The Finnish Winter War not very popular in Russia
J. Anderson
Dmitry
> In Finland a new book, *Tuntematon talvisota* (The Unknown Winter War), edited by Tuomo Vihavainen and Andrey Sakharov, has recently been published. On its 513 pages Finnish and Russian historians analyze reports produced in 1939-40 for Stalin and the Soviet leadership by NKVD (later to become KGB and FSB). These formerly secret files have now been opened by the FSB archives.
>
> The book shows that there was quite strong opposition against the war against Finland among the Soviet public. Numerous civilians and even soldiers gave proof of > considerable civic courage by criticizing the war.
I can't imagine many would dare to criticise Stalin's actions. By
1939 everyone knew the concequences of criticisms.
> Red Army soldiers admired the skills and staunchness of their Finnish adversaries and marvelled at the living standards in the areas that they had invaded.
>
> In addition to fierce Finnish resistance, the domestic impopularity of the war was obviously one reason why Stalin decided to suspend the attack in March 1940
> and await a more opportune moment.
Interesting. I didn't think that Stalin would bother about public
opinon.
J. Anderson
"Dmitry" <dmitrijs...@inbox.lv> wrote in message
news:9995c744-5e34-4781...@c3g2000yqd.googlegroups.com...
On 31 Oct, 16:00, "J. Anderson" <anderso...@inbox.lv> wrote:
> In addition to fierce Finnish resistance, the domestic
> impopularity of the war was obviously one reason
> why Stalin decided to suspend the attack in March
> 1940 and await a more opportune moment.
> Interesting. I didn't think that Stalin would bother about public opinon.
According to the book, he actually used the Winter War for testing the
effectiveness of the official propaganda. Apparently its penetration power
was not yet sufficient.
Remember that Stalin was a frightened little shit-head. He was constantly
afraid of something. Of his fellow revolutionaries, of the kulaks, of the
army's High Command, of the intelligentsiya, of Hitler, of the Americans, of
the Chinese, of the Jews, of doctors etc. Some hero.
Andrzej Adam Filip
> "Dmitry" <dmitrijs...@inbox.lv> wrote:
> On 31 Oct, 16:00, "J. Anderson" <anderso...@inbox.lv> wrote:
>
>> In addition to fierce Finnish resistance, the domestic
>> impopularity of the war was obviously one reason
>> why Stalin decided to suspend the attack in March
>> 1940 and await a more opportune moment.
>
>> Interesting. I didn't think that Stalin would bother about public opinon.
>
> According to the book, he actually used the Winter War for testing the
> effectiveness of the official propaganda. Apparently its penetration power
> was not yet sufficient.
>
> Remember that Stalin was a frightened little shit-head. He was constantly
> afraid of something. Of his fellow revolutionaries, of the kulaks, of the
> army's High Command, of the intelligentsiya, of Hitler, of the Americans, of
> the Chinese, of the Jews, of doctors etc. Some hero.
Was he "afraid enough" to "do not fix the problems pretty efficiently"
(in most cases) with "success" (from *HIS* perspective)? :-)
If the enemy is "the worthless shit-head" then how to describe the
people he defeated? If you want preserve "baltic's self estime" then
watch out *HOW* you criticize him.
--
[pl>en Andrew] Andrzej Adam Filip : an...@onet.eu : Andrze...@gmail.com
Paranoids are people, too; they have their own problems. It's easy
to criticize, but if everybody hated you, you'd be paranoid too.
-- D. J. Hicks
Vladimir Makarenko
> On 31 Oct, 16:00, "J. Anderson" <anderso...@inbox.lv> wrote:
>> In Finland a new book, *Tuntematon talvisota* (The Unknown Winter War), edited by Tuomo Vihavainen and Andrey Sakharov, has recently been published. On its 513 pages Finnish and Russian historians analyze reports produced in 1939-40 for Stalin and the Soviet leadership by NKVD (later to become KGB and FSB). These formerly secret files have now been opened by the FSB archives.
>>
>> The book shows that there was quite strong opposition against the war against Finland among the Soviet public. Numerous civilians and even soldiers gave proof of > considerable civic courage by criticizing the war.
>
> I can't imagine many would dare to criticise Stalin's actions. By
> 1939 everyone knew the concequences of criticisms.
Hm, human's primary biological features are that they think what they do
intent to and lose control what they say, - or as in Vysotski's song:
"Moi yazyk kak shnurok razvyazalsya..."
"My tongue went untied a shoe string..."
Do not forget that Stalin was very unpopular for a very long time by then.
It's a myth that any regime any oppression can scare to a degree that
they will just shut up. Somebody somewhere still will continue to talk.
>
>> Red Army soldiers admired the skills and staunchness of their Finnish adversaries and marvelled at the living standards in the areas that they had invaded.
>>
>> In addition to fierce Finnish resistance, the domestic impopularity of the war was obviously one reason why Stalin decided to suspend the attack in March 1940
>> and await a more opportune moment.
>
> Interesting. I didn't think that Stalin would bother about public
> opinon.
Stalin was paranoid, not "paranoid" as an insult but as the medical
condition. He bothered about everything. He was locking his bedroom
from inside with a guard standing outside.
VM.
Dmitry
> Dmitry wrote:
> > On 31 Oct, 16:00, "J. Anderson" <anderso...@inbox.lv> wrote:
> >> In Finland a new book, *Tuntematon talvisota* (The Unknown Winter War), edited by Tuomo Vihavainen and Andrey Sakharov, has recently been published. On its 513 pages Finnish and Russian historians analyze reports produced in 1939-40 for Stalin and the Soviet leadership by NKVD (later to become KGB and FSB). These formerly secret files have now been opened by the FSB archives.
>
> >> The book shows that there was quite strong opposition against the war against Finland among the Soviet public. Numerous civilians and even soldiers gave proof of > considerable civic courage by criticizing the war.
>
> > I can't imagine many would dare to criticise Stalin's actions. By
> > 1939 everyone knew the concequences of criticisms.
>
> Hm, human's primary biological features are that they think what they do
> intent to and lose control what they say, - or as in Vysotski's song:
>
> "Moi yazyk kak shnurok razvyazalsya..."
> "My tongue went untied a shoe string..."
>
> Do not forget that Stalin was very unpopular for a very long time by then.
> It's a myth that any regime any oppression can scare to a degree that
> they will just shut up. Somebody somewhere still will continue to talk.
I agree. But having "neobuzdannyj jazyk" was a very risky business.
> >> Red Army soldiers admired the skills and staunchness of their Finnish adversaries and marvelled at the living standards in the areas that they had invaded.
>
> >> In addition to fierce Finnish resistance, the domestic impopularity of the war was obviously one reason why Stalin decided to suspend the attack in March 1940
> >> and await a more opportune moment.
>
> > Interesting. I didn't think that Stalin would bother about public
> > opinon.
>
> Stalin was paranoid, not "paranoid" as an insult but as the medical
> condition. He bothered about everything. He was locking his bedroom
> from inside with a guard standing outside.
Yes. I think his mental disability was part of the reason for his
crimes against humanity.
Valtsu
Any way, it must have been a shock for Stalin to realise that his
military might was in such a poor state during the Winter War. A minor
Anschluss performed as a parade march turned out to be something quite
the opposite. What a humiliation it was to see Hitler expand his reich
while Stalin made a blunder of getting Finland back to Mother Russia.
