between Taraki and
Amin on background of rural conservative revolt led to Amin replacing
Taraki, near collapse of Afghan army and consequent Soviet invasion
December 1979. Amin executed and replaced by Soviet-backed Babrak
Karmal 1980.
Afghanistan became “hot” theatre in Cold War, with U.S. backing
conservative resistance to tie down Soviet army. Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia and Iran similarly backed anti-regime forces for religious,
strategic and political reasons. Success of Soviet use of Hind
helicopter-gunships and special forces against mujahedin mitigated by
U.S. Stinger ground-to-air missiles from 1986. Mohammad Najibullah
replaced Karmal 1987, becoming president after promulgation of new
republican constitution by loya jirga. 1988 agreement between
Afghanistan, U.S., Pakistan and USSR allowed for full Soviet
withdrawal 1989. USSR and U.S. agreed to stop support 1991.
Najibullah regime fell 1992, replaced by ethnic Tajik Burhannudin
Rabbani. However, mujahadin alliance increasingly fragmented by ethnic
and power rivalries marking Afghanistan’s further descent into
warlordism. 1994, factional fighting, including indiscriminate attacks
on civilian areas in Kabul destroyed much of capital, killed some
25,000. Mostly Pashtun Taliban emerged as serious rival to Rabbani
regime 1993-94 with Pakistani assistance. Led by Mullah Omar, Taliban
seized Kabul September 1996, installing radical Islamist regime
recognised 1997 by only Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirate (CHK) and
Pakistan. United Front (Northern Alliance), mainly non-Pashtun
opposition coalition retained strongholds in northeastern Afghanistan,
formed under authority of Ahmad Shah Masood.
Having fought there 1980s Osama bin Laden took refuge in Afghanistan
from mid-1990s, both benefactor and guest of Taliban. Presence led to
August 1998 U.S. cruise missile attack on Afghanistan following U.S.
embassy bombings east Africa and UN-imposed measures 1999.
With Northern Alliance close to total defeat, commander Masood
assassinated 9 September 2001, two days before attack on New York,
Washington by al-Qaeda terrorists. International alliance under U.S.
leadership sought overthrow of Taliban following refusal to hand over
bin Laden, aiding opposition forces taking Kabul November 2001.
December 2001 Bonn agreement created Afghan Interim Authority, led by
Hamid Karzai. Fall of Kandahar signalled fall of Taliban December
2001, but Mullah Omar and bin Laden remained at large.
Foreign peacekeeping troops began arriving January 2002 under UN-
mandated International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF). NATO
assumed control of ISAF from August 2003 followed by an expansion from
capital Kabul to north (2004), west (2005), south and east (2006);
present forces: approx. 100,000 on the ground (as of December 2009),
to be increased to 134,000 by October 2010 as part of significant new
U.S. and NATO troop commitments during 2009. This includes Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), small civil-military forces aimed at kick-
starting reconstruction and security in the regions along with
bolstering central government authority. U.S. leads continued counter-
terrorism operations under separate Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
mission, answering direct to CENTCOM.
Bonn process saw a new moderate Islamic constitution adopted January
2004 following loya jirga. Popular election of President Hamid Karzai
October 2004 and National Assembly and Provincial Councils in
September 2005. Electoral system excluded political parties raising
fears whether legislature can be robust arm of state.
Failure to tackle human rights abusers and war criminals of past eras
sees discredited figures of past embedded in every level of
administration. This has disillusioned the population and culture of
impunity an ongoing source of instability.
A Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme
decommissioned some 60,000 former combatants on Ministry of Defence
rolls by June 2005. Mid-2005, follow-up programme Disbandment of
Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) began, now in the face of insurgency all
but moribund.
New Afghan National Army (ANA) due to grow to 172,00 by 2011.
Increasingly cooperating with international forces in operations and
has been seen as nascent institutional successes in post-Taliban era
although still a long way to go. Over 80,000 Afghan National Police
(ANP) have received training but remain largely a source of insecurity
and fear. The judicial sector is a major area of neglect.
Opium cultivation and trafficking dominate economy, at record levels
both a source and symptom of ongoing instability; opium trade involves
public officials at every level and also provides funding for the
Taliban and insurgent groups. According to the UNODC, cultivation has,
however, shrunk rapidly over last two years, and Afghanistan now
accounts for 79 per cent of world supply (down from 93% in 2007).
January 2006, the international community renewed its commitment to
Afghanistan for 5 years in London with the Afghanistan Compact setting
benchmarks in Development, Governance and Security with counter-
narcotics a cross-cutting issue, but progress has been limited.
Afghanistan’s post-conflict recovery remains precarious. The ongoing
cross border insurgency in the southern and eastern provinces while
not large in numbers sees around half the country off limits to
government outreach and development assistance outside district
centres. The Taliban is the main driver of the insurgency but other
groups include Hizb-i Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the major
benefactor of US aid during the mujahidin years. Insurgents have
proved adept at exploiting local fissures and disenfranchisement with
much less of an ideological following. The Taliban now hold sway in
the South and East of the country, as well as in pockets of the West
and North, and in 2009 started launching increasingly brazen attacks
in urban areas. 2009 saw the worst levels of violence in Afghanistan
since the 2001 invasion, with 2,400 civilians killed (up 14% on 2008),
according to the UN, and highest number of ISAF troop
casualties.
Deeply flawed August 2009 presidential elections highlighted
international community’s and Afghan government’s failure to build
sustainable democratic institutions. Elections marked by widespread
fraud, mainly favouring incumbent Karzai. Independent Election
Commission in October declared run-off between Karzai and main
challenger and ex-FM Abdullah after it disqualified hundreds of
thousands of votes due to fraud. Karzai re-elected by default on 2
November after Abdullah withdrew own candidacy from run-off, claiming
fair vote impossible. Polls have to a large extent eroded public
confidence in Karzai administration, and by extension international
community; Parliament have yet to fully approve Karzai’s cabinet
nominations.
updated January 2010
For further information see Crisis Group reports and briefings on
Afghanistan. The CrisisWatch database provides a report on monthly
conflict developments for Afghanistan since September 2003.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=1
Conflict history: DR Congo
New Search - Map
Head of State: President Joseph Kabila (December 2006-)
Head of government: Prime Minister Adolphe Muzito (October 2008-)
From 600s to the 1800s, a large portion of what is now the DRC was
part of Kongo Empire, a well developed state with extensive trade
networks. In the 1400s, when Portuguese navigators explored the banks
of the Zaire River for the first time, the territory of the empire
extended from the south-western regions of the DRC to parts of the
Republic of Congo, Angola, and Gabon.
In 1884, Belgian King Leopold II began ruling the “Congo Free State”
as his personal colony, exploiting vast natural resources through
indigenous forced labor. Under international pressure denouncing the
brutality of his regime, Leopold transferred control of his property
1908 to the Belgian government, which renamed the country Belgian
Congo.
In June 1960, after upsurge of anti-colonial sentiment and first
parliamentary elections, Belgium accepted independence of the Congo.
Within two weeks, country faced nationwide army mutiny and
secessionist movements in Katanga and southern Kasai. Foreign powers
fuelled tensions, with Belgium eager to maintain control over copper
mines in Katanga and U.S. fearing Congo’s break-up and Soviet inroads
in context of Cold War.
New Congolese authorities immediately called on UN to deploy a
peacekeeping force to help reestablish state sovereignty. ONUC
deployed blue helmets in summer 1960, eventually reaching 20.000 total
troops before its total withdrawal June 1964. Meanwhile, power
struggle between President Joseph Kasavubu and PM Patrice Lumumba
intensified. Fearing that Lumumba would appeal for Soviet support,
U.S. and Belgium encouraged Colonel Joseph Desire Mobutu to arrest
Lumumba. Escaping the capital Leopoldville (today Kinshasa), Lumumba
was eventually captured and assassinated in January 1961 with Belgian
complicity.
In November 1965, after reorganising the army and pacifying by force
the country with U.S. support, Colonel Joseph Desire Mobutu ousted
Kasavubu. and began a thirty-two year rule. Mobutu systematically used
country’s mineral wealth to consolidate power, co-opt rivals and
enrich himself and his allies through patronage. Western countries,
specially U.S, France and Belgium assisted Mobutu’s regime under
pretext of blocking expansion of communism in Central Africa.
In 1972, he changed country’s name to Zaire, and his own name to
Mobutu Sese Seko. In May 1978, French and Belgium paratroopers were
dropped over the mining city of Kolwezi to evacuate 2,500 Europeans
threaten by rebels supported by Cuban military advisers. Following end
of Cold War, the cessation of international aid and internal pressure
to democratise pushed him to reinstate multiparty politics 1991, but
Mobutu manipulated agreement to retain power until 1997.
During summer 1994, following the genocide against Tutsi and moderate
Hutu in Rwanda, up to 2 million Rwandan Hutu fled the Tutsi rebellion
into the DRC and set up refugee camps in the Congolese Kivu provinces.
Interahamwe militia member, soldiers of the Forces armées rwandaises
(FAR – Rwanda Armed Forces) and civilian officials from Rwandan
President Habyarimana’s regime who took part in the 1994 genocide also
managed to enter Congo. They settled in the camps intending to regroup
and launch attacks against new Tutsi-led regime in Rwanda. In November
1996, a Congolese rebellion under Laurent Kabila’s leadership, backed
by Rwanda and Uganda, brutally dismantled these camps, progressed
toward Kinshasa and finally ousted Mobutu in May 1997.
War sparked again in August 1998 when Kabila, now president, demanded
that all Rwandan military leave the country and moved to purge Tutsi
from government. Rwandan and Ugandan troops invaded. Kabila called on
Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia for help. Estimated 5 million people died
in ensuing conflicts 1998-2003, mostly from war-related diseases and
starvation. Lusaka ceasefire signed July 1999 and UN peacekeeping
mission (MONUC) authorised in 2000. Laurent Kabila mysteriously
assassinated in January 2001 and replaced by son Joseph. Peace
negotiations resulted in Rwandan and Ugandan withdrawal in late 2002,
but proxies remained. In December 2002, all Congolese belligerents and
political groups signed peace deal in Sun City, South Africa, ushering
in transitional government June 2003 in which Joseph Kabila shared
power with four vice-presidents.
Yet conflict in the Eastern provinces of the DRC continued. Rebel
groups, including foreign militias (the Rwandan Hutu rebellion of the
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, FDLR, being the
largest), continued to fight for land and resources. Massive violence
in north eastern Ituri halted 2003 after three-month French-led
emergency mission under EU authority, after UN failed to contain
clashes. However, the province continues to suffer from Ugandan based
rebel group Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency from 2005. Kampala
threatened to pursue LRA into Congo, while Kinshasa suspected Uganda
sought access to resources in east. International Court of Justice
2005 found Ugandan army committed human rights abuses and illegally
exploited Congolese natural resources. LRA continues to operate in
Orientale Province with attacks in October and December 2008 killing
hundreds and displacing thousands of villagers.
Deaths and displacements led UN to describe Eastern Congo as “world’s
worst humanitarian crisis” March 2005. Following DRC government
request International Criminal Court (ICC) investigate crimes from
June 2002 throughout DRC, ICC Prosecutor opened investigation into
crimes in Ituri in June 2004. The ICC issued five arrest warrants for
DRC leaders and four are now in ICC custody – three militia leaders
charged with crimes in Ituri, and opposition MLC leader Jean-Pierre
Bemba who was arrested May 2008 for atrocity crimes committed
2002-2003 in neighbouring CAR. Congolese authorities refuses to arrest
fifth suspect, CNDP leader Bosco Ntaganda, for fear of derailing
current peace process negotiations with CNDP (see below).
New constitution introducing president/prime minister power sharing
and two-term presidential limit approved in December 2005 referendum,
promulgated 18 February 2006. After delays, national assembly and
first-round presidential elections held 30 July 2006. Violent clashes
in Kinshasa between Kabila and Bemba supporters when neither gained
majority in first-round vote. Kabila took presidency in 29 October
second round (58% of vote), and his alliance won majority in national
and provincial assemblies. Elections considered by outside observers
to be relatively free and fair, ushering in first truly democratic
government 40 years. Kabila government faces substantial challenges,
including an abusive and ill-disciplined national army (FARDC), an
inability to re-establish authority in areas liberated from rebel
groups, lack of transparent resource management, corrupt public
administration, and lack of infrastructure and basic services.
From November 2006 to December 2007, security further deteriorated in
North Kivu, when dissidents under command of General Laurent Nkunda
(CNDP, National Congress for the Defence of the People – Nkunda’s
Tutsi-led political-military movement, unveiled July 2006) repeatedly
clashed with the FARDC.
Signing of Nairobi Agreement November 2007 and Goma “Actes
d’Engagement” January 2008 welcomed. Former provided for repatriation
of FDLR and latter for ceasefire and voluntary demobilisation of
combatants in east, to be implemented through “Amani” peace program.
But despite some initial signs of success, serious clashes between
CNDP and FARDC continued. September-November 2008 saw major advances
by the CNDP against FARDC undermining confidence in national army,
while June 2008 brought heavy FDLR attacks on civilian camps in North
Kivu.
Regional summit in Nairobi November 2008, involving DRC and Rwanda
leaders, pushed for implementation of Goma and Nairobi Agreements. UN
report made public December 2008 revealed extent of the clandestine
Rwandan support for CNDP, as well as extensive collaboration between
FDLR and Congolese military officers. International pressure and
political opportunism led Kabila to cut a deal with Rwandan President
Paul Kagame, creating an opportunity for a diplomatic normalisation
and rapprochement between Rwanda and DRC.
DRC accepted a joint military operation against the FDLR in its main
North Kivu stronghold, while Rwanda would undermine support for Nkunda
and transfer CNDP leadership to Bosco Ntaganda. In January 2009,
Ntaganda agreed to integrate CNDP troops into Congolese national army
in exchange for CNDP being given key military and political positions.
Rwandan and FADRC troops launched operation “Umoja Wetu” against FDLR
20 January to 25 February 2009, but ended with scant results. FDLR
avoided direct confrontations by dispersing in Kivu forests; only
marginally weakened in North Kivu, remained intact in South Kivu. Less
than 500 fighters surrendered to MONUC during the first three months
of 2009 (MONUC estimated FDLR’s strength to 6,500-7,000 fighters by
end of 2008). FDLR regrouped and began new recruitments immediately
after Umoja Wetu’s end, and started retaliating against civilians who
“collaborated” with operation.
On 2 March 2009 government announced “Kimia II” offensive against
FDLR, led by FADRC with MONUC support; led to modest achievements
against the Rwandan rebellion, including increasing the disarmament
rate of FDLR combatants. Gregoire Ndahimana arrested in North Kivu
August 2009; indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal on war
crime charges. As a result of the two military offensives, MONUC
reported to the UN Security Council that it had demobilized close to
1,400 FDLR combatants during the first eleven months of 2009. On 17
November 2009 German police arrested two top FDLR political leaders,
Ignace Murwanashyaka and Deputy Straton Musoni; both were part of the
FDLR support network that continues to operate from Europe, North
America and some African countries.
Kimia II officially ended 31 December 2009; heavily criticised for
causing civilian suffering, failure to neutralise FDLR and delaying
long-awaited security sector reform (SSR). MONUC, now numbering 22,000
troops, criticized for failing to protect civilians from human rights
violations committed by both FDLR and FARDC. Human Right Watch
recorded that 1,400 civilians killed January-September 2009, either by
FDLR combatants or rogue FARDC units; 7,500 rapes, 9,000 burned
buildings and 900,000 new IDPs reported in North and South Kivu due to
the military offensives. FDLR has maintained majority of its
combatants and ability to retaliate against civilians. December 2009
UN report concluded that Kimia II had failed to dismantle the
organisation’s political and military structures on the ground in
eastern DRC.
On 1 January 2010, “Amani Leo” military offensive launched by FARDC
with MONUC logistical support, aiming to eradicate FDLR rebels within
3 months. Amani Leo puts strong emphasis civilian protection, joint
planning and conditionality of MONUC support linked to FARDC’s respect
for human rights.
Kabila during 2006 presidential campaign promised reconstruction of
infrastructure and consolidation of democracy, but very little
progress made since December 2006. Socio-economic situation has
deteriorated in most of the country. Political pluralism has shrunk,
with opposition virtually excluded from governorships despite
performance in 2006 elections. Brutal police crackdown on political-
cultural movement Bundu dia Kongo in Bas-Congo and a string of
arbitrary arrests of activists, journalists and parliamentarians March
2009 have jeopardized free expression.
The Congolese Constitution stipulates the implementation of major
steps towards decentralisation before May 2010, local election before
end of 2011, and first-round presidential elections three months
before end of Kabila’s current mandate on 6 December 2011. All
institutional reforms and electoral preparations have to a large
extent been delayed. Major concerns remain about the smooth
implementation of the Congolese democratic roadmap, as agreed during
the period of transition by the former belligerents.
Updated February 2010
For further information see Crisis Group reports and briefings on DR
Congo. The CrisisWatch database provides a report on monthly conflict
developments for DR Congo since September 2003.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=37
Conflict history: Iraq
New Search - Map
Head of State: President Jalal Talabani, April 2005 –
Head of Government: Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, May 2006 –
British troops occupied Baghdad 1917 during collapse of Ottoman
Empire. World War I peace negotiations 1919-1920 awarded present-day
Iraq as single mandate to Britain, combining three separate Ottoman
provinces (Baghdad, Basra and Mosul) with multiple religious and
ethnic communities.
British control violently disputed by Iraqis, leading to three-month
uprising southern Iraq 1920. British-backed Hashemite kingdom
installed 1921, becoming independent constitutional monarchy 1932.
Monarchy fell 1958 in coup led by General Abd-al-Karim Qasem. Qasem
attempted to combine nationalism with social reform, playing off
increasingly powerful populist movements: Nasserite Arab nationalists,
secularist Arab Baath party and Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), and
Shiite Islamic Call (Daawa) Party. Tikrit-born Saddam Hussein, young
Baath member, involved in assassination plot on Qasem 1959.
Qasem removed in February 1963 coup engineered by Baath party in
conjunction with other Arab nationalist elements. Senior Baath party
figures, including prominent Tikriti Baathists, brought into
government under non-Baath Iraqi president Abdul Salam Arif. But Arif
outmanoeuvred and ousted them in internal coup November 1963.
Confrontation between Arif regime (first Abdul-Salam and then, when he
died 1966, his brother Abdel-Rahman) and Baathists continued.
Dissident army officers, supported by Baath militia, overthrew Arif
regime July 1968 and installed Baathist Ahmad al-Bakr as president,
with Baathists rapidly dominating Revolutionary Command Council (RCC).
Baath party progressively set up party institutions parallel to state,
coming to control and supersede it. Saddam Hussein, tasked with
creating and running purged internal security service, used patronage
to build up power base built largely on connections to Tikrit.
Construction of bureaucracy and state-centralisation 1970s funded by
rising oil prices and production; by 1979 Iraq second biggest oil
producer in Gulf. Saddam Hussein officially succeeded al-Bakr April
1979, purging RCC of one third of its members in doing so.
Iraq went to war with Iran 1980 in bid to challenge Iranian dominance
in Middle East, undermine appeal of revolutionary Shiite Islamist
regime and end dispute over Shatt al-Arab waterway. Osirak nuclear
reactor destroyed in Israeli strike 1981. At war-end 1988 Hussein
claimed victory, though sides had fought to standstill with estimated
800,000 to 1 million deaths.
Iran-Iraq war marked further accumulation of Saddam Hussein’s power,
concentrated in tribal and Sunni allies to growing exclusion of Shiite
and Kurdish groups. By 1987 one third of RCC members were Tikriti.
However, despite Shiite opposition centred on Daawa party, most Iraqi
Shiites rallied to war, even though 250,000 Iraqi Shiites allegedly of
Iranian origin were forcibly displaced and Shiite-majority south Iraq
bore brunt of war.
Main Kurdish rebel groups, conversely, turned war to their tactical
advantage. Negotiations on autonomy had broken down 1970s over issue
of oil-rich, multi-ethnic Kirkuk. Two main Iraqi Kurdish parties,
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK), used war to ally themselves periodically with Iran and gain
effective control over parts of northern Iraq. Regime launched counter-
insurgency 1987, culminating in so-called Anfal operations 1988, with
between 50,000 and 100,000 civilian deaths from mass executions. On
numerous occasions Iraqi regime used poison gas on civilians,
including on town of Halabja March 1988.
Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, claiming Kuwaiti territory, was met
with concerted U.S-led and UN-backed diplomatic and then military
effort to dislodge Iraqi troops. Return of demoralised and defeated
Iraqi troops sparked Shiite uprising 1991, eventually crushed by
Republican Guard, with reprisals and intensified forced relocation of
Marsh Arabs, including draining of marshes. Western encouragement of,
and then failure to support, southern uprising compromised West
amongst southern Shiites.
Similar Kurdish revolt collapsed by April 1991 as some 1.5 million
Kurdish refugees fled to Turkey and Iran (both have significant
Kurdish populations). Kurdish groups re-asserted control over parts of
northern Iraq after establishment of no-fly zone north of 36th
parallel, as well as allied-patrolled safe haven. War between PUK and
KDP broke out 1994 ending in U.S.-sponsored agreement 1998. Meanwhile,
international protection afforded considerable self-rule, while Iraqi
Kurdistan served as base for minority groups and for Turkish (Kurdish
Workers’ Party – PKK) and Iranian Kurdish groups (KDP-Iran and
Komala).
UN Security Council resolutions 1990-1991 required Iraq to surrender
weapons of mass destruction and allow full UN inspections. No-fly
zones imposed north (1991) and south (1992). When Iraq response deemed
inadequate further resolutions imposed. Sanctions regime imposed 1990
was modified 1995-1996 taking form of “oil-for-food” program allowing
Iraq to sell oil to buy its own products under UN-controlled
distribution. Program provided some relief but also illegal income
stream for regime through inflated contracts, while discount oil
bought political allegiance.
Regime accused of interfering repeatedly with inspection work of UN
Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) 1997-1998 prompting launch of U.S.-
UK “Desert Fox” operation December 1998 targeting suspected biological
warfare facilities. Inspectors were unable to return thereafter. U.S.
and UK further struck Iraq’s air-defence capability repeatedly
1998-2003. New UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
(UNMOVIC) began work November 2002 following massive U.S. pressure and
UNSC resolution 1441 stating Iraq in “material breach” of earlier
resolutions. Bush administration preparing for war after 9/11 attacks
and war in Afghanistan. UNMOVIC stated December 2002 that regime’s
disclosure contained little new, but February 2003 attempts by U.S.
and UK to persuade UNSC to pass new resolution failed, as France,
Russia and China called for more time to let UN do its work. U.S.
indicated it would take military action without UN approval and
launched war March 2003 with UK, Australian and Polish ground support.
Regime had melted away by 10 April; U.S. declared “end to major combat
operations” 1 May 2003.
Baath party and Iraqi army disbanded by U.S. decree May 2003. Post-war
lawlessness and resentment over lack of reconstruction increasingly
gave way to concerted insurgency through 2003, attacking U.S.-led
troops, Shiite leaders’ gatherings, UN and Red Cross headquarters in
Iraq - leading U.S. to speed up power transfer. Insurgency continued
unchecked despite capture of Saddam Hussein December 2003. U.S. troops
engaged in heavy fighting against Mahdi militia of junior Shiite
cleric Moqtada al-Sadr April/May 2004. Similar stand-off August 2004
in Shiite holy city of Najaf ended by intervention of senior Shiite
cleric in Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.
UNSC resolution May 2003 lifted economic sanctions and backed U.S.
administration. Subsequent UNSC resolution October 2003 provided
legitimacy for Interim Governing Council (IGC) set up by U.S July
2003. IGC ultimately agreed on interim constitution March 2004 and
‘sovereignty’ passed to Iraqi Interim Government June 2004 with new
UNSC resolution, though U.S. troop strength remained undiminished
totalling over 130,000 plus thousands of private security guards. 100-
member Consultative Assembly set up August 2004.
Post-war Iraq moved toward establishing a permanent government.
Transitional National Assembly picked in January 2005 elections marked
by robust turnout among Kurds and Shiites despite record number of
insurgent attacks; turnout low among Sunni voters after clerics called
for boycott and insurgents threatened violence. Informal power sharing
arrangement set up when government formed 5 April 2005 with Shiite PM,
Ibrahim al-Jaafari, and Kurdish President, Jalal Talabani.
Transitional government drafted a new constitution; approved by
national referendum October 2005. Elections for new 4-year
parliamentary assembly December 2005 saw greater participation by
Sunni voters. Shiite-led United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) took the most
votes but no majority; UIA leader PM al Jaafari struggled to form
coalition government amid ongoing sectarian violence and strong
opposition to his candidacy.
Efforts to train Iraqi police forces faltered, hampered by
infiltration of forces by insurgents and attacks on recruiting
stations. Trial of Saddam Hussein at Iraqi Tribunal on charges of
crimes against humanity began October 2005 but soon thrown into
disarray by security concerns and walkouts by defendants and defence
team. In November 2006, an Iraqi tribunal found Hussein guilty of
crimes against humanity and sentenced him to death by hanging; Hussein
executed on 30 December.
Fears of outright civil war rose through 2006 as sectarian violence
intensified. Despite the death of Al Qaeda in Iraq’s leader, Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi, in an air strike in June, the UN estimated an average of
more than 100 Iraqi civilians were dying per day and more than 34,000
killed in total during 2006. U.S. combat deaths in December reached
3,000 since March 2003. PM al-Maliki’s 16-17 December reconciliation
conference largely a failure after several important groups, including
supporters of radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, boycotted. Al-Maliki in
December 2007 reversed U.S.’s 2003 disbandment of Iraqi army and
allowed ex-soldiers to rejoin the armed forces or receive pensions;
similarly, former Baath party officials allowed to return to public
life in January 2008.
On 11 January 2007, U.S. President Bush announced a new U.S strategy
for Iraq. So-called military “surge” involved 30,000 extra U.S.
troops, mainly deployed to Baghdad but also Anbar province. U.S.
troops began to push insurgents including al-Qaeda in Iraq out of
towns and provinces which had been hotbeds of insurgency; high levels
of violence continued throughout first half of 2007, but security
significantly improved over final months. Political stalemate largely
continued during year, however: the Iraqi Consensus Front, the main
Sunni Arab political bloc, withdrew from the government in August 2007
in a dispute over power-sharing, rejoined 19 July 2008.
