SR-71 Manuals on-line
Bob Tenney
David McArthur
> My apologies if this is old news:
>
> http://www.sr-71.org/blackbird/manual/
(Quick poll: how many people went straight the the page dealing with
max airspeed and altitude.)
Quite like the matteroffact sentence: "When planning 42 degree bank-
angle turns at speeds above Mach 3.1..."
Pat Flannery
I've got the actual printed one*, which has loads of helpful advice like
not lowering the landing gear at Mach 3.
My favorite part is what airflow through the nacelles and engines was
like at varous Mach numbers:
http://www.sr-71.org/blackbird/manual/1/1-33.php
*Around the size and weight of a Sears catalog; I pity the pilots who
were expected to learn everything by heart that was in this manual.
Pat
David McArthur
They certainly had their hand fulll flying them. Liked the spin
section too. Which basically says don't do it and if you do, ejecting
might be the best option.
D.
Pat Flannery
>
> They certainly had their hand fulll flying them. Liked the spin
> section too. Which basically says don't do it and if you do, ejecting
> might be the best option.
From what I've read flying the U-2, particularly in the early days, was
even more of a nail-biting experience than the SR-71.
At least with the SR-71 you could divide up the work between two
crewmembers; the A-12 must have kept its pilot very busy indeed.
Pat
David McArthur
Must've been frustrating - flying near the edge of space and nae time
to look around and admire the view (although not sure how much of a
view there is at 85k') because your head buried in the instruction
manual
Pat Flannery
> Must've been frustrating - flying near the edge of space and nae time
> to look around and admire the view (although not sure how much of a
> view there is at 85k') because your head buried in the instruction
> manual
In the U-2 your view upwards was constrained by the sunshade on the
inside of the canopy that was keeping you from getting fried by the
solar UV flux at those altitudes (radiation exposure at those altitudes
was pretty heavy on the long U-2 missions as well, and a lot of U-2
pilots blamed future baldness on that problem).
View out of the canopy of the A-12/SR-71 was nothing to get excited
about either, although there was always the downwards periscope image to
keep you interested, particularly when the smoke trails of SAMs would
appear on it working their way up to your altitude.
You know, given the weight of that manual, I actually could picture it
moving the CG around slightly on something as long as a SR-71.
The thing that I always thought would be something to experience is
ejecting at full altitude and speed from a Blackbird, as it's going to
take some time for you to fall back into the thicker part of the
atmosphere after ejection, and the view as you fell earthwards from the
edge of space would really be something to see.
Pat
Greg D. Moore (Strider)
> The thing that I always thought would be something to experience is
> ejecting at full altitude and speed from a Blackbird, as it's going to
> take some time for you to fall back into the thicker part of the
> atmosphere after ejection, and the view as you fell earthwards from
> the edge of space would really be something to see.
Or give you time to read the manual.
--
Greg Moore
Ask me about lily, an RPI based CMC.
Pat Flannery
> Pat Flannery wrote:
>
>> The thing that I always thought would be something to experience is
>> ejecting at full altitude and speed from a Blackbird, as it's going to
>> take some time for you to fall back into the thicker part of the
>> atmosphere after ejection, and the view as you fell earthwards from
>> the edge of space would really be something to see.
>
> Or give you time to read the manual.
The thing about the manual is that it does have a marked "Emergency
Procedures" section in it, but even that is 140 pages long.
I get a feeling that in most cases with this aircraft you either know
how to fix a problem without consulting the manual or you end up crashing.
I suspect that crew training for this aircraft was very comprehensive
indeed, with extensive testing on what to do in regards to any emergency
situation that might develop without having to consult the pilot's manual.
The fact that there were so few of them built made each one a very
precious asset that you didn't want to lose, as well as meaning you
could afford to choose a pretty small group of really top-notch aircrew
to fly them.
Pilots described the missions themselves as pretty boring if everything
was working right, with days of intense mission planning leading to a
few hours of actual flight in which hardly any maneuvering was done.
Pat
Pat
Paul A. Suhler
I asked that of Frank Murray, one of the project pilots.
He said that there was enough automation on the recon gear
that the workload wasn't too bad.
Paul
Paul A. Suhler
>The thing about the manual is that it does have a marked "Emergency
>Procedures" section in it, but even that is 140 pages long.
>I get a feeling that in most cases with this aircraft you either know
>how to fix a problem without consulting the manual or you end up crashing.
>I suspect that crew training for this aircraft was very comprehensive
>indeed, with extensive testing on what to do in regards to any emergency
>situation that might develop without having to consult the pilot's manual.
>The fact that there were so few of them built made each one a very
>precious asset that you didn't want to lose, as well as meaning you
>could afford to choose a pretty small group of really top-notch aircrew
>to fly them.
