What next for NASA?
McLean1382
would be a large payoff in developing a crew transfer vehicle and a tug capable
of being launched by at least one US ELV, and phasing out the shuttle as soon
as the new vehicle has proved itself.
What groups are advocating this, and which ones are most effective in making
their case?
Will McLean
Rand Simberg
mclea...@aol.com (McLean1382) made the phosphor on my monitor glow
in such a way as to indicate that:
>Looking at the economics of our current programs, it looks to me like there
>would be a large payoff in developing a crew transfer vehicle and a tug capable
>of being launched by at least one US ELV, and phasing out the shuttle as soon
>as the new vehicle has proved itself.
There's actually no much of a payoff for that. US ELVs are expensive,
too. NASA doesn't want to do enough in space to justify developing
new vehicles.
************************************************************************
simberg.interglobal.org * 310 372-7963 (CA) 307 739-1296 (Jackson Hole)
interglobal space lines * 307 733-1715 (Fax) http://www.interglobal.org
"Extraordinary launch vehicles require extraordinary markets..."
Replace first . with @ and throw out the "@trash." to email me.
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Henry Vanderbilt
>
> Looking at the economics of our current programs, it looks to me like there
> would be a large payoff in developing a crew transfer vehicle and a tug capable
> of being launched by at least one US ELV, and phasing out the shuttle as soon
> as the new vehicle has proved itself.
>
Never underestimate the current NASA's ability to spend the maximum
available money to produce the minimum acceptable results. I have
great faith in their ability to make an ELV launched CTV just as
expensive as Shuttle to operate, by the time they're done throwing
people at the process.
> What groups are advocating this..
We at Space Access Society are advocating that NASA SLI concentrate
on an ELV-launched CTV, as being the minimum necessary assurance
that they can meet US international commitments in the event of
major Shuttle problems.
Whether NASA might retire Shuttle once such a system is in place
is not a question we address, though we do advocate eventual
retirement of Shuttle once its various current functions are
addressed by various new (preferably commercial) more specialized
space transports.
As mentioned above, we don't expect the current NASA manned space
establishment to save money in doing this. We do however think
that given the international commitments the US has made, an ELV-
launched CTV is a prudent backup to the complex and fragile Shuttle.
We also think that an ELV-launched CTV is about the least harmful
to commercial developments use of the SLI funds that's at all
likely to come about - by definition it won't even be competitive
with existing ELV's, since it would expend a large ELV plus hundreds
to thousands of NASA man-years of processing for every flight. Any
entrepreneur who can't compete with *that* ain't trying. (We will
of course fight any attempt to operate such a vehicle "commercially"
at below-cost rates - we see such as unlikely though; Shuttle's
current prohibition on doing such seems likely to hold.)
> ..and which ones are most effective in making
> their case?
>
> Will McLean
Interesting question. It's tough to quantify advocacy effectiveness
without at least ten years of hindsight. We are, however, plugging
away at the job.
- Henry Vanderbilt, Executive Director, Space Access Society
http://www.space-access.org
McLean1382
>There's actually no much of a payoff for that. US ELVs are expensive,
>too. NASA doesn't want to do enough in space to justify developing
>new vehicles.
Six flights of the shuttle a year is costing us, what, $3.5 billion? I'm going
from memory, but I think it's in that ball park.
Now, assume you can develop an x-38 derived crew transfer vehicle by, say 2008.
Capable of being lifted by Delta IV or Ariane, and perhaps AtlasV. And a space
tug for delivering heavy modules, along the lines of the Russian FGB.
You should be able to duplicate the same delivery capacity with probably not
more than a dozen Delta IV launches. If you have to use the heavy version for
all of them that's about $2 billion, yes? But you can probably use the medium
for some launches, because in practice the shuttle often uses a good deal less
of it's theoretical payload capacity for various reasons.
Of course, the exact figure will depend a great deal on what sort of manifest
the shuttle will be handling at that point. But I think there's the potential
for something like a billion a year in operating savings.
Will McLean
Rand Simberg
mclea...@aol.com (McLean1382) made the phosphor on my monitor glow
in such a way as to indicate that:
>>There's actually no much of a payoff for that. US ELVs are expensive,
>>too. NASA doesn't want to do enough in space to justify developing
>>new vehicles.
>
>Six flights of the shuttle a year is costing us, what, $3.5 billion? I'm going
>from memory, but I think it's in that ball park.
>
>Now, assume you can develop an x-38 derived crew transfer vehicle by, say 2008.
>Capable of being lifted by Delta IV or Ariane, and perhaps AtlasV. And a space
>tug for delivering heavy modules, along the lines of the Russian FGB.
>
>You should be able to duplicate the same delivery capacity with probably not
>more than a dozen Delta IV launches. If you have to use the heavy version for
>all of them that's about $2 billion, yes?
You're not counting all the other money that JSC spends to maintain
their astronaut office, which will still be there.
>But you can probably use the medium
>for some launches, because in practice the shuttle often uses a good deal less
>of it's theoretical payload capacity for various reasons.
>
>Of course, the exact figure will depend a great deal on what sort of manifest
>the shuttle will be handling at that point. But I think there's the potential
>for something like a billion a year in operating savings.
Even if correct, that's not worth spending the development costs now.
Congress rarely considers out-year savings when funding this year's
programs. If it did, Shuttle would have been developed much
differently.
Also, you have to look at the opportunity costs. Putting money into a
crew capsule to fly on an ELV is money that won't be put into
something that might actually significantly reduce cost of access for
both people and cargo.
Jorge R. Frank
<20010407130013...@ng-fr1.aol.com>:
>Rand Simberg writes:
>
>>There's actually no much of a payoff for that. US ELVs are expensive,
>>too. NASA doesn't want to do enough in space to justify developing
>>new vehicles.
>
>Six flights of the shuttle a year is costing us, what, $3.5 billion? I'm
>going from memory, but I think it's in that ball park.
Old memory. :-) It was that high in the early nineties, but it's down to $3
billion. And the marginal costs of an individual shuttle launch are fairly
low - it was $3 billion in 1997 when the shuttle flew eight times, and
barely less in 1999 when the shuttle flew four times. Maintaining the
infrastructure and standing army that supports the shuttle is the expensive
part, not the actual launches. It would not be exaggerating too much to
say that the *first* shuttle launch per year costs around $2.5 billion,
with each flight after that being in the $100 million range.
--
JRF
Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail,
check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and
think one step ahead of IBM.
Jorge R. Frank
<3afd4856....@nntp.ix.netcom.com>:
>On 07 Apr 2001 17:00:13 GMT, in a place far, far away,
>mclea...@aol.com (McLean1382) made the phosphor on my monitor glow
>in such a way as to indicate that:
>
>>Of course, the exact figure will depend a great deal on what sort of
>>manifest the shuttle will be handling at that point. But I think
>>there's the potential for something like a billion a year in operating
>>savings.
>
>Even if correct, that's not worth spending the development costs now.
>Congress rarely considers out-year savings when funding this year's
>programs. If it did, Shuttle would have been developed much
>differently.
And station. Development cost caps on both programs have forced NASA to
trade development cost for operational cost. It looks good in the short
run, but costs you plenty in the long run.
Rand Simberg
jrf...@ibm-pc.borg (Jorge R. Frank) made the phosphor on my monitor
glow in such a way as to indicate that:
>>Even if correct, that's not worth spending the development costs now.
>>Congress rarely considers out-year savings when funding this year's
>>programs. If it did, Shuttle would have been developed much
>>differently.
>
>And station. Development cost caps on both programs have forced NASA to
>trade development cost for operational cost. It looks good in the short
>run, but costs you plenty in the long run.
Yes, station is arguably worse, because its mission is even more
incoherent than that of the Shuttle, so its future costs and
capabilities are *really* irrelevant.
Rand Simberg
simberg.i...@trash.org (Rand Simberg) made the phosphor on my
monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that:
>Also, you have to look at the opportunity costs. Putting money into a
>crew capsule to fly on an ELV is money that won't be put into
>something that might actually significantly reduce cost of access for
>both people and cargo.
After reading Henry's V's (that's Vanderbilt, not the king...) post, I
agree with him that the above is not the major concern. In fact, it
might actually be a good distraction to keep NASA out of our hair
while we develop low-cost launch.
Any money that they spend toward that end, like SLIP, is unlikely to
be very helpful anyway, if the X-33/X-34 programs are any indication.
McLean1382
>Also, you have to look at the opportunity costs. Putting money into a
>crew capsule to fly on an ELV is money that won't be put into
>something that might actually significantly reduce cost of access for
>both people and cargo.
Well, yes. Do you have a proposal that you are confident will provide a
superior return on investment?
And note that the CTV will actually complement many RLV approaches. It could
certainly complement designs that use an expendable upper stage to reach orbit,
at least for some payload classes.
The designs that render a CTV superfluous are exactly the ones that have the
highest risk, and the highest initial investment.
Like Venturestar, for instance.
Will McLean
Rand Simberg
mclea...@aol.com (McLean1382) made the phosphor on my monitor glow
in such a way as to indicate that:
>>Also, you have to look at the opportunity costs. Putting money into a
>>crew capsule to fly on an ELV is money that won't be put into
>>something that might actually significantly reduce cost of access for
>>both people and cargo.
>
>Well, yes. Do you have a proposal that you are confident will provide a
>superior return on investment?
Yes--building reusable launchers.
>And note that the CTV will actually complement many RLV approaches. It could
>certainly complement designs that use an expendable upper stage to reach orbit,
>at least for some payload classes.
>
>The designs that render a CTV superfluous are exactly the ones that have the
>highest risk, and the highest initial investment.
Nonsense.
>Like Venturestar, for instance.
You make my point. Venturestar was specifically and purposefully
designed to be high risk.
That doesn't mean that reusable launch systems are intrinsically high
risk.
Charles Buckley
McLean1382 <mclea...@aol.com> wrote:
>Rand Simberg writes:
>
>>Also, you have to look at the opportunity costs. Putting money into a
>>crew capsule to fly on an ELV is money that won't be put into
>>something that might actually significantly reduce cost of access for
>>both people and cargo.
>
>Well, yes. Do you have a proposal that you are confident will provide a
>superior return on investment?
>
I was looking into doing a market survey to determine the appropriate
demand and possible cost range of recovering samples from long term in-orbit
satellites for engineering analysis. We have data points that extend back to
1958 in orbit and sample returns would greatly help in LEO development.
The rough numbers I have (from Jeff Greason) was a $100 million development
cost with a $20 million prototype. Per unit costs after that of $22 million
for the 1st stage and $8 million for the second. That would be for a fully
reusable system of a Gemini level vehicle. (ie, 2 man crew, very little cargo).
The issue is this: I estimate that it would cost about $40 million to develope
a Gemini capsule now. We have much better off-the-shelf technology and
knowledge of the environment now. I eventually got this down to needing to
use a Delta 7925 as the most cost/performance effective option. However, I would
need to adapt the fairing to allow manned egress. Also, the per unit cost
of about $60 million per Delta put a minimal non-recoverable cost per launch.
That is true with any of the ELV's currently in service. It also adds an area
of R&D that I would need to depend upon another company doing. If you are short
on money, it is far better to work with firm numbers from outside vendors.
While I think I *might* manage a combination of marketable products which would
make option 1 profitable, I do not see a way to eat that $60 million per launch on
option 2.
I am halfway tempted to just pay the $60-$100 million to launch a space transport,
then hire a Soyuz to get into orbit and for refueling. That is probably the most
cost effective solution leveraging off current hardware. Space-to-Space is a much
easier engineering solution that Earth-to-LEO. Keeps R&D costs down. Use Soyuz to
recover LEO artifacts, then use the transport to recover items from GEO. Not even
NASA has any samples from GEO, as far as I know. Be able to get into a virgin
market that way. By returning samples as opposed to whole artifacts, you can reduce
the return-to-earth weight.
Establish a high priced market, then push the costs onto the people purchasing
the product. Then, roll that into a round of financing for spin-off opportunities.
The fourth wave of profitable returns will be the cheap one. (We already have
people making money of launches. we have people making money off comsats. What
we don't have is people making money off people in space. Make a profitable
solution for *that* and it opens up the game. Until we can spin-off a profitable
manned business, then prices will stay high for manned access).
John Hare
simberg.i...@trash.org (Rand Simberg) writes:
>>And note that the CTV will actually complement many RLV approaches. It could
>>certainly complement designs that use an expendable upper stage to reach
>orbit,
>>at least for some payload classes.
>>
>>The designs that render a CTV superfluous are exactly the ones that have the
>>highest risk, and the highest initial investment.
>
>Nonsense.
>
>>Like Venturestar, for instance.
>
>You make my point. Venturestar was specifically and purposefully
>designed to be high risk.
>
>That doesn't mean that reusable launch systems are intrinsically high
>risk.
>
I have about reached the conclusion that RLVs can be developed for
less money than ELVs of similar capability if managed correctly.
It is reasonable to suggest 2 underperformance full size vehicles
for low end testing. Followed by 2 full performance Y vehicles.
These 4 vehicles have to be paid for once each and then
maintained and repaired. While the ELV may be 'declared'
operational after expending less vehicles, loss rate is almost
guaranteed to be high for the first few dozen launches. The
cost of vehicles expended in test, early lost payloads, insurance
reflecting the risk, and the uncertainty of cause of some accidents,
can easily excede the cost of the RLV development. A shoestring
operation could concievably build one test article and one
operational vehicle for a cost less than two test ELVs and
their support program.
The first operational transport will have the capability of placing
more payload in orbit than a large production run of ELVs.
Consider the transport with a 7,000 lb payload and weekly
launch cycle. That would give 175 tons per year per transport
to LEO. It is easy for me to believe that this vehicle would be
cheaper to develop than a 30 ton payload ELV that launched
and expended itself 6 times a year.