Late 2008 and early 2009 brought signs of relative improvement;
sectarian violence decreased and security began to stabilise in many
parts of the country. In January 2008, Iraqi forces took over control
of security in Baghdad’s fortified Green Zone in what PM Maliki called
Iraq’s “day of sovereignty”. Al-Maliki drew criticism for offensive
against Shiite militias in Basra, starting in late March 2008 and
involving 30,000 Iraqi troops, that left hundreds dead; situation
stabilised after 10 May Iranian-brokered ceasefire.
Some positive political developments as parliament passed legislation
approving state budget and limited amnesty for detainees on 13
February 2008, but presidential council rejected law defining
relationship between center and governorates ahead of provincial
elections; however, law evetually ratified by Presidential Council
follow intervention by Bush administration. The 31 January 2009
provincial elections a relative success, with a lower turnout than the
2005 elections but broad participation and few violent incidents
reported amid tight security. Al-Maliki emerged stronger, his
nationalist rhetoric resonating with the non-Kurdish electorate; al-
Maliki’s coalition made major gains in Basra and Baghdad, while Shiite
Supreme Islamic Council, Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), Kurds lost
ground. Vote in Kirkuk delayed and yet to be held as parliament could
not resolve dispute over power-sharing provisions.
U.S. negotiations with the Iraqi government led to Strategic Framework
Agreement in November 2008, by which U.S. forces to leave Iraq no
later than December 2011. Incoming Obama administration announced the
pullout of U.S. combat brigades by August 2010 as first step. As
planned, U.S. forces handed over control of towns and cities to Iraqi
security forces by 30 June 2009. Resurgence of devastating bombings in
Baghdad during 2009, but overall death toll declined. Parliament on 6
December 2009 approved new electoral law after months of debate,
raising the number of parliamentary seats from 275 to 325 and
rescheduling parliamentary elections to 7 March 2010.
While levels of violence have dropped in many areas of the country,
attention has now turned to the intensifying conflict between Arabs
and Kurds, as both the federal government and the Kurdistan regional
government lay claim to oil and gas resources in the disputed
territories, in particular in Kirkuk governorate. Tensions have been
building along so-called “trigger line”, Arab-Kurdish dividing line,
where federal army troops and Kurdish regional guard fighters are
entrenched.
updated January 2010
For further information see Crisis Group reports and briefings on
Iraq. The CrisisWatch database provides a report on monthly conflict
developments for Iraq since September 2003.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=51
Conflict history: Zimbabwe
New Search - Map
Head of State: President Robert Mugabe, 1987- (re-elected 1996, 2002,
2008 unconfirmed)
Zimbabwe’s ongoing crisis dates to 1965 when Ian Smith, leader of
Southern Rhodesia, issued Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI)
from Britain, imposing white-minority rule. Action prompted
international sanctions and guerrilla war which, by 1979, claimed some
36,000 lives and displaced some 1.5 million. Britain brokered 1979
peace deal involving government, Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African
National Union (ZANU) and Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People’s
Union (ZAPU), culminating in Lancaster House Agreement. Agreement
secured ceasefire between parties and set out steps towards legal
independence, including Independence Constitution guaranteeing
majority rule and reserving 20% of parliamentary seats for whites.
In 1980 elections, Mugabe won 57 seats of 80 reserved for blacks,
becoming Zimbabwe’s PM and Africa’s most feted leader, presiding over
continent’s second largest manufacturing base. Rhodesian Front won all
20 seats reserved for whites. In early 1980s, Mugabe unleashed brutal
repression in Matabeleland and Midlands against minority Ndebele
population that supported rival ZAPU party, dispatching North Korean-
trained brigades. Five-year crackdown killed over 20,000 mainly
unarmed civilians - episode known in Zimbabwe as “Gukurahundi”. ZAPU
coerced 1987 into merger with ZANU creating ZANU-PF, paving way for
constitutional change giving Mugabe executive presidential powers and
turning country into de facto one-party state. Attempts to create de
jure one-party state failed 1990, but Mugabe secured re-election
1996.
President lost February 2000 constitutional referendum – first time
people voted against regime in clear protest. Mugabe responded with
repression and violence. Forcible seizures of mostly white-owned land
by ZANU liberation war veterans – beginning late 1990s – spiked after
election defeat, crippling economy and leading to chronic shortage of
basic commodities and services from 2000. But Mugabe defeated newly
formed Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) opposition in June 2000
parliamentary elections, though missing two-thirds majority needed to
change constitution. Seriously flawed elections held March 2002
(presidential) and 2005 (parliamentary): Mugabe resorted to using
state machinery, war veterans and youth militias to intimidate,
suppress dissent, gag media, manipulate food aid and violate human
rights. Denounced by international observers as neither free nor fair,
elections nevertheless endorsed by South Africa and, in 2005, by AU as
well.
Zimbabwe left Commonwealth December 2003 following indefinite
suspension agreed by triumvirate of Nigeria, Kenya and Australia. MDC
leader Morgan Tsvangirai faced on-and-off trial on charges of plotting
to assassinate Mugabe. Further sedition charges laid after failed 2003
general strike. In context of rapidly depreciating currency and 85%
unemployment, government launched “Operation Murambatsvina” in 2005 to
forcibly clear urban slums. Operation deprived over 18% of population
of homes or livelihoods and badly damaged informal sector, the
lifeline for many. MDC split November 2005 over decision to boycott
poll for newly-formed upper house of parliament, Senate.
After brutal government crackdown on opposition in March 2007, the
Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) mandated South African
President Mbeki to mediate between government and MDC – aiming to
secure new constitution and free and fair conditions for elections.
Talks stalled January 2008, when Mugabe called snap polls for March
despite MDC’s call for postponement until new constitution adopted.
Ex-finance minister and SADC head Makoni announced candidacy on 5
February in first open challenge to Mugabe from within ruling party
since independence. Arthur Mutambara put his breakaway MDC faction
behind ruling party renegade. Makoni’s limited grassroots support and
late entry into presidential race meant campaign failed to gather
momentum, but challenge left Mugabe unsure of allies.
On 29 March 2008, Zimbabwe held combined presidential and
parliamentary elections flawed by pre-poll manipulation, though
campaigning relatively open and Tsvangirai able to hold large rallies.
Only “friendly” countries and institutions invited to observe polls
and most western media barred. Despite skewed playing field,
Zimbabwe’s people clearly signaled rejection of status quo: for first
time, ZANU-PF lost control of parliament to MDC, which made
unprecedented in-roads into rural areas.
Outcome of presidential poll heavily disputed, with MDC’s Tsvangirai
claiming outright victory over Mugabe. Electoral commission withheld
results for over a month, while ZANU-PF launched countrywide campaign
of violence and intimidation with over 2,000 detained and 200,000
displaced by June 2008. Violence continued against MDC supporters
throughout 2008 and 2009. On 2 May, electoral officials finally
announced results: Tsvangirai received 47.9% against Mugabe’s 43.2%,
warranting run-off.
Presidential run off 27 June 2008 won by Mugabe after Tsvangirai,
having been arrested 5 times during that month, withdrew due to
election conditions 22 June 2008. Mugabe and Tsvangirai agree to hold
talks beginning 24 July 2008. Power sharing deal (“Global Political
Agreement”, GPA) signed 15 September where Mugabe retained position of
President and Tsvangirai became Prime Minister; both to lead cabinet
bodies. Tsvangirai sworn in as PM 11 February 2009, 61 strong cabinet
inaugurated 13 February, consists of MDC and ZANU-PF members with MDC
receiving slight majority. Yet power-sharing government remains
strained due to outstanding power sharing issues, continued repression
against MDC members, and Mugabe unilaterally appointing cabinet
members and scheduling meetings. MDC disengaged from unity government
for 3 weeks in October 2009 over stalled implementation of GPA.
Divides between ZANU-PF members increasingly apparent during 2009, but
Mugabe elected Zanu-PF President for a further 5 years in December.
ZAPU re-emerged formally separating from ZANU-PF in May 2009 after
months of consolidating support base.
Zimbabweans face economic turmoil and corruption, food shortages and
collapse of vital services although 2009 saw an improvement in access
to food and wages being paid. HIV/AIDS among adults stands at over
20%. In April 2008 annual inflation stood at over 165,000% – the
world’s highest by a margin – making day-to-day life for Zimbabweans
increasingly difficult. The government temporarily suspended the
Zimbabwean dollar and replaced it with foreign currencies on 12 April
2009, initially for one year. Starvation and cholera epidemic hit
population at end of 2008, over 4,000 reported dead by January 2009.
Up a third of population are thought to have fled over recent years.
Remittances from growing diaspora have become a lifeline for many
remaining. Unity Government unveiled $8.5 billion economic recovery
plan March 2009. International community have only partially responded
to calls foreign aid under “humanitarian plus” program (assistance and
support to key social sectors) and a lifting of sanctions; targeted
sanctions against key members of Mugabe’s political elite remain.
IMF, World Bank, EU, US and Australia have begun assistance despite
cautious initial reactions, but nowhere near $8.5 billion requested.
Updated January 2010
For further information see Crisis Group reports and briefings on
Zimbabwe. The CrisisWatch database provides a report on monthly
conflict developments for Zimbabwe since September 2003.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=119
chhotemianinshallah
Conflict areas and subjects covered
in this week's update:
Reports: Iran, Pakistan
Commentary: Sudan, Sri Lanka, Haiti
Website: Sri Lanka, Guinea, Indonesia
Crisis Group reports published this week:
The Iran Nuclear Issue: The View from Beijing
17 February
While China resists tougher UN Security Council sanctions on Iran, it
is likely to ultimately come on board but will seek to delay and
weaken the West's desired measures.
Reforming Pakistan's Civil Service
16 February
If Pakistan’s deteriorating civil service is not urgently repaired,
public disillusionment and resentment could be used by the military to
justify another spell of authoritarian rule.
more Crisis Group reports
Crisis Group commentary:
"La UE se juega su prestigio en Sudán"
Alain Délétroz, Foreign Policy Edición Española, 18 de febrero
Sri Lanka: "La revanche sans fin de Rajapakse"
Alain Délétroz, Le Temps, 16 février
"La lenta implosión de Sudán"
Alain Délétroz, El Mundo, 12 de febrero
"Haiti's Women Rise from the Rubble"
Bernice Robertson, The Daily Beast, 12 February
more Crisis Group commentary
Crisis Group website:
Crisis Group has updated two webpages highlighting key issues:
Sri Lanka: After the War
End Military Rule in Guinea
Crisis Group has updated two online conflict histories:
Indonesia
Sri Lanka
The Iran Nuclear Issue: The View from Beijing
Asia Briefing Nº100
17 February 2010
OVERVIEW
The revelation in 2009 of nuclear facilities near Qom intensified
international criticism of Iran’s opaque nuclear development. As
Western countries prepare to pursue tougher sanctions at the UN,
China’s acquiescence as a permanent Security Council member is vital
but will be difficult to obtain. Beijing is reluctant to pursue
further sanctions, insisting that a solution to the nuclear impasse
must be sought first and foremost through diplomacy. It emphasises
that as long as Iran honours its Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty
(NPT) commitments not to use nuclear technology for military purposes,
it should not be obliged to forgo its rights, including enrichment,
under that accord.
Beijing is unconvinced that Iran has the ability to develop nuclear
weapons in the short term and does not share the West’s sense of
urgency about the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran, despite the
risks that this would present to China’s long-term interests.
Moreover, it does not believe the sanctions proposed by the West will
bring about a solution to the issue, particularly given the failure of
this approach so far. And while Beijing has stated that it supports a
“nuclear-free” Middle East, it does not want to sacrifice its own
energy interests in Iran. However, if China finds itself facing
unanimous support for sanctions from other Security Council members,
it will delay but not block a resolution, while seeking to weaken its
punitive terms.
China has vested interests in a good relationship with Iran. Iran is
China’s third largest source of imported crude oil and possesses the
abundant energy reserves that the rising power needs to sustain its
rapid economic growth. China’s thirst for energy and its vast foreign
reserves are an ideal complement to Iran, which has the world’s second-
largest crude oil reserves but desperately needs investment to develop
them. But China’s priorities in Iran go beyond economic interests.
Strong bilateral relations help to counter U.S. dominance in the
Middle East and increase Beijing’s strategic leverage. China sees
Iran’s influence in the Middle East and Central Asia as useful to
advancing its political, economic and strategic agenda in that region.
The two countries also share important historical and political
affinities, shaped by suspicion towards the West and reinforced by an
experience of sanctions and a perception of U.S. interference in their
domestic politics. At the same time, the condemnation by some Iranian
clerics of Chinese actions following the July 2009 Xinjiang riots has
also led Beijing to view the relationship through the lens of
protecting its domestic stability.
Chinese officials have been pursuing a delay-and-weaken strategy with
regard to UN sanctions by focusing on the importance of a negotiated
settlement. Pursuit of the diplomatic track delays punitive action and
maximises Beijing’s bargaining power with regard to both Iran and the
West. Nevertheless, if Russia finally supports sanctions, China will
likely come on board to avoid diplomatic isolation. Ultimately,
Beijing will not side with Iran at the expense of its relations with
the U.S. Despite recent troubles in the Sino-U.S. relationship, China
still values those ties more than its ties to Tehran. To protect its
interests, however, it will negotiate strongly to weaken the terms of
proposed sanctions.
This briefing examines the factors influencing China’s policy towards
Iran, the framework within which Beijing will ultimately make its
decisions and the likely implications for international efforts to
address the nuclear issue, particularly within the UN.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=6536
The Iran Nuclear Issue: The View from Beijing
Beijing/Brussels, 17 February 2010: While China resists tougher UN
Security Council sanctions on Iran, it is likely to ultimately come on
board but will seek to delay and weaken the West’s desired measures.
The Iran Nuclear Issue: The View from Beijing,* the latest
International Crisis Group briefing, examines China’s perspective on
the nuclear impasse, including why it is so hesitant to support
further sanctions and insists that more diplomacy is the key to a
peaceful solution. However, if Beijing finds itself facing unanimous
support for new sanctions from other Security Council members, it can
be expected to avoid a veto and focus instead on ensuring that
punitive measures will not harm its interests.
“China lacks the West’s sense of fundamental urgency about the Iran
nuclear issue”, explains Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Crisis Group's
China Adviser and North East Asia Project Director. “It is yet to be
convinced that Tehran is on the cusp of achieving the capabilities to
highly enrich and weaponise its uranium, or that there is an imminent
threat of military confrontation in the Middle East”.
China is most likely to pursue a delay-and-weaken strategy with regard
to the sanctions the West says are needed to bring Iran into serious
negotiations on its controversial nuclear program. While China has
stated that it supports a “nuclear-free” Middle East, it does not want
to sacrifice its deepening economic ties with Tehran, especially in
oil. But Beijing’s approach also reflects its consistent historical
opposition to sanctions, doubt about their efficacy and a tactical
hedge. By using delaying tactics and giving each side part of what its
wants, China maximises benefits from both.
In addition to its need for energy, China’s relationship with Tehran
is shaped by broader foreign and domestic policy calculations. Strong
bilateral ties strengthen Beijing’s position in the Middle East and
Central Asia, China’s “Grand Periphery” which has become a priority
focus of its geo-strategy. They also help balance Washington’s
influence in the region. China and Iran share a sense of suspicion
towards the West – reinforced by common experience of being the target
of sanctions and a similar perception of U.S. interference in their
internal politics. In China’s eyes, Iran’s regional power will expand
in future, meaning that good relations could serve its interests for
years to come.
However, “Beijing still values its relations with Washington more than
its ties to Tehran”, says Robert Templer, Crisis Group's Asia Program
Director. “If China finds itself isolated on the Security Council, it
will not side with Iran at the expense of that relationship but will
instead negotiate hard to ensure that sanctions are as weak as
possible”.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
To support our work in Asia and around the world, please click here.
*Read the full Crisis Group briefing on our website: http://www.crisisgroup.org
Contacts: Gabriela Keseberg Dávalos (Brussels) +32 (0) 2 536 0071
Kimberly Abbott (Washington) +1 202 785 1602
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=6536&m=1
Reforming Pakistan's Civil Service
Asia Report 185
16 February 2010
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Decades of mismanagement, political manipulation and corruption have
rendered Pakistan’s civil service incapable of providing effective
governance and basic public services. In public perceptions, the
country’s 2.4 million civil servants are widely seen as unresponsive
and corrupt, and bureaucratic procedures cumbersome and exploitative.
Bureaucratic dysfunction and low capacity undermine governance,
providing opportunities to the military to subvert the democratic
transition and to extremists to destabilise the state. The civilian
government should prioritise reforms that transform this key
institution into a leaner, more effective and accountable body.
General Pervez Musharraf’s eight-year military rule left behind a
demoralised and inefficient bureaucracy that was used to ensure regime
survival. There was a dramatic rise in military encroachments as
retired generals were appointed to key civil posts, such as the
chairmanship of the Federal Public Service Commission, the premier
agency for recruitment and promotions. The military regime’s poorly
conceived devolution of power led to further administrative confusion
and the breakdown of service delivery at the district level, the key
administrative unit of governance. The decision to vest revenue and
law and order functions in nazims (mayors), elected indirectly and on
a non-party basis, led to greater collusion between unscrupulous
district officials and corrupt police.
The civil bureaucracy’s ills, however, predate military rule. Archaic
rules and procedures and a rigid hierarchical authority structure have
undermined its oversight of a public sector that has expanded
considerably since the 1970s. Low salaries, insecure tenure, and
obsolete accountability mechanisms have spawned widespread corruption
and impunity. Recruitments, postings and promotions are increasingly
made on the basis of personal contacts and political affiliation,
instead of on merit.
The civil service’s falling standards impact mostly Pakistan’s poor,
widening social and economic divisions between the privileged and
underprivileged. With citizens increasingly affected by conflict and
militancy, including millions displaced by fighting in the Northwest
Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA), the government’s ability to ensure law and order and provide
services such as education and health care will be vital to winning
the hearts and minds of the public, and restoring links between the
citizen and the state.
Bureaucratic procedures and practices, formal or informal, play a key
role in public perceptions of the government’s functioning. Both the
Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), which heads the coalition government at
the centre, and its main opposition, the Pakistan Muslim League
(Nawaz) (PML-N), have a stake in investing the patience, resources and
political capital needed to enhance the bureaucracy’s ability to
execute government policies and respond to public grievances and
needs. Both parties should resist the temptation to again use the
bureaucracy for short-term political ends, which undermined its
functioning. The government’s inability to deliver basic services and
good governance could provide an ambitious military leadership the
opportunity to intervene.
In the 1990s, the PPP and the PML-N each formed two elected
governments but were prevented each time from completing a full term
by the military – either through its civilian proxy, the president, or
a direct coup in October 1999. The two parties share the blame for
that flawed transition, by failing to deliver good governance and as
well as a willingness to align with the military against each other.
Unsurprisingly, each dismissal, including the October coup, was
justified on the grounds of bad governance and corruption. In this,
another period of fragile democratic transition, the two parties must
realise that repeating past mistakes will again make them vulnerable
to military intervention.
If the flaws of an unreformed bureaucracy are not urgently addressed,
the government risks losing public support. The recommendations of the
National Commission on Government Reforms (NCGR), which was set up by
the military regime in 2006 and presented a report to Prime Minister
Yusuf Raza Gilani in May 2008, if properly implemented could help
reform the civil service.
The international community too can help improve governance by
supporting civil service reform, expanding training programs, and
providing technological support and expertise to modernise methods of
administration. However, the U.S., EU and other donors should refrain,
absent political reform, from supporting bureaucracies such as the
FATA secretariat, where unchecked powers and the absence of financial
oversight make corruption more likely. They must also condition aid on
measures to institute greater accountability and transparency. Indeed,
with hundreds of millions more dollars committed for Pakistan’s
development, for example through the U.S. Enduring Assistance and
Cooperation Act 2009, comes increased risk of corruption and waste,
particularly if the money is directly channelled to inefficient and
unaccountable institutions. If international development funds yield
few tangible results, undermining local expectations, the hearts and
minds of the Pakistani public will likely be lost rather than won.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Government of Pakistan:
1. Enhance civil service performance and revive a spirit of public
service by:
a) increasing salaries and pensions, particularly for those at the
bottom of the hierarchy, providing better housing, transport and
health insurance for all government employees, and subsidised
schooling for their children;
b) conducting regular training, including refresher courses, at all
levels of the bureaucracy;
c) improving standards of instruction at training institutions to
inculcate professional skills as well as norms and practices that
reward integrity and professional commitment;
d) providing competitive compensation and benefits to attract
qualified and motivated instructors;
e) linking an officer’s performance during training programs with
promotions, thus no longer using successful completion as the only
yardstick;
f) establishing and strictly abiding by new criteria for secretariat
appointments to include professional expertise, diversity of
experience, demonstrable leadership in public institutions, and
ability to tackle challenging assignments;
g) modifying Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) to include tangible,
performance-oriented criteria instead of subjective evaluations of
officers’ characters;
h) instituting a transparent and competitive selection process to
encourage representation of all occupational groups, and reserving
positions in each basic pay scale for officers from each of those
groups; and
i) ensuring that specialists have the same access to training
facilities as generalist officers in occupational groups.
2. Eliminate military interference by:
a) ending the practice of hiring serving or retired military officers
in the civil service and abolishing the annual 10 per cent quota
reserved for military officers;
b) refraining from renewing contracts of retired military officers
presently occupying civil service positions;
c) enacting laws barring serving or retired military personnel from
heading any institution dealing with civil service training,
recruitment or promotions; and
d) immediately ending the practice of having senior appointments
subject to evaluation and clearance by the military’s intelligence
agencies.
3. Enhance the functioning of federal and provincial secretariats by:
a) reducing excessive centralisation of functions and devolving
administrative and financial authority to lower tiers, with effective
oversight;
b) revising and simplifying existing rules and procedures to ensure
that civil servants are informed of their rights and responsibilities;
c) ending the systemic bias in favour of generalists by allowing the
same opportunities for postings, promotions and career advancement to
specialists; and
d) reversing the quota for District Management Group (federal)
appointees to provincial posts at the level of Basic Pay Scale (BPS)
21 so that 75 per cent of these posts are reserved for provincial
civil servants, and the remainder for federal appointees.
4. Institute effective accountability over the civil bureaucracy by:
a) implementing the recommendations of the Charter of Democracy,
signed between the PPP and PML-N, to set up an independent
accountability commission, answerable to the National Assembly’s
Public Accounts Committee (PAC); this committee would investigate – in
tandem with the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) – alleged
malpractice and financial and other corruption by government officials
and take disciplinary actions against those found guilty;
b) empowering federal and provincial ombudsmen to redress public
grievances against bureaucratic malpractice; and
c) holding federal and provincial secretaries accountable to
parliament and provincial assemblies by mandating national and
provincial parliamentary committees to hold regular hearings requiring
these civil servants to account for efficient use of resources as well
as the organisation, management and staffing of their respective
departments.
5. Promote fairness and eliminate opportunities for political
manipulation at all levels of the civil administration by:
a) expanding the role of the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC)
from a recruiting agency to one that professionally oversees all
aspects of the bureaucracy’s functioning;
b) mandating parliamentary committees to vet and approve senior civil
service appointments, proposed by the FPSC, to ensure that they are
made on merit rather than personal or political affiliation, followed
by a vote in parliament;
c) withdrawing the discretionary power of the prime minister to
promote officers to the highest grade in the bureaucracy and
transferring it to the FPSC;
d) guaranteeing security of tenure and providing civil servants legal
protection against postings, transfers and promotions that do not
conform to due process;
e) empowering the Federal Services Tribunal to monitor postings and
transfers, and review civil servants’ complaints about arbitrary
transfers; and
f) replicating these measures in the provinces.
6. Settle the status of the report by the National Commission on
Government Reforms (NCGR) by:
a) constituting a bipartisan parliamentary committee on civil service
reform, with half the members nominated by the government and half by
the opposition, co-chaired by the prime minister and the leader of the
opposition, to assess the report, placing recommendations before the
national and provincial assemblies for detailed debate and review;
b) once approved, present a final bill on the floor of the National
Assembly for a vote; and
c) encourage the provincial assemblies to follow suit on reform of the
provincial services.
7. Improve land administration and local governance by:
a) computerising land records;
b) making certificates of possession and other land ownership-related
documents available at information kiosks in tehsils (towns) for a
small fixed fee;
c) establishing call centres in districts to report requests for
bribes, illegal commissions and other abuses, including by the patwari
(village revenue officer); and
d) devolving authority to tehsil officials to issue certificates of
domicile and related documents, rather than through district
headquarters.
8. Modernise civil service systems and processes and enhance inter-
agency coordination through e-governance technology by:
a) making compliance with standards set by the E-Government
Directorate (EGD) mandatory for major federal government projects;
b) instituting compulsory training in basic information technology
processes for all government employees in BPS-5 and above; and
c) giving the EGD greater financial and organisational autonomy by
converting it from a cell to an attached department of the ministry of
information technology.
9. Improve police functioning by having the parliament review the
Police Order (2002); setting up a parliamentary subcommittee to deal
exclusively with policing; and empowering accountability and
managerial bodies such as the public safety commissions and the
National Police Management Board.
10. Mainstream FATA’s bureaucracy by abolishing the FATA secretariat
and the office of the political agent, and transferring their
authority to the NWFP secretariat, relevant provincial line ministries
and district departments.
To the U.S. and the International Community:
11. Condition FATA aid under the U.S. Enduring Assistance and
Cooperation Act 2009 on reform of the region’s corrupt and
dysfunctional bureaucracy, including the abolition of the FATA
secretariat and the office of the political agent, with their powers
transferred to the NWFP secretariat, relevant provincial line
ministries and district departments.
12. Include technocrats, as well as cadre civil servants, in all
public sector capacity building projects, in addition to training
schemes at leading international universities and institutes.
13. Build the capacity of civil service training institutions by
providing instructors and teaching materials on best international
practices of public policy, fiscal policy, financial management,
infrastructure development, human resource management, energy and
agriculture.
14. Provide technical support for the expansion of E-government
technologies, particularly in areas such as land revenue
administration, taxation and policing, and leverage aid to press line
ministries, departments and agencies to incorporate E-governance
processes within their domains.
Islamabad/Brussels, 16 February 2010
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6528&l=1
"La UE se juega su prestigio en Sudán",
Alain Délétroz in Foreign Policy Edición Española
18 de febrero de 2010
Foreign Policy Edición Española
La Unión Europea se equivoca al enviar observadores a la farsa de
elecciones de Sudán. Su reto ahora es mantener algo de credibilidad.
