Google Groups no longer supports new Usenet posts or subscriptions. Historical content remains viewable.
Dismiss

Name Your Balt Commie

2 views
Skip to first unread message

Alexei

unread,
Jul 30, 2003, 9:15:11 AM7/30/03
to
In light of Holman's posting, I thought I'd start a list of Balts taking
part in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to show Henry that not only
"russkies" were participants in the CPSU's policies. Naturally, some of the
members had no choice, but surely, to be named a leader, one had a choice.

1. Arvids Pelshe
2. Viktors Pugo
3. Alfreds Rubiks
4. Augusts Voss
5. The Latvian Riflemen -- those who protected Lenin during the October
revolution
6. Anatolijs Gorbunovs...

Anyone else?

Aleksejs


Henry Alminas

unread,
Jul 30, 2003, 9:35:14 AM7/30/03
to

"Alexei" <al...@altaboutlatvia.com> wrote in message
news:bg8gp5$17o9$1...@msunews.cl.msu.edu...

Gee, gawsh Alex - so what percentage of the *Latvian* population
does that make? (Even if you assume that the people named
were indeed ethnic Latvians).

Best - - Henry


Alexei

unread,
Jul 30, 2003, 9:52:35 AM7/30/03
to

"Henry Alminas" <halm...@comcast.net> wrote in message
news:mQPVa.12801$Vt6....@rwcrnsc52.ops.asp.att.net...

My grandfather didn't get his promotion because he wasn't a member of the
Communist Party. And he didn't want to be. So I draw a conclusion that one
must have been a member of the Communist Party to get any kind of promotion
at work, thus the majority of those residing in Latvia were communists,
though not by ideology.
My point is that some Latvians played a bigger role in the Soviet government
than they're credited.And if you look at the puppet governments installed in
the Baltics after 1940, the chairpersons were representatives of ethnic
nationalities: i.e. in Lithuania, it was a Lithuanian in charge under the
Soviet, in Latvia, it was a Latvians and in Estonia it was Estonian. Surely,
they hadn't just converted to communism, but were fervent supporters of the
idea.

Aleks


Eugene Holman

unread,
Jul 30, 2003, 10:08:07 AM7/30/03
to
In article <bg8gp5$17o9$1...@msunews.cl.msu.edu>, "Alexei"
<al...@altaboutlatvia.com> wrote:

7. Antanas Snieckus
8. Justas Paleckis
9. Johannes Lauristin
10. Albert Kolge
11. Väino Väljas [who served as Soviet ambassador to politically sensitive
Nicaragua under Gorbachev]
12. Edgar Savisaar
13. Arnold Rüütel [presently the president of Estonia]
14. Algirdas Brazauskas [presently the prime minister of Lithuania]
15. - 52. The 37 unnamed Lithuanian communists shot by Lithuanian
partisans and Einsatzkommando 3 at Panevezys and Kedainiai in late July,
1941.


On Johannes Lauristin:
Source:
http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1991/02/910227.html(opt,mozilla,unix,english,,new)

<quote>
LAURISTIN BUST REMOVED. The bust of Estonian Communist leader
Johannes Lauristin has been removed from the courtyard of Toompea
Castle, seat of the Estonian government, Paevaleht reported February
26. Tallinn's Deputy Mayor Irina Raud said the bust was removed
at the family's request. Johannes Lauristin joined the ECP in
1917 and died fleeing the advancing German Army in 1941. His
daughter Marju, a strong proponent of Estonian independence outside
the USSR, is the current deputy speaker of Estonia's Supreme
Council. (Riina Kionka)
</quote>

It is difficult to determine how reliable the Jäger Report [
http://www.holocaust-history.org/works/jaeger-report/] is, supposedly
documenting the "cleansing" of Lithuania and neighboring territories of
Jews, communists, and other undesirables by Einsatzkommando 3, assisted by
local Lithuanian partisans, during the summer of 1941.

Supposing that it is at least partially trustworthy, lest us consider the
entry [Source: ibidem] for July 21, 1941:
<quote>
July 21, 41 Panevezys 59 Jews, 11 Jewesses,
1 fem. Lithuanian, 1 Pole, 22 Lith. Comm., 9 Russ. Comm. 103
</quote>

In Panevys on July 21, 1941, 22 people which the Nazis regarded as
*Lithuanian communists*, that is to say, not Jews, not Russians, and not

Two days later we get for Kedainiai:

<quote>
July 23, 41 Kedainiai 83 Jews, 12 Jewesses, 14 Russ.
Comm., 15 Lith. Comm., 1 Russ. O-Politruk 3 125
</quote>

Once again, the toll of 125 for this locality includes 15 *Lithuanian
communists* in addition to 14 Russian communists and 1 Russian political
leader (politruk).

These unnamed Lithuanian communists were evidently pointed out to the
Germans by the local partisans. We can assume that they had a local
profile that justified their being shot in the minds of the partisans and
the members of Einsatskomamndo 3.

Regards,
Eugene Holman

Henry Alminas

unread,
Jul 30, 2003, 10:09:28 AM7/30/03
to

"Alexei" <al...@altaboutlatvia.com> wrote in message
news:bg8it3$19fa$1...@msunews.cl.msu.edu...

Are you a slow reader Alex?

Best - - Henry


Eugene Holman

unread,
Jul 30, 2003, 10:16:04 AM7/30/03
to
In article <bg8gp5$17o9$1...@msunews.cl.msu.edu>, "Alexei"
<al...@altaboutlatvia.com> wrote:

> In light of Holman's posting, I thought I'd start a list of Balts taking
> part in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to show Henry that not only
> "russkies" were participants in the CPSU's policies. Naturally, some of the
> members had no choice, but surely, to be named a leader, one had a choice.
>
> 1. Arvids Pelshe
> 2. Viktors Pugo
> 3. Alfreds Rubiks
> 4. Augusts Voss
> 5. The Latvian Riflemen -- those who protected Lenin during the October
> revolution
> 6. Anatolijs Gorbunovs...

7. Antanas Snieckus

*Lithuanian communists*, that is to say, not Jews and not Russian communists.

Two days later we get for Kedainiai:

<quote>
July 23, 41 Kedainiai 83 Jews, 12 Jewesses, 14 Russ.
Comm., 15 Lith. Comm., 1 Russ. O-Politruk 3 125
</quote>

Once again, the toll of 125 for this locality includes 15 *Lithuanian
communists* in addition to 14 Russian communists and 1 Russian political
leader (politruk).

These unnamed Lithuanian communists were evidently pointed out to the
Germans by the local partisans. We can assume that they had a local
profile that justified their being shot in the minds of the partisans and

the members of Einsatzkommando 3.

These are just two entries for a more than two month orgy of killing
during the course of which more than 130,000 people, a third of them
Jewish children and more than a thousand of them listed as 'Lithuanian
communists* were recorded as having been killed in Lithuania and adjacent
territories in southern Latvia, [at that time] Poland, and western Belarus
by the members of Einsatzkommando 3 with the assistance of Lithuanian
partisans.

Regards,
Eugene Holman

Henry Alminas

unread,
Jul 30, 2003, 10:32:23 AM7/30/03
to

"Eugene Holman" <hol...@elo.helsinki.fi> wrote in message
news:holman-3007...@10.1.1.191...

Keep trying dimbulb.
We have been through this before.
Now let us check the progression of you Alzheimer's condition.
Just what was the percentage of ethnic Lithuanians in the communist
party prior to russkie "liberation" - say in 1938?
I know that I posted those figures for you - several times.

Best - - Henry


Eugene Holman

unread,
Jul 30, 2003, 10:57:37 AM7/30/03
to
In article <XFQVa.18958$uu5.2498@sccrnsc04>, "Henry Alminas"
<halm...@comcast.net> wrote:

<deletions>


>
> Keep trying dimbulb.
> We have been through this before.
> Now let us check the progression of you Alzheimer's condition.
> Just what was the percentage of ethnic Lithuanians in the communist
> party prior to russkie "liberation" - say in 1938?

At most a few hundred. But that was 1938.

> I know that I posted those figures for you - several times.

I am perfectly aware of the fact that communism had virtually no popular
support in the Baltics prior to 1940. But I am also aware of the fact that
its lack of popular support in Russia in 1917 did not prevent Lenin and
Stalin from imposing their will and political agenda, using tools such as
mass repression and artifical famines to make their point, on the country
and eventually establishing a communist dictatorship there, either.

By July 1941, when these murders of thousands of Lithuanian communists
were taking place, many Lithuanians had been indoctrinated into communism,
has been forced into the party, or had entered it for purely pragmatic
reasons. Although the Nazis were consolidating their position as primary
occupants many Lithuanians had joined the party during the preceding year
in order to continue to work in local administration or virtually any
high-profile job. I certainly agree with you that the number of Lithuanian
communists was still relatively small, but it was far larger than it had
been in 1938. People in provincial towns pointed out to the marauding
Einstazkommandos as Lithuanian communists had probably been school
principals, police and fire chiefs, journalists, and mid-level bureaucrats
a few weeks earlier when the Nazi invasion began. Indeed, after
Lithuania's incorporation into the USSR in September, 1940, they could not
have served in such positions had they not, nominally at least, been
Communist Party members. Thus, in the Lithuania of July, 1941, "Lithuanian
communist" does not, for the most part, mean Lithuanian true believer in
communism. rather, it means person known to have been a member of the
local communist party, because he/she could not be functioning in certain
positions in what was by then a Sovietized society without party
membership.

You seem to be working on the assumption that communists need some type of
popular support before they can gain power. The reverse is the case.
Standard communist procedures call for a small group of dedicated
revolutionaries to sieze power, close the borders, and take control of all
media and communications. The population is thus under their absolute and
total control, and is forced to listen to its version of the news and
accept its policies. The job of building popular support is then
imlemented using carrots, such as full employment, abundant money [chasing
far too few goods, but that's another problem], and chestfuls of medals
and citations, and the stick of confiscations, arbitrary arrests,
deportations, and murders.