>Pilots described the missions themselves as pretty boring if everything
>was working right, with days of intense mission planning leading to a
>few hours of actual flight in which hardly any maneuvering was done.
I got to talk to Rogers Smith once at Blackbird Airpark. One
thing he said is that the SR took more concentration than any
other aircraft he'd flown. (It reminded me of a Air Force
pilot's remark that the airplane seemed to know when you were
looking out the window.)
The other thing Smith said is that he was always amazed with
how thoroughly the AF pilots knew the aircraft.
He was the NASA pilot who made the last Blackbird flight in 1999.
Paul
Pat Flannery
>> From what I've read flying the U-2, particularly in the early days, was
>> even more of a nail-biting experience than the SR-71.
>> At least with the SR-71 you could divide up the work between two
>> crewmembers; the A-12 must have kept its pilot very busy indeed.
>
> I asked that of Frank Murray, one of the project pilots.
> He said that there was enough automation on the recon gear
> that the workload wasn't too bad.
If you read between the lines on this formerly classified project
history, it suggests that the A-12 was overall more of a success than
the SR-71: http://www.blackbirds.net/sr71/oxcart/successortou2.html
...due to the larger space available for the cameras.
I'd still like to learn more about Project KEMPSTER and the ion sheath
to defeat radar, as the Russians have been doing work on the same
concept, apparently with some success:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plasma_stealth
We discussed this years back here, and apparently the A-12 used in the
KEMPSTER tests still exists in a museum, and still has the holes in it
where the the ion beams were emitted.
Pat
Pat Flannery
>> Pilots described the missions themselves as pretty boring if everything
>> was working right, with days of intense mission planning leading to a
>> few hours of actual flight in which hardly any maneuvering was done.
>
> I got to talk to Rogers Smith once at Blackbird Airpark. One
> thing he said is that the SR took more concentration than any
> other aircraft he'd flown. (It reminded me of a Air Force
> pilot's remark that the airplane seemed to know when you were
> looking out the window.)
>
> The other thing Smith said is that he was always amazed with
> how thoroughly the AF pilots knew the aircraft.
>
> He was the NASA pilot who made the last Blackbird flight in 1999.
I imagine every pilot realized that even something going a little wrong
at the speeds and altitudes where they would be operating could mean
death in very short order, so it behooved them to know everything about
the aircraft they possibly could.
The one that sounded spooky to fly was the U-2 at full altitude, where
it was possible to turn just a little too tight and have the wing facing
outboard go supersonic while the inboard one stalled, because you had
reached the very outer edge of the aircraft's performance envelope.
Then you would just fall out of the sky as the plane fell apart.
At least with the Blackbirds the total mission time over target wasn't
that long due to the aircraft's high speed; flying in the U-2 and having
to walk that razor's edge for hour after hour was just made for
generating ulcers...then of course there was the pleasant thought of
spending several years in a Soviet prison if that engine should ever
quit while you were somewhere over the vast expanse of the USSR.
I don't know how they could talk anyone into volunteering to fly those
missions, and a psychological profile of a "average" U-2 pilot would be
fascinating to read. :-)
Pat
Paul A. Suhler
>I'd still like to learn more about Project KEMPSTER and the ion sheath
>to defeat radar, as the Russians have been doing work on the same
>concept, apparently with some success:
>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plasma_stealth
>We discussed this years back here, and apparently the A-12 used in the
>KEMPSTER tests still exists in a museum, and still has the holes in it
>where the the ion beams were emitted.
There's a 274-page report on the KEMPSTER equipment in
the supporting materials for my book at AIAA. Starts
with computations for the design of a "window" and goes
through drawings of the devices.
Jeannette Remak told me that they found the holes in
the chines of article 122 (on the Intrepid). However,
there also were other aircraft used for the flight
testing.
Paul
Pat Flannery
>
> There's a 274-page report on the KEMPSTER equipment in
> the supporting materials for my book at AIAA. Starts
> with computations for the design of a "window" and goes
> through drawings of the devices.
>
> Jeannette Remak told me that they found the holes in
> the chines of article 122 (on the Intrepid). However,
> there also were other aircraft used for the flight
> testing.
I've been looking for that report online, but no luck yet.
Meanwhile, the plot thickens:
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckScript=blogscript&plckElementId=blogDest&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&plckPostId=Blog%3A27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3A2ba4cc01-f3cf-41e6-9f05-bf326e93f36c
Pat
Paul A. Suhler
>On 12 Mar 2010 18:42:43 -0800, suh...@pollux.usc.edu (Paul A. Suhler)
>wrote:
>
>>There's a 274-page report on the KEMPSTER equipment in
>>the supporting materials for my book at AIAA.
>
>come across your book so far? New release?
>
>Either way, I want a copy, dammit!