La decisión de la responsable de política exterior de la UE, Catherine
Ashton, de enviar una misión europea de observación para supervisar
las elecciones de abril de este año en Sudán es un triunfo de la
esperanza sobre la experiencia. Los observadores no evitarán que el
Partido del Congreso Nacional, actualmente en el poder, amañe el
proceso y, lo que es peor, con su presencia se arriesgan a legitimar
un régimen encabezado por Omar al Bashir, acusado de crímenes de
guerra por el Tribunal Penal Internacional.
Lo ideal sería que estas votaciones se retrasaran hasta que mejorara
el ambiente electoral, especialmente en el norte. Pero con los
partidos políticos clave decididos a seguir adelante, y los socios
internacionales poco dispuestos o incapaces de detenerlos, los
observadores deberían al menos entender en qué se están metiendo.
Tienen que ser conscientes de que ellos no van a impedir que se
produzca un fraude electoral masivo, ya que gran parte de las trampas
ya están hechas. La ley electoral favorece al partido de Al Bashir,
que manipuló el censo del año pasado para inflar el número de
distritos que lo apoyan y amañó el registro de los votantes en Darfur
de modo que sólo una fracción de los tres millones de desplazados de
esa región devastada por la guerra podrá emitir su voto. La Comisión
Electoral Nacional y los comités electorales estatales, todos
dominados por el partido de Al Bashir, también han trazado distritos
por todo el norte del país que refuerzan a los árabes leales al
partido y excluyen a las tribus que han sufrido la brutalidad de
Jartum.
A la misión internacional le va a costar detectar nuevos fraudes. El
grupo, que está formado por unos cien observadores de la UE
desperdigados por el país más grande de África, está destinado a
fracasar. La inseguridad y la falta de infraestructura impedirán que
lleguen a muchas áreas. Incluso donde puedan desplegarse, aquellos que
no sean capaces de hablar árabe u otra de las lenguas de Sudán y sin
experiencia previa en el país serán fácilmente engañados por el
Partido del Congreso Nacional de Al Bashir. Un puñado de supervisores
extranjeros no puede competir con una sofisticada maquinaria de
control sobre una administración local con una gran experiencia en el
uso de la intimidación y la violencia contra sus oponentes.
La credibilidad de la política exterior de la Comisión Europea se
encuentra aquí en peligro. También la de Ashton. Tras haber decidido
enviar observadores a cumplir una tarea casi imposible, la UE tiene
ahora que intentar sacar el mejor partido posible a una mala decisión.
Nombrar a un responsable con experiencia en la supervisión de
elecciones difíciles sería un comienzo, pero la UE tiene también que
defender la independencia de esa misión. Existirán presiones externas
e internas para que los observadores se muerdan la lengua e ignoren
los flagrantes defectos del proceso electoral. Es necesario resistirse
a esto con firmeza.
El momento clave llegará cuando la misión tenga que evaluar
formalmente los comicios siguiendo los estándares internacionales y la
ley nacional para emitir un rápido veredicto sobre su credibilidad.
Una declaración basada en un buen trabajo de investigación y apoyada
con datos puede calmar las tensiones postelectorales o reforzar las
reclamaciones creíbles de malas prácticas, aumentando la presión para
que estas quejas se aborden de modo imparcial. Pero una declaración
basada solo en un conocimiento limitado de la situación corre el
riesgo de encubrir un proceso lleno de fallos. En Sudán, eso
significaría respaldar la inevitable reelección de Al Bashir y socavar
aún más la estabilidad del país.
Tanto en su declaración como en el posterior informe más detallado, la
misión de observación de la UE tendrá que ofrecer una franca
evaluación de todos los fallos de las elecciones. No debería centrarse
simplemente en las irregularidades de las votaciones. Tendrán que
condenar las desiguales condiciones de partida de los participantes y
la manipulación por parte del Partido Nacional del Congreso de los
datos sobre población, reparto de los distritos y registro para votar.
Dadas las draconianas leyes de seguridad y las restricciones sobre los
derechos de los votantes de Darfur, los observadores deberían mirar
más allá de las cuestiones técnicas y denunciar el entorno represivo
en el que se ha acudido a las urnas.
Y si los partidos de oposición de Sudán al final rechazan las reglas
dictadas por Jartum y deciden boicotear las elecciones, la UE debería
suspender de inmediato su operación y exigir una revisión de las
condiciones en que se celebren los comicios.
Enviar esta misión de observación fue una decisión equivocada. Pero
ahora que sigue adelante al menos debe evitar minar la credibilidad
internacional de la UE y desestabilizar aún más a un ya frágil Sudán.
Alain Délétroz es vicepresidente para Europa de International Crisis
Group
Foreign Policy Edición Española http://www.fp-es.org/
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6537&l=1
Sri Lanka: "La revanche sans fin de Rajapakse",
Alain Délétroz in Le Temps
16 février 2010
Le Temps
Alain Délétroz, vice-président de International Crisis Group à
Bruxelles, explique que le président du Sri Lanka poursuit une
politique revancharde qu’illustre l’arrestation de son rival, le
général Fonseka.
Victoire et répression: avec l’arrestation du général Fonseka,
candidat malheureux aux élections présidentielles, ce scénario se
répète au Sri Lanka. En 2009, la victoire militaire sur le mouvement
des Tigres de libération de l’Eelam tamoul s’était conclue par une
répression brutale contre la population tamoule. Aujourd’hui,
l’arrestation d’opposants suit la victoire électorale du président
sortant, Mahinda Rajapakse, refermant ainsi l’espace de débat qui
s’était entrouvert durant la campagne présidentielle.
En mai dernier, l’armée sri lankaise remportait la victoire sur les
Tigres, mettant fin à près de 30 ans de guerre civile. Pendant
plusieurs semaines, elle avait resserré son étau autour du Nord-Est.
Les civils, coincés dans la parcelle de terre où s’étaient repliés les
insurgés, restèrent pris entre les bombardements des forces
gouvernementales et la violence des rebelles. Les Nations unies
estiment que plus de 7000 civils ont été tués et au moins 13 000
autres blessés pendant les derniers cent jours de combats.
Depuis, la politique de Rajapakse a contribué à renforcer encore le
ressentiment de la communauté tamoule. Après la guerre, plus de 250
000 déplacés sont restés internés dans des conditions indignes. Dans
un premier temps, les agences humanitaires n’ont eu aucun accès aux
camps. Puis, le gouvernement les a laissé entrer, mais en continuant
de maintenir à l’écart pendant des semaines les agences de protection,
la presse et les organisations défendant les droits de l’homme.
Depuis quelques mois, la situation s’améliore pourtant: la plupart des
internés ont été libérés, et ceux qui restent dans les camps jouissent
d’une liberté de mouvement accrue.
Beaucoup de civils continuent, toutefois, à vivre cantonnés dans ces
camps de transition, et ceux qui rentrent chez eux retournent vers des
régions semées de mines. Aucune poursuite judiciaire n’a été
entreprise contre les responsables des crimes commis pendant la
guerre. Les reconstructions marginalisent encore la minorité tamoule:
les dirigeants communautaires sont exclus d’institutions largement
dirigées par les militaires.
Plus généralement, la corruption et la violence se sont répandues au
point que beaucoup de Sri Lankais considèrent aujourd’hui que le
président va trop loin. L’entrée en politique d’un autre «héros» de
guerre avait été particulièrement mal vécue par le camp Rajapakse.
Après avoir mené l’attaque sous les ordres de celui-ci, le général
Fonseka s’était présenté aux présidentielles comme le candidat de la
transparence et de l’apaisement au Nord. Son projet de gouvernement se
basait sur un plan de reconstruction en dix points, comprenant la
levée de l’état d’urgence et la démilitarisation de la région.
Il est peu probable qu’un homme connu pour son nationalisme
cinghalais, et dont les faits d’armes ont si peu pris en compte le
droit humanitaire international, se serait réellement fait le
défenseur sincère de la cause tamoule et de la justice. Mais la
candidature du général Fonseka a au moins contribué à agréger une
opposition dispersée. Ce contrepoids au tout-puissant clan
présidentiel avait créé, le temps de la campagne, une incertitude
favorable au changement et au compromis. Par ailleurs, les accusations
mutuelles de crimes contre l’humanité que le général et le président
se jetèrent en public tout au long de la campagne auront contribué à
mettre en relief les horreurs des derniers mois de la guerre.
Publicité
Par l’arrestation de Fonseka, le 8 février, et les violences qui se
multiplient au lendemain des élections, le président démontre à ceux
qui en auraient douté que, malgré sa victoire électorale confortable,
l’heure n’est pas à la réconciliation. Ces actions revanchardes contre
l’opposition contribuent à plonger les partis dans la peur et le
désarroi avant les élections législatives prévues pour mars ou avril.
La direction prise par Rajapakse devrait appeler une réaction
vigoureuse. Les améliorations observées ces derniers mois au Nord-Est
ne sont pas l’effet de la bonne volonté du gouvernement, mais
démontrent plutôt qu’il reste sensible aux pressions internationales.
Cela devrait convaincre plus que jamais l’Europe de maintenir sa
pression sur Rajapakse. La révision par la Commission européenne du
système d’accès privilégié au grand marché européen pour les produits
sri lankais (GSP +, dans le langage bruxellois) a provoqué à Bruxelles
un débat intense sur les réformes que Colombo devrait entreprendre
pour continuer à bénéficier de ce statut privilégié. Lors d’un récent
échange au Parlement européen, en présence de l’ambassadeur du Sri
Lanka, un député britannique d’origine sri lankaise faisait remarquer
que la perte du système préférentiel d’accès au marché européen
signifierait la destruction de 250 000 emplois au Sri Lanka… Pour les
frères Rajapakse, les petits jeux revanchards semblent plus importants
que de sauver les emplois de leurs électeurs. Il est essentiel que les
partenaires du Sri Lanka, y compris la Suisse qui a accueilli tant de
réfugiés de ce pays sur son territoire, fassent bien sentir à Colombo
qu’il est essentiel de conserver le «GSP +» et qu’à cette fin, la
souplesse doit venir du gouvernement sri lankais et non de la
Commission européenne. Créer du chômage dans un pays en reconstruction
serait d’une profonde absurdité.
Sans une véritable enquête sur les crimes commis durant les derniers
mois de guerre, sans une réforme qui permette une véritable
représentation politique de la communauté tamoule, les dangers d’une
résurgence de la lutte armée resteront puissants. La tradition
d’impunité qui s’est installée au cours des années de guerre a
sérieusement affaibli la démocratie sri lankaise. Le défi, pour les
partenaires de ce pays, consiste à briser cette dynamique destructive.
Alain Délétroz est le Vice-président pour l’Europe de l’International
Crisis Group
Le Temps http://www.letemps.ch/
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6532&l=1
"La lenta implosión de Sudán",
Alain Délétroz in El Mundo
12 de febrero de 2010
El Mundo
La situación política en el país más grande del África, Sudán, pende
de un hilo. De una vez por todas, tanto los sudaneses como la
comunidad internacional deben actuar para ayudar a resolver los
problemas de este país, establecer una paz duradera y conseguir la
seguridad en la zona.
2010 es un año crucial para Sudán y para los países implicados en el
proceso de paz. Más de dos décadas de conflictos han marcado su
historia, con una guerra civil entre el norte y el sur, muertes
masivas y millones de refugiados en Darfur. Ahora, este trágico
escenario amenaza con repetirse, debido al colapso que sufre el
Acuerdo de Paz Global que puso fin a la guerra en 2005.
La comunidad internacional debe evitar a toda costa más muertes en la
zona, como los recientes 140 muertos por enfrentamientos tribales al
sur del país. Por ello, tiene que empezar a trabajar junto al gobierno
de Sudán en dos asuntos de prioridad máxima: las elecciones nacionales
y el referéndum de autodeterminación en el sur de Sudán en enero de
2011.
Las elecciones nacionales están planeadas para abril de este año, y es
prioritario asegurar que se celebren de forma justa y segura. Las
claves para el éxito son: un censo fiable donde todo el pueblo sudanés
esté representado, incluyendo a los dos millones de desplazados de
Darfur; un poder judicial independiente y una administración electoral
imparcial. Si esto se cumple, el referéndum sobre la independencia del
sur de Sudán se podrá llevar a cabo en 2011, como está previsto, y su
resultado debe ser aceptado por las partes implicadas.
Quedan menos de 12 meses para conseguir una adecuada transformación
democrática y la resolución de conflictos en todo el país. Sin
embargo, los principales actores involucrados no arrancan. Con el
panorama electoral actual, está claro que la paz no llegará al país.
Lamentablemente, las elecciones generales de abril han perdido su
propósito original: conseguir un Gobierno legítimo y democrático.
Ahora son sólo una herramienta para mantener al Partido de Congreso
Nacional (NCP) en el poder en Jartum y facilitar el referéndum de
autodeterminación en el sur de Sudán.
Ninguna de las dos representaciones políticas que se van a presentar a
las elecciones, NCP y el Movimiento de Liberalización de los Pueblos
de Sudán (SPLM), tiene un interés común. Ambas están movidas, única y
exclusivamente, por sus propios intereses. Sus negociaciones no
conducen a ninguna parte y aunque los dos quieren celebrar las
elecciones, se presentan por razones muy equivocadas.
El NCP quiere los votos para recuperar la legitimidad política
necesaria para proteger al presidente Omar al-Bashir, acusado de
crímenes contra la humanidad, de la Corte Penal Internacional.
Mientras, el SPLM trabaja para que no descarrilen las elecciones, ya
que podría poner en peligro su objetivo principal: la celebración del
referéndum de independencia del sur. Incluso amenaza con declarar la
independencia unilateralmente si se ve presionado a aceptar un
aplazamiento de la consulta.
En cuanto al referéndum, las encuestas indican que tras su
celebración, África contará con un nuevo país entre sus fronteras.
Siempre y cuando se lleve a cabo como está planeado y sin altercados.
Si el sur de Sudán decide independizarse, éste sería un proceso muy
complejo donde sólo cabría una fórmula para conseguir el éxito: el
trabajo unificado de los actores internacionales y regionales bajo un
liderazgo fuerte y seguro.
Las cartas han sido repartidas. Es fundamental avanzar rápidamente en
varios frentes que impliquen a los actores principales y les obliguen
a actuar. Y más ahora que se palpa el distanciamiento entre NCP y
SPLM. El Gobierno de Jartum tiene que aplicar urgentemente una serie
de reformas jurídicas para garantizar un proceso electoral nacional
libre y justo. NCP y SPLM deben negociar acuerdos marco cuanto antes.
Es imprescindible conseguir un tratado de paz en Darfur que permita a
todos los habitantes de la zona votar en las elecciones nacionales. Y,
si finalmente el resultado del referéndum fuera la independencia del
sur, habría que ayudar a formar dos estados democráticos y
económicamente estables.
El tiempo es primordial para Sudán y no corre a su favor. Hay un
enorme trabajo, muy complicado, que debe realizarse cuanto antes,
tanto en Darfur, como en el resto del país, pero sobre todo en el sur,
que ya muestra las primeras señales de disturbios. Los actores
internacionales deben moverse ya. Sin más demora han de ponerse en
marcha para conseguir llevar la paz y la estabilidad a la zona. El
primer paso, sin duda, tiene que ser dotarse de una voz común. Si la
comunidad internacional falla, el riesgo de una nueva guerra civil es
inminente. El resultado: más refugiados, más pobreza, más muertes y
más dolor para millones de personas. Sudán afronta su oportunidad
ahora. Si se la deja escapar será muy difícil conseguir otra similar.
Alain Délétroz es vicepresidente para Europa de International Crisis
Group
El Mundo http://www.elmundo.es/diario/
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6540&l=1
"Haiti's Women Rise from the Rubble",
Bernice Robertson in The Daily Beast
12 February 2010
The Daily Beast
The quake claimed the lives of Haiti’s best-known feminist activists.
How the rebuilding efforts should advance gender equality—and honor
their memories.
On March 7, 2004, Haitian women’s rights advocate Myriam Merlet penned
a letter to sister advocates in the Caribbean. “Tomorrow is
International Women's Day, and right now, with the sound of gunshots
in the background… and dozens of national and international gunshot
victims in the hospital and in the morgue, we are continuing to
organize and focusing our efforts on building a country where our
rights will be respected and our voices heard.”
Tragically for the Haitian women’s movement, Merlet was among several
celebrated activists who were lost in the Jan. 12 earthquake,
including Magalie Marcelin, a jurist known for her pivotal role in
fighting violence against women, and Anne Marie Coriolan, a linguist,
economist, and fierce advocate for Haiti’s women, youth, and peasants.
Although they came from diverse professional backgrounds, the trio was
united in a single cause: to make women equals in Haitian society.
Because of these women, rape is now a punishable crime in Haiti.
Domestic violence is increasingly denounced. Battered women now have
some safe houses to turn to for help.
Because of these women, rape is now a punishable crime in Haiti,
rather than a weapon used by the powerful to subdue activists.
Domestic violence is increasingly denounced. Battered women now have
some safe houses to turn to for help. Haitian women’s contribution to
the country’s socioeconomic advancement—as 43 percent of household
heads and 84 percent of the country’s self-employed workforce—is
increasingly incorporated into the country’s poverty reduction and
development strategies. To keep the momentum going, women must be
recognized as leaders in the country’s reconstruction efforts, which
hinge, in part, on continued efforts to fight gender inequality.
To begin with, Haitian women should be included in the efforts
recently undertaken, post-disaster, to assess the country’s needs. As
schools reopen, women can seek a commitment to girls' education, and
as clinics are rebuilt, they can fight for reproductive health care.
Before the quake, girls accounted for just over 40 percent of Haiti’s
secondary-school population. Health-care needs are even more dire.
Eighty percent of Haitian women are forced to give birth in precarious
conditions without qualified medical assistance, due to limited access
to heath centers and high costs.
As the Haitian National Police is reconstituted, women’s advocates can
ask for more women to wear the uniform, and for police training on
issues such as domestic violence. When reconstruction contracts are
handed out, advocates should demand that some be reserved for female-
owned enterprises, and that women in rural areas are part of
development and micro-enterprise initiatives.
The three deceased feminist leaders helped pave the way for this kind
of activism. Magalie’s favorite expression was bel moun, a Creole
saying she coined meaning “people who support the good of Haiti.” It
was the perfect description for the kind of society of Haitian women
these women were fighting for. Anne Marie could always foresee the
next mile of the struggle and discern ways to get there. Myriam was as
tough as she was tender, as patriotic as she was progressive.
In 1994, alongside many other women, they helped establish a Ministry
of Women’s Affairs and Rights, where each of them subsequently served.
Anne-Marie was chief of staff in 1995. Myriam later served in the same
capacity. Magalie worked hand-in-hand with the ministry to draft,
revise, and lobby for the passage of a 2009 law on domestic household
workers, ensuring that over 200,000 women and girls would be granted
worker status under Haitian law. They also worked on a paternity bill—
still on the legislative agenda—to ensure the recognition and support
of children born out of wedlock. Their colleagues say they will
remember Anne Marie for her sense of organization, Magalie for her
fearlessness, and Myriam for her tenacity.
All three women, each founders of a prominent women’s rights
organization in the country—SOFA (the Haitian Women’s Solidarity
Movement), Kay Fanm, and Enfofam—worked tirelessly to create the
National Coordination for Advocacy on Women’s Rights, a platform for
feminist organizations throughout the country. Its aim was to advance
women’s rights and improve the socio-economic condition of women in
Haiti.
Through their hard work and that of other women leaders, when the
earthquake struck on January 12, 7 percent of Haiti’s National Police
force were women, four women were serving as government ministers, six
held seats in parliament, and even more were slated to appear on the
ballot for the now postponed Feb. 28 parliamentary elections.
The women that Myriam, Magalie, and Anne-Marie empowered must build on
their legacy to ensure Haiti’s recovery and reconstruction includes
female voices. Only then can the new Haiti—the one that emerges from
this crisis—become a country true to these fallen leaders’ legacies.
Plus: Check out more from Giving Beast, featuring news, video, and
amazing photographs of people, places, and issues that need our
support.
Bernice Robertson is a senior analyst with the International Crisis
Group.
The Daily Beast http://www.thedailybeast.com/
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6533&l=1
» sri lanka: after the war
1. The current situation
2. What should be done
3. Crisis Group resources
Picture: Sri Lankan Tamil civilians arrive to a government-controlled
area after fleeing territory controlled by the LTTE separatist rebels
in Puthukkudiyirippu, 26 March 2009. REUTERS
Last updated 17 February 2010
1. The current situation
Latest Crisis Group Sri Lanka Report
”Sri Lanka: A Bitter Peace", 11 January 2010
Nine months after the decisive military victory over the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), there has been little progress in
reconstructing Sri Lanka’s battered democratic institutions or
establishing conditions for a stable peace. On 26 January 2010,
Mahinda Rajapaksa was re-elected president of Sri Lanka after a
campaign marked by violence and conducted in an environment where the
rule of law has largely collapsed. Rights groups and the Election
Commissioner raised concerns about the widespread misuse of state
resources by the Rajapaksa campaign, biased media coverage favouring
the incumbent and physical intimidation of the opposition. The 8
February arrest of Rajapaksa’s main presidential challenger, the
retired General Sarath Fonseka, has increased levels of political
tension and provoked street protests and criticism from both the
Buddhist and Christian clergy. Fonseka is due to be court martialed
for having conspired against the government while still a member of
the military. The government is also considering charging him in a
civilian court with corruption and other crimes. During the campaign,
Fonseka accused the Rajapaksa family of corruption and raised the
issue of war crimes during the final months the war. On the day of his
arrest, Fonseka announced he would be willing to provide evidence to a
future international inquiry into war crimes charges against the
state.
Rajapksa’s election victory seems unlikely to move Sri Lanka in the
direction of a sustainable peace. Despite vague promises about the
need for reconciliation, Rajapaksa’s post-war policies have deepened
rather than resolved the grievances that generated and sustained LTTE
militancy. While the LTTE’s defeat and the end of its control over
Tamil political life are historic and welcome changes, the victory
over Tamil militancy will remain fragile unless Sinhalese-dominated
political parties make strong moves towards a more inclusive and
democratic state.
The government’s internment of more than a quarter million Tamils
displaced from the Northern Province – some for more than six months –
was further humiliation for a population brutalised by months of
ferocious fighting, during which thousands of civilians were killed by
government shelling and LTTE firing. The return by the end of 2009 of
most of the displaced to their home districts, and the increased
freedom of movement for the nearly 100,000 still in military-run
camps, were important steps forward. However, the resettlement process
has failed to meet international standards for safe and dignified
returns.
The government’s approach to the development and reconstruction of the
north and east is also contributing to minority fears and alienation.
Government plans remain unclear, with local communities and political
leaders not consulted and even donors not informed of overall
reconstruction plans. Strong military influence over policies, tight
military control over the population and restrictions on local and
international NGOs increase the risk of land conflicts, with the
strong possibility of demographic changes that would dilute the Tamil
character of the north. No real space has been given to Tamil and
Muslim political or community leaders in the north and very little in
the east.
The Rajapaksa government has initiated no political reforms to address
the concerns of Tamils and other minorities. The government-sponsored
All Party Representative Committee (APRC) designed to craft
constitutional reforms has stopped meeting with no sign of an
alternative process. Tamil and Muslim parties remain weak and divided,
although recent encouraging initiatives to develop a common platform
and build trust among Tamil-speaking parties deserve support. Inside
and outside Sri Lanka, many Tamils remain angry at the lack of
accounting or justice for the thousands of civilians killed in the
final months of the war. Most of the million-strong diaspora is still
committed to a separate state and many would be willing to support
renewed violence.
The brutal nature of the conflict, especially in its closing months,
has undermined Sri Lanka’s democratic institutions and governance. All
ethnic communities are suffering from the collapse of the rule of law.
Disappearances and political killings associated with the government’s
counter-insurgency campaign have dropped considerably since the end of
the war. Impunity for abuses by state officials continues, however,
and fear and self-censorship among civil society activists and
political dissidents has grown stronger in the wake of the
government’s post-election crackdown on its critics in the media and
opposition party activists. The government continues to maintain and
use the Prevention of Terrorism Act and Emergency Regulations to
weaken its political opposition.
2. What should be done
•The Sri Lankan government should take meaningful steps to reestablish
the rule of law for all Sri Lankans. Particular measures would include
ending emergency rule and abolishing the Prevention of Terrorism Act,
establishing the Constitutional Council and independent commissions
(especially for police and human rights), depoliticising the
judiciary, ending the routine practice of police torture and
prosecuting members of the security forces and paramilitaries against
whom there is credible evidence of human rights violations.
•The Sri Lankan government should take steps to normalise life in war-
affected areas and address the longstanding and legitimate grievances
of Tamil-speaking minorities. This would include reestablishing the
primacy of the civilian administration over the military in the north,
reducing high security zones, establishing a meaningful process of
consultation with Tamil and Muslim leaders on development plans for
the north and east, enforcing the language equality provisions of the
constitution and maximising the devolution of powers already granted
to provincial councils under the thirteenth amendment.
•The UN and donor governments should coordinate more closely to see
that all resettlement from government camps is done according to
established guiding principles, and insure a strong role for
protection agencies, including the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC). Donors should end assistance to any camps where full
freedom of movement is not allowed and link additional aid to an
effective monitoring role for UN agencies and NGO partners. The
government should be encouraged to resettle the long-term displaced
Muslim population while limiting the risk of land conflicts between
Muslims and Tamils in the north. India, Japan, Western donors, the
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank should work together to see
that additional development assistance is tied to an inclusive and
transparent planning process for the reconstruction of the north which
gives Muslim and Tamil community leaders real decision-making power.
•The UN and bi-lateral donors should insist on a clear plan for the
rehabilitation and reintegration of the more than 11,000 detainees who
surrendered from or are suspected of involvement with the LTTE. No
work with suspected ex-combatants should be funded until the
government has put in a place a proper legal framework that guarantees
the rights of the detained and has allowed the ICRC to play its
internationally recognised monitoring and protection role.
•The international community should actively support the establishment
of an independent international commission of inquiry into violations
of humanitarian law by both sides during the war. Donors should link
further development assistance to governance reforms designed to curb
impunity and make government accountable to citizens of all
communities.