Vladimir Makarenko
Well according to the released details not really so - Beria prevented
arrival of medical personnel to the scene IIRC for two or three hours
(critical in case of stroke) with silent approval of the others.
>
> Any way, it must have been a shock for Stalin to realise that his
> military might was in such a poor state during the Winter War. A minor
> Anschluss performed as a parade march turned out to be something quite
> the opposite. What a humiliation it was to see Hitler expand his reich
> while Stalin made a blunder of getting Finland back to Mother Russia.
>
I don't know if he really was capable to really feel humiliation or
whatever when no threat was involved: paranoids are translating
everything into the level of threat, I guess they experience feeling of
vengeance for "latent threat" towards somebody who earlier presented
threat but otherwise are "numb".
VM.
J. Anderson
"Mikhail Medved" <mikhai...@mail.ru> wrote in message
news:5ad43d65-5bca-4aea...@l31g2000vbp.googlegroups.com...
> That's fine but let's begin with calling things their proper names
> instead of politically correct bullshit: "the 2nd Russo-Finnish war"
> was, in fact, WWII, in which Finland was an ally of Nazi Germany. It
> remained as such until 1944 when, facing an inevitable defeat, it
> signed a separate truce with USSR and was forced to declare war on its
> former cordial ally, Nazi Germany.
Whatever. Perhaps you can suggest an alternative scenario for Finland? One
that would have produced the same result: not getting occupied by anyone.
Staying neutral was not an option, considering that Stalin still was
planning to grab the country.
Anton
You should be more precise, Johnny, and call things with their proper
names: "considering that Stalin, acting according to his pact with
Hitler, still was planning to grab the country".
--
Anton
Vladimir Makarenko
> "J. Anderson" <ander...@inbox.lv> wrote:
>> "Dmitry" <dmitrijs...@inbox.lv> wrote:
>> On 31 Oct, 16:00, "J. Anderson" <anderso...@inbox.lv> wrote:
>>
>>> In addition to fierce Finnish resistance, the domestic
>>> impopularity of the war was obviously one reason
>>> why Stalin decided to suspend the attack in March
>>> 1940 and await a more opportune moment.
>>> Interesting. I didn't think that Stalin would bother about public opinon.
>> According to the book, he actually used the Winter War for testing the
>> effectiveness of the official propaganda. Apparently its penetration power
>> was not yet sufficient.
>>
>> Remember that Stalin was a frightened little shit-head. He was constantly
>> afraid of something. Of his fellow revolutionaries, of the kulaks, of the
>> army's High Command, of the intelligentsiya, of Hitler, of the Americans, of
>> the Chinese, of the Jews, of doctors etc. Some hero.
>
> Was he "afraid enough" to "do not fix the problems pretty efficiently"
> (in most cases) with "success" (from *HIS* perspective)? :-)
>
> If the enemy is "the worthless shit-head" then how to describe the
> people he defeated? If you want preserve "baltic's self estime" then
> watch out *HOW* you criticize him.
>
That is an interesting topic: how come dumb and mean politicians are
making it to the very top? Stalin's personal assistant/secretary who
deserted in 1929(?) told stories about the boss that few in the West
took in the time seriously - Stalin was spending most of his time doing
NOTHING except eavesdropping on others phone calls, making endless
political alliances and counter alliances, etc. In the same time the
others were really *working*. Now doesn't matter how dumb is one or how
smart is the other but if the dumb spends all of his time figuring how
to screw the smart when the smart is busy fixing problems - one day he
will succeed. Especially having such powers as Stalin had at his disposal.
WWII victorious thinking was done not by Stalin, but rather by the
Soviet General Staff - a collective of very outstanding individuals.
He turned smart enough not to meddle too much into the game.
VM.
Eugene Holman
<anton....@gmail.com> wrote:
<deletions>
>
> > Whatever. Perhaps you can suggest an alternative scenario for Finland? One
> > that would have produced the same result: not getting occupied by anyone.
> > Staying neutral was not an option, considering that Stalin still was
> > planning to grab the country.
>
> You should be more precise, Johnny, and call things with their properas
> names: "considering that Stalin, acting according to his pact with
> Hitler, still was planning to grab the country".
After the German sneak attack on its erstwhile ally, the USSR, June 22,
1941, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact became irrevelant.
On the other hand, the USSR was committed to "solving the Finnish problem"
in much the same manner as it had "solved the Baltics problem" the
previous summer. The ominously named Karelo-Finnish Soviet-Socialist
Republic had been created by merging the Karelian Autonomous Soviet
Socialist Republic with the territory annexed from Finland immediately
after the termination of the Finnish-Soviet War, aka the Winter War, in
March 1941. The USSR, assuming that Finland would eventually become
involved in round two of the effort to "solve the Finnish problem", this
time with German support - German forces were already stationed in Finland
� pre-emptively attacked Finland, which had declared itself neutral and,
theoretically, did not allow German attacks on the USSR from Finnish
territory, even though German forces operating on or from Finnish
territory had been involved in acts of war against the USSR such as mining
the Gulf of Finland, the harbor of Leningrad, and the river Neva, even
before June 22. A major air assault on eighteen Finnish cities on June 25,
motivated by the Soviet view that Finland, its declared neutrality
notwithstanding, was allowing its territory to be used by Germany for
military operations against it (and thus constituting a "problem" that had
to be dealt with in a manner unforeseen in the no longer relevant
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact), left Finland with no choice but declare itself
at war with the USSR.
Whether the Continuation War is better regarded as a separate war or a
component of World War II is a matter of definition and perspective. From
the Finnish standpoint Finland initially had no other objective than to
regain the territory that it regarded as having been illegally annexed
from it consequent to the Winter War of 1939-1940. These objectives
changed, however, when Finland opportunistically and, with historical
hindsight, unwisely, made the decision to give the Soviets a taste of
their own medicine by crossing the 1939 border and occupying parts of
Soviet Karelia that had never been part of Finland. On the other hand,
Finland had been theoretically neutral even if allowing Germany to use its
territory as a staging ground for attacks on the USSR, a concession to
Germany that arguably allowed it to escape the fate of Denmark and Norway.
The Soviet side recognized these special circumstances, with Finnish and
Soviet diplomats in Stockholm, Soviet ambassador Alexanda Kollantai
playing a key role, hammering out a solution that allowed Finland to
extricate itself from the war as an independent, unoccupied country if it
would force German soldiers to leave its territory, accept the 1940
borders, and, later, pay compensation to the USSR for the damage done on
what it regarded as its territory during the Finnish occupation. Finland
accepted all of these terms and an armistice between Finland and the USSR
was signed on September 19, 1944. This differs from the situation between
Germany and the USSR, which ended with the total collapse and
unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany rather than with an armistice or
peace treaty.
Thus, the Continuation War was part of the tapestry of events now referred
to collectively as World War II, but from the standpoint of its causes,
distinctive diplomatic features, and resolution, it has many of the
attributes of a separate conflict.
Regards,
Eugene Holman
Vladimir Makarenko
This is a rather lame attempt to provoke Russkies into out of proportion
response. Btw should Russkies expect that Romanians will claim they
fought their own separate war? And why stop there? SS Viking - its own
war. "Blue Division" - its own war, etc. It is all because evil Russkies
succeeded to wage multiple wars against all European countries
simultaneously AND separately (and won!). Some stupid historians put on
all that mess an umbrella - "WWII".
