German conference highlights doubts about ESA's manned space plans
John McKernan
> [Deleted: a long and cogent discussion of why
> the German manned space program, and by extension the world's other
> manned space programs, are a waste of money.]
I agree that current manned space programs are largely a waste of
money, although I do think a little bit of useful basic research falls
out of the massive engineering projects. That does not mean that manned
space research is a bad idea though, just that the current way of doing
it is wrong. Manned space research is very valuble science and
technology R&D, because the room and resouces found in space are very
important to Mankind. The only reason vast numbers of people aren't
living in space now is that we don't have the technology to get them
there, to live there, and to extract and utilize the resources that are
there. However at some point in the distant future we will have this
technology.
Therefore the purpose of manned space research should be to do the
basic R&D needed to develope the technology for the mass colonization
of space. Note that this basic research is likely to be quite
different from a mammoth engineering project to drop a few people onto
Mars and bring them back.
John L. McKernan. jm...@sun.com
Disclaimer: These are my opinions but, shockingly enough, not necessarily Sun's
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"It's kind of a macho thing,
programmers are always trying to be weirder than their machines."
Daniel Fischer
[ What follows are translated extracts from an article I wrote on a confe=
rence that took place in Bonn on 5 March 1991. I tried to be fair to all
parties that participated, but the result looks somewhat onesided. What
could I do: the pro side simply didn't provide more arguments - I even
reread all the speeches looking for more. So please flame *them*, not me!
Readers in other European nations, particularly in France, might find
it unbelievable or stubborn what the Germans are doing here, the British,
though - who refused to take part in any of the ESA plans mentioned here -
might support the critics mentioned hereafter. Opinions from the U.S.
would be very welcome, too - with 'Fred' there's at least as much money
at stake, not to speak of the Space Exploration Initiative (=:SEI). ]
The government of the Federal Republic of Germany ist standing firm to the
multi-billion-deutschmarks project package COLUMBUS/HERMES/ARIANE V solely for
political and not scientific reasons: this has become clear once more at a
major conference, "Raumfahrt kontrovers" (Spaceflight controversial) at the
Friedrich-Ebert Foundation in Bonn, Germany. Supporters and critics alike do
differ little in their assessment of German space activities prior to the 1987
The Hague decision by ESA to long for autonomy in manned spaceflight: noone
denies anymore the successes of space science missions (HELIOS, ROSAT etc.)
or the use of telecommunication, weather and earth observation satellites. Nor
is there anyone who denies that manned spaceflight has been 'sold' to the
German taxpayer with dubious arguments in the past. There had been studies
predicting exponential growth in space profits, factories in space were said
to be working in near future, and microgravity materials research had been
heralded as the ultimate justification of manned spaceflight.
Already in 1973 the German government had decided to join in U.S. missions,
the Spacelab was built, and the results of the SL-1 and D-1 flights were then
celebrated as scientific sensations. But ESA's former Director General R.Luest
made it clear once more that "mediocre or trivial experients" had dominated
these missions - and thus left the impression with many scientists in other
fields that microgravity research is an extremely expensive nonsense. ESA's
policy is not centered on microgravity, said Luest: as much as possible should
be done unmanned, and man in space was needed only in a few areas, most
notably maintenance of orbiting laboratories, platforms and satellites. But
even the latter argument was countered by an outspoken critic of manned space=
flight, E.Keppler: orbital repairs could only be of such a primitive kind that
they could be handled by robots as well. The first HUBBLE revisit in late 1993
might prove him wrong - or not.
There's no controversy, however, in another aspect of how one must NOT argue
for manned spaceflight: the technical 'spin-off's' are meager. Luest called
the hope for them "dangerous and dishonest", and Keppler cited a U.S. study
that had checked 20000 alleged NASA spin-off's, finding only 14 genuine. He
also cited SF writer A.C.Clarke with the concept that moving Mount Everest
into the Sahara would be as spin-off-rich as manned spaceflight (and, implicit=
ly, equally pointless).
So what arguments are left in favor of manned spaceflight? The American vision
of going to Mars was only supported by one of many scientists present: G.
Neukum, a planetary geologist, is convinced that you will never understand a
planet unless you walk on its surface. But he is far from supporting NASA's
SEI: setting a timetable for a rush to Mars is dead wrong, he says, such a
mission must be developed organically as part of a very well planned and
for a long time coming unmanned exploration concept (by the way, Neukum also
sees no point whatsoever for manned activities in *earth's* orbit). "The fun
of spaceflight as such is justification enough", was the most bizarre argument
heard at the conference: R.Lo of Berlin's Technical University believes in
space tourism to the moon, once launch costs are down. ESA's position on the
SEI, Luest reported, is very cautious - mainly because of lacking funds.
