[Independent] MI5, Camp Delta, and story that shames Britain

[MGGPillai]

The Independent, London

MI5, Camp Delta, and the story that shames Britain
Bisher al-Rawi and Jamil el-Banna are among eight British residents
who remain prisoners at the U.S. Naval Air Station at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba. They are jailed because British officials rendered them into
the hands of the CIA in Africa, a fact that may explain why the
British government refuses to intercede on their behalf. Bisher and
Jamil have been wrongfully imprisoned now for more than three years.
This is the story of their betrayal by the British government and
their appalling treatment at the hands of the CIA and the U.S. military.
By George B. Mickum
Published: 16 March 2006

The author, a partner with Washington law firm Keller and Hackman,
represents Bisher al-Rawi and Jamil el-Banna. This exclusive report
is compiled from conversations with his two clients, their
declassified letters and declassified legal responses, and
information provided by the US Military

Several weeks after 11 September 2001, two MI5 agents arrived at
Bisher al-Rawi's family home to recruit him to work for British
Intelligence. The visit was part of an effort to recruit scores of
individuals from London's Muslim community for reconnaissance work
and to assist the war on terror.

ABU QATADA

In particular, MI5 sought contacts with some of the Muslim clerics
preaching in London. Mr al-Rawi was a perfect candidate, educated,
fluent in English, and a friend of a Muslim cleric named Abu Qatada.
The agents presented identification, introducing themselves to Mr al-
Rawi as "Alex" and "Matt". However, they are the same names the
agents used throughout the Muslim community in London.

The agents asked Mr al-Rawi wide-ranging questions, which he answered
candidly. At the end of the meeting, they asked if would agree to
speak to them again.

Two more meetings took place at Mr al-Rawi's family home in London.
At the agents' suggestion, Mr al-Rawi started meeting them at a
coffee shop in Victoria station. Shortly after, the agents asked Mr
al-Rawi to work for MI5 on a more formal basis. He agreed. Over the
next nine months, meetings took place in hotel rooms in and around
London.

Throughout Mr al-Rawi's relationship with MI5, his agents pressured
him to accept payment for his services. He refused all such
overtures. The only thing Mr al-Rawi , 38, who is Iraqi born, ever
accepted from MI5 was a mobile telephone. He took it to put an end to
the agents' demand for him to be contactable.

As his work with MI5 continued, Mr al-Rawi became increasingly
alarmed about his relationship with MI5 and his potential exposure.
Eventually, he sought assurances from Matt and Alex that his work as
an intermediary between MI5 and Abu Qatada would not get him into
trouble. Ultimately, he requested a meeting with MI5 and a private
attorney, suggesting the human rights lawyer Gareth Peirce. MI5 refused.

To assuage his concerns and convince him to continue working for MI5,
the agents set up the first of two meetings with an MI5 lawyer whom
they called " Simon". Alex and Matt were present at both meetings.
Simon introduced himself to Mr al-Rawi as a lawyer with MI5. He
conceded that Simon was not his real name. Simon assured Mr al-Rawi
he was running no risk by working with MI5 and that MI5 and Simon
himself would come to his aid if Mr al-Rawi found himself
compromised. Simon told him that all he needed to do was record the
date and time of his conversations with Simon, and MI5 would be able
to identify and locate Simon. Mr al-Rawi's refusal to insist on a
meeting with a private attorney would have devastating consequences.

Abu Qatada was completely aware of Mr al-Rawi's relationship with
MI5. Mr al-Rawi carried questions and answers between the parties,
served as a translator, and participated in negotiations with Abu
Qatada. "All I did in Britain was try to help with steps necessary to
get a meeting between Abu Qatada and MI5. I was trying to bring them
together. MI5 would give me messages to take to Abu Qatada, and Abu
Qatada would give me messages to take back to them."

It was during this time that Mr al-Rawi's good friend, Jamil el-
Banna, a Jordanian British resident, became involved. While the
British Government was publicly asserting that Abu Qatada's
whereabouts were unknown, Abu Qatada was actively engaged in a
dialogue with British officials that involved Mr al-Rawi and Mr el-
Banna. Mr al-Rawi asked Mr el-Banna to drive Abu Qatada's wife and
son to meet Abu Qatada in London. Mr el-Banna followed Mr al-Rawi,
who led the way on his motorcycle. When Abu Qatada was arrested, Mr
el-Banna taxied his wife and child home at the request of the British
officials on the scene. Mr el-Banna never was arrested: the police
thanked him for his assistance. He was never even questioned because
everyone was aware of his limited involvement. Based on this
involvement, he has been tortured and jailed for three years.

