Barlevi & Deobandi Schools Slug It Out In Pakistan's Civil War
nkdat...@bigmailbox.net
Daily Star, Dhaka, Bangladesh
Friday, June 26, 2009
Civil war in Pakistan?
By M.B.Naqvi
PAKISTAN is in the midst of a civil war. Taliban, al-Qaeda and other
Islamic extremist groups like LET, Jaish Mohammad, et al claim that
they are fighting for Islam and they aim at establishing an Islamic
Caliphate. Those in power are now jubilant. They have the Taliban on
the run; the Pakistan army has scored victories in Swat and Malakand
Divisions. So far so good.
What they are now claiming is a second victory: all religious leaders
and Mashaikh of the Barelvi school have termed all those rebels in
Pakistan's northwest as un-Islamic. Scholars of Darul Uloom Deoband,
the second largest chunk of the subcontinent's Muslims, have come out
clearly, disowning the Taliban and calling their efforts un-Islamic.
These are political victories, if they can be used properly; improper
use will boomerang. The celebrations are premature. Why?
In a civil war there are always ups and downs. The rebels fight an
asymmetrical war: they come, hit and disappear; they refuse to fight
set piece battles. It is the army that wants them to congregate in one
place so that it can crush them.
They normally refuse to provide this satisfaction to an army, except
when they are about to win. That stage is not near. The Pakistan army
started with an offensive and the Taliban disappeared. They went into
their hiding places -- only to come out again later to attack and then
see if they have to run away or can stay. This can happen innumerable
times. This is where Pakistan is at.
The certificates from the leaders of Barelvi and Deobandi schools can
be put to use if used for propaganda. There is a great risk involved
in what Pakistan has so far done. The Ulema and Mashaikh of the
Barelvi school were collected by the state, and there appear to be
some who perhaps want some kind of a civil war between Barelvis and
Deobandis. This can lead to unending woes and sorrows for the people.
Will someone drive some sense into the brains of decision-makers in
this country?
No doubt the Pakistan state now has an advantage. Winning a civil war
is all about getting the support and allegiance of the common people.
Once the state wins back respect and love from its own people, it
cannot be defeated. The rebel guerillas also cannot succeed without
popular support. Is the Pakistan state in a position to ensure the
Islamic bigots' ultimate defeat?
The story is that the Taliban have not been able to re-establish
rapport with the common people of NWFP and tribal areas. Most people
do not like the Taliban, al-Qaeda and others. Doubtless they fear them
because of what they will do if they become angry. The February 2008
election showed that an ordinary Pushtoon prefers secular Pushtoon
nationalists of ANP to all others, including those shouting Islamic
slogans. Even in a later bye-election ANP won handsomely.
The trouble in the Frontier region is in part another civil war inside
the larger civil war: The Taliban wants ANP to be decimated more than
anything else. This has also proved to be a contest between those who
promise an Islamic dispensation and secular democrats.
Pakistan has first to ensure that the common people side with them and
oppose the cruel and barbaric obscurantists. This is where the
propaganda part comes in. Propaganda, if done stupidly, can backfire.
Secondly, how it will manage that is up to the state; but it has to
mobilise the people against the barbaric Taliban.
How can it win the people's support against those who offer quick and
cheap Islamic justice and a Caliphate, which might superficially
appeal to Muslim or Pushtoon masses?
If the state is seen as mobilising some people in the way the Indians
mobilised their Salva Judums against Naxalites, it may not be
effective. The mobilised people should not be seen as robots
manipulated by the government. The state has to do better than the
rebels, but has fewer resources in those parts. It can implement its
plans more easily, and the rebels cannot do without bloodshed and
dicey efforts. The state has to reform itself as well as the economy
so that the common people get something.
The trajectory of a civil war should be familiar to people now after
so many cases that can be studied. The rebels succeed when they do
better than the state. The biggest historic victory of rebels was in
China under Mao Tse Tung. He established what later became China by
one simple but effective device: his men and women confiscated the
lands of big landlords and redistributed them among the landless.
Whoever does this becomes a political immortal. By the time Mao's
march men ended, there was the People's Republic of China.
In India, CPM implemented modest but effective land redistribution --
and has ruled West Bengal for over 37 years. Only now has CPM received
a big setback, when the party started behaving like others in wooing
industrialists with lands of poor peasants. It is an object lesson to
the subcontinent's politicians.
This CPM episode must be understood. Only he who does something
concrete for the poor and the needy will win in the end. Those who do
not do so will lose. This is the best way to conquer any territory,
and the conquest will last indefinitely if the conqueror is not stupid
or needlessly greedy. The old rebels become the new People's army and
go on to become a bigger and stronger state.
But the process can be reversed just as easily. But it is contingent
on one big condition. The state has to be intelligent and well
informed. Stupid states are fated to fail and come to grief. All a
government or a state has to do is what the rebels promise -- in
substance and not in form only. But ownership of land is the core
issue in most places.
In populous South Asia, unemployment and overpopulation make for a
combustible situation. Fulfillment of the promise of a job or ensuring
other means of livelihood does the same for urban people that
guerillas have done for the landless in the countryside.
The state can always do much more than the rebels. It can ensure
personal freedoms as well as provide some kind of a social security,
together with genuine land reforms, while ensuring impartial justice.
Romanise
What of the article is the basis for you to add "Barlevi & Deobandi
Schools Slug It Out" to the title?
Is it that Pakistani Government is closer to Barelvi than to deobandi
despite both calling Taliban un-islamic?
Have Taliban taken away land of Zamindars like Nanga Pir, Zafar Khan,
Imran Khan, etc and given it to poor
Satish Kumar
>
> What of the article is the basis for you to add "Barlevi & Deobandi
> Schools Slug It Out" to the title?
> Is it that Pakistani Government is closer to Barelvi than to deobandi
> despite both calling Taliban un-islamic?
>
> Have Taliban taken away land of Zamindars like Nanga Pir, Zafar Khan,
> Imran Khan, etc and given it to poor
>
> www.dmjoshi.org
It is as meaningless to draw distinction between an evil Deobandi and
an equally evil Barlevi as it is to do such between General Yahya Khan
Tweedledum and General Zia ul Huq Tweeddledee. But for all that it