Prague Spring
DR...@teikyopost.edu
following things come to mind: The multi-megaton nuclear tests conduncted before
the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in June 1963, Civil Defense drills in
school, the erection of the Berlin Wall, the Cuban missile crisis, various
political assassinations, The Gulf of Tonkin resolution, President Lyndon B.
Johnson's "Great Society" speech in Jan, 1965, the Vietnam War in which three of
my high school classmates died. One of the few bright memories is the "Prague
Spring," which I followed through television. In January 1988, when Alexander
Dubcek emerged from obscurity, I decided to delve into the details.
An abbeviated version of the following commentary was published in The American,
the former afternoon daily in Waterbury, CT that has since merged into the
morning Republican-American, on 2 September 1988 ("Seeds of 'Prague Spring'
Taking Hold 20 Years Later," p 7).
Domenico Rosa
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The recent 20th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia has sparked
renewed political activism that augments the ongoing struggles in Poland. In
Prague, 10,000 demonstrators chanted "Dubcek, Dubcek" and demanded the
withdrawal of Soviet troops and free elections. In Moscow, 500 activists,
organized by the fledgling Democratic Union, called for a return to a
multi-party government and shouted "Prague, Prague."
On the evening of August 20, 1968, over 500,000 Soviet and other Warsaw Pact
troops invaded Czechoslovakia, a treacherous and brutal act that shattered the
reform movement which had generated worldwide interest. In order to avoid
senseless bloodshed, the Czechoslovak government decided against a futile
military response and instead ordered peaceful civilian resistance.
By the next day the entire country had been occupied, and tanks rolled down the
streets of the major cities. Alexander Dubcek, the first secretary of the
Czechoslovak Communist Party, and other reform leaders were handcuffed and flown
to secret locations. The emotional oral confrontations between the unarmed
civilians and the edgy soldiers and tank crews provided a dramatic spectacle on
the evening news.
The "Prague Spring" began in January 1968 when the stalinist Antonin Novotny was
forced to resign as first secretary of the Communist Party. The reformers
embarked on a "new course" that was based on the recognition and public
admission that twenty years of stalinist rule had been a dismal failure. This
"new course" called for a return to "socialism with a human face" and
"democratic socialism." In less than eight months, profound political and
economic changes that were implemented, creating a sensation on both sides of
the iron curtain.
In 1946 the Czechoslovak Communist Party received a plurality of 38.7% of the
votes in a relatively free and open election. In February 1948, a political
crisis arose, and the Communist Party seized absolute power. As a result of
Soviet dictator Josef Stalin's machinations, from 1948 to 1953 there followed a
series of purges, arrests, show trials and executions. The Czechoslovak
Communist Party was recast in the form of the perverse apparat, the brutal
secret police-based system that Stalin had created twenty years earlier. Novotny
was a prime mover and beneficiary of the purges, becoming first secretary in
1953 and president in 1957. He ruled as a virtual dictator making effective use
of the secret police, political intrigue and patronage.
Novotny was able to keep a tight lid on the ferment that erupted within the
Soviet bloc during his tenure. In 1953 Stalin's death led to a wave of riots and
strikes in Eastern Europe. In Hungary, Imre Nagy became prime minister of a
reform government that lasted until the stalinists ousted him in 1955. In
February 1956, Nikita S. Khrushchev delivered his famous "secret speech" that
denounced some of Stalin's crimes and launched his destalinization campaign.
Political crises soon erupted in Poland and Hungary. In Poland, Wlawdyslaw
Gomulka established a "national communist" government following a personal
confrontation in which he convinced Khrushchev to halt the Soviet forces that
were heading for Warsaw. In Hungary, continued stalinist rule led to large
popular demonstrations that erupted into a full-scale revolution that toppled
the communist regime and returned Nagy to power. Nagy's inability to control the
revolution and his plans to withraw from the Warsaw Pact and declare neutrality
contributed to the bloody Soviet invasion in November 1956.
In 1964 Khrushchev was deposed and replaced by Leonid I. Brezhnev as first
secretary and by Aleksei N. Kosygin as prime minister. Destalinization and
liberalization came to an abrupt halt, and an official program to rehabilitate
Stalin was begun.
By 1967 Czechoslovakia faced enormous problems: a population crippled and
powerless after twenty years of submission to stalinist rule; economic
stagnation arising from dogmatic stalinist "iron and steel" central planning; a
work force without initiative and demoralized by incompetent managers and
political hacks who controlled the trade unions; cynical students staging
periodic demonstrations and following silly western fads; intellectuals unhappy
with strict censorship and constant repression; a civil service stifled by the
absurd stalinist dual bureaucracy whereby every government ministry had a
duplicate entity within the Communist Party apparatus; a moribund Communist
Party controlled by a collection of mediocre bureaucrats known as apparatchiks,
corrupt political insiders and ruthless opportunists.
In the autumn of 1967 discontentment with Novotny's rule was widespread even
within his handpicked central committee which was trying to engineer his
resignation. In December Novotny's last two schemes--a personal appeal to
Brezhnev and a military coup--both fell flat. When the central committee
reconvened in January, Novotny had no option but to resign as first secretary,
although he was allowed to retain the cerimonial office of President. Dubcek, a
centrist among the reformers, was unanimously elected first secretary on January
5.
The censored press had not informed the public about the intense power struggle
within the central committee, although bits and pieces had filtered through
foreign sources. The cautious public was unsure about what to expect from
Dubcek's election. On the surface, his personality and background indicated
nothing more than an honest, clean apparatchik. There was, however, a strong
underlying feeling that profound changes were to follow. This was demonstrated
on January 7 when Dubcek attended a soccer match and received prolonged,
spontaneous applause from the spectators.
