Remembering Arafat
GWhyte
By HonestReporting.com
HonestReporting.com | November 18, 2005
http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=20235
Yassir Arafat, frequently cited as the father of modern-day terror, died one
year ago. One would think that in describing this man and his dark legacy,
the mainstream media would reflect the reality that marked his rule.
Instead, the media ignore the real impact this man and his disastrous
choices have had on the region.
Arafat said "No" to peace and "Yes" to more terror
Reuters states that Arafat failed "to realize his dream of a Palestinian
state." Yet Arafat was offered his "dream" and rejected it. The article,
heavy on the official commemorations of Arafat, does not even mention the
historic Camp David Summit in which Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak
offered Arafat Gaza, a Jerusalem capital, and a sizeable percentage of the
West Bank. As former American President Bill Clinton said this week, Arafat
made a "colossal, historical blunder" in not accepting Israel's offer.
Former U.S. envoy Dennis Ross offered this explanation at the time, "Arafat
could not accept Camp David... because when the conflict ends, the cause
that defines Arafat also ends."
A LEGACY OF VIOLENCE
Not only did Arafat reject Barak's offer, he launched a war of terror that
has since claimed the lives of over 1,000 Israelis and even more of his own
people. Typical of Reuters' assessment:
Arafat, a former guerrilla leader who won a Nobel Peace Prize and the deep
admiration of his people only to sink into renewed conflict with Israel,
left a complicated legacy.
But Arafat did not passively "sink" into violence. He consciously rejected
the offer of a state and chose violence. His legacy, as documented by
HonestReporting here, is far from complicated. Under his "leadership," the
PLO pioneered the hallmarks of modern terrorism:
hostage taking -- The Munich Olympics set a deadly modern precedent
airplane high-jacking -- Long before September 11, the PLO had hijacked
dozens of passenger jets;
school massacres -- The horrific massacre in Chechenya had its precedent in
Israel
suicide bombing -- Bombings in Iraq, Spain, London, Kenya, Jordan and many
places around the world today were one the PLO's main weapons.
A LEGACY OF CORRUPTION
Meanwhile, Arafat stole hundreds of millions of dollars that were supposed
to help the people he claimed to champion. The Palestinian Authority today
is trying unsuccessfully to deal with the rampant corruption that he
institutionalized. According to Issam Abu Issa, the former chairman of the
Palestine International Bank:
Rather than use donor funds for their intended purposes, Arafat regularly
diverted money to his own accounts. It is amazing that some U.S. officials
still see the Palestinian Authority as a partner even after U.S.
congressional records revealed authenticated PLO papers signed by Arafat in
which he instructed his staff to divert donors' money to projects benefiting
himself, his family, and his associates. (Middle East Quarterly)
What's so complicated about that legacy?
Comments to Reuters: edi...@reuters.com
The New York Times referred to the official Palestinian commemorations in
the Muqata, Arafat's headquarters, in this manner:
Israel confined Mr. Arafat to the compound for most of the last three years
of his life, though he was treated at a French military hospital for two
weeks before his death on Nov. 11, 2004. His funeral the next day at the
Muqata was a chaotic affair attended by tens of thousands of anguished
mourners.
After the Oslo Accords, Arafat was free to travel both within the disputed
territories and abroad. It was only after repeated terrorist attacks, which
were shown to be supported directly by Arafat, that Israel confined him to a
large cluster of buildings in central Ramallah.
Comments to The New York Times: let...@nytimes.com
The Washington Post also removes personal responsibility from Arafat by
noting that "Israel stopped regarding Arafat as a partner after
Israeli-Palestinian peace talks broke down in late 2000 and a second
Palestinian uprising erupted."
Both the breakdown in talks and the spontaneous "eruption" of violence were
direct choices of Arafat. It is astonishing that the media have chosen not
to point out these basic facts.
Comments to The Washington Post: let...@washpost.com
Perhaps The Arab Times, hardly an unbiased source, said it best several
years ago when they wrote:
He (Arafat) has destroyed Palestine. He has led it to terrorism, death and a
hopeless situation... All Arab leaders know this fact. It won't be possible
for us to gain from the Middle East road map for peace if this man remains
in power.
