Advances in electronic direct democracy: Why not in UK? Follow up report

[INIREF*I&R ~ GB]

E-voting in referendum tested successfully in 12 regions

On the 11th March 2012 twelve "Cantons" enabled electronic voting for a
national referendum.

Many Swiss people living abroad were included in the electronic ballot.

Around 116,000 citizens had the opportunity to vote electronically and
16.5 percent voted in this way. Only one "bad vote" was detected when a
person accidentally voted twice. This error was rapidly detected and
corrected by the electoral authority.

Report: http://www.news.admin.ch/message/index.html?lang=de&msg-id=43719

Address for inquiries:
Sektion Information und Kommunikation, Bundeskanzlei, Switzerland.

-----------------------
Report noted by:

I&R ~ GB Citizens' Initiative and Referendum
Campaign for direct democracy in Britain
<http://www.iniref.org>
<http://www.iniref.org/carta.htm> lobby your MP-candidate for stronger
democracy. For Scotland please adapt campaign materials.

[S]

On Mar 12, 7:24 pm, INIREF*I&R ~ GB <infoT...@OUTiniref.org> wrote:
> E-voting in referendum tested successfully in 12 regions
>
> On the 11th March 2012 twelve "Cantons" enabled electronic voting for a
> national referendum.
>
> Many Swiss people living abroad were included in the electronic ballot.
>
> Around 116,000 citizens had the opportunity to vote electronically and
> 16.5 percent voted in this way. Only one "bad vote" was detected when a
> person accidentally voted twice. This error was rapidly detected and
> corrected by the electoral authority.

How many cases were there of a "head of family" voting on behalf of
all his family members or people selling their votes and letting
someone else vote with their credentials or letting that other person
watch them vote to make sure that they voted correctly? How do you
detect such cases?

[Cynic]

On Mon, 12 Mar 2012 13:59:30 -0700 (PDT), S <s_pick...@yahoo.com>
wrote:

>> Many Swiss people living abroad were included in the electronic ballot.
>>
>> Around 116,000 citizens had the opportunity to vote electronically and
>> 16.5 percent voted in this way. Only one "bad vote" was detected when a
>> person accidentally voted twice. This error was rapidly detected and
>> corrected by the electoral authority.
>
>How many cases were there of a "head of family" voting on behalf of
>all his family members or people selling their votes and letting
>someone else vote with their credentials or letting that other person
>watch them vote to make sure that they voted correctly? How do you
>detect such cases?

Such things are perfectly possible with our present system, so I see
no reason why it would increase.

--
Cynic

[Cynic]

On Tue, 13 Mar 2012 13:34:28 +0000 (UTC), soupdragon <m...@privacy.com>
wrote:

>>>How many cases were there of a "head of family" voting on behalf of
>>>all his family members or people selling their votes and letting
>>>someone else vote with their credentials or letting that other person
>>>watch them vote to make sure that they voted correctly? How do you
>>>detect such cases?>
>> Such things are perfectly possible with our present system, so I see
>> no reason why it would increase.

>Possible, yes. But not easily so - unlike voting from home via a pc.

In many home situations it is easier now than it would be via a PC.
In other circumstances the reverse is true. IMO in the majority of
cases it would be just as easy either way, just a variation on
technique.

If you have sufficient control over another person to be able to
demand that they vote in the way you tell them, no system can ensure
that that control is impossible (or even overly difficult) to achieve.
I could, for example, insist on accompanying my wife to the polling
station and insist she show me her completed ballot paper before
putting it in the box (or figure another method to prove how she
voted). If I control her, she will do as I tell her.

But if I *don't* have such control, but could only make use of her
vote with some sort of force or subterfuge, she would know or find out
that I had done so and would be able to take action against me either
pre-vote or post-vote.

--
Cynic

[Cynic]

On Tue, 13 Mar 2012 14:58:36 +0000 (UTC), soupdragon <m...@privacy.com>
wrote:

>> In many home situations it is easier now than it would be via a PC.
>> In other circumstances the reverse is true. IMO in the majority of
>> cases it would be just as easy either way, just a variation on
>> technique.
>>
>> If you have sufficient control over another person to be able to
>> demand that they vote in the way you tell them, no system can ensure
>> that that control is impossible (or even overly difficult) to achieve.
>> I could, for example, insist on accompanying my wife to the polling
>> station and insist she show me her completed ballot paper before
>> putting it in the box (or figure another method to prove how she
>> voted). If I control her, she will do as I tell her.
>>
>> But if I *don't* have such control, but could only make use of her
>> vote with some sort of force or subterfuge, she would know or find out
>> that I had done so and would be able to take action against me either
>> pre-vote or post-vote.
>

>But all that would be *so* much easier to do in the privacy of home than
>in a polling station and booth with its staff and police officer keeping
>an eye on things, particularly the voters behaviour.

I disagree completely. People who have so much control over another
person that they are certain that the other person would not make any
official complaint about their vote being stolen will be able to exert
such control in public or private - it really makes little difference.
Besides which there is nothing to prevent a person going to a polling
station themself with the voting card of another (same sex) person and
casting a vote on their behalf, or arranging for a postal vote for
them (which they fill in).

At the end of the day I very much doubt that there are a sufficient
number of people who would do such a thing to affect the result
significantly.

--
Cynic

[Tim Richards]

On Mar 13, 12:49 pm, cynic_...@yahoo.co.uk (Cynic) wrote:
>
> Such things are perfectly possible with our present system, so I see
> no reason why it would increase.
>

Indeed.

I am on the electoral register and yet I can't remember receiving a
voting card for at least five years.

Now I never vote anyway so it's by-the-by but I often wonder whether
the LA has simply given up on sending me one or if it's being used for
nefarious purposes.

I imagine a check (if there is one) on how "I" voted at the last
election, for example, would be most illuminating.

[HardySpicer]

Not sure if the great unwashed can be trusted. Not that I trust MPs
much either of course
but they have to be stand and answer for the laws they pass. For
instance, people may vote to bring back hanging
or castrate rapists - no manner of medieval things that are knee-jerk
reactions. The power of the mob.
Just read the daily mail and see for yourselves.


Hardy

[INIREF*I&R ~ GB]

The best way to improve participation in public affairs and to encourage
responsible citizenship is to introduce the option of direct democracy.
This can apply to the whole range of government fields, not only "law
and order".

All this hanging and flogging stuff is regularly wheeled out as
propaganda against democracy. It's your fantasy. Where there are cruel
judicial punishments these were mainly installed by despots or elected
governments.

There is a public opinion trend against cruel punishments -- maybe not
reflected in the gutter press. In recent referenda in Europe majorities
of people voted AGAINST capital punishment (Republic of Ireland, a large
German federal state).

I&R ~ GB Citizens' Initiative and Referendum
Campaign for direct democracy in Britain

<http://www.iniref.org> <http://www.iniref.org/carta.htm> See ways to

[Cynic]

On Tue, 13 Mar 2012 20:10:17 +0000 (UTC), soupdragon <m...@privacy.com>
wrote:

>> I disagree completely. People who have so much control over another
>> person that they are certain that the other person would not make any
>> official complaint about their vote being stolen will be able to exert
>> such control in public or private - it really makes little difference.
>

>And do you really think the police and polling officers would not take an
>'interest' in someone insisting another shows them how they voted before
>posting their slip in the ballot box in what is supposed to be a secret
>vote - particularly if it involves, say, a family of four?

The "insisting" would be done privately before getting to the polling
station. It would not be done in a way that would arouse suspicion.

>> Besides which there is nothing to prevent a person going to a polling
>> station themself with the voting card of another (same sex) person and
>> casting a vote on their behalf, or arranging for a postal vote for
>> them (which they fill in).

>Oh that's been tried. It usually gets discovered fairly quickly when the
>individual who was supposed to vote turns up and finds someone has posed
>as them or the local policeman on duty or staff knows the genuine voter
>personally and spots the imposter.