VM.
VM.
Eugene Holman
Makarenko <vma...@nospamgmail.com> wrote:
> Eugene Holman wrote:
<deletions>
> > Thus, the Continuation War was part of the tapestry of events now referred
> > to collectively as World War II, but from the standpoint of its causes,
> > distinctive diplomatic features, and resolution, it has many of the
> > attributes of a separate conflict.
>
> This is a rather lame attempt to provoke Russkies into out of proportion
> response.
No it isn't. It is an attemt to show that there were people in Finland AND
the USSR who regarded the Finnish-Soviet conflict as a special case and
acted accordingly. The USSR did not treat Finland, even if a "vanquished
enemy", anywhere near as badly as it did its other vanquished enemies, and
after the Treaty on Friendship, Aid, and Mutual Assistance had been signed
in 1948, and reparations had been paid in 1953, Finland and the USSR began
a special relationship which, particularly after the accession to the
Finnish presidency of Urho Kekkonen in 1956, had no counterpart in Europe.
> Btw should Russkies expect that Romanians will claim they
> fought their own separate war?
Antonescu's Romania was a genunine ally of Nazi Germany, and it was
treated accordingly after the war, even if Romania, for its own reasons
rather than as a consequence of an agreement with the USSR, eventually
began to go its own path. Finland was never a headache for the USSR, nor
did that they would be invaded by the USSR if they agreed with them - the
1961 "Note crisis" has demonstrated itself to be a political ploy invented
by Urho Kekkonen to ensure himself a second term. Soviet-Romanian
relations were far more problematic. The people who had found themselves
trapped in the part of Greater Romania that was annexed by the USSR and
made into the Moldavian SSR had, even in the mid-1970s, about as many
opportunities to contact their relatives in what was then Romania proper
as North Koreans have of contacting relatives in South Korea.
> And why stop there? SS Viking - its own
> war. "Blue Division" - its own war, etc. It is all because evil Russkies
> succeeded to wage multiple wars against all European countries
> simultaneously AND separately (and won!). Some stupid historians put on
> all that mess an umbrella - "WWII".
WW II in Europe was essentially a matter of Germany and its allies,
willing or unwilling, waging war against the USSR and its allies, willing
or unwilling. Before the outbreak of the first stage of the war with the
German and, later, Soviet, attacks on Poland, Finland, like the other
three Nordic countries, was neutral. For easily understood geopolitical
reasons, the USSR sought to pre-emptively prevent Finnish territory from
being used as a staging ground for hotilities against the USSR, attacking
it in 1939, just as Nazi Germany sought to prevent Norway and Denmark, as
well as Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, amd France from being used
by the British as a staging ground for attacks against Germany by
occupying them, with France being partially occupied and partially
co-opted, a few months later. By failing to defeat, conquer, and absorb
Finland in the 1939-1940 conflict, the USSR assured that its worst
scenario would come true: Finland allowed what remained of its territory
to be used by Germany, the only country that could defend it from further
Soviet aggression, despite its having looked the other way according to
the conditions of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact when the USSR attacked it in
1939, as a staging ground for hostilities against the USSR. Accordingly,
solving the "Finnish problem" did not mean defeating Finland militarily
and incorporating the rest of it into the Karelo-Finnish SSR, even if some
people in the USSR might have seen that as a desirable "final solution",
but rather getting German troops out of the country and erecting a
political structure that would assure that Germany could never again use
Finland as a staging area for hostilities against the USSR.
Mannerheim, Paasikivi, and Kekkonen understood the logic behind this, and
they worked with the Soviet authorities to implement relations between the
two countries that would assure it. In this respect we are dealing with a
distinct pre-emptive and long-term damage control operation worked out
between two parties rather than with a traditional military solution
imposed by the stronger party on the weaker one by force.
Regards,
Eugene Holman
Eugene Holman
> Eugene Holman wrote:
<deletions>
> > Thus, the Continuation War was part of the tapestry of events now referred
> > to collectively as World War II, but from the standpoint of its causes,
> > distinctive diplomatic features, and resolution, it has many of the
> > attributes of a separate conflict.
>
> This is a rather lame attempt to provoke Russkies into out of proportion
> response.
No it isn't. It is an attempt to show that there were people in Finland AND
Mannerheim, and then later and more effectively, Paasikivi and Kekkonen,
Vladimir Makarenko
> In article <K5WdnWcFaIckdWnX...@giganews.com>, Vladimir
> Makarenko <vma...@nospamgmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Eugene Holman wrote:
> <deletions>
>
>>> Thus, the Continuation War was part of the tapestry of events now referred
>>> to collectively as World War II, but from the standpoint of its causes,
>>> distinctive diplomatic features, and resolution, it has many of the
>>> attributes of a separate conflict.
>> This is a rather lame attempt to provoke Russkies into out of proportion
>> response.
>
> No it isn't. It is an attempt to show that there were people in Finland AND
> the USSR who regarded the Finnish-Soviet conflict as a special case and
> acted accordingly. The USSR did not treat Finland, even if a "vanquished
> enemy", anywhere near as badly as it did its other vanquished enemies, and
> after the Treaty on Friendship, Aid, and Mutual Assistance had been signed
> in 1948, and reparations had been paid in 1953, Finland and the USSR began
> a special relationship which, particularly after the accession to the
> Finnish presidency of Urho Kekkonen in 1956, had no counterpart in Europe.
Your persistence in provoking a peaceful sleepy Russkie into an unscaled
response noted.
>
>> Btw should Russkies expect that Romanians will claim they
>> fought their own separate war?
>
> Antonescu's Romania was a genunine ally of Nazi Germany,
And you state so because ...?
> and it was
> treated accordingly after the war,
After war those who were in wrong camp were rounded up and mostly shot
or hung.
> even if Romania, for its own reasons
> rather than as a consequence of an agreement with the USSR, eventually
> began to go its own path. Finland was never a headache for the USSR, nor
> did that they would be invaded by the USSR if they agreed with them - the
> 1961 "Note crisis" has demonstrated itself to be a political ploy invented
> by Urho Kekkonen to ensure himself a second term.
Never heard about this story.
> Soviet-Romanian
> relations were far more problematic. The people who had found themselves
> trapped in the part of Greater Romania that was annexed by the USSR and
> made into the Moldavian SSR had,
What the hell is "greater Romania" ? Anyway as I said before there were
no WWI and WWII there was a single one with some break for lunch.
> even in the mid-1970s, about as many
> opportunities to contact their relatives in what was then Romania proper
> as North Koreans have of contacting relatives in South Korea.
Hm, except of course I don't see any desire on part of Moldavia to go
back to Romania. It says all.
>
>> And why stop there? SS Viking - its own
>> war. "Blue Division" - its own war, etc. It is all because evil Russkies
>> succeeded to wage multiple wars against all European countries
>> simultaneously AND separately (and won!). Some stupid historians put on
>> all that mess an umbrella - "WWII".
>
> WW II in Europe was essentially a matter of Germany and its allies,
> willing or unwilling, waging war against the USSR and its allies, willing
> or unwilling.
That is a major mis presentation as WWII was a bloody fight century old
feud between Euro alpha males for dominance. At what USSR looked
understandingly very nervously knowing Euro habit to rob everybody in
sight. The fact that USSR had been dragged into this mess and played a
major role solving the problem doesn't mean that it created it.