Of the three components of the ESA package, the heavy-lift launcher ARIANE V
is the least controversial, but still questions were asked about the need for
such a launcher. While an ESA manager reiterated the agency's belief in
ever heavier and more complex spacecraft, several scientists argued for just
the opposite trend: while the politicians and the engineers were in favor of
big orbital platforms with dozens of instruments and multiple tasks, the
scientists were asking for small and *quick* 'dedicated missions' with
unimpressively looking but highly capable satellites. This concept, of course,
requires cheap small launchers like the PEGASUS, not the big ARIANE V.
The COLUMBUS manned laboratory to be docked to FREEDOM and the ESA FREEFLYER,
however, met much resistance. Their supporters can only hint at *possible*
breakthroughs in microgravity and life sciences with long-term missions that
would make the trying as such worthwile. The critics countered that there's
no need for these laboratories: material science needs quick return of the
samples and the chance to fly them again and again - going with small piggyback
payloads on Chinese rockets was more attractive. Even the strong pro-micro-g
faction inside the German Aerospace Research Establishment DLR made it clear
that they were not married with the COLUMBUS concept: they would accept any
means of flying their experiments with quick data return - and don't see any
basic link with manned spaceflight.
The HERMES space shuttle, finally, was hailed as Europe's road into space
autonomy, but then again, noone could answer the question why this objective
would be worth billions of deutschmarks. Also, it was claimed, Hermes was an
unavoidable step in the development of the Saenger spaceplane which is remar=
kably popular even among the critics of the ESA spaceflight plans. Here,
though, it was countered that Hermes doesn't have an engine of its own and
that it is exactly the engine that makes the Saenger plans so demanding. Also,
it would be wrong to argue in favor of Hermes mainly with it being seen as an
intermediate step towards an even more expensive task.
So why then does the German federal government stand so firmly behind the
The Hague decisions, despite the current financial crisis following German
unity and the Gulf war contributions? Only a stretching of the timeline and
some descoping (especially of Hermes) is being called for. Either between the
lines or directly all speakers at the conference confessed it: it is the
resolve of France, ESA's #1 source of money, to carry on with the projects,
paired with the fear of the Germans to fall behind when being too critical.
E.Riedl from the Dept. of Economy even invoked the scenario of Japan taking
Germany's place in ESA, should the latter drop out of the manned plans. In
addition, he argued with the 'prestige' Germany as a whole would gain from
its major contributions to the manned package - and he compared that directly
with last year's soccer world championship. The conference left one wondering
whether t h i s is the right base to make crucial and very expensive
decisions for the decades to come...
Daniel Fischer, Koenigswinter
[To appear in next week's issue of 'SKYWEEK' - the .l.e.5 readers that are also
reading Usenet's sci.space might thus feel privileged to have this 'preprint']
Nick Szabo
>Experience so far says very strongly that if you plan to do in-space repairs,
>you had better plan to have humans (or the imaginary just-as-flexible
>teleoperated robots which will be available almost right away now for sure,
>really, trust us) on hand.
Or, if you prefer not to pay the $1,000,000++/hour cost of an EVA, you
could make sure it works before you launch it.
--
Nick Szabo sz...@sequent.com
"What are the _facts_, and to how many decimal places?" -- RAH
Nick Szabo
>
> [ What follows are translated extracts from an article I wrote on a confe=
> rence that took place in Bonn on 5 March 1991.
An excellent article. Thanks you very much for this informative view
of the ESA project decision process and scientist's opinions. I urge
those intimidated by the length to read this article anyway, every word
is worth it. Kudos!
Nick Szabo
>...Therefore the purpose of manned space research should be to do the
>basic R&D needed to develope the technology for the mass colonization
>of space. Note that this basic research is likely to be quite
>different from a mammoth engineering project to drop a few people onto
>Mars and bring them back.
This is a good direction to go. A very fruitful, and relatively efficient,
long-term space adaptation experiment would be the following: two small
capsules at either ends of a tether that can provide variable gravity,
from 0 to 1 g's. The main stops would be microgravity, lunar,
Martian, and 1 gravity. With 20 mice and 20 kg of life support, experimental
shielding, and tether per mouse, the whole thing is launchable on a Pegasus.