Best,
Eugene Holman

Eugene Holman

unread,
Jul 30, 2003, 11:21:19 AM7/30/03
to
In article <XFQVa.18958$uu5.2498@sccrnsc04>, "Henry Alminas"
<halm...@comcast.net> wrote:

<deletions>
>
> Keep trying dimbulb.
> We have been through this before.
> Now let us check the progression of you Alzheimer's condition.
> Just what was the percentage of ethnic Lithuanians in the communist
> party prior to russkie "liberation" - say in 1938?

At most a few hundred. But that was 1938.

> I know that I posted those figures for you - several times.

I am perfectly aware of the fact that communism had virtually no popular
support in the Baltics prior to 1940. But I am also aware of the fact that
its lack of popular support in Russia in 1917 did not prevent Lenin and
Stalin from imposing their will and political agenda, using tools such as
mass repression and artifical famines to make their point, on the country
and eventually establishing a communist dictatorship there, either.

By July 1941, when these murders of thousands of Lithuanian communists
were taking place, many Lithuanians had been indoctrinated into communism,

had been forced into the party, or had entered it for purely pragmatic
reasons. Although the Nazis were then consolidating their position as primary
occupants, many Lithuanians had joined the party during the preceding year


in order to continue to work in local administration or virtually any
high-profile job. I certainly agree with you that the number of Lithuanian
communists was still relatively small, but it was far larger than it had
been in 1938. People in provincial towns pointed out to the marauding
Einstazkommandos as Lithuanian communists had probably been school
principals, police and fire chiefs, journalists, and mid-level bureaucrats
a few weeks earlier when the Nazi invasion began. Indeed, after
Lithuania's incorporation into the USSR in September, 1940, they could not
have served in such positions had they not, nominally at least, been
Communist Party members. Thus, in the Lithuania of July, 1941, "Lithuanian
communist" does not, for the most part, mean "Lithuanian true believer in

communism", rather, it means "person known to have been a member of the
local communist party", because he/she could not be functioning in certain


positions in what was by then a Sovietized society without party
membership.

You seem to be working on the assumption that communists need some type of
popular support before they can gain power. The reverse is the case.
Standard communist procedures call for a small group of dedicated
revolutionaries to sieze power, close the borders, and take control of all
media and communications. The population is thus under their absolute and
total control, and is forced to listen to its version of the news and
accept its policies. The job of building popular support is then

implemented using carrots, such as full employment, abundant money [chasing

treasure

unread,
Jul 30, 2003, 1:16:28 PM7/30/03
to
I am curious who these "local Lithuanian partisans" cooperating with the
German Einsatzkommando 3 were. I am only familiar with two groups who were
called "Lithuanian partisans" . One were the Soviet guerrilla units who
were trained and sent from Russia to infiltrate prior to entry of the Soviet
Army. They were recruited from
the exile camps that sprouted up in Russian, Belarus (Gudian) and Ukrainian
cities by those fleeing the German invasion. The ones sent to Lithuania
typically consisted of large amounts of Russians, Litvaks, Poles, Gudai.
Ethnic Lithuanians made up as few as 20-30% and rarely more than 60% ethnic
Lithuanians. They would not necessarily be acting openly in areas that
they would be recognized by the local population until after The Army had
established control. And then they would no longer be "necessary" anyway.
Seem highly unlikely that they would be cooperating with the German
Einsatzkommando.

The other group were the Lithuanian "Mis^ko Broliai" or Forest Brothers
which were a mixture of former Lithuanian Army troops and civilians,
volunteer or forced to take to the woods to escape conscription or arrest by
the occupying armies. Usually operating locally they eventually coalesced
into a single command under VLIK-as, the Supreme Committee for the
Liberation of Lithuania. The focus of the Mis^ko Broliai was resistance to
the Nazi invasion and occupation, and later resistance to the Communist
invasion. I wonder why partisans who were leading resistance to Nazi
occupation would at the same time be cooperating with Nazi units?

Who were this 3rd group of partisans who were cooperating with this German
Einsatzkommando 3 then?
Were they some of the German units who operated dressed in the uniforms of
the local army or militias?
Or were they German conscripted, organized and trained units?
Who was this German Einsatzkommando 3 anyway?

-Kovas


* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
In the faces of men and women I see God.
~Walt Whitman in Song of Myself~
0====(::::::::::::::::>
Spirit Tomes and Treasures
"Books and Earthly Goods to Nurture the Spirit"
*Visit http://www.spirit-tomes.com for
metaphysical supplies and information.*


Eugene Holman <hol...@elo.helsinki.fi> wrote in message
news:holman-3007...@10.1.1.191...

treasure

unread,
Jul 30, 2003, 1:28:42 PM7/30/03
to
Actually, the local ethnic leaders rarely ever had any power as all orders
came from all real political power was held by the "politruk". The Second
(Or political) Secretary who was always invariably Russian.

Under the Nazis the local leaders fen were not given an option of resigning.
If they did not run and hide fast enough to get away from the Nazis they
were put under "house arrest" in their offices. They were given
announcements to read or orders to sign and told to do so or they and their
families would be shot. You will find that often rather than making
official proclamations by the German Military Commanders, that orders to
round up Jews in an area under Nazi Military occupation were made over the
signature of the local town Mayor or village Elder. Authority that they
would not really have as part of their own elected civil responsibilities.
Just a sick little SS joke, one supposes. Not exactly signs of active or
willing local participation.

--


* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
In the faces of men and women I see God.
~Walt Whitman in Song of Myself~
0====(::::::::::::::::>
Spirit Tomes and Treasures
"Books and Earthly Goods to Nurture the Spirit"
*Visit http://www.spirit-tomes.com for
metaphysical supplies and information.*
Eugene Holman <hol...@elo.helsinki.fi> wrote in message
news:holman-3007...@10.1.1.191...

Dmitry

unread,
Jul 30, 2003, 3:05:21 PM7/30/03
to
> My grandfather didn't get his promotion because he wasn't a member of the
> Communist Party. And he didn't want to be. So I draw a conclusion that one
> must have been a member of the Communist Party to get any kind of promotion
> at work, thus the majority of those residing in Latvia were communists,
> though not by ideology.

That's why lots of party IDs were handed back in to Communist
headquarters even before the independance was declared.

> My point is that some Latvians played a bigger role in the Soviet government
> than they're credited.And if you look at the puppet governments installed in
> the Baltics after 1940, the chairpersons were representatives of ethnic
> nationalities: i.e. in Lithuania, it was a Lithuanian in charge under the
> Soviet, in Latvia, it was a Latvians

First secretaries of the Communist Party
25 Aug 1940 - 25 Nov 1959 Janis Kalnberzins (b. 1893
- d. 1986)
25 Nov 1959 - 15 Apr 1966 Arvids Pelse (b. 1899
- d. 1983)
15 Apr 1966 - 14 Apr 1984 Augusts Voss (b. 1916
- d. 1994)
14 Apr 1984 - 4 Oct 1988 Boriss Pugo (b. 1937
- d. 1991)
4 Oct 1988 - 7 Apr 1990 Janis Vagris (b.
1930)
7 Apr 1990 - 24 Aug 1991 Alfreds Rubiks (b.
1935)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Chairmen
of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
25 Aug 1940 - 11 Apr 1952 Augusts Kirhensteins (b. 1872
- d. 1963)
1 Sep 1941 - 12 Aug 1944 Otto Heinrich Drechsler (b. 1895
- d. 1945)
(Generalkommissar)
12 Aug 1944 - 2 Feb 1945 W. von Borke
(acting Generalkommissar)
11 Apr 1952 - 27 Nov 1959 Karlis Ozolins (b. 1905
- d. 1987)
27 Nov 1959 - 5 May 1970 Janis Kalnberzins (s.a.)
5 May 1970 - 20 Aug 1974 Vitalijs Rubenis (b.
1914)
20 Aug 1974 - 22 Jun 1985 Peteris Strautmanis (b.
1919)
22 Jun 1985 - 6 Oct 1988 Janis Vagris (s.a.)
6 Oct 1988 - 15 Sep 1992 Anatolijs Gorbunovs (b.
1942)
(chairman Supreme Soviet from 3 May 1990)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Chairmen
of the Council of People's Commissars
(from Aug 1946, chairmen of the Council of Ministers)
25 Aug 1940 - 27 Nov 1959 Vilis Lacis (b. 1904
- d. 1966)
27 Nov 1959 - 23 Apr 1962 Janis Peive (b. 1906
- d. 1976)
23 Apr 1962 - 5 May 1970 Vitalijs Rubenis (s.a.)
5 May 1970 - 6 Oct 1988 Jurijs Rubenis (b.
1925)
6 Oct 1988 - 7 May 1990 Vilnis Edvins Bresis (b.
1938) and in

Lstrad33

unread,
Jul 30, 2003, 11:57:39 PM7/30/03
to
>From: "Alexei" al...@altaboutrussianlegs.com

>In light of Holman's posting, I thought I'd start a list of Balts taking
>part in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to show Henry that not only
>"russkies" were participants in the CPSU's policies. Naturally, some of the
>members had no choice, but surely, to be named a leader, one had a choice.

Naturally, dummy..
All (every freaking last one) of the russian enslaved citizens of the Baltics
"were participants in the USSR's policies. The occupying russian red army made
sure of that.

Any every (freaking last) one of the USSR's policies was planned and approved
by the "Russian Communist Party".. back yonder in Moskow.