A person who makes a computer vote using the identity of someone else
will be discovered just as quickly as soon as the real voter tries to
cast their vote, so a polling station has no advantage in that
respect. The second eventuality is easily circumvented by ensuring
that you don't know the officials at the polling station before
handing across your voting card. The officials are the only people
who will be aware of what name you are voting under - everyone else
will naturally assume that you have come to cast a vote under your own
name even if they know you and/or the person you are impersonating.

>> At the end of the day I very much doubt that there are a sufficient
>> number of people who would do such a thing to affect the result
>> significantly.

>At the moment, no. That's because it's a little tricky to accomplish that
>discourages most of them. So why make it easy for them by moving it to
>the privacy of their own home? By all means introduce electronic voting
>but in a polling station. Private booths with vote keys should eliminate
>the 'show us how you voted' routine.

The big advantage of voting from home is that it will result in a far
higher percentage of the electorate casting a vote, and therefore
arguably result in the election result reflecting the wishes of the
people more accurately. In addition it will reduce the cost of
holding an election that will hopefully result in the people's opinion
being sought more often via a referendum.

--
Cynic

[INIREF*I&R ~ GB]

malcol...@googlemail.com wrote:
> On Wednesday, 14 March 2012 11:53:37 UTC, INIREF*I&amp;R ~ GB wrote:

>> HardySpicer wrote:
>>
>>
>> All this hanging and flogging stuff is regularly wheeled out as
>> propaganda against democracy. It's your fantasy. Where there are cruel
>> judicial punishments these were mainly installed by despots or elected
>> governments.
>

> Yet opinion polls consistently show a higher proportion of the general public support the death penalty than MPs.

You omitted:

> There is a public opinion trend against cruel punishments -- maybe not
> reflected in the gutter press. In recent referenda in Europe majorities
> of people voted AGAINST capital punishment (Republic of Ireland, a large
> German federal state).

Opinion polls do not well predict results of referenda. With
referendum-democracy there is a process of information and debate -- and
mind-changing -- which people socialised in UK seemingly do not
understand because they have never experienced it.

> The more participate, the thinner the responsibility is spread.

Nonsense, human responsibility is not nutella spread on crispbread.

People can use democracy for their own ends but democracy changes people
too, in mainly positive ways.

I&R ~ GB Citizens' Initiative and Referendum
Campaign for direct democracy in Britain

http://www.iniref.org/
http://www.iniref.org/steps.html Basic presentation
http://www.iniref.org/case.html The case for more democracy
<http://www.ipetitions.com/petition/dd-gb> sign up for reform

[Cynic]

On Wed, 14 Mar 2012 19:28:09 +0000 (UTC), soupdragon <m...@privacy.com>
wrote:

>>>And do you really think the police and polling officers would not take
>>>an 'interest' in someone insisting another shows them how they voted
>>>before posting their slip in the ballot box in what is supposed to be
>>>a secret vote - particularly if it involves, say, a family of four?
>>
>> The "insisting" would be done privately before getting to the polling
>> station. It would not be done in a way that would arouse suspicion.
>

>And you don't think a family of four showing the father how they voted
>in what is a secret ballot would not arouse the suspicion of the polling
>station officers?

A family arriving and entering together would not arouse suspicion,
no. Holding a completed ballot paper in such a way as the people you
came in with could see it is likewise not particularly suspicious.
And even if a polling station officer *was* suspicious, what do you
suppose would be the likely consequence?

>>>> Besides which there is nothing to prevent a person going to a
>>>> polling station themself with the voting card of another (same sex)
>>>> person and casting a vote on their behalf, or arranging for a postal
>>>> vote for them (which they fill in).

>>>Oh that's been tried. It usually gets discovered fairly quickly when
>>>the individual who was supposed to vote turns up and finds someone has
>>>posed as them or the local policeman on duty or staff knows the
>>>genuine voter personally and spots the imposter.

>> A person who makes a computer vote using the identity of someone else
>> will be discovered just as quickly as soon as the real voter tries to
>> cast their vote, so a polling station has no advantage in that
>> respect.

>How so? They avoid the risk of being identified by the officials who
>are likely to be local and may know them.

The probability of any official remembering a particular person who
voted some hours before is far less than the probability of an IP
address being traced. As said, a person doing such a thing would
*not* enter a polling station if he recognised the officials, so the
probability of any officials recognising the person is pretty slim.

> The second eventuality is easily circumvented by ensuring
>> that you don't know the officials at the polling station before
>> handing across your voting card.

>How do you know that, when the officials are not indentifiable until the
>day you vote?

You find out as you are about to enter the polling station. If you do
not recognise any official you hand across the other person's voting
card, if you recognise any of them you hand across your own card and
go to a different polling station or come back later to make the
unlawful vote.

>> The officials are the only people
>> who will be aware of what name you are voting under - everyone else
>> will naturally assume that you have come to cast a vote under your own
>> name even if they know you and/or the person you are impersonating.

>..and the person you are impersonating when they turn up, at which point
>a voting irregularity would be recorded and investigated.

We have covered that situation, in which a computer vote has no
advantage. The scenario is about a person voting in the name of
someone they know will *not* be voting themself. And in that respect
a computer vote is going to have far fewer candidates for such a
subterfuge, because a greater proportion of people will decide to
vote.

>>>> At the end of the day I very much doubt that there are a sufficient
>>>> number of people who would do such a thing to affect the result
>>>> significantly.
>>
>>>At the moment, no. That's because it's a little tricky to accomplish
>>>that discourages most of them. So why make it easy for them by moving
>>>it to the privacy of their own home? By all means introduce electronic
>>>voting but in a polling station. Private booths with vote keys should
>>>eliminate the 'show us how you voted' routine.
>>
>> The big advantage of voting from home is that it will result in a far
>> higher percentage of the electorate casting a vote, and therefore
>> arguably result in the election result reflecting the wishes of the
>> people more accurately.
>

>I completely disagree. It will lead to opportunities to manipulate the
>voting by block voting for others with no one overseeing it. Hacking will
>commonplace allowing multiple votes to be cast at the click of a button
>using IP spoofing. Electronic voting from home will be a golden
>opportunity for underhand activity as there will be no guard guarding the
>guards. I'm sorry, but if people are too lazy to take part in the
>democratic process, that's their loss.

Absolute paranoid rubbish. An electronic system could be made less
succeptible to tampering than physical ballot boxes, and unlike a
ballot sytem it could be arranged so that people can check *after* the
vote is closed to ensure that their vote was registered correctly (or
if they did not vote they could check to ensure that no vote was cast
in their name). We trust computer networks with our money all the
time, I'm sure they would be sufficiently trustworthy to handle our
votes once every 5 years.

>> In addition it will reduce the cost of
>> holding an election that will hopefully result in the people's opinion
>> being sought more often via a referendum.

>I don't see how. What of those people who don't have or use a computer,
>of which there are plenty (around 25%)?

What year did that figure come from? And how many people who do not
own or use a computer don't have easy *access* to a computer when they
need to use one?

>Are you going to exclude them
>from the democratic process simply because they are not interested/can't
>afford it? Or do you run polling booths for them, thereby making it all
>_more_ expensive?

Very few people don't have easy access to a computer, and those few
could cast their vote at the closest library, thus requiring no
additional infrastructure or organisation.

--
Cynic

[Tim Roll-Pickering]

Cynic wrote:

> I disagree completely. People who have so much control over another
> person that they are certain that the other person would not make any
> official complaint about their vote being stolen will be able to exert
> such control in public or private - it really makes little difference.
> Besides which there is nothing to prevent a person going to a polling
> station themself with the voting card of another (same sex) person and
> casting a vote on their behalf, or arranging for a postal vote for
> them (which they fill in).

True in Great Britain (although you don't actually need the polling card)
but Northern Ireland has introduced ID requirements for voting (coupled with
a system of provision for those who lack preexisting relevant ID). And I
suspect the drive in polling reform in the next few years is going to be to
tighten up the current system - e.g. ID needed to vote at the polling
station, stronger checks on postal ballots and the like - which renders the
"it can happen already" arguments invalid.

[Tim Roll-Pickering]

Tim Richards wrote:

> I am on the electoral register and yet I can't remember receiving a
> voting card for at least five years.