MISPLACED HERO
This week, three suicide bombers blew up three hotels in Amman, Jordan,
killing 57 people, including many Palestinians. Newsweek ran a story
accompanied by the following picture. Look carefully at the wall behind the
family in mourning. An HonestReporting subscriber wrote to us:
I can't help but notice the irony of these Palestinians mourning the deaths
of their relatives caused by the Jordanian suicide bombers with a picture of
the father of all suicide bombers proudly displayed on the wall behind them.
We agree. Strange that the reporter didn't find it appropriate to mention
this irony.
Palestinian members of the Al-Akhras clan gather in a mourning room in the
West Bank village of Silet-Al-Thaher to grieve over the loss of 17 relatives
in the Amman bombing.
Comments to Newsweek: Let...@newsweek.com
Not all the media are guilty of misinformation by omission. The Guardian ran
a column by former PLO Representative Karma Nabulsi in which he takes the
media to task for portraying Arafat in a Negative light. According to
Nabulsi:
Arafat, for all his flaws and mistakes, stood for a just peace, based on a
historic compromise. He believed in international law, in a two-state
solution based on implementing UN resolution 242, and for a just settlement
for refugees, the main victims of this conflict. His legitimacy came from
more than the fact that he was democratically elected: he performed a
historic purpose in the life of Palestinians, a purpose as yet unfulfilled.
By representing his people's general will and collective spirit, he
symbolized the absent state's sovereign institutions.
Comments to the Guardian: let...@guardian.co.uk
It is not enough for the media to simply say that Arafat was unsuccessful in
his goal of establishing a Palestinian State. Any reflection on his life
that does not mention the terror that he facilitated or the corruption that
characterized his rule is a gross mischaracterization of the man and his
dubious legacy.
Did your local paper gloss over the anniversary of Arafat's death? Let them
know of their obligation for reporting that give all the facts.
Thank you for your ongoing involvement in the battle against media bias.
GWhyte
Let them breathe
Nov 17th 2005 | JERUSALEM
From The Economist print edition
http://www.economist.com/world/africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=5169503
Despite Israel's withdrawal from Gaza, its Palestinian inhabitants were
still suffocating. Now America's secretary of state has helped loosen their
straitjacket
IT TOOK a little more than 48 hours for Condoleezza Rice to resolve
something that Israeli and Palestinian officials at all levels-and despite
the considerable persuasive powers of James Wolfensohn, the former World
Bank president who is now a Middle East peace envoy-had been arguing about
for five months. After an all-night negotiating session, a deal was
announced on the Rafah border crossing between Gaza and Egypt. With luck,
this could lead towards a better, freer life for Palestinians in Gaza-and
perhaps even, eventually, for those in the West Bank, the main bit of a
hoped-for Palestinian state. And that, in turn, might create the conditions
for a push to a final peace settlement.
Israel, which pulled its settlers and troops out of Gaza this summer, had
wanted to keep control of Gazans' only border with another country, so it
could track and block suspected terrorists. The Palestinian Authority (PA)
wanted to run Rafah itself, with a third party-the European
Union-supervising. The compromise: Israeli officers in an observation room a
few miles away will watch the crossing point through a barrage of
closed-circuit cameras, and ask Palestinian colleagues to detain or stop
anyone they don't like. If the Palestinians refuse, European officers at the
scene will have the final say.
But while the slight concession to its sovereignty is symbolically important
to the Palestinian Authority and to Gazans who will once again be able to
visit relatives on the other side of the border, what matters more in
practical terms are the deal's other parts. The Rafah crossing is merely the
least of several bottlenecks to the free movement of goods and people on
which Gaza's future will depend.
The economy will rely on agricultural exports. Those and other products will
leave not via Rafah but by the Kerem Shalom goods terminal to Egypt, which
will stay under Israeli control with PA officers present; and via the Karni
crossing, the gateway via Israel for goods both to the West Bank, virtually
a separate part of the Palestinian economy since the second intifada began
in 2000, and to the rest of the world, since Gaza does not yet have a
working seaport or airport.
