Questions about Apollo 13
P...@2k.com
have been different? 13 would have gone to Fra Mauro, 14 wouldn't
have to. Where was the other landing supposed to be?
And one for Sy: I just got to see the show from the History Channel
last week. You mentioned that you requested the cryo stir, either an
extra one or maybe just at an unscheduled time, don't remember which.
Do you think the timing of the stir had anything to do with the
explosion, or was it likely to happen whenever the next stir took
place?
Henry Spencer
>If Apollo 13 had been successful, how would the remaining schedule
>have been different? 13 would have gone to Fra Mauro, 14 wouldn't
>have to. Where was the other landing supposed to be?
Before the accident, the crew for 14 was training for Littrow, with the
objective of investigating what were thought to be volcanic deposits (a
persistent will-o-the-wisp that later affected targeting for 16 and 17).
Post-accident, 14 was retargeted for Fra Mauro partly because dating the
formation of Mare Imbrium was still a very high science priority, and
partly because Apollo cutbacks were already threatening to make 14 the
last H-series flight. Fra Mauro was one of the few potential landing
sites which looked like it *wouldn't* benefit much from the J-series
rover, so using the last H there made a lot of sense.
--
spsystems.net is temporarily off the air; | Henry Spencer
mail to henry at zoo.utoronto.ca instead. | he...@spsystems.net
Sy Liebergot
The tank stir was normally performed once a day, after sleep, but I
requested an extra stir before sleep because the Oxygen Tank 2’s
quantity instrumentation reading had failed earlier and I wanted a more
frequent quantity reading of Oxygen Tank 1. The explosion would likely
have occurred during the scheduled post-sleep stir, eight hours later.
There’s an old saying : “No good deed goes unpunished.”
Sy Liebergot
“Apollo EECOM: Journey of A Lifetime”
www.apolloeecom.com
--
Sy Liebergot
Gareth Slee
In your opinion would the eight hour difference have changed anything?
The explosion would have happened then but things would have turned out
the same I'd have thought?
--
Gareth Slee
Sy Liebergot
Gareth Slee Wrote:
> Sy Liebergot Sy.Lieber...@spacebanter.com wrote:
> -
> P...@2K.com Wrote: -
> If Apollo 13 had been successful, how would the remaining schedule
> have been different? 13 would have gone to Fra Mauro, 14 wouldn't
> have to. Where was the other landing supposed to be?
>
> And one for Sy: I just got to see the show from the History Channel
> last week. You mentioned that you requested the cryo stir, either
> an
> extra one or maybe just at an unscheduled time, don't remember
> which.
> Do you think the timing of the stir had anything to do with the
> explosion, or was it likely to happen whenever the next stir took
>
>
> The tank stir was normally performed once a day, after sleep, but I
> requested an extra stir before sleep because the Oxygen Tank 2's
> quantity instrumentation reading had failed earlier and I wanted a
> more
> frequent quantity reading of Oxygen Tank 1. The explosion would
> likely
> have occurred during the scheduled post-sleep stir, eight hours
> later.
>
> There's an old saying : "No good deed goes unpunished.‰
> Sy Liebergot
> "Apollo EECOM: Journey of A Lifetime‰
>
>
> In your opinion would the eight hour difference have changed anything?
> The explosion would have happened then but things would have turned
> out
> the same I'd have thought?
>
> --
>
> I'm also asked this many times. According to the chief FDO, Jerry
> Bostic, the delay would not have changed anything. A direct abort was
> not an option.
> Sy
--
Sy Liebergot
Dave Michelson
> Gareth Slee Wrote:
>
>> In your opinion would the eight hour difference have changed
>> anything? The explosion would have happened then but things would
>> have turned out the same I'd have thought?
>>
> Bostic, the delay would not have changed anything. A direct abort was
> not an option.
I suppose the real questions are: (1) To what extent would the delay
have eased the consumables situation? and (2) To what extent would the
delay have made it more difficult to make any of the required course
corrections, particularly the one that put the spacecraft back on a free
return trajectory?
--
Dave Michelson
da...@ece.ubc.ca
Scott Hedrick
"Sy Liebergot" <Sy.Lieber...@spacebanter.com> wrote in message
news:Sy.Lieber...@spacebanter.com...