They're not very well designed to be striking - it's possible you (or
someone else at your letterbox) simply binned them as junk without it
registering.

Check also that you *are* on the register and what precise address - there
are a number of known problems with registers stubbornly refusing to accept
they have flawed address details on their database. I myself have problems
with the register using the road at the front of our building rather than
the road the entrance is on (for which the Royal Mail database is correct)
and letters don't get it fixed.

[Tim Roll-Pickering]

Cynic wrote:

>>I don't see how. What of those people who don't have or use a computer,
>>of which there are plenty (around 25%)?

> What year did that figure come from? And how many people who do not
> own or use a computer don't have easy *access* to a computer when they
> need to use one?

I *think* that's a 2011 figure - a couple of years earlier it was even
higher. There are regular surveys on internet penetration that have shown
there's still a sizable chunk of the population who don't have home internet
access. For some it's the (perceived) cost, for others they've lived their
lives up to now without needing it and don't feel a need to get it. Then
there are those who regularly move and can't be arsed with the hassle of
setting up utilities each time - landline penetration has also peaked. The
less literate may also have less reason to use it.

Now some may have adequate alternative internet access via work or local
cyber cafes or the like. But others just don't feel a need for it - they
don't use it in their work, they don't need it to communicate and so forth.

[INIREF*I&R ~ GB]

malcol...@googlemail.com wrote:
> On Wednesday, 14 March 2012 23:05:46 UTC, INIREF*I&amp;R ~ GB
> wrote:
>> malcolm.mc74 wrote: Opinion polls do not well predict results of

>> referenda. With referendum-democracy there is a process of
>> information and debate -- and mind-changing -- which people
>> socialised in UK seemingly do not understand because they have
>> never experienced it.
>

> Also, if you think that your vote actually counts, then you have a
> degree of responsibility that's completely lacking when responding to
> a mere oppion poll. But will you actually do the kind of research
> that a full time politician ought to be doing?
>

With the well-designed elements of direct democracy which we propose

e.g. at <http://www.iniref.org/steps.html> (basic intro) and
<http://www.iniref.org/gb-debate-dd.html> (towards best design for GB +
countries)

only proposals which are readily understandable will be approved by the
necessary large number of voters. Then a process of genuine political
participation can begin -- see more about this just below.

>>
>>> The more participate, the thinner the responsibility is spread.
>>
>> Nonsense, human responsibility is not nutella spread on
>> crispbread.
>

> Tell that to a member of an angry mob.

Again, with good democracy design there is no role for a "mob". The
procedure is stately and deliberative. From idea, to formalised
proposition, to endorsement by many fellow citizens, to public debate,
to parliament's response, through referendum process all with
information and loads of opportunity for questioning and discussion, all
of this means that people learn process and political facts. This sort
of learning-by-doing-democracy has been documented e.g. in a Danish case
(Maastricht poll), the Euro-constitution poll in France and often elsewhere.

[Cynic]

In this discussion however it would be a question as to what
percentage people would find it more difficult to get to a place where
they can access the Internet than they could get to a polling station
- and whether that is more or less than the number of people where the
reverse is the case.

I am pretty darn certain that more people will vote from home who
would not have bothered to go to a polling station than the number of
people who would have gone to a polling station but would not bother
to look for an online access point.

There is, admittedly, a danger that people without Internet access
will give their details to someone they trust to cast a vote for them,
and there will be cases where the trust is mis-placed and the friend
or family member votes for a different party than the one they were
instructed to vote for. I suspect that a similar thing might well
happen at polling booths, though it is less likely than online voting.
I do not believe it is likely to be a significant issue however,
because people who ask a proxy to vote for them are highly likely to
choose a person who they believe is backing the same party as they
are.

--
Cynic

[Tim Richards]

On Mar 15, 4:20 pm, cynic_...@yahoo.co.uk (Cynic) wrote:
>
> I am pretty darn certain that more people will vote from home who
> would not have bothered to go to a polling station than the number of
> people who would have gone to a polling station but would not bother
> to look for an online access point.
>

Agreed.

If I was gullible enough to believe that putting an X on a piece of
paper once every four years could actually change anything then, of
course, I'd choose to sit in the comfort of my flat with a glass of
Chateau Neuf Du Pape and vote rather than trudge three miles down the
road and have to mingle with the ordinaries with their Croydon
facelifts all jabbering into their mobiles.

And why is every word in the UK these days "innit"?

I thought that was a race of people who lived beyond the Arctic Circle?

[Kenneth S.]

That's what I thought too! Aren't they the ones who used to
be called Lapps? Here's another question. Why have their dances
become so popular in seedy night clubs?

[Basil Jet]

No, the Lapps are now called Sami. Eskimos are now called Inuit.

[Cynic]

On Thu, 15 Mar 2012 19:11:27 +0000 (UTC), soupdragon <m...@privacy.com>
wrote:

>> A family arriving and entering together would not arouse suspicion,
>> no. Holding a completed ballot paper in such a way as the people you
>> came in with could see it is likewise not particularly suspicious.
>> And even if a polling station officer *was* suspicious, what do you
>> suppose would be the likely consequence?
>

>They would probably call in the police officer or make a very loud
>comment to the individuals that they should not show their vote to
>others.

It is not a criminal offence to show people how you have voted, and so
I have no idea why you think the police would have the slightest
interest in the matter. It is not even a civil offence. And if
anyone were to tell me that I should not reveal who I voted for to
other people, they would get a lecture on how erroneous such a view
is, and some advice to mind their own business!

There have been several posters who have announced on this newsgroup
who they voted for, and AFAIK not a single one received a visit from
the police or "words of advice" from any official.

>> The probability of any official remembering a particular person who
>> voted some hours before is far less than the probability of an IP
>> address being traced.
>

>One of the officials at my polling station is a neighbour whom I'm
>on a nodding aquaintence. Do you think he'd recognise someone else
>coming in and voting in my name as an imposter? I do. And that's a risk
>the imposter would have to weigh up. Spoofing an IP address is trivial
>if you have the knowledge.

We were discussing the situation where the person is forcing a family
member to hand over their vote. In that situation he is likely to
know if the official knows the family member. There is also a choice
of polling station for most people, in which case you would go to one
that is unlikely to have anyone that knows you or yours.

>> You find out as you are about to enter the polling station. If you do
>> not recognise any official you hand across the other person's voting
>> card, if you recognise any of them you hand across your own card and
>> go to a different polling station or come back later to make the
>> unlawful vote.

>Err, you are registered to vote at a specific polling station. You don't
>pick and choose. You're told where to go.

Not IME. The last time I voted (which was not the last election), I
had a choice of 3 different polling stations I could have attended.

>> We have covered that situation, in which a computer vote has no
>> advantage. The scenario is about a person voting in the name of
>> someone they know will *not* be voting themself.

>Was it? I don't remember that condition being added.

The scenario was a bullying husband forcing his wife or kids to hand
over their vote to him.

>However, in that
>case, the risk of being personally identified as not being the person
>you are impersonating remains, not only by staff, but other voters
>milling about. So much easier to do from the safety of your home and
>a computer.

The substitution will only be discovered when the genuine voter goes
to vote. Nobody except a single official would have known who gave
the phoney name, so it will be pointless asking any of the people who
were milling around. The probability of anyone remembering the face
of a person who was one of 100's that they ticked off from a list is
too small to worry about.

>> And in that respect
>> a computer vote is going to have far fewer candidates for such a
>> subterfuge, because a greater proportion of people will decide to
>> vote.

>A complete non sequitur. You're already excluding the 25% of the
>population who do not have or use acomputer, so your poll will
>never be for more than 75% of the population even if everyone votes.

If not having a computer will exclude a person from voting in an
electronic voting system, then I suppose not owning a polling station
must exclude a person from voting these days?

>>>I completely disagree. It will lead to opportunities to manipulate the
>>>voting by block voting for others with no one overseeing it. Hacking
>>>will commonplace allowing multiple votes to be cast at the click of a
>>>button using IP spoofing. Electronic voting from home will be a golden
>>>opportunity for underhand activity as there will be no guard guarding
>>>the guards. I'm sorry, but if people are too lazy to take part in the
>>>democratic process, that's their loss.