3. Crisis Group resources
For Crisis Group resources on the current crisis in the northeast,
see:
•"Sri Lanka's Choice, and the World's Responsibility", Chris Patten in
International Herald Tribune, 13 January 2010
•The Situation in Sri Lanka, Andrew Stroehlein, testimony to the
European Parliament Subcommittee on Human Rights, Brussels, 1 October
2009
•"Gaigner la paix au Sri Lanka", Les Echos, 30 July 2009
•"Sätt press på Sri Lankas regering", Sydsvenskan (Sweden), 22 July
2009
•"Brutálna vojna sa skončila. Potrebný je spravodlivý mier", Pravda
(Slovakia), 21 July 2009
•"War Without End", Robert Templer in International Herald Tribune, 21
July 2009
•"Sri Lanka: un massacre sponsorisé?", Alain Délétroz in Le Temps, 27
May 2009
•"The EU's Role in Securing Sri Lanka's Peace", Alain Délétroz and
Andrew Stroehlein in European Voice, 20 May 2009
•"Sri Lanka's 50,000 Hostages", Andrew Stroehlein in The Guardian, 12
May 2009
•"Japan: Back UN Action on Sri Lanka", joint statement by Human Rights
Watch, the International Crisis Group, Amnesty International, and the
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 11 May 2009.
•"Falling Down on the Job", Gareth Evans in Foreign Policy, 1 May
2009
•"Sri Lanka's Death Zone", Donald Steinberg in Reuters: The Great
Debate, 23 April 2009
•"Day of Reckoning in Sri Lanka", comment by Robert Templer in Foreign
Policy, 21 April 2009
•Statement by Crisis Group Board of Trustees: Crisis in Sri Lanka, 20
April 2009
•“A Slaughter Waiting to Happen”, op-ed by Lakhdar Brahimi in
International Herald Tribune, 20 March 2009
•Conflict Risk Alert: Sri Lanka, 9 March 2009
Select previous Crisis Group Sri Lanka reports:
•Sri Lanka: A Bitter Peace, Asia Briefing N°99, 11 January 2010
•Development Assistance and Conflict in Sri Lanka: Lessons from the
Eastern Province, Asia Report N°165, 16 April 2009
•Sri Lanka’s Eastern Province: Land, Development, Conflict, Asia
Report N°159, 15 October 2008
•Sri Lanka's Return to War: Limiting the Damage, Asia Report N°146, 20
February 2008
•Sri Lanka: Sinhala Nationalism and the Elusive Southern Consensus,
Asia Report N°141, 7 November 2007
•Sri Lanka’s Human Rights Crisis, Asia Report N°135, 14 June
2007
For all Crisis Group Sri Lanka reports, click here.
For a month-by-month report on developments in Sri Lanka since
September 2003, see Crisis Group's CrisisWatch database.
For more background on the situation in the country, see our Sri Lanka
conflict history.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6070&l=1
end military rule in guinea
End Military Rule in Guinea
1. The current situation
2. What should be done
3. Crisis Group resources
Photo: Soldiers patrol on a vehicle near the international airport in
Conakry October 5, 2009. REUTERS/Luc Gnago
Pour accéder à la version française, appuyez ici
Updated 16 February 2010
1. The current situation
Crisis Group Podcasts
Guinée après la tentative d’assassinat contre Camara (8 janvier 2010).
CrisisWatch Podcast (8 January 2010) featured an analysis by Richard
Moncrieff, Crisis Group’s West Africa Project Director, of the events
in Guinea since the shooting of junta leader Moussa Dadis Camara on 3
December 2009
The background to the crisis in Guinea can be found on our country
page.
The 3 December shooting of Dadis by his aide, Aboubacar ‘Toumba’
Diakité, was followed by a period of great uncertainty. For nearly six
weeks, the junta refused to give a clear statement on the health
condition of its leader, who on 12 January finally arrived in Burkina
Faso's capital Ouagadougou to meet with interim leader Sékouba Konaté
and mediator Blaise Compaoré. Three days later, he agreed to remain in
Ouagadougou indefinitely, an announcement welcomed by many since his
return threatened to spark further destabilisation in the country.
Under Konate, there is a more positive atmosphere, backed up with
improved dialogue, a new transitional arrangement, including a
National Transitional Council, and a new transitional government
expected soon. The international community is stepping up its effort,
including through scoping missions, for reform of the security
sector.
These events have created a window of opportunity to enact the reforms
that are needed to prevent further violence, but serious challenges
remain. On the civilian side, a new government must be formed as soon
as possible. It should concentrate on ensuring smooth and rapid
progress towards elections
2. What should be done
The transition is still highly vulnerable to the emergence of a new
strong man or to the individual strategies of politicians. It is vital
that the terms of the transition are held to, including that no member
of the junta or of the government is allowed to run in the forthcoming
elections. Equally the institutions and key individuals of the
transition need protection. Further ECOWAS military presence will
surely be needed.
Reform of the Guinean security system is a vital task, critical to the
long term stability of Guinea and its neighbours. But it is only
beginning, and will take much time and hard work yet. At this stage,
four actions are vital:
•To contain the threat from military indiscipline and irregular
forces. Attention must be paid by the authorities in Guinea, ECOWAS
and the wider international community to dealing with militia, or
people recently in militia groups, by offering them meaningful re-
integration opportunities and monitoring their activities. Street
level indiscipline by regular troops must be contained.
•To enhance the capacity of Guinean government, military and civil
society to formulate its own strategy for reform of the security
system, through proper consultation and outreach. If donors come in at
this point and write strategy themselves with little local buy-in, the
chances of success will be slim.
•Donors therefore have to coordinate closely, and avoid the
multiplication of different interlocutors. It is vital to avoid the
situation that has developed in neighbouring Guinea Bissau where
different elements of the government have been able to cherry pick
bits of SSR assistance from different international partners. At
present, ECOWAS is clearly best placed to lead the international
effort.
•The International Commission of Enquiry into the events of 28
September 2009 found that three individuals were chiefly responsible
for the killings: Dadis Camara, Officer Moussa Tiegboro Camara and
former aide-de-camp Aboubacar ‘Toumba’ Diakité. Dadis Camara should
accept that his role in the country is not constructive and should
remain outside. All three should eventually face justice, whether at a
national or international level. All those who may be reasonably
suspected of having committed abuses against civilians, including but
not limited to these three, should be excluded from all institutions
of the transition.
3. Crisis Group resources
On 16 October 2009, Crisis Group published the briefing Guinea:
Military Rule Must End.
Commentary:
•"Mining deals shouldn't blind us to the crimes of these thugs",
Richard Moncrieff in The Independent, 5 December 2009
•"Keeping West Africa Stable", Louise Arbour in The International
Herald Tribune, 26 November 2009
•"Guinea: The Junta Must Leave", On the African Peace-building Agenda,
François Grignon, 17 November 2009
•"Guinée : La junte doit partir, ni plus ni moins", On the African
Peace-building Agenda, François Grignon, 10 November 2009
•"Guinea, repressione e violenza minacciano l'intera regione",
Corriere della Sera, Richard Moncrieff, 2 October 2009
•"Internationale Sanktionen gegen Guineas Herrscher sind notwendig",
Die Zeit, Richard Moncrieff, 2 October 2009
•"Repression and Violence Are a Danger to the Whole Region", The
Independent, Richard Moncrieff, 30 September 2009
Crisis Group Podcasts: "Massacre en Guinée" (2 Octobre 2009) and
"Massacre in Guinea" (2 October 2009); Guinée après la tentative
d’assassinat contre Camara (8 janvier 2010).
CrisisWatch Podcast No77 (8 January 2010) featured an analysis by
Richard Moncrieff, Crisis Group’s West Africa Project Director, of the
events in Guinea since the shooting of junta leader Moussa Dadis
Camara on 3 December 2009
For all Crisis Group Guinea reports, click here.
For a month-by-month report on developments in Guinea since September
2003, see Crisis Group's CrisisWatch database.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6403&l=1
Conflict history: Indonesia
New Search - Map
Head of State: Pres. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Oct. 2004 –
Formerly the Dutch East Indies, Indonesia declared independence in
1945 and achieved it four years later after protracted guerrilla war.
Experience of shared colonial struggle and the 1928 adoption by
Indonesia’s nationalist movement of single lingua franca, bahasa
Indonesia, have been two most important factors holding the
archipelago of over 17,000 islands and over 250 ethnic groups
together.
Indonesia’s first decade was marked by the rise and fall of
parliamentary democracy (first free election held in 1955; second held
in 1999); outbreak of regional rebellions which claimed to be
struggling for an Islamic state in Sumatra, Sulawesi, and West Java,
though local grievances were paramount; rise of Indonesian military
and Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) as powerful political
institutions; and dominance of Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno.
Early 1960s Sukarno tried to maintain increasingly precarious
political balance between PKI, which had grown to become third largest
Communist Party in world outside Soviet Union and China, and military.
30 September 1965, group of revolutionary junior officers backed by
some members of PKI, murdered six generals and announced they had
taken power to forestall army coup. Major-General Suharto, who some
claim had prior knowledge of coup attempt, rallied army. Over next six
months, Suharto engineered transfer of power from Sukarno to himself
and encouraged purge of PKI leaving as many as half a million dead.
Worst killings took place East Java, where army encouraged local
Muslim youth groups to take revenge for PKI’s efforts to unilaterally
seize and redistribute land, and in Bali and Aceh.
There is widespread myth ethnic Chinese bore brunt of killings. While
true that Suharto accused People’s Republic of China of backing “fifth
column” of Indonesian Chinese and subsequently banned the use of
Chinese symbols and cultural expression during his reign, ethnic
Chinese probably do not account for more than 2,000 of hundreds of
thousands killed. Most were ethnic Javanese and Balinese.
30 September coup attempt and aftermath marked the beginning of
Suharto’s “New Order” government though he did not formally become
president until 1967. His authoritarian government bears
responsibility for most of Indonesia’s conflicts, but seeds were
planted earlier. Suharto years came to violent end May 1998, after the
1997 Asian financial crisis added to growing dissatisfaction with his
rule and his family’s corruption. Vice-president, B.J. Habibie,
succeeded Suharto. Habibie’s decision to allow East Timor referendum,
and consequences of that decision (see Timor-Leste) ended his
presidency October 1999. Muslim cleric and intellectual Abdurrahman
Wahid became president, only to be impeached in July 2001. Megawati
Sukarnoputri, Sukarno’s daughter, took over until country’s first
direct presidential elections in 2004, won by Gen. (ret.) Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono with 61 per cent of vote. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
was re-elected president in 2009 with 60.8 per cent of the vote.
Following major conflicts confront Indonesia:
Papua (Papua and West Papua Provinces): Sukarno’s failure to gain
control of Dutch-controlled western half of island of New Guinea at
independence made its inclusion into Indonesia a top domestic and
foreign policy priority. Indonesian troops were sent there in 1961,
and, with help of Kennedy administration in U.S., Dutch were pressured
to turn territory over to UN in 1963. U.N. administered vote on self-
determination, called Act of Free Choice, conducted in 1969 among just
over 1,000 representatives hand-picked by Indonesia under flagrant
intimidation by security forces. Vote was unanimously in support of
integration with Indonesia. Small, scattered and poorly armed
guerrilla group, called Free Papua Organisation or OPM, has been
fighting for independence ever since, but much larger part of
population supports non-violent efforts to get same result. A Special
autonomy package for Papua, passed by Indonesian parliament 2001, was
undercut by decision of Megawati government January 2003 to divide
Papua into two provinces – Papua and West Papua -- as way of weakening
support for independence.
Several causes of tension remain: perceived slow implementation of the
Special Autonomy law; communal tensions linked to shifting
demographics between the indigenous and non-indigenous population;
lack of equal access to natural resource wealth; heavy-handed response
by security forces; stalled dialogue on Papuan cultural and political
expression; and lasting scars left by military abuses during Suharto
era. Distrust between Papuans and the government continue despite
efforts for dialogue on both sides. The 2009 national legislative
elections were accompanied by acts of violence. Three people have died
in incidents related to gun attacks around the PT Freeport Indonesia
copper and gold mine near Timika between July to December 2009 have
led to a heightened security presence around the mine. The military’s
announcement of plans for the creation of a new regional command for
West Papua province November 2009, combined with the fatal shooting
of an OPM commander Kelly Kwalik December 2009, augment local feelings
that the central government continues to see the Papuan issue as a
security rather than a political problem.
Aceh (Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam): Former sultanate on northern tip of
Sumatra held out against Dutch longer than any other part of what
became Indonesia. Its leaders were promised recognition of special
status from newly independent government, and when this failed to
materialise, armed rebellion called Darul Islam broke out in 1953.
Defeated in early 1960s, some former members formed pro-independence
Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM) 1976, citing range of
political and economic grievances. Low-intensity guerrilla war ensued,
under leadership of Acehnese exile Hasan di Tiro, based in Sweden.
Suharto government launched massive counterinsurgency offensive in
1990 after number of Libyan-trained GAM guerrillas began series of
attacks on police posts, transmigrant camps and other places. Abuses
committed by army between 1990-1998 left lasting scars, and demands by
Acehnese for justice after Suharto fell went unheeded. GAM took
advantage of anger, new political openness, and demands for East Timor-
style referendum, to rebuild. Violence escalated 1999-2000, halted
temporarily by negotiations between GAM and government of Abdurrahman
Wahid, brokered by Geneva-based Henri Dunant Centre that broke down
December 2002. 19 May 2003, Megawati government declared military
emergency, downgraded to civilian emergency May 2004. The December
2004 tsunami caused hundreds of thousands of deaths in Aceh, opened up
the conflict zone to outside aid bodies and caused GAM to issue a
unilateral ceasefire. Helsinki peace talks mediated by Crisis
Management Initiative, an NGO led by former Finnish President Martti
Ahtisaari, led to the signing of a historic peace agreement between
GAM and the government August 2005.
As part of peace agreement, local political parties were allowed to
compete in provincial elections. Partai Aceh became the predominant
political vehicle for the majority of GAM. 2007 former GAM commander,
Irwandi Yusuf was elected governor of Aceh province on a platform of
reconciliation and provincial development. Despite several grenade
attacks on Partai Aceh offices in 2008 and anxiety in Jakarta and
military that GAM dominated provincial parliament would lead to
renewed calls for independence, 2009 national elections were peaceful
with Partai Aceh, becoming the dominant party by winning 46.8 per cent
of the provincial parliament vote. However, post conflict
complications remain unresolved: assimilation of ex combatants into
society; armed criminal actions including extortion and kidnapping;
settlement of historic grievances; implementation of provincial
legislation. November and December 2009 also saw several unresolved
gun attacks on foreign nationals residing in Aceh.
Ambon and Moluccas The Southern part of Moluccan archipelago, capital
Ambon, was one of few areas of Dutch East Indies to prefer Dutch
control; some leaders proclaimed the Republic of South Moluccas (RMS)
in 1950 rather than submit to control from Jakarta. The RMS movement
was largely but not exclusively Christian in area almost equally
divided between Christians and Muslims. It was defeated November 1950
after brief but bloody war; an estimated 12,000 Ambonese families fled
to Netherlands. Only vestige of RMS thereafter was raising of RMS flag
every 25 April by RMS sympathizers who would then all be arrested.
Communal relations outwardly peaceful until just after Suharto fell.
However, 19 January 1999, a minor brawl at end of Muslim fasting month
erupted into full-scale war between Christians and Muslims. By the
time a peace agreement was signed, in early 2002, as many as 5,000
people had been killed and hundreds of thousands displaced. Although
conflict on the scale of 1999 has not reoccurred, April 2004 and
December 2008 saw outbreaks of violence and rioting. Latent communal
tensions, equitable distribution of development fund, corruption,
access to land and resources, and the creation of new districts, are
all potential triggers that undermine lasting stability in the
region.
Central Sulawesi: Street battles between Christian and Muslim gangs,
often supporting different competing political parties, December 1998
escalated into sectarian violence between the two communities in
Central Sulawesi in 1999. Poso was one of the worst affected areas
peaking in mid-2000 after a massacre of over 100 Muslims by
Christians. Malino Accords signed December 2001 between warring
factions diminished conflict although attacks continued until 2006 by
radical groups such as Mujahidin KOMPAK and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).
Tension in Poso spiked again January 2007 after police raided a JI
hideout and killed 15 although calm has since returned to the region.
Initiatives in improving education and offering vocational training to
would-be extremists have helped keep the peace. Underlying grievances
related to justice and accountability, and effective targeting and
oversight of recovery funding remain key factors in ensuring a
sustainable peace.
Darul Islam and Jemaah Islamiyah: Darul Islam (DI) rebellion broke out
West Java 1949. DI became core of movement that led to birth of Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI) terrorist organisation. DI movement called for Islamic
State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia or NII). By mid-1950s, it
was joined by two other Darul Islam movements, in Aceh and South
Sulawesi. All three were defeated by Indonesian army, only to be
revived mid-1970s with help of Indonesian intelligence. Abdullah
Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir joined DI at this time in reaction to
Suharto’s repression of political Islam. They were arrested in 1979,
released in 1982, and fled to Malaysia in 1985 where they developed
community of Indonesian exiles, many of them DI members. Sungkar
helped organise recruitment of DI members to fight against the Soviet
Union Afghanistan in 1980’s These men, including Hambali, became
prominent leaders of JI when Sungkar formed the organisation in 1994.
Social networks linked to JI and DI affiliated schools remain
recruiting grounds for new members and shelters for wanted
terrorists. JI members have been involved in the 2000 Christmas Eve
bombings, October 2002 Bali bomb, August 2003 Marriot bomb, September
2004 Australian embassy bomb, October 2005 Bali bombings and July 2009
Marriot-Ritz Carlton bombings. They were also active in sectarian
conflict in Poso and Ambon. Government de-radicalisation initiatives;
the capture or killing of influential salafi-jihadi leaders such as
Mohammad Noordin Top November 2009; and internal JI debates over the
legitimate use of violence, have all played a role in decreasing but
not eliminating the threat of future terrorist actions.
Other ethnic and communal conflicts: Other post-Suharto conflicts have
erupted in West and Central Kalimantan between ethnic Dayaks and
Madurese, migrant group who Dayaks see as having dispossessed them of
land and economic opportunities. Combined death toll in Kalimantan
outbreaks since 1999 is well over 1,000 and number of displaced close
to 100,000. In handful of areas across Indonesia, major
decentralization program has exacerbated existing tensions by creating
new districts drawn along ethnic or communal lines. Also, government’s
failure to address problem of displaced effectively is laying
groundwork for future violence.
Updated 16 February 2010
For further information see Crisis Group reports and briefings on
Indonesia. The CrisisWatch database provides a report on monthly
conflict developments for Indonesia since September 2003.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=49
Conflict history: Sri Lanka
New Search - Map
Head of State: President Mahinda Rajapaksa (Sri Lanka Freedom Party),
November 2005-
Prime Minister: Ratnasiri Wickremanayake (Sri Lanka Freedom Party),
November 2005-
Sri Lanka gained independence from Britain in 1948 after almost 450
years of colonial rule by various western powers. Westminster-style
parliamentary democracy implemented, with elections soon turning on
ethnic issues. Nationalists from Sinhala majority (74% of population)
passed laws discriminating against Tamils (18%) and Muslims (6%),
including 1956 act making Sinhala official language and 1972
constitution giving Buddhism ‘foremost place’ in state. In early
1970s, young people turned to violence to express discontent at
limited socio-economic opportunities, leading to failed 1971 uprising
in south by Sinhala Nationalist/Marxist JVP (People’s Liberation
Front), as well as formation of militant Tamil movements in north and
east competing with established Tamil parties.
Tamil militants marginal until 1983 ambush killed thirteen soldiers in
northern town of Jaffna, provoking Sinhala nationalists to unleash
pogroms in Colombo and other Sinhala majority areas. Over 1,000 Tamils
killed and tens of thousands fled homes; state failed to stop
violence. Support for numerous Tamil militant groups flourished and
hundred of thousands of Tamils emigrated in following few years,
creating international support base for Tamil separatism that
continues today. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), fighting for
separate Tamil state, emerged dominant by late 1980s after their
violent elimination of Tamil rivals. LTTE initiated guerrilla war and
bombing campaign on central government targets and began to capture
territory in north and east. Government responded with killings and
“disappearances” of Tamils.
In 1987, India signed agreement with the Sri Lankan government that
dispatched peacekeeping force (IPKF) to north east and initiated
constitutional amendments promising Tamil autonomy. IPKF soon became
embroiled in war with LTTE. Anti-Indian nationalist sentiment in south
fuelled fresh JVP uprising, met with brutal government repression. In
1990, President Ranasinghe Premadasa, hoping to pave the way for
negotiated settlement, ordered IPKF to leave and opened negotiations
with Tigers. LTTE soon broke from talks, captured additional territory
and stepped up violence, including increased use of suicide bombs,
used to murder Indian PM Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991 and Premadasa in May
1993.
Another peace effort followed 1994 parliamentary victory of People’s
Alliance (led by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party) and the SLFP’s Chandrika
Kumaratunga’s election as President later that year, riding wave of
support for a negotiated settlement. Diplomacy collapsed April 1995
when LTTE sank two navy gunboats, triggering government military
campaign that retook Jaffna peninsula December 1995. LTTE began
widespread bombing of military and civilian targets in Sinhalese
areas. Despite attempt on Kumaratunga’s life December 1999, government
submitted extensive constitutional plans for devolution of power to
north and east; voted down in parliament in August 2000 with
opposition from both the JVP and the United National Party (UNP).
Violence escalated 2000-2001 with new territorial gains for LTTE in
increasingly impoverished north east.
UNP won December 2001 parliamentary elections after campaigning on
peace platform, President Kumaratunga forced into uneasy cohabitation
with new Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe. New government
negotiated ceasefire agreement February 2002 under Norwegian
facilitation, temporarily easing tensions. In peace negotiations, LTTE
and government agreed to explore a settlement based on extensive
autonomy for north and east under a federal system. LTTE withdrew from
negotiations April 2003 citing exclusion from meetings with
international donors and lack of government cooperation. LTTE
presented proposals for Interim Self-Government Authority in October
2003 as basis for new negotiations. Kumaratunga, largely excluded from
peace process, acting on Sinhala anti-negotiation sentiment and anger
at LTTE ceasefire violations, took over defense and other crucial
ministries, effectively stalling peace process. President dissolved
February 2004 and called fresh elections April 2004, which
Kumaratunga’s Sri Lanka Freedom Party won in alliance with JVP. The
search for a sustainable solution further complicated when the LTTE’s
eastern military commander, ‘Col. Karuna’, split from the Tigers March
2004. Violent clashes between the two factions and Karuna’s growing
collaboration with Sri Lankan military further undermined trust
between government and LTTE and contributed to ceasefire’s eventual
collapse.
Renewed hopes of cooperation following December 2004 tsunami proved
short-lived as disputes arose over distribution of foreign aid. LTTE
boycott of presidential election November 2005 helped secure victory
of PM Mahinda Rajapaksa (SLFP) as part of Sinhala nationalist alliance
with JVP and Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU). LTTE launched wave of attacks
on police and army in north and east; government quietly began brutal
counterinsurgency efforts, while Karuna faction, now renamed Tamil
Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP) continued guerrilla attacks on LTTE
in east. February 2006 talks in Geneva failed to salvage battered
ceasefire. Government launched military offensive July 2006, capturing
strategic towns of Sampur in September 2006 and Vakarai in January
2007. Fighting caused massive displacement and heavy casualties. LTTE
renewed pre-ceasefire strategy of suicide bombings on southern
civilian targets and stepped up forcible recruitment of children and
adults. LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran declared ceasefire
“defunct” 27 November 2006 and called for renewed “freedom struggle”
for independent state. Conflict intensified through late 2006 and
continued throughout 2007; both sides suffered heavy casualties. Fall
of LTTE camps in Thoppigala 11 July 2007 gave Government forces’
control over whole of eastern province. Military activity then shifted
north, as government opened fronts on four sides of LTTE controlled
Wanni region.
Government formally withdrew from ceasefire with LTTE on 16 Jan 2008.
Fighting intensified during first months of year, and conventional
battles were accompanied by continuing rights abuses from both sides,
including political assassinations, abductions, and targeted attacks
on civilians. 20,000 to 30,000 killed between 2006 and early 2009,
with government and particularly LTTE suffering heavy losses in battle
and estimated 5,000 civilians killed in crossfire and targeted
attacks. Eastern Provincial Council elections in May 2008 saw victory
of government candidates in alliance with breakaway Tiger faction
TMVP, amid widespread reports of violence, intimidation, ballot-
stuffing and other serious irregularities. Current TMVP leader, S.
Chandrakanthan, alias Pillayan, selected as Chief Minister, with
government promises to devolve power and commence major development
projects. To date, no significant practical authority granted to the
eastern provincial council, despite constitutional provisions
devolving many powers to provinces.. After his release from British
jail on immigration charges, Karuna returned to Sri Lanka and
recommenced political work. Tensions between TMVP leaders Karuna and
Pillayan intensified after Karuna joined parliament 7 October 2008;
related clashes broke out between their factions in east, including
killings and disappearances. Karuna appointed minister for national
integration and reconciliation 9 March 2009 when he and many of his
fighters officially joined the SLFP.
Following the 2 January 2009 capture of de facto LTTE capital of
Killinochchi, government forces won back all but small amount of
territory held by LTTE in the Mullaitivu District. First four months
of 2009 saw more than 300,000 civilians trapped in areas of fighting,
with limited access to food, water or medical assistance. The LTTE
forcibly conscripted civilians and prevented others from fleeing LTTE-
controlled areas by firing at them, killing many. Government
repeatedly bombed and shelled densely populated areas, including its
own unilaterally declared “no fire zone”. 13 March 2009 statement by
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed grave concern over
credible evidence of war crimes by both sides. UN and government
leaders called on the LTTE to allow civilians freedom of movement and
urged both sides to halt their fighting to allow access for additional
humanitarian relief and humanitarian personnel. The Government
rejected any pause in the fighting. UN Agencies estimated more than
7,500 civilians dead and over 15,000 wounded between mid-January and
early May 2009, but the death toll remains disputed, with government
rejecting early June media reports that as many as 20,000 civilians
killed in final weeks of war.
The Government declared victory on 18 May 2009. A picture of the body
of LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran appeared in the press the next
day, and the entire LTTE leadership seems certain to have been killed.
There have been no attacks attributed to the LTTE since the government
declared victory and no sign of any continued military capability in
Sri Lanka.
With the military phase of Sri Lanka’s thirty-year civil war over,
major challenges remain before a lasting peace can be found. The
treatment of more than 280,000 civilians who escaped the fighting and
were forced to remain in overcrowded government-run internment camps
generated significant international concern and pressure on the
government. Conditions in camps failed to meet international
standards, with poor sanitation, insufficient water supplies and
inadequate food and medical care. The displaced were denied the right
to live with relatives or host families, and UN agencies and
humanitarian organisations were denied full and unimpeded access to
the camps and unable to deliver adequate supplies and services. By
October 2009 fewer than 20,000 had been released from the camps.