>
> Gareth Slee Wrote:
>> In your opinion would the eight hour difference have changed anything?
>> The explosion would have happened then but things would have turned
>> out
>> the same I'd have thought?
One wonders what would have happened with 8 hours foreknowledge.
Stuf4
> And one for Sy: I just got to see the show from the History Channel
> last week. You mentioned that you requested the cryo stir, either an
> extra one or maybe just at an unscheduled time, don't remember which.
> Do you think the timing of the stir had anything to do with the
> explosion, or was it likely to happen whenever the next stir took
> place?
There has been a lot of feedback presented to this forum that the word
'explosion' is a term that was not used in the many descriptions of the
incident that were published in the official NASA report:
===============
And here are some pertinent quotes from NASA's official "REPORT OF
APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD" (http://history.nasa.gov/ap13rb/ch1.pdf) that
have been posted:
"It is now clear that oxygen tank no. 2 or its associated tubing
lost pressure integrity because of combustion within the tank,
and that effects of oxygen escaping from the tank caused the
removal of the panel covering bay 4 and a relatively slow leak
in oxygen tank no. 1 or its lines or valves."
"After the relatively slow propagation process ... took
place, there was a relatively abrupt loss of oxygen tank no. 2
integrity. About 69 seconds after the pressure began to rise, it
reached the peak recorded, 1008 psia, the pressure at which the
cryogenic oxygen tank relief valve is designed to be fully open.
Pressure began a decrease for 8 seconds, dropping to 996 psia
before readings were lost."
"27. Findings
a. The pressure relief valve was designed to be fully open at
about 1000 psi.
b. Oxygen tank no. 2 telemetry showed a pressure drop from
1008 psia at 55:54:45 to 996 psia at 55:54:53, at which time
telemetry data were lost.
Determination
This drop resulted from the normal operation of the pressure
relief valve as verified in subsequent tests."
>From p5-22, http://history.nasa.gov/ap13rb/ch5.pdf
===============
...and this is from an old post with a reference to a diagram in the
official report that clearly shows how the tank was designed not to
explode catastrophically:
===============
It is part of EECOM's job to know the possible failure modes for
systems they are responsible for. They are thoroughly trained in the
design of, and use of, the O2 tank's overpressure "Relief valve". See
page 4-3, figure 4-1 titled "Oxygen tank no. 2 internal components":
http://history.nasa.gov/ap13rb/ch4pt.1.pdf
This diagram shows how the tank was designed with a "Blowout disc" (at
top). The tank was engineered to not explode. The Relief valve was
the safety. The Blowout disc was the safety to the safety, to protect
for a case of operators not catching the overpressure condition in
time.
An O2 tank actually exploding would easily have catastrophic results.
Designers knew this so they redundantly protected against it.
The reason to protect against it is so that your other critical systems
will still be useable in the case of a blowout disc expulsion. I would
expect this information to be known by the systems experts, and if not
then I would expect this info to have been volunteered in a simple
phone call from Downey (North American).
===============
~ CT
Stuf4
tanks had been tested and retested, proving that they don't explode
when overpressurized (they experienced a more benign failure per
design):
============
For burst testing qualification done long before flight, four tanks
referred to as PV-1, PV-2, PV-3, and PV-4 were overpressurized to the
point of failure. Results:
"All ruptures were similar... In no case was there violent
fragmentation."
(pg D-21, http://history.nasa.gov/ap13rb/appDpt.1.pdf)
I also take note of the photo titled:
"Figure D3-4. - Plan view of the top of the oxygen shelf."
Burst plugs on both O2 tanks are clearly shown as having an 'X' on top
of them. It is easy to guess that this was a sticky tape-type
application that had the express purpose of reducing the energy of the
plugs should they actually burst. Otherwise their fragments would have
a tendency to become projectiles. This info indicates to me that the
failure modes were known and planned for.
============
~ CT
Stuf4
> Gareth Slee Wrote:
> > Sy Liebergot Sy.Lieber...@spacebanter.com wrote:
> > -
> > P...@2K.com Wrote: -
> > Do you think the timing of the stir had anything to do with the
> > explosion, or was it likely to happen whenever the next stir took
> > place?-
> > The explosion would
> > likely
> > have occurred during the scheduled post-sleep stir, eight hours
> > later.