>> Absolute paranoid rubbish. An electronic system could be made less
>> succeptible to tampering than physical ballot boxes, and unlike a
>> ballot sytem it could be arranged so that people can check *after* the
>> vote is closed to ensure that their vote was registered correctly (or
>> if they did not vote they could check to ensure that no vote was cast
>> in their name). We trust computer networks with our money all the
>> time, I'm sure they would be sufficiently trustworthy to handle our
>> votes once every 5 years.

>Only a fool with no knowledge of the darknet would say something like
>that. How long before bogus websites are set up and emails sent telling
>you your voting details have been compromised and to log into this
>official looking website and add your details? Phishing like that will
>become rife, as it is currently with banking fraud.

I see. In that case you must think that our banking system is so
horribly compromised that it is non-functional. The fact is that
despite the fact that it is (a) operating all the time and (b) there
are far more people who would like to syeal your money than those who
would like to steal your vote, the losses from fraud remain a tiny
fraction of the total transactions. It voting fraud (on a system that
would only operate for a day every 5 years) were as low, it would not
affect the result at all. As for phishing attacks - the only people
likely to be at all interested would be UK nationals. Any phishing
attack would be reported PDQ, and the authorities would set about
tracing who set it up, which would be quite likely to succeed if such
details were actually used to vote.

>> What year did that figure come from? And how many people who do not
>> own or use a computer don't have easy *access* to a computer when they
>> need to use one?

>The figure is from 2011 and the upshot is that rather than polling all
>the people, you would be polling only those who had internet access.

No, you have drawn a completely false conclusion.

>> Very few people don't have easy access to a computer,

>But your talking above about _secure_ computers, not public computers
>which, by their nature are not secure.

The computer you vote from does not need to be secure at all if the
system is set up reasonably.

>> and those few
>> could cast their vote at the closest library, thus requiring no
>> additional infrastructure or organisation.

>Most libraries have been closed except in major towns and cities. How
>do you address that?

If necessary a computer terminal can be made available in a school or
council office for use by the handful of people who don't have any
other easier access, but of all your objections I think that one is
nowadays the most purile.

--
Cynic

[saracene]

On Mar 15, 7:55 pm, Basil Jet <jo...@journeyflow.spamspam.com> wrote:
> On 2012\03\15 19:33, Kenneth S. wrote:
>
> > On Thu, 15 Mar 2012 10:59:23 -0700 (PDT), Tim Richards

> > <trichards...@googlemail.com>  wrote:

>
> >> And why is every word in the UK these days "innit"?
>
> >> I thought that was a race of people who lived beyond the Arctic Circle?
>
> >    That's what I thought too!  Aren't they the ones who used to
> > be called Lapps?
>
> No, the Lapps are now called Sami. Eskimos are now called Inuit.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oSSxrb6Bvhk

[Cynic]

On Thu, 15 Mar 2012 21:50:34 +0000 (UTC), soupdragon <m...@privacy.com>
wrote:

>> It is not a criminal offence to show people how you have voted, and so
>> I have no idea why you think the police would have the slightest
>> interest in the matter. It is not even a civil offence. And if
>> anyone were to tell me that I should not reveal who I voted for to
>> other people, they would get a lecture on how erroneous such a view
>> is, and some advice to mind their own business!
>>
>> There have been several posters who have announced on this newsgroup
>> who they voted for, and AFAIK not a single one received a visit from
>> the police or "words of advice" from any official.
>

>You're shifting the goalposts. We were not discussing telling people how
>you voted *after* you had put the ballot paper in the box. We were
>discussing showing the ballot paper to others after you've marked it but
>before you put it in the box.

The situation is the same in either case. It is not an offence to
tell someone else how you vote before, during or after you vote. ou
could wave your completed voting slip around and announce to the whole
polling station how you have voted and no policeman will be called to
arrest you.

>> We were discussing the situation where the person is forcing a family
>> member to hand over their vote. In that situation he is likely to
>> know if the official knows the family member. There is also a choice
>> of polling station for most people, in which case you would go to one
>> that is unlikely to have anyone that knows you or yours.

>Well now you're just flip flopping. We were discussing that point above
>and *also* the point about impersonating another which is what this is
>about.

Impersonating someone who is *not* under your control will be much
more difficult in a computer system, because you would need their
login details rather than just a name and address.

>> Not IME. The last time I voted (which was not the last election), I
>> had a choice of 3 different polling stations I could have attended.

>But you have to state which one you attend *before* polling day to
>ensure all your details are at that station. You can't just wander into
>any polling station.

I didn't AFAICR - I recall deciding whether to pop out from work and
vote or wait until after I got home, which would have entailed 2
different polling stations. All the stations in the area had the same
list, and I suppose the lists were compared later to see if anyone
voted at more than one polling station.

>> The substitution will only be discovered when the genuine voter goes
>> to vote.

>Um no. Read what I wrote. There is always the risk that someone in the
>station will recognise that you are not who you claim to be as they may
>know personally the individual you are attempting to impersonate. See
>my point about my neighbour.

How will your neighbour know what name you are voting under? You will
only be showing the official your polling card. You neighbour will
simply assume you are voting under your own name.

>> Nobody except a single official would have known who gave
>> the phoney name, so it will be pointless asking any of the people who
>> were milling around. The probability of anyone remembering the face
>> of a person who was one of 100's that they ticked off from a list is
>> too small to worry about.

>The probability that my neighbour would spot someone impersonating me
>would be considerable.

How? Your neighbour will see a stranger handing across a polling card
and going in to vote. They will not know that they handed in *your*
polling card.

> That risk would be avoided by voting by computer.

Or our present posal votes.

In practice it can be made very difficult for anyone to gather enough
details to enable them to use the vote of a neighbour or stranger.

>> If not having a computer will exclude a person from voting in an
>> electronic voting system, then I suppose not owning a polling station
>> must exclude a person from voting these days?

>What are you talking about?

The same nonsense that you are talking about. You no more need to use
your *own* computer to vote than you need to use your *own* polling
station. So ownership is irrelevant. The vast majority of people
will be able to get to a computer easier than they can get to a
polling station.

>>>Only a fool with no knowledge of the darknet would say something like
>>>that. How long before bogus websites are set up and emails sent telling
>>>you your voting details have been compromised and to log into this
>>>official looking website and add your details? Phishing like that will
>>>become rife, as it is currently with banking fraud.

>> I see. In that case you must think that our banking system is so
>> horribly compromised that it is non-functional.

>Well yes, it is. Phishing scams are reconded to rake in a considerable
>amount of money, with very little that banks can do about it.

The perpetrators are usually caught, and in any event the dynamics are
completely different to voting, because the phisher is rarely the
person who actually uses the information.

> The fact is that
>> despite the fact that it is (a) operating all the time and (b) there
>> are far more people who would like to syeal your money than those who
>> would like to steal your vote, the losses from fraud remain a tiny
>> fraction of the total transactions.

>The problem is *massive*. The banks just don't like to talk about it
>as it creates a bad impression.

It is not at all massive as a percentage of transactions.

>> It voting fraud (on a system that
>> would only operate for a day every 5 years) were as low, it would not
>> affect the result at all. As for phishing attacks - the only people
>> likely to be at all interested would be UK nationals. Any phishing
>> attack would be reported PDQ, and the authorities would set about
>> tracing who set it up, which would be quite likely to succeed if such
>> details were actually used to vote.

>You *really* know very little about computer fraud, do you? I can't
>believe anyone could be so naive.

It is probably because I understand rather more than you do that I
know that a voting system can be made more secure than a polling
booth.

>>>The figure is from 2011 and the upshot is that rather than polling all
>>>the people, you would be polling only those who had internet access.

>> No, you have drawn a completely false conclusion.

>Nope. I have drawn the correct conclusion. You have restricted taking
>part in the democratic process conditional on owning or access to a
>computer and internet access. That, by definition, is undemocratic .