Brian Thorn
>You should be able to duplicate the same delivery capacity with probably not
>more than a dozen Delta IV launches. If you have to use the heavy version for
>all of them that's about $2 billion, yes? But you can probably use the medium
>for some launches, because in practice the shuttle often uses a good deal less
>of it's theoretical payload capacity for various reasons.
Eh. Remember that Shuttle's 'theoretical payload capacity' is now
63,500 lbs. Even on its 'light' missions, Shuttle is hauling payload
to orbit that would be really pushing an Atlas II or any of the EELV
Mediums.
And Shuttle's flying at close to its maximum payload capacity to
Alpha, due to the penalty of a 51.6 orbit and 200 mile altitude.
Brian
McLean1382
redne...@aol.comspam (John Hare) writes:
>Consider the transport with a 7,000 lb payload and weekly
>launch cycle. That would give 175 tons per year per transport
>to LEO. It is easy for me to believe that this vehicle would be
>cheaper to develop than a 30 ton payload ELV that launched
>and expended itself 6 times a year.
Unfortunately, it's not clear that you can find 52 customers with payloads that
small. Based on the current launcher manifest, you'd run out of customers
sometime in April.
Will McLean
McLean1382
>>The designs that render a CTV superfluous are exactly the ones that have the
>>highest risk, and the highest initial investment.
>
>Nonsense.
Almost all of the serious RLV designs fall into four classes:
1: Two stage, partly expendable, generally with the expendable portion based
heavily on existing stages
2: as above, evolving later into two stage wholly reusable
3: Two stage, designed to be wholly reusable from the beginning
4: Fully reusable SSTO
For the same payload requirement, and making similar assumptions, initial
investment and risk increases as we move from 1 to 4.
(OK, if your assumptions are sufficiantly optimistic, 4 isn't riskier than
three. But you have to be reaily, really optimistic)
A crew tranfer vehicle would complement 1 or 2 nicely in the right payload
range.
Will McLean
Rand Simberg
mclea...@aol.com (McLean1382) made the phosphor on my monitor glow
in such a way as to indicate that:
>In article <20010407183213...@nso-fm.aol.com>,
If one looks only at the current market, no new vehicles can be
justified--they'll never amortize their development costs. But I
suspect that John was not assuming current market.
Rand Simberg
mclea...@aol.com (McLean1382) made the phosphor on my monitor glow
in such a way as to indicate that:
>>>The designs that render a CTV superfluous are exactly the ones that have the
>>>highest risk, and the highest initial investment.
>>
>>Nonsense.
>
>Almost all of the serious RLV designs fall into four classes:
>
>1: Two stage, partly expendable, generally with the expendable portion based
>heavily on existing stages
>2: as above, evolving later into two stage wholly reusable
>3: Two stage, designed to be wholly reusable from the beginning
>4: Fully reusable SSTO
>
>For the same payload requirement, and making similar assumptions, initial
>investment and risk increases as we move from 1 to 4.
It is not at all clear that investment and risk increase for the fully
reusable systems.
>(OK, if your assumptions are sufficiantly optimistic, 4 isn't riskier than
>three. But you have to be reaily, really optimistic)
I believe that 4 is much riskier than 3, particularly in the small
payload class. But I don't think that 1 or 2 are in any way
preferable to 3. And I don't really understand the difference between
1 and 2.
>A crew tranfer vehicle would complement 1 or 2 nicely in the right payload
>range.
Yes, if there were no other alternatives. I think that 3 remains
preferable.
Dr John Stockton
news:sci.space.policy, John Hare <redne...@aol.comspam> wrote at Sat,
7 Apr 2001 22:32:13 :-
>I have about reached the conclusion that RLVs can be developed for
>less money than ELVs of similar capability if managed correctly.
>It is reasonable to suggest 2 underperformance full size vehicles
>for low end testing. Followed by 2 full performance Y vehicles.
>These 4 vehicles have to be paid for once each and then
>maintained and repaired. While the ELV may be 'declared'
>operational after expending less vehicles, loss rate is almost
>guaranteed to be high for the first few dozen launches. The
>cost of vehicles expended in test, early lost payloads, insurance
> reflecting the risk, and the uncertainty of cause of some accidents,
>can easily excede the cost of the RLV development. A shoestring
>operation could concievably build one test article and one
>operational vehicle for a cost less than two test ELVs and
>their support program.
Presumably, an RLV is a Re-usable Launch Vehicle and an ELV is /in fact/
an Expending (not just Expendable) LV.
In the face of : fair wear and tear; flight accident caused by natural
circumstances, by human error, by design fault, by unnoticed wear; enemy
action; terrorism; maintenance accident, ground-level weather;
earthquake; politicians; etc., there is no possibility of building
individual RLVs which can be guaranteed to last for ever. Therefore, to
have reliable access to space, there must be (AISB) continual production
of LVs.
For this production to be reliable, it must be at a sufficient, steady
rate; to build a batch and then to need a political decision on a
further batch, whether the same or different in design, cannot be
reliable.
Therefore RLVs should not be over-designed; they should be expected to
wear out, if not otherwise lost, regularly. They should also not be
over-sized.
RLVs being nevertheless small in active fleet-size, they should be the
most reliable means of launching valuable payloads (such as most
satellites, and planetary probes).
But, with a human presence in space, much necessary payload is of little
intrinsic value; it only becomes valuable in orbit. The following must
be cheap on the ground in comparison with their launch costs - water,
fuel, food, clothing - indeed, almost anything used in orbit that can be
routinely purchased off-the-shelf on the ground and that does not become
a station or vehicle component.
These, then, are expendable, replaceable payloads. The loss of Mars
Odyssey during launch would of itself have been a tragedy; the loss of a
similar mass of routine ISS consumables would of itself have been
unimportant (persistent non-arrival would be another matter).
Other moderately replaceable payloads are individual satellites for such
as Iridium and Globalstar; and IIRC Soviet military practice was also to
launch many satellites in turn where the USA preferred many eggs in one
basket.
ISTM, therefore, that there may be an under-recognised opening for the
production of highly-expendable launch vehicles, of significantly less
than 100% mission reliability, which should be cheaper. All that
matters in delivering low-cost stuff to ISS is that the final few metres
of the delivery be well-controlled and safe, and that if today's
delivery of fresh underwear, food, and water ends up in the sea, an
equivalent package can be sent tomorrow, ...
This is particularly so, of course, if the individual quantities
delivered are not large.
--
© John Stockton, Surrey, UK. j...@merlyn.demon.co.uk Turnpike v4.00 MIME. ©
Web <URL: http://www.merlyn.demon.co.uk/> - FAQqish topics, acronyms & links;
some Astro stuff in astro.htm, gravity.htm; quotes.htm; pascal.htm; &c &c &c.
No Encoding. Quotes before replies. Snip well. Write clearly. Don't Mail News.
McLean1382
(Rand Simberg) writes:
>It is not at all clear that investment and risk increase for the fully
>reusable systems.
I think it is difficult to avoid the conclusion, assuming equally competent
designers.
Assume two reusable designs with similar payload to orbit, separation velocity,
etc, the first with a reusable upper stage, the second with an expendable one.
The upper stage of the first will be considerably more massive, because of the
need for TPS, recovery equipment (wings, landing fuel, parachutes, landing
gear, whatever). This will require a considerably more massive first stage or
stages. All other things being equal, development and production costs tend to
increase as dry mass does.
The builder of the fully reusable design will need to design and test an upper
stage with all this additional complexity. Further, the additional systems
provide more opportunities for problems, and delays in the program.
The builder of the second design may be able to use an existing upper stage. No
such fully reusable launcher upper stages exist.
The second design will be far more forgiving of upper stage failures, both in
development and service. It will also be more forgiving of lower stage failure,
since the first stage or stages will be cheaper, and their failure will not
endanger a high value upper stage.
There is a significant risk that the reusable upper stage is more expensive to
service than expected: there have only been two types of orbiter flown, one
without reusable main engines, and the experience we do have is not
encouraging.
Will McLean
Henry Spencer
Dr John Stockton <j...@merlyn.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>In the face of : fair wear and tear; flight accident caused by natural
>circumstances, by human error, by design fault, by unnoticed wear; enemy
>action; terrorism; maintenance accident, ground-level weather;
>earthquake; politicians; etc., there is no possibility of building
>individual RLVs which can be guaranteed to last for ever.
Right. Like aircraft, they will sometimes get bent or broken; like most
aircraft, even if nothing like that happens, they will have a finite
working life after which they must be retired. And like most aircraft,
often they will be relegated to secondary purposes well before they are
actually grounded, because newer ones are better and cheaper to operate.
>Therefore, to
>have reliable access to space, there must be (AISB) continual production
>of LVs.
Right. Partly they will go to handle growing demand, partly they will
replace older ones being retired.
>For this production to be reliable, it must be at a sufficient, steady
>rate; to build a batch and then to need a political decision on a
>further batch, whether the same or different in design, cannot be
>reliable.
It's actually quite common for aircraft to go out of production. The
result is that the ones in service are replaced by a different type, not
by more of the exact same thing. For example, Lockheed TriStars have
almost disappeared from Western airlines, because they are no longer in
production and the old ones are getting older and being sold off.
>RLVs being nevertheless small in active fleet-size, they should be the
>most reliable means of launching valuable payloads (such as most
>satellites, and planetary probes).
Correct, but not specifically because of small fleets -- rather, because
they can be tested repeatedly and have bugs ironed out of them *before*
they are trusted with valuable payloads.
>But, with a human presence in space, much necessary payload is of little
>intrinsic value; it only becomes valuable in orbit. The following must
>be cheap on the ground in comparison with their launch costs - water,
>fuel, food, clothing - indeed, almost anything used in orbit that can be
>routinely purchased off-the-shelf on the ground and that does not become
>a station or vehicle component.
Actually, the same effect will operate, if less strongly, even for things
that do become station or vehicle components. Extremely high launch cost
is the big reason why such things cost so much now. When weight is less
critical and replacement of ailing equipment is routine, costs plummet.
Many of the things that are now hand-built at astronomical expense *could*
be bought off the shelf, or very nearly, were it not for the demand for
absolute minimum weight and absolute maximum reliability. For example,
diving-equipment companies build man-rated pressure hulls routinely.
>ISTM, therefore, that there may be an under-recognised opening for the
>production of highly-expendable launch vehicles, of significantly less
>than 100% mission reliability, which should be cheaper.
Possibly. But ELVs are not necessarily the most attractive approach to
meeting such a requirement. There are other systems, like laser
launchers, which provide even cheaper ways to deliver bulk cargo.
--
When failure is not an option, success | Henry Spencer he...@spsystems.net
can get expensive. -- Peter Stibrany | (aka he...@zoo.toronto.edu)
Rand Simberg
mclea...@aol.com (McLean1382) made the phosphor on my monitor glow
in such a way as to indicate that:
>>It is not at all clear that investment and risk increase for the fully
That's actually a good argument, and I'll concede that a fully
reusable has a higher development cost and (somewhat) higher
development risk.
However, I don't think that anything less is worth building, given the
market. A vehicle with an expendable upper stage is unlikely to
create a new market, partly because it will have a higher marginal
cost per flight (I believe significantly), and partly because it will
not be useful for passengers, which are the only significant market
that I can see. And for existing market, the investors will never get
their money back.
Henry Spencer
McLean1382 <mclea...@aol.com> wrote:
>Assume two reusable designs with similar payload to orbit, separation velocity,
>etc, the first with a reusable upper stage, the second with an expendable one.
>...This will require a considerably more massive first stage or
>stages. All other things being equal, development and production costs tend to
>increase as dry mass does.
An interesting theory; what's the evidence for it? Costs of expendable
rocket stages do *not* scale particularly noticeably with size. With
complexity, thinness of margins, and closeness to the leading edge of
technology, yes... but not, to any great extent, with size. Just making
everything bigger costs very little, especially if it's done before the
size of things like support facilities is fixed.
>The builder of the fully reusable design will need to design and test an upper
>stage with all this additional complexity.
The builder of the semi-reusable design will also have to design and test
an upper stage. The greater simplicity of an expendable stage may well be
balanced out by the high hardware costs of a proper test program (throwing
away a stage each time) and the inherent difficulty of trying to build
reliable stages when you cannot test-fly the individual flight articles.
What he'll probably do is skimp on the test program and settle for the
same sort of poor reliability shown by existing expendables. He's lost a
lot of the benefit of reusability.
>Further, the additional systems
>provide more opportunities for problems, and delays in the program.
True, somewhat mitigated by easier and more thorough testing and possible
commonality with the first stage.
>The builder of the second design may be able to use an existing upper stage.
Very unlikely, if only because most of the existing designs are controlled
by his competitors. Technical problems also abound there; the Saenger
guys originally planned to use an existing Ariane stage as an expendable
upper stage (as an alternative to the reusable Horus upper stage), but
concluded that it wasn't practical, notably due to separation problems.
If he's not very cost-sensitive, he might decide to use an existing solid
motor... but motors are not stages, so he still has quite a bit of work to
do there. At least one aspiring semi-reusable outfit looked at using
existing stages and decided that they really had to build their own.
>The second design will be far more forgiving of upper stage failures, both in
>development and service.
Only if you assume that a failure in a reusable upper stage implies losing
it -- that the reusable stage is not designed for fault tolerance and
intact abort, or that the test program doesn't gradually work up to full
capability, using an aircraft-like "envelope expansion" approach (so that
problems are detected before they become fatal).
How many upper stages will the second design be willing to throw away on
test flights, before it starts entrusting customer payloads to them? Bet
it's a one-digit number.
>It will also be more forgiving of lower stage failure,
>since the first stage or stages will be cheaper, and their failure will not
>endanger a high value upper stage.
The former is unproven verging on implausible. The latter is at least
somewhat true, although "endanger" doesn't necessarily mean "lose" when
the stage is reusable.
>There is a significant risk that the reusable upper stage is more expensive to
>service than expected: there have only been two types of orbiter flown, one
>without reusable main engines, and the experience we do have is not
>encouraging.
