Missile Defenses Report

[Marcus Corbin]

DEFENDING AMERICA:
A NEAR- AND LONG-TERM PLAN TO DEPLOY MISSILE DEFENSES

Report of the Missile Defense Study Team

The Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
Washington, DC 20002-4999
(202) 546-4400

TABLE OF CONTENTS


PREFACE


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


CHAPTER ONE
THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT

Ballistic Missiles: Strategic Weapons for Rogues

Proliferation

Former Soviet and Chinese ICBMs and SLBMs

Clinton's Misguided Optimism

CHAPTER TWO
FUNDAMENTALS OF AN EFFECTIVE GLOBAL DEFENSE

Typical Defense Coverage Characteristics

Cost Considerations

Effectiveness Considerations

CHAPTER THREE
GLOBAL DEFENSE: FIRST FROM THE SEA, THEN FROM SPACE

Global Defense: From the Sea

Global Defense: From Space

Relief from the ABM Treaty Is Essential

CHAPTER FOUR
RECOMMENDED PROGRAM COSTS AND SCHEDULES


CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION




APPENDIX
WHAT DID AMERICANS GET FOR THE $30 BILLION INVESTMENT IN SDI?

SDI A Good Value:Three Reasons Why
How SDI Advanced Technology
Political Will Is the Issue, Not Technology


PREFACE

The threat of ballistic missile attack is clear, present, and growing. Rogue states such as
Iran and North Korea are acquiring the capability to threaten the lives of Americans with
nuclear devastation. Other states with already existing nuclear missile arsenals, such as
Russia and China , are unstable and potentially threatening as well. Even though the technology
is available to build a missile defense system, however, the United States remains vulnerable
to attacks from ballistic missiles. This is a failure of potentially monumental proportions. It
has been a failure primarily of political will.

Last November, House Republicans pledged to end this sorry legacy of intentionally keeping the
United States of America vulnerable to missile attack. They promised in their Contract with
America to deploy highly effective missile defenses-theater and national-at the earliest
possible date. On February 15, the House modified this position somewhat, voting to downgrade
the priority for fielding a national missile defense system by amending Title II of the
National Security Revitalization Act (NSRA). Despite this change, the Republican leaders in the
House and Senate are still committed to restoring momentum to America's missile defense
programs. But to make this commitment a reality, they need a plan. Congress needs an
alternative, or "Team B." missile defense plan that, unlike the self-constrained and go-slow
programs of "Team A" (the Clinton Administration), will lead as soon as possible to a defense
not only of U.S. forces overseas, but also of the American homeland.

Thus was born The Heritage Foundation's Missile Defense Study Group, or Team B. Inspired by the
Team B study of Soviet military capabilities in the 1970s, which became a major impetus to the
Reagan military buildup of the 1980s, Heritage's Missile Defense Team B. like its predecessor,
has set out to challenge the prevailing assumptions of U.S. policy. What is being challenged
today, however, is not the intelligence community's underestimation of the Soviet military
threat, but the Clinton Administration's policy of intentionally leaving American cities and
territory open to missile attack. By seeking to expand the application of the outdated and
strategically irrelevant Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Clinton Administration is trying to
give the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) a new lease on life. And by purporting to
defend U.S. forces and allies overseas while leaving the American homeland undefended, it is
neglecting what should be the government's highest priority: to protect its citizens from
destruction.

Team B believes that the U.S. also needs to maintain an ability to defend against modern
aircraft and cruise missiles. The cruise missile is likely to become a more pressing threat
because of its demonstrated effectiveness in the Gulf War. But the ballistic missile threat is
now more pressing. The U.S. has no effective homeland or theater ballistic missile defense, and
major political inhibitions must be overcome before this sad fact is changed. Hence, Team B
focused on ballistic missile defenses in this report.