Later ya'all,
LS/


Eugene Holman

unread,
Jul 31, 2003, 7:38:59 AM7/31/03
to
In article <20030730235739...@mb-m06.news.cs.com>,
lstr...@cs.com (Lstrad33) wrote:

> >From: "Alexei" al...@altaboutrussianlegs.com
>
> >In light of Holman's posting, I thought I'd start a list of Balts taking
> >part in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to show Henry that not only
> >"russkies" were participants in the CPSU's policies. Naturally, some of the
> >members had no choice, but surely, to be named a leader, one had a choice.
>
> Naturally, dummy..
> All (every freaking last one) of the russian enslaved citizens of the Baltics
> "were participants in the USSR's policies. The occupying russian red army made
> sure of that.

Soviet enslaved. The two biggest enchilladas in the USSR during the 1940s
when the Baltics were being enslaved and sovietized enslaved were the
Georgians Stalin and Beria. The Soviet military was made up of
representatives of almost all of the Soviet nations. For example, the head
of the Soviet Air Force in Estonia during the 1980s was a Chechen,
Dzhokhar Dudaev. In your frenzied attempt to paint everything Soviet as
Russian, you show the depths of your ignorance of history and knee-jerk
russophobia. Communism was an international movement. Russia was the first
country that it was able to gain control over, and, with the help of
committed communists, some of the truest believers being Latvians, it
used the vast resources of Russia to implement its nation-destroying,
class-struggle based internationalist agenda. Communism was just as intent
on destroying Russia as a nation and identity as it was on destroying the
nations and identities of the Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians.

> Any every (freaking last) one of the USSR's policies was planned and approved
> by the "Russian Communist Party".. back yonder in Moskow.

The guys in power in the Kremlin represented the CPSU, the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union, not any "Russian Communist Party", nejęga. One of the
most orthodox and inflexible members of the CPSU, a person who played a
major rule in planning and implementing demographic policy in Latvia and
Estonia was none other than Riga-born Arvids Pelshe, a man who did not
carry out orders issued by "Russians", but rather one who drew up the
orders and issued them to Russians and others to implement. When the time
came to choose between an independent Latvia or a continuation of the
USSR, one of the key figures working to ensure the continued poresence of
his native Latvia within an orthodox communist USSR was Boriss Pugo, one
of the implementers of the August coup which backfired and allowed the
Baltic countries to grab their independence and run. If you see the
history of Latvia as having been perverted by Russians, there are
certainly Russians who see the history of Russia and the rest of the
former USSR as having been perverted by foreign communists, including the
Latvian Rifles, who played a crucial role in defending Soviet communism in
its earliest stages, and high-ranking Kremlin-resident Latvian communists,
members of the innermost circle of Soviet power, such as the
aforementioned Pelshe and Pugo.

Regards,
Eugene Holman

Martin Georgin

unread,
Jul 31, 2003, 8:34:41 PM7/31/03
to
hol...@elo.helsinki.fi (Eugene Holman) wrote in message news:<holman-3107...@c518-m3.eng.helsinki.fi>...

> In article <20030730235739...@mb-m06.news.cs.com>,
> lstr...@cs.com (Lstrad33) wrote:
>
> > >From: "Alexei" al...@altaboutrussianlegs.com
>
> > >In light of Holman's posting, I thought I'd start a list of Balts taking
> > >part in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to show Henry that not only
> > >"russkies" were participants in the CPSU's policies. Naturally, some of the
> > >members had no choice, but surely, to be named a leader, one had a choice.
> >
> > Naturally, dummy..
> > All (every freaking last one) of the russian enslaved citizens of the Baltics
> > "were participants in the USSR's policies. The occupying russian red army made
> > sure of that.
>
> Soviet enslaved. The two biggest enchilladas in the USSR during the 1940s
> when the Baltics were being enslaved and sovietized enslaved were the
> Georgians Stalin and Beria.

Russified Georgians.

> The Soviet military was made up of
> representatives of almost all of the Soviet nations. For example, the head
> of the Soviet Air Force in Estonia during the 1980s was a Chechen,
> Dzhokhar Dudaev. In your frenzied attempt to paint everything Soviet as
> Russian, you show the depths of your ignorance of history and knee-jerk
> russophobia. Communism was an international movement. Russia was the first
> country that it was able to gain control over, and, with the help of
> committed communists, some of the truest believers being Latvians,

When Lenin was alive it had an internationalist character. When Stalin
assumed control it became increasingly Russian nationalist. Trotsky
was the last internationalist old guard killed by Stalin. "Socialism
in One Country" was Stalin's call. He even claimed to be the defender
of ancient Rus during the height of WW2 and purged majority of
non-russians from the Politburo by 1944.

Regards,
Martin

Alexei

unread,
Jul 31, 2003, 11:19:34 PM7/31/03
to

> >
> > > >In light of Holman's posting, I thought I'd start a list of Balts
taking
> > > >part in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to show Henry that
not only
> > > >"russkies" were participants in the CPSU's policies. Naturally, some
of the
> > > >members had no choice, but surely, to be named a leader, one had a
choice.
> > >
> > > Naturally, dummy..
> > > All (every freaking last one) of the russian enslaved citizens of the
Baltics
> > > "were participants in the USSR's policies. The occupying russian red
army made
> > > sure of that.
> >
> > Soviet enslaved. The two biggest enchilladas in the USSR during the
1940s
> > when the Baltics were being enslaved and sovietized enslaved were the
> > Georgians Stalin and Beria.
>
> Russified Georgians.

What does the term "Russified Georgians" mean? Would Red Riflemen be
"Russifed Latvians"? And what difference does it make what kind of
Georgians they were?

>
> > The Soviet military was made up of
> > representatives of almost all of the Soviet nations. For example, the
head
> > of the Soviet Air Force in Estonia during the 1980s was a Chechen,
> > Dzhokhar Dudaev. In your frenzied attempt to paint everything Soviet as
> > Russian, you show the depths of your ignorance of history and knee-jerk
> > russophobia. Communism was an international movement. Russia was the
first
> > country that it was able to gain control over, and, with the help of
> > committed communists, some of the truest believers being Latvians,
>
> When Lenin was alive it had an internationalist character. When Stalin
> assumed control it became increasingly Russian nationalist.

Not nessecarily. Lenin organized the First International (Comintern) in 1919
to allow communists to take over the world. Even after Stalin took over the
power of the Soviet state, the push was for the international socialist
revolution. The whole International congress was held for that purpose. I
think Stalin bargained recognition of the Soviet Union by Western countries
for the right to give up the worldwide revolution. Comintern was dissolved
only in 1943. (Source:
http://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/dissolution.htm) It
is stretching to say that Stalin was increasingly Russian nationalist. He
had no reason to be....


Trotsky
> was the last internationalist old guard killed by Stalin. "Socialism
> in One Country" was Stalin's call.

As for Trotsky -- Stalin would have killed anyone capable of taking away his
power. Trotsky, Kamanev etc. were just some of them. Trotsky was Stalin's
nemesis....

He even claimed to be the defender
> of ancient Rus during the height of WW2 and purged majority of
> non-russians from the Politburo by 1944.

Stalin's purges had nothing to do with nationality. Rather it was a matter
of chance. Anyone, anywhere for whatever reason could be accused of being an
emeny of the state and suffer the dreadful consequences. making Stalin
sounds like a "defender of ancient Rus" is absurd and historically
unsubstantiated.


Martin

unread,
Aug 1, 2003, 3:26:21 PM8/1/03
to

"Alexei" <al...@altaboutlatvia.com> wrote in message
news:bgcmh4$22eu$1...@msunews.cl.msu.edu...

>
>
> > >
> > > > >In light of Holman's posting, I thought I'd start a list of Balts
> taking
> > > > >part in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to show Henry that
> not only
> > > > >"russkies" were participants in the CPSU's policies. Naturally,
some
> of the
> > > > >members had no choice, but surely, to be named a leader, one had a
> choice.
> > > >
> > > > Naturally, dummy..
> > > > All (every freaking last one) of the russian enslaved citizens of
the
> Baltics
> > > > "were participants in the USSR's policies. The occupying russian red
> army made
> > > > sure of that.
> > >
> > > Soviet enslaved. The two biggest enchilladas in the USSR during the
> 1940s
> > > when the Baltics were being enslaved and sovietized enslaved were the
> > > Georgians Stalin and Beria.
> >
> > Russified Georgians.
>
> What does the term "Russified Georgians" mean? Would Red Riflemen be
> "Russifed Latvians"? And what difference does it make what kind of
> Georgians they were?

Stalin was educated at the Greek Orthodox Theological Seminary in Tiflis
where Russian prejudice and racism thrived against Georgians. It's no
coincidence that Georgia suffered the worst during Stalin's reign of terror.
Obviously he believed Georgian language and culture were a dog language and
culture. Did the Red Riflemen speak russian?

He had every reason to be, the Nazi invasion was the final that trigger that
revealed Stalin's russian nationalist tendancies.

>
>
> Trotsky
> > was the last internationalist old guard killed by Stalin. "Socialism
> > in One Country" was Stalin's call.
>
> As for Trotsky -- Stalin would have killed anyone capable of taking away
his
> power. Trotsky, Kamanev etc. were just some of them. Trotsky was Stalin's
> nemesis....
>
> He even claimed to be the defender
> > of ancient Rus during the height of WW2 and purged majority of
> > non-russians from the Politburo by 1944.
>
> Stalin's purges had nothing to do with nationality. Rather it was a matter
> of chance. Anyone, anywhere for whatever reason could be accused of being
an
> emeny of the state and suffer the dreadful consequences. making Stalin
> sounds like a "defender of ancient Rus" is absurd and historically
> unsubstantiated.

Unsubstantiated? There are plenty of evidence, do a google search or visit
your university library, there are many books on the topic of Stalin's
russian nationalism, for example the book "Stalin's Holy War: Religion,
Nationalism, and Alliance Politics, 1941-1945"

Regards,
Martin


Alexei

unread,
Aug 1, 2003, 4:14:37 PM8/1/03
to

"Martin" <mart...@joymail.com> wrote in message
news:x9zWa.4916$bo1...@news-server.bigpond.net.au...