There is significant risk that the expendable upper stage is more
expensive to develop, and less reliable, than expected. Both are common.
John Hare
(Rand Simberg) writes:
>On 08 Apr 2001 15:35:33 GMT, in a place far, far away,
>mclea...@aol.com (McLean1382) made the phosphor on my monitor glow
>in such a way as to indicate that:
>
>>In article <20010407183213...@nso-fm.aol.com>,
>>redne...@aol.comspam (John Hare) writes:
>>
>>>Consider the transport with a 7,000 lb payload and weekly
>>>launch cycle. That would give 175 tons per year per transport
>>>to LEO. It is easy for me to believe that this vehicle would be
>>>cheaper to develop than a 30 ton payload ELV that launched
>>>and expended itself 6 times a year.
>>
>>Unfortunately, it's not clear that you can find 52 customers with payloads
>that
>>small. Based on the current launcher manifest, you'd run out of customers
>>sometime in April.
>
The asumption is that you have some particular quantity
of cargo. Based on the current launcher manifest, the 30
ton ELV would run out of customers in January.
>If one looks only at the current market, no new vehicles can be
>justified--they'll never amortize their development costs. But I
>suspect that John was not assuming current market.
>
This is true. The current market doesn't justify ELV or RLV
development. My arguement is that, given a certain quantity
of annual cargo, a suitable RLV can possibly be developed
for less cash than a suitable ELV. After that, it's gravy.
John Hare
snip
>ISTM, therefore, that there may be an under-recognised opening for the
>production of highly-expendable launch vehicles, of significantly less
>than 100% mission reliability, which should be cheaper. All that
>matters in delivering low-cost stuff to ISS is that the final few metres
>of the delivery be well-controlled and safe, and that if today's
>delivery of fresh underwear, food, and water ends up in the sea, an
>equivalent package can be sent tomorrow, ...
>
>This is particularly so, of course, if the individual quantities
>delivered are not large.
I think that one would design for reliability anyway. Just that it would
be accepted that much, much cheaper procedures and components
would result in somewhat less reliability. I agree that an expendable
with rational planning could seriously cut launch costs. I also happen
to believe that it is possible to develope and build a manned transport
for even less.
My reasoning is that the vehicles expended in testing
are more expensive than the handfull of incrementally tested manned
transports. Regulatory costs and insurance should be significantly less
also. Both vehicles are basically hand built anyway, so much of the
expense of the (rational) RLV construction is less challenging than
commonly suggested. As long as we are not asking each other for
funding, we will probably have to agree to disagree on this one.
For the record, I consider the optimum configuration to be TSTO
with HTHL first stage and VL upper. First stage designed for
maximum velocity performance that is compatable with economical
and flexible continous operability. Modified Roton upper stage.
Edward V. Wright
sp...@merlyn.demon.co.uk wrote on 4/8/01 12:58 PM:
> In the face of : fair wear and tear; flight accident caused by natural
> circumstances, by human error, by design fault, by unnoticed wear; enemy
> action; terrorism; maintenance accident, ground-level weather;
> earthquake; politicians; etc., there is no possibility of building
> individual RLVs which can be guaranteed to last for ever. Therefore, to
> have reliable access to space, there must be (AISB) continual production
> of LVs.
Not necessarily. There are many forms of transportation, including
specialized aircraft, that are not in continual production but built to
order.
> For this production to be reliable, it must be at a sufficient, steady
> rate; to build a batch and then to need a political decision on a
> further batch, whether the same or different in design, cannot be
> reliable.
True, but this assumes the vehicles in question must be built to government
order.
> Therefore RLVs should not be over-designed; they should be expected to
> wear out, if not otherwise lost, regularly.
You mean unlike that horrid disaster, the DC-3?
The approach you are advocating was put forth by American automobile
executives such as Robert McNamara in the 1950's. As a result, the US auto
industry was nearly destroyed by foreign competition just a few years later.
By coincidence, the same Robert McNamara went on to become Secretary of
Defense, where he ended research into high-speed X-vehicles.
> But, with a human presence in space, much necessary payload is of little
> intrinsic value; it only becomes valuable in orbit. The following must
> be cheap on the ground in comparison with their launch costs - water,
> fuel, food, clothing - indeed, almost anything used in orbit that can be
> routinely purchased off-the-shelf on the ground and that does not become
> a station or vehicle component.
> ISTM, therefore, that there may be an under-recognised opening for the
> production of highly-expendable launch vehicles, of significantly less
> than 100% mission reliability, which should be cheaper.
That does not necessarily follow. Water, fuel, food, and clothing are
delivered by reusable land, sea, and air vehicles. While an expendable
vehicle might be cheaper than a reusable vehicle, it certainly will not be
free. An expendable vehicle that is 1/10 the cost of a reusable vehicle
might still be more expensive overall, even if the reusable vehicle is lost
on every 10th flight. Of course, in the real world, expendable vehicles are
usually more than 1/10 the cost and few reusable vehicles crash once in
every 10 flights.
if you look at aircraft, you'll find reusable vehicles used even on missions
where there is no cargo at all. Aircraft are reusable not only to minimize
the loss of payloads, but also to minimize the loss of the vehicles
themselves.
Stephen Souter
simberg.i...@trash.org (Rand Simberg) wrote:
> On Sat, 07 Apr 2001 17:06:45 GMT, in a place far, far away,
> simberg.i...@trash.org (Rand Simberg) made the phosphor on my
> monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that:
>
> >Also, you have to look at the opportunity costs. Putting money into a
> >crew capsule to fly on an ELV is money that won't be put into
> >something that might actually significantly reduce cost of access for
> >both people and cargo.
>
> After reading Henry's V's (that's Vanderbilt, not the king...) post, I
> agree with him that the above is not the major concern. In fact, it
> might actually be a good distraction to keep NASA out of our hair
> while we develop low-cost launch.
What exactly has NASA done which is stopping and/or delaying the
development by private enterprise of low-cost launch vehicles?
--
Stephen Souter
s.so...@edfac.usyd.edu.au
http://www.edfac.usyd.edu.au/staff/souters/
Stephen Voss
> > Therefore RLVs should not be over-designed; they should be expected to
> > wear out, if not otherwise lost, regularly.
>
> You mean unlike that horrid disaster, the DC-3?
>
> The approach you are advocating was put forth by American automobile
> executives such as Robert McNamara in the 1950's. As a result, the US auto
> industry was nearly destroyed by foreign competition just a few years later.
> By coincidence, the same Robert McNamara went on to become Secretary of
> Defense, where he ended research into high-speed X-vehicles.
Im not sure hes saying quite what your hearing....
If you look historically quite a number of DC-3s crashed. Noone says the DC-3
was unsafe. We should do everything reasonable to prevent space disasters, but
even if you do almost everything right...s--t happens.
When the Challenger exploded the wind went out of the shuttle program. Instead
of saying "no more than x shuttle launches a year" or "no shuttle launches under
50 degrees"
we should be looking at how the weaknesses of the shuttle can be corrected in
the next
vehicle.
The space shuttle successor wont look as glamorous (or maybe it will) but it
should be
cheaper,faster and safer.
When he says "overdesigned" I think he means with too many parts like the
shuttle has.
The shuttle is not the reliable space truck that we need for long term space
exploration
and ferrying goods and men to space. Its too expensive for what it does....too
expensive
to build and too expensive to operate.
Rand Simberg
s.so...@edfac.usyd.edu.au (Stephen Souter) made the phosphor on my
monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that:
>What exactly has NASA done which is stopping and/or delaying the
>development by private enterprise of low-cost launch vehicles?
One could write a book on that subject, and in fact, I know somebody
who is... :-(
But suffice it to say in the interests of bandwidth, that when NASA
threatens to subsidize favored contractors with federal funds to
develop launchers, and possibly even to subsidize their operations,
that investors justifiably look askance at purely private endeavors
that will have to compete with the deep pockets of the taxpayer.
Ask Andy Beal.
Rand Simberg
Voss <vo...@gate.net> made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a
way as to indicate that:
>The space shuttle successor wont look as glamorous (or maybe it will) but it
>should be
>cheaper,faster and safer.
There will not be, and should not be, a "space shuttle successor."
Stephen Voss
Rand Simberg wrote:
> On Mon, 09 Apr 2001 00:04:34 -0400, in a place far, far away, Stephen
> Voss <vo...@gate.net> made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a
> way as to indicate that:
>
> >The space shuttle successor wont look as glamorous (or maybe it will) but it
> >should be
> >cheaper,faster and safer.
>
> There will not be, and should not be, a "space shuttle successor."
There has to be a space shuttle successor...you need a cheap reusable vehicle
for transporting to LEO.
NOTE that I didnt say the government would be the owner/operator...
Once the debris field has cleared from the destruction of an idea of a government
owned SSTO program I am HOPING that one of these contractors
may decide to go ahead and build their design privately.
Rand Simberg
>> There will not be, and should not be, a "space shuttle successor."
>
>There has to be a space shuttle successor...you need a cheap reusable vehicle
>for transporting to LEO.
That depends on what you mean by "space shuttle successor." If you
mean a single vehicle that will do all the things that Shuttle does,
but cheaper and better, then no.
If you mean an industry consisting of a variety of low-cost launch
vehicles that fill a number of market niches, and render the Shuttle
superfluous, then I'm all for it.
Dwayne Allen Day
: But suffice it to say in the interests of bandwidth, that when NASA
: threatens to subsidize favored contractors with federal funds to
: develop launchers, and possibly even to subsidize their operations,
: that investors justifiably look askance at purely private endeavors
: that will have to compete with the deep pockets of the taxpayer.
: Ask Andy Beal.
Andy Beal went out of business for a lot of reasons. NASA was not one of
them.
D
Andrew Case
>Andy Beal went out of business for a lot of reasons. NASA was not one of
>them.
Care to elaborate? Certainly Beal blamed NASA & government interference
in general for his decision to shut down.
What are the real reasons, if not the ones Beal gave?
......Andrew
--
Andrew Case |
ac...@plasma.umd.edu |
Institute for Plasma Research |
University of Maryland, College Park |
Rand Simberg
Allen Day <wayn...@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu> made the phosphor on my
monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that:
>Rand Simberg <simberg.i...@trash.org> wrote:
And you know that, how?
I will concede that there are a number of reasons for his failure, and
that his press release was somewhat disingenuous in laying all of the
blame at NASA's door, but I find it easily conceivable that government
competition was one of the factors that made him throw in the towel,
and in fact may have been the straw on the camel's back.
Dr John Stockton
news:sci.space.policy, Henry Spencer <he...@spsystems.net> wrote at Sun,
8 Apr 2001 21:36:38 :-
>
>>For this production to be reliable, it must be at a sufficient, steady
>>rate; to build a batch and then to need a political decision on a
>>further batch, whether the same or different in design, cannot be
>>reliable.
>
>It's actually quite common for aircraft to go out of production. The
>result is that the ones in service are replaced by a different type, not
>by more of the exact same thing. For example, Lockheed TriStars have
>almost disappeared from Western airlines, because they are no longer in
>production and the old ones are getting older and being sold off.
>
The difference there is that there is a sufficient number of production
lines, world-wide, covering large- and medium- size air transport
supply. If one line closes, others are still running. Moreover, much
of the market is for the carriage of relatively small units
(passengers); even if all the Jumbo-sized craft were removed, the
hundred-seaters could do the essential work, at a price.
At present there is just one working production system for man-rated
space launchers, in Russia; and one entering production, in China. The
USA had such a line, 1975-1990 or thereabouts; but it produced fewer
than ten launch vehicles or near-vehicles, and stopped.
--
© John Stockton, Surrey, UK. j...@merlyn.demon.co.uk Turnpike v4.00 MIME. ©
Web <URL: http://www.merlyn.demon.co.uk/> - FAQish topics, acronyms, & links.
Dwayne Allen Day
:>Andy Beal went out of business for a lot of reasons. NASA was not one of
:>them.
: Care to elaborate? Certainly Beal blamed NASA & government interference
: in general for his decision to shut down.
Read this:
http://www.bealaerospace.com/articles/DallasObserver/index.htm
: What are the real reasons, if not the ones Beal gave?
(not necessarily in order of importance)
1-the collapse of the market (there are too many rockets chasing too few
payloads)
2-export problems (he never thought he would have trouble exporting a
rocket from the country)
3-inconsistent management/leadership
4-poor planning (the initial selection of a launch site that would be
taken out by the first hurricane)
5-environmental regulations (non-US)
6-political problems (non-US)
7-other minor regulatory problems (non-US)
8-the collapse of the market
The reaction among certain space activists to Beal's collapse and his
public reason for it says a lot about their own biases. In short, Beal
blamed NASA and everyone who wanted to believe him believed him. Yet
Beal's own statements early on indicated that he planned on being up and
running long before SLI would become an issue. The fact that he couldn't,
and then blamed SLI, was largely ignored by the activists. Look at the
market. That's the real issue.
D
Dwayne Allen Day
:>Andy Beal went out of business for a lot of reasons. NASA was not one of
:>them.
: And you know that, how?
The market collapsed.
How do you know that NASA _was_ the reason? Because he said so?
: blame at NASA's door, but I find it easily conceivable that government
: competition was one of the factors that made him throw in the towel,
: and in fact may have been the straw on the camel's back.
He _really_ believed that SLI was going to produce a low-cost booster to
undercut his market? So he had more faith in NASA's achieving cost
reductions than just about everybody else?
D
Rand Simberg
Allen Day <wayn...@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu> made the phosphor on my
monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that:
>:>Andy Beal went out of business for a lot of reasons. NASA was not one of
>:>them.
>
>: And you know that, how?
>
>The market collapsed.
>
>How do you know that NASA _was_ the reason? Because he said so?
I didn't say that NASA was *the* reason, just that it could have been
one of the reasons. I don't know for sure.
You, OTOH, claim absolutely that it was not a factor.