Every Euro should start every morning with a two part pray: Thank You
God for USSR defeating Nazis, Thank You God for USA keeping USSR muzzled.
> Before the outbreak of the first stage of the war with the
> German and, later, Soviet, attacks on Poland, Finland, like the other
> three Nordic countries, was neutral.
Hah, neutral like on June 22 1941?
> For easily understood geopolitical
> reasons, the USSR sought to pre-emptively prevent Finnish territory from
> being used as a staging ground for hotilities against the USSR, attacking
> it in 1939, just as Nazi Germany sought to prevent Norway and Denmark, as
> well as Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, amd France from being used
> by the British as a staging ground for attacks against Germany by
> occupying them, with France being partially occupied and partially
> co-opted, a few months later.
France? Occupied? Wrong. As a matter of fact the feud I mentioned above
this time mutated into a weird mix of Civil wars, national liberation
and many many other things. It became a total mess. And of course
Germany would have no chance with "occupation" of the Europe if most of
it welcome overruling national states by some kind of racially "pure"
Euro Empire. Bare facts of almost non existent resistanse point at this.
> By failing to defeat, conquer, and absorb
> Finland in the 1939-1940 conflict, the USSR assured that its worst
> scenario would come true: Finland allowed what remained of its territory
> to be used by Germany, the only country that could defend it from further
> Soviet aggression, despite its having looked the other way according to
> the conditions of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact when the USSR attacked it in
> 1939, as a staging ground for hostilities against the USSR. Accordingly,
> solving the "Finnish problem" did not mean defeating Finland militarily
> and incorporating the rest of it into the Karelo-Finnish SSR, even if some
> people in the USSR might have seen that as a desirable "final solution",
> but rather getting German troops out of the country and erecting a
> political structure that would assure that Germany could never again use
> Finland as a staging area for hostilities against the USSR.
That is already chewing on old bone. I however really interested - who
came up with an idea to attack Finns? Molotov? After 1920 disaster
Stalin was always afraid of any military conflicts.
>
> Mannerheim, and then later and more effectively, Paasikivi and Kekkonen,
> understood the logic behind this, and they worked with the Soviet
> authorities to implement relations between the two countries that would
> assure it. In this respect we are dealing with a distinct pre-emptive and
> long-term damage control operation worked out between two parties rather
> than with a traditional military solution imposed by the stronger party on
> the weaker one by force.
Traditional military solution was out of reach for Soviets - look at
sheer size of Finnish territory. Soviets desperately needed troops
elsewhere.
VM.
>
> Regards,
> Eugene Holman
Eugene Holman
Makarenko <vma...@nospamgmail.com> wrote:
> Eugene Holman wrote:
> > In article <K5WdnWcFaIckdWnX...@giganews.com>, Vladimir
> > Makarenko <vma...@nospamgmail.com> wrote:
> >
> >> Eugene Holman wrote:
> > <deletions>
> >
> >>> Thus, the Continuation War was part of the tapestry of events now referred
> >>> to collectively as World War II, but from the standpoint of its causes,
> >>> distinctive diplomatic features, and resolution, it has many of the
> >>> attributes of a separate conflict.
> >> This is a rather lame attempt to provoke Russkies into out of proportion
> >> response.
> >
> > No it isn't. It is an attempt to show that there were people in Finland AND
> > the USSR who regarded the Finnish-Soviet conflict as a special case and
> > acted accordingly. The USSR did not treat Finland, even if a "vanquished
> > enemy", anywhere near as badly as it did its other vanquished enemies, and
> > after the Treaty on Friendship, Aid, and Mutual Assistance had been signed
> > in 1948, and reparations had been paid in 1953, Finland and the USSR began
> > a special relationship which, particularly after the accession to the
> > Finnish presidency of Urho Kekkonen in 1956, had no counterpart in Europe.
>
>
> Your persistence in provoking a peaceful sleepy Russkie into an unscaled
> response noted.
No problem. If my persistence results in your learning more about the
complexities of the Finnish-Soviet relationship, so much the better :-)
> >
> >> Btw should Russkies expect that Romanians will claim they
> >> fought their own separate war?
> >
> > Antonescu's Romania was a genunine ally of Nazi Germany,
>
> And you state so because ...?
Of Romania's robust partition in Operation Barbarossa and the Holocaust,
both of its own Jewish citizens and of Jews in the parts of the USSR
invaded, occupied, and ethnically cleansed of Jews by the Romanian army.
>
> > and it was
> > treated accordingly after the war,
>
> After war those who were in wrong camp were rounded up and mostly shot
> or hung.
The facts that such a punishment of Mannerheim was never even considered
by the Soviets, and that the initiative for the post-war "war guilt"
trials in Finland came from the Finns, not the Soviets, supports my view
that the Continuation War of 1941-1944, or, to use your "lunch break" way
of thinking, the Finnish-Soviet conflict of 1939-1940, and 1941-1944, is
best regarded as a distinct episode falling outside of WW II proper.
> > even if Romania, for its own reasons
> > rather than as a consequence of an agreement with the USSR, eventually
> > began to go its own path. Finland was never a headache for the USSR, nor
> > did that they would be invaded by the USSR if they agreed with them - the
> > 1961 "Note crisis" has demonstrated itself to be a political ploy invented
> > by Urho Kekkonen to ensure himself a second term.
>
> Never heard about this story.
For starters:
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Note_Crisis
<quote>
Note Crisis
The Note Crisis (Finnish: Noottikriisi) was a political crisis in Finland
relations in 1961. The Soviet Union sent a diplomatic note on October 30,
1960, citing an article of the FCMA treaty (= the Treaty of Friendship,
Coperation, and Mutual Assistance concluded between Finland and the USSR
in 1948/EH) referring to the threat of war.
The most common view is that the Soviet Union was motivated by a desire to
ensure Urho Kekkonen's re-election. After Olavi Honka dropped his
candidacy, Kekkonen was re-elected by an overwhelming vote of 199 out of
300 electoral college votes in the 1962 Presidential election.
</quote>
Here is a traditional analysis of the Note Crisis in somewhat more detail:
Source: http://countrystudies.us/finland/25.htm
<quote>
The Note Crisis of 1961, far more serious than the 1958 crisis,
constituted the most severe strain in Soviet-Finnish relations since 1948.
On October 30, 1961, the Soviet government sent a note to Finland that
called for mutual military consultations according to Article 2 of the
1948 FCMA treaty. For Finland, the note represented a real threat of
Soviet military intervention. As during the 1958 crisis, a tense
international situation coupled with Soviet fears of a German military
resurgence led to Soviet pressure on Finland. There was also a domestic
side to the crisis; as in 1958, the Soviets considered certain elements on
the Finnish political scene to be objectionable. The Soviets were
concerned about the SDP, especially about the SDP nominee for president,
Olavi Honka. Delivered only two and one-half months before the Finnish
presidential elections, the Soviet note demonstrated clearly which
candidate the Soviets preferred. In response to the note, Kekkonen sought
to placate Soviet fears by dissolving the Finnish parliament in November
1961. He then flew to Novosibirsk, where he met with Khrushchev and, after
three days of personal consultations, succeeded in winning Khrushchev's
confidence to such a degree that the call for military consultations was
rescinded. The Note Crisis not only constituted a personal diplomatic
triumph for Kekkonen but also led to an era of increased
confidence-building measures between the two governments.