Georgia has been an Orthodox country along with Armenia for many years. It's
not surprising that he attended an orthodox seminary. In fact, his mother
wanted him to go to be a priest. Also, he was expelled from the seminary.
Your conclusion that Stalin was a Russifed Georgian drawn on the basis of
what school Stalin went to, wouldn't you say, is a bit fat-fetched.
(source: http://www.dickinson.edu/~history/dictators/stalin_dictator.html)
"Because of Russification, the Georgian language was being phased out in
schools and was only taught as a foreign language. (That's way before the
Soviet Union) Soso (Stalin's kid name) had become vengeful towards the
Russian teachers at the school, and had participated in several uprisings
against them. A vengeful attitude towards authority figures in general and
everyone who was more powerful than himself had developed during these
school years.

"Although it was reported that Stalin stopped believing in the existence of
God since before the age of thirteen, his mother wanted him to be an
Orthodox priest. After finishing school, he entered a seminary. While in
the seminary, he became more and more withdrawn. Classmates commented that
he had no sense of humor. Instead of responding to jokes with laughter, he
would respond with his fists. Similar to his earlier school years, in the
seminary he participated in many uprisings against the priests."

It's no
> coincidence that Georgia suffered the worst during Stalin's reign of
terror.

It is hard to tell who suffered the worst under Stalin. His paranoiah
governed the purges most of the time. He purged anyone whom he mistrusted no
matter their nationality, education or status.

> Obviously he believed Georgian language and culture were a dog language
and
> culture.

He was the one who grew up with it. I haven't read anything about Stalin
thinking his own native Georgian language as 'a dog language'. In fact,
Google returned no hits.

Did the Red Riflemen speak russian?

I think they did. Otherwise, providing bodyguard service to Lenin at the
time of the 1917 revolution would be an impossible task.

>
> >
> > >
> > > > The Soviet military was made up of
> > > > representatives of almost all of the Soviet nations. For example,
the
> > head
> > > > of the Soviet Air Force in Estonia during the 1980s was a Chechen,
> > > > Dzhokhar Dudaev. In your frenzied attempt to paint everything Soviet
> as
> > > > Russian, you show the depths of your ignorance of history and
> knee-jerk
> > > > russophobia. Communism was an international movement. Russia was the
> > first
> > > > country that it was able to gain control over, and, with the help of
> > > > committed communists, some of the truest believers being Latvians,
> > >
> > > When Lenin was alive it had an internationalist character. When Stalin
> > > assumed control it became increasingly Russian nationalist.

>


> He had every reason to be, the Nazi invasion was the final that trigger
that
> revealed Stalin's russian nationalist tendancies.

I'm arguing against your statement that "When Lenin was alive it had an


internationalist character. When Stalin assumed control it became
increasingly Russian nationalist."

Stalin gave up on World Socialist Revolution, i.e an international
character, to win the likes of the leaders of the United States and Great
Britain during the World war II. It had nothing to do with his being a
Russian nationalist.


> >
> > Stalin's purges had nothing to do with nationality. Rather it was a
matter
> > of chance. Anyone, anywhere for whatever reason could be accused of
being
> an
> > emeny of the state and suffer the dreadful consequences. making Stalin
> > sounds like a "defender of ancient Rus" is absurd and historically
> > unsubstantiated.
>
> Unsubstantiated? There are plenty of evidence, do a google search or visit
> your university library, there are many books on the topic of Stalin's
> russian nationalism, for example the book "Stalin's Holy War: Religion,
> Nationalism, and Alliance Politics, 1941-1945"

There is only one book that I found that claims that Stalin was a Russian
nationalist, it was right after the book that claimed there was no holocost.
In my opinion, Stalin created a new version of a human being, the so-called
Soviet man. People of all nationalities of the Soviet Union were supposed to
become this Soviet man. Stalin was hardly a promoter of the Russian culture,
instead, he was busy creating a new culture, the Soviet culture. Perhaps,
one could describe him as a Soviet nationalist, but not a Russian one.

Tootles,

Aleks


Martin

unread,
Aug 1, 2003, 4:41:23 PM8/1/03
to

"Alexei" <al...@altaboutlatvia.com> wrote in message
news:bgei0f$njc$1...@msunews.cl.msu.edu...

>
> "Martin" <mart...@joymail.com> wrote in message
> news:x9zWa.4916$bo1...@news-server.bigpond.net.au...
> >
> > "Alexei" <al...@altaboutlatvia.com> wrote in message
> > news:bgcmh4$22eu$1...@msunews.cl.msu.edu...
> > >
> > >
> > > emeny of the state and suffer the dreadful consequences. making Stalin
> > > sounds like a "defender of ancient Rus" is absurd and historically
> > > unsubstantiated.
> >
> > Unsubstantiated? There are plenty of evidence, do a google search or
visit
> > your university library, there are many books on the topic of Stalin's
> > russian nationalism, for example the book "Stalin's Holy War: Religion,
> > Nationalism, and Alliance Politics, 1941-1945"
>
> There is only one book that I found that claims that Stalin was a Russian
> nationalist, it was right after the book that claimed there was no
holocost.
> In my opinion, Stalin created a new version of a human being, the
so-called
> Soviet man. People of all nationalities of the Soviet Union were supposed
to
> become this Soviet man. Stalin was hardly a promoter of the Russian
culture,
> instead, he was busy creating a new culture, the Soviet culture. Perhaps,
> one could describe him as a Soviet nationalist, but not a Russian one.

I'm sure the Soviet education system taught you otherwise, but how do you
account for Stalin's rhetoric in his speech at the 1941 annual October
Revolution parade where he declared Moscow as the basis of ancient Rus? If
you believe that this is evidence of promoting Soviet culture and
nationalism, then clearly Soviet = Russian.

A quick google search revealed this, with references to books that you
obviously missed:

Nationalism was a third component of Stalin's revised WWII personality cult.
Under Lenin, he had aggressively smothered national cultures, prioritising
the right of the working class to consolidate its power over that of nations
such as the Ukraine to self-determination. (1) A simultaneous anti-religious
movement further displaced local identities, as secular Sovietization that
stressed the socialist state over nation created a "new multinational
party-dominated Soviet culture." (2) During the war, however, nationalism
was utilised by Stalin to centralise power and encourage patriotism at the
expense of non-Russian self-determination. For practical reasons, Stalin
allowed himself to become associated specifically with Russian nationalism
in order to appeal to the majority of his citizens. For example, Stalin's
rhetoric in his defiant speech at the 1941 annual October Revolution parade
hailed Moscow as the basis of Rus (medieval Russia) and then proceeded to
list the nation's notable military heroes, politicians and writers,
regardless of their ideological allegiances. (3) Stalin thus selectively
incorporated a specific variety of nationalism into his WWII persona to
inflame ancient patriotic fervour that was more reminiscent of tsarist
Russification drives than his recent Sovietization campaigns.

1) Geoffrey Hosking, The First Socialist Society: A History of the Soviet
Union from Within (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), p. 249
2) Ibid p. 249
3) Robert McNeal, Stalin: Man and Ruler (Oxford: Macmillan Press, 1988), p.
246.

Are you claiming that these books belong with books that claim that there
was no holocast?

Regards,
Martin


Dmitry

unread,
Aug 1, 2003, 6:06:41 PM8/1/03
to
mart...@joymail.com (Martin Georgin) wrote in message news:<a656d98c.03073...@posting.google.com>...

> hol...@elo.helsinki.fi (Eugene Holman) wrote in message news:<holman-3107...@c518-m3.eng.helsinki.fi>...
> > In article <20030730235739...@mb-m06.news.cs.com>,
> > lstr...@cs.com (Lstrad33) wrote:
> >
> > > >From: "Alexei" al...@altaboutrussianlegs.com
>
> > > >In light of Holman's posting, I thought I'd start a list of Balts taking
> > > >part in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to show Henry that not only
> > > >"russkies" were participants in the CPSU's policies. Naturally, some of the
> > > >members had no choice, but surely, to be named a leader, one had a choice.
> > >
> > > Naturally, dummy..
> > > All (every freaking last one) of the russian enslaved citizens of the Baltics
> > > "were participants in the USSR's policies. The occupying russian red army made
> > > sure of that.
> >
> > Soviet enslaved. The two biggest enchilladas in the USSR during the 1940s
> > when the Baltics were being enslaved and sovietized enslaved were the
> > Georgians Stalin and Beria.
>
> Russified Georgians.

I'm not sure what you mean, Martin. I've spent one month in Georgia
in 1981, most of it in remote village in Western Kahetia. People
there were extremely proud of their national heritage. At every meal
first toast was always to Stalin (they do drink a lot, much more than
French). We were trying to say that we don't appreciate Stalin's
ways. They said that Djugashvili is their national hero and we should
respect their ways while in Georgia. Do you think they were
Russified? None of them liked Russia, in fact they hated it.

Have you been to Georgia? If yes, what is your experience?

Alexei

unread,
Aug 1, 2003, 9:39:19 PM8/1/03
to

> >
> > There is only one book that I found that claims that Stalin was a
Russian
> > nationalist, it was right after the book that claimed there was no
> holocost.
> > In my opinion, Stalin created a new version of a human being, the
> so-called
> > Soviet man. People of all nationalities of the Soviet Union were
supposed
> to
> > become this Soviet man. Stalin was hardly a promoter of the Russian
> culture,
> > instead, he was busy creating a new culture, the Soviet culture.
Perhaps,
> > one could describe him as a Soviet nationalist, but not a Russian one.
>
> I'm sure the Soviet education system taught you otherwise, but how do you
> account for Stalin's rhetoric in his speech at the 1941 annual October
> Revolution parade where he declared Moscow as the basis of ancient Rus? If
> you believe that this is evidence of promoting Soviet culture and
> nationalism, then clearly Soviet = Russian.