That's a much stronger claim. I'm asking you do defend it. Unlike
you (and other fake ZR's), I don't (implicitly) claim to have ESP to
get into his mind.
>: blame at NASA's door, but I find it easily conceivable that government
>: competition was one of the factors that made him throw in the towel,
>: and in fact may have been the straw on the camel's back.
>
>He _really_ believed that SLI was going to produce a low-cost booster to
>undercut his market? So he had more faith in NASA's achieving cost
>reductions than just about everybody else?
I dont know, but he had faith in NASA's ability to bad mouth a concept
and lead potential customers astray, backing up their words with
billions in taxpayers' funds.
Could he have succeeded even in the face of SLI subsidies with a
better concept and business plan execution? Maybe. But I think that
it's too strong a statement to say that NASA's actions had zero
influence on his decision. Regardless of his regard for them
technically, he had good reason to fear them politically, and it could
have made for just one more nail in the coffin.
Dwayne Allen Day
: I didn't say that NASA was *the* reason, just that it could have been
: one of the reasons. I don't know for sure.
: You, OTOH, claim absolutely that it was not a factor.
Look at the timelines--he had planned on being up and running long before
SLI even could have had an effect. His blaming SLI is clearly a
non-issue.
Note how curious it is that he did not blame govt.-subsidized Atlas and
Delta boosters, which were direct competitors with him.
: Could he have succeeded even in the face of SLI subsidies with a
: better concept and business plan execution? Maybe. But I think that
: it's too strong a statement to say that NASA's actions had zero
: influence on his decision. Regardless of his regard for them
: technically, he had good reason to fear them politically, and it could
: have made for just one more nail in the coffin.
No. The timeline does not work. He was blaming a program that was still
years away for his problems that already existed. It made no sense.
Read the link I provided. It indicates that he faced a lot of problems,
including finding capital (why invest in risky aerospace in 1999 or 2000
when you can invest in a sure-thing dot com?). But the biggest issue was
that the market collapsed. That was far more immediate than SLI ever was.
And the fact that he did not seem to anticipate having problems exporting
a rocket indicates some serious problems with his business plan. That's
like designing exploding beach toys and being surprised when the FBI
knocks on your door.
I am always amaazed that libertarian space activists, who supposedly
believe in a free-market, a) are generally ignorant of the existing space
market, including prices, #of launches, trends, etc., and b) have a
knee-jerk need to bash NASA, regardless of other factors (witness little
discussion of EELV as a possible source of Beal's woes, regulatory
concerns, and international/non-US issues).
(This is a general comment, not directed at you.)
D
Rand Simberg
Allen Day <wayn...@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu> made the phosphor on my
monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that:
>: I didn't say that NASA was *the* reason, just that it could have been
>: one of the reasons. I don't know for sure.
>
>: You, OTOH, claim absolutely that it was not a factor.
>
>Look at the timelines--he had planned on being up and running long before
>SLI even could have had an effect. His blaming SLI is clearly a
>non-issue.
Obviously, his plans went awry. Given changes in the plans
necessitated by whatever events, he had to decide if it made sense to
continue move forward in the face of potentially aggressive future
government competition.
>Note how curious it is that he did not blame govt.-subsidized Atlas and
>Delta boosters, which were direct competitors with him.
Those never threatened to offer low-cost launch.
>: Could he have succeeded even in the face of SLI subsidies with a
>: better concept and business plan execution? Maybe. But I think that
>: it's too strong a statement to say that NASA's actions had zero
>: influence on his decision. Regardless of his regard for them
>: technically, he had good reason to fear them politically, and it could
>: have made for just one more nail in the coffin.
>
>No. The timeline does not work. He was blaming a program that was still
>years away for his problems that already existed. It made no sense.
We don't know how many years away he thought his vehicle was, at the
time he made the decision.
>Read the link I provided. It indicates that he faced a lot of problems,
>including finding capital (why invest in risky aerospace in 1999 or 2000
>when you can invest in a sure-thing dot com?). But the biggest issue was
>that the market collapsed. That was far more immediate than SLI ever was.
>And the fact that he did not seem to anticipate having problems exporting
>a rocket indicates some serious problems with his business plan. That's
>like designing exploding beach toys and being surprised when the FBI
>knocks on your door.
I have read it, and I agree that he screwed up in multiple ways (some
of which were apparent to me even at the time, but since he never
asked my advice, I never saw any reason to publicly disparage him).
That doesn't mean that the potential government competition was not
one more factor in his ultimate decision.
>I am always amaazed that libertarian space activists, who supposedly
>believe in a free-market, a) are generally ignorant of the existing space
>market, including prices, #of launches, trends, etc., and b) have a
>knee-jerk need to bash NASA, regardless of other factors (witness little
>discussion of EELV as a possible source of Beal's woes, regulatory
>concerns, and international/non-US issues).
Yes, that is a problem. When we focus on NASA as a bogeyman, we often
lose sight of other critical barriers.
>(This is a general comment, not directed at you.)
Thanks, I think...
Andrew Case
>Read the link I provided. It indicates that he faced a lot of problems,
>including finding capital (why invest in risky aerospace in 1999 or 2000
>when you can invest in a sure-thing dot com?).
Part of the problem with raising capital is that government subsidized
programs are making the same promises. The difference being that Beal's
approach had a hope in hell, where X-33 didn't. Sure Beal blamed SLI:
it was the latest in a *long* line of government funded programs promising
the moon (and delivering green cheese :). Before SLI there was X-33 to
drive away investment capital, and before X-33 there were other programs.
Your dot com analogy makes the point perfectly: it's perception that
counts. If dot coms look like a sure thing, that's where the money goes,
regardless of the fact that their business models may be crap, as the
events of the past year have shown. The perception of government
subsidized competition is all that's needed to drive away capital.
>But the biggest issue was
>that the market collapsed. That was far more immediate than SLI ever was.
Market collapse is obviously a really big deal. But that doesn't make it
the whole story. Given a bit more capital and some assurance that he
wouldn't face a subsidized competitor, BEAL might have been able to
weather the storm.
>And the fact that he did not seem to anticipate having problems exporting
>a rocket indicates some serious problems with his business plan. That's
>like designing exploding beach toys and being surprised when the FBI
>knocks on your door.
I was also a little dubious about this element of the plan. I think
any plan that involves launch from a foreign country is going to have
trouble with US authorities. If the country in question is third world,
the problems can be very hard to deal with.
Dwayne Allen Day
: Obviously, his plans went awry. Given changes in the plans
: necessitated by whatever events, he had to decide if it made sense to
: continue move forward in the face of potentially aggressive future
: government competition.
He had to decide if it made sense to continue in a business where the
market had just died. And he knew about government competition before he
started. He cannot claim ignorance as an excuse.
:>Note how curious it is that he did not blame govt.-subsidized Atlas and
:>Delta boosters, which were direct competitors with him.
: Those never threatened to offer low-cost launch.
They competed DIRECTLY with him in the marketplace for GEO launches,
unlike SLI. And they competed with him immediately, not _potentially_ ten
years down the road.
If I can venture a guess why he blamed SLI and not EELV, it was because
EELV already existed when he started. Had he blamed EELV, people would
have rightly said "Well, you knew that when you started, so are you now
saying that you were stupid to start?" No, he needed a convenient
government scapegoat and SLI was convenient.
:>No. The timeline does not work. He was blaming a program that was still
:>years away for his problems that already existed. It made no sense.
: We don't know how many years away he thought his vehicle was, at the
: time he made the decision.
1-he did state his original timeline, that timeline slipped
2-this is more proof that aerospace is a fickle beast. Timelines ALWAYS
slip and it ALWAYS takes a long time to reach the market. If your
business plan cannot account for that fact, then you are in the wrong
business.
: I have read it, and I agree that he screwed up in multiple ways (some
: of which were apparent to me even at the time, but since he never
: asked my advice, I never saw any reason to publicly disparage him).
NASA does not ask your advice, so why do you publicly disparage NASA and
not the private space entrepreneur? A silly, misguided plan is a silly,
misguided plan, no matter who pursues it, yet entrepreneurs whose hearts
are in the right place (Beal, MirCorp) get a pass from space activists?
: That doesn't mean that the potential government competition was not
: one more factor in his ultimate decision.
1-it was the only one he blamed
2-it was swallowed hook, line and sinker by certain space activists
3-anybody who is shocked to discover the government subsidizing launch
vehicles must also be shocked by the sun rising in the morning. Beal knew
about EELV when he started, yet he suddenly woke up in late 2000 and
learned it was not a free market out there?
D
Dwayne Allen Day
: Part of the problem with raising capital is that government subsidized
: programs are making the same promises. The difference being that Beal's
: approach had a hope in hell, where X-33 didn't. Sure Beal blamed SLI:
: it was the latest in a *long* line of government funded programs promising
: the moon (and delivering green cheese :).
Which of course begs the question: if government funded programs have a
long record of NOT achieving low-cost access to space, how come Beal felt
threatened by SLI? In other words, if we all know that it will fail, then
it is a non-issue, right?
: Before SLI there was X-33 to
: drive away investment capital, and before X-33 there were other programs.
: Your dot com analogy makes the point perfectly: it's perception that
: counts. If dot coms look like a sure thing, that's where the money goes,
: regardless of the fact that their business models may be crap, as the
: events of the past year have shown. The perception of government
: subsidized competition is all that's needed to drive away capital.
You don't even need government subsidized competition to drive away
capital. All you need is the cruel facts of the marketplace:
1-rockets are expensive
2-rockets take long to build
3-rockets blow up
4-the launch market collapsed in the midst of his capital search
If someone wants to spend their investment dollars on a high-tech
enterprise, they are going to pick one that has a faster rate of return
and appears more of a sure thing. Space has not qualified for either of
these for a long time, and government subsidized launchers are only a
small part of that. Iridium failed because dirt-based cell phones moved
faster than space-based ones ever could, which is a classic space problem.
: Market collapse is obviously a really big deal. But that doesn't make it
: the whole story. Given a bit more capital and some assurance that he
: wouldn't face a subsidized competitor, BEAL might have been able to
: weather the storm.
"Might"? The market collapsed. How easy is it to market anything that is
going to take another 4-5 years to reach the market when the market is
dead _right now_?
: I was also a little dubious about this element of the plan. I think
: any plan that involves launch from a foreign country is going to have
: trouble with US authorities. If the country in question is third world,
: the problems can be very hard to deal with.
And yet SLI is the only government program that Beal blamed?
D
Michael Walsh
Rand Simberg wrote:
> On Mon, 09 Apr 2001 14:08:54 +1000, in a place far, far away,
> s.so...@edfac.usyd.edu.au (Stephen Souter) made the phosphor on my
> monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that:
>
> >What exactly has NASA done which is stopping and/or delaying the
> >development by private enterprise of low-cost launch vehicles?
>
> One could write a book on that subject, and in fact, I know somebody
> who is... :-(
>
> But suffice it to say in the interests of bandwidth, that when NASA
> threatens to subsidize favored contractors with federal funds to
> develop launchers, and possibly even to subsidize their operations,
> that investors justifiably look askance at purely private endeavors
> that will have to compete with the deep pockets of the taxpayer.
>
> Ask Andy Beal.
>
> ************************************************************************
> simberg.interglobal.org * 310 372-7963 (CA) 307 739-1296 (Jackson Hole)
> interglobal space lines * 307 733-1715 (Fax) http://www.interglobal.org
In Beal's case it would seem that his concerns about NASA competition
may have been the proverbial straw that broke the camels back, but
the rest of the load came from escalating costs and schedule delays.
NASA seems to be muddling around trying to determine just what to
do.
Mike Walsh
Michael Walsh
Rand Simberg wrote:
By omission, both of you seem to be ruling out escalating development
costs and schedule slippages. Admittedly these should have been predictable
and perhaps were not out of line with other companies developments
but it seems to have been a shock to Beal who proudly posted that he
had determined the way to develop a low cost booster.
I don't see how you can argue against the
"straw that broke the camel's back" without knowing the
state of Andrew Beal's mind. After all, he was the one who
made the decision to stop.
Mike Walsh
Rand Simberg
Allen Day <wayn...@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu> made the phosphor on my
monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that:
>He had to decide if it made sense to continue in a business where the
>market had just died. And he knew about government competition before he
>started. He cannot claim ignorance as an excuse.
He knew about the relatively weak subsidies provided to Atlas et al,
but he had already decided that those were beatable, or he wouldn't
even have started in the first place.
>:>Note how curious it is that he did not blame govt.-subsidized Atlas and
>:>Delta boosters, which were direct competitors with him.
>
>: Those never threatened to offer low-cost launch.
>
>They competed DIRECTLY with him in the marketplace for GEO launches,
>unlike SLI. And they competed with him immediately, not _potentially_ ten
>years down the road.
>
>If I can venture a guess why he blamed SLI and not EELV, it was because
>EELV already existed when he started.
That's right. In fact, that was the competition that he was going
after.
>No, he needed a convenient
>government scapegoat and SLI was convenient.
It was indeed. However, just because you're paranoid doesn't mean
they aren't out to get you...
>:>No. The timeline does not work. He was blaming a program that was still
>:>years away for his problems that already existed. It made no sense.
>
>: We don't know how many years away he thought his vehicle was, at the
>: time he made the decision.
>
>1-he did state his original timeline, that timeline slipped
>2-this is more proof that aerospace is a fickle beast. Timelines ALWAYS
>slip and it ALWAYS takes a long time to reach the market. If your
>business plan cannot account for that fact, then you are in the wrong
>business.
That is avoiding my point. What mattered at the time was not his
original timeline. His new timeline was now perhaps coming up against
yet another new government program that might be more of a threat than
the existing or enhanced expendables.
>: I have read it, and I agree that he screwed up in multiple ways (some
>: of which were apparent to me even at the time, but since he never
>: asked my advice, I never saw any reason to publicly disparage him).