For Kekkonen, the lesson of the Note Crisis was that the Soviets needed
continual reassurance of Finnish neutrality. He pointed out that Soviet
mistrust of Finnish declarations of neutrality in the 1930s had led to
war. After 1961, the Finns took great pains to demonstrate their
neutrality and to prevent a repetition of the Note Crisis. The effort to
win the trust of the Soviets led Kekkonen in two directions--expanded
trade and cultural contacts between the two countries and a more active
international political role in which Finland worked to promote peace in
Northern Europe and around the world.
</quote>
President Urho Kekkonen was on a high-profile visit to the United States
when Finland received that diplomatic note from the USSR requesting
consultations in accordance with the Treaty of Friendship, Coperation, and
Mutual Assistance, concluded between Finland and the USSR in 1948, due to
the Berlin crisis. Kekkonen broke off his visit to the US and flew to
Novosibirsk, with Finland being a focus of world attention as much as it
had been in 1939. Whatever the Soviets wanted to consult Kekkonen about
was quickly resolved, and Kekkonen, a lion tamer from the standpoint the
world press and the indispensible leader of his country from the
standpojnt of many Finns, was re-elected by an overwhelming majority to
the office he had been elected to by the narrowest of margins, and also
with some Soviet political meddling in the background, in 1956.
Material in Soviet archives declassified after 1991 strongly indicates
that the idea of sending the diplomatic note originated with Kekkonen, not
the Soviets.
Sopurce:
http://vanha.verkkouutiset.fi/arkisto/Arkisto_1997/24.tammikuu/NOOTTI.HTM
<quote>
<deletions>
UKK - KGB:n agentti
Hannu Rautkallio k�sittelee aihetta sek� teoksessaan *Novosibirskin
lavastus. Noottikriisi 1961* (Jyv�skyl� 1991) ett� uusimmassa teoksessaan
*Laboratorio Suomi. Kekkonen ja KGB 1944-1962* (Juva 1996). Toisin kuin
monet muut, Rautkallio on tutustunut entisen Neuvostoliiton arkistoihin ja
tukee k�sityst��n viittauksilla l�hteisiin, joiden t�ytynee olla olemassa.
Rautkallion mukaan Kekkonen oli itse asiassa KGB:n agentti, joka yhdess�
KGB-miesten kanssa suunnitteli ja lavasti koko noottikriisin. Nootti oli
tilattu ja sen sis�ll�st� ja jatkotoimenpiteist� oli ennalta sovittu.
Tarkoituksena oli p�nkitt�� Kekkosen asemaa ja palvella Neuvostoliiton
etuja Suomessa.
<deletions>
</quote>
<TRANSLATION>
Urho Kaleva Kekkonen � KGB agent
Finnish historian Hannu Rautkallio deals with the issue in two books
*Novosibirskin lavastus. Noottikriisi 1961* ('The Novosibirsk Sham. The
1961 Note crisis', Jyv�skyl� 1991) and his most recent work *Laboratorio
Suomi. Kekkonen ja KGB 1944-1962* ('Laboratory Finland. Kekkonen and the
KGB 1944-1962', Juva 1996). Unlike many others, Rautkallio has actually
acquainted himself with the archives of the former Soviet Union and he
supports his contention with references to sources that almost certainly
exist.
According to Rautkallio, Kekkonen was actually a KGB agent who, together
with other KGB operatives, planned and staged the entire Note Crisis. The
note was ordered and its contents as well as the measures to be taken
consequent to it were agreed upon in advance. The intention was to bolster
Kekkonen's position and serve the interests of the Soviet Union in
Finland.
</TRANSLATION>
>
> > Soviet-Romanian
> > relations were far more problematic. The people who had found themselves
> > trapped in the part of Greater Romania that was annexed by the USSR and
> > made into the Moldavian SSR had,
>
>
> What the hell is "greater Romania" ?
Romania in the pre-1940 borders.
> Anyway as I said before there were no WWI and WWII there was a single
> one with some break for lunch.
All the more reason to regard the Finnish-Soviet conflict as an isolated
episode, also with a lunch break, hence the terms used in Finnish
historiography: talvisota 'the Winter War' and jatkosota 'the Continuation
War'.
> > even in the mid-1970s, about as many
> > opportunities to contact their relatives in what was then Romania proper
> > as North Koreans have of contacting relatives in South Korea.
>
> Hm, except of course I don't see any desire on part of Moldavia to go
> back to Romania. It says all.
I would prefer to say that it is the other way around. Although Romania is
poor, it is in the EU. In stark contrast to it, Moldava, its hapless
eastern neighbor, is the poorest country in Europe, in addition to which
part of it, Transdnestria, is under foreign occupation. One of the first
things that Moldova did when it gained its independence in 1991 was ditch
the Cyrillic alphabet and its Soviet-imposed "Moldavian" language for the
Latin alphabet and convergence of its distinct national variety of
Romanian with the standard Romanian of Romania. The flag that the young
republic chose for itself is quite similar to that of Romania:
Moldovan flag:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/flags/flagtemplate_md.html
Current Romanian flag:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/flags/flagtemplate_ro.html
Flag of Socialist Romania:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_Romania_%281965-1989%29.svg
<deletions>
Regards,
Eugene Holman
Eugene Holman
...of Romania's robust participation in Operation Barbarossa and the Holocaust,
For starters:
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Note_Crisis
<quote>
Note Crisis
Source: http://countrystudies.us/finland/25.htm
the Berlin crisis. Kekkonen broke off his visit to the US and flew, via
Helsinki, where he dissolved Parliament, to Novosibirsk, with Finland
being a focus of world attention as much as it had been in 1939. Whatever
the Soviets wanted to consult Kekkonen about was quickly resolved, and
Kekkonen, a bear tamer from the standpoint the world press and the
indispensible leader of his country from the standpoint of many Finns, was
Mikhail Medved
> In article <hcmdrd$lk...@news.eternal-september.org>, Anton
>
> <anton.use...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> <deletions>
>
>
>
> > > Whatever. Perhaps you can suggest an alternative scenario for Finland? One
> > > that would have produced the same result: not getting occupied by anyone.
> > > Staying neutral was not an option, considering that Stalin still was
> > > planning to grab the country.
>
> > You should be more precise, Johnny, and call things with their properas
> > names: "considering that Stalin, acting according to his pact with
> > Hitler, still was planning to grab the country".
>
> After the German sneak attack on its erstwhile ally, the USSR, June 22,
> 1941, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact became irrevelant.
>
.....
>
> Thus, the Continuation War was part of the tapestry of events now referred
> to collectively as World War II, but from the standpoint of its causes,
> distinctive diplomatic features, and resolution, it has many of the
> attributes of a separate conflict.
A rather long study. Alas, the conclusion (above) is not supported by
facts.
Let's examine two arguments in Eugene's essay:
1. Finland's situation was unique.
Not really. Romania also suffered loss of territory prior to the
beginning of the war between Germany and USSR. It also wanted to re-
gain the lost territory and, in the course of victorious opening days
of the war, it changed its mind trying to establish "the Greater
Romania". Similarly to Finland, when the defeat became apparent, the
country changed sides and declared war on Germany.
There were differences, for sure, but the thesis of uniqueness doesn't
hold.
2. Finland was treated differently than other allies of Germany after
the victory of the Allied Powers.