ARREST IN GAMBIA

Mr al-Rawi then turned his energy to his brother Wahab's long-planned
mobile peanut oil factory, a project in Gambia.

Gambian authorities detained Mr al-Rawi, Mr el-Banna and their
friends immediately after the group landed in Africa. Indeed, shortly
after the arrest, Gambian authorities told the arrested group that
the British had told them to make the arrests.

There is no question that British officials rendered Mr al-Rawi and
Mr el-Banna into the hands of CIA officials in Africa in November of
2002. During one of Mr el-Banna's more than 100 interrogation
sessions, his interrogator told him his adopted country had betrayed him

A British citizen, Abdullah El Janoudi, who accompanied Mr al-Rawi
and Mr el-Banna to Gambia, confirms that a large American by the name
of Lee told him British officials had the group arrested. He also
confirms that during the interrogations that took place every two
days, the CIA continued to press for incriminating evidence about Abu
Qatada that linked him with al-Qa'ida.

In Africa, the CIA had a complete file on Mr al-Rawi that included
his hobbies, information that can only have come from British
Intelligence. Mr al-Rawi states that "from the very beginning in the
Gambia the CIA said, 'The British told us that one of you was helping
MI5.' By the second day in the Gambia, they [the CIA] were asking me
to work for the US in Britain. I said I would not."

AFGHANISTAN

Although Mr al-Rawi's brother Wahab and another friend were released
after a month and returned to England, Mr al-Rawi and Mr el-Banna
were rendered at the end of 2002 in a CIA Gulfstream jet, one of a
fleet of jets used by the CIA in its "extraordinary rendition"
programme, in which the US transports victims to foreign countries
for the express purpose of torture.

Mr el-Banna's account of his arrest reads:

Detainee: "When they came and arrested and handcuffed me, they were
wearing all black. They even covered their heads ... They took me,
covered me, put me in a vehicle and sent me somewhere. I don't know.
It was at night. Then from there to the airport right away.

Tribunal president: An airport in Gambia?

Detainee: Yes. We were in a room like this with about eight men. All
with covered-up faces.

Tribunal president: Were you by yourself at that time?

Detainee: Yes. They cut off my clothes.

Mr al-Rawi and Mr el-Banna were taken to the notorious "dark prison"
in Kabul, Afghanistan. There, both men were imprisoned underground in
isolation and darkness and tortured over two weeks. They were held in
leg shackles 24 hours a day. They were starved, beaten, dragged along
floors while shackled, and kicked. Round-the-clock screams from
fellow prisoners made sleep impossible.

Subsequently, they were transferred to the US Air Force base at
Bagram, Afghanistan. Although they were chained hand and foot and
hooded, while waiting to be transported, their captors beat them. Mr
el-Banna, in particular, was beaten repeatedly.

In Bagram, they were imprisoned and tortured for another two months.
They were beaten, starved, and sleep deprived. What is particularly
noteworthy is the fact that the only information the interrogators
were interested in was information about Abu Qatada. Over the years,
CIA and military interrogators have repeatedly attempted to suborn
testimony from both men, linking Abu Qatada to al-Qa'ida. Mr el-Banna
has repeatedly refused offers of freedom, money, and passports in
exchange for false testimony.

GUANTANAMO BAY

Ultimately, both men were transported to Guantanamo, a trip so
harrowing that a government informer, who was posing as a prisoner
and had to be transported and treated the same as other prisoners,
stated in a television interview that, at the time, he wished someone
would shoot him. Forced to wear darkened goggles, face-masks and
earphones, chained at the ankles, handcuffed behind their backs with
thin plastic that caused incredible pain, and, in some cases, lasting
damage, starving and sick prisoners who had been deprived of sleep
were forced to maintain a sitting position, legs forward and chained
without moving for nearly 24 hours.

If they moved they were beaten, kicked, hit with blunt objects. The
government informer lasted barely one month in the intolerable
conditions in Guantanamo before demanding freedom. During the first
month at Guantanamo in which both were kept in strict solitary
confinement, the pair were interrogated six hours per day and kept in
the interrogation room for 14 hours per day, sometimes in freezing
temperatures to induce hypothermia, one of the many techniques
approved for use by the Bush administration. In some cases they were
short-shackled, hands behind heels, for the entire time.