10 such experiments could be launched over 10 years into various orbits to
test out the biological effects of various kinds of gravity, radiation and
shielding. The results of earlier experiments would feed back into the
design of later experiments. Since mice and humans share 96% of our genetic
code, most of the results will apply to human biology. The entire experiment
should run about $50 million plus $8 million per launch = $130 million, or
$0.13 billion. Both in terms of gravity level and radiation, these
experiments will teach us more about biological adaptation to space
environments than many of the more expensive experiments currently envisioned.
Matthew DeLuca
>In article <1991Mar7.1...@zoo.toronto.edu> he...@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) writes:
>>Experience so far says very strongly that if you plan to do in-space repairs,
>>you had better plan to have humans (or the imaginary just-as-flexible
>>teleoperated robots which will be available almost right away now for sure,
>>really, trust us) on hand.
>Or, if you prefer not to pay the $1,000,000++/hour cost of an EVA, you
>could make sure it works before you launch it.
Of course, nothing *ever* breaks down after launch, and orbiting debris
has *never* punched holes in things...
--
Matthew DeLuca
Georgia Institute of Technology Do not meddle in the affairs of wizards,
Office of Information Technology for they are subtle, and quick to anger.
Internet: cco...@prism.gatech.edu
Andreas G. Nowatzyk
>>>Experience so far says very strongly that if you plan to do in-space repairs,
>>
>>Or, if you prefer not to pay the $1,000,000++/hour cost of an EVA, you
>>could make sure it works before you launch it.
>
>thought they had. Not to mention Apollo 13 and Gemini 8. There is this
>peculiar myth within NASA that all possible problems can be anticipated,
>and you really can be certain that the thing will work before you launch it.
>The universe keeps trying to tell NASA that this is wrong, and NASA keeps
>not listening.
True, but I read the original argument slightly differently: It is possible
to design Solar Max, etc. for in-orbit repair by robots, which was not done.
("it works" refering to the ability to repair/replace a system remotely)
If in-orbit repair is cost effective (= cheaper than launching a replacement,
which is a big IF in the context of small, specialized micro-sats),
it may still pay of to do this via robotics.
Hardware that isn't designed for this, will require a very elaborate robot.
However if the design takes robotic service into account, things change
dramatically. For example, a lot of consumer equipment (VCRs & such) and
some computer gear (Mac's, printers, etc.) are now routinely designed for
robotic assembly. Lots of tiny details reqire attention: aviod screws,
avoid round screw-in connectors, provide guide-paths for modules,
snap-into-place things are king, locking mechanisms that require tools to
push in several places are fine, but ones that require rotary action are not,
avoid ill shaped objects like cable harnesses, ... nothing really fancy, but
it is quite a departure from the way current space probes are designed.
Furthermore, in-orbit repairs are limited to module swaps. It's hard to
imagine someone replacing a 300+ pin surface mounted chip during EVA.
Henry Spencer
>
>Or, if you prefer not to pay the $1,000,000++/hour cost of an EVA, you
>could make sure it works before you launch it.
The Solar Max, Palapa/Westar, Syncom, Hubble, Intelsat, etc. people all
thought they had. Not to mention Apollo 13 and Gemini 8. There is this
peculiar myth within NASA that all possible problems can be anticipated,
and you really can be certain that the thing will work before you launch it.
The universe keeps trying to tell NASA that this is wrong, and NASA keeps
not listening.
This is not to say that efforts to *improve* the odds of the thing working
are inappropriate. Especially if you are paying today's launch costs and
waiting for today's lead times, it is clearly cost-effective to spend an
awful lot of effort on that. The fundamental mistake is basing all your
plans on the assumption that if you try hard enough, you can eliminate all
chance of failure. That way lie (a) enormous costs, and (b) disastrous
failures. Because the unexpected *will* happen.
This is also not to say that today's extremely expensive EVAs are cost-
effective for most purposes. Unless costs are brought down, extensive
preparation and *planning to cope with failures* is more practical, barring
occasional super-costly projects like Hubble.
--
"But this *is* the simplified version | Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
for the general public." -S. Harris | he...@zoo.toronto.edu utzoo!henry
Nick Szabo
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Newsgroups: sci.space
Subject: Re: German conference highlights doubts about ESA's manned space plans
Message-ID: <21...@crg5.UUCP>
Date: 11 Mar 91 02:36:00 GMT
>True, but I read the original argument slightly differently: It is possible
>to design Solar Max, etc. for in-orbit repair by robots, which was not done.