What is the percentage of people in the UK who cannot get *access* to
a computer system once every 5 years?

>>>> Very few people don't have easy access to a computer,

>>>But your talking above about _secure_ computers, not public computers
>>>which, by their nature are not secure.

>> The computer you vote from does not need to be secure at all if the
>> system is set up reasonably.

>But 25% don't own one and, of the 75% left, a large number have very
>poor security leaving them vulnerable to attacks from malware,
>keyloggers, port sniffing, etc.

Port-sniffers etc. would not facillitate voting fraud. At the *very*
most they would allow someone to find out who you voted for - which I
suggest is not a goal that anyone would find worth the risk. A MitM
attack or a specifically targetted virus is about the only way a vote
could be rigged, and there are several ways to make that eventuality
detectable pre-voting day, making it a very high-risk venture for the
fraudster. Plus post-vote checking *by the voters* could trivially be
set up to provide statistical evidence of significant fraud.

>> If necessary a computer terminal can be made available in a school or
>> council office for use by the handful of people who don't have any
>> other easier access,

>So, you'll have polling stations for the 25% who don't own a computer,
>and unsecure, vulnerable home computers for the rest. Sounds expensive
>and prone to fraud.

Having a publically accessible computer is not anything like as
expensive as setting up a polling station

>> but of all your objections I think that one is
>> nowadays the most purile.

>On the contrary, I think that disadvantaging a considerable part of the
>electorate - 25% - because they don't happen to own a particular item is
>a very real issue that strikes at the heart of democracy for *all* the
>people. You seem to be more interested in turn out at the expense of true
>democracy. And if that means sidelining a quarter of the electorate, to
>bad. And that is dangerous in my books.

You think a person can get to a specific polling station more easily
than they could get to any computer in the country?

In fact it would allow people to vote who presently lose out because
they don't happen to be in their home town on voting day, so it is far
less of a disadvantage.

--
Cynic

[Tim Roll-Pickering]

Cynic wrote:

>>I *think* that's a 2011 figure - a couple of years earlier it was even
>>higher. There are regular surveys on internet penetration that have shown
>>there's still a sizable chunk of the population who don't have home
>>internet
>>access. For some it's the (perceived) cost, for others they've lived their
>>lives up to now without needing it and don't feel a need to get it. Then
>>there are those who regularly move and can't be arsed with the hassle of
>>setting up utilities each time - landline penetration has also peaked. The
>>less literate may also have less reason to use it.

>>Now some may have adequate alternative internet access via work or local
>>cyber cafes or the like. But others just don't feel a need for it - they
>>don't use it in their work, they don't need it to communicate and so
>>forth.

> In this discussion however it would be a question as to what
> percentage people would find it more difficult to get to a place where
> they can access the Internet than they could get to a polling station
> - and whether that is more or less than the number of people where the
> reverse is the case.

I'm not sure that's so well surveyed. Most libraries offer internet access
but in many cases you need to be a pre-existing member and

> I am pretty darn certain that more people will vote from home who
> would not have bothered to go to a polling station than the number of
> people who would have gone to a polling station but would not bother
> to look for an online access point.

Whilst not directly comparable, I've seen this approach in a number of
university students' unions. Since they have opt out memberships, and thus
huge numbers of people scooped up on the electoral rolls (as opposed to
other membership organisations that work on an opt in basis), they're one of
the few potential points of comparison and in recent years many have made
switches from paper ballots to online voting. And in general there have been
few signs that simply transferring voting from polling stations on campus to
a website does much to raise turnout by itself - indeed in some cases it
actually resulted in *lower* participation. Where there has been a
significant increase in turnout year on year has been when there's been a
much wider strategy of electronic engagement with the students.

Now obviously a students' union election is very different from a public
election, but a lot of the assumptions about the introduction of online
voting are similar, namely that voting suddenly becomes much more convenient
and so turnout rises significantly.

[Cynic]

On Fri, 16 Mar 2012 15:01:41 -0000, "Tim Roll-Pickering"
<T.C.Roll-...@qmul.ac.uk> wrote:

>Now obviously a students' union election is very different from a public
>election, but a lot of the assumptions about the introduction of online
>voting are similar, namely that voting suddenly becomes much more convenient
>and so turnout rises significantly.

I think that there is a very significant difference between the two.
Students are walking around in close proximity to their voting station
during their normal day, and so physically voting is not nearly as
inconvenient to them as it is to the average town or city dweller who
has just got home to a warm house after work, perhaps on a wet and
windy evening, and must decide whether to leave that comfortable house
and take a 10 or 15 minute walk to place a vote a place that he would
otherwise not have gone anywhere near.

--
Cynic

[Cynic]

On Fri, 16 Mar 2012 18:12:03 +0000 (UTC), soupdragon <m...@privacy.com>
wrote:

>> The situation is the same in either case. It is not an offence to
>> tell someone else how you vote before, during or after you vote. ou
>> could wave your completed voting slip around and announce to the whole
>> polling station how you have voted and no policeman will be called to
>> arrest you.
>

>You think so? Well you're wrong.

No, I assure you I am correct.

>"No-one is allowed to see who you vote for so make sure you vote in a
> polling booth which has a screen around it. Put an ‘X’ by the person or
> party you want to vote for. Fold your ballot paper in half and put it in
> the ballot box." - directgov.com

>"It is an offence under the Representation of the People Act 1983 for
>someone to ask you to show them your completed ballot paper, or for you
>to show your completed ballot paper to anyone, before lodging it in the
>ballot box. This includes the Returning Officers and station officials.
>Once you complete your ballot paper in the privacy of a voting booth, you
>should fold it in half and place it immediately in the ballot box"
> Electoral Reform Commission.

>So, a policeman will most certainly arrest someone waving their completed
>paper and telling the station how you voted.

I note that you do not understand what you have quoted. It is indeed
an offence to try to find out how another person has voted. It is not
however an offence to *volunteer* that information.

Sort of similar to how it is an offence to take someone's money
without their permission, but it is not an offence to hand £20 notes
out to anyone who wants one.

>> Impersonating someone who is *not* under your control will be much
>> more difficult in a computer system, because you would need their
>> login details rather than just a name and address.

>Trivial to obtain using a key logger. And once you have it, no risk
>of being indentified at a polling station.

You haven't thought that through, have you? You will only use your
login details *once* in order to cast your vote. So a keylogger will
only be able to gather that information after it is too late for
anyone else to use it. Try again.

>>>ensure all your details are at that station. You can't just wander
>>>into any polling station.

>> I didn't AFAICR - I recall deciding whether to pop out from work and
>> vote or wait until after I got home, which would have entailed 2
>> different polling stations. All the stations in the area had the same
>> list, and I suppose the lists were compared later to see if anyone
>> voted at more than one polling station.

>Well, now you're just making this up as you go along. Have you ever
>voted? It doesn't sound like it, at least not in the UK.

I could say exactly the same about you. Or maybe it's just the case
that different areas have different methods in that regard.

>> How will your neighbour know what name you are voting under? You will
>> only be showing the official your polling card.

>..which has my name on it. Duh!

Explain to me how *your neighbour* will get to see what name is
written onyour polling card.

>> simply assume you are voting under your own name.

>You've never voted, have you?

Yes, which is why you will have to explain yourself, because I can
assure you that when I voted I was under no obligation to let everyone
in the polling station see my polling card or tell anyone except the
official at the desk what name I was voting under. It is not even an
offence to register and vote under an assumed name, and quite a few
people register under an assumed name in order to keep their real name
out of the electoral register.

>>>The probability that my neighbour would spot someone impersonating me
>>>would be considerable.

>> How? Your neighbour will see a stranger handing across a polling card

>..with my name on it..

How would they know that the card has your name on it?

>> and going in to vote. They will not know that they handed in *your*
>> polling card.

>Of course he will. My name is on it.

Do *you* read the names on other people's polling cards when you go to
vote?

>> The same nonsense that you are talking about. You no more need to use
>> your *own* computer to vote than you need to use your *own* polling
>> station. So ownership is irrelevant.
>

>Err no. Ownership is highly relevant. Under your system, I need a
>computer to vote.