Not really. All European allies of Nazi Germany, Italy, Romania,
Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland, were gathered in Paris in 1947 to sign
peace treaties. Of course, each of those countries had its own
transgressions and merits in the eyes of the Allied Powers, so each of
them was treated somewhat differently. But the difference was in
details, and Finland was not singled out as a separate case.
> Regards,
> Eugene Holman
Eugene Holman
<6f28c813-186a-44f1...@x15g2000vbr.googlegroups.com>,
Mikhail Medved <mikhai...@mail.ru> wrote:
<deletions>
> 2. Finland was treated differently than other allies of Germany after
> the victory of the Allied Powers.
>
> Not really. All European allies of Nazi Germany, Italy, Romania,
> Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland, were gathered in Paris in 1947 to sign
> peace treaties. Of course, each of those countries had its own
> transgressions and merits in the eyes of the Allied Powers, so each of
> them was treated somewhat differently. But the difference was in
> details, and Finland was not singled out as a separate case.
Mannerheim, the Finnish military leader during the conflict with the
Soviet Union and the president of Finland during the period when the peace
accord was being negotiated, was not regarded by the Soviet Union, the
post-war Finnish government, or the Allied Powers as a war criminal.
Compare his fate to that of Romania's Ion Antonescu.
Regards,
Eugene Holman
Mikhail Medved
>
> Mikhail Medved <mikhail_b...@mail.ru> wrote:
>
> <deletions>
>
> > 2. Finland was treated differently than other allies of Germany after
> > the victory of the Allied Powers.
>
> > Not really. All European allies of Nazi Germany, Italy, Romania,
> > Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland, were gathered in Paris in 1947 to sign
> > peace treaties. Of course, each of those countries had its own
> > transgressions and merits in the eyes of the Allied Powers, so each of
> > them was treated somewhat differently. But the difference was in
> > details, and Finland was not singled out as a separate case.
>
> Mannerheim, the Finnish military leader during the conflict with the
> Soviet Union and the president of Finland during the period when the peace
> accord was being negotiated, was not regarded by the Soviet Union, the
> post-war Finnish government, or the Allied Powers as a war criminal.
> Compare his fate to that of Romania's Ion Antonescu.
Perhaps, Mannerheim was not a military criminal. While Antonescu was.
> Regards,
> Eugene Holman
Eugene Holman
<8c16e579-379c-49b7...@g23g2000vbr.googlegroups.com>,
Mikhail Medved <mikhai...@mail.ru> wrote:
> On Nov 8, 2:01=A0pm, hol...@mappi.helsinki.fi (Eugene Holman) wrote:
> > In article
> > <6f28c813-186a-44f1-a5ec-929f32b18...@x15g2000vbr.googlegroups.com>,
> >
> > Mikhail Medved <mikhail_b...@mail.ru> wrote:
> >
> > <deletions>
> >
> > > 2. Finland was treated differently than other allies of Germany after
> > > the victory of the Allied Powers.
> >
> > > Not really. All European allies of Nazi Germany, Italy, Romania,
> > > Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland, were gathered in Paris in 1947 to sign
> > > peace treaties. Of course, each of those countries had its own
> > > transgressions and merits in the eyes of the Allied Powers, so each of
> > > them was treated somewhat differently. But the difference was in
> > > details, and Finland was not singled out as a separate case.
> >
> > Mannerheim, the Finnish military leader during the conflict with the
> > Soviet Union and the president of Finland during the period when the peac=
> e
> > accord was being negotiated, was not regarded by the Soviet Union, the
> > post-war Finnish government, or the Allied Powers as a war criminal.
> > Compare his fate to that of Romania's Ion Antonescu.
>
> Perhaps, Mannerheim was not a military criminal. While Antonescu was.
Mannerheim's army crossed the old Finnish-Soviet border and, between 1941
and 1944, occupied parts of the Karelo-Finnish SSR, including its capital,
Petroskoi, that had never been part of Finland. The Finnish occupation
authorities ran concentration camps there where Soviet citizens of Russian
ethnicity were signled out for special treatment and died like flies (for
details, see e.g.
http://www.hs.fi/english/article/President+Halonen+rejects+compensation+for+Russian+detainees+at+Finnish+wartime+concentration+camps/1101978357994).
It was also involved in the 900-day seige of Leningrad. By any objective
criteria, Mannerheim should have been tried as a war criminal, but the
Soviets never demanded this. President Rito Ryti, whom Mannerheim
succeeded, as well as many members of Ryti's government, were tried and
convicted for "war guilt", but the initiative for this came from Finland,
not the Soviet Union.
Regards,
Eugene Holman
J. Anderson
"Eugene Holman" <hol...@mappi.helsinki.fi> wrote in message
news:holman-0911...@holmaninmacbook.eng.helsinki.fi...
> By any objective criteria, Mannerheim should have been tried
> as a war criminal, but the Soviets never demanded this.
> President Rito Ryti, whom Mannerheim succeeded, as well as
> many members of Ryti's government, were tried and convicted
> for "war guilt", but the initiative for this came from Finland,
> not the Soviet Union.
Oh please, Eugene, you certainly must know that Zhdanov _demanded_ a
tribunal. The only remarkable thing was that the Finns were allowed to
handle the whole thing themselves. Gritting their teeth the Finnish judges
sentenced Risto Ryti, six of his cabinet ministers and Finland's wartime
envoy to Berlin to between 2 and 10 years in jail -- thereby violating one
of the basic principles of western justice: that you mustn't legislate with
retrospective effect.
Mikhail Medved
>
>
>
> Mikhail Medved <mikhail_b...@mail.ru> wrote:
> > On Nov 8, 2:01=A0pm, hol...@mappi.helsinki.fi (Eugene Holman) wrote:
> > > In article
> > > <6f28c813-186a-44f1-a5ec-929f32b18...@x15g2000vbr.googlegroups.com>,
>
> > > Mikhail Medved <mikhail_b...@mail.ru> wrote:
>
> > > <deletions>
>
> > > > 2. Finland was treated differently than other allies of Germany after
> > > > the victory of the Allied Powers.
>
> > > > Not really. All European allies of Nazi Germany, Italy, Romania,
> > > > Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland, were gathered in Paris in 1947 to sign
> > > > peace treaties. Of course, each of those countries had its own
> > > > transgressions and merits in the eyes of the Allied Powers, so each of
> > > > them was treated somewhat differently. But the difference was in
> > > > details, and Finland was not singled out as a separate case.
>
> > > Mannerheim, the Finnish military leader during the conflict with the
> > > Soviet Union and the president of Finland during the period when the peac=
> > e
> > > accord was being negotiated, was not regarded by the Soviet Union, the
> > > post-war Finnish government, or the Allied Powers as a war criminal.
> > > Compare his fate to that of Romania's Ion Antonescu.
>
> > Perhaps, Mannerheim was not a military criminal. While Antonescu was.
>
> Mannerheim's army crossed the old Finnish-Soviet border and, between 1941
> and 1944, occupied parts of the Karelo-Finnish SSR, including its capital,
> Petroskoi, that had never been part of Finland.
The name is Petrozavodsk. Look at the map. While I agree that there is
a certain controversy over the toponimic of places, which changed
hands, the city "that has never been part of Finland" and has always
been part of Russia deserve its proper name.