I didn't mean this, but this is a good point. Incidentally, Solar Max
did need special design changes to allow repair (as opposed to retrieval
and relaunch) by astronauts. It would be interesting to compare the cost
of redesign for robotic vs. the cost of redesign for human repair, and
then factor in the costs of human EVA time vs. telerobotic repiar time.
>....For example, a lot of consumer equipment (VCRs & such) and
>some computer gear (Mac's, printers, etc.) are now routinely designed for
>robotic assembly. Lots of tiny details reqire attention: aviod screws,
>avoid round screw-in connectors, provide guide-paths for modules,
>snap-into-place things are king, locking mechanisms that require tools to
>push in several places are fine, but ones that require rotary action are not,
>avoid ill shaped objects like cable harnesses, ... nothing really fancy, but
>it is quite a departure from the way current space probes are designed.
>
>Furthermore, in-orbit repairs are limited to module swaps. It's hard to
>imagine someone replacing a 300+ pin surface mounted chip during EVA.
Good point. Are there any large differences between design for robotic
and astronautic EVA repair?
--
Nick Szabo sz...@sequent.com
"What are the _facts_, and to how many decimal places?" -- RAH
--
: Nick Szabo - via FidoNet node 1:102/851 (818)352-2993
: ARPA/INTERNET: Nick....@p0.f851.n102.z1.fidonet.org
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Nick Szabo
>True, but I read the original argument slightly differently: It is possible
>to design Solar Max, etc. for in-orbit repair by robots, which was not done.
I didn't mean this, but this is a good point. Incidentally, Solar Max
did need special design changes to allow repair (as opposed to retrieval
and relaunch) by astronauts. It would be interesting to compare the cost
of redesign for robotic vs. the cost of redesign for human repair, and
then factor in the costs of human EVA time vs. telerobotic repiar time.
>....For example, a lot of consumer equipment (VCRs & such) and
>some computer gear (Mac's, printers, etc.) are now routinely designed for
>robotic assembly. Lots of tiny details reqire attention: aviod screws,
>avoid round screw-in connectors, provide guide-paths for modules,
>snap-into-place things are king, locking mechanisms that require tools to
>push in several places are fine, but ones that require rotary action are not,
>avoid ill shaped objects like cable harnesses, ... nothing really fancy, but
>it is quite a departure from the way current space probes are designed.
>
>Furthermore, in-orbit repairs are limited to module swaps. It's hard to
>imagine someone replacing a 300+ pin surface mounted chip during EVA.
Good point. Are there any large differences between design for robotic
and astronautic EVA repair?
Kieran A. Carroll
Subject: Re: German conference highlights doubts about ESA's manned space plans
> In article <1991Mar7.1...@zoo.toronto.edu>
> he...@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) writes:
>
> >Experience so far says very strongly that if you plan to do in-space repairs,
> >you had better plan to have humans (or the imaginary just-as-flexible
> >teleoperated robots which will be available almost right away now for sure,
> >really, trust us) on hand.
>
> Or, if you prefer not to pay the $1,000,000++/hour cost of an EVA, you
> could make sure it works before you launch it.
Nick, to ``make sure'' that a satellite ``works'' before you launch it,
you might have to spend anywhere from millions to tens of millions of
dollars, depending on the complexity of the spacecraft. What level of
reliability do you want to design into the satellite, and verify via
ground testing? 99%? Or three nines? Or four? Do you want dual-string
redundancy? Or are you going to make your designers hate you forever,
and insist on triple-string?
All those satellites that we've seen fail on orbit, including the ones that
the Shuttle was sent up to repair, were designed by people who tried
to ``make sure that it works'' befoire launch. Many of the people involved
in design of these are very smart, and very conscientious, probably more so
than you and I. Satellites don't typically fail because of sloppy design or
construction. They fail because >nobody< can imagine beforehand >all< the things
that might go wrong with a complicated, custom-built device.
My view is the cost of using spacecraft could be made cheaper if moderately-priced
on-orbit check-out and servicing facilities were available to be rented out.
That way, a great deal of the expense in designing spacecraft could be eliminated
(``the NASA way'' of design wouldn't have toof the expenses of ground-testing the beasts. However, this assumes that
you have >people< in orbit to do the testing and repair --- because the things that
will go wrong with your satellite will be exactly those that you didn't anticipate,
and so you won't have built your teleoperated robot to handle that
unexpected contingency, and so the robot won't be able to effect the repair.