Responding to international pressure and growing domestic unease, the
government sped up resettlement process in the final months of 2009.
Nearly 150,000 released from the camps and allowed to return to their
home districts by the end of the year. Those remaining in government
camps were allowed a significant degree of freedom of movement on 1
December. As of early February 2010, some 100,000 still remain in
camps, despite the government’s promise to close all camps by the end
of January 2010.
Resettlement process fraught with serious problems. Large portion of
those released in late 2009 and early 2010 have not yet been able to
return to their homes, but are instead staying in government buildings
and other “transit facilities”. Many of those able to return home face
extremely difficult conditions, with wide destruction of home
districts during war, most houses damaged and/or looted, many areas
not yet fully demined; opportunities to earn livelihood limited.
Access to the newly resettled population by humanitarian and
protection agencies remains restricted. Military also continues to
detain more than 11,000 suspected of LTTE ties in extra-legal
detention centres, where they have no access to legal counsel, family
members or protection agencies. With the exception of the Jaffna
peninsula, ICRC has no access to any of the displaced or those
detained in the north and east of the country.
International calls for independent investigation into alleged human
rights abuses and war crimes by both government and LTTE have
continued, among others by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on 5 June
2009. Philip Alston, UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary
or arbitrary executions, in January 2010 repeated calls for
“independent inquiry … into war crimes and other grave violations”
committed in the final months of the war. October 2009 U.S. State
Department report highlighted possible war crimes by both government
and LTTE. Government has continued to strenuously object to any
international investigation, though it has appointed a “committee of
experts” to respond to State Department report. On 15 February 2010,
European Council formally withdrew GSP+ trade concessions for Sri
Lanka, citing government’s poor human rights record; suspension to
take effect August 2010 unless government makes significant reforms.
In November 2009, President Rajapaksa announced early presidential
elections for 26 January 2010. Rajapaksa opposed by recently retired
general Sarath Fonseka, Army commander for the final three years of
war. Fonseka backed by an otherwise ideologically divided opposition
coalition, including pro-market United National Party, Sinhala
nationalist and leftist People’s Liberation Front, Sri Lanka Muslim
Congress and the formerly pro-LTTE Tamil National Alliance. Campaign
period marked by bitter accusations of corruption and abuses of power
by both Fonseka and Rajapaksa, along with widespread misuse of state
resources and media coverage favouring the incumbent and physical
intimidation of opposition supporters. At least four people killed and
scores injured in pre-election violence. Rajapaksa re-elected on 26
January 2010 with 58% of vote and overwhelming support from Sinhala
voters. International observers called the voting largely free and
fair, but Fonseka, who won strong support in Tamil and Muslim
districts, alleged widespread vote-rigging by the goverment and filed
legal challenge to the results. Post-election fallout turbulent:
Fonseka stated his willingness on 8 February to provide war crimes
evidence against army in any international investigation; hours later,
Fonseka arrested by military police, with government accusing him of
plotting a military coup; many pro-Fonseka military officers also
detained or taken for questioning. Two days later, Rajapaksa dissolved
parliament and announced 8 April general elections.
The Sri Lankan government has done little so far to address the
decades-old challenge of developing a set of political reforms able to
address the grievances of Tamils and other minorities while reassuring
Sinhalese concerned about the danger of separatism. A central test of
the government’s commitment to finding a lasting and just peace will
be its willingness to implement provisions in the existing
constitution granting powers to provincial councils. In a fair
process of negotiation, the government may well have to go futher and
consider additional legal changes likely to be necessary to satisfy
representatives of Tamils, Muslims and other minorities. To date,
though, the Rajapaksa government has yet to initiate any political
reforms or process of negotiation with Tamil and other minority
leaders.
Updated February 2010
For further information see Crisis Group reports and briefings on Sri
Lanka. The CrisisWatch database provides a report on monthly conflict
developments for Sri Lanka since September 2003.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=100
Sid Harth
reportSent: Tue 2/23/10 12:59 PM
To:
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP - NEW REPORT
The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE
Colombo/Brussels, 23 February 2010: Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora groups
should move away, once and for all, from the failed agenda of the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and instead put their energies
into the quest for a sustainable and just peace in a united Sri
Lanka.
The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE,* the latest report from
the International Crisis Group, examines political dynamics within the
Tamil diaspora since May 2009, as Tamils abroad adapt to the LTTE’s
defeat. It also looks at the potential for new forms of militancy
within the diaspora, especially among the younger generations,
radicalised by the deaths of thousands of Tamil civilians in the final
months of the war. While there is little chance of the Tamil Tigers
regrouping in the diaspora, most Tamils abroad remain profoundly
committed to a separate state of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka.
“New diaspora initiatives attempt to carry forward the struggle for an
independent state in more transparent and democratic ways, but they
must repudiate the LTTE’s violent methods”, says Robert Templer,
Crisis Group’s Asia Program Director. “And they must also recognise
that the LTTE’s separatist agenda is out of step with the wishes and
needs of Tamils in Sri Lanka”.
The gap between the diaspora and Tamils in Sri Lanka has widened. Most
in the country are exhausted by decades of war and are more concerned
with rebuilding their lives under difficult circumstances than in
continuing the fight for an independent state. Without the LTTE to
enforce a common political line, Tamil leaders in Sri Lanka are
proposing substantial reforms within a united Sri Lanka. While Tamils
have the democratic right to espouse separatism non-violently, Tamil
Eelam has virtually no domestic or international backing. With the Sri
Lankan government assuming Tamils abroad remain committed to violent
means, the diaspora’s continued calls for a separate state feed the
fears of the Rajapaksa administration and provid e excuses for
maintaining destructive anti-terrorism and emergency laws.
The Sri Lankan government must address the legitimate grievances at
the root of the conflict: the political marginalisation and physical
insecurity of most Tamils in Sri Lanka. The international community
needs to press Colombo much more strongly for political and
constitutional reforms. Donors should insist that money given to
redevelop the north and east is tied closely to the demilitarisation
and democratisation of the region. This should include giving Tamils
and Muslims a meaningful role in determining the future of the areas
where they have long been the majority. Donor governments and the
United Nations must also insist on an independent investigation into
the thousands of Tamil civilians killed in the final months of
20fighting in 2009.
“Tamils in Sri Lanka currently have little appetite for a return to
armed struggle”, says Robert Templer. “But should the Sri Lankan state
continue to fail to respond to their collective aspirations, some may
eventually seek a solution through violence and could find willing
partners in the diaspora”.
To support our work in Asia and around the world, please click here.
*Read the full Crisis Group briefing on our website: http://www.crisisgroup.org
Contacts: Andrew Stroehlein (Brussels) +32 (0) 2 541 1635
Kimberly Abbott (Washington) +1 202 785 1602
To contact Crisis Group media please click here
The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-
profit, non-governmental organisation covering some 60 crisis-affected
countries and territories across four continents, working through
field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve
deadly conflict.
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The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE
Asia Report Nº186
23 February 2010
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
For the past quarter-century the Tamil diaspora has shaped the Sri
Lankan political landscape through its financial and ideological
support to the military struggle for an independent Tamil state.
Although the May 2009 defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) has dramatically reduced the diaspora’s influence, the majority
of Tamils outside Sri Lanka continue to support a separate state, and
the diaspora’s money can ensure it plays a role in the country’s
future. The nature of that role, however, depends largely on how
Colombo deals with its Tamil citizens in the coming months and on how
strongly the international community presses the government to enact
constitutional reforms to share power with and protect the rights of
Tamils and other minorities. While the million-strong diaspora cannot
regenerate an insurgency in Sri Lanka on its own, its money and
organisation could turn up the volume on any violence that might
eventually re-emerge.
Following the defeat of the LTTE, the mood in the diaspora has been a
mix of anger, depression and denial. Although many had mixed feelings
about the LTTE, it was widely seen as the only group that stood up for
Tamils and won them any degree of respect. The Tigers’ humiliating
defeat, the enormous death toll in the final months of the war and the
internment of more than a quarter million Tamils left the diaspora
feeling powerless, betrayed by the West, demanding justice and, in
some cases, wanting revenge. A minority in the community is happy the
LTTE is gone, since it directed much of its energy to intimidating and
even killing those Tamils who challenged their rule.
Funding networks established by the LTTE over decades are seriously
weakened but still in place. There is little chance, however, of the
Tigers regrouping in the diaspora. LTTE leaders in Sri Lanka are dead
or captured and its overseas structures are in disarray. Clinging to
the possibility of victory long after defeat was inevitable damaged
the LTTE’s credibility and weakened its hold on the community.
Nonetheless, most Tamils abroad remain profoundly committed to Tamil
Eelam, the existence of a separate state in Sri Lanka. This has
widened the gap between the diaspora and Tamils in Sri Lanka. Most in
the country are exhausted by decades of war and are more concerned
with rebuilding their lives under difficult circumstances than in
continuing the struggle for an independent state. There is no popular
support for a return to armed struggle. Without the LTTE to enforce a
common political line, Tamil leaders in Sri Lanka are proposing
substantial reforms within a united Sri Lanka. Unwilling to recognise
the scale of defeat, and continuing to believe an independent state is
possible, however, many diaspora leaders have dismissed Tamil
politicians on the island either as traitors for working with the
government or as too weak or scared to stand up for their people’s
rights.
Many now reluctantly recognise the need for new forms of struggle,
even if they would still prefer the LTTE fighting. New organisations
have formed that are operating in more transparent and democratic ways
than the LTTE and that aim to pressure Western governments to accept
an independent state for Tamils. These include plans for a
“transnational government of Tamil Eelam”, independent referenda among
Tamils in various countries endorsing the call for a separate state,
boycotts against products made in Sri Lanka and advocacy in support of
international investigations into alleged war crimes by the Sri Lankan
state. The new initiatives, however, refrain from criticising the LTTE
or holding it responsible for its own crimes or its contribution to
the shattered state of Sri Lankan Tamil society.
So long as this is the case, most Western governments will remain
sceptical of the diaspora’s post-LTTE political initiatives. All have
kept the transnational government of Tamil Eelam at arm’s length given
its resemblance to a government-in-exile, even if the group does not
claim this status. Western governments will have little choice but to
engage with the dominant, pro-separatist Tamil organisations, even if
officials would prefer to deal only with the handful of interlocutors
with a record of criticising the Tigers. But until it moves on from
its separatist, pro-LTTE ideology, the diaspora is unlikely to play a
useful role supporting a just and sustainable peace in Sri Lanka.
Watching the devastation of the final months of the war and the
seeming indifference of governments and the United Nations, many
Tamils, particularly the younger generation born in the West, grew
deeply disillusioned. Governments with large Tamil communities have
been worried this might lead to new forms of militancy. In the last
months of the war and months immediately following, there were self-
immolations by Tamil protestors, vandalism against Sri Lankan
embassies, and increased communal tensions between Tamils and
Sinhalese abroad. While such events have grown less frequent, risks of
radicalism in the diaspora cannot be dismissed entirely.
While Tamils have the democratic right to espouse separatism non-
violently, Tamil Eelam has virtually no domestic or international
backing. With the Sri Lankan government assuming Tamils abroad remain
committed to violent means, the diaspora’s continued calls for a
separate state feed the fears of the Rajapaksa administration and
provide excuses for maintaining destructive anti-terrorism and
emergency laws.
To ensure the current peace is a lasting one, the Sri Lankan
government must address the legitimate grievances at the root of the
conflict: the political marginalisation and physical insecurity of
most Tamils in Sri Lanka. Statements made by President Mahinda
Rajapaksa since his January 2010 re-election suggest there is little
chance the needed political and constitutional reforms will be offered
in his next term. Any significant improvement in the political
position of Tamils and other minorities in Sri Lanka will thus come
slowly and with difficulty, requiring significant shifts in the
balance of political power within Sri Lanka as well as careful but
tough persuasion from outside.
India, Japan, Western governments and multilateral organisations can
do much more to assist the political empowerment of Tamils in Sri
Lanka and press Colombo to address the causes behind the rise of the
LTTE and other Tamil militant groups. There should be no blank cheque
for Colombo to redevelop the north and east without first creating a
political climate where Tamils and Muslims can freely express their
opinions and have a meaningful role in determining the future of the
areas where they have long been the majority. Donor governments and
the UN should also press more strongly for an independent inquiry into
the thousands of civilians, almost all Tamil, killed in the final
months of fighting. Their aid should be tied to an end to impunity for
human rights violations and abuses of political power that undermine
democracy and threaten the freedoms of Sri Lankans from all ethnic
communities.
Colombo/Brussels, 23 February 2010
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6545&l=1
bademiyansubhanallah
in this week's update: for the week of 22 February 2010
Reports: Abkhazia, Iraq, Sri Lanka
Commentary: Sudan, Timor-Leste, Middle East,
EU Crisis Response
Announcement: Facebook fan page
Crisis Group reports published this week:
Abkhazia: Deepening Dependence
26 February
In the eighteen months since Russia recognised it as independent from
Georgia, small but strategic Abkhazia has become increasingly
dependent on its giant patron.
Iraq's Uncertain Future: Elections and Beyond
25 February
The run-up to the Iraqi elections on 7 March has brought to light deep-
seated problems that threaten the country’s fragile recovery.
The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE
23 February
Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora groups should move away, once and for all,
from the failed agenda of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
and instead put their energies into the quest for a sustainable and
just peace in a united Sri Lanka.
Crisis Group commentary:
"Sudan: un 2010 decisivo tra elezioni e referendum"
Alain Délétroz, Limes, 26 febbraio
"Is policing in Timor-Leste a spectator sport?"
Cillian Nolan, The Interpreter, 24 February
"The Middle East's Dangerous Equilibrium"
Peter Harling, Foreign Policy, 23 February
"Kapazität der EU zur Friedenssicherung schwindet"
Alain Délétroz, Der Tagesspiegel, 22. Februar
"The spoils of EU reform"
Alain Délétroz, Reuters, 19 February
Announcement:
Crisis Group has relaunched its fan page on Facebook: click here to
join
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.british/browse_thread/thread/566bb31c0c47e665/c508ed515702583b?q=International+Crisis+Group:+Sid+Harth
Abkhazia: Deepening Dependence
Europe Report Nº202
26 February 2010
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The historically coveted region of Abkhazia has become even more
dependent on Moscow since Russia’s controversial recognition a year
and a half ago. Russia is financing half the region’s budget, and
against vigorous Georgian protests, it is spending $465 million to
refurbish existing and build new military installations in the
picturesque Black Sea coastal area. Virtually the entire population
holds Russian citizenship, and almost all trade is with the northern
neighbour. It will take constructive, creative thinking on the part of
Georgian, Russian, Abkhazian and international actors alike to restore
even a modicum of confidence between the parties to the conflict.
Given Abkhazia’s unrealistic insistence that Georgia recognise it as
independent and the equally unrealistic prospect that Sukhumi will
acknowledge Georgia’s sovereignty, the two parties should focus on
creating economic and humanitarian links without status preconditions
in order to benefit both, build stability and give momentum to a long
reconciliation process.
Abkhazian officials concede that the entity’s “independence” is in
effect limited by the asymmetrical nature of its relationship with
Russia but do not see their deepening dependence on Moscow as a
threat. “Independence is a means to an end, and not an end in itself”,
a high-ranking official told Crisis Group. “We have the amount of
independence that meets our security and economic needs”.
In return for recognition and aid, Russia obtained highly prized
military-strategic assets in Abkhazia, damaged Georgia’s drive to join
NATO, demonstrated its anger at Western nations for their recognition
of Kosovo and underlined its antipathy towards the government of
Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. Perhaps most notably, Moscow
has shown that in certain circumstances it can flex its muscles
unilaterally without suffering significant political costs. Relations
with the U.S., NATO and the European Union (EU) are essentially back
to normal, even though Moscow has failed to implement important
elements of the ceasefire agreements concluded at the end of its
August 2008 war with Georgia by President Medvedev and French
President Sarkozy, the latter acting as the EU Presidency.
Abkhazia’s international status is far from settled. With only three
countries other than Russia considering it independent from Georgia
and no chance of any EU member-state or other major international
recognition in the near term, the conflict is unresolved and could
again destabilise the southern Caucasus. As many as 212,000 ethnic
Georgians remain forcibly displaced, and whereas some ethnic Georgians
have in the past been able to return to the Gali district, Abkhazian
officials most recently stated that no returns to other parts of the
entity will be authorised. Questions also linger as to how solid a
long-term asymmetrical relationship between Russia and Abkhazia might
be. Some, especially ethnic Abkhaz, who number less than 100,000 in
the entity, are wary of becoming overly reliant on Moscow
economically, politically, and culturally, or essentially being
assimilated.
The chances for meaningful progress between Tbilisi and Sukhumi were
slim even before the 2008 war and have been further eroded. Tbilisi
sees the conflict as a matter of Moscow occupying and annexing its
territory, while the Abkhazian authorities see Russia as a guarantor
of security. Diplomatic relations between Moscow and Tbilisi have been
cut. The bitterness between the two governments is deeply personalised
and emotional. Beyond occasional discussions in Geneva called for by
the ceasefire agreements, there is no real process or forum for
Russia, Georgia and representatives from Abkhazia and South Ossetia to
find solutions to even day-to-day issues.
The Georgian authorities should show their constructiveness by not
trying to isolate Abkhazia, even though Moscow’s flouting of the
ceasefire agreements makes this a bitter pill to swallow. It remains
uncertain, given their military and economic dependence on Moscow, how
much room for independent manoeuvre the de facto authorities in
Sukhumi have to deal with Georgia. The long-awaited “State Strategy on
the Occupied Territories: Engagement through Cooperation” unveiled by
Tbilisi in January 2010 partly reflects new thinking. Though the
initial reaction from Abkhazia has been dismissive, the plan contains
some concepts that, if followed through, could start the two sides on
a more promising course.
This report gives a snapshot of the state of affairs in Abkhazia
today, particularly the extent of Russian involvement. Future
reporting will deal more extensively with opportunities for finding
common ground, as well as present more detailed analysis of refugee
and IDP and other issues.
Recommendations:
To all sides:
1. Ensure the free movement and operation of international and local
humanitarian organisations to and within Abkhazia, without status or
other political preconditions.
To the Government of the Russian Federation:
2. Implement fully the terms of the 2008 ceasefire agreements, which
oblige Russia to reduce troop levels to those mandated before 8 August
2008, and withdraw from previously unoccupied areas.
3. Refrain from building permanent Russian military installations in
Abkhazia.
4. Disavow as inconsistent with international conventions and norms
recent statements by the authorities in Abkhazia that they will not
allow return of the up to 212,000 still displaced Georgians.
5. Do not claim that Abkhazia is part of the “Olympic zone” or
emphasise its participation in the organisation of the 2014 Sochi
Winter Olympic Games.
6. Engage with any Georgian government to defuse tensions, including
the current one with which Moscow has no formal relations.
To the Government of Georgia:
7. Cooperate with the EU, UN and NGOs engaged in projects in Abkhazia;
streamline formalities for project implementation; and make changes,
as needed, to the “Law on Occupied Territories” to facilitate such
activities.
8. Continue, without setting status preconditions, to offer the
Abkhazians measures that allow them to develop ties beyond Russia,
including a free trade zone in the Gali and Zugdidi districts and the
re-opening of trade and transport links, such as regular bus, ferry
and air connections.
9. Support initiatives aimed at broadening the dialogue between
Georgian and Abkhazian officials and civil society groups.
To authorities in Abkhazia:
10. Use opportunities to engage with Georgia in direct dialogue at any
level, and reconsider Georgian offers to open economic, transport and
trade links.
11. Pass the necessary legislation to regulate the status of ethnic
Georgians living in Abkhazia (mainly the Gali region); allow free
movement by persons in that region across the administrative border
with Georgia; and develop a plan outlining under what conditions and
when IDPs will be allowed to return to other parts of Abkhazia.
To the EU, UN and other international actors:
12. Continue to implement humanitarian, confidence-building, economic
integration and democracy building projects in Abkhazia and finalise
agreements with Tbilisi and Sukhumi to make quicker decisions on
project implementation.
13. Continue or renew contacts with authorities and civil society
groups in Abkhazia – including by travelling there – without implying
legitimisation or recognition of Abkhazia as an independent state or
otherwise undermining Georgian sovereignty.
Sukhumi/Tbilisi/Istanbul/Brussels, 26 February 2010
http://www.adobe.com/products/acrobat/
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6550&l=1
Iraq’s Uncertain Future: Elections and Beyond
Middle East Report N°94
25 February 2010
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As a rule, Iraq’s post-Saddam elections have tended to magnify pre-
existing negative trends. The parliamentary polls to be held on 7
March are no exception. The focus on electoral politics is good, no
doubt, but the run-up has highlighted deep-seated problems that
threaten the fragile recovery: recurring election-related violence;
ethnic tensions over Kirkuk; the re-emergence of sectarianism; and
blatant political manipulation of state institutions. The most
egregious development was the decision to disqualify over 500
candidates, a dangerous, arbitrary step lacking due process, yet
endorsed by the Shiite ruling parties. Under normal circumstances,
that alone might have sufficed to discredit the elections. But these
are not normal circumstances, and for the sake of Iraq’s stability,
the elections must go on. At a minimum, however, the international
community should ramp up its electoral monitoring and define clear red
lines that need to be respected if the results are to be considered
legitimate. And it should press the next government to seriously
tackle the issue – long-neglected yet never more critical – of
national reconciliation.
Over the past year, there were grounds to believe that Iraq’s post-war
wounds were healing and that the primary challenge had become one of
state building. Despite a spate of high-profile attacks in Baghdad and
lower-level ones elsewhere, violence was down. Politics took centre
stage. The outcome of the January 2009 provincial elections was a
setback to the more openly sectarian parties and brought a change in
local government. Most significantly, perhaps, those elections marked
the Sunni Arabs’ unambiguous acceptance of and entry into the
political and institutional arena that they had once massively
rejected and violently resisted.
But simmering conflicts were not long to come to a boil. Negotiations
over an electoral law in the second half of the year took far longer
than anticipated, forcing a five-week election delay. The perennially
difficult question of Kirkuk’s administrative status, as well as Sunni
Arab concerns that refugees would not be fully represented, further
stood in the way. These finally were overcome with the help of
external pressure and mediation but neither they – nor the underlying
ethnic and confessional fault line they reflected – are close to
genuine resolution.
The mid-January announcement by the Accountability and Justice
Commission (AJC) that it would disqualify 511 candidates for alleged
ties to the banned Baath party was the most disturbing. The decision
was blindly adopted by the Independent High Electoral Commission
(IHEC); Prime Minister Maliki’s government proceeded to embrace it and
then pressured the appeal panel to perform a hasty and cursory review.
Most appeals were denied. The episode caused havoc, raising questions
about the AJC’s legal standing, the judiciary’s credibility, the
electoral commission’s legitimacy and ability to fairly administer the
polls, and thus the election’s integrity as a whole – not least
because the AJC’s leaders themselves are parliamentary candidates. A
naked power play with sectarian overtones in that its most prominent
victims are Sunni Arabs, it also reopened old wounds and cast a
troubling light on Maliki, who only a year ago had won votes by
eschewing sectarian rhetoric and has pledged to stitch together a
broad non-sectarian electoral alliance.
Thankfully, there is little talk of boycott, as the spectre of 2005 –
when Sunni Arabs shunned the polls and thus voluntarily
disenfranchised themselves – looms heavy. That said, in the absence of
an impartial internal monitor, the international community – primarily
the U.S., EU and UN – now has an even greater responsibility to ensure
that these flawed elections are damaged no further and to clearly
define the requirements for them to be considered legitimate. Iraqi
and international observers should be able to deploy freely to all
polling stations and monitor both the vote and vote count. They
should, in particular, observe the conduct of institutions and
agencies whose impartial role will be critical in ensuring free and
fair elections: the Supreme Court and IHEC, as well as the military
and police. Blatant interference or massive fraud should be seen and
stated as red lines that will force a review of how the international
community views a future government.
That leaves what happens after the elections, assuming they pass this
threshold. The question then will be whether the incoming government
is able and willing to address the country’s numerous political
deficiencies, from sectarianism to politicised institutions and much
in between. Serious work toward national reconciliation is long
overdue. This time, forming a coalition government and holding it up
as an example of national unity will not suffice. There will have to
be meaningful progress on opening up political space, increasing cross-
sectarian participation and improving transparency and
accountability.
Reform of de-Baathification should be a priority, at least to set
clear criteria and procedures embedded in law; the process should also
be given a time horizon of a maximum of two years, at which point all
remaining files should be closed and the effort terminated. In this
endeavour, it will remain critical for members of the international
community to stay actively engaged and bolster a still-weak Iraqi
state by offering their Iraqi partners full technical, financial and
diplomatic assistance and support economic reconstruction. U.S. troops
may be on their way out, but it is too soon to abandon Iraq to the
vagaries of internal conflicts and regional rivalries.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Government of Iraq:
1. Ensure free and fair elections by:
a) implementing the important code of conduct that the main coalitions
signed on 17 February;
b) instructing security forces to provide free and secure access to
polling stations;
c) reinstating, to the extent possible, candidates disqualified on the
ground of alleged ties to the banned Baath party; and
d) refraining from interference in the work of the Independent High
Electoral Commission and the Supreme Court and protecting these
institutions from interference by others.
2. Launch a serious effort once a new government is formed to open up
political space, increase cross-sectarian participation, improve
transparency and accountability in decision making and strengthen, and
encourage the political independence of, the judiciary and independent
commissions.
3. Reform the Accountability and Justice Commission as a matter of
priority by setting clear criteria and procedures embedded in law, and
providing de-Baathification with a time horizon of a maximum of two
years, at which point all remaining files should be closed and the
effort terminated.
To Members of the International Community (notably the UN, EU and
U.S.):
4. Play an assertive role in ensuring the elections are free, fair,
transparent and inclusive.
5. Define clearly and publicly what constitute red lines that, if
crossed, would discredit the elections, notably:
a) discouraging voters from reaching polling stations for lack of
security;
b) obstructing their access to certain polling stations;
c) allowing non-registered voters to vote or registered voters to vote
more than once; and
d) tampering with ballots, ballot boxes or vote count.
6. Encourage the parties’ compliance with the code of conduct signed
on 17 February.
7. Encourage the independence of the institutions and agencies
involved in the electoral process, notably the Supreme Court and IHEC,
as well as the military and police.