Only in the same way as you need a polling booth to vote in the
present system.

> Under the current system, all I need to do is walk a
>few hundred yards to a polling station.

And in a computerised vote all you would need to do would be to walk
even less distance to the nearest available computer.

>> will be able to get to a computer easier than they can get to a
>> polling station.

>And your evidence for this is.. ?

Ummm - becaues there are a tad mnore computers in any given town than
there are polling stations.
>
>[Voting fraud..]

>>>Well yes, it is. Phishing scams are reconded to rake in a considerable
>>>amount of money, with very little that banks can do about it.

>> The perpetrators are usually caught,

>What world do you live in? The perpetrators are almost *never* caught.

Um - you are quite wrong wrt perps who operate from a country that
takes such things seriously. I have *once* had my CC details used
fraudulently, and the perp was behind bars a month later.

>> and in any event the dynamics are
>> completely different to voting, because the phisher is rarely the
>> person who actually uses the information.

>Which is exactly how it will work at an election. Data passed on to
>'interested party' who will then use it to place blocks of votes. So
>the 'dynamics' are identical.

There are *very* few "interested parties" wrt voting fraud, and the
big difference is that they are all likely to be in the same country
as where the scam is taking place, which makes a huge difference.
Most of the difficulty in catching people is due to having to split
the police work between different forces in different countries - the
language barrier alone is a considerable hinderence before taking into
account vastly different prioriities and differences in laws and
procedures.

>>>>>But your talking above about _secure_ computers, not public
>>>>>computers which, by their nature are not secure.

>>>> The computer you vote from does not need to be secure at all if the
>>>> system is set up reasonably.
>
>>>But 25% don't own one and, of the 75% left, a large number have very
>>>poor security leaving them vulnerable to attacks from malware,
>>>keyloggers, port sniffing, etc.

>> Port-sniffers etc. would not facillitate voting fraud.

>Yes they would.

Explain the mechanism by which they could do so.

>> most they would allow someone to find out who you voted for - which I
>> suggest is not a goal that anyone would find worth the risk.

>Nope. A keylogger would give them your login details because you will
>have to register your details with HMG website before voting.

> A MitM
>> attack or a specifically targetted virus is about the only way a vote
>> could be rigged, and there are several ways to make that eventuality
>> detectable pre-voting day, making it a very high-risk venture for the
>> fraudster.

>How so? Name one. How would the fraudster be at risk when he is
>hiding behind a proxy?

As said, both a machine virus and a MitM attack would have to be set
up some time before the actual day of the vote for fairly obvious
reasons (you cannot undetectably redirect or infect thousands of PCs
at a second's notice). Anything that is set up to affect a
significant percentage of the population would be discovered by
*someone* PDQ, almost certainly prior to the day of the vote. Whilst
the source of a virus might not be traceable (though it ususlly is if
found early and enough effort to trace it is expended), its effects
could be negated with suitable pre-planned security measures, and a
MitM machine *cannot* by its nature "hide behind a proxy" because it
must be a machine that is contactable by the voter (active listening
ports on a direct and thus traceable IP address.

One big advantage of a computer vote is that if necessary it can be
postponed at short notice for a week or so without a great deal of
cost or disruption.

>Checking *by the voters* could trivially be

>> set up to provide statistical evidence of significant fraud.
>

>Explain how this would work.

As one method of several possibilities: The computers taking the
votes would have access to two databases. One will be an existing
database of all registered voters and whatever login details will be
required, and the other will be a database of the votes cast. When a
person logs in to vote, they are verified by a lookup of the voters'
database, which has a field to denote whether that voter has already
voted or not. If the voter is verified and has not already voted, he
is permitted to cast his vote. His selected vote is entered into the
votes' database together with a unique number, and his entry on the
voters' database is marked as "voted" together with the IP address the
vote was cast from. The unique number is both stored against the vote
in the votes' database and sent back to the voter, and voters are
encouraged to store or make a note of that unique number.

After the close of the vote, copies of the voters' database are given
to each party (as confidential files) so that the parties can check
that (a) the number of entries in the votes' database is the same as
the number of entries in the voters' database marked as having voted,
and (b) any IP address that was used to cast an extraordinarily high
number of votes is explainable.

The second (vote's) database is made public for anyone who wants to
download. Thus anyone can count the votes for themselves, and also
ensure that every associated number is indeed unique.

In addition, any voter can lookup their their unique number in the
database (which they received when they voted), and ensure that the
vote recorded against that number was indeed the party that they voted
for. As only the voter knows the number they were given, the numbers
will not tell anyone else how any particular person voted.

Having the possibility for every voter to check *after the fact* that
their vote was accurately recorded is probably the best security
against substituted votes. With every party having the list of who
did and who did not vote (as indeed they do at present) enables them
to carry out spot checks of people marks as having voted to ensure
that they did in fact vote.

Any fraud on a large enough scale to be likely to affect the outcome
of an election would be pretty much certain to be detected after the
fact by those methods.

>> Having a publically accessible computer is not anything like as
>> expensive as setting up a polling station
>

>Really? A polling station consists of a few bits of wood, a box and
>a curtain. Maintenance involves painting the wood occassionaly and fixing
>the occassional torn curtain. Lifespan is probably around 30 -40 years
>before needing replacement. Lifespan cost? Probably no more than a couple
>of hundred pounds including purchase costs.
>What would the equivalent cost for a public PC polling station? Well lets
>see. Half dozen PCs, cost of operating system, installation of a secure
>network and associated switches and routers. Provision of Internet access
>via 3rd party ISP. Installation of neccessary security for each PC.
>Maintenance costs include software updates, replacement of failed
>hardware. Being generous, 10% capital costs. Lifespan - 10 years tops
>before hardware becomes obsolete and can't handle software updates.

>Less expensive? I sense you've never worked in IT.

You would obviously use computers that *already exist* for other
purposes, so it would cost you absolutely nothing extra except someone
to man the public buildings that are kept open a few hours longer than
usual. I sense that you have never worked in a job that requires you
to think very hard.

--
Cynic

[Tim Roll-Pickering]

Cynic wrote:

>>Now obviously a students' union election is very different from a public
>>election, but a lot of the assumptions about the introduction of online
>>voting are similar, namely that voting suddenly becomes much more
>>convenient
>>and so turnout rises significantly.

> I think that there is a very significant difference between the two.
> Students are walking around in close proximity to their voting station
> during their normal day,

Often not actually. Increasingly lots of students are spending relatively
little time on campus as contact hours reduce (at one point undergraduates
on my degree had as little as two contact hours a week), students do their
best to pack their hours into as few days as possible. Many now have
part-time jobs that add to their restrictions whilst an ever growing
proportion don't live on the (main) campus (the institution I work at once
had large halls several tube stops away). Even when on campus they're not
necessarily near the designated polling station(s). Then we get onto the
cases of resarch students in fieldwork stages, students on years abroad,
placement years, part-timers, outreach courses...

> and so physically voting is not nearly as
> inconvenient to them as it is to the average town or city dweller who
> has just got home to a warm house after work, perhaps on a wet and
> windy evening, and must decide whether to leave that comfortable house
> and take a 10 or 15 minute walk to place a vote a place that he would
> otherwise not have gone anywhere near.

For some yes, for a not insignicant number of others it can actually be
*more* inconvenient to make the journey to campus than to go to the local
polling station.

What evidence do you have beyond instinct that there are large numbers of
people who would suddenly vote (and vote responsibly not just random click)
if only they could do it in 10 minutes at their computers?

[tim....]

"Cynic" <cyni...@yahoo.co.uk> wrote in message
news:4f5f4214.10354687@localhost...