>
>NASA does not ask your advice, so why do you publicly disparage NASA and
>not the private space entrepreneur? A silly, misguided plan is a silly,
>misguided plan, no matter who pursues it, yet entrepreneurs whose hearts
>are in the right place (Beal, MirCorp) get a pass from space activists?
Because I want to see private entrepreneurs succeed. I have neither
hope, nor desire for NASA to do so, at this point, because their
definition of success is not mine.
>: That doesn't mean that the potential government competition was not
>: one more factor in his ultimate decision.
>
>1-it was the only one he blamed
So, he likes to blame others instead of himself. That's regrettably
human, but it doesn't mean that it wasn't a factor.
>2-it was swallowed hook, line and sinker by certain space activists
I don't see the relevance of this point at all. I never noticed that
he did anything to please or displease, or even acknowledge the
existence of, space activists in general or those "certain space
activists" in particular.
>3-anybody who is shocked to discover the government subsidizing launch
>vehicles must also be shocked by the sun rising in the morning. Beal knew
>about EELV when he started, yet he suddenly woke up in late 2000 and
>learned it was not a free market out there?
He wasn't concerned with EELV--he was concerned with SLI.
You seem to be slipping back and forth between two positions distinct,
as it suits your argument--he was concerned with EELV|he was concerned
with SLI.
None of these points [1,2,3] negate the possibility that it was a
factor.
Rand Simberg
Allen Day <wayn...@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu> made the phosphor on my
monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that:
>Which of course begs the question: if government funded programs have a
>long record of NOT achieving low-cost access to space, how come Beal felt
>threatened by SLI? In other words, if we all know that it will fail, then
>it is a non-issue, right?
Because they also have a long record of preventing others from
achieving it (e.g., AMROC).
>You don't even need government subsidized competition to drive away
>capital. All you need is the cruel facts of the marketplace:
>
>1-rockets are expensive
>2-rockets take long to build
>3-rockets blow up
This is a dramatic oversimplification of the reality.
>4-the launch market collapsed in the midst of his capital search
What "capital search"? He was using his own money.
Michael Walsh
Rand Simberg wrote:
> On Mon, 09 Apr 2001 00:04:34 -0400, in a place far, far away, Stephen
> Voss <vo...@gate.net> made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a
> way as to indicate that:
>
> >The space shuttle successor wont look as glamorous (or maybe it will) but it
> >should be
> >cheaper,faster and safer.
>
> There will not be, and should not be, a "space shuttle successor."
>
Whether there is or not there should be.
Actually it is just a matter of what and when.
Mike Walsh
Michael Walsh
Henry Spencer wrote:
> In article <20010408182715...@nso-mg.aol.com>,
> McLean1382 <mclea...@aol.com> wrote:
> >Assume two reusable designs with similar payload to orbit, separation velocity,
> >etc, the first with a reusable upper stage, the second with an expendable one.
> >The upper stage of the first will be considerably more massive...
> >...This will require a considerably more massive first stage or
> >stages. All other things being equal, development and production costs tend to
> >increase as dry mass does.
>
> An interesting theory; what's the evidence for it?
This is an old aircraft design assumption that shows up in a lot of costing
models. Like most rules of thumb, it has definite uses especially when
comparing costs of similar craft.
In the statement above, the problem is with the "all other things being equal"
which may not be true.
Mike Walsh
Rand Simberg
Walsh <mp1w...@home.com> made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such
a way as to indicate that:
>By omission, both of you seem to be ruling out escalating development
>costs and schedule slippages. Admittedly these should have been predictable
>and perhaps were not out of line with other companies developments
>but it seems to have been a shock to Beal who proudly posted that he
>had determined the way to develop a low cost booster.
That was implicit in the "many factors."
>I don't see how you can argue against the
>"straw that broke the camel's back" without knowing the
>state of Andrew Beal's mind. After all, he was the one who
>made the decision to stop.
Yes, that's my point.
************************************************************************
simberg.interglobal.org * 310 372-7963 (CA) 307 739-1296 (Jackson Hole)
interglobal space lines * 307 733-1715 (Fax) http://www.interglobal.org
"Extraordinary launch vehicles require extraordinary markets..."
Dwayne Allen Day
:>No, he needed a convenient
:>government scapegoat and SLI was convenient.
: It was indeed. However, just because you're paranoid doesn't mean
: they aren't out to get you...
If you're paranoid, you probably have other mental problems as well.
:>NASA does not ask your advice, so why do you publicly disparage NASA and
:>not the private space entrepreneur? A silly, misguided plan is a silly,
:>misguided plan, no matter who pursues it, yet entrepreneurs whose hearts
:>are in the right place (Beal, MirCorp) get a pass from space activists?
: Because I want to see private entrepreneurs succeed. I have neither
: hope, nor desire for NASA to do so, at this point, because their
: definition of success is not mine.
So all support for these entrepreneurial efforts start with blinders
on. But poorly planned and thought out entrepreneurial efforts fail and
then discredit others, legitimate ones that follow. I propose that
unrealistic efforts like MirCorp do great damage to future efforts.
: So, he likes to blame others instead of himself. That's regrettably
: human, but it doesn't mean that it wasn't a factor.
And, as I pointed out, it cannot be a factor given the timelines--his
project was in serious trouble when the market collapsed. SLI is not
expected to produce anything for many years, if at all. His claim that
SLI was the cause just does not stand up.
:>2-it was swallowed hook, line and sinker by certain space activists
: I don't see the relevance of this point at all. I never noticed that
It relates to my earlier comment that libertarian space activists tend to
be in denial and ignore reality--they choose to blame NASA before looking
at any other factors, such as the market.
: He wasn't concerned with EELV--he was concerned with SLI.
That's what he said publicly when he quit. But EELV was his domestic US
competitor. His true competitors were the rockets already flying or about
to fly.
: You seem to be slipping back and forth between two positions distinct,
: as it suits your argument--he was concerned with EELV|he was concerned
: with SLI.
No. If you reread my postings from the beginning, you see that I never
said I believe that he was concerned with SLI. SLI was his scapegoat, and
many people bought his claim without examining it.
D
Dwayne Allen Day
: By omission, both of you seem to be ruling out escalating development
: costs and schedule slippages. Admittedly these should have been predictable
No, I implied it when I noted that aerospace is a fickle beast--schedules
ALWAYS slip and rockets ALWAYS take a long time to build. Aerospace is
one field where it will take many years before you can generate any
revenue.
It is also worth noting that his technological choices were somewhat
unconventional. He picked a rocket that was bound to present development
problems. That's a management failure.
D
Rand Simberg
Allen Day <wayn...@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu> made the phosphor on my
monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that:
>: It was indeed. However, just because you're paranoid doesn't mean
>: they aren't out to get you...
>
>If you're paranoid, you probably have other mental problems as well.
Well, we all have various mental problems--it's always a matter of
degree. There are some jobs for which paranoia is a job requirement,
like network security (I know whereof I speak, because that's one of
my gigs right now...)
>:>NASA does not ask your advice, so why do you publicly disparage NASA and
>:>not the private space entrepreneur? A silly, misguided plan is a silly,
>:>misguided plan, no matter who pursues it, yet entrepreneurs whose hearts
>:>are in the right place (Beal, MirCorp) get a pass from space activists?
>
>: Because I want to see private entrepreneurs succeed. I have neither
>: hope, nor desire for NASA to do so, at this point, because their
>: definition of success is not mine.
>
>So all support for these entrepreneurial efforts start with blinders
>on.
No. I didn't contribute in any way to Mr. Beals activities, but I
still hoped that he would succeed, since I couldn't do anything to
influence his prospects one way or the other. What would have been
the value in criticizing him?
>But poorly planned and thought out entrepreneurial efforts fail and
>then discredit others, legitimate ones that follow. I propose that
>unrealistic efforts like MirCorp do great damage to future efforts.
They perhaps do, but simply criticizing them is unlikely to affect
their course of action. NASA, OTOH, is at least in theory supposed to
be responsive to those in the government who are responsible for it,
and who can be influenced by public criticism.
>: So, he likes to blame others instead of himself. That's regrettably
>: human, but it doesn't mean that it wasn't a factor.
>
>And, as I pointed out, it cannot be a factor given the timelines--his
>project was in serious trouble when the market collapsed. SLI is not
>expected to produce anything for many years, if at all. His claim that
>SLI was the cause just does not stand up.
And as I pointed out, at the time it wasn't altogether clear just what
SLI was at that time. For all he knew, it could turn out to be loan
guarantees to Lockmart to build Vulturestar.
>:>2-it was swallowed hook, line and sinker by certain space activists
>
>: I don't see the relevance of this point at all. I never noticed that
>
>It relates to my earlier comment that libertarian space activists tend to
>be in denial and ignore reality--they choose to blame NASA before looking
>at any other factors, such as the market.
I still don't see what it has to do with Beal's decision.
>: He wasn't concerned with EELV--he was concerned with SLI.
>
>That's what he said publicly when he quit. But EELV was his domestic US
>competitor. His true competitors were the rockets already flying or about
>to fly.
But as you said, that was the competitor that he knew about from the
beginning, and built his business plans against. It would make no
sense for him to complain about them after the fact.
>: You seem to be slipping back and forth between two positions distinct,
>: as it suits your argument--he was concerned with EELV|he was concerned
>: with SLI.
>
>No. If you reread my postings from the beginning, you see that I never
>said I believe that he was concerned with SLI. SLI was his scapegoat, and
>many people bought his claim without examining it.
No, but *he* said it. Your bringing in EELV is just a red herring.
Rand Simberg
Allen Day <wayn...@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu> made the phosphor on my
monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that:
>It is also worth noting that his technological choices were somewhat
>unconventional. He picked a rocket that was bound to present development
>problems. That's a management failure.
Actually, I think that his design choice was quite conservative, from
a development risk standpoint. I think it was a lousy choice, but not
because it was risky.
Unless, of course, you think that any design in which you develop your
own engines is inherently risky.
************************************************************************
simberg.interglobal.org * 310 372-7963 (CA) 307 739-1296 (Jackson Hole)
interglobal space lines * 307 733-1715 (Fax) http://www.interglobal.org
"Extraordinary launch vehicles require extraordinary markets..."
Michael Walsh
Dwayne Allen Day wrote:
He was building a large launch vehicle and choosing what he regarded
as a simple pressure fed system. I don't believe he picked a rocket that
was bound to present any more development problems than any
competitive concepts he could have picked.
I fault him for wanting to build a single new engine for each stage
rather than clustering a common engine for at least the first two
stages.
He had the problem of trying to develop a system that we would
be low cost to construct and fly.
OK, why do you believe the concept he picked was bound to present
development problems? I believe you are correct, but I have discussed
the matter of "Big Dumb Booster" development in these newsgroups
before and people who should have better qualifications than I do,
specifically George Herbert have disagreed. Herbert did say, I
believe in one post, that he thought Beal deviated too far from the
simple context.
I guess since this is policy we should keep it simple, I just wondered
what you meant by your remark.
Mike Walsh
Michael Walsh
Rand Simberg wrote:
> On Mon, 09 Apr 2001 23:40:52 GMT, in a place far, far away, Dwayne
> Allen Day <wayn...@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu> made the phosphor on my
> monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that:
>
> >It is also worth noting that his technological choices were somewhat
> >unconventional. He picked a rocket that was bound to present development
> >problems. That's a management failure.
>
> Actually, I think that his design choice was quite conservative, from
> a development risk standpoint. I think it was a lousy choice, but not
> because it was risky.
>
> Unless, of course, you think that any design in which you develop your
> own engines is inherently risky.
>
I believe this to be true, although I am certain it is arguable.
As I said in a replay to Day, I think it was a mistake for Beal to
try to develop three separate engines. Of course, he didn't get
beyond No. 2 and I don't believe he ever fired a completely
integrated third stage propulsion system.
Mike Walsh
Dwayne Allen Day
:>But poorly planned and thought out entrepreneurial efforts fail and
:>then discredit others, legitimate ones that follow. I propose that
:>unrealistic efforts like MirCorp do great damage to future efforts.
: They perhaps do, but simply criticizing them is unlikely to affect
: their course of action.
But calling a spade a spade is useful for obtaining a better hand. As I
said, I propose that unrealistic efforts only hurt future
efforts. Practically nobody pointed out MirCorp's unrealistic plans
because they _wanted_ them to succeed, perpetuating a big lie. Then when
MirCorp folded, others stepped in to (surprise!) blame NASA.
:>It relates to my earlier comment that libertarian space activists tend to
:>be in denial and ignore reality--they choose to blame NASA before looking
:>at any other factors, such as the market.
: I still don't see what it has to do with Beal's decision.
It was what prompted my original post on this--someone simply parroted the
line that Beal was done in by Big Bad NASA. But it's not true. He had
lots of problems, which many choose to ignore.
: But as you said, that was the competitor that he knew about from the
: beginning, and built his business plans against. It would make no
: sense for him to complain about them after the fact.
Right, but I provided a motive for him to not complain about them. I
submit that they were more of a factor in his quitting than SLI. But if
he had complained about them, he would have looked stupid.
: No, but *he* said it. Your bringing in EELV is just a red herring.
No. I listed a bunch of reasons why he failed. The market collapsing was
the big one. But I later added EELV to that list. It is in addition to
all the rest. Add them all up and they equal a much better causal
explanation than SLI.
D
Rand Simberg
Allen Day <wayn...@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu> made the phosphor on my
monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that:
>But calling a spade a spade is useful for obtaining a better hand. As I
>said, I propose that unrealistic efforts only hurt future
>efforts. Practically nobody pointed out MirCorp's unrealistic plans
>because they _wanted_ them to succeed, perpetuating a big lie. Then when
>MirCorp folded, others stepped in to (surprise!) blame NASA.
Well, it was partly NASA's fault, in the sense that even if the stock
market hadn't gone south, and Walt hadn't missed the payment that
defaulted his contract, there was a *lot* of pressure on RSA to
deorbit Mir by NASA.