--
Kieran A. Carroll @ U of Toronto Aerospace Institute
uunet!attcan!utzoo!kcarroll kcar...@zoo.toronto.edu
Doug McDonald
In article <1991Mar11.1...@zoo.toronto.edu> kcar...@zoo.toronto.edu (Kieran A. Carroll) writes:
>
>All those satellites that we've seen fail on orbit, including the ones that
>the Shuttle was sent up to repair, were designed by people who tried
>to ``make sure that it works'' befoire launch. Many of the people involved
>in design of these are very smart, and very conscientious, probably more so
>than you and I.
No comment.
> Satellites don't typically fail because of sloppy design or
>construction. They fail because >nobody< can imagine beforehand >all< the things
>that might go wrong with a complicated, custom-built device.
>
True but irrelevant!!!! Most fatal problems are so simple that they
CAN be expected!
I certainly can imagine that a Viton O-Ring exposed to very high sudden
load changes would fail if cooled to 20 degrees F before use!!! It
is blatently obvious to anybody who either hs USED them - or to anybody
who reads the blurb sheets on O-Rings published by the Parker Co.
I certainly can imagine that if you fail to test the components of
a Cassegrain telescope together that you risk having problems.
Examples of something that might be beyond guessing beforehand is the
sunlight induced jitter problem in the Hubble.
Doug McDonald
Henry Spencer
>to design Solar Max, etc. for in-orbit repair by robots, which was not done.
Actually, Solar Max is interesting because it *was* designed for in-orbit
repair, albeit by humans rather than robots... but in fact about half the
work the astronauts did on it was on subsystems which were not meant for
in-orbit repair! This all boils down to trying to anticipate what might
fail, and as I said before, the unexpected is the real killer in these
things.
Some of the Hubble salvage schemes likewise involve in-orbit work on
subsystems that were not meant to be opened up in space; they are being
taken seriously with humans but probably couldn't be with robotics.
The Syncom repair was on things that weren't likely to fail in orbit
because they didn't have to work for any length of time, on a satellite
that wouldn't be repairable in orbit anyway because it would be out of reach.
Well, surprise surprise, the ignition control for the perigee motor *did*
fail, leaving the satellite crippled but within reach. Ditto for the
upcoming Intelsat salvage mission.
And for both Solar Max and Palapa/Westar, a robotic repair mission would
have been a complete failure unless the hardware was very general-purpose,
because the custom-built grappling gadgetry simply did not work. For
Solar Max, after some ill-advised initial fumbling, a procedure using
the shuttle arm proved workable, barely. (I don't know for sure, but I'd
be surprised if it would have been practical with teleoperation delays.)
For P/W, there was a purely-manual backup procedure, which got used.
These experiences had sufficient impact that they didn't even bother with
the gadgetry for the Syncom repair, just let the humans do it. (Note
that this required muscle, not just dexterity, to take the spin off the
bird by hand [!], and existing dextrous robots often are not muscular.)
Kieran A. Carroll
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Newsgroups: sci.space
Subject: Re: German conference highlights doubts about ESA's manned space plans
Date: 11 Mar 91 16:56:26 GMT
Nick Szabo sz...@crg5.UUCP write:
Subject: Re: German conference highlights doubts about ESA's manned space plans
Date: 8 Mar 91 01:53:56 GMT
> In article <1991Mar7.1...@zoo.toronto.edu>
> he...@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) writes:
>
> >Experience so far says very strongly that if you plan to do in-space repairs,
> >you had better plan to have humans (or the imaginary just-as-flexible
> >teleoperated robots which will be available almost right away now for sure,
> >really, trust us) on hand.
>
> Or, if you prefer not to pay the $1,000,000++/hour cost of an EVA, you
> could make sure it works before you launch it.
Nick, to ``make sure'' that a satellite ``works'' before you launch it,
you might have to spend anywhere from millions to tens of millions of
dollars, depending on the complexity of the spacecraft. What level of
reliability do you want to design into the satellite, and verify via
ground testing? 99%? Or three nines? Or four? Do you want dual-string
redundancy? Or are you going to make your designers hate you forever,
and insist on triple-string?
All those satellites that we've seen fail on orbit, including the ones that
the Shuttle was sent up to repair, were designed by people who tried
to ``make sure that it works'' befoire launch. Many of the people involved
in design of these are very smart, and very conscientious, probably more so
than you and I. Satellites don't typically fail because of sloppy design or
construction. They fail because >nobody< can imagine beforehand >all< the things
that might go wrong with a complicated, custom-built device.