> On Mon, 12 Mar 2012 13:59:30 -0700 (PDT), S <s_pick...@yahoo.com>
> wrote:
>
>>> Many Swiss people living abroad were included in the electronic ballot.
>>>
>>> Around 116,000 citizens had the opportunity to vote electronically and
>>> 16.5 percent voted in this way. Only one "bad vote" was detected when a
>>> person accidentally voted twice. This error was rapidly detected and
>>> corrected by the electoral authority.
>>

>>How many cases were there of a "head of family" voting on behalf of
>>all his family members or people selling their votes and letting
>>someone else vote with their credentials or letting that other person
>>watch them vote to make sure that they voted correctly? How do you
>>detect such cases?
>
> Such things are perfectly possible with our present system, so I see
> no reason why it would increase.

I do

The chances of getting caught have shortened considerably so there is ever
reason why it might be more prevalent (in principle, probably not in
Switzerland)

tim

[tim....]

"Cynic" <cyni...@yahoo.co.uk> wrote in message

news:4f5f54f9.15192109@localhost...

> On Tue, 13 Mar 2012 13:34:28 +0000 (UTC), soupdragon <m...@privacy.com>
> wrote:
>
>>>>How many cases were there of a "head of family" voting on behalf of
>>>>all his family members or people selling their votes and letting
>>>>someone else vote with their credentials or letting that other person
>>>>watch them vote to make sure that they voted correctly? How do you
>>>>detect such cases?>
>>> Such things are perfectly possible with our present system, so I see
>>> no reason why it would increase.
>

>>Possible, yes. But not easily so - unlike voting from home via a pc.
>
> In many home situations it is easier now than it would be via a PC.
> In other circumstances the reverse is true. IMO in the majority of
> cases it would be just as easy either way, just a variation on
> technique.
>
> If you have sufficient control over another person to be able to
> demand that they vote in the way you tell them, no system can ensure
> that that control is impossible (or even overly difficult) to achieve.
> I could, for example, insist on accompanying my wife to the polling
> station and insist she show me her completed ballot paper before
> putting it in the box (or figure another method to prove how she
> voted). If I control her, she will do as I tell her.

but someone associated with the poll will see you do this, and (hopefully)
do something about it

tim

[Cynic]

On Fri, 16 Mar 2012 19:58:49 -0000, "Tim Roll-Pickering"
<T.C.Roll-...@qmul.ac.uk> wrote:

>What evidence do you have beyond instinct that there are large numbers of
>people who would suddenly vote (and vote responsibly not just random click)
>if only they could do it in 10 minutes at their computers?

It is based on the assumption that a person is more likely to do
something that can be achieved easily than they are to do something
that requires a greater effort. Companies have also found that
"special offers" that a person can register for by logging into a web
site have a far greater take-up rate than offers that require the
customer to register at a shop, which I think is good evidence that
voting would see a similar increase.

--
Cynic

[Cynic]

On Sat, 17 Mar 2012 10:01:59 +0000 (UTC), soupdragon <m...@privacy.com>
wrote:

> It is not even an
>> offence to register and vote under an assumed name, and quite a few
>> people register under an assumed name in order to keep their real name
>> out of the electoral register.

>It is not an offence to appear as a clown either. So what? Your name
>change must be done legally - such as marriage or deed poll and you are
>required to provide proof of your name change.

No, that is incorrect.

>> Do *you* read the names on other people's polling cards when you go to
>> vote?

>My neighbour is an official. How many times do I have to remind you?
>That was the point I brought up right at the beginning!

And really what is the chances of the official happening to know the
person you are voting for *and* that you would not know that fact?

>>>Err no. Ownership is highly relevant. Under your system, I need a
>>>computer to vote.

>> Only in the same way as you need a polling booth to vote in the
>> present system.

>Nope. Not the same. The council supplies that for me.

Just as they would supply the temporary use of a computer to the few
people who need it.

>>> Under the current system, all I need to do is walk a
>>>few hundred yards to a polling station.

>> And in a computerised vote all you would need to do would be to walk
>> even less distance to the nearest available computer.

>And where would this computer be for the 25% who don't have one?

Many places. Their son's bedroom. Their neighbour. A nearby
relative's house. And for the very few people where none of the above
apply, the local school, council office, library, or police station -
wherever the council have made available for use by that small
minority of the district.

>>>> will be able to get to a computer easier than they can get to a
>>>> polling station.

>>>And your evidence for this is.. ?

>> Ummm - becaues there are a tad mnore computers in any given town than
>> there are polling stations.

>Where in the town? If I have no computer, the nearest publically
>accessible one to me - assuming I can use it - is 3 miles away.

The vast majority of people have access to a non-public computer when
they need it. I would expect the council to arrange for some of their
existing computers to be available for public use on voting day.

>> There are *very* few "interested parties" wrt voting fraud,

>Opinion as fact. How do you know this?

Oh come off it! You cannot seriously be saying that the number of
people with a desire to nobble a vote in the UK is anything like the
same order of magnitude as the number of people with a desire to steal
money.

>> and the
>> big difference is that they are all likely to be in the same country
>> as where the scam is taking place, which makes a huge difference.

>Why? Computers make it trivial to work offshore, rendering it almost
>impossible to trace.

The reason is that very few people outside the UK would be interested
in nobbling a UK election. There is no self-interest for them.

>> Most of the difficulty in catching people is due to having to split
>> the police work between different forces in different countries - the
>> language barrier alone is a considerable hinderence before taking into
>> account vastly different prioriities and differences in laws and
>> procedures.

>????

What is confusing you?

>>>>>But 25% don't own one and, of the 75% left, a large number have very
>>>>>poor security leaving them vulnerable to attacks from malware,
>>>>>keyloggers, port sniffing, etc.

>>>> Port-sniffers etc. would not facillitate voting fraud.

>>>Yes they would.

>> Explain the mechanism by which they could do so.

>See above - not that I'm going to go into any more detail than the
>sketchy outline I've given, in a public forum. It is sufficient to
>show the workings.

I cannot think of a way that a port sniffer can be used to nobble a
vote. You have not shown any workings at all. Do you even know what
a port-sniffer is?

>>>> most they would allow someone to find out who you voted for - which
>>>> I suggest is not a goal that anyone would find worth the risk.

>>>Nope. A keylogger would give them your login details because you will
>>>have to register your details with HMG website before voting.

>>> A MitM
>>>> attack or a specifically targetted virus is about the only way a
>>>> vote could be rigged, and there are several ways to make that
>>>> eventuality detectable pre-voting day, making it a very high-risk
>>>> venture for the fraudster.

>>>How so? Name one. How would the fraudster be at risk when he is
>>>hiding behind a proxy?

>> As said, both a machine virus and a MitM attack would have to be set
>> up some time before the actual day of the vote for fairly obvious
>> reasons (you cannot undetectably redirect or infect thousands of PCs
>> at a second's notice). Anything that is set up to affect a
>> significant percentage of the population would be discovered by
>> *someone* PDQ, almost certainly prior to the day of the vote.

>Except it won't. These things are only discovered after they become
>active.

Total and complete bollocks! There are organisations that do little
else except examine every bit of code that is being widely
dissemminated. Plenty of viruses with a "trigger date" have been
detected long before the trigger date, and warnings issued.

> They've had 5 years to develop it, set it up as a bogus cookie or
>some such and it sits doing nothing and looking innocent for years until
>it gets a message through its irc port or similar on the actual day.

As said, any code that has been that widely disseminated would have
been picked up by *someone* in a fairly short period of time. I'm not
sure what you believe a cookie could achieve in this context. Do you
know what a cookine is?

> Too
>late to do anything about it. Thousands of zombie computers casting
>votes.

How would that be achieved? You appear to have heard a few scary
words and are using them without any understanding whatsoever.

> In any case, how many home PC users keep their machines clean
>and updated the instant a warning comes out? It is estimated that
>around 80% of home computers are infected by trojans, worms and other
>forms of malware. And you want to run voting from these machines?

It would not matter whether the user knows of the threat, it is the
government who would be the only one who needs to know and would be
able to act to prevent the damage. Not, as i have said, it would be
possible to alter a vote in a way that is not detected immediately
after the fact - and so all it would do is create some inconvenience
as the election will have to be re-held.