>:>It relates to my earlier comment that libertarian space activists tend to
>:>be in denial and ignore reality--they choose to blame NASA before looking
>:>at any other factors, such as the market.
>
>: I still don't see what it has to do with Beal's decision.
>
>It was what prompted my original post on this--someone simply parroted the
>line that Beal was done in by Big Bad NASA. But it's not true. He had
>lots of problems, which many choose to ignore.
Yes, that was me (sort of). My point was that NASA was one of the
factors (though certainly not the only one).
But I'm quite confident, for reasons of relativity and causility, if
nothing else, that my post had nothing to do with whether or not Beal
blamed NASA.
>: But as you said, that was the competitor that he knew about from the
>: beginning, and built his business plans against. It would make no
>: sense for him to complain about them after the fact.
>
>Right, but I provided a motive for him to not complain about them. I
>submit that they were more of a factor in his quitting than SLI. But if
>he had complained about them, he would have looked stupid.
>
>
>: No, but *he* said it. Your bringing in EELV is just a red herring.
>
>No. I listed a bunch of reasons why he failed. The market collapsing was
>the big one. But I later added EELV to that list. It is in addition to
>all the rest. Add them all up and they equal a much better causal
>explanation than SLI.
That doesn't mean that SLI wasn't also a factor. It is possible for
there to be more than one factor (as you tacitly admit in making a
list), even if some are stronger than others.
Rand Simberg
Walsh <mp1w...@home.com> made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such
a way as to indicate that:
>OK, why do you believe the concept he picked was bound to present
>development problems? I believe you are correct, but I have discussed
>the matter of "Big Dumb Booster" development in these newsgroups
>before and people who should have better qualifications than I do,
>specifically George Herbert have disagreed. Herbert did say, I
>believe in one post, that he thought Beal deviated too far from the
>simple context.
I, for one, don't believe his error was in choosing a design that had
development problems (though it's a design I would not have chosen).
His problems were much deeper--wrong market, inability to deal with
the legal regulatory issues, here and abroad, and a failure to learn
from (or even AFAIK, research) his predecessors' failures. Basically,
the concept died of hubris.
************************************************************************
simberg.interglobal.org * 310 372-7963 (CA) 307 739-1296 (Jackson Hole)
interglobal space lines * 307 733-1715 (Fax) http://www.interglobal.org
"Extraordinary launch vehicles require extraordinary markets..."
Dwayne Allen Day
: Well, it was partly NASA's fault, in the sense that even if the stock
: market hadn't gone south, and Walt hadn't missed the payment that
: defaulted his contract, there was a *lot* of pressure on RSA to
: deorbit Mir by NASA.
This is _really_ stretching it. By MirCorp's own admission, they never
raised the money they needed to raise.
If MirCorp had been able to raise some money, then any alleged NASA
pressure on RSA would have had no effect. They didn't make the
money. Period.
: Yes, that was me (sort of). My point was that NASA was one of the
: factors (though certainly not the only one).
But how do you _know_ that NASA was one of the factors? Because he said
so? The other factors were certainly real. It is not possible to deny
that the market collapsed from under him. It is not possible to deny that
he had (totally foreseeable) export problems. It is not possible to deny
that he had a host of non-US regulatory/environmental/political
problems. All these things were real. SLI was just a vaprous possibility
in the distant future--and a convenient scapegoat. When my business
propositions fail, I blame my dog. When space entrepreneur's plans fail,
they blame NASA.
: That doesn't mean that SLI wasn't also a factor. It is possible for
: there to be more than one factor (as you tacitly admit in making a
: list), even if some are stronger than others.
See above. SLI seems a highly unlikely factor at all, given the timelines
and the weightiness of his other problems.
Yet SLI is the one he blamed, and SLI is the one that space activists want
to blame because it fits their ideology, not because it makes sense.
D
McLean1382
writes:
>An interesting theory; what's the evidence for it? Costs of expendable
>rocket stages do *not* scale particularly noticeably with size. With
>complexity, thinness of margins, and closeness to the leading edge of
>technology, yes... but not, to any great extent, with size. Just making
>everything bigger costs very little, especially if it's done before the
>size of things like support facilities is fixed.
>
????
Sure, it's not a linear relationship. But you would seem to be suggesting that
one would expect a Saturn V to cost "very little" more than an Atlas-Centaur, A
Titan IV strap-on to cost little more than a Delta strap-on, etc.
Likewise, with reusable vehicles you expect a 737 to cost rather more to
develop than a bizjet, event though both are twin engine subsonic airliners.
Will McLean
Rand Simberg
Allen Day <wayn...@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu> made the phosphor on my
monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that:
>: Yes, that was me (sort of). My point was that NASA was one of the
>: factors (though certainly not the only one).
>
>But how do you _know_ that NASA was one of the factors? Because he said
>so?
I don't _know_ that, just as you don't _know_ that it wasn't.
However, I'm less dogmatic about it than you are.
>The other factors were certainly real. It is not possible to deny
>that the market collapsed from under him. It is not possible to deny that
>he had (totally foreseeable) export problems. It is not possible to deny
>that he had a host of non-US regulatory/environmental/political
>problems. All these things were real. SLI was just a vaprous possibility
>in the distant future--and a convenient scapegoat. When my business
>propositions fail, I blame my dog. When space entrepreneur's plans fail,
>they blame NASA.
All of the factors were real, including NASA, based on history.
>: That doesn't mean that SLI wasn't also a factor. It is possible for
>: there to be more than one factor (as you tacitly admit in making a
>: list), even if some are stronger than others.
>
>See above. SLI seems a highly unlikely factor at all, given the timelines
>and the weightiness of his other problems.
The timeline is not relevant, because you don't know what his true
timeline was, but there is no point in going over this again. The
fact that his other problems were weighty doesn't make the NASA
competition problem weightless.
>Yet SLI is the one he blamed, and SLI is the one that space activists want
>to blame because it fits their ideology, not because it makes sense.
I blamed SLI because that was the context of the discussion (i.e.,
someone asked, in what way was NASA keeping us from developing cheap
launch). I offered Beal as a possible example. I didn't claim that
NASA was solely responsible for his failure.
Michael R. Irwin
Stephen Souter wrote:
>
<Snip>
> What exactly has NASA done which is stopping and/or delaying the
> development by private enterprise of low-cost launch vehicles?
Essentially they contract with a single contractor and then
allow them to treat the resulting knowledge as proprietary
property after paying them a premium price to develop it.
This puts all others at a competitive disadvantage and scares
the hell out of "investors". The ones who know the corporate
government links and where the bodies are buried buy into the
proper contractor and the rest stay away from private ventures.
In the post cold war era reduced numbers of military systems
has translated this sitution into singular monopolies that
nobody (adequately funded) will compete with; while scaring
"investors" away from entrepreneurial endeavers willing to tackle
the big boys.
Regards,
Mike Irwin
Edward V. Wright
sp...@merlyn.demon.co.uk wrote on 4/9/01 10:10 AM:
>>> For this production to be reliable, it must be at a sufficient, steady
>>> rate; to build a batch and then to need a political decision on a
>>> further batch, whether the same or different in design, cannot be
>>> reliable.
>>
>> It's actually quite common for aircraft to go out of production. The
>> result is that the ones in service are replaced by a different type, not
>> by more of the exact same thing. For example, Lockheed TriStars have
>> almost disappeared from Western airlines, because they are no longer in
>> production and the old ones are getting older and being sold off.
>
> The difference there is that there is a sufficient number of production
> lines, world-wide, covering large- and medium- size air transport
> supply. If one line closes, others are still running.
Why should that be a difference? Why shouldn't the same be true for space
vehicles?
> At present there is just one working production system for man-rated
> space launchers, in Russia; and one entering production, in China. The
> USA had such a line, 1975-1990 or thereabouts; but it produced fewer
> than ten launch vehicles or near-vehicles, and stopped.
You're describing a dysfunctional system, which is a poor model for how a
functional one would operate.
Edward V. Wright
wayn...@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu wrote on 4/9/01 11:20 AM:
> Rand Simberg <simberg.i...@trash.org> wrote:
> :>Andy Beal went out of business for a lot of reasons. NASA was not one of
> :>them.
>
> : And you know that, how?
>
> How do you know that NASA _was_ the reason? Because he said so?
And you know it wasn't because a tabloid paper, usually read only for its
personal ads, says so?
Edward V. Wright
wayn...@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu wrote on 4/9/01 4:37 PM:
> No. If you reread my postings from the beginning, you see that I never
> said I believe that he was concerned with SLI. SLI was his scapegoat, and
> many people bought his claim without examining it.
Others, like you, rejected his claim without examining it. If you had, you
would have discovered that Andy Beal did express concern about SLI
beforehand, and even donated money to ProSpace to oppose it.
Henry Spencer
McLean1382 <mclea...@aol.com> wrote:
>>An interesting theory; what's the evidence for it? Costs of expendable
>>rocket stages do *not* scale particularly noticeably with size. With
>>complexity, thinness of margins, and closeness to the leading edge of
>
>Sure, it's not a linear relationship. But you would seem to be suggesting that
>one would expect a Saturn V to cost "very little" more than an Atlas-Centaur, A
>Titan IV strap-on to cost little more than a Delta strap-on, etc.
The cost (as opposed to price) of the Titan IV strap-ons is more than the
Delta ones because they are segmented, mostly. That adds considerable
complexity. Also, with solids there is a bit more of a size effect than
with liquids, because they have to be handled fully loaded.
The Saturn V was a lot more complex than an Atlas-Centaur, not just
bigger. And I would also note that even a small size effect can be
substantial when the size difference is that large -- the Saturn V is
*enormous* by comparison to Atlas. (The Saturn V could put a fully-fueled
Atlas in orbit.)
The classic example of counterintuitive scaling is that the first stage of
a Delta II is *far* larger than the second stage, yet costs less.
A major guiding principle of the Ariane 5 design -- well documented in
print -- was that performance problems encountered during design would
generally be solved by making the core bigger, since that cost almost
nothing.
>Likewise, with reusable vehicles you expect a 737 to cost rather more to
>develop than a bizjet, event though both are twin engine subsonic airliners.
This has much more to do with stereotyped expectations, and company-size
effects, than anything else. Note that the largest bizjets are not much
smaller than low-end 737s, and indeed, bizjet derivatives are now busily
attacking the low end of the 737 market.
--
When failure is not an option, success | Henry Spencer he...@spsystems.net
can get expensive. -- Peter Stibrany | (aka he...@zoo.toronto.edu)
Edward V. Wright
wayn...@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu wrote on 4/9/01 7:19 PM:
> But calling a spade a spade is useful for obtaining a better hand. As I
> said, I propose that unrealistic efforts only hurt future
> efforts. Practically nobody pointed out MirCorp's unrealistic plans
> because they _wanted_ them to succeed, perpetuating a big lie.
Really??? Have you forgotten -- or would you like us to forget -- the
predictions you made in Florida Today?
Perhaps I should remind you, then.
In your FT op-ed, you declared, with your usual absolute certainty, that
there was no money to be made aboard Mir. "Zero revenue" for Mir-based
entertainment or tourism -- that's what you declared.
That was just days before MirCorp announced tourism and entertainment deals
worth tens of millions of dollars.
Millions of dollars are not "zero", Dwayne.
Yet, you still talk as if you're infallible. You insult people who have
made billions of dollars, saying they "don't understand business." You tell
us that anything which doesn't follow the NASA party line is "unrealistic"
-- no proof, just because you, Dwayne Day of GWU, say so. Because you _want_
it to be true.
> Then when MirCorp folded, others stepped in to (surprise!) blame NASA.
It seems much more reasonable than clinging to a forgone conclusion whose
predictions of "zero revenue" had already proved false. Of course,
regardless of the facts, you will step in to (surrpise!) say excuse NASA.
> It was what prompted my original post on this--someone simply parroted the
> line that Beal was done in by Big Bad NASA. But it's not true.
So you claim. But apart from some politically correct rhetoric about NASA
and a tabloid newspaper article, you have presented no evidence to back up
your claim.
> He had lots of problems, which many choose to ignore.
No one has ignored those problems, and even if we did, it would not prove
your claim. You are using an ad hominem argument, which is invalid.
Edward V. Wright
wayn...@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu wrote on 4/9/01 8:21 PM:
> : Well, it was partly NASA's fault, in the sense that even if the stock
> : market hadn't gone south, and Walt hadn't missed the payment that
> : defaulted his contract, there was a *lot* of pressure on RSA to
> : deorbit Mir by NASA.
>
> This is _really_ stretching it. By MirCorp's own admission, they never
> raised the money they needed to raise.
> If MirCorp had been able to raise some money, then any alleged NASA
> pressure on RSA would have had no effect.
Oh??? And how can you possibly know that?
> : Yes, that was me (sort of). My point was that NASA was one of the
> : factors (though certainly not the only one).
>
> But how do you _know_ that NASA was one of the factors? Because he said
> so?
Because he said so and because he backed his words with money. It is
unlikely that Andy Beal would have donated money to lobby against something
he wasn't concerned about.
In the real world, facts count more than political correctness, Dwayne.
> It is not possible to deny that the market collapsed from under him.
It most certainly is. While the LEO satellite market collapsed, that was not
the market Beal was aiming for. He was going for the GEO satellite market,
which is still moderately healthy.
> It is not possible to deny that he had (totally foreseeable) export problems.
And it is not impossible to wonder if government agencies may have played a
role in those problems. It has happened before, even if you consider it
un-PC to say so.
> All these things were real. SLI was just a vaprous possibility
> in the distant future--and a convenient scapegoat. When my business
> propositions fail, I blame my dog.
What business propositions are those? I'm curious, since often denigrate the
business experience of self-made billionaires, what business experience you
have -- if any?
> When space entrepreneur's plans fail, they blame NASA.
So? The fact that you lie about your dog does not prove that other people
are lying about NASA. That's called "guilt by association." Your polemic
implies that because NASA is blamed so frequently, it must be innocent. That
doesn't follow. Al Capone was frequently blamed for all sorts of things.