During his lengthy incarceration, Mr el-Banna has repeatedly asked
his interrogators to administer a polygraph test, but the military
has refused. However, the military's unwillingness to give him a lie
detector deviates from standard prison policy. Former interrogators
at Guantanamo confirm that a "passed" polygraph test is a
prerequisite to be transferred to Camp IV, the lowest security prison
camp on the base.

Mr el-Banna is in Camp IV. Mr al-Rawi, who also is in Camp IV, had a
polygraph administered, but the military has refused to turn over the
results and there is no mention of it in records produced by the
military.

Indeed, the military has taken great pains to prevent any exculpatory
information from creeping into the official records to ensure
prisoners have no chance to exonerate themselves. In Guantanamo, Mr
al-Rawi has met perhaps 10 different CIA agents. One agent who went
by the name "Elizabeth" told him: "Don't think that leaving here will
come without a price." Mr al-Rawi said: "She asked me whether I would
work with them, and I said no. [She] suggested, 'How about working
with MI5?'"

MI5 MEETINGS

Mr al-Rawi's relationship with MI5 did not end with his arrest. He
has met MI5 agents at Guantanamo on numerous occasions. He first met
an MI5 agent in the early autumn of 2003, fully shackled. After some
perfunctory questions and answers that confirmed his work with MI5,
the agent offered him an oblique, belated apology: "Sorry about all
this." Several months later, Alex, the MI5 agent with whom Mr al-Rawi
worked in London, interrogated him at Guantanamo. Among other things,
Mr al-Rawi told Alex the Americans wanted him to work for US
intelligence.

In January 2004, Martin and Matt, the other two MI5 agents that Mr al-
Rawi worked with in London, met Mr al-Rawi in an interrogation room.
During that meeting, agents proposed that Mr al-Rawi return to
working with MI5 upon his release. He agreed. The following day, the
agents told him it would take them one to six months to get him home.

Former Guantanamo interrogators report that all prisoner interviews
with foreign intelligence officials are videotaped. The trial judge
in charge of both men's cases granted them motion to preserve that
specific evidence along with copious other evidence we have managed
to identify.

REVIEW TRIBUNAL

I advised the men more than one month before I travelled to
Guantanamo in September 2004, advising them not to appear before the
CSRT (Combatant Status Review Tribunal) or participate in the
process. My letters were not delivered until after each had
participated in his tribunal. I advised them against participating,
among other reasons because the tribunals were permitted to rely on
information obtained under torture. Both men were not even permitted
to review all the evidence against them, and thus had no chance to
defend themselves.

The following testimony from a CSRT proceeding demonstrates the Bush
administration's commitment to providing prisoners with meaningful
due process. In response to the charge "While living in Bosnia, the
detainee associated with a known al-Qa'ida operative" the following
colloquy, which could have been lifted from the pages of The
Adventures of Alice in Wonderland, took place:

Detainee: Give me his name.

President: I do not know.

Detainee: How can I respond to this?

President: Did you know of anybody who was a member ofal- Qa'ida?

Detainee: No, no.

President: I'm sorry, what was your response?

Detainee: No. If you tell me the name, I can respond and defend
myself against this accusation.

President: We are asking you the questions and we need you to respond
to what is on the classified summary.

Although both men never were anywhere near Afghanistan or Iraq, never
were involved in any wrongful activity, never possessed a weapon of
any kind, they were powerless to defend themselves against the charge
that they had associated with Abu Qatada, "a known al-Qa'ida
operative", even though Abu Qatada has never been charged with any
crime or been shown to be a member of or involved in al-Qa'ida. But,
the full extent of both men's betrayal by MI5 does not end here.

At the tribunal, Mr al-Rawi testified under oath about his
relationship with MI5 and his role as a liaison between MI5 and Abu
Qatada. He informed the tribunal that MI5 had expressly approved of
his role: "During a meeting with British Intelligence, I had asked if
it was OK for me to continue to have a relationship with Abu Qatada.
They assured me it was."