Heritage's Team B is made up of the finest minds on missile defense in the country. Chaired by
Ambassador Henry Cooper, former Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, Team
B was asked to devise a near- and long-term plan to deploy the most effective global defense
possible. After examining alternative strategies, it became clear that only a missile defense
system capable of spanning the entire globe could protect the American homeland and U.S.
forces, allies, and friends overseas. And after assessing various technologies and
architectures and asking which plan would be most cost-effective, Team B came to the conclusion
that the best approach to achieving this global defense would be to devise a system that was
deployed 'First from the sea and then in space." Team B concluded that the already existing
Navy Upper Tier program could be upgraded and expanded not only to protect U.S. forces and
allies overseas from theater missile threats, but eventually to become part of a larger
strategic defense system comprising space-based elements that could provide coverage of the
entire globe.

The Heritage Foundation has come full circle in publishing this report. In the early 1980s,
under the leadership of General Daniel O. Graham (also a Team B member), The Heritage
Foundation sponsored High Frontier: A New National Strategy, a study which served as a major
inspiration for Ronald Reagan's decision to launch the Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983.
However, because a decision to deploy was never made, much of the promise of SDI was lost. As
this report demonstrates amply, the SDI program made much progress in research and development,
but a misguided adherence to the ABM Treaty prevented the U.S. from making an unambiguous
commitment to deployment. It is hoped that this report will enable the Congress to pick up
where SDI left off and to set America, finally, on the road to deployment.

On behalf of my colleagues at The Heritage Foundation, I would like to thank Ambassador Cooper
for his leadership in assembling the study team and in drafting the report. Hank is truly one
of the heroes in the campaign to defend America. I would also like to thank the Team B members
who took time out of their extremely busy schedules to make this report possible. All of us at
Heritage were greatly impressed by their brilliance and dedication.

I would also like to thank Heritage Senior Policy Analyst Baker Spring, who served as
rapporteur for the study. His insights and knowledge were indispensable to me as editor of the
report. So, too, were the support and guidance of Lawrence Di Rita, Heritage's Deputy Director
of Foreign and Defense Policy Studies.

Finally, all of us working on this project owe a debt of gratitude to Frank Gaffney, a Team B
member and Director of the Center for Security Policy. Frank's work with the Coalition to
Defend America, a grass-roots organization, has done much to educate the American public and
politicians about the need for missile defense. That missile defense is back on America's
political agenda is in no small part the result of Frank's efforts.

All of us at The Heritage Foundation are proud to be a part of this historically important
study. We can only hope that Congress will share our sense of urgency about the need to defend
America and implement Team B's plan to build a global defense system as soon as possible.

Kim R. Holmes
Vice President and Director of Foreign and
Defense Policy Studies

******************************

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The clear, present, and growing danger posed by ballistic missiles of all ranges compels an
urgent response to defend the American people and their overseas troops, friends, and allies.
The least expensive and most effective solution to this global problem is a global defense,
deployed first at sea within the next three to four years and then in space by early in the
next decade. But Clinton Administration policy and acquisition programs must be changed to
achieve this defense capability. An additional $1 billion is needed in fiscal 1996 over that
requested by the Clinton Administration, and about $6.3 billion more than likely Clinton
Administration requests will be needed over the next five years.

The threat of ballistic missiles is global and growing. Missiles with warheads of mass
destruction now can be launched with little warning from the sea or any of at least a half
dozen states to attack cities in most of the world. For example, North Korea is developing a
missile, called the Taepo Dong 2, which may have a range of 2,000 to 5,000 miles.
Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) marketed as space launchers could provide rogue
states with the ability to attack the U.S. homeland faster than an effective defense can be
deployed. A potential missile threat exists from Russia and China as well. Russia has inherited
control of the Soviet Union's entire missile arsenal, which it continues to modernize. While a
massive attack from Russia may now be unlikely, the problem of an accidental or unauthorized
launch from that politically unstable part of the world should not be ignored. Long-range
Russian missiles, including submarine-launched ballistic missiles, number perhaps 1,300 and are
capable of delivering thousands of nuclear warheads. China's strategic missile arsenal, which
it is modernizing, is far smaller, numbering perhaps 100.