I did a quick search for the original text of Stalin's speech on the Red
Square on Nov. 7, 1941. If you understand Russian, here's the link
http://militera.lib.ru/docs/ww2/leaders/speeches/stalin_1941-11-07.html

There is absolutely no talk hailing Moscow as the Center of Rus. There's
however, a listing of nation's heroes to inpire the Soviet army that for
better or worse was fighting the German occupants. "Let the image of your
brave predecessors inspire you," Stalin said. "Alexander Nevsky, Dmitry
Donskoy... etc.
Nothing about Moscow being the center of the Rus.

>
> A quick google search revealed this, with references to books that you
> obviously missed:
>
> Nationalism was a third component of Stalin's revised WWII personality
cult.
> Under Lenin, he had aggressively smothered national cultures, prioritising
> the right of the working class to consolidate its power over that of
nations
> such as the Ukraine to self-determination. (1) A simultaneous
anti-religious
> movement further displaced local identities, as secular Sovietization that
> stressed the socialist state over nation created a "new multinational
> party-dominated Soviet culture."

This is exactly what I'm talking about when I say Stalin wanted to create a
Soviet man, which he successfully did. Soviet man with Soviet culture. Local
identities were displaced among Russians as well as among other nations.

(2) During the war, however, nationalism
> was utilised by Stalin to centralise power and encourage patriotism at the
> expense of non-Russian self-determination. For practical reasons, Stalin
> allowed himself to become associated specifically with Russian nationalism
> in order to appeal to the majority of his citizens. For example, Stalin's
> rhetoric in his defiant speech at the 1941 annual October Revolution
parade
> hailed Moscow as the basis of Rus (medieval Russia) and then proceeded to
> list the nation's notable military heroes, politicians and writers,
> regardless of their ideological allegiances.

See above about Stalin's speech.


(3) Stalin thus selectively
> incorporated a specific variety of nationalism into his WWII persona to
> inflame ancient patriotic fervour that was more reminiscent of tsarist
> Russification drives than his recent Sovietization campaigns.

It was not as much as Russification as it was Sovietization, Martin.

>
> 1) Geoffrey Hosking, The First Socialist Society: A History of the Soviet
> Union from Within (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), p. 249
> 2) Ibid p. 249
> 3) Robert McNeal, Stalin: Man and Ruler (Oxford: Macmillan Press, 1988),
p.
> 246.
>
> Are you claiming that these books belong with books that claim that there
> was no holocast?

No, I am not. I'm saying, however, that merely the fact that it's in print
does not mean it is correct.


Martin

unread,
Aug 2, 2003, 4:07:36 PM8/2/03
to

"Alexei" <al...@altaboutlatvia.com> wrote in message
news:bgf518$190v$1...@msunews.cl.msu.edu...

Okay, I've found an english language version of Stalin's November 7 speech
and you are correct.

>
> >
> > A quick google search revealed this, with references to books that you
> > obviously missed:
> >
> > Nationalism was a third component of Stalin's revised WWII personality
> cult.
> > Under Lenin, he had aggressively smothered national cultures,
prioritising
> > the right of the working class to consolidate its power over that of
> nations
> > such as the Ukraine to self-determination. (1) A simultaneous
> anti-religious
> > movement further displaced local identities, as secular Sovietization
that
> > stressed the socialist state over nation created a "new multinational
> > party-dominated Soviet culture."
>
> This is exactly what I'm talking about when I say Stalin wanted to create
a
> Soviet man, which he successfully did. Soviet man with Soviet culture.
Local
> identities were displaced among Russians as well as among other nations.
>

Well several recent books like "Stalin's Holy War: Religion, Nationalism,
and Alliance Politics, 1941-1945" argue differently.

Okay, so here is another book about the emergence of Russian nationalism
during Stalin reign:

National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern
Russian National Identity, 1931-1956, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 2002

National Bolshevism is an investigation of the paradoxical emergence of a
popular sense of Russian national identity during the Stalin epoch.
Controversial in the sense that Soviet social identity is generally believed
to have stemmed from class consciousness, this book argues that Stalin-era
ideology was actually more Russian nationalist than it was proletarian
internationalist. Detailing the production, projection and popular reception
of this propaganda between 1931 and 1956, National Bolshevism identifies
Stalinist ideological dynamics that continue to affect Russian society to
the present day.

problematica

It has been known for a long time that the Stalinist party leadership
occasionally appropriated imagery and symbols from the ancient regime.
Resolving the long-standing debate over the nature and significance of this
flirtation with the Russian national past (particularly the co-option of
tsarist heroes, myths and iconography), National Bolshevism argues that such
actions during the mid-to-late 1930s amounted to no less than an ideological
about-face. Profoundly pragmatic and unabashedly populist, this ideological
shift had a transformative effect on Russo-Soviet society that has remained
unacknowledged among scholars until now.

Frustrated with the failure of propaganda campaigns during the late 1920s,
Stalin and his entourage began to look for new ways to bolster the
legitimacy of Bolshevik rule during the early 1930s. Their search was
complicated by the need to mobilize popular support within a society that
had proven to be too poorly-educated to be inspired by unadulterated
Marxist-Leninism. Distancing themselves from fifteen years of idealistic,
utopian sloganeering, Stalin and his colleagues gradually refashioned
themselves as etatists and began to selectively rehabilitate famous
personalities and familiar symbols from the Russian national past. By 1937,
party ideology had assumed a valence that I refer to as Stalinist
russocentrism.

Having detailed this ideological volte-face within the party hierarchy,
National Bolshevism traces the trajectory of the new official line into the
1950s in analysis organized both chronologically and thematically.
Foregrounded is an original methodological approach that disaggregates
Stalinist russocentrism into three distinct dimensions concerned with the
production, projection and reception of ideology. In this vein, a broad
survey of the party line's "production" is followed by analysis which tracks
its "projection" into the Soviet public sphere through education and mass
culture (e.g. the press, literature, film, theater, opera and museum
exhibition). This research, in turn, is complemented by treatment of the
popular "reception" of Stalinist russocentrism on the mass level, something
that I accomplish through the use of a broad swath of letters, diaries,
secret police reports and other material that can provide glimpses of public
opinion under Stalin.

Appraising official russocentrism as the most successful ideological
initiative of the Stalin era, National Bolshevism argues that it also
precipitated the formation of a mass sense of Russian national identity,
something which not only survived the death of Stalin in 1953, but remains
in circulation to the present day. Inchoate and internally inconsistent
before the revolution, modern Russian national identity turns out to be a
strikingly recent development, having been systematized, rationalized and
transformed into a mass phenomenon only midway through the twentieth
century. The origin and persistence of this sense of Russian national
identity explains why so many of the rallying calls favored by modern
Russian politicians like V. V. Putin and G. A. Ziuganov display a clear
Stalinist pedigree. These factors also account for why such sloganeering
continues to find resonance among Russian-speakers in the former Soviet
space today, almost two generations after Stalin's death. More than just a
study of Stalinist propaganda between 1931 and 1956, National Bolshevism is
an innovative treatment of the formation of modern Russian national identity
over the course of the twentieth century.

audience

Situated at the intersection of an array of contemporary debates, National
Bolshevism is designed for those interested in Stalinism, Soviet ideology,
mass culture, the popular press, education and the history of everyday life,
as well as those engaged in burgeoning new academic fields associated with
the theory and practice of national identity formation. Moreover, National
Bolshevism's chronological breadth, spanning some twenty-five years between
1931 and 1956, assures the book the attention of audiences concerned with
the interwar period, the Second World War, and the first Cold War decade.

But aside from these thematic points of reference, National Bolshevism's
methodological approach should also be of considerable interest. Addressing
not only the production and projection of propaganda, but its popular
reception as well, this study eschews many of the shortcomings that have
limited more traditional work on ideology and popular mobilization in recent
years.

Such an emphasis on popular reception and public opinion also distinguishes
National Bolshevism from more conventional treatments of nation-building,
both within the Russo-Soviet spectrum and throughout much of the rest of the
literature on the subject. Most scholarship, after all, neglects the role
that common people play in the process by focusing exclusively on either
theory or national elites. National Bolshevism, however, uses the innovative
work of prominent theorists (Anderson, Gellner, Hroch, Brubaker, Bakhtin, de
Certeau, etc.) as a lens through which to evaluate an empirical inquiry into
identity formation on the mass level. As such, this book's findings are
notable for their precision, degree of nuance and subtle contextualization
within the historical dynamics of the Stalin era.


comparable works

The first book of its kind to address the production, projection and
reception of russocentric ideology under Stalin, National Bolshevism fits
neatly into a broad convoy of recent publications by prominent authors and
university presses. A natural complement to theoretical work on Eastern
European identity formation by Suny, Slezkine, Hosking, Dunlop, Brubaker,
Laitin and Kaiser,[1] it supersedes dated accounts by Agursky, Barghoorn,
Besancon and others.[2] National Bolshevism's analysis of the Stalin period
dovetails with another book that I regard as essentially an epilogue to my
study -- Yitzhak Brudny's new monograph on Russian nationalism between the
late 1950s and the collapse of the USSR.[3]

On the subject of Stalinist mass culture, National Bolshevism engages with
many of the major publications in the field, especially those by Brooks,
Clark, Lahusen and Dobrenko.[4] National Bolshevism sharpens the analysis of
Stalinist cinema found in the works of Kenez and Taylor, and opens a whole
new discussion on Orientalism in the Stalin-era public sphere.[5]

Finally, in the debate over Stalinist social mentalite, National Bolshevism
spars with one of the most influential books of the past decade by Stephen
Kotkin.[6] Complementing recent monographs by Fitzpatrick, Hoffmann and
Davies,[7] National Bolshevism extends and qualifies aspects of their work
by looking beyond the mid-1930s into the 1940s and 1950s. An original study,
my analysis of Stalinist russocentrism is nevertheless grounded squarely
within the mainstream of scholarly literature on the Soviet experience.


outline

National Bolshevism opens with a survey of the historiographical controversy
surrounding the Stalinist party's flirtation with Russian historical myths,
heroes and iconography. It then segues into an extensive discussion of
contemporary theoretical work on national identity formation and its
applicability to the Russian context during the pre-revolutionary period.