> The Finnish occupation
> authorities ran concentration camps there where Soviet citizens of Russian
> ethnicity were signled out for special treatment and died like flies (for
> details, see e.g.http://www.hs.fi/english/article/President+Halonen+rejects+compensati...).
> It was also involved in the 900-day seige of Leningrad. By any objective
> criteria, Mannerheim should have been tried as a war criminal, but the
> Soviets never demanded this. President Rito Ryti, whom Mannerheim
> succeeded, as well as many members of Ryti's government, were tried and
> convicted for "war guilt", but the initiative for this came from Finland,
> not the Soviet Union.
It was very important for Russia to keep Finns on as much friendly
terms as possible. And the Finns decided to switch sides at a very
important moment for the USSR, thus making a case that they should be
rewarded for that, so to speak. Therefore, Finland was definitely
treated differently than some other German allies. But what does it
really prove? Every other country among the signatories of Paris peace
treaties of 1947 was treated somewhat differently. It doesn't make
them totally independent parties. They were in the opposing military
camp, and were all treated as such.
> Regards,
> Eugene Holman
Eugene Holman
<ander...@inbox.lv> wrote:
> "Eugene Holman" <hol...@mappi.helsinki.fi> wrote in message
> news:holman-0911...@holmaninmacbook.eng.helsinki.fi...
>
> > By any objective criteria, Mannerheim should have been tried
> > as a war criminal, but the Soviets never demanded this.
> > President Rito Ryti, whom Mannerheim succeeded, as well as
> > many members of Ryti's government, were tried and convicted
> > for "war guilt", but the initiative for this came from Finland,
> > not the Soviet Union.
>
> Oh please, Eugene, you certainly must know that Zhdanov _demanded_ a
> tribunal.
Yes, I do. Andrei Zhdanov, however, was a military man and head of the
Allied Control Commission, not a politician with the authority to propose
or implement Soviet government policy. Stalin seems to have had no
interest in seeing Finland go through the type of process that Germany
went through at Nuremberg.
> The only remarkable thing was that the Finns were allowed to
> handle the whole thing themselves.
Just as remarkable is that Urho Kekkonen, the driving force behind the
"war guilt trials" and, born in 1900, still a relatively young man in
1946, was able to use thse trials to politically neutralize many of the
key figures in Finnish politics of the generation before him.
> Gritting their teeth the Finnish judges
> sentenced Risto Ryti, six of his cabinet ministers and Finland's wartime
> envoy to Berlin to between 2 and 10 years in jail -- thereby violating one
> of the basic principles of western justice: that you mustn't legislate with
> retrospective effect.
Don't forget that the Minister of Justice, within whose sphere of
responsibility adhering to the basic principles of western justice falls,
was none other than Urho Kekkonen during this period.
Regards,
Eugene Holman
Eugene Holman
<9f1d67db-bbe0-4652...@r31g2000vbi.googlegroups.com>,
Mikhail Medved <mikhai...@mail.ru> wrote:
> On Nov 8, 11:54=A0pm, hol...@mappi.helsinki.fi (Eugene Holman) wrote:
> > In article
<deletions>
> >
> > Mannerheim's army crossed the old Finnish-Soviet border and, between 1941
> > and 1944, occupied parts of the Karelo-Finnish SSR, including its capital=
> ,
> > Petroskoi, that had never been part of Finland.
>
> The name is Petrozavodsk. Look at the map. While I agree that there is
> a certain controversy over the toponimic of places, which changed
> hands, the city "that has never been part of Finland" and has always
> been part of Russia deserve its proper name.
However the name Petroskoi is used by the Karelians, arguably the
indigenous population of the area. Do you say Vyborg or Viipuri? K�kisalmi
or Priozersk? In Finnish we say 'Pietari', not some variant of
'Sankt-Peterburg', just as in Russian you say 'Tekhas', not 'Teksas', for
Texas. Proper names and their usage are probematical as we go from one
language to another. In Finnish the name for the French city Nice is
'Nizza', its Italian name.
>
> > The Finnish occupation
> > authorities ran concentration camps there where Soviet citizens of Russia=
> n
> > ethnicity were signled out for special treatment and died like flies (for
> > details, see e.g.http://www.hs.fi/english/article/President+Halonen+rejec=
> ts+compensati...).
> > It was also involved in the 900-day seige of Leningrad. By any objective
> > criteria, Mannerheim should have been tried as a war criminal, but the
> > Soviets never demanded this. President Risto Ryti, whom Mannerheim
> > succeeded, as well as many members of Ryti's government, were tried and
> > convicted for "war guilt", but the initiative for this came from Finland,
> > not the Soviet Union.
>
> It was very important for Russia to keep Finns on as much friendly
> terms as possible. And the Finns decided to switch sides at a very
> important moment for the USSR, thus making a case that they should be
> rewarded for that, so to speak. Therefore, Finland was definitely
> treated differently than some other German allies. But what does it
> really prove? Every other country among the signatories of Paris peace
> treaties of 1947 was treated somewhat differently. It doesn't make
> them totally independent parties. They were in the opposing military
> camp, and were all treated as such.
I understand the general principle that you are referring to, but I think
that the Soviets also realized that neutral Finland became their enemy in
1939 because of the unjustified and unprovoked attack on its territory,
and the onerous terms imposed by the 1940 peace treaty. If the USSR had
treated Finland in the same manner, say, as Nazi Germany treated Sweden,
the relationship between the two countries would have been totally
different. The "Finnish problem" was of the Soviets own making, something
they tacitly acknowledged in 1944 when they concluded a separate peace
with onerous, but not draconian, conditions. The most important attribute
of this peace from the perspective of my argument was that the Soviet
government did not demand that the wartime Finnish leadership, in
particular Mannerheim, be tried as war criminals, even though the army,
and later state, headed by Mannerheim had been involved in the siege of
Leningrad, had allowed Finnish territory to be used by the German army as
a staging ground for attacks on the USSR, had occupied a part of the USSR
that had never been part of historical Finland, and had run concentration
camps in the occupied areas of the USSR where Slavic populations were
singled out for treatment far harsher than that meted out to the
indigenous local Finnic minorities (Karelians, Vepsians, etc.). Any subset
of these would have sufficed to make Mannerheim a war criminal � la
Keitel, the German commander in chief, or D�nitz, the successor to the
main wartime leader, Adolf Hitler, according to the principles established
at Nuremberg.
There is no questioning the fact that Finland and the USSR were in
opposing military camps, but it there is reason to ask whether Finland was
in the camp with Germany by choice, as an ally, or because no other option
was available and with limited objectives, as a cobelligerent, or even
possibly as an opportunist. The facts that Finland never even considered
nazifying its society and, with the exception of the period between June
1944 and September 1945 (http://www.nndb.com/gov/539/000120179/), had a
functioning American embassy in Helsinki, strongly suggest that both the
United States AND the Soviet Union regarded the Soviet-Finnish conflict as
being somewhat distinct from WW II, even if there was some overlap. It is
also significant that both the Soviet Union, under the initiative of its
ambassador to Sweden, Alexandra Kollantai (who was of partially Finnish
ancestry and spoke Finnish fluently), various American diplomats,
particularly former American ambassador to Finland (1937 - 1942) H. F.
Arthur Schoenfeld, as well as various politicians in Finland, notably Urho
Kekkonen, engaged in intense negotiations in Stockholm during the spring
and summer of 1944 with the objective of disengaging Finland from the war
and re-establishing normal relations with the USSR.