8. Monitor both the vote and vote count rigorously through the free
and wide deployment of Iraqi and international observers to polling
stations and both regional and central counting centres.
9. Speak out strongly against deliberate acts of fraud and
manipulation.
10. Encourage political and institutional reform following the
elections, especially of the Accountability and Justice Commission,
and push for political independence of the judiciary and independent
commissions.
11. Develop a stance that, if the above-mentioned red lines are
crossed and election results are not broadly accepted by the public,
would make diplomatic, military and development aid dependent on
commitment to thorough institutional reform.
Baghdad/Washington/Brussels, 25 February 2010
http://www.adobe.com/products/acrobat/
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6548&l=1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Colombo/Brussels, 23 February 2010
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6545&l=1
"Sudan: un 2010 decisivo tra elezioni e referendum",
Alain Délétroz in Limes
26 febbraio 2010
Limes
Il vice presidente dell'Icg esorta la comunità internazionale a
rimanere unita alla vigilia di due tappe difficili per il Sudan: le
elezioni di aprile e il referendum sull'indipendenza del Sud. Per
evitare la lenta implosione del più grande stato africano.
La situazione politica del paese più grande dell'Africa è appesa ad un
filo. Sia i Sudanesi che la comunità internazionale devono agire per
risolvere i problemi del paese, stabilire una pace duratura e la
sicurezza nella zona una volta per tutte.
Il 2010 è un anno cruciale per il Sudan e per i paesi implicati nel
processo di pace. Più di dieci anni di conflitti hanno segnato la sua
storia, con una guerra civile tra il nord e il sud, uccisioni di massa
e milioni di rifugiati in Darfur. Adesso questo tragico scenario
minaccia di ripetersi, a causa del fallimento dell'accordo di pace
globale che mise fine alla guerra nel 2005.
La comunità internazionale deve evitare a tutti i costi altre vittime
nella zona, come i recenti 140 morti per scontri tribali nel sud del
paese. La comunità internazionale deve cominciare a lavorare insieme
al governo del Sudan su due questioni di massima priorità: le elezioni
nazionali e il referendum per l'autodeterminazione che si terrà nel
Sud Sudan in gennaio 2011.
Le elezioni nazionali sono previste per aprile di questo anno ed è
fondamentale assicurarsi che si svolgano in modo equo e sicuro. La
chiave per il successo è: un censo affidabile in cui tutto il popolo
sudanese sia rappresentato, inclusi i milioni di sfollati del Darfur,
un potere giudiziario indipendente e un'amministrazione elettorale
imparziale. Se questo si realizza, il referendum sull'indipendenza del
Sudan si potrà effettuare nel 2011, come previsto, e il suo risultato
dovrà essere accettato dalle parti coinvolte.
Mancano meno di 12 mesi per ottenere una trasformazione democratica
adeguata e la risoluzione dei conflitti in tutto il paese. Nonostante
ciò, i principali attori coinvolti non si mobilizzano.
Dato il panorama elettorale attuale è ovvio che il paese non
raggiungerà la pace. Purtroppo, le elezioni generali di aprile hanno
perso tutto il loro scopo originale: ottenere un governo legittimo e
democratico. Adesso sono solo uno strumento per mantenere il Partito
del Congresso Nazionale (NCP) al potere a Khartoum e facilitare il
referendum per l'indipendenza del Sud Sudan.
Le due rappresentazioni politiche che si presenteranno alle elezioni,
l'NCP e il Movimento per la liberazione del popolo sudanese (SPLM),
non hanno alcun interesse in comune. Infatti entrambe sono mosse
esclusivamente dai loro interessi personali. Le loro negoziazioni non
portano da nessuna parte e, sebbene i due desiderino vincere le
elezioni, si presentano per ragioni molto sbagliate.
L'NCP desidera vincere le elezioni per recuperare la legittimità
politica necessaria per proteggere il presidente Omar al-Bashir,
accusato di crimini contro l'umanità dalla Corte Penale
Internazionale. Nel frattempo, lo SPLM lavora affinché le elezioni non
falliscano, dal momento che potrebbero mettere in pericolo il suo
obiettivo principale : lo svolgimento del referendum per
l'indipendenza del Sud. Esso minaccia addirittura di dichiarare
l'indipendenza unilateralmente, in caso si dovesse sentire obbligato
ad accettare di rimandare la consultazione.
In quanto al referendum, i quesiti indicano che a seguito del suo
svolgimento, l'Africa conterà un nuovo paese tra le sue frontiere. Se
e quando si svolgerà come previsto e senza complicazioni.
Se il Sud Sudan decidesse di dichiararsi indipendente, questo sarebbe
un processo molto complesso con un'unica formula per il successo: il
lavoro unificato degli attori internazionali e regionali sotto una
leadership forte e sicura.
Le carte sono state distribuite. È essenziale fare rapidi progressi
sui diversi fronti che coinvolgano i principali attori e li
costringano ad agire. Ancora di più adesso che la distanza tra l'NCP
et lo SPLM è tangibile. Il governo di Khartum deve applicare con
urgenza una serie di riforme giuridiche per garantire un processo
elettorale nazionale libero e giusto. L'NCP e lo SPLM devono negoziare
degli accordi al più presto possibile.
È indispensabile ottenere un trattato di pace in Darfur che permetta a
tutti gli abitanti della zona di votare alle elezioni nazionali. E, se
alla fine il risultato del referendum fosse l'indipendenza del Sud,
bisognerà aiutare il Sudan a formare due stati democratici e
economicamente stabili.
Il tempo è determinante per il Sudan e non gioca a suo favore. C'è un
enorme lavoro, molto complicato, che deve essere realizzato il prima
possibile, tanto in Darfur quanto nel resto del paese, ma soprattutto
nel Sud, che sta mostrando i primi segni di agitazione. Gli attori
internazionali devono muoversi adesso. Devono mettersi in moto senza
ulteriori ritardi per raggiungere la pace e la stabilità nella zona.
Prima di tutto devono dotarsi di una voce comune. Se la comunità
internazionale dovesse fallire, il rischio di una nuova guerra civile
sarà imminente. Il risultato: ancora rifugiati, ancora povertà, ancora
morti e ancora dolore per milioni di persone. Il Sudan si gioca la sua
chance adesso. Se se la lascia scappare sarà molto difficile ottenerne
un'altra.
Alain Délétroz è il Vice Presidente per l'Europa dell'International
Crisis Group
Limes http://temi.repubblica.it/limes/
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6551&l=1
"Is policing in Timor-Leste a spectator sport?",
Cillian Nolan in The Lowy Intepreter
24 February 2010
The Lowy Interpreter
The end of February is here, which means it's time for the UN Security
Council to renew the mandate of the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-
Leste. Based on the Secretary-General's latest report, released on 18
February, it seems very much like business as usual. The report clings
to the fiction that the UN is in charge of policing the half-island
state. The reality is a lot murkier. A formal handover of 'executive
policing responsibilities' is progressing on a district-by-district
basis, but response to recent events resembles a collective abdication
of responsibility.
In December, shots fired into the air by the Timorese police (PNTL)
outside a late-night party led to the death of a popular musician. The
PNTL General Commander soon ordered his officers in Dili to 'step
back' and give the UN police the lead.
As Dili residents began to complain about the sudden invisibility of
their own police, the Timorese district commander then unilaterally
ordered his officers to cease operations altogether. He said the UN
police were ineffective, using their guns 'just for show', citing the
injury of his officers in a confused joint response to fighting in one
of the city's markets.
He also said the PNTL wasn't learning anything from its UN
counterparts. After all, the commander asked, isn't the UN technically
responsible for security? It was a daring rebuke to the logic of the
UN's district-by-district handover. Newspapers quickly filled with
calls for the return of the PNTL, seen as faster to respond and less
hesitant to bring out its guns. PNTL has since returned to the
streets, but the incident hurt the image of the UN police and further
weakened the 'democratic policing principles' they are here to
promote.
Neither the PNTL senior command nor the Government publicly spoke out
against the district commander's move. The General Commander was busy
leading a dubious 'mega-operation' against rumoured 'ninja' activity
in the border districts — without any UN involvement, even though the
international force retains executive authority in the area. (One
leading NGO has also raised concerns over possible human rights
violations.)
The Secretary-General's report is short on prescriptions to cure the
ills of the Timorese police, but provides incisive diagnosis of its
problems. Dili is back to 'apparent normalcy' since the 2006 crisis,
but it argues the PNTL is not ready to give up UN support. The service
remains weak in operational, administrative and management capacity,
and lacks basic equipment. There are few clear, enforced policies on
fundamentals such as the use of force. There is ample evidence of
misconduct with no effective disciplinary mechanism. Police frequently
have little understanding of the country's evolving criminal
legislation.
Much work thus remains to be done, but the report also acknowledges
the 'limited capacity of UNMIT police to contribute to the development
of the PNTL', noting consistent difficulties in attracting staff with
the right skills. The Secretary-General recommends a limited reduction
in police presence by mid-2011. But the question is not how many
police will be here but what they will be doing. Much remains to be
defined regarding a 'reconfiguration' of roles as the handover
proceeds.
Given this inability of UN police to influence outcomes, Crisis Group
recommended in December that the UN hand over formal control sooner
rather than later. This would bring the mission's mandate into line
with the reality of policing in the country and hopefully prompt the
Government, and the police, to take further steps toward solving
problems only they can fix.
Future support from either the UN, Australia, Portugal, or even
Indonesia will only work if the Government can be clear about its
needs. It requires a comprehensive plan for the force's future
development — a full independent assessment could be a first step. In
the meantime, the Government, PNTL and UNMIT need to put aside public
rancour and find common ground on 'reconfiguring' the role of the UN
police if they are to remain an active player rather than a mere
spectator in building the police in Timor-Leste.
Cillian Nolan is the International Crisis Group's Dili-based analyst.
The Lowy Interpreter
http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2010/02/24/Is-policing-in-Timor-Leste-a-spectator-sport.aspx?p=true
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6549&l=1
"The Middle East's Dangerous Equilibrium",
Peter Harling in Foreign Policy
23 February 2010
Foreign Policy
President Obama's first year of "engagement" has yielded little more
than simmering crises and a frustrating diplomatic stalemate. But for
all its pitfalls, the United States cannot quit the Arab world.
A year into U.S. President Barack Obama's presidency, the Middle East
is on the brink. Almost every country in the region spent 2009 waiting
in vain for something dramatic to come out of Washington. By the time
2010 was rung in, most players appeared to have given up just as
hastily on the Obama administration. As hopes of progress wane, the
region risks slipping back into chaos.
The year's holding pattern produced some positive signs. In Lebanon
and Gaza, Hezbollah and Hamas showed relative restraint, a reflection
of the new constraints they face, having both assumed a larger share
of power and suffered the destructive consequences of past wars. The
West Bank appears remarkably quiet. Iraq continued to witness, as the
U.S. military put it, "sustainable levels of violence."
But the calm is deceptive. None of the region's fundamental problems
has been solved. There has been no progress on the peace process,
whether in its Palestinian or Syrian versions. Iran's nuclear file is
fast approaching a perilous impasse. Iraq's future remains as
unpredictable as ever: Regional actors have yet to fully play their
part, even as the United States, seeming more interested in
maintaining acceptable conditions for a withdrawal than in
consolidating what it will leave behind, gradually bows out. In
Lebanon, the stalemate reached during George W. Bush's administration
is now enshrined in a national unity government which has yet to prove
it can produce much more than paralysis. Yemen is shaken to its roots.
Throughout the area, a vicious struggle is taking place just under the
surface at a time when the rules of the game are dangerously unclear.
Hamas, virtually strangled in Gaza, might be tempted to reframe its
struggle more regionally -- something it historically has been loath
to do. So far, the United States has done little to lift the Israeli
siege and has done much to obstruct Palestinian reconciliation,
meaning that Hamas has few other options than to look outside the
territory.
Hezbollah has been preparing for the next, more decisive round with
Israel since the 2006 showdown. Because the movement is now an
integral part of the Lebanese government, because it has redeployed
its military deeper into Lebanese territory, and because it doesn't
see its defeat as an option, there exists a real potential for a far
more comprehensive war than last time. Although, arguably, neither
side wants a renewed conflict, their mutually reinforcing military and
rhetorical buildup, combined with the absence of negotiated redlines
and effective containment mechanisms, creates a dynamic that could
spiral out of control. Rather than attempting to mediate between the
parties and work toward clarifying and enforcing reciprocal redlines,
the United States has urged the side on which it has least leverage,
Hezbollah, to stop its "provocations."
The Iranian issue has fallen back into a now familiar pattern, with
yet another cycle of halfhearted diplomatic overtures, half-effective
sanctions, and half-empty threats. Washington and Tehran apparently
have turned the page on their elusive "engagement," returning to a
state of subdued confrontation. Here as well, Iran's uneasy domestic
situation, coupled with the U.S. preoccupation with withdrawing from
Iraq and "surging" in Afghanistan, could lower the threshold for
confrontation.
As is often the case, Damascus offers a relatively accurate reflection
of the regional state of play, as it endlessly seeks to adjust to the
shifting political terrain. Washington contends that Syria is covertly
deepening its military cooperation with Iran and Hezbollah just as
fast as it is, overtly, developing ties with Turkey in all other
domains. Skepticism in the United States has reduced prospects for a
genuine partnership, while reluctance in Israel has thwarted progress
in peace negotiations. For this reason, the Turkish and Iranian offers
are -- from the perspective of Damascus -- the only games in town.
Moreover, as pressure mounts on Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran, Syria's
room to maneuver shrinks. When the perils of war return, Syria will
need those allies more than ever. In this instance, Damascus fears
that another redline could be crossed, leading to conflict spilling
over onto Syrian territory for the first time since 1973.
Such dynamics represent clear threats to U.S. interests. They render
calls for disengagement illusory; if Washington were to ignore the
Middle East, the region surely would find tragic ways to recapture its
attention. At a time when the United States is discovering the limits
of military might, confronting its tarnished regional image, and
struggling with dwindling political leverage, it is tempting to
conclude that there is little for it to do. Yet a lack of progress in
the region is having a considerable effect all its own, and not for
the better. As the administration's calls for peace fall flat and
pressure on the militant camp comes to bear, the balance between
diplomacy and conflict is turning wobbly in a region that desperately
needs some external stabilization from Washington.
Peter Harling is the Project Director for Iraq, Lebanon and Syria at
the International Crisis Group
Foreign Policy http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6546&l=1
"Kapazität der EU zur Friedenssicherung schwindet",
Alain Délétroz in Der Tagesspiegel
22. Februar 2010
Der Tagesspiegel
Mit der Ernennung Catherine Ashtons zur Hohen Vertreterin der EU für
Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik haben sich die Briten scheinbar großen
Einfluss im außenpolitischen Machtgefüge der EU gesichert. Doch das
Krisenmanagement wird von Deutschen und Franzosen bestimmt - und es
hat einen stark militärischen Geschmack. Ein Gastbeitrag von Alain
Délétroz
Ein üppiges Festmahl findet in Brüssel statt. Dabei werden einige
besser als andere gefüttert. Wie eine unverdauliche Buchstabensuppe
hören sich für Außenstehende die neuen EU-Institutionen an, die sich
nach Inkrafttreten des Lissabon-Vertrags mit Außenpolitik
beschäftigen. Eher als eine Suppe ist es aber ein Bankett - von
Patronage, Gefallen und Einfluss. Die Briten denken, sie hätten mit
der Ernennung Catherine Ashtons zur Hohen Vertreterin der EU für
Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik den besten Sitzplatz am Banketttisch
bekommen, doch sie irren. Bestimmt wird das Menü nämlich von den
Deutschen und den Franzosen, und der erste Gang hat schon mal einen
stark militärischen Geschmack.
Derzeit geht es um ein Organ, welches Crisis Management and Planning
Directorate-CMPD getauft wurde, zu Deutsch "Direktorat für
Krisenmanagement und Planung". Es soll einen wichtigen Teil von
Ashtons Auswärtigem Dienst bilden, also dem neuen Europäischen
Diplomatischen Corps. Im Dezember 2008 einigte sich der Europäische
Rat auf die Verschmelzung in ein einziges Direktorat der zivilen und
der militärischen Sparte der europäischen Friedensmissionsplanung. Es
war ein logischer Schritt, der die EU dazu befähigen sollte,
effektiver auf Konfliktsituationen zu reagieren.
Militärischer Aspekt dominiert
Jetzt wo diese neue Struktur Gestalt annimmt, wird jedoch deutlich,
dass der militärische Aspekt dominiert. Zivile Experten, wie etwa der
ehemalige Direktor der zivilen Krisenbewältigung, wurden aus den
Entscheidungskreisen verdrängt. Doch das ist nicht alles. Auf der
Liste für die sogenannte "integrierte strategische Planung" in der
vorübergehenden CMPD-Struktur scheinen nur ein Fünftel der Namen
ziviles Planungswissen mitzubringen.
Diese Entwicklung ist aus zwei Gründen bizarr. Erstens waren bisher
die überwiegende Mehrheit der europäischen Missionen in Krisengebieten
zivil; 21 von 27, um genau zu sein. Die EU war schon immer ein viel
effizienterer Akteur in den zivilen Komponenten der
Konfliktbearbeitung und Friedensförderung - wie beispielsweise in den
Bereichen Polizei, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Grenzschutzmissionen - als
es jemals auf der militärischen Seite gewesen ist. Zweitens: Unter den
vielen Erfahrungen aus Bosnien und anderen Missionen, ist klar, dass
das Militär nichts mehr verabscheut, als Aufgaben zu erledigen, für
die es nicht geschult wurde. Niemals sollte es zu Polizeiaufgaben oder
zur Einführung von Justizreformen aufgefordert werden.
Militärexperten sollen zivile Missionen planen
Doch diese Realität wird nun in der Führung und Struktur der CMPD
nicht widergespiegelt. Stattdessen wurden die traditionellen Stärken
der EU ignoriert. Jetzt schauen wir in eine Zukunft, in der
Militärexperten die Planung ziviler Missionen übernehmen.
Wie und warum konnte dies geschehen? Ganz einfach: Die aktiven
Mitgliedsländer der Union, die genau wissen, was sie wollen, nutzen
die besten Teile für sich. Die anderen schauen währenddessen zu.
Frankreich drängte seine Sicht nach vorn, und stieß nur bei den
Deutschen auf Widerstand. Eine Abmachung, die Deutschland wichtige
Positionen an einer anderen Stelle der Post-Lissabon-Ära sichert,
scheint der Grund der dominierend französischen Vision des CMPD zu
sein. Die Briten und andere Europäer, die an diesen Missionen
mitwirken, haben den Handel entweder bewusst zugelassen oder haben es
nicht bemerkt. Sie werden erst dann protestieren, wenn sie Personal
für die neuen europäischen Friedensförderungseinsätze beitragen
müssen.
Nein, dies ist nicht ein weiterer Brüsseler Kuhhandel. Auch ist die
CMPD kein obskures Element innerhalb der EU-Maschinerie. Es geht
buchstäblich um Leben und Tod, sowohl für die Menschen in den
Krisengebieten als auch für die europäischen Bürger, die an laufenden
und an künftigen Missionen beteiligt sind und sein werden. Die CMPD
wird das Herzstück des neuen Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienstes sein.
Es wird das Organ sein, welches sich mit den schwierigsten globalen
Friedens- und Sicherheitsproblemen, in denen die EU eingebunden ist,
beschäftigen wird.
Mehr Kompetenzen für den Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienst
Die EU braucht eine Institution, die den gesamten "Konfliktzyklus"
bewältigen kann, von der Prävention zur Krisenbewältigung, dem
Wiederaufbau und der Entwicklung. Der Vertrag von Lissabon erteilt der
Hohen Vertreterin eindeutig Autorität über "die Koordinierung der
zivilen und militärischen Aspekte" von "friedenserhaltenden
Aufgaben ... Aufgaben wie Kampfeinsätzen bei Krisenbewältigung,
einschließlich Friedensbemühungen und Post-Konflikt-Stabilisierung".
In der Tat sollten all diese Aufgaben und die damit verbundenen
Finanzinstrumente nun komplett von der Kommission an den Europäischen
Auswärtigen Dienst übergehen. Um maximale Effizienz zu erreichen,
sollte eine einzige Generaldirektion für die Friedenssicherung und
Krisenbewältigung geschaffen werden.
Im Idealfall würde Ashton unter dem Lissabon-Vertrag die Verantwortung
und die Führung über alle an der Außenpolitik beteiligten Direktorate
übernehmen: Entwicklung, Nachbarschaft, humanitäre Hilfe. Leider
entspricht der Ehrgeiz des Lissabontextes noch nicht Ashtons eigenem.
Sie zieht es vor, bescheiden zu bleiben. Lieber koordiniert sie die
Außenpolitik zusammen mit den Kommissaren, anstatt eine ausgesprochene
Verfechterin der Rolle der EU im Bereich der Friedenssicherung zu
sein.
Ashtons Aufgabe ist massiv und kompliziert. Doch wenn sie ein CMPD
zulässt, in dem der militärische Aspekt der EU-Missionen stärker
gefördert wird, erschwert sie ihre Arbeit umso mehr. Nicht nur für
sich selbst, sondern auch für all diejenigen, die ihr im Amt folgen
werden. Die Strukturen, die heute geschaffen werden, werden sich über
Jahrzehnte nachhaltig auf die Art und Weise, wie die EU-Projekte in
der Welt wahrgenommen werden, auswirken. Die Kapazität der Union zur
Konfliktverhütung und zur Friedenssicherung hat gerade einen herben
Schlag erlitten. Wird der Kurs nicht rechtzeitig korrigiert, wird
diese Entwicklung äußerst negative Auswirkungen auf das Engagement der
EU in Krisengebieten weltweit haben.
Alain Délétroz ist Vizepräsident für Europa der International Crisis
Group
Der Tagesspiegel http://www.tagesspiegel.de/
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6544&l=1
"The spoils of EU reform",
Alain Délétroz in Reuters
19 February 2010
Reuters
There is a sumptuous feast happening in Brussels, but some are better
fed than others. What to many may seem an indigestible alphabet soup
of new EU institutions dealing with foreign policy after the Lisbon
treaty, is actually a smorgasbord of patronage, favour and influence.
Britain may feel it has done well to get the spot at the head of the
table in the form of new High Representative Catherine Ashton, but in
reality the French and Germans seem to be the ones setting the menu.
Currently at issue is an organ called the Crisis Management Planning
Directorate (CMPD), which is intended to be at the very heart of
Ashton’s External Action Service — essentially the new European
diplomatic corps.
In December 2008, the European Council agreed to merge civilian and
military aspects of the planning for European peace keeping missions
into a single CMPD. It was a logical step that would help the EU be
more efficient in its response to conflicts.
As this new structure is now taking shape, however, the military
aspect has been given vastly disproportionate weight.
Civilian experts, most notably the former director on the civilian
crisis management side, have been pushed out of the decision-making
structures.
But it doesn’t stop there. In the CMPD transitional structure, only
one-fifth of the names listed for the so-called “integrated strategic
planning unit” seem to have civilian planning expertise.
This development is bizarre for two reasons.
First, the vast majority of European missions in conflict areas have
been civilian: 21 out of 27, in fact. The EU has been a much more
efficient actor in the civilian components of conflict management and
peace building — like policing, rule of law and border missions — than
it ever has been on the military side.
Second, among the many lessons learnt in Bosnia and elsewhere, one is
that the military hate to do what they have not been trained for. They
should never be asked to police cities or launch judiciary reforms.
One would have expected such realities to be reflected in the
leadership and structure of the CMPD.
Instead, they have ignored the EU’s traditional strengths, and we are
now looking at a future in which military experts will be planning
civilian missions.
To understand how and why this has happened, one needs to understand
that active member states, with clear ideas of what they want, get the
best parts while others simply watch on. France pushed its views only
to come up against resistance from Berlin.
A deal securing German positions elsewhere in the post-Lisbon
machinery seems to have allowed a certain French view to dominate the
CMPD. The UK and other Europeans who contribute to these missions have
either allowed the deal to go forward, or weren’t aware that it was
happening.
But they will almost certainly show resistance the day they are asked
to contribute personnel for new European peace building missions under
this structure.
This is not just another Brussels horse-trading story. The CMPD is not
an obscure element in the EU machinery. This is quite literally a life-
and-death matter, both for people suffering in crisis zones and for
European citizens involved in current and future missions.
The CMPD will be the very core of the new European External Action
Service and be the body that deals with all the toughest issues of
world peace and security the EU is involved in.
The EU needs an institution that can deal with the full “conflict
cycle”, from prevention to crisis management, rebuilding and
development.
The Lisbon treaty is very clear in giving the High Representative
authority over “coordination of the civilian and military aspects” of
“peace keeping tasks… tasks of combat forces in crisis management,
including peace making and post-conflict stabilisation”.
Indeed, all these responsibilities and their associated financial
instruments should now move over entirely from the Commission to the
External Action Service. For the sake of efficiency, it would be
essential to create a single Directorate General for peace building
and crisis management.
Ideally, under Lisbon, Ashton should have responsibility and exercise
leadership over all the directorates that are involved in external
policies: development, neighbourhood, humanitarian aid, at least.
Unfortunately, the ambition of the Lisbon text has not yet been
matched by Ashton’s own. She has preferred to express a more humble
desire to co-ordinate or work closely with all the commissioners
involved in foreign affairs, rather than be an outspoken champion for
the EU’s role in peace building.
Ashton’s task is huge and complicated, to be sure, but by allowing the
CMPD to be dominated by a vision that overly promotes military aspects
of EU missions, she has made it tougher still — and not just for
herself but for those who will come after.
The structures being created today will have a lasting impact on the
way the EU projects itself in the world for decades.
The Union’s conflict prevention and peace building capacity has just
suffered a blow to its effectiveness that, if left uncorrected, will
have enormous impact on the ground in crisis zones worldwide.
Alain Délétroz is Vice President for Europe of the International
Crisis Group
Reuters http://uk.reuters.com/
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6541&l=1
chhotemianinshallah
To:
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP - NEW REPORT
The Threat from Jammat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh
Dhaka/Brussels, 1 March 2010: The Bangladesh government has taken
steps to dismantle the terrorist group Jammat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh
(JMB), but it should not take its demise for granted: the organisation
is regrouping and the possibility of another attack is increasing.