>> Whilst
>> the source of a virus might not be traceable (though it ususlly is if
>> found early and enough effort to trace it is expended), its effects
>> could be negated with suitable pre-planned security measures, and a
>> MitM machine *cannot* by its nature "hide behind a proxy" because it
>> must be a machine that is contactable by the voter (active listening
>> ports on a direct and thus traceable IP address.

>Traceable to where? What makes you think these machines won't be offshore
>as they are at present? Then what will you do?

It is not the machines that are prosecuted, it is the people who
control them. There are several ways to trace the people who are
controlling a machine even if it is in a country that will resist a
strong request by our government to examine the machine itself.

>> One big advantage of a computer vote is that if necessary it can be
>> postponed at short notice for a week or so without a great deal of
>> cost or disruption.

>The cost and disruption will be considerable.

In what ways?

> And a fix for the attack
>will have to be dealt with. And speaking of attacks, how will you
>deal with DoS attacks? You're creating an anarchists dream world
>here, opportunities for anti-capitalists or anyone with an axe to
>grind to attack a state process.

What do you suppose a DoS attack will achieve for the perpetrator?
AFIACS it will have no effect on the election itself apart from a
delay, and carries a very significant risk of getting the perpetrator
an extremely long time in jail. Not that a DoS attack will be all
that easy to achieve on a halfway decent system design.

>Sounds very expensive and complicated to implement.

That's because you don't understand it. In fact it is a great deal
*less* expensive than all the organisation needed for a paper
election, and most of the work only needs to be done once.

> Here's a better idea.
>Get people to put an X on a piece of paper and then get some people to
>count them.

Far more expensive. Of all your arguments, expense cannot possibly be
a serious argument, either in terms of cost for the election itself or
in terms of cost in man-hours lost in order for people to cast their

vote.

>> Any fraud on a large enough scale to be likely to affect the outcome
>> of an election would be pretty much certain to be detected after the
>> fact by those methods.

>*chuckle*

If that is not the case, then exactly the same is true of a paper
election. There is no way a voter can check that his ballot paper was
in fact counted, so if your paranoia is justified wrt a computer vote,
it is even more justified with a papaer vote.

If you fear a MitM attack on computers, consider that a substitution
attack of a physical ballot box is *just* as possible.

>> You would obviously use computers that *already exist* for other
>> purposes, so it would cost you absolutely nothing extra except someone
>> to man the public buildings that are kept open a few hours longer than
>> usual. I sense that you have never worked in a job that requires you
>> to think very hard.

>And where would these 'computers that already exist' come from? Thin air?

They don't have to come from anywhere because they already exist in
great numbers inside every public building in the country. They are
simply borrowed (or "re-purposed") for the duration of the election.

>Who provides the infrastructure? Where would you get the fat pipe? Where
>will the server farms needed to cope with such a level of traffic come
>from? A few old PCs running Win95 collecting dust in a cupboard in
>council offices? I sense you've never worked in the real world where
>these issues have to be addressed and costed.

Ah, bless. You do not know that the governement already has plenty
sufficient infrastructure to support a voting system. I don't know
why you believe that it would require particularly "fat pipes". All
we are dealing with is an average of a 10 minute session involving
maybe 10 KB or so of data from every UK citizen over 18 during
a single day. That's not a particuarly high traffic load compared
with many other systems. It is probably comparable to the load on the
national lottery website, but it only has to be working for 24 hours -
thus it is feasible to divert resources from other government
facillities for the duration.

In fact it would be a pretty good use of all the money spent on
computer equipment for the Olympics, which otherwise would probably go
the way of the Millenium Dome after the games.

>I think we're done here. I have successfully shown that using home pcs is
>at serious risk of voting fraud and illegal activity.

Yes, we are done. I have successfully shown that a computer system
would be far more secure than our present anarchic system, and would
save millions of pounds whilst permitting the disabled and people who
are away from their home towns on voting day day to vote just as
easily as anyone else.

--
Cynic

[Cynic]

On Sat, 17 Mar 2012 14:36:06 -0000, "tim...."
<tims_n...@yahoo.co.uk> wrote:

>> If you have sufficient control over another person to be able to
>> demand that they vote in the way you tell them, no system can ensure
>> that that control is impossible (or even overly difficult) to achieve.
>> I could, for example, insist on accompanying my wife to the polling
>> station and insist she show me her completed ballot paper before
>> putting it in the box (or figure another method to prove how she
>> voted). If I control her, she will do as I tell her.

>but someone associated with the poll will see you do this, and (hopefully)
>do something about it

It can be done so that it is not at all obvious - and few people will
be worried about a husband and wife being close.

--
Cynic

[S]

On Mar 13, 8:10 pm, soupdragon <m...@privacy.com> wrote:
> cynic_...@yahoo.co.uk (Cynic) wrote innews:4f5f9c64.33474671@localhost:

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Tue, 13 Mar 2012 14:58:36 +0000 (UTC), soupdragon <m...@privacy.com>
> > wrote:
>
> >>> In many home situations it is easier now than it would be via a PC.
> >>> In other circumstances the reverse is true.  IMO in the majority of
> >>> cases it would be just as easy either way, just a variation on
> >>> technique.
>

> >>> If you have sufficient control over another person to be able to
> >>> demand that they vote in the way you tell them, no system can ensure
> >>> that that control is impossible (or even overly difficult) to
> achieve.
> >>> I could, for example, insist on accompanying my wife to the polling
> >>> station and insist she show me her completed ballot paper before
> >>> putting it in the box (or figure another method to prove how she
> >>> voted).  If I control her, she will do as I tell her.
>

> >>> But if I *don't* have such control, but could only make use of her
> >>> vote with some sort of force or subterfuge, she would know or find
> out
> >>> that I had done so and would be able to take action against me either
> >>> pre-vote or post-vote.
>
> >>But all that would be *so* much easier to do in the privacy of home
> than
> >>in a polling station and booth with its staff and police officer
> keeping
> >>an eye on things, particularly the voters behaviour.

>
> > I disagree completely.  People who have so much control over another
> > person that they are certain that the other person would not make any
> > official complaint about their vote being stolen will be able to exert
> > such control in public or private - it really makes little difference.
>

> And do you really think the police and polling officers would not take an
> 'interest' in someone insisting another shows them how they voted before
> posting their slip in the ballot box in what is supposed to be a secret
> vote - particularly if it involves, say, a family of four?

>
> > Besides which there is nothing to prevent a person going to a polling
> > station themself with the voting card of another (same sex) person and
> > casting a vote on their behalf, or arranging for a postal vote for
> > them (which they fill in).
>

> Oh that's been tried. It usually gets discovered fairly quickly when the
> individual who was supposed to vote turns up and finds someone has posed
> as them or the local policeman on duty or staff knows the genuine voter
> personally and spots the imposter.
>
> > At the end of the day I very much doubt that there are a sufficient
> > number of people who would do such a thing to affect the result
> > significantly.
>
> At the moment, no. That's because it's a little tricky to accomplish that
> discourages most of them. So why make it easy for them by moving it to
> the privacy of their own home? By all means introduce electronic voting
> but in a polling station. Private booths with vote keys should eliminate
> the 'show us how you voted' routine.

The latest issue of comp.risks <http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/
26.75.html> has several articles on what can and does go wrong with
voting machines.

[Cynic]

On Mon, 19 Mar 2012 21:53:45 +0000 (UTC), soupdragon <m...@privacy.com>
wrote:

>Internet Voting a "disaster in waiting"
>Thu, 1 Mar 2012 17:37:51 -0800

>Internet voting systems too insecure, researcher warns

He appears to be commenting on one particular rather stupid and
(deliberately?) insecure implementation of a system designed for a
specialist purpose (replacing a postal vote). He then compares its
security *not* with the postal vote it would replace, but with a
physical ballot vote that would not be affected.

Voting by e-mail for heaven's sake! Would a postal vote be carried
out by postcard?

His entire argument is a strawman as far as I am concerned, because it
is pointing out the flaws in an obviously deficit system that I would
never suggest.

By those same arguments, ballot voting is terribly insecure, because
the random taxi-driver who is asked to carry the filled ballot box to
the counting station could easily interfere with the votes.

--
Cynic