Regards,
Eugene Holman
J. Anderson
>> Mannerheim's army crossed the old Finnish-
>> Soviet border and, between 1941 and 1944,
>> occupied parts of the Karelo-Finnish SSR,
>> including its capital, Petroskoi, that had never
>> been part of Finland.
> The name is Petrozavodsk. Look at the map.
> While I agree that there is a certain controversy
> over the toponimic of places, which changed hands,
> the city "that has never been part of Finland" and
> has always been part of Russia deserve its proper name.
Eugene will tell you that Petroskoi, the Finnish version of the city's name,
has been in use for as long as that community has existed. During the
Finnish occupation, however, the place was called ��nislinna ("Onegaburg")
in Finnish. We dropped that name in 1944, and since then it has not been
politically correct to use it. Just like nobody in Germany would say
Litzmannstadt for L�dz.
> Every other country among the signatories of
> Paris peace treaties of 1947 was treated somewhat
> differently. It doesn't make them totally independent
> parties. They were in the opposing military camp,
> and were all treated as such.
You tend to ignore the one decisive thing that separates Finland from all
the rest: it was never occupied. You also haven't found an answer to my
question earlier in this thread, the one concerning what options Finland had
in 1940: "Perhaps you can suggest an alternative scenario for Finland? One
J. Anderson
> It is also significant that both the Soviet Union, under the initiative
> of its ambassador to Sweden, Alexandra Kollantai (who was of
> partially Finnish ancestry and spoke Finnish fluently), various
> American diplomats, particularly former American ambassador
> to Finland (1937 - 1942) H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld, as well as various
> politicians in Finland, notably Urho Kekkonen,
No, notably J.K. Paasikivi!
Eugene Holman
<ander...@inbox.lv> wrote:
> "Eugene Holman" <hol...@mappi.helsinki.fi> wrote in message
> news:holman-1011...@holmaninmacbook.eng.helsinki.fi...
>
> > It is also significant that both the Soviet Union, under the initiative
> > of its ambassador to Sweden, Alexandra Kollantai (who was of
> > partially Finnish ancestry and spoke Finnish fluently), various
> > American diplomats, particularly former American ambassador
> > to Finland (1937 - 1942) H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld, as well as various
> > politicians in Finland, notably Urho Kekkonen,
>
> No, notably J.K. Paasikivi!
Paasikivi certainly played an important and visible role, but archival
sources reveal that Kekkonen, in addition to the overt role he was playing
in the Peace Opposition, had been covertly wheeling and dealing through
the American embassy in Stockholm with American and Soviet officials in
his attempts to extricate Finland from the war and ensure himself a
central position in post-war Finnish politics. Kekkonen's relationship
with Vladimir Vladimirov, later to serve as his *kotiryss�* - 'home
Russian', dates back to this period.
> > engaged in intense negotiations in Stockholm during the spring
> > and summer of 1944 with the objective of disengaging Finland from
> > the war and re-establishing normal relations with the USSR.
Kekkonen, fully cognizant of the most probable nature of the post-war
realities inland would face, was deeply involved in the work that would
lead to re-establishing normal and mutually beneficial relations between
Finland and the USSR. This is known to have begun on Kekkonen's initiative
with requests to the American diplomat who monitored and was eventually
put in charge of Finnish affairs at the Stockholm embassy in June 1944
after the United States had broken off diplomatic relations with Finland
to open up a conduit to Soviet officialdom. Kekkonen's Soviet contacts,
conducted through American channels, can be dated as far back at 1942.
Regards,
Eugene Holman
Mikhail Medved
> "Mikhail Medved" <mikhail_b...@mail.ru> wrote in message
>
> news:9f1d67db-bbe0-4652...@r31g2000vbi.googlegroups.com...
>
> >> Mannerheim's army crossed the old Finnish-
> >> Soviet border and, between 1941 and 1944,
> >> occupied parts of the Karelo-Finnish SSR,
> >> including its capital, Petroskoi, that had never
> >> been part of Finland.
> > The name is Petrozavodsk. Look at the map.
> > While I agree that there is a certain controversy
> > over the toponimic of places, which changed hands,
> > the city "that has never been part of Finland" and
> > has always been part of Russia deserve its proper name.
>
> Eugene will tell you that Petroskoi, the Finnish version of the city's name,
> has been in use for as long as that community has existed. During the
> in Finnish. We dropped that name in 1944, and since then it has not been
> politically correct to use it. Just like nobody in Germany would say
Yes, you and Eugene are right. I take my retort back.
> > Every other country among the signatories of
> > Paris peace treaties of 1947 was treated somewhat
> > differently. It doesn't make them totally independent
> > parties. They were in the opposing military camp,
> > and were all treated as such.
>
> You tend to ignore the one decisive thing that separates Finland from all
> the rest: it was never occupied. You also haven't found an answer to my
> question earlier in this thread, the one concerning what options Finland had
> in 1940: "Perhaps you can suggest an alternative scenario for Finland? One
> that would have produced the same result: not getting occupied by anyone."
Sorry, I didn't mean to be rude, just didn't have time. I'll answer
tomorrow.
J. Anderson
> On Nov 10, 4:56 am, "J. Anderson" <anderso...@inbox.lv> wrote:
>> "Mikhail Medved" <mikhail_b...@mail.ru> wrote in message
>>
>> news:9f1d67db-bbe0-4652...@r31g2000vbi.googlegroups.com...
>>
>>>> Mannerheim's army crossed the old Finnish-
>>>> Soviet border and, between 1941 and 1944,
>>>> occupied parts of the Karelo-Finnish SSR,
>>>> including its capital, Petroskoi, that had never
>>>> been part of Finland.
>>> The name is Petrozavodsk. Look at the map.
>>> While I agree that there is a certain controversy
>>> over the toponimic of places, which changed hands,
>>> the city "that has never been part of Finland" and
>>> has always been part of Russia deserve its proper name.
>> Eugene will tell you that Petroskoi, the Finnish version of the city's name,
>> has been in use for as long as that community has existed. During the
>> in Finnish. We dropped that name in 1944, and since then it has not been
>> politically correct to use it. Just like nobody in Germany would say
>
> Yes, you and Eugene are right. I take my retort back.
Now wait a moment, Misha! You were actually right this time. Why should
Eugene (or I) be using the Finnish name form when it comes to
Petrozavodsk, when we don't do it concerning Pietari (for Piter),
Moskova (for Moscow) or Pihkova (for Pskov). Eugene is even usually
writing Vyborg instead of Viipuri.
>>> Every other country among the signatories of
>>> Paris peace treaties of 1947 was treated somewhat
>>> differently. It doesn't make them totally independent
>>> parties. They were in the opposing military camp,
>>> and were all treated as such.
>> You tend to ignore the one decisive thing that separates Finland from all
>> the rest: it was never occupied. You also haven't found an answer to my
>> question earlier in this thread, the one concerning what options Finland had
>> in 1940: "Perhaps you can suggest an alternative scenario for Finland? One
>> that would have produced the same result: not getting occupied by anyone."
>
> Sorry, I didn't mean to be rude, just didn't have time. I'll answer
> tomorrow.
Be careful now. If you start being nice and polite, it will make it
difficult for me to be nasty back. Surely that is not what you want? SCB
needs all the 'Russophobes' it can get!