Yet, he was hardly innocent.
> Yet SLI is the one he blamed, and SLI is the one that space activists want
> to blame because it fits their ideology, not because it makes sense.
No, because the facts support it. You seem to believe that facts are less
important than your personal beliefs. Instead of giving reasoned arguments,
you merely ridicule anyone who dares to criticize NASA. A polemic written by
a space policy student from GWU is still a polemic -- it doesn't prove
anything.
WMclean290
>Essentially they contract with a single contractor and then
>allow them to treat the resulting knowledge as proprietary
>property after paying them a premium price to develop it.
>
And, given a market with high development costs in relation to the market size,
this is exactly what you would expect them to do if they were an ordinary
private company.
Look at the market for very large airliners. Nobody expects an airline to split
its order for superjumbo airliners between Boeing and Airbus, at best
increasing the airline's cost and at worst insuring that neither will be built.
No airline contracts to buy an A380, on the condition that Airbus share the
blueprints with Boeing.
Neither is any reasonable person surprised that companies that have never built
an airplane before find difficulty in breaking into the market.
Sure, NASA could provide a level playing field between the "favored
contractors" and the "entrepreneurs/truly private companies".
They could put a couple of billion dollars in a pinata, and let everyone with a
business card and an artist's rendering of their RLV design take a swing at it
with a stick.
That way NASA wouldn't be "picking a winner"
Will McLean
rk
> >: blame at NASA's door, but I find it easily conceivable that government
> >: competition was one of the factors that made him throw in the towel,
> >: and in fact may have been the straw on the camel's back.
> >
> >He _really_ believed that SLI was going to produce a low-cost booster to
> >undercut his market? So he had more faith in NASA's achieving cost
> >reductions than just about everybody else?
>
> I dont know, but he had faith in NASA's ability to bad mouth a concept
> and lead potential customers astray, backing up their words with
> billions in taxpayers' funds.
One, as D-Day said, the [potential] market collapsed. Going off of
memory, each year there is on order of about 80 launches and about 125
or so payloads. That's a small market. And it doesn't seem to be
growing, despite what one reads in the trade press.
Of course, the activists always go on and on and on about how expensive
launch costs are; particularly government ones. Typically, they also
claim that they scare investors away by bad mouthing; now it's the
customers.
Of course, that bad mouthing [if it did and if it had an impact -
another discussion] can be easily be shown to be bullshit; simply launch
a rocket and demonstrate technical competency and costs. Time to pick
out the correct entry in my .sig file ...
----------------------------------------------------------------------
rk "There is nothing like real data
stellar engineering, ltd. to f' up a great theory."
stel...@erols.com.NOSPAM -- me, circa 1995
Hi-Rel Digital Systems Design
rk
> NASA does not ask your advice, so why do you publicly disparage NASA and
> not the private space entrepreneur? A silly, misguided plan is a silly,
> misguided plan, no matter who pursues it, yet entrepreneurs whose hearts
> are in the right place (Beal, MirCorp) get a pass from space activists?
Don't forget the darling of all, Rotary Rocket.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
rk This is not rocket science; this is
stellar engineering, ltd. seat of the pants guesstimation.
stel...@erols.com.NOSPAM -- [name deleted], April 6, 2001,
Hi-Rel Digital Systems Design
rk
> That is avoiding my point. What mattered at the time was not his
> original timeline. His new timeline was now perhaps coming up against
> yet another new government program that might be more of a threat than
> the existing or enhanced expendables.
Do you think that the evil-Government's (tm) SLI is a credible threat to
near-term low-cost launch? mid-term? long-term?
Rand Simberg
<stel...@nospamplease.erols.com> made the phosphor on my monitor glow
in such a way as to indicate that:
>One, as D-Day said, the [potential] market collapsed.
Actually, that's not really true. Beale was going after GEO.
>Going off of
>memory, each year there is on order of about 80 launches and about 125
>or so payloads. That's a small market. And it doesn't seem to be
>growing, despite what one reads in the trade press.
No, it wasn't a good market to go after in the first place--one of his
mistakes, but it didn't "collapse."
>Of course, the activists always go on and on and on about how expensive
>launch costs are; particularly government ones. Typically, they also
>claim that they scare investors away by bad mouthing; now it's the
>customers.
This has happened in my presence. Unfortunately, I can provide no
further details without violating non-disclosures, so you can believe
me or not.
>Of course, that bad mouthing [if it did and if it had an impact -
>another discussion] can be easily be shown to be bullshit;
"Easily"? Sure, if you have unlimited resources. It takes money,
which is generally hard to come by under the circumstances.
Rand Simberg
<stel...@nospamplease.erols.com> made the phosphor on my monitor glow
in such a way as to indicate that:
>Rand Simberg wrote:
>
>> That is avoiding my point. What mattered at the time was not his
>> original timeline. His new timeline was now perhaps coming up against
>> yet another new government program that might be more of a threat than
>> the existing or enhanced expendables.
>
>Do you think that the evil-Government's (tm) SLI is a credible threat to
>near-term low-cost launch?
No. BTW, I don't believe that "the government" is evil--just stupid
and with different goals than me. And that comment doesn't apply to
government employees in general (though it does to a few in
particular).
>mid-term?
Possibly, it's too early to say.
>long-term?
No.
rk
> But how do you _know_ that NASA was one of the factors? Because he said
> so? The other factors were certainly real. It is not possible to deny
> that the market collapsed from under him. It is not possible to deny that
> he had (totally foreseeable) export problems. It is not possible to deny
> that he had a host of non-US regulatory/environmental/political
> problems. All these things were real. SLI was just a vaprous possibility
> in the distant future--and a convenient scapegoat. When my business
> propositions fail, I blame my dog. When space entrepreneur's plans fail,
> they blame NASA.
Yeah, but do you continually kick your dog, repeatedly, in public?
rk
> If someone wants to spend their investment dollars on a high-tech
> enterprise, they are going to pick one that has a faster rate of return
> and appears more of a sure thing. Space has not qualified for either of
> these for a long time, and government subsidized launchers are only a
> small part of that. Iridium failed because dirt-based cell phones moved
> faster than space-based ones ever could, which is a classic space problem.
It looks like it's time for another rk poll - we'll limit this to the
space nuts who read this group.
Who has a cell phone? Say 'c'.
Who has an Iridium phone? Say 'i'.
I don't think that the 'ayes' will have it on this one, but we shall
see.
rk
> Essentially they contract with a single contractor and then
> allow them to treat the resulting knowledge as proprietary
> property after paying them a premium price to develop it.
My personal belief is that Government funded developments should not be
stamped proprietary.
It will be interesting to see what Lockheed Martin [I have found out
that Lockheed Martin personnel consider "LockMart" offensive] does with
X-33 technology.
Rand Simberg
<stel...@nospamplease.erols.com> made the phosphor on my monitor glow
in such a way as to indicate that:
>My personal belief is that Government funded developments should not be
>stamped proprietary.
I agree, but it is also my personal belief that proprietary
government-funded developments are way down the list of the things
keeping us out of space.
>It will be interesting to see what Lockheed Martin [I have found out
>that Lockheed Martin personnel consider "LockMart" offensive] does with
>X-33 technology.
They will do nothing further with it--it has already amply served its
purpose.
It doesn't surprise me that Lockmart personnel find "LockMart"
offensive. OTOH, with all due respect to the many good people who are
unfortunate enough to work there, I find LockMart offensive... :-)
rk
> >> That is avoiding my point. What mattered at the time was not his
> >> original timeline. His new timeline was now perhaps coming up against
> >> yet another new government program that might be more of a threat than
> >> the existing or enhanced expendables.
> >
> >Do you think that the evil-Government's (tm) SLI is a credible threat to
> >near-term low-cost launch?
>
> No. BTW, I don't believe that "the government" is evil--just stupid
> and with different goals than me. And that comment doesn't apply to
> government employees in general (though it does to a few in
> particular).
>
> >mid-term?
>
> Possibly, it's too early to say.
>
> >long-term?
>
> No.
Agreed [although will not comment on Government employees - there's like
2 million of them and my neighborhood is filled with them - I live
between Baltimore and DC].
It doesn't appear that SLI was a serious credible threat.
Note that X-33 performance is now being openly discussed *everywhere*.
rk
> >One, as D-Day said, the [potential] market collapsed.
>
> Actually, that's not really true. Beale was going after GEO.
Clarification: I was referring to the launch market as a whole. While
there were rosy predictions, it seems more or less flat, at best. I
have read in numerous places that there just are too many launch
vehicles.
> >Going off of
> >memory, each year there is on order of about 80 launches and about 125
> >or so payloads. That's a small market. And it doesn't seem to be
> >growing, despite what one reads in the trade press.
>
> No, it wasn't a good market to go after in the first place--one of his
> mistakes, but it didn't "collapse."
Yes, it is a small market and I believe those numbers are correct. I
have read, over the past few years, about how things will grow - see
many graphs with extrapolated curves. Recently, predictions have
changed.
> >Of course, the activists always go on and on and on about how expensive
> >launch costs are; particularly government ones. Typically, they also
> >claim that they scare investors away by bad mouthing; now it's the
> >customers.
>
> This has happened in my presence. Unfortunately, I can provide no
> further details without violating non-disclosures, so you can believe
> me or not.
Did SLI scare away Beal's customers? I would find it hard to believe
that a successful, powerful businessman, would be spooked so easily. By
a program that many feel isn't a credible threat [see our previous
posts].
> >Of course, that bad mouthing [if it did and if it had an impact -
> >another discussion] can be easily be shown to be bullshit;
>
> "Easily"? Sure, if you have unlimited resources. It takes money,
> which is generally hard to come by under the circumstances.
I thought Beal was self-financed? It would take just one itty-bitty
launch.
Number of X-33 launches: zero.
Number of SLI launches: zero.
A non-zero number for Beal launches would make the case "easily."
rk
> >My personal belief is that Government funded developments should not be
> >stamped proprietary.
>
> I agree, but it is also my personal belief that proprietary
> government-funded developments are way down the list of the things
> keeping us out of space.
I was making a general statement on the role of Government-sponsored
technology used for space.
There are many things keeping us out of space - I make no claim as to
whether it's related to pseudo-proprietary information or not.
> >It will be interesting to see what Lockheed Martin [I have found out
> >that Lockheed Martin personnel consider "LockMart" offensive] does with
> >X-33 technology.
>
> They will do nothing further with it--it has already amply served its
> purpose.
I was referring what they will do with it, in the context of Michael's
remarks, with respect to the stamping of "proprietary" over the material
or letting others have it.
> It doesn't surprise me that Lockmart personnel find "LockMart"
> offensive. OTOH, with all due respect to the many good people who are
> unfortunate enough to work there, I find LockMart offensive... :-)
No comment on the latter - but I had no idea that "LockMart" was
considered an offensive term and came across information that it was
last week.
Rand Simberg
<stel...@nospamplease.erols.com> made the phosphor on my monitor glow
in such a way as to indicate that:
>Note that X-33 performance is now being openly discussed *everywhere*.
You mean (lack of) performance? And do you mean technical
performance, or programmatic performance?
rk
> >Note that X-33 performance is now being openly discussed *everywhere*.
>
> You mean (lack of) performance? And do you mean technical
> performance, or programmatic performance?
It wasn't a positive portrayal.
If I didn't throw the stuff out, I can post references and excerpts if
there is a desire to read them. I am about out of time posting this
morning.
Rand Simberg
<stel...@nospamplease.erols.com> made the phosphor on my monitor glow
in such a way as to indicate that:
>Did SLI scare away Beal's customers?
Not that I am aware. Beal wasn't far enough along to have any AFAIK.
>I would find it hard to believe
>that a successful, powerful businessman, would be spooked so easily. By
>a program that many feel isn't a credible threat [see our previous
>posts].
I think that he was spooked by lots of things. As I said, I don't
think that he did his homework before he got into the business, though
I suspect he thinks that he did.
>> "Easily"? Sure, if you have unlimited resources. It takes money,
>> which is generally hard to come by under the circumstances.
>
>I thought Beal was self-financed? It would take just one itty-bitty
>launch.
Not really. Most payload customers are not going to be convinced by
one itty-bitty launch. The new Delta has had some successes, but it's
also had some failures, and that makes customers nervous--they want
more of a track record before they'll commit. That's one of the
problems with developing a new expendable--test programs are
expensive. (It was also a problem with VentureStar, because they
weren't designing for low marginal costs and fast turnaround).
> Number of X-33 launches: zero.
> Number of SLI launches: zero.
>
>A non-zero number for Beal launches would make the case "easily."
Nope.
Greg D. Moore (Strider)
"Edward V. Wright" <edwr...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:B6F8ABD0.1861%edwr...@earthlink.net...
> in article D4uA6.674$Rf7....@grover.nit.gwu.edu, Dwayne Allen Day at
> wayn...@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu wrote on 4/9/01 7:19 PM:
>
> > But calling a spade a spade is useful for obtaining a better hand. As I
> > said, I propose that unrealistic efforts only hurt future
> > efforts. Practically nobody pointed out MirCorp's unrealistic plans
> > because they _wanted_ them to succeed, perpetuating a big lie.
>
> Really??? Have you forgotten -- or would you like us to forget -- the
> predictions you made in Florida Today?
>
> Perhaps I should remind you, then.
>
> In your FT op-ed, you declared, with your usual absolute certainty, that
> there was no money to be made aboard Mir. "Zero revenue" for Mir-based
> entertainment or tourism -- that's what you declared.
>
> That was just days before MirCorp announced tourism and entertainment
deals
> worth tens of millions of dollars.
>
> Millions of dollars are not "zero", Dwayne.
You're right. I remember the millions of dollars made on Mir. Oh wait, no
I don't. Can you remind me?
Which tourists flew to Mir? Which entertainment deals were carried out?
