Here is an example of why what Elias is proposing is important. The twitter signin has 'groomed' ppl into poor privacy practices and so the bad guys have moved in.
I've been waiting for phishing to start for a while and also you can expect malware on the end of the tinyurl, tr.im, bit,ly urls because it hides the destination (we subconsiously scan urls and assess trust of that link by its name).
So here is a good writeup on this weeks emergent twitter phishing - it uses all the standard bad guy techniques - they just needed an incentive to start.
http://threatchaos.com/2009/01/twitter-phishing/
d.
The problem is not so much that (it's bad, arguably, and even you
could force some complexity or length (personally I recommend
long-sentences)) but really the fact that it was trivial to do the
password reset on the accounts.
What should've been done is that a secondary token is required to do
the reset. For example, the crystal account requests a reset, is sent
a 'confirm reset thing' to an offline area (her email, an internal
twitter site, etc) and then it's processed there (possibly with yet
another token).
> but yes a dictionary attack is something they could have prevented with
> rate-limiting!
--
noon silky
http://www.boxofgoodfeelings.com/