Chapter one begins with an examination of Russian-speaking society at the
turn of the century, a time when in many European countries, one could
observe the acceleration of societal dynamics that typically contribute to
mass mobilization and national identity formation (e.g. the spread of
literacy and print culture). Chapter one argues, however, that although
universal education and mass culture were already facts of everyday life in
countries like France during this era, a variety of factors prevented
Russian-speaking society from enjoying the benefits of such basic societal
institutions before the early 1930s.

Chapters two through six address issues of identity formation in Soviet
society during the decade preceding the Second World War by examining the
party hierarchy's evolving strategy for societal mobilization and the
inculcation of a popular sense of patriotism. Individual chapters analyze
each of the dimensions of this process: the production of ideology within
the party hierarchy; its projection through public education and
state-sponsored mass culture; and its reception within the society at large.
Such an approach foregrounds the complexities involved in the formulation of
a sense of group identity without neglecting the difficulties of
transmitting it to the popular level or the peculiarities of its mass
reception.

Insofar as identity formation is a long-term process requiring commitment
and consistency, chapters seven through ten trace this dynamic through the
war years, while chapters eleven through fourteen follow it into the
mid-1950s. In each period, individual chapters address ideological
production, projection and reception, detailing a tightly-controlled process
in which mass agitation in the public schools was reinforced by broad
attention given to the same themes throughout the society's mass culture
forums (e.g. literature, the press, film, etc.). Long misunderstood, the
deployment of Russian national heroes, myths and iconography was a pragmatic
move to augment the arcane aspects of Marxist-Leninism with populist
rhetoric designed to bolster Soviet state legitimacy and promote a
society-wide sense of allegiance to the USSR. Ironic in the sense that the
resultant social mentalité turned out to be qualitatively more "Russian"
than "Soviet," this unintended consequence of the campaign is something
which continues to reverberate throughout the former Soviet space to the
present day.

National Bolshevism's analysis of Stalin-era ideology draws to a close with
a wide-ranging discussion of the implications of Stalinist russocentrism for
the post-1953 time period. Taking advantage of Yitzhak Brudny's study of
Russian nationalism between the Khrushchev and Gorbachev periods, I identify
dynamics that link Stalin-era russocentrism with aspects of present-day
Russian national identity and argue that a thorough understanding of the
latter requires acknowledgment of its origins between 1931 and 1956. In
essence, National Bolshevism proposes that in order to grasp what is at
stake in places like Chechnya today -- particularly the imperial nostalgia,
defensiveness and chauvinism displayed by the Russian political elite -- it
is necessary to approach the subject of Russian national identity as an
unfortunate but remarkably tangible legacy of the Stalin years. Viewed in
this sense as a syndrome of one of the most brutal, authoritarian regimes of
the twentieth century, modern Russian national identity ceases to be the
"riddle wrapped in a mystery inside of an enigma" that Churchill termed it
some six decades ago. Instead, when properly contexualized, the formation of
modern Russian national identity provides a host of intriguing new
perspectives on the past, present and future of this post-Soviet society.

table of contents

Introduction: Mobilization, Populism, and the Formation of Modern Russian
National Identity

1. Tsarist and Early Soviet Society's Weak Sense of National Identity


part one: 1931-1941

2. Mobilizing Stalinist Society in the Early to Mid-1930s

3. The Emergence of Russocentric Etatism

4. Ideology in the Prewar Classroom

5. Popularizing State Ideology through Mass Culture

6. The Popular Reception of National Bolshevism on the Eve of War


part two: 1941-1945

7. Wartime Stalinist Ideology and Its Discontents

8. Ideological Education on the Home Front

9. Wartime Mass Culture and Propaganda

10. Popular Engagement with the Official Line during the War


part three: 1945-1953

11. Soviet Ideology during the Zhdanovshchina and High Stalinism

12. Public and Party Education during the Early Postwar Period

13. Postwar Soviet Mass Culture

14. The Popular Reception of Ideology during Stalin's Last Decade

Conclusion: National Bolshevism and Modern Russian National Identity

Appendix: Civic History Textbook Development, 1934-1955


notes

[1] Ronald Grigor Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution and
the Collapse of the Soviet Union (Stanford, 1993); Yuri Slezkine, Arctic
Mirrors: Russia and the Small Peoples of the North (Ithaca, 1994); Geoffrey
Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, 1552-1917 (Cambridge MA, 1997); Russian
Nationalism Past and Present, edited by G. Hosking and R. Service (New York,
1998); John B. Dunlop, The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism
(Princeton, 1984); Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the
National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge UK, 1996); David D. Laitin,
Identities in Formation: the Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad
(Ithaca, 1998); Robert J. Kaiser, The Geography of Nationalism in the USSR
(Princeton, 1994).

[2] Mikhail Agursky, The Third Rome: National Bolshevism in the USSR
(Bolder, 1987); Frederick C. Barghoorn, Soviet Russian Nationalism (New
York, 1956); Alain Besancon, "Nationalism and Bolshevism in the USSR," in
The Last Empire: Nationality and the Soviet Future, edited by Robert
Conquest (Stanford, 1986); etc.

[3] Yitzhak Brudny, Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism and the Soviet
State (Cambridge MA, 1998).

[4] Jeffrey Brooks, "Thank You, Comrade Stalin": Soviet Public Culture from
Revolution to Cold War (Princeton, 1999); Katerina Clark, The Soviet Novel:
History as Ritual (Chicago, 1980); Thomas Lahusen, How Life Writes the Book:
Real Socialism and Socialist Realism in Stalin's Russia (Ithaca, 1997);
Evgenii Dobrenko, The Making of the State Reader: Social and Aesthetic
Contexts of the Reception of Soviet Literature, translated by Jesse M.
Savage (Stanford, 1997).

[5] Peter Kenez, Cinema and Soviet Society, 1917-1953 (Cambridge, 1992);
Richard Taylor, "Ideology and Popular Culture in Soviet Cinema," in The Red
Screen: Politics, Society and Art in Soviet Cinema, edited by Ann Lawton
(London, 1992), 42-65.

[6] Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization
(Berkeley, 1995).

[7] Sheila Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism -- Ordinary Life in Extraordinary
Times (New York, 1999); David Hoffman, Peasant Metropolis: Social Identities
in Moscow, 1929-1941 (Ithaca, 1994); Sarah Davies, Popular Opinion in
Stalin's Russia: Terror, Propaganda and Dissent, 1933-1941 (Cambridge UK,
1997).


vienalga_man

unread,
Aug 3, 2003, 6:48:15 AM8/3/03
to
"Alexei" <al...@altaboutlatvia.com> wrote in message news:<bg8gp5$17o9$1...@msunews.cl.msu.edu>...

Just looking back through the records, none of the above finished
well.
Probably because Latvians didn't much care for them.

Most countries had prominent, active Reds that finished badly.
It may say something about their real popularity, as opposed to what
the chants and slogans said.

R.

(Cuando se libre Cuba..., Soon, I think.)

Dmitry

unread,
Aug 3, 2003, 7:41:31 PM8/3/03
to
vienal...@hotmail.com (vienalga_man) wrote in message news:<cf3034d3.03080...@posting.google.com>...

> "Alexei" <al...@altaboutlatvia.com> wrote in message news:<bg8gp5$17o9$1...@msunews.cl.msu.edu>...
> > In light of Holman's posting, I thought I'd start a list of Balts taking
> > part in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to show Henry that not only
> > "russkies" were participants in the CPSU's policies. Naturally, some of the
> > members had no choice, but surely, to be named a leader, one had a choice.
> >
> > 1. Arvids Pelshe
> > 2. Viktors Pugo
> > 3. Alfreds Rubiks
> > 4. Augusts Voss
> > 5. The Latvian Riflemen -- those who protected Lenin during the October
> > revolution
> > 6. Anatolijs Gorbunovs...
> >
> >
> >
> > Anyone else?
> >
> > Aleksejs
>
> Just looking back through the records, none of the above finished
> well.

What happened to Anatolijs Gorbunovs? How did he finish?

> Probably because Latvians didn't much care for them.

Do you think Latvians didn't care about A.Gorbunovs because he signed
the declaration on the Renewal of the Independence of the Republic of
Latvia or because he signed it before USSR collapsed?

>
> Most countries had prominent, active Reds that finished badly.

If you consider the USA as "most countries", then you're right, most
Red Indians did finish badly.

Dmitry

unread,
Aug 3, 2003, 8:06:55 PM8/3/03
to
"treasure" <trea...@netnitco.net> wrote in message news:<8IudnWOPH7C...@netnitco.net>...

> Actually, the local ethnic leaders rarely ever had any power as all orders
> came from all real political power was held by the "politruk". The Second
> (Or political) Secretary who was always invariably Russian.

Actually, politruk was a little man (or woman dressed up like a man)
who was in charge of "political health" at place of work such as
factory, military unit or similar. Politruks took the orders from
government and had very little political power. Second Secretary was
deputy Secretary.

Andres Lepp

unread,
Aug 3, 2003, 9:04:04 PM8/3/03
to

"Eugene Holman" <hol...@elo.helsinki.fi> wrote in message
news:holman-3107...@c518-m3.eng.helsinki.fi...

> In article <20030730235739...@mb-m06.news.cs.com>,
> lstr...@cs.com (Lstrad33) wrote:
>
> > >From: "Alexei" al...@altaboutrussianlegs.com
> >
> > >In light of Holman's posting, I thought I'd start a list of Balts
taking
> > >part in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to show Henry that not
only
> > >"russkies" were participants in the CPSU's policies. Naturally, some of
the
> > >members had no choice, but surely, to be named a leader, one had a
choice.
> >
> > Naturally, dummy..
> > All (every freaking last one) of the russian enslaved citizens of the
Baltics
> > "were participants in the USSR's policies. The occupying russian red
army made
> > sure of that.
>
> Soviet enslaved. The two biggest enchilladas in the USSR during the 1940s
> when the Baltics were being enslaved and sovietized enslaved were the
> Georgians Stalin and Beria.