My view is the cost of using spacecraft could be made cheaper if moderately-priced
on-orbit check-out and servicing facilities were available to be rented out.
That way, a great deal of the expense in designing spacecraft could be eliminated
(``the NASA way'' of design wouldn't have toof the expenses of ground-testing the beasts. However, this assumes that
you have >people< in orbit to do the testing and repair --- because the things that
will go wrong with your satellite will be exactly those that you didn't anticipate,
and so you won't have built your teleoperated robot to handle that
unexpected contingency, and so the robot won't be able to effect the repair.
--
Kieran A. Carroll @ U of Toronto Aerospace Institute
uunet!attcan!utzoo!kcarroll kcar...@zoo.toronto.edu
--
: Kieran A. Carroll - via FidoNet node 1:102/851 (818)352-2993
: ARPA/INTERNET: Kieran.A..Carroll@p0.f851.n102.z1.fidonet.org
: UUCP: ...!{elroy!bohica,elroy!wciu,cit-vax!wciu}!mcws!851.0!Kieran.A..Carroll
: Compu$erve: >internet:Kieran.A..Carroll@p0.f851.n102.z1.fidonet.org
Dave Smith
>
>>Experience so far says very strongly that if you plan to do in-space repairs,
>>you had better plan to have humans (or the imaginary just-as-flexible
>>teleoperated robots which will be available almost right away now for sure,
>>really, trust us) on hand.
>
>Or, if you prefer not to pay the $1,000,000++/hour cost of an EVA, you
>could make sure it works before you launch it.
>
This is a screamer. What do you do at Sequent, Nick? Work in marketing?
--
David L. Smith
FPS Computing, San Diego ucsd!celit!dave or da...@fps.com
"It was time to stop playing games. It was time to put on funny hats and
eat ice cream. Froggie played his oboe" - Richard Scarry
Dave Smith
>
>>....For example, a lot of consumer equipment (VCRs & such) and
>>some computer gear (Mac's, printers, etc.) are now routinely designed for
>>robotic assembly.
>>Furthermore, in-orbit repairs are limited to module swaps. It's hard to
>>imagine someone replacing a 300+ pin surface mounted chip during EVA.
>
>Good point. Are there any large differences between design for robotic
>and astronautic EVA repair?
Two things. Design for robotic assembly is _not_ the same as design for
robotic repair. Assembly is a strictly defined set of steps to be gone
through. Repair is rather chaotic, usually. It's also invariably true
that whatever you didn't plan to be repairable is the part that breaks.
At present, in-orbit repairs are _not_ limited to module swaps. Remember
Skylab? Sun shield deployment that wasn't designed into the original
design. No little attachment points pre-provided. On Mir they went out
and kicked the airlock a couple of times, or something like that, right?
Definitely not in the design spec. Some of these things
can be done with tele-operated robots. However, until you have a tele-operated
robot that is as flexible in operation (what, we didn't put a sun shield
gripper on the robot?!? It doesn't have a foot!?! :-)) as a human there
are going to be cases where the person is needed.
Nick Szabo
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Newsgroups: sci.space
Subject: Re: German conference highlights doubts about ESA's manned space plans
Date: 13 Mar 91 01:01:49 GMT
In article <16...@celit.fps.com> da...@fps.com (Dave Smith) writes:
> >[I write]
> >Or, if you prefer not to pay the $1,000,000++/hour cost of an EVA, you
> >could make sure it works before you launch it.
> >
>
>This is a screamer. What do you do at Sequent, Nick? Work in marketing?
This is a screamer. :-) I work in testing, making sure our products work.
Not to brag, but Sequent's main selling point is our quality statistics,
such as up-time. Sequent repairmen are about as common as Maytag
repairmen. :-) Even so, when needed they can do the job for about
1/20,000th the cost of our vaunted astronauts.
Now back to the regularly scheduled space.flamefest. :-)
--
Nick Szabo sz...@sequent.com
"If you want oil, drill lots of wells" -- J. Paul Getty
The above opinions are my own and not related to those of any
organization I may be affiliated with.
Nick Szabo
> >could make sure it works before you launch it.
> >
>
>This is a screamer. What do you do at Sequent, Nick? Work in marketing?
This is a screamer. :-) I work in testing, making sure our products work.