Continuously on station, effective missile defenses are needed worldwide to counter the
missile's potential for blackmail, terror, destruction, and disruption of U.S. military
operations overseas. Without a ready response to such threats, the U.S. and its allies and
friends will be subject to coercion and attack by otherwise third-rate powers armed with
missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

Modern technology makes it feasible to develop and deploy affordable, effective ballistic
missile defenses. All that is lacking is proper understanding of missile defenses and the
political will to build them. It is also important to maintain effective defenses against
modern aircraft and cruise missiles, but in that case there are no major political inhibitions
to modernizing U.S. air defenses. Cold War ideology associated with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty must be overcome to build effective ballistic missile defenses.

The Clinton Administration is right that U.S. overseas troops, friends, and allies need to be
defended from this growing threat of ballistic missiles. But defending America is equally
urgent. No responsible U.S. leader should ask Americans to defend the citizens of other nations
while leaving America defenseless. Yet that is precisely what the Clinton Administration is
doing. Further, the Clinton Administration's plan would produce a sea-based defense in the Sea
of Japan that could shoot down a missile launched from North Korea toward Japan, but not if it
is launched toward the United States of America. Such a policy must be changed.

To counter this threat, The Heritage Foundation's Team B study group recommends that the U.S.:

*Deploy global defenses as soon as technically feasible-first at sea and then in space.

Specifically, a decision should be made now to deploy as soon as technically feasible the
Navy's Upper Tier interceptor system and the Brilliant Eyes space-based sensor system. At the
same time, technology demonstration programs should be conducted for two years for the
Space-Based Interceptor (SBI) and Space-Based Laser (SBL). Following a critical design review
at the end of the two-year period, the most effective space-based defense architecture should
be selected for deployment. About $1 billion would be required in fiscal 1996 and fiscal 1997
to support these initiatives.

*Build Navy Upper Tier defenses.

The quickest, least expensive, and politically least intrusive way to achieve a global defense
against missiles, including for the U.S., is to exploit the nearly $50 billion already invested
in the Navy's AEGIS system. The AEGIS system is a ship-borne weapons system that has been used
to direct surface-to-air missiles, also on the ships, against enemy aircraft. A fully upgraded
AEGIS system could be used as a sea-based defense against short-range or longer-range ballistic
missiles. For a little over $1 billion, deployment could begin in about three years. For a
total of $2 billion-$3 billion, 650 defensive interceptors could be deployed on 22 cruisers as
early as in 2001.

*Expedite Brilliant Eyes.

Brilliant Eyes is a sensor satellite capable of detecting missile launches and tracking the
missiles in flight. This program should be fully funded and accelerated to assure that the Navy
Upper Tier can defend the largest area possible against near-term threat missiles and can
respond to likely offensive countermeasures. For $4 billion-$5 billion, the system could
achieve an initial operational status as early as 2001. Deployment could begin as early as
1999.

*Fully fund Navy Upper Tier and Brilliant Eyes programs without ABM Treaty restraints.

The Navy Upper Tier and Brilliant Eyes programs should be fully funded as a top national
priority. However, these programs should be conducted without the constraints imposed by an
expansion of the scope of the ABM Treaty that would limit theater missile defenses, as well as
strategic defenses. Such an expansion would impose limits on, among other things, interceptor
speed and the locations of deployed theater defense systems. Expanding the scope of the ABM
Treaty would prevent engineers from exploiting off-the-shelf technology to defend overseas U.S.
troops, friends, and allies and Americans at home.

*Revive space-based defense programs and direct them toward deployment.

Space-based defenses, including both Space-Based Interceptors (SIS) and Space-Based
Lasers(SOLS), are the most affordable and effective long-term systems to protect the U.S.
homeland and to counter advanced theater ballistic missiles.