Mr al-Rawi requested that the MI5 agents Alex, Matt, and Martin
appear before the tribunal to confirm his work with MI5 and Abu
Qatada. Very much out of character, the tribunal president recognised
the obvious importance of such testimony and "determined that these
three witnesses were relevant". He instructed the military prosecutor
to make inquiries and to determine whether the British Government
would make the witnesses available .

The British Government not only refused to allow the witnesses to
appear, it refused to confirm the accuracy of Mr al-Rawi's account,
thereby ensuring both men's fate and consigning them to indefinite
imprisonment. The following account is taken from Mr al-Rawi's CSRT:

President: Detainee has requested three witnesses who would testify
that he supported the British Intelligence Agency. We have contacted
the British Government and at this time, they are not willing to
provide the tribunal with that information. The witnesses are no
longer considered reasonably available, so I am going to deny the
request for those three witnesses.

Later in the proceeding, the president issued the following
clarification: " The British Government didn't say they didn't have a
relationship with you, they just would not confirm or deny it. That
means I only have your word."

Mr el-Banna's CSRT hearing was so procedurally defective that it
would make good farce were the result not so devastating. The only
evidence considered by the tribunal was that he drove Abu Qatada's
wife and son to visit him during the time British authorities were
engaged in discussions with him. In fact, his CSRT hearing was
postponed and reconvened three times on 25 September, 28 September, 2
October and 9 October 2004 to allow the military's prosecuting
attorney to collect and present additional evidence to the tribunal.

At the conclusion, Mr el-Banna's personal representative, a soldier
and non-lawyer who could be compelled under the CSRT rules to testify
against him courageously dissented from the tribunal's conclusion,
including a formal statement in the CSRT record: "The personal
representative states that the record is insufficient to prove that
the detainee is an enemy combatant."

Although Mr al-Rawi disclosed his involvement with MI5 during our
first meeting in 2004, he has been loath to go public with this
information. But there are few options left available to both men.

Congress voted to ban torture by an overwhelming majority in December
2005, but President Bush signed the bill into law with a clarifying
"signing statement" that allows him to ignore it whenever he chooses.
Of more immediate concern is Congress's recent legislative reversal
of the Supreme Court's decision to allow prisoners at Guantanamo to
file petitions for habeas corpus . In response to the passage of the
Detainee Treatment Act, the US government moved quickly to dismiss
all of the habeas cases filed by prisoners at Guantanamo, including
those filed by Mr al-Rawi and Mr el-Banna.

NO RETURN

Neither man can return to the UK because their visas have expired.
The British Government adamantly refuses to reissue them visas or
allow them to return home on humanitarian grounds. If the cases are
dismissed, the US military intends to transfer Mr al-Rawi to Iraq and
Mr el-Banna to Jordan. There, each will be jailed with the host
country's pro-American acquiescence. Recent reconnaissance indicates
the US government is negotiating with foreign governments to jail
prisoners from Guantanamo indefinitely.

Why the British Government has treated these two men as it has, I
cannot say. What seems most likely is that they were simply
expendable pawns in Great Britain's and America's attempt to create a
case against Abu Qatada

My security clearance allows me to review all of the classified
evidence in the cases, including all the evidence the tribunal relied
upon to conclude that Mr al-Rawi and Mr el-Banna were enemy
combatants. There is no evidence in the record, classified or
unclassified, which supports the military's determination that these
are enemy combatants. None.

The African business trip that ended in chains and imprisonment

By Robert Verkaik

Jamal el-Banna and Bisher al-Rawi were arrested at Banjul airport,
Gambia, in November 2002 on suspicion of links to terrorism.

The two friends were in a party of five businessmen who were trying
to start up a peanut oil venture. Two other British nationals
detained at the same time were flown home.

The Government argues that Mr al-Rawi, an Iraqi citizen in his late
thirties and Mr el-Banna, a Palestinian in his forties, who have both
brought up families in Britain, are British residents with limited
rights.

After their arrest, the two men were interviewed by the Americans and
flown in chains to Bagram in Afghanistan. In early 2003, they were
taken to Guantanamo Bay.

Last month Mr Justice Collins ruled that Mr el-Banna and Mr al-Rawi
should have their case for judicial review heard in the High Court,
and that claims of torture at the camp meant the Government might
have an obligation to act. But the Government maintains: "It is only
through ... their nationality that persons can ... enjoy the
obligations placed on a state by international law."

© 2006 Independent News and Media Limited