Russian enslaved, you can never change that fact with your inerpreting. Do
not emphasize the ethnicity of separate persons in the apparatus. In that
case you must say than Jews not Russians, made most of the NKVD's dirty work
in 1940-41 in the Baltics. But you must know that we saw that mostly it was
Russian imperialism, and your beloved Georgian Stalin and Jews like Idel
Jakobson were only on the paylist of Russian imperialism.

/crap is deleted/


>
> The guys in power in the Kremlin represented the CPSU, the Communist Party
> of the Soviet Union, not any "Russian Communist Party", nejęga.

Sure it was Russian Communist Party because there was no official Russian
Communist Party, only Commitees of CPSU in Oblasts level. So CPSU = Russian
CP.

/more crap deleted/

Martin Georgin

unread,
Aug 3, 2003, 10:30:30 PM8/3/03
to
"Alexei" <al...@altaboutlatvia.com> wrote in message news:<bg8gp5$17o9$1...@msunews.cl.msu.edu>...
> In light of Holman's posting, I thought I'd start a list of Balts taking
> part in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to show Henry that not only
> "russkies" were participants in the CPSU's policies. Naturally, some of the
> members had no choice, but surely, to be named a leader, one had a choice.
>
> 1. Arvids Pelshe
> 2. Viktors Pugo
> 3. Alfreds Rubiks
> 4. Augusts Voss
> 5. The Latvian Riflemen -- those who protected Lenin during the October
> revolution
> 6. Anatolijs Gorbunovs...

If we accept the substance of Professor David Brandenberger's book


"National Bolshevism Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of

Modern Russian National Identity, 1931-1956", that Stalinist ideology


was actually more Russian nationalist than it was proletarian

internationalist, then we can only draw one inescapable conclusion:
That Arvids Pelshe, Viktors Pugo, Alfreds Rubiks, Augusts Voss and
Anatolijs Gorbunovs were fools, duped into believing they were
promoting class consciousness and international communism, they where
in fact serving the cause of russian nationalism, and were the
unwitting agents of russia imperialism in their respective republics.

Regards,
Martin

Alexei

unread,
Aug 4, 2003, 12:13:14 AM8/4/03
to

>
> If we accept the substance of Professor David Brandenberger's book
> "National Bolshevism Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of
> Modern Russian National Identity, 1931-1956", that Stalinist ideology
> was actually more Russian nationalist than it was proletarian
> internationalist, then we can only draw one inescapable conclusion:
> That Arvids Pelshe, Viktors Pugo, Alfreds Rubiks, Augusts Voss and
> Anatolijs Gorbunovs were fools, duped into believing they were
> promoting class consciousness and international communism, they where
> in fact serving the cause of russian nationalism, and were the
> unwitting agents of russia imperialism in their respective republics.

You see, Martin, I disagree with the book's premice. My starting point is
that Stalin was not a Russian nationalist. However, I can't agrue with the
book without having read it. I can only read the snippet that you provided.
I don't see Stalin as a promoter of all things Russian. Sure, there were
films made about Russian heroes like Alexandr Nevsky (which incidentally was
done by a Riga-born Sergei Eistenstein), but those films were made to
promote Russian Patriotism and rise all of the nations in the Soviet Union
against the Nazi Germany. It was much like the Stalin's speech in 1941 when
he recited the names of the Russian "heroes" to inspire people to fight
against the Germans. But before the war, with the MR pact in 1939, the party
policy changed suddenly. The propaganda machine died down about the evils of
the Third Reich, patially at the German request. Incidentally, on imdb.com
films like Alexandr Nevsky have Georgian title. I believe it's significant.
Stalin wasn't a Russian nationalist, but rather he used the Russian culture,
the culture of the vast majority of the people, to "unite all the peoples of
the Soviet Union". Who wants to go against the majority - Not our Great
Leader! And it is absurd to state that the Latvian communists you mentioned
were "duped" into believing anything, because most of them were active in
the Party much after Stalin's death in 1953. Furthermore, under Khruschev
and with the creation of the warsaw Pact, the ideas od communism once again
became international.

Ladzius

unread,
Aug 4, 2003, 5:22:34 AM8/4/03
to
"Alexei" <al...@altaboutlatvia.com> wrote in message news:<bgf518$190v$1...@msunews.cl.msu.edu>...
> > >

On May 2, 1933 Stalin called Russians "the main nation of the world"
and credited to them the seuccess of "October revolution".
See http://www.historia.ru/2003/02/nevezhin.htm

It's hard to deny the obvious, ain't it Alex ?

Rgds,
Ladzius

Eugene Holman

unread,
Aug 4, 2003, 9:16:03 AM8/4/03
to
In article <a656d98c.03080...@posting.google.com>,
mart...@joymail.com (Martin Georgin) wrote:

I think the conclusion is more complex.

These men were idealists or opportunists who, sincerely believing at one
time in their lives that communism was the wave of the future, hooked up
with the Bolsheviks, the best show in town because they were the only show
in town. They were willing to play along, even as communism became less
idealistic in its efforts to spread the new doctrine and more pragmatic in
its efforts to consolidate and preserve what it had already gained. Part
of communist pragmatism involved usurping the vast resources of Russia,
including what could be defined as a radically modified form of Russian
nationalism, to serve its own objectives, nor is that strange or unusual.
Nevertheless, a movement made up of a motley mixture of Russians, Jews,
Georgians, Latvians, and Ukrainians, most of them members of a tiny
minority of politically subversive urban intellectuals, murdered the
Russian ruling dynasty, illegally seized Russian state power, and killed
off some 8,000,000 to 10,000,000 people, the overwhelming majority of them
Russians, before it could consolidate power during the period between 1917
and 1924, can hardly be regarded as a simple evolutionary continuation of
Russian nationalism. Even the title of Mr. Brandenberger's book suggests
that there was a major discontinuity in Russian nationalism between 1917
and 1931, when the "modern", or "forcibly modernized", phase begins. It is
ultimately a matter of semantics whether we prefer to call the
bolshevized, multinationalized, Georgian-led, forcibly modernized
nationalism that emerged "Modern Russian Natinal Identity", "Soviet
National Identity", o something else. My interpretation is that there were
many superficial but deceptive similarities between the two, and that
Hitler's attack on the USSR resulted in the newly emergent Soviet national
identity having to fall back upon its discredited predecessor, Russian
national identity, as the easiest methodology for uniting a many-times
traumatized nation against a common enemy. (We see the same thing the
evolution of some languages: after centuries of struggle to establish
their identitities as languages distinct from Latin, Italian and French
found themselves borrowing extensively from Latin during the Renaissance,
without ever relinquishing the justification for being regarded as
languages which had evolved from Latin and thus still being someting
essentially different.) Nevertheless, I still think that there are many
justifications for claiming that Soviet national identity was, in the
final analysis, as ill-disposed to Russian national identity as a relic
from a past that it was trying to distance itself from as it was towards
the national identities of the peoples whose countries and cultures were
forced to become members of the Soviet family of nations.

The entire world view of communism and dialectal materialism is
uncompromisingly opposed to nation-level nationalisms even if, for
pragmatic reasons, its Soviet implementation was often ready, like a
vodka-sodden drunk or, to use a more palatable analogy, a language needing
to extend its vocabulary during a period of rapid cultural change, to go
back one step in order to go two steps forward.

Regards,
Eugene Holman

Martin

unread,
Aug 4, 2003, 4:08:50 PM8/4/03
to

"Ladzius" <ladz...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:1d7cb8e7.03080...@posting.google.com...

And don't forget Stalin's toast in 1945 to the Russians as the leading
people of the Soviet Union:

I would like to raise a toast to the health of our Soviet people and, before
all, the Russian people.
I drink, before all, to the health of the Russian people, because in this
war they earned general recognition as the leading force of the Soviet Union
among all the nationalities of our country.
I raise a toast to the health of the Russian people not only because they
are the leading people, but also because they have a clear mind, a steadfast
character, and endurance.
Our government made more than a few mistakes; at times we were in a
desperate situation, when our army fell back... because there was no other
escape. Another people might have said to the Government: you have not
justified our expectations; go away; we will set up another government, that
will make peace with Germany and secure us tranquillity. But the Russian
people did not come to this; they believed in the correctness of their
government's policy and made sacrifices, to ensure the defeat of Germany.
And this trust of the Russian people in the Soviet Government was the
decisive strength, which secured the historic victory over the enemy of
humanity, -- over fascism.
Thanks to them, to the Russian people, for that trust!
To the health of the Russian people!

Regards,
Martin


Alexei

unread,
Aug 4, 2003, 12:34:04 PM8/4/03
to

"Martin" <mart...@joymail.com> wrote in message
news:m3zXa.12008$bo1....@news-server.bigpond.net.au...

>
> "Ladzius" <ladz...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
> news:1d7cb8e7.03080...@posting.google.com...
> > "Alexei" <al...@altaboutlatvia.com> wrote in message
> news:<bgf518$190v$1...@msunews.cl.msu.edu>...
> > > > >
> >
> > On May 2, 1933 Stalin called Russians "the main nation of the world"
> > and credited to them the seuccess of "October revolution".
> > See http://www.historia.ru/2003/02/nevezhin.htm
> >
> > It's hard to deny the obvious, ain't it Alex ?
> >
> > Rgds,
> > Ladzius
>
> And don't forget Stalin's toast in 1945 to the Russians as the leading
> people of the Soviet Union:

Sure, as a leader of the Soviet Union, it is very understandable why he had
given the toast to the largest national group in the country. The political
spin, if you will, was that the Red Army, whose members were largely
Russians, was "liberating" Europe from the Hitlerites... It makes a good
politician, a smart, progmatic man, which I think Stalin was. Before I get
bombarded with accusation that I deny that Stalin was an evil man, I will
say he was an evil man, yet I think a man cannot stay in power for so long
without the intelligence and progmatism it takes to manipulate the fellow
comrades and the masses.