Meanwhile, since Israel is still granting few Palestinians permits to work
in Israel and plans to bring the number to zero within a couple of years,
free movement of workers between Gaza and the West Bank will also be vital
for letting the economy breathe. This week's deal includes a promise to
speed up the sluggish work rate at Karni from around 35 trucks a day now to
150 by the end of this year and 400 by the end of next year. Limited bus
convoys are to start shuttling between Gaza and the West Bank by
mid-December, truck convoys by mid-January.
But this is only a start. A port and airport would give Gaza trade access to
the world without going via Israel, which adds a lot to transport costs.
Here, however, the situation is the same as before. There is no agreement on
the airport; Palestinians can start building a seaport, but with no deal on
how to supervise it. Plans for a road or rail link between the West Bank and
Gaza, so they can function as one economic unit (essential if they are to
function as a Palestinian state in the future) remain shelved; Israel fears
that Gaza's main export to the West Bank would be weapons and people to use
them.
Advertisement
Finally, even as one part of the Palestinian economy sees relief, the
noose tightens on another. The day the deal was signed, Israel's upgraded
"passenger terminal" between Jerusalem and Bethlehem came into operation.
Travellers between the two cities, which are on opposite sides of the new
barrier separating Israel from the West Bank, now have to get off their
buses, unload their luggage and go through an international-border-style
passport check. On its first day, delays of over two hours were reported.
The city that makes its living from the tourists and pilgrims who come to
Jesus's birthplace was just starting to see a recovery after the intifada,
which had driven over 90% of them away. Stifling its economy will feed
resentment and terror, not a peace-friendly atmosphere.
GWhyte
The U.S. has lost momentum in opening up Middle Eastern societies
Michael Young
http://www.reason.com/links/links111705.shtml
The Bush administration has lost the initiative on Middle Eastern
democratization. The gong of reality has apparently sounded. But just as
some officials overestimated how democracy would impose sudden serenity on
Iraq, those advocating a departure from democratization as a cornerstone of
American foreign policy misjudge just how much the Arab world has changed
since April 2003.
Things were different a year ago. In his second inaugural address, President
George W. Bush issued an inventory of liberal promises: "We will encourage
reform in other governments by making clear that success in our relations
will require the decent treatment of their own people." (Applause.)
"America's belief in human dignity will guide our policies. Yet rights must
be more than the grudging concessions of dictators; they are secured by free
dissent and the participation of the governed. In the long run, there is no
justice without freedom, and there can be no human rights without human
liberty." (Applause.) . "Americans, of all people, should never be surprised
by the power of our ideals. Eventually, the call of freedom comes to every
mind and every soul. We do not accept the existence of permanent tyranny
because we do not accept the possibility of permanent slavery."
(Applause.) . "Democratic reformers facing repression, prison, or exile can
know: America sees you for who you are, the future leaders of your free
country." And so on.
In a much publicized speech in Cairo last June, Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice applied this idealism to the Middle East, saying: "For 60
years, my country, the United States, pursued stability at the expense of
democracy in this region here in the Middle East-and we achieved neither.
Now, we are taking a different course. We are supporting the democratic
aspirations of all people."
Then the masonry began to collapse. With the administration facing growing
domestic discontent over the war in Iraq (including, lately, from within the
GOP) and a salvo of rotten fruit for its performance after hurricane
Katrina, for nominating Harriet Miers to the Supreme Court, and for the
Valerie Plame affair, the idealism began sounding more like the clang of an
empty saucepan than an alarum rallying the liberal legions. On top of that,
more urgent priorities elbowed their way to the top of the agenda.
Last weekend, for example, after failing at a summit in Bahrain to persuade
Arab states to adopt a final statement promoting democracy, Rice traveled to
Saudi Arabia, and there had to put democratic values on the backburner. The
Americans and the Saudis effected a reconciliation of sorts, after deep
differences over Iraq. The two sides set up joint working groups on
terrorism, oil production, and the granting of U.S. visas to Saudi citizens,
among other things. This harked back to the tradeoff that for decades
ensured Washington would leave Arab despots alone: Whenever the U.S. has
regarded security and economic self-interest as paramount in the Middle
East, democracy has lost out.