The Threat from Jammat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh,* the latest report
from the International Crisis Group, assesses the ongoing danger JMB
poses to the state. Despite two government crackdowns since 2005, the
organisation continues to recruit, train and raise funds. Although JMB
is a much weaker force due to the arrest of hundreds of its members
and the execution of its original leadership council, it remains a
potent threat with a proven capacity to regenerate. Its past and
present ties to Pakistan’s Lashkar-e-Tayyba (LeT), the organisation
responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attack and for a foiled December 2009
plot to target embassies in Dhaka, reinforce that threat.
“In the past few years Bangladeshi security agencies have been
relatively successful in getting at Islamist extremist groups to the
extent that organisations like JMB are struggling to survive”, says
Michael Shaikh, Crisis Group’s Senior Analyst for Asia. “But JMB’s
resilience and recent involvement with foreign jihadis indicate that
it is still bent on bringing down the state”.
As a result of increased government pressure, JMB seems to have
shifted strategies. Like many other jihadi organisations, it is
constantly evolving and mutating; its past actions may not necessarily
indicate its future direction. JMB appears to have modified its
recruitment strategies, restricted its rural activities and altered
its funding base. While it may have lost hundreds of operatives to the
crackdowns, those that remain are likely to be more fully committed
and thus more dangerous.
If JMB’s strengths are clear, its weaknesses are equally evident. Many
of its mainstream political and financial patrons have been arrested
or have lost power. Its reduced manpower means it has fewer resources
to devote to recruitment and training for major operations. And its
top explosives expert and other senior operatives have turned
government informers, compelling less committed cadres to quit JMB.
The one lethal quality that the organisation retains in abundance,
however, is patience.
Sheikh Hasina’s current Awami League government is especially aware of
Bangladesh’s Islamist extremist problem, as its members have been
victims of attacks. But internal wrangling, lack of coordination
between security agencies and the absence of a single counter-
terrorism force have undermined any sustained effort to dismantle
organisations like JMB. However, the biggest danger, in the absence of
new attacks, is government complacency, and a sense that the problem
has already gone away.
“All things considered, Sheikh Hasina and her government have not done
badly at dealing with the terrorism threat. But it is no time to rest
on their laurels”, says Robert Templer, Crisis Group’s Asia Program
Director. “JMB’s weaknesses present the Awami League an opening to
reshape its response to terrorism. If it moves quickly it could
eradicate the organisation once and for all”.
http://co122w.col122.mail.live.com/default.aspx?rru=inbox&wa=wsignin1.0
The Threat from Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh
Asia Report N°187
1 March 2010
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), a terrorist organisation,
remains active and dangerous despite the decimation of its ranks over
the last five years. Its links to the Pakistan group Lashkar-e-Tayyaba
(LeT) remain a particularly serious concern. Since its coordinated
bombing attack across the country on 17 August 2005, police have
arrested hundreds of JMB members; they have also executed every member
of its original leadership, including its founder, Shaikh Abdur
Rahman. Its last successful attack was in January 2006. The state has
succeeded in tackling the Islamist extremist threat to the extent that
organisations such as JMB are struggling to survive. But the arrest of
95 JMB operatives since October 2008 and discoveries of huge caches of
explosives demonstrate that JMB was able to regroup, recruit and raise
funds. No one should take its demise for granted: the possibility of
another attack remains, and the government should move quickly to
create a planned police-led counter-terrorism force. It should also
step up counter-terrorism cooperation, particularly with neighbouring
India.
The crackdown after the 2005 bombings yielded a wealth of new data,
much of it from court documents, about JMB’s origins, aims, training,
funding and leadership. While Shaikh Abdur Rahman deliberately sought
out contacts with Pakistan-based jihadi organisations, including al-
Qaeda and LeT, his goal from the beginning was the establishment of
Islamic rule in Bangladesh. He had no broader jihadi agenda, nor was
he interested in indiscriminate civilian casualties. JMB focused its
attacks on government offices, particularly courts and judges. It was
set up with two wings, one for da’wah (religious outreach) stressing
the need for Islamic law, and a military wing, whose members, called
ehsar, underwent rigorous training. At its height in 2005, it may have
had as many as 2,000 ehsar in nine regional divisions, with its
stronghold in Rajshahi, in the country’s north west. Today, the number
may be down to 250.
JMB initially had two main bases of recruitment: the network of
mosques and schools associated with the Salafist organisation Ahle
Hadith, and the youth wing of the Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami,
called Islamic Chatra Shabir (ICS). Family networks were also
important, with members drawing in their brothers, sons and nephews.
Within the top leadership, arranged marriages with women from top JMB
families were instrumental in cementing solidarity. Since the 2005
crackdown, there has been less reliance on open da’wah meetings for
fear of infiltration and more reliance on four madrasas run by JMB
itself. There also appears to be an increase in recruiting from elite
schools and universities.
Money was never a problem for JMB and even in its reduced
circumstances it appears to have multiple sources of funding. After
the crackdown it reduced its reliance on crop donations and a form of
taxation in rural areas, again for fear of infiltration, but it draws
on income from a number of local businesses. It also appears to rely
heavily on donations from JMB members and supporters working in the
Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In addition, its
control of hundi operations – the system of sending money across
borders without any electronic transactions that is also known as
hawala – has been an important income-earner. The organisation is also
involved in transnational crime: the arrest of a key leader in late
2008 revealed JMB’s involvement in a counterfeiting ring run by LeT
across South Asia, and in arms smuggling across the Indian border.
JMB’s current strategy is to rebuild the organisation with a lower
profile to gradually launch a Taliban-like military takeover of a
district in the north west and use that as a base to establish Islamic
law. Given its somewhat depleted resources and the new intelligence
available to authorities following important arrests in 2008 and 2009,
that goal seems wildly unrealistic. The one quality that the
leadership has in abundance, however, is patience.
The danger from JMB is exacerbated by its links to other Bangladeshi
and international jihadi groups and to members of the Bangladeshi
diaspora in Britain. New information has revealed operational ties to
LeT and to al-Muhajiroun, the groups whose members took part in the
London underground bombings of July 2005. There has also been
collaboration between JMB and a splinter of the once formidable but
now diminished Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, Bangladesh (HUJI-B).
Bangladesh’s political mainstream has long understood the danger posed
by JMB but has either deliberately used it for narrow political ends,
as during the coalition government led by the Bangladesh National
Party (BNP) from 2006 to 2007, or been distracted by other concerns.
The current Awami League government is especially aware of the problem
as its members have been victims of attacks. But internal wrangling,
lack of coordination between security agencies and the absence of a
single counter-terrorism force have undermined any sustained effort to
dismantle the organisation.
Dhaka/Brussels, 1 March 2010
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6552&l=1
chhotemianinshallah
Conflict areas and subjects covered
in this week's update:
Reports: Zimbabwe, Bangladesh, CrisisWatch
Commentary: Iran/China, Central Asia, Iraq
Speeches and Interviews: Middle East Peace
Website: Burundi
Crisis Group reports published this week:
Zimbabwe: Political and Security Challenges to the Transition
3 March
Despite initial scepticism, Zimbabwe’s year-old unity government has
achievements to its credit, but the democratic transition remains at
risk, especially from hard-line security officials – President Robert
Mugabe’s last reliable supporters.
CrisisWatch N°79
1 March
Four actual or potential conflict situations around the world
deteriorated and two improved in February 2010, according to the new
issue of the International Crisis Group’s monthly bulletin
CrisisWatch.
Crisis Group commentary:
"Warum China mit Sanktionen zögert"
Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Die Zeit, 2.März
"Asia Central, contra las cuerdas"
Robert Templer, Foreign Policy Edición Española, 2 de marzo
"Les frontières incertaines du Kurdistan"
Joost Hiltermann, Le Monde Diplomatique, 4 mars
Crisis Group speeches and interviews:
"Middle East Peace: Ground Truths, Challenges Ahead"
4 March
Testimony by Robert Malley to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations
Committee
Crisis Group website update:
Elections au Burundi : Prevenir toute escalade de violence
Zimbabwe: Political and Security Challenges to the Transition
Africa Briefing Nº70
3 March 2010
OVERVIEW
As Zimbabwe enters its second year under a unity government, the
challenges to democratic transformation have come into sharp focus.
Despite reasonable progress in restoring political and social
stability, ending widespread repression and stabilising the economy
since February 2009, major threats could still derail the reform
process. In particular, resistance of intransigent and still powerful
security sector leaders and fractious in-fighting between and within
the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU-PF) and the Movement for
Democratic Change (MDC) must be addressed now. South Africa and other
countries in southern Africa – who monitor the accord that guides the
transition – must press the parties, and particularly President Robert
Mugabe, to see the transition through to a successful conclusion.
Donors should back their efforts.
The unity government, created under the Global Political Agreement
(GPA) signed by Mugabe and MDC factional leaders Morgan Tsvangirai and
Arthur Mutambara, was born under a cloud of scepticism. Most observers
gave it little chance, predicting that, even as prime minister,
Tsvangirai would fall prey to Mugabe’s “divide, rule, co-opt and
destroy” strategy. Against the odds, the government started well:
schools and hospitals re-opened; civil servants were paid and returned
to work; the Zimbabwe dollar was shelved; goods returned to store
shelves; and a cholera epidemic was controlled. Human rights activists
reported a significant drop in abuses. Donors generally received well
an ambitious yet pragmatic reconstruction program calling for $8.5
billion in foreign aid and investment.
But major concerns undermining the transition process have come to the
fore. Hardline generals and other Mugabe loyalists in ZANU-PF are
refusing to implement the government’s decisions, boycotting the new
national security organ and showing public disdain for Tsvangirai.
Farm seizures have continued virtually unabated. Most attention has
focused on completing the GPA, but ZANU-PF has delayed or ignored
important commitments in that document, while stalling constitutional
reforms by insisting on preserving broad executive privileges. Key
blocked steps include a land audit, appointment of MDC governors, an
end of arbitrary detentions and arrests, regular functioning of the
National Security Council in place of the infamous Joint Operations
Command, public consultations on a new constitution and preparation
for elections.
These delays reflect the two deeper challenges on which this briefing
concentrates. First, a mature political system must develop, so that
ZANU-PF and MDC engage as both competitors in the political arena and
partners in the inclusive government. This will be difficult,
especially under the divisive Mugabe, but other ZANU-PF leaders,
including the factions led by Vice President Joice Mujuru, and Defence
Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa, know that their party has lost much
popular support and needs a generational shift. For its part, the MDC
must keep faith and engaged with its broad following in the transition
process, including trade unions, human rights groups and women’s
organisations. It must also show the country as a whole that it is a
viable custodian of the state – competent, transparent, and capable of
preserving social change since independence.
Equally challenging are security issues. A relatively small number of
“securocrats” use their positions and symbiotic relationship with
Mugabe to exercise veto power over the transition. They are motivated
by differing factors: fear of losing power and its financial benefits,
fear of prosecution for political or financial abuses, and a belief
that they guard the liberation heritage against Tsvangirai and the
MDC, which they view as fronts for white and Western interests.
Zimbabweans across the political spectrum are quietly considering how
to ease these officers into retirement, even at the cost of allowing
them to keep their assets and providing them a degree of impunity from
domestic prosecution, while simultaneously professionalising security
forces respectful of human rights and a democratically elected
government.
While the primary tasks ahead rest with Zimbabweans, the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) must take seriously its GPA
guarantor role. South African President Jacob Zuma’s activism as
mediator must convey the message that the region will abide no
alternative to the GPA. His recent actions, including appointment of
three respected advisers to oversee the Zimbabwe account, are welcome
indications he will be tougher vis-à-vis Mugabe on GPA obligations and
respect for rule of law.
The broader international community, especially the UK, U.S., EU and
China, should support and complement SADC’s efforts through careful
calibration of trade, aid, and investment to encourage progress;
maintenance of targeted sanctions on those thwarting the transition;
and lifting of sanctions on entities key to economic recovery. Donors
should provide new recovery and development assistance – including for
rural development, health and education and strengthening of the
judiciary, legislature and civil society – through transparent
mechanisms, such as the Multi-Donor Trust Fund.
This briefing focuses on political party and security issues, as well
as South Africa’s mediation. Subsequent reporting will analyse other
topics vital to the transition, including constitutional and legal
reform, justice and reconciliation, sanctions policies and security
sector reform.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6554&l=1
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/crisiswatch/cw_2010/cw79.pdf
"Warum China mit Sanktionen zögert",
Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt in Die Zeit
2. März 2010
Die Zeit
Das Regime in Peking lehnt aus verschiedenen Gründen Sanktionen gegen
Iran ab. Im Streit um das Atomprogramm versucht China zuvörderst, die
eigene Position zu stärken.
Seit Monaten üben die USA diplomatischen Druck auf China aus, um
erneut Sanktionen gegen Iran zu bewirken. Diese Bemühungen fördern
jedoch weniger eine echte Lösung der iranischen Nuklearfrage, als dass
sie den chinesischen Interessen in die Hände spielen. Gegenwärtig
plädiert China für eine Auseinandersetzung auf dem diplomatischen
Wege. Die Strategie des "Verzögern und Schwächen" der Sanktionen
ermöglicht China, sowohl den Westen als auch Iran auszuspielen und
somit von beiden Zugeständnisse zu bekommen.
Peking will aus gleich mehreren Gründen starke Sanktionen vermeiden:
Erstens ist Iran Chinas zweitgrößter Öllieferant. China und Iran
teilen eine starke Abneigung gegen westlich-imperialistisches
Verhalten. Das geht zum einen auf historische Gründe zurück, hat aber
auch mit der aktuellen amerikanischen Haltung gegenüber deren
Innenpolitik zu tun. Sowohl China als auch Iran empfinden diese als
Einmischung. Pekings starke Verbundenheit mit Teheran soll also auch
ein Gegengewicht zu amerikanischen Interessen innerhalb einer Region
bilden, die China als Teil seiner "weiteren Peripherie" auffasst.
Zweitens sieht Peking, im Gegensatz zu den USA und Europa, in der
Frage der iranischen Atompolitik keine dringende Notwendigkeit zum
Handeln. Die meisten chinesischen Analysten sind nicht davon
überzeugt, dass Iran in absehbarer Zeit in der Lage sein wird, Uran so
anzureichern, dass es Nuklearwaffen produzieren könnte.
Drittens hat Peking keine Angst vor einem israelischen Luftangriff auf
iranische Atomanlagen. Es ist der Meinung, dass die USA motiviert und
stark genug sind, um ihren Verbündeten zu zügeln. Es macht den
Chinesen auch wenig aus, dass dieses Thema amerikanische Ressourcen
und Aufmerksamkeit in Anspruch nimmt.
Viertens: Peking steht der Zweckmäßigkeit von Sanktionen skeptisch
gegenüber. Bereits drei Mal hat der Westen Sanktionen gegen Iran
verhängt, ohne großen Erfolg. Sanktionen, so China, werden viel
wahrscheinlicher nur mehr Widerstand bewirken. Peking vermutet, dass
die westliche Fixierung auf Zwangsmaßnahmen Teil eines umfassenderen
Plans ist, der einen Regimewechsel in Teheran fördern soll. Bei
solchen Themen handelt China immer vorsichtig.
Blockiert China am Ende tatsächlich die bevorstehenden Sanktionen,
würde es dafür nicht nur einen hohen politischen Preis zahlen, sondern
auch einige seiner bedeutsamsten Interessen gefährden. Trotz der
jüngsten Reibungen mit den USA wegen der Waffenlieferungen an Taiwan
und wegen Obamas Treffen mit dem Dalai Lama, dem Oberhaupt der
Tibeter, will China nicht ernsthaft seine wichtigste bilaterale
Beziehung gefährden.
Vorerst steht China noch auf dem Siegertreppchen. Das Beharren auf
eine diplomatische Lösung verlängert den Zeitraum, indem alle Parteien
um Pekings Unterstützung buhlen. Gleichzeitig steigert China seine
Hebelwirkung. Je feindlicher sich der Westen gegen Iran verhält, umso
mehr Macht gewinnt Peking in Richtung Teheran. Iranische Beamte
versuchen bereits, China in eine verbindlichere, engere Beziehung im
Energiebereich zu locken. Anreize wie etwa Steuersenkungen für
chinesische Ölunternehmen sollen dabei helfen.
Sieht sich China jedoch mit einer einstimmigen Unterstützung für
Sanktionen von allen anderen ständigen Sicherheitsratsmitgliedern
konfrontiert, wird es nicht mehr sein Veto einsetzen. Dabei ist die
Position Russlands ein wesentlicher Faktor bei Chinas Berechnungen.
Traditionell arbeitet Peking mit Moskau zusammen, um im Sicherheitsrat
nicht isoliert zu werden. Moskaus wahrscheinliche Unterstützung der
Iran-Sanktionen schrumpft daher drastisch das Potenzial eines
chinesischen Einspruchs. Viel eher wird China versuchen, die
Zwangsmaßnahmen so weit wie möglich zu schwächen und letztlich
wirkungslos zu machen.
Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt ist China-Beraterin und Nordostasien-
Projektleiterin der International Crisis Group.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6557&l=1
"Asia Central, contra las cuerdas",
Robert Templer in Foreign Policy Edición Española
2 de marzo de 2010
Foreign Policy Edición Española
La emigración y la corrupción atentan contra la estabilidad de
Tayikistán, Kirguizistán y Uzbekistán, pero no hay reformas a la
vista. Sus gobiernos son incapaces y están muy poco motivados para
emprender los cambios políticos y económicos que pueden contener el
aumento de las tensiones y la pobreza causado por la crisis.
La crisis económica mundial ha arrasado con la poca estabilidad que
quedaba en muchos países de Asia Central. La zona se enfrenta a
inmensos problemas con una muy difícil solución. Y es que países como
Tayikistán, Kirguizistán y Uzbekistán ven peligrar su estabilidad por
diferentes causas: pobreza, desempleo, corrupción, emigración,
radicalización islámica e incremento de los regímenes autoritarios.
Pero los mayores problemas a los que se enfrentan, son sus propios
gobiernos, que tienen cero interés en solventar la situación. Si
quieren sobrevivir como Estados independientes, es necesario que se
esfuercen por crear economías funcionales, erradicar la corrupción,
mejorar los servicios sociales y realizar reformas urgentes en el
sector laborar.
La crisis provocó que millones de tayikos, kirguís y uzbecos que
emigraron a Rusia y Kazajistán en la época de bonanza de estos países,
perdieran sus trabajos. Ahora, muchos han vuelto a casa y otros han
decidido permanecer en la ilegalidad, sufriendo situaciones
discriminatorias a diestro y siniestro. Los efectos han sido
devastadores en ambos casos. Los propios gobiernos no pueden ocuparse
de los emigrantes retornados, porque no disponen de los medios
necesarios para hacerlo. Las remesas –fundamentales para la
subsistencia de estos países– han disminuido sustancialmente.
Multiplicando la pobreza ya existente.
Y es que sin saberlo, la emigración de trabajadores de Tayikistán,
Kirguistán y Uzbekistán ha servido durante muchos años como salvavidas
político en sus lugares de origen. Uno por la gran inyección económica
que suponen para su país, y de la que se han aprovechado sus
gobiernos. Dos, porque así se deshacen del sector más joven y a su vez
más crítico y problemático de la población. A los que más conflictos
puedan desatar, mejor tenerlos lejos. El resultado en el ámbito social
es la desmembración de muchas familias por la falta de una figura
masculina, ya que se trata de sociedades predominantemente
patriarcales.
Las estadísticas señalan que los que abandonaron sus casas para
trabajar en los países vecinos, con mejores economías son los más
capacitados y los más jóvenes. En Rusia y Kazajistán en cambio les
tocan los trabajos poco cualificados y muy mal pagados. Esta
hemorragia masiva la estuvieron sufriendo los gobiernos durante años,
sin hacer nada por impedirlo. La fuga de cerebros fue descomunal.
Ahora en cambio, muchos quieren volver.
Este es un problema enorme. Estos Estados no tienen la capacidad ni la
fortaleza económica para manejar la afluencia de repatriados. Ni
tampoco la intención. Así que se enfrentan a centenares de
desempleados tirados en sus calles. Los que antes traían dinero, ahora
son un estorbo. Todo esto, derivará en una nueva oleada de
delincuencia que acarreará consecuencias devastadoras para los países.
Si no llegan pronto las reformas, están perdidos.
La ineficacia de los mandatarios actuales está provocando una
situación insostenible. La corrupción en estos países es de
dimensiones inimaginables. La situación social y política, deplorable.
A este paso, su camino lleva directo a la autodestrucción. Y es que
los intereses particulares del gobierno, están provocando que muy
pocos prosperen, pero que muchos vivan en la más absoluta pobreza y
depresión.
Tayikistán ha estado en calma desde que finalizó la guerra civil en
1997. No obstante, la corrupción es incalculable. La violencia y la
pobreza se palpan en las calles y los grupos extremistas están
empezando a aflorar por todos los rincones del país. Principalmente,
por su proximidad a Afganistán. La situación es inadmisible.
En Kirguistán, las elecciones parlamentarias fraudulentas celebradas
en febrero de 2005, condujeron a un levantamiento popular sin
precedentes, que depuso al presidente Askar Akayev. En su lugar, fue
elegido Kurmanbek Bakíyev y desde entonces su Gobierno ha vivido una
crisis tras otra. Violencia política, revueltas, desconfianza popular
han sido sus ingredientes principales. La perspectiva del caos y la
delincuencia es desorbitada.
Uzbekistán se encuentra en una situación lamentable. Principalmente
debido a un Ejecutivo poco competente, a la depresión económica y a la
aplicación de políticas ineficaces. Las reformas políticas y
económicas han fallado. La represión religiosa y política y el
empeoramiento de las condiciones de vida han aumentado las tensiones y
la violencia.
Sin duda, sin nuevas reformas radicales tanto políticas como
laborales, con el paro afluente, la larga lista de problemas en la
región seguirá incrementándose. La inacción de los Estados para paliar
la grave situación es constante. Así que la inseguridad ciudadana
sigue creciendo.
El descontento no puede ser mayor. Sin esfuerzos irrefutables por
cambiar la situación, los países de Asia Central están a la merced de
los ciclos económicos y de la caída de los vecinos más poderosos, como
Rusia. La tranquilidad de estos Estados reside no en la política que
desarrollen internamente, sino en las condiciones externas que les
afecten.
Es poco probable que estos cambios ocurran en un futuro cercano. Los
gobiernos de la región siguen estando dirigidos por las élites, ajenas
a los problemas de la sociedad. La rápida acción que se necesita se ve
mermada por los intereses de unos pocos. Y mientras tanto, el pueblo
sigue sufriendo.
Robert Templer es director del Programa de Asia de International
Crisis Group
Foreign Policy http://www.fp-es.org/
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6555&l=1
"Les frontières incertaines du Kurdistan",
Joost Hiltermann in Le Monde diplomatique
4 mars 2010
Le Monde diplomatique
Entre Arabes et Kurdes irakiens, la fracture n’a rien de nouveau :
elle découle des promesses faites — et ultérieurement trahies — au
lendemain de la première guerre mondiale et de la chute de l’Empire
ottoman. Après l’invasion américaine de 2003, les revendications des
Kurdes ont resurgi avec force et leurs dirigeants tentent d’exploiter
la faiblesse de Bagdad. Mais la roue peut encore tourner. Le pouvoir
central se rebâtit lentement (lire « En Irak, émergence d’un pouvoir
autoritaire à dominante chiite »), dopé par les perspectives
d’exportations massives de pétrole, de nouveaux contrats venant d’être
signés avec des compagnies étrangères. Approche le moment fatidique où
les dirigeants kurdes et fédéraux devront prendre une décision :
conclure un accord ou, en cas d’échec, se préparer à une prochaine et
très sanglante guerre civile.
Pour beaucoup d’Irakiens, le terme impropre de « conflit chiites-
sunnites » cache la volonté des dirigeants d’activer des « leviers
confessionnels » pour atteindre leur objectif politique. Il en va de
même pour le terme de « conflit arabo-kurde ». A vrai dire, les
Irakiens n’ont pas tout à fait tort. Dans les quartiers de Bagdad, les
familles et les communautés sont mélangées, Arabes et Kurdes se
mariant entre eux et considérant l’identité irakienne comme un
dénominateur commun.
Ce phénomène se limite toutefois aux centres urbains car, plus on se
rapproche des collines vallonnées du Nord, des abords de l’Iran et de
la Turquie, des massifs montagneux du Kurdistan, plus cette identité
irakienne s’estompe au profit d’un fort nationalisme kurde
foncièrement opposé au nationalisme ethnique arabe qui se dissimule
sous le manteau de l’unité irakienne. Cette revendication remet ainsi
en question la légitimité de l’ordre postottoman, auquel les Kurdes
n’ont jamais adhéré, et réactive une notion obsolète, celle d’un «
Etat-nation » où se conjuguent Etat et identité ethnique.
Pour le moment, la bataille porte sur la délimitation de la frontière
entre cet « Irak kurde » et le reste du pays, en majorité arabe. S’il
ne tenait qu’aux Kurdes, cette ligne de (...)
Retrouvez la version intégrale de cet article dans Le Monde
diplomatique actuellement en kiosques.
Joost R. Hiltermann est Directeur adjoint du Middle East and North
Africa Project de l’International Crisis Goup
Le Monde diplomatique http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/
Middle East Peace: Ground Truths, Challenges Ahead,
Robert Malley
Testimony by Robert Malley, Middle East and North Africa Program
Director, International Crisis Group to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, “Middle East Peace: Ground Truths, Challenges Ahead”.
Mr. Chairman: First, let me express my appreciation to you for the
invitation to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
In the seventeen years since it was first launched, the peace process
has gone through times that were better and through times that were
worse, but none that were more complex, confusing or contradictory as
today. That is because of late so much that had been relatively
stable -- in terms of the character of local actors, shape of the
regional landscape and assessment of the U.S. role -- has undergone
dramatic shifts. Only a handful of these recent transformations need
mention: the death of Yasser Arafat, father of Palestinian
nationalism, and incapacitation of Ariel Sharon, Israel's last heroic
leader; Fatah's crisis; Hamas's electoral triumph and takeover in
Gaza; the 2006 Lebanon and 2008 Gaza wars, which shook Israel's
confidence and bolstered that of Islamist militants; the failure of
the Abbas-Olmert talks; U.S. regional setbacks in Iraq and diplomatic
disengagement elsewhere; Iran's increased influence; and the growing
role of other regional players. This is not a mere change in
scenery. It is a new world. As the ground beneath the peace process
has shifted, U.S. efforts have yet to fully adjust.