I just don't see Stalin as a *Russian* nationalist, rather as a *Soviet*
nationalist. Calling Stalin a Russian is absurd, for he was Georgian through
and through - from his acent to his last name... In fact, if we can trust
Dmitry, Stalin is still a hero back in Georgia.

Alexei

unread,
Aug 4, 2003, 12:45:04 PM8/4/03
to

"Ladzius" <ladz...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:1d7cb8e7.03080...@posting.google.com...

That same page cites Stalin as "born in Caucasus where the table toast was a
tradition followed by a cognac or wine, thus interwined Russian and Georgian
traditions." Does one really expect Stalin to gather Moscow division that
just participated in the May day parade to say: "Russians are the worst
nation in the world." This would have been a foolish political suicide.
Stalin saw the Russian nation as the nation that sacrificed the most to
develop the Soviet state, thus the country became the first to be the bearer
of the Socialist revolution. But that would hardly make him a "Russian
nationalist." I think what makes one a nationalist is the disregard to any
other nation, the idea that one nation is better than the other. And to say
that Stalin thought Russian nation was better than any other nation,
especially within the Soviet Union, would mean that Stalin himself was a
"second-rate" citizen due to his own Georgian upbringing and heavy accent.
If presentday National Bolsheviks existed back in 1939, I'm certain Stalin
would have been the victim.

Aleks


Martin

unread,
Aug 4, 2003, 5:01:36 PM8/4/03
to

"Eugene Holman" <hol...@elo.helsinki.fi> wrote in message
news:holman-0408...@c518-m3.eng.helsinki.fi...

Yes I agree, during the period between 1917 and 1931, with Lenin's
leadership, communism in the Soviet Union really was beyond the notion of
nationality, and many communists of various countries were attracted to
this. What I believe Brandenberger is arguing is that once Stalin came to
power, he abandoned this internationalist idea from within and began
implementing an agenda that had all the characteristics of Russian
nationalism, while maintaining the veneer of Leninist internationalism.

> ultimately a matter of semantics whether we prefer to call the
> bolshevized, multinationalized, Georgian-led, forcibly modernized
> nationalism that emerged "Modern Russian Natinal Identity", "Soviet
> National Identity", o something else. My interpretation is that there were
> many superficial but deceptive similarities between the two, and that
> Hitler's attack on the USSR resulted in the newly emergent Soviet national
> identity having to fall back upon its discredited predecessor, Russian
> national identity, as the easiest methodology for uniting a many-times
> traumatized nation against a common enemy. (We see the same thing the

Stalin was already beginning to use elements of Russian nationalism already
in the 1930's, before the Nazi invasion. The Nazi invasion only served to
accelerate a process that had already began ten years earlier.

> evolution of some languages: after centuries of struggle to establish
> their identitities as languages distinct from Latin, Italian and French
> found themselves borrowing extensively from Latin during the Renaissance,
> without ever relinquishing the justification for being regarded as
> languages which had evolved from Latin and thus still being someting
> essentially different.) Nevertheless, I still think that there are many
> justifications for claiming that Soviet national identity was, in the
> final analysis, as ill-disposed to Russian national identity as a relic
> from a past that it was trying to distance itself from as it was towards
> the national identities of the peoples whose countries and cultures were
> forced to become members of the Soviet family of nations.
>
> The entire world view of communism and dialectal materialism is
> uncompromisingly opposed to nation-level nationalisms even if, for
> pragmatic reasons, its Soviet implementation was often ready, like a
> vodka-sodden drunk or, to use a more palatable analogy, a language needing
> to extend its vocabulary during a period of rapid cultural change, to go
> back one step in order to go two steps forward.

Ofcourse the real genius of Stalin's rule is not his brutal methods of
annexing independant states, but the subtle redefinition of the meaning of
the language of soviet communist, claiming to follow principles of communism
but implementing a Russian nationalist agenda. I wonder how many communist
true believers, remembering Lenin's rule noted this inconsistency,
questioned it and were promptly purged and shot. George Orwell, the
dis-illusioned socialist, was inspired to write the novel 1984 as a direct
result of this Stalinist double-speak.

Regards,
Martin


Martin

unread,
Aug 4, 2003, 5:11:10 PM8/4/03
to

"Alexei" <al...@allaboutlatvia.com> wrote in message
news:bgmfgi$1qij$2...@msunews.cl.msu.edu...

>
> I just don't see Stalin as a *Russian* nationalist, rather as a *Soviet*
> nationalist. Calling Stalin a Russian is absurd, for he was Georgian
through
> and through - from his acent to his last name... In fact, if we can trust
> Dmitry, Stalin is still a hero back in Georgia.

Arguing that Stalin was not a Russian nationalist because he was Georgian is
similar to arguing that Hitler was not a German nationalist because he was
Austrian.

Regards,
Martin


Watchdog

unread,
Aug 4, 2003, 7:20:16 PM8/4/03
to
On Mon, 04 Aug 2003 21:11:10 GMT, "Martin" <mart...@joymail.com>
wrote:

Not exactly the same thing since Austrians are in fact Germans and
speak the same German language that they speak across the border in
Bavaria. Russians and Georgians are two entirely different people with
different histories, languages and culture. The only real thing they
had in common was the Orthodox Religion. To be a nationalist of a
country you at least have to be that nationality I would think.

Dmitry

unread,
Aug 5, 2003, 3:19:45 PM8/5/03
to
"Alexei" <al...@allaboutlatvia.com> wrote in message news:<bgmg57> That same page cites Stalin as "born in Caucasus where the table toast was a

> tradition followed by a cognac or wine, thus interwined Russian and Georgian
> traditions."

I've seen a soviet recipe book (cuisine of 15 republics) published in
1951. As one can imagine the first 4 pages were totally dedicated to
praising Soviet government, Communist Party and personally
I.V.Stalin (and of course there was a bit about how imperialists
starving their own citizens). When it came to beverages the book
claimed that it is scientifically proven that beer and vodka are very
bad for your health and are extremely damaging for formation of
proletarian spirit in Soviet citizens. On the contrary, wine has some
good nutritional qualities and is very much recommended in moderation.
It was supported by a photograph showing Soviet workers pouring the
contain of beer and vodka bottles down onto the floor and followed by
the list and pictures of good wine that you can have, most produced in
Georgia.

Back to the subject, after October revolution Bolshevik party
discouraged Russian nationalism as a part of decaying imperialism
ideology up to 1941. However, despite the effort many Russians,
mainly in rural areas, were still holding on to their cultural
identity, traditions and religion. For example, they didn't
appreciate demolition of churches and thousands of clergymen, monks
and nuns as well as ordinary believers to have been subjected to
repression up to execution and murder. The course of combat in the
beginning of WWII forced Stalin to mobilise all the resources he could
for defence, including those who still considered themselves Russians
as well as Russian Orthodox Church as Russian people's moral force.
Without delay churches were opened for services, and clergy including
bishops were released from prisons.

It had changed back to "normal" after WWII.

Lstrad33

unread,
Aug 6, 2003, 1:46:18 AM8/6/03
to
>From: dmitry....@ntlworld.com

>Actually, politruk was a little man (or woman dressed up like a man)
>who was in charge of "political health" at place of work such as
>factory, military unit or similar. Politruks took the orders from
>government and had very little political power. Second Secretary was
>deputy Secretary.

Actually politroki could issue orders calling for the arrest and trial of any
senior russian flunky - from general to local Party chief.
Note the arrest and imprisonment of the the '56 Latvian 'president' for
political 'reactionism' and 'nationalist revanchism'.

'Treasure' was correct.
Why are you lying again, Alexei/russianlegs?

LS/


Alexei

unread,
Aug 6, 2003, 8:59:44 AM8/6/03
to

> 'Treasure' was correct.
> Why are you lying again, Alexei/russianlegs?

Actually, you reponded to Dmirty, not me....

>
> LS/
>
>


Ladzius

unread,
Aug 6, 2003, 1:54:44 PM8/6/03
to
"Alexei" <al...@allaboutlatvia.com> wrote in message news:<bgmg57$1r4b$2...@msunews.cl.msu.edu>...

I'd shed a tear or two with you about the appaling treatment that pure
uncle Jo receives from presentday National Bolsheviks, if in fact he
wasn't their main hero. Saying that the russians are the "main" nation
implies that other nations are subordinate, and it IS nationalism,
whether you like it or not.
But at the end of the day it's not Stalin's words, but his deeds that
prove the point - from his selection of historical heroes ( Ivan the
Terrible, Alexandr Nevski, Suvorov - any non-russians ?), to his
"exercises" in Russian linguistics.

Vladas

>
> Aleks

Alexei

unread,
Aug 6, 2003, 2:12:39 PM8/6/03
to

>
> I'd shed a tear or two with you about the appaling treatment that pure
> uncle Jo receives from presentday National Bolsheviks, if in fact he
> wasn't their main hero. Saying that the russians are the "main" nation
> implies that other nations are subordinate, and it IS nationalism,
> whether you like it or not.
> But at the end of the day it's not Stalin's words, but his deeds that
> prove the point - from his selection of historical heroes ( Ivan the
> Terrible, Alexandr Nevski, Suvorov - any non-russians ?), to his
> "exercises" in Russian linguistics.

This doesn't make sense: Stalin, a Georgian, thought the *other nation*,
i.e. Russians, are the "maiol nation", thus subordinating his own people
(Georgians) to Russia. Did he think of himself as a second-rate political
leader, next to a Russian such as Molotov? I highly doubt that...

Aleks

0 new messages