Similarly, last week's bombings in Amman will almost certainly make less
likely American pressure on Jordan's King Abdullah to open up his police-run
system. The monarch has cleverly sought to peddle the line that now is the
time to let democracy flourish, but somehow that is unconvincing. Which Arab
leader has ever increased the repressive powers of his security agencies, as
the king intends to do through a tough anti-terrorism law currently being
drafted, while also giving his society more freedom?
The bombings took place as interest began waning in Jeffrey Goldberg's
much-talked-about profile of former National Security Advisor Brent
Scowcroft. Regurgitating the tenets of "realism", Scowcroft, who served
under President George H.W. Bush, expressed deep doubts about the
administration's democratization efforts. Quite why the congenitally
uninspired Scowcroft has been promoted to foreign policy sage is a mystery,
though his close relationship with the president's father offers part of the
answer. There is also the fact that realists, who had nothing to say after
9/11, have regained some credence as the administration falters in Iraq.
That's why Scowcroft was not alone: His former protégé, Richard Haass,
currently the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote an
opinion piece in The New York Times last week outlining what he sees as the
ideal foreign policy doctrine for the U.S. Haass affirmed that while
democracy promotion was a legitimate policy goal, "to make it a doctrine is
neither desirable nor practical." Before him, fellow realist Gideon Rose,
managing editor of Foreign Affairs magazine, argued that "the Bush doctrine
has collapsed, and the administration has consequently embraced realism,
American foreign policy's perennial hangover cure." How had things changed?
"In practice, the Bush administration has recently begun to pursue interests
rather than ideals and conciliation rather than confrontation."
Rose's diagnosis was incomplete: The administration has always mixed
interests and ideals, conciliation and confrontation, since no foreign
policy can ever be conducted on the basis of one without the other. But he
was indirectly right in another sense: When it comes to facing the dilemma
of advancing democracy against interests in the Arab world, the
administration has been willing to hold up odiously manipulated elections as
proof of progress-for example the recent presidential election in Egypt or
municipal elections in Saudi Arabia. In other words, the administration,
perhaps reluctantly, has intermittently fallen back on an old realist trick
of insisting things are better, providing counterfeit evidence of this, and
turning to more important items of business.
Yet now is as good a time as ever for the U.S. to make democratization a
basis of its foreign policy doctrine in the Middle East. Many Arabs have no
patience for Bush. But the center of gravity in the region has decisively
shifted in the direction of advancing liberty, as recent events have eroded
the legitemacy of Arab leaders: three relatively free elections this year in
Iraq (one of them forthcoming in December), another relatively free election
in Lebanon after the country saw an end to Syrian occupation, and growing
discontent with the fossilocracies in other parts of the region,
particularly Egypt or Tunisia, and with second-generation despotisms, such
as those in Syria and Jordan. For an administration to ignore such changes
and banish democracy to a secondary tier of priorities would display a
striking lack of ambition and foresight.
A more obvious parallel question is whether the U.S. can even return to the
cold realism that guided policy under the first Bush administration. As 9/11
showed, that approach posed a genuine national security threat, as
disgruntled Arabs, associating Washington with their own domestic
persecutors, retaliated against the U.S. Conversely, absolute, inflexible
devotion to democracy at the expense of more practical consideration of
interests is simply not sensible.
That leaves a third option: that the U.S. declare the spread of democracy a
strategic interest (not an open-ended desire), one that must be advanced
where and when possible, even if it is temporarily delayed by intervening
objectives. Arab regimes should be pushed to take specific measures within
specific timeframes to open up their societies, and the U.S. can tie this to
other forms of bilateral cooperation. Finally, no administration should ever
hail as progress what is patently an effort by dictatorships to sell it a
defective bill of democratic goods.
Is this certain to work? No, but any policymaker wanting to adapt to the new
realities in the Middle East is better off working according to these
guidelines, rather than by playing down democratic principles and helping
buttress the illegitimate, failing states that make a new 9/11 possible.
Reason contributing editor Michael Young is opinion editor at the Daily Star
newspaper in Beirut.