> >
> > There's an old saying : "No good deed goes unpunished.‰
> > Sy Liebergot
> > In your opinion would the eight hour difference have changed anything?
> > The explosion would have happened then but things would have turned
> > out
> > the same I'd have thought?
> >
> > --
> > Gareth Slee[/Q
> >
> > I'm also asked this many times. According to the chief FDO, Jerry
> > Bostic, the delay would not have changed anything. A direct abort was
> > not an option.
> > Sy
> Sy Liebergot
Ok, certain statements above have gone unquestioned for several weeks
now. The most significant issue I see is the notion that:
"A direct abort was not an option."
My understanding is that more than one direct abort option was
considered, and then discarded. Here is one reference that spells out
some specifics:
http://myweb.accessus.net/~090/as13.html
Excerpt from the tables near the middle of the page:
-----------
Immediately after the accident, the following trajectory options were
computed. The weather and recovery ships of opportunity for these areas
were soon made available. The delta-V capability of the docked DPS with
the SM was 1994 fps and 4830 fps without the SM. The LM RCS capability
with the SM was 44 fps.
Direct Return
Area Tig DeltaV GETLC Weather Recovery Ships
MPL 60:00 6079 118:12 Good Iwo Jima
MPL 60:00 10395 94:15 Good Iwo Jima
-----------
~ CT
Stuf4
Another major point:
Anyone who sees whatif-ing Apollo13 to be a productive exercise is
missing a big piece of the picture if they don't examine the alternate
consequence of the EECOM team diligently monitoring tank pressure
following cryostir and taking mitigating action at the first sign of
anomalous response. Here is an old thread:
http://groups.google.com/group/sci.space.history/browse_frm/thread/5deb5eb4fba7fe01/f80924b7fe0d4e10?#f80924b7fe0d4e10
(http://tinyurl.com/yjfxqb)
~ CT
Stuf4
Here is a more condensed excerpt from that old thread:
=====
I dug up this old book that was published in 1972, "XIII - THE APOLLO
FLIGHT THAT FAILED"(*) by Henry Cooper Jr, and found these quotes:
(*) - Original title: "13: The Flight That Failed"
"...as Tank No. 2 emptied, the safety switch overheated and failed. As
was determined much later by experimentation with similar equipment
under similar circumstances, the switch undoubtedly fused shut so that
it couldn't turn off the heaters. The failure could have been
discovered had any of the ground crew noticed that the heaters were
still drawing current for hours after they should have turned off, and
thus were still in operation; apparently, no one looked at the current
gauge." (p17-18)
"...because Liebergot was concentrating on the readings for the
hydrogen tanks, which were on the right side of his television screen,
he didn't notice the rapidly increasing numbers in one of the
oxygen-pressure columns, three inches to the left of where he was
looking." (p20)
=====
Perhaps Sy would like to explain himself when he continually repeats
that line that "no good deed goes unpunished".
It would appear that his view is that it was not part of his duty to
monitor Tank P following cryostir and that it is beyond the scope of
his job to monitor heater currents. Perhaps there was something more
important for him to monitor such that the entire team was clueless
when the "explosion" (as the revisionist version has become) bit them
all.
Notice that we are not talking about any one person missing this. We
are talking about ALL OF THEM missing it. Back room and all. Maybe
the title of Kranz's book should have been:
TRUTH IS NOT AN OPTION.
And maybe the working title of Sy's book was:
APOLLO EECOM: SMOKESCREEN OF A LIFETIME.
I've been extremely patient on this thread. People involved have had
ample time to explain themselves. But misrepresentation of hard facts
such as those that persist in the popular story about Apollo 13 are of
the kind that lead to future near-fatalities, if not worse.
This thread is titled "Questions about Apollo 13". For some reason
there seems to be a gross lack of people who consider it important to
get answers to the hard questions. Cooper's book was written in 1972!
Can anyone site a single source where Kranz, Liebergot, Lovell or
ANYONE involved has gone on record to respond to those issues
highlighted 34 years ago? I'm not aware of a single one.
The masses appear to be quite satieted with the Ron Howard version of
space history.
~ CT