The reformers had definite objectives: revitalization and democratization of the
entire Communist Party apparatus, with all deliberations and debates made
public; dismantling the dual bureaucracy and entrusting the day-to-day
government operations to the professional civil service; establishing an
independent judiciary; eliminating cencorship; decentralizing economic planning;
and overall emancipation of all sectors of society.
There was no set plan for achieving these objectives and no way of determining
the ultimate results. The reformers went out of their way to reaffirm repeatedly
their loyalty to the Soviet Union and their adherence to the Warsaw Pact. They
remembered the Soviet invasion of Hungary and wanted to avoid a similar fate.
However, they felt that the reforms were essential and inevitable in order to
establish a viable claim for retaining power.
Events soon started following their own course. Public opinion and the press
became the key instruments for dislodging conservatives from their posts.
Government archives were opened to investigators. Renewed interest in political
developments led to a phenomenal increase in sales of newspapers and magazines.
Public disclosures about corruption, abuses of power and the political trials of
the 1950's aroused immense public anger and forced many resignations. Some
officials committed suicide. The corrupt general Jan Sejna fled and was given
political asylum in the United States.
In March the censors voluntarily ceased to funtion, although the law ending
cencorship was not passed until June. Novotny resigned as President and was
replaced by Ludvik Svoboda who had commanded the Czechoslovak corps that had
distinguished itself in the Eastern Front during World War II. Swoboda had been
awarded numerous Soviet military decorations. After the war, he became a victim
of the purges, was jailed and was later assigned as a bookkeeper to a remote
cooperative. Subsequently, he was rehabilitated at Khrushchev's personal
insistence and was appointed to the army's historical institute. The intent of
his appointment was to reassure the Soviet leaders.
In April the central committee formally approved the "action program" of
reforms. At this meeting Dubcek mentioned the need to return to "socialism with
a human face." In May plans were announced for convening an extraordinary
congress of the Communist Party in September. The task of the congress would be
to debate and ratify the reforms and to elect a new central committee which
would exclude most of the remaining conservatives.
By this time, the Soviet leaders were having grave concerns about the startling
developments in Czechoslovakia. To the Czechoslovaks the reforms strengthened
the power of the Communist Party. The Soviet leaders felt that the Communist
Party, and therefore the Soviet Union, was losing control. The continued
assurances by the reformers that they were loyal to the Soviet Union and the
Warsaw Pact did not offset the fact that most of the men who were obedient to
Moscow had been removed from office. The elimination of cencorship had led to
the publication of some articles that criticized the Soviet Union, proposed
leaving the Warsaw Pact and declaring neutrality, and asked for a return to a
multi-party system. The reformers would not yield to Soviet pressure for halting
the reform process and restoring cencorship. Many meetings were held between
Czechoslovak and Soviet officials, culminating in a heated three day
confrontation at the end of July. The Bratislava agreement that followed gave
the impression that the crisis had been resolved.
In setting the stage for the invasion, the Soviet bloc press had been publishing
a barrage of bogus articles giving the impression that the Czechoslovak party
had been taken over by a small group which was under the spell of West German
"revanchists" and other "imperialists." The official communique following the
invasion stated that the troops were sent in response to an appeal from
"statesmen and party representatives" requesting assistance against "the threat
of counterrevolutionary forces who were plotting with foreign forces hostile to
socialism."
The Soviets planned to set up a puppet "revolutionary government of workers and
peasants." This plan was foiled by President Svoboda who secured the release of
the arrested reformers and forced the Soviets to negotiate with them. As a
result of these Moscow negotiations, Dubcek and other reformers were reinstated.
However, the Soviets regained control of the secret police and proceeded to
dismantle the "Prague Spring" from the inside. Dubcek was ousted as first
secretary in 1969, expelled from the party in 1970 and given a job as a forestry
inspector.
The "Prague Spring" became a historical footnote. Dubcek and the other reformers
faded into obscurity depicted in the West as naive dreamers who expected to
convice Brezhnev and Kosygin that the apparat could be successfully converted
into democration socialism.
Eventually, Brezhnev and Kosygin became captives of the apparat. Kosygin's
proposed limited reforms were shelved by the party bureacracy, and he was
permitted to retire as prime minister only a few months before his death.
Brezhnev ushered in an era of unprecedented privileges, perks and corruption for
the bureacracy, although the overall standard of living declined. During the
last years of his life he was almost totally incapacitated, but he had to be
retained as a front-man and died in office in Nov. 1982.
Today Brezhnev is in disgrace and is blamed for the "era of stagnation." Soviet
novelist Daniel Granin has decribed Brezhnev's cabal as a bunch of
"money-grubbers, fleecers, high-flown con men, heros of cynicism and black
marketeers."
The course of history has intervened. References to the "Prague Spring" are
being made in the world press in conjunction with Soviet leader Mikhail S.
Gorbachev's programs of "glasnost" and "perestroika" involving openness and
economic restructuring. Last January, the Italian newspaper, L'Unita', published
a startling interview with Dubcek, his first since being deposed. Dubcek
referred to "perestroika" as being "indispensable" and of having a "profound
connection" with his own reform program of 20 years ago.
Dubcek lamented the loss of 20 years and pondered "about what could have been
accomplished in these years with the 'new course' and about the advantages which
there would have been for our country and for socialism."
Not many reformers have been able to survive. Dubcek has lived to see the seeds
of the "Prague Spring" take root in the heart of the apparat that crushed him 20
years ago.