This hearing is entitled "Ground Truths, Challenges Ahead", and there
could not have been more fitting title. Only by taking a sober,
honest look at where things stand today might we have an opportunity
to overcome the challenges and begin to reshape the region in ways
that serve our national interests.
1.
Mr. Chairman, at the outset it is important to acknowledge several
stark, uncomfortable realities.
Among Palestinians, the national movement, once embodied by Fatah and
led by Arafat, is in deep crisis, weakened, fragmented and without a
compass. Fatah is divided, lacking a clear political program, prey to
competing claims to privilege and power. Rival sources of authority
have multiplied. Mahmoud Abbas is President, though his term has
expired; he heads the PLO, though the Organization's authority has
long waned. Salam Fayyad, the effective and resourceful Prime
Minister, cannot govern in Gaza and, in the West Bank, must govern
over much of Fatah's objection. Hamas has grown into a national and
regional phenomenon, and it now has Gaza solidly in its hands. But
the Islamist movement itself is at an impasse -- besieged in Gaza,
suppressed in the West Bank, at odds with most Arab states, with
little prospect for Palestinian reconciliation and with internal
divisions coming to the fore. Meanwhile, diaspora Palestinians --
once the avant-garde of the national movement -- are seeking to regain
their place, frustrated at feeling marginalized, angered by what they
see as the West Bankers' single-minded focus on their own fate.
Both symptom and cause of Palestinian frailty, foreign countries --
Arab, Western and other -- are wielding greater influence and in
greater numbers. All of which leaves room for doubt whether the
Palestinian national movement, as it currently stands, can confidently
and effectively conduct negotiations for a final peace agreement, sell
a putative agreement to its people, and, if popularly endorsed, make
it stick. There is insufficient consensus over fateful issues, but
also over where decisions should be made, by whom and how.
To this must be added more recent travails: the Goldstone affair,
which damaged President Abbas's personal credibility; the U.S.
administration's course correction on a settlements freeze, which
undercut Palestinian as well as Arab trust in America; and steps as
well as pronouncements by the Israeli government, which depleted what
faith remained in Prime Minister Netanyahu.
The backdrop, of course, is seventeen years of a peace process that
has yielded scant results, not a few of them negative, and has eroded
confidence in negotiations as a means of achieving national goals.
The Palestinian people, as much as its political elite, sees no real
alternative option, and so for now will persist on this path. The
acceptance of indirect talks, after some hesitation and after
rejecting their direct version, is the latest indication. But the
acceptance is grudging rather than heartfelt, and resigned rather than
hopeful. They are hoping for guarantees now, a sense that talks will
not last forever even as facts on the ground change in their
disfavor.
In far less pronounced fashion, Israel too has witnessed a
fragmentation of its political landscape. Endemic government weakness
and instability as well as deepening social splits have combined with
the rise of increasingly powerful settler and religious
constituencies. Together, these developments call into question the
state’s ability to achieve, let alone carry out, an agreement that
would entail the uprooting of tens of thousands of West Bank
settlers.
Nor has disillusionment with the peace process been an exclusively
Palestinian affair. Israelis too are losing hope; fairly or not, they
read Abbas's rejection of former Prime Minister Olmert's offer as a
sign that peace will remain elusive. Instead, they focus on the
violent aftermaths of their withdrawal from South Lebanon and from
Gaza; on the rise of militant forces in Palestine and throughout the
region that reject their nation's very existence; on those groups'
acquisition of ever more deadly and far-reaching weapons. Although
still confident in their military superiority, Israelis have begun to
doubt. The Lebanon and, to a lesser degree, Gaza wars were warning
signs to a nation for whom the security establishment has from the
start been a pillar of strength even amid political turmoil. The
threat to Israel, real or perceived, from Iran, Hamas and Hizbollah,
supplants much else. Israelis are looking for security guarantees
that take into account these broader regional shifts in any eventual
agreement; they also are looking for signs of genuine acceptance of,
rather than temporary acquiescence in their existence.
Political fragmentation has hit the regional scene as well and the
balance of power has been one victim. So-called moderate Arab regimes
on which the U.S. long relied no longer can dictate or expect
compliance from their counterparts. They too have suffered from the
peace process dead-end, the Lebanon war and the conflict over Gaza
which exposed them to their people as impotent or, worse, on the wrong
side of history. Increasingly, they appear worn out and bereft of a
cause other than preventing their own decline and proving their own
relevance. Gradually, they are being upstaged or rivaled by other,
more dynamic players, states (such as Iran, Syria or, to a lesser
degree, Qatar) or movements (most notably Hamas and Hizbollah). They
still can carry the day -- witness the Arabs' decision to back
proximity talks. But they do so with greater difficulty and so with
greater reservations, feeling the pressure of dissenters both domestic
and regional.
The final change, and one that arguably must concern us most, is the
United States' loss of credibility and influence. There are many
reasons for this -- setbacks in Iraq; Iran's rise; the failure of
diplomacy in the 1990s and the disengagement from diplomacy in the
decade that followed; and the unavoidable disappointment of
unreasonably high Arab expectations coupled with the avoidable U.S.
missteps that followed President Obama's election among others. The
bottom line is that large numbers in the region wonder what the U.S.
stands for and seeks to achieve and that -- an evolution far more
worrisome -- growing numbers have begun not to care.
2.
U.S. peace efforts toward a two-state solution have a chance to
succeed only if they take into account these profound alterations and
adapt to them. They cannot assume that our credibility, the outlook
or nature of the Israeli and Palestinian polities, or regional
dynamics in 2010 are even remotely similar to what they were in 2000.
In this sense, the fate of some of the administration's early efforts
should serve as a warning sign.
1. Any approach must take account of reduced U.S. credibility and
influence while seeking ways to restore them. The first lesson, self-
evident but too often honored in the breach, is to define a clear and
achievable goal, assess what actions are required -- domestically,
regionally and internationally -- to realize it and make sure there is
a strategy to cope with the fallout in the event one or both parties
resist. It means avoiding high stakes risks at a time when neither
the U.S. nor the region can afford another high level failure. It
means avoiding raising expectations and allowing actions to speak for
themselves. And it means working closely with others to increase our
leverage.
One particular idea that receives regular attention is for the U.S. to
unveil a set of parameters that can serve as its terms of reference
for negotiations -- e.g., a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders with
one-to-one swaps; Jerusalem as the capital of two states based on
demographic realities; a third party security presence in the West
Bank. I believe the time for such an initiative almost certainly will
come. It would not be a concession to either of the parties but
rather the prudential step of a mediator seeking to narrow negotiation
positions within realistic bounds; if such terms cannot be agreed
upon, it is hard to see what purpose negotiations might serve or how
they could possibly succeed. Nor would it be dictating a specific
outcome so much as defining a zone of possible compromise, making
clear to leaders on both sides what the U.S. believes to be a
reasonable outcome, giving their publics something to debate and rally
around, and suggesting the costs of forfeiting this chance. But this
should be done only at the right moment, in the proper context. It
should only be done with strong regional (especially Arab) and
international backing. And it should be done only if the U.S. is
prepared to deal with the prospect of either or both sides saying
no.
2. Our strategy must be mindful of, without being captive to, both
sides' politics and the mutual, collapsing faith in the old plans and
formulas. Mahmoud Abbas's refusal to engage in direct talks under the
auspices of a more sympathetic and engaged administration was, seen
from the U.S., frustrating and puzzling almost to the point of
incomprehension. Much of it was explained on account of his personal
trauma -- what the Goldstone humiliation meant to him and his close
ones -- and anxiety. Yet the impasse must be understood as going far
beyond personal pique (though there is some of that) or the
apprehensions of a single man (though he has a considerable amount of
that too).
Abbas's reaction is, above and beyond all, a reflection of an enormous
popular disappointment in the process that began in 1993. He is, in
a sense, the last true believer, holding out hope in the promise of a
negotiations strategy of which, among his colleagues, he was the first
and most ardent supporter. But even he could no longer ignore that he
sits at the centre of three concentric circles of failure: 16 years
since the Oslo accords, five since he was elected president and one
since Barack Obama took office. And so it has become that much harder
for him to justify or defend a process that is deprecated in Ramallah,
whether to a skeptical population, to his Fatah movement or even to
himself. His demands for a settlements freeze (prompted, he believes,
by the U.S.), then for robust terms of reference are not a sign that
he has given up on negotiations. They are a sign that he wants to
enter them under conditions that, in his mind, offer a chance of
success. It would be a mistake for us, or for Israel, to see Abbas as
a temporary obstacle rather than as the more moderate expression of a
deeply entrenched collective disillusionment.
The same is true on the Israeli side. Benjamin Netanyahu can be
maddening in his grudging acceptance of a two state solution, numerous
caveats, political maneuvering and foot-dragging. His coalition
partners -- a mix of right wing, xenophobic and religious parties --
certainly complicate the path toward a peace agreement. But
Netanyahu's insistence on Palestinian recognition of a Jewish state as
much as his demands for far more stringent security -- and thus,
territorial -- arrangements -- are not mere pretexts to avoid a deal
and are far more than the expressions of a passing political mood.
They reflect deep-seated popular sentiment regarding the yearning for
true Arab recognition and acceptance and fear of novel, unconventional
security threats. New coalition partners or new elections might
change the atmosphere. They are not about to change the underlying
frame of mind. In short, we should no more underestimate how deep
runs Palestinian skepticism than we should downplay how broadly
Netanyahu's positions resonate.
3. A successful strategy must reflect the changing nature -- and
increased fragmentation -- of both Palestinian and Israeli politics.
New actors and forces have emerged on both scenes. As a result, we
need to find a way to reach out to skeptical constituencies that often
are the most energized, the most dynamic and the most indifferent to
talk of a two-state solution. These include settlers and religious
groups on the Israeli side; the diaspora, refugees and Islamists on
the Palestinian. This will entail finding ways to communicate with
them, but also to reflect some of their concerns in an eventual peace
deal.
Mr. Chairman, any talk of inclusiveness inevitably raises the
difficult, controversial question of Hamas and how the U.S. ought to
deal with it. I have long believed that the issue of direct U.S.
engagement with the organization is a distraction, a diversion that
prevents us from thinking clearly and rationally about a more basic
issue -- namely, whether we believe a politically and geographically
divided Palestinian national movement is in a position to reach,
implement and sustain a historic deal.
My view is that it cannot. By challenging President Abbas, Hamas can
make it more difficult for him to resume direct negotiations. By
resuming rocket attacks from Gaza, it can once again disrupt talks
should they begin. By mounting a campaign in the territories and
refugee camps, it can torpedo the chance of passage in a referendum,
should a deal be reached. And, throughout -- by its activities,
rhetoric and presence in Gaza -- it lowers the Israeli public's belief
in peace. Hamas almost certainly has lost popular support and its
freedom of maneuver in the West Bank has been sharply curtailed. But
it remains a powerful political and military presence, with strong
domestic backing and the capacity to act. Conventional wisdom has it
that Hamas should be dealt with only once the peace process has shown
significant progress; the theory neglects the Islamist movement's
ability to ensure that it does not.
It ought not to have escaped notice that, amid the flurry of
discussions between Abbas and Olmert and then the drama surrounding
the initiation of direct or indirect talks between Abbas and
Netanyahu, some of the more practical, implicit arrangements and
serious negotiations have been struck between Israel and Hamas -- over
Gaza for example, or the prisoners exchange. That does not mean that
Hamas -- any more than Fatah -- can claim to represent the Palestinian
people or speak on their behalf. It does not mean that the U.S. must
deal directly with Hamas. And it does not mean that the U.S. should
openly promote Palestinian unity, a Palestinian decision that they
need to take themselves. But at a minimum, the U.S. should stop
standing in the way of a possible reconciliation agreement and signal
it would accept an accord to which President Abbas lent his name.
4. A successful strategy must adapt to changing regional dynamics.
The Middle East is far more polarized and decentralized than a decade
ago and our traditional partners no longer have the power they once
had to carry the region with them. With too many actors able and
willing to intervene, an Israeli-Palestinian track cannot proceed on
its own, let alone succeed on its own. This has major implications on
how we deal with.
Syria is not a central or perhaps even decisive actor in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. But it undoubtedly is a crucial one, and its
importance has risen as the regional landscape has changed. In
particular, its allies -- Hamas and Hizbollah -- have gained
considerable power. Damascus can take on a spoiling role or a
stabilizing one. It can facilitate Middle East peace or retard it.
How U.S.-Syrian relations evolve will go a long way toward determining
what part the Syrian regime ultimately chooses to play.
Improved relations between the U.S. and Syria as well as a resumption
of Israeli-Syrian peace talks are, in this respect, of critical
importance. It used to be feared that movement on the Syrian track
would impede progress on the Palestinian one. No more. There are
several reasons. On its own, an agreement between Israel and the
Palestinians, but without agreement with Syria or Lebanon, would not
produce peaceful relations between Jerusalem and the rest of the Arab
world. Without Syria, in other words, the most powerful incentive for
Israelis to make the compromises required for a peace deal --
recognition and normalcy -- would be lacking. Nor would Syria see any
reason to discourage its allies in Palestine from undermining the deal
or Hizbollah from maintaining military pressure in the north. In
other words, the benefits for Israel of a Palestinian deal are partial
and political costs are high. A comprehensive accord, by contrast,
would magnify the payoff: Arab states would establish normal relations
with Israel; Hizbollah and Hamas would have to readjust their stance;
even the Iranian leadership would be compelled to adapt. At a time
when growing numbers of Israelis are questioning both the feasibility
and usefulness of a peace agreement, this factor looms large.
Progress on the Syrian track also would bolster the Palestinians'
ability to move in their talks. Palestinians need Arab backing and
cooperation to legitimize compromises, most notably on issues that are
not strictly Palestinian -- the status of Jerusalem or the fate of the
refugees -- and for which Damascus's acquiescence would make a
difference. This is all the more true given the state of Palestinian
politics, weak, divided and susceptible to outside interference.
Should Syria feel excluded, it could undermine the accord and mobilize
its allies to do the same.
Finally, U.S engagement with Syria could be put to use to seek to
establish new redlines between Israel and Hizbollah. The border
between Israel and Lebanon might seldom have been calmer, but the
threshold for renewed -- and large-scale confrontation -- rarely has
been lower. Should conflict re-erupt and its ripple effects spread,
this once again deal a devastating blow to diplomatic prospects.
To date, the Obama administration's experience with the Syrian regime
has left many doubtful. Despite signs of engagement, including high
level visits and the decision to dispatch an ambassador, Washington
sees little evidence of reciprocity. To the contrary, it sees are
signs of deepening ties to Hizbollah and Iran and, most recently,
opposition to indirect Israeli-Palestinian talks.
It was always to be expected that engagement with Syria would be an
arduous, painstaking affair; prospects remain uncertain. But to judge
results at this stage or on the basis of its ties to traditional
allies is to misunderstand the regime and how it makes its decision.
Syria itself sees little of value emerging from the first 14 months of
the administration -- continued sanctions; repeated calls for it to
sever ties to reliable allies; paralysis on the peace process; and
lack of cooperation on regional issues.
There is a broader point. In Western capitals as well as in Israel,
considerable time and energy is spent on the question whether Syria is
genuinely interested in a peace deal; whether it would be prepared to
fundamentally shift is strategic orientation – shorthand for cutting
ties to current allies; and, if so, what it might take (returning the
Golan, neutralizing the international tribunal on the murder of former
Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri, lifting U.S. sanctions, or providing
vast economic support) to entice Damascus to make that move.
At its core, the question is ill-directed and the conceptual framework
underpinning it is flawed. However much Syria aspires to these
political or material returns, and notwithstanding the importance it
places on the bilateral U.S. relationship, the key for the regime
relates to its assessment of regional trends, domestic dynamics as
well as the interaction between the two. The end-result is a
debilitating perceptions gap: whereas outsiders ponder how far Syria
might be willing to go in helping reshape the region, Damascus
considers where the region is headed before deciding on its next
moves. What Washington can do for Damascus matters; what it can do in
and for the region may matter more.
The temptation in Washington so far has been to test Syrian goodwill
-- will it do more to harm the Iraqi insurgency, help President Abbas
in Palestine, loosen ties to traditional allies or stabilize Lebanon?
On its own, that almost certainly will not succeed. The U.S. is not
the only one looking for evidence. So too is Syria -- for proof that
the risks it takes will be offset by the gains it makes. The region's
volatility drives them to caution and to hedge their bets pending
greater clarity on where the region is heading and, in particular,
what Washington will do.
Ultimately, we do not know how far the Syrian leadership can or will
go. It likely will make up its mind only when it deems it absolutely
necessary -- when it is faced with a concrete and attractive
alternative strategic role in the region an peace offer. Today,
Syria's incentives -- strategic, economic and social -- to adjust its
posture and policies are high but uncertain; the risks are profound
and tangible. In particular, as long as the current situation of
neither peace nor war that defines Syria’s relations with Israel
endures, Damascus most likely will seek to maintain – and play on –
the multiplicity of its relations and will continue to use its ties to
Hizbollah, Iran and Hamas to provide it with what it considers a form
of leverage and deterrence. For Washington, the challenge was and
remains to adopt regional and bilateral policies that help Syria's
calculations in the right direction.
One thing is clear: Syria will be careful not to move prematurely and
risk alienating current allies without at a minimum having secured
complementary ones (regional or international). In this sense,
Syria’s ability to adjust its strategic stance also will be, in part,
a function of its allies’ situation and perceptions at the time. The
more Iran, Hizbollah or Hamas feel pressured, the more they interpret
Syrian moves as betraying them at a critical juncture, the harder it
will be for Damascus to display signs of greater autonomy or distance
from them. As a result, the more Syria's historic partners are
embattled and the U.S. clamors for a break between Syria and them, the
more Damascus will redouble signs of loyalty toward them. The recent
summit meeting between presidents Assad and Ahmadinejad, and the
highly dismissive tone adopted toward the U.S. are exhibit A.
Because sanctions will not be lifted until Syria changes its relations
with its allies and because Syria will not modify these relations in
the absence of far more substantial regional changes, a wiser approach
would be for the U.S. and Syria to explore together whether some
common ground could be found on specific issues and work on a
blueprint for their relationship. If successful, this could provide a
more realistic test of both sides' intentions, promote their interests
and start shaping the Middle East in ways that can reassure Syria
about what the future holds. On Iraq, Damascus may not truly exercise
positive influence until genuine progress is made toward internal
reconciliation. The U.S. could push in that direction, test Syria's
reciprocal moves and, together with the Iraq government, offer
Damascus the prospect of stronger economic relations with its
neighbor. In Palestine, Syria claims it can press Hamas to moderate
its views but again only if there is real appetite in the U.S. for an
end to the internal divide. Likewise, both countries could agree to
try to immunize Lebanon from regional conflicts and push the state to
focus on long-overdue issues of governance. Given the current outlook
and suspicion in Damascus and Washington, these are all long shots.
But, with little else in the Middle East looking up, it is a gamble
well worth taking.
3.
One cannot conclude an overview of the situation in the Middle East
without warning about real and potential flashpoints, either one of
which risks steering the region in unpredictable -- but predictably
perilous -- directions. There are many -- the explosive situation in
Jerusalem is one, the tense situation on Israel's northern border
another -- but I will focus briefly on one.
Mr. Chairman, you have visited Gaza recently and so there is no need
to describe the appalling humanitarian conditions of a population,
forty to sixty percent of whom are unemployed, in excess of that
living beneath the poverty level. Israel has legitimate security
concerns; it also has an interest in obtaining the release of Corporal
Shalit, held in captivity in Gaza for over 1,300 days.
But to inflict collective punishment on the people of Gaza is both
morally unconscionable and politically self-defeating. Hamas has lost
backing as a consequence of the siege, it is true, but at what price
and to what end? It is nowhere nearer losing control over Gaza and
elections are nowhere in sight. The end of all legal commerce and
flourishing of a tunnel-based economy is destroying the business class
and granting more power to those who currently hold it. A generation
of Gazans is bring brought up knowing nothing but want and despair.
Hamas -- although hardly eager for renewed confrontation after
Operation Cast Lead -- might soon conclude its best bet is to provoke
a new escalation in order to break out of its current impasse. Arab
public opinion, which harbored such high expectations for President
Obama, increasingly is viewing U.S. policy through the lens of Gaza's
ordeal and Washington's seeming obliviousness to this plight.
It is hard to see how any of this is good for Israel's security or
U.S. national interests. There are options for opening Gaza up to
normal trade -- through Israel, through Egypt or by sea -- in ways
that meet Israel's legitimate security concerns. We should press for
them and help put them into place.
6.
Mr. Chairman, at the dawn of this new presidency, my colleague Hussein
Agha and I wrote:
so much of what the peace process relied upon has been transfigured.
It was premised on the existence of two reasonably cohesive entities,
Israeli and Palestinian, capable of reaching and implementing historic
decisions, a situation that, today, is in serious doubt; continued
popular faith and interest in a two-state solution, which is waning;
significant U.S. credibility, which is hemorrhaging; and a relatively
stable regional landscape, which is undergoing seismic shifts.
The challenge for the administration is to devise a strategy that
strives for our traditional goals but in a radically transformed
environment. It will take persistence and flexibility, determination
and creativity, a retooled approach toward local parties and the
region. It likely will take time. There are no shortcuts. There is
no choice.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6560&l=1
African Peace-building Agenda: "Elections au Burundi : Prévenir toute
escalade de violence",
François Grignon
Un pas vers l´avant et, peut-être, deux vers l´arrière: la
consolidation démocratique et la stabilisation du Burundi de ces
dernières années seront mises à l´épreuve lors des prochaines
élections communales, présidentielles et législatives qui auront lieu
entre mai et septembre prochain. A l´approche de ces scrutins, les
principales forces politiques du pays doivent préserver les progrès
accomplis et la région poursuivre ses efforts de conciliation.
L’attitude de plus en plus répressive du parti au pouvoir contre ses
opposants et ses tentatives de manipulation du processus électoral
laissent craindre sa décrédibilisation : menaces et actes d
´intimidation sont quotidiennement à l´ordre du jour, les partis de l
´opposition ne peuvent jouir librement des libertés politiques de base
et les mouvements de jeunes des différentes formations politiques ont
commencé à s’affronter sous l’œil parfois complice de la police
nationale.
Après plus de dix ans de guerre civile et trois de transition, Pierre
Nkurunziza et son parti, le Conseil national pour la défense de la
démocratie – Forces de défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD), étaient
sortis vainqueurs des urnes il y a cinq ans. Le processus électoral
avait pu compter à l´époque sur l´appui d’une mission de maintien de
la paix des Nations unies, venue renforcer les troupes sud-africaines
déployées au début de la transition pour protéger les leaders rebelles
de retour au pays.
L´intégration des Forces nationales de libération (FNL) au sein des
institutions et de la vie politique nationale a transformé le paysage
politique burundais en portant la bataille pour le pouvoir au cœur de
la majorité Hutu, entre les différentes rébellions et les forces
politiques hutu non-armées. Cette polarisation rendra difficile
l’obtention de toute majorité absolue lors des prochaines élections
parlementaires, et peu probable toute victoire au premier tour du
scrutin présidentiel.
Ce scénario est bon pour le Burundi dont le processus de paix s’est
fondé sur le partage du pouvoir entre les différentes forces
politique, le dialogue et la recherche du compromis. C’est néanmoins
le pire pour le CNDD-FDD, qui est depuis trois ans en quête de pouvoir
sans partage, et voudrait saisir l’opportunité des prochains scrutins
pour y parvenir.
Sous pression, l´opposition est elle-aussi tentée de répondre à la
violence par la violence. Les FNL et le FRODEBU, comme le CNDD-FDD,
ont commencé à mobiliser ou remobiliser des groupes de jeunes, à des
fins d’auto-défense. De plus, à quelques exceptions près, les partis
d’opposition n’offrent pas de nouvelle vision politique pour le
Burundi. Ils répondent souvent à la pression sécuritaire par des
provocations où la surenchère verbale et se contentent d´accuser le
CNDD-FDD de corruption et de pratiques autoritaires, sans montrer
vraiment qu’une fois au pouvoir, ils agiraient différemment.
Garantir la sécurité et prévenir toute escalade de violence sont deux
enjeux fondamentaux pour le bon déroulement et la crédibilité des
scrutins. Pour cela, un changement d’attitude de l´administration
Nkurunziza et des partis d’opposition est indispensable. Ceux-ci
doivent abandonner toute mentalité de combat et préserver l’intégrité
des institutions nationales, que ce soit la police nationale ou la
Commission électorale nationale indépendante (CENI).
La société civile, ONG et média, doivent aussi se préparer à pouvoir
rendre compte des abus perpétrés sur l’ensemble du territoire, et les
documenter clairement afin de pouvoir en attribuer la responsabilité.
Le rôle de prévention joué par les médias publics et privés est
essentiel. Ceux-ci doivent absolument garantir un accès équitable et
équilibré sur toutes les ondes aux différentes forces politiques du
pays, produire une information de qualité et s’abstenir de toute
propagande politicienne.
Enfin, les pays de l´Initiative régionale sur le Burundi (Ouganda,
Tanzanie, Rwanda, Kenya, Afrique du Sud) devraient déployer une
mission de police régionale pour aider la police burundaise à assurer
la sécurisation des élections et renforcer son impartialité. Composée
de petites équipes et dotées de moyens logistiques et de
communications par les partenaires financiers du Burundi, cette
mission pourrait mettre l’accent sur la prévention de la violence en
travaillant directement au sein de la PNB pour renforcer ses capacités
et veiller à sa neutralité.
Cette mission pourrait aussi être mise sous l’autorité politique d´un
envoyé spécial régional de haut niveau, mandaté pour faciliter la
résolution des différends et conflits entourant la gestion du
processus électoral. Ce travail de médiation préventive pourrait
également prévenir toute escalade en cas d’incidents graves.
Parallèlement, les bailleurs de fonds devraient appuyer le déploiement
au plus tôt de missions nationales et internationales d´observation
électorale ainsi que fournir le financement nécessaire et l´expertise
technique adéquate à la CENI, pour lui assurer effectivement son
indépendance. Les responsables politiques burundais doivent aussi être
prévenus que tous ceux qui se rendraient responsables de crimes
politiques graves seront poursuivis par les juridictions
internationales, au cas où les juridictions burundaises ne seraient
pas en mesure de le faire.
Le moment n’est pas encore venu d’abandonner le Burundi aux affres de
la politique politicienne. Son processus de paix est un succès
national et régional remarquable. Il est essentiel de poursuivre sa
consolidation.
François Grignon est Directeur du Programme Afrique de l'International
Crisis Group.
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