Rand Simberg
<stel...@nospamplease.erols.com> made the phosphor on my monitor glow
in such a way as to indicate that:
>> >It will be interesting to see what Lockheed Martin [I have found out
>> >that Lockheed Martin personnel consider "LockMart" offensive] does with
>> >X-33 technology.
>>
>> They will do nothing further with it--it has already amply served its
>> purpose.
>
>I was referring what they will do with it, in the context of Michael's
>remarks, with respect to the stamping of "proprietary" over the material
>or letting others have it.
So was I. I suspect that it will be crated up and put alongside the
lost Ark in the big warehouse. And NASA and LockMart will put *top*
people on it...
As for letting others have it, they'll probably be willing--question
is, who would want it, and would they be willing to pay anything for
it? As someone who never thought that it was all that hot a concept
even if turned out to be successful (in the
ability-to-get-something-off-the-launch-pad sense), I have no idea.
>> It doesn't surprise me that Lockmart personnel find "LockMart"
>> offensive. OTOH, with all due respect to the many good people who are
>> unfortunate enough to work there, I find LockMart offensive... :-)
>
>No comment on the latter - but I had no idea that "LockMart" was
>considered an offensive term and came across information that it was
>last week.
I can certainly see how it would be. Sounds too much like K-Mart
(which of course was the intent of whatever wag came up with it in the
first place).
Henry Spencer
WMclean290 <wmcle...@aol.com> wrote:
>>Essentially they contract with a single contractor and then
>>allow them to treat the resulting knowledge as proprietary
>>property after paying them a premium price to develop it.
>
>And, given a market with high development costs in relation to the market size,
>this is exactly what you would expect them to do if they were an ordinary
>private company.
However, NASA is *not* a private company, and developing technology for
*everyone* to use is part of its job.
Michael R. Irwin
rk wrote:
>
> "Michael R. Irwin" wrote:
>
> > Essentially they contract with a single contractor and then
> > allow them to treat the resulting knowledge as proprietary
> > property after paying them a premium price to develop it.
>
> My personal belief is that Government funded developments should not be
> stamped proprietary.
>
> It will be interesting to see what Lockheed Martin [I have found out
> that Lockheed Martin personnel consider "LockMart" offensive] does with
> X-33 technology.
Perhaps when U.S.G. starts publishing its technology results
under "copyleft" licenses space enthusiasts will take another
look at the open source/free software paradigm.
It looks to me like the open source crowd has the current
advantage because they are more flexible in working with
commercial applications and thus better at raising and investing
resources for their projects. The free software segment OTOH
receives a lot of cross over support because their copyleft
and ideological purity results in a more stable "commons" of
accessible tools for everyone.
Effectively this places "open source" on the leading edge investing
resources on risky efforts and finding out what works while the
"free software" sector plods along filling the chinks in and
making sure a stable comprehensive set of tools so necessary to
their communities ongoing viability remains available to all.
With an effective "open university online" system in cooperation
with effective humanitarian aid and economic development a "great
leap forward" might actually be possible for the 3rd and 4th
worlds. I note this because some have made the effective case
that others besides lazy wealthy Americans might be interested
in settling space and a larger fraction of 6 billion is a huge
pile of resources compared to a smaller fraction of 300 Million.
The sum of the two of course is even larger than either alone
and provides a more diverse set of potential resources for
creative project managers and marketing specialists.
Ideas on how to setup an effective range of dynamics between
corporate interests and interested volunteers in the open
engineering space arena similar to what the open source/free-
software/dot.com sector has done are welcome.
This ends my rhetorical spam attacks for today. :)
Regards,
Mike Irwin
rk
> >Did SLI scare away Beal's customers?
>
> Not that I am aware. Beal wasn't far enough along to have any AFAIK.
OK, perhaps a miscommunication or lost in the thread.
I dont know, but he had faith in NASA's ability to bad mouth
a concept and lead potential customers astray, backing up
their words with billions in taxpayers' funds.
> >I would find it hard to believe
> >that a successful, powerful businessman, would be spooked so easily. By
> >a program that many feel isn't a credible threat [see our previous
> >posts].
>
> I think that he was spooked by lots of things. As I said, I don't
> think that he did his homework before he got into the business, though
> I suspect he thinks that he did.
I can agree with that. His exit strategy appeared to consist of blaming
the bogeyman.
Of course, I admire anyone who puts his reputation, time, and bucks on
the line to do something. Some things are good, some stupid, but it's
nice to see someone get off his ass and try. That of course goes for
Mircorp, Rotary, etc.
> >> "Easily"? Sure, if you have unlimited resources. It takes money,
> >> which is generally hard to come by under the circumstances.
> >
> >I thought Beal was self-financed? It would take just one itty-bitty
> >launch.
>
> Not really. Most payload customers are not going to be convinced by
> one itty-bitty launch. The new Delta has had some successes, but it's
> also had some failures, and that makes customers nervous--they want
> more of a track record before they'll commit. That's one of the
> problems with developing a new expendable--test programs are
> expensive. (It was also a problem with VentureStar, because they
> weren't designing for low marginal costs and fast turnaround).
I would say that there is quite a difference between 0 successful
launches and 1. That difference is much greater than that between 1 and
2.
> > Number of X-33 launches: zero.
> > Number of SLI launches: zero.
> >
> >A non-zero number for Beal launches would make the case "easily."
>
> Nope.
I would disagree; I think if they successfully flew one mission they
would be defined as real. After all, everyone has to start somewhere.
How many launches did Sealaunch have before their first paying
customer? Pegasus? Arianne V? I don't know, don't have the time to
look it up [yeah, lazy, but I don't have the time and many have this
right on their fingertips] but will be interesting to see. I believe to
get on the onramp for standard NASA spacecraft - I'll look it up later
if any wants the info, I have the url somewhere - you need one
successful launch.
Regards,
Rand Simberg
<stel...@nospamplease.erols.com> made the phosphor on my monitor glow
in such a way as to indicate that:
>> >Did SLI scare away Beal's customers?
>>
>> Not that I am aware. Beal wasn't far enough along to have any AFAIK.
>
>OK, perhaps a miscommunication or lost in the thread.
>
> I dont know, but he had faith in NASA's ability to bad mouth
> a concept and lead potential customers astray, backing up
> their words with billions in taxpayers' funds.
That doesn't mean that it happened to him--just that he was aware of
it happening to his predecessors, and that he might have thought it
could happen to him as well.
>> >> "Easily"? Sure, if you have unlimited resources. It takes money,
>> >> which is generally hard to come by under the circumstances.
>> >
>> >I thought Beal was self-financed? It would take just one itty-bitty
>> >launch.
>>
>> Not really. Most payload customers are not going to be convinced by
>> one itty-bitty launch. The new Delta has had some successes, but it's
>> also had some failures, and that makes customers nervous--they want
>> more of a track record before they'll commit. That's one of the
>> problems with developing a new expendable--test programs are
>> expensive. (It was also a problem with VentureStar, because they
>> weren't designing for low marginal costs and fast turnaround).
>
>I would say that there is quite a difference between 0 successful
>launches and 1. That difference is much greater than that between 1 and
>2.
But not great enough to get customers, unless the payloads are really
cheap, and he wasn't going for really cheap payloads--he was going for
things like Hughes HS-whatevers.
>> > Number of X-33 launches: zero.
>> > Number of SLI launches: zero.
>> >
>> >A non-zero number for Beal launches would make the case "easily."
>>
>> Nope.
>
>I would disagree; I think if they successfully flew one mission they
>would be defined as real. After all, everyone has to start somewhere.
>How many launches did Sealaunch have before their first paying
>customer?
I don't know but that was done by a company named "Boeing." They
didn't need credibility.
>Pegasus?
Their first flight was paid for by DARPA.
>Arianne V?
Yes, they put the payload in the drink on their first launch. The
payload owners were upset. Again, Ariane was a pretty well-defined
brand by that time.
A newcomer will have a much tougher time of it.
j
<edwr...@earthlink.net> wrote:
> in article OWuf5pED...@merlyn.demon.co.uk, Dr John Stockton at
> sp...@merlyn.demon.co.uk wrote on 4/9/01 10:10 AM:
>
> >>> For this production to be reliable, it must be at a sufficient, steady
> >>> rate; to build a batch and then to need a political decision on a
> >>> further batch, whether the same or different in design, cannot be
> >>> reliable.
> >>
> >> It's actually quite common for aircraft to go out of production. The
> >> result is that the ones in service are replaced by a different type, not
> >> by more of the exact same thing. For example, Lockheed TriStars have
> >> almost disappeared from Western airlines, because they are no longer in
> >> production and the old ones are getting older and being sold off.
> >
> > The difference there is that there is a sufficient number of production
> > lines, world-wide, covering large- and medium- size air transport
> > supply. If one line closes, others are still running.
>
> Why should that be a difference? Why shouldn't the same be true for space
> vehicles?
>
> > At present there is just one working production system for man-rated
> > space launchers, in Russia; and one entering production, in China. The
> > USA had such a line, 1975-1990 or thereabouts; but it produced fewer
> > than ten launch vehicles or near-vehicles, and stopped.
>
> You're describing a dysfunctional system, which is a poor model for how a
> functional one would operate.
Until we outgrow NASA we won't learn how functional space government works.
--
http://www.ttsw.com/orion/orion.html Progress is waiting for you.
rk
> >> >Did SLI scare away Beal's customers?
> >>
> >> Not that I am aware. Beal wasn't far enough along to have any AFAIK.
> >
> >OK, perhaps a miscommunication or lost in the thread.
> >
> > I dont know, but he had faith in NASA's ability to bad mouth
> > a concept and lead potential customers astray, backing up
> > their words with billions in taxpayers' funds.
>
> That doesn't mean that it happened to him--just that he was aware of
> it happening to his predecessors, and that he might have thought it
> could happen to him as well.
But since we pretty much agree that SLI won't offer any real competition
in the near-term, he shouldn't really have had any major problems.
Heck, Long March was selling launches when they were actively blowing
things up. Pegasus kept customers when they were not having very many
good days.
Now, for the Arianne V initial launch, didn't the customer [ESA?] get a
heavily discounted price?
Rand Simberg
<stel...@nospamplease.erols.com> made the phosphor on my monitor glow
in such a way as to indicate that:
>> That doesn't mean that it happened to him--just that he was aware of
>> it happening to his predecessors, and that he might have thought it
>> could happen to him as well.
>
>But since we pretty much agree that SLI won't offer any real competition
>in the near-term, he shouldn't really have had any major problems.
Well, I have no idea when he thought he was going to have a working
vehicle. He was having, at the least severe teething problems.
>Heck, Long March was selling launches when they were actively blowing
>things up. Pegasus kept customers when they were not having very many
>good days.
Pegasus had no competition. Long March was probably really cheap (as
in government subsidized) as well.
>Now, for the Arianne V initial launch, didn't the customer [ESA?] get a
>heavily discounted price?
I'm not familiar with the business arrangements.
Michael Walsh
Dwayne Allen Day wrote:
> Rand Simberg <simberg.i...@trash.org> wrote:
> :>But poorly planned and thought out entrepreneurial efforts fail and
> :>then discredit others, legitimate ones that follow. I propose that
> :>unrealistic efforts like MirCorp do great damage to future efforts.
>
> : They perhaps do, but simply criticizing them is unlikely to affect
> : their course of action.
>
> But calling a spade a spade is useful for obtaining a better hand. As I
> said, I propose that unrealistic efforts only hurt future
> efforts. Practically nobody pointed out MirCorp's unrealistic plans
> because they _wanted_ them to succeed, perpetuating a big lie. Then when
> MirCorp folded, others stepped in to (surprise!) blame NASA.
Well, the thing about MirCorp's plans is that they might have made
sense if Russia was willing to finance a big segment of a continuing Mir
which depends a lot on internal politics and who controls resources in
Russia and what they want to do with it. NASA had a perfectly valid
desire to make certain Russia kept up its ISS commitments.
MirCorp demonstrated that there were customers for various
space activity, including Tito as a tourist and NBC's TV show
plans. Not enough to keep Mir alive, but I would give their
attempt credit for current hopes at non-engineering and scientific
commercialization of the ISS.
I regard this as positive. You may not. From your remarks,
it sounds as if you believe the whole idea is premature and
rather to do more harm than good.
I don't agree, but such is life!
Mike Walsh
Michael Walsh
"Edward V. Wright" wrote:
> You seem to believe that facts are less
> important than your personal beliefs. Instead of giving reasoned arguments,
> you merely ridicule anyone who dares to criticize NASA. A polemic written by
> a space policy student from GWU is still a polemic -- it doesn't prove
> anything.
Ed, this sounds more like a self indictment of the way you argue
in these newsgroups.
Mike Walsh
Michael Walsh
rk wrote:
Maybe someday we will find out exactly what NASA intends to do with
SLI and be able to answer that problem.
Perhaps NASA is proposing to destroy it all with complete
ISO 9000 compliance.
Just mingling a thread.
Mike Walsh
Michael Walsh
rk wrote:
>
>
> Note that X-33 performance is now being openly discussed *everywhere*.
>
Specifically, what do you mean by that? Just curious.
Is it relevant to this discussion?
Mike Walsh
Michael Walsh
rk wrote:
> Rand Simberg wrote:
>
> > >Note that X-33 performance is now being openly discussed *everywhere*.
> >
> > You mean (lack of) performance? And do you mean technical
> > performance, or programmatic performance?
>
> It wasn't a positive portrayal.
>
> If I didn't throw the stuff out, I can post references and excerpts if
> there is a desire to read them. I am about out of time posting this
> morning.
I have some curiosity about this. Are their some particulars or are
the comments based on the things already posted.
I am particulary curious about Lockheed-Martin's rationale of the
way they handled the development of the LH2 tanks. Did they
just hand it off to the contractor that built them or did they do
some kind of progress monitoring?
I admit this is the sort of detail that I really don't expect to
see.
Mike Walsh