SIS could intercept in space all ballistic missiles with ranges longer than about 200-300
miles. SIS could also intercept some long-range ballistic missiles in their boost phase, or
shortly after launch. SBI systems would be simpler and far less expensive than ground-based
interceptor systems of comparable capability. The most promising SBI system is the Brilliant
Pebbles program. Fully approved as a Major Defense Acquisition Program in 1992, and
subsequently scuttled by the Clinton Administration, a revived program could begin deployment
at the end of the decade, with full funding and streamlined management.

SOLS are in the technology demonstration phase and could provide a boost-phase intercept
capability against missiles with ranges greater than about 75 miles. They could also provide a
robust mid-course discrimination capability to counter future offensive missile
countermeasures, thereby maintaining the full effectiveness of SIS or any other midcourse
interceptors. With streamlined management and full funding, a prototype SBL could be tested
late in this decade and a constellation of about 12 SOLS could be deployed by the middle of the
next decade.

Both SIS and SOLS are needed ultimately to provide an effective global defensive capability.
However, in a budget-limited environment where the Clinton Administration is hostile to
developing space-based defenses, Congress may be constrained in devising an appropriate
acquisition strategy for space-based systems. Therefore, to provide space-based options at a
later date, Congress should accelerate research and development of both SIS and SOLS for the
next two years. This would require an additional appropriation of $200 million-$300 million per
year for each program. A space-based defense architecture should be selected in 1997 to deploy
by early in the next decade. The total cost for deploying the combined SBI/SBL space defense
system is expected to be under $20 billion.

*Refrain from limiting missile defense capabilities in negotiations with the Russians.

The Clinton Administration is now engaging in negotiations with the Russians and several other
states of the former Soviet Union concerning the future of the ABM Treaty. In the course of
these negotiations, it has become clear that the Administration wants to expand the scope of
the ABM Treaty, which imposes severe limitations on strategic defenses, to cover theater
missile defense systems as well. According to press accounts, the Administration has expressed
a willingness to impose limitations on the speed of the target missile interceptors may be
tested against and on the speed of the interceptors.

The ABM Treaty, however, was never meant to impose any limitations on theater missile defense
systems. It should be noted that the Soviets built theater anti-missile systems such as the
SA-10 and SA-12 without asking to renegotiate the ABM Treaty. Nor have the Russians consulted
with the U.S. on their S-300 and S-500 systems, which they are marketing as being superior to
U.S. theater defense systems. Congress should continue to insist that no such limitations be
imposed.

*Not give Russia a veto over U.S. missile defense options.

The U.S. should insist that it will build defenses for America and overseas troops, friends,
and allies without arbitrarily restraining systems to satisfy an outdated ABM Treaty-a treaty
based upon a Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) strategy of the Cold War, which Henry Kissinger,
chief architect of the ABM Treaty, recently said "makes no sense in a multipolar world of
proliferating nuclear powers.

The U.S. should take a principled position that effective global defenses are essential to
preserving the peace in the new world disorder, and that all interested nations should
cooperate in building and operating such defenses. The U.S. should be prepared to enter
agreements on how prospective "partners," including U.S. allies, Russia, and other appropriate
nations, might cooperate in building defenses and operating them to protect the world community
against ballistic missile attacks. Such agreements could implement Boris Yeltsin's January 1992
proposal for a joint Global Protection System. However, the U.S. needs to make it clear to
other nations, including Russia, that it intends to build the most effective defenses
technically feasible at the earliest possible time. The U.S. should be amenable to a
cooperative approach, but it needs to be clear that it is prepared to proceed independently.
Under no circumstances should any foreign country, including Russia, have the right to veto
U.S. efforts to defend America's people, friends, and allies against missile strikes.

*Pass a new missile defense act.

Congress should replace the Missile Defense Act of 1991 with a new act that makes clear these
basic principles and policy guidance-particularly that state-of-the-art technology should be
fully exploited to make all missile defenses as effective as possible. Such defenses should be
built as quickly as possible.