>
> OM
It came out last September, although volume shipments
didn't start until November. I thought I'd posted the
link here, but here goes:
http://www.amazon.com/Rainbow-Gusto-Stealth-Lockheed-Blackbird/dp/160086712X
And here's the publisher's link:
http://www.aiaa.org/content.cfm?pageid=360&id=1789
Cheers,
Paul
Pat Flannery
> It came out last September, although volume shipments
> didn't start until November. I thought I'd posted the
> link here, but here goes:
>
> http://www.amazon.com/Rainbow-Gusto-Stealth-Lockheed-Blackbird/dp/160086712X
>
That's why the name rang a bell!
Oh, this is the one Scott Lowther has been posting the pre-A-12 designs
on his blog from.
Boy, did they come up with some weird ideas, especially those odd delta
things with the giant vertical fins:
http://up-ship.com/blog/?p=5435
That thing looks downright "Luft 46". :-)
Pat
David Spain
> There's a 274-page report on the KEMPSTER equipment in
> the supporting materials for my book at AIAA. Starts
> with computations for the design of a "window" and goes
> through drawings of the devices.
Paul,
The 'download supporting materials' link on the AIAA website
is password protected.
Does becoming an AIAA member give one a working password for that?
Dave
Paul A. Suhler
>
>Paul,
>
>The 'download supporting materials' link on the AIAA website
>is password protected.
>
>Does becoming an AIAA member give one a working password for that?
>
>Dave
Hi, Dave.
The password is on page 261 of the book, the supporting materials
appendix.
Paul
Paul A. Suhler
>On 15 Mar 2010 06:26:13 -0700, suh...@pollux.usc.edu (Paul A. Suhler)
>wrote:
>
>>The password is on page 261 of the book, the supporting materials
>>appendix.
>
>give people trying to figure out how to get past a certain part of a
>game:
>
>"Did you read the manual?"
>
>"Of course not! Nobody reads the manual!"
>
>"Well, you should. Unless you pirated the game..."
>
>"<CLICK>
>
Repeat after me:
"Authors do not piss off their publishers."
....
....
;-)
David Spain
>
> The password is on page 261 of the book, the supporting materials
> appendix.
Very good. Now I have to figure out if I want to become an AIAA member
anyway...
Dave
OM
wrote:
...Oh, come on now. Someone's *got* to have the crack for this one
somewhere. Or at least the cheat codes :P
OM
--
]=====================================[
] OMBlog - http://www.io.com/~o_m/omworld [
] Let's face it: Sometimes you *need* [
] an obnoxious opinion in your day! [
]=====================================[
David Spain
> On Tue, 16 Mar 2010 14:02:58 -0400, David Spain <nos...@127.0.0.1>
> wrote:
>
>>suh...@pollux.usc.edu (Paul A. Suhler) writes:
>>> Hi, Dave.
>>>
>>> The password is on page 261 of the book, the supporting materials
>>> appendix.
>>
>>Very good. Now I have to figure out if I want to become an AIAA member
>>anyway...
>
> ...Oh, come on now. Someone's *got* to have the crack for this one
> somewhere. Or at least the cheat codes :P
>
>
> OM
Umm, you could buy the book?
;-)
Dave
Paul A. Suhler
You don't have to be an AIAA member:
http://www.amazon.com/Rainbow-Gusto-Stealth-Lockheed-Blackbird/dp/160086712X
I'm not a member (I'm in IEEE and ACM) and there's even
talk of letting me give AIAA lectures here and there.
Paul
David Spain
> You don't have to be an AIAA member:
>
> http://www.amazon.com/Rainbow-Gusto-Stealth-Lockheed-Blackbird/dp/160086712X
>
> I'm not a member (I'm in IEEE and ACM) and there's even
> talk of letting me give AIAA lectures here and there.
Roger that. That was what I meant to convey to OM....
Sooner or later rest assured I'll own a copy of your book
whether I'm an AIAA member or not...
Dave
David Spain
> On Tue, 16 Mar 2010 23:22:59 -0400, David Spain <nos...@127.0.0.1>
> wrote:
>
>>Roger that. That was what I meant to convey to OM....
>
> ...No, you simply conveyed that you *missed the joke*.
>
> OM
Well ok, perhaps so, but I'm trying to stay out of the doghouse...
I will NOT piss off Paul Suhler's publisher
I will NOT piss off Paul Suhler's publisher
I will NOT piss off Paul Suhler's publisher
...
;-)
Dave
David Spain
> On Thu, 18 Mar 2010 00:05:50 -0400, David Spain <nos...@127.0.0.1>
> wrote:
>
>>Well ok, perhaps so, but I'm trying to stay out of the doghouse...
>
> ...With who? Me or Paul?
>
> OM
Both!
Dave
Peter Stickney
> On 3/11/2010 9:54 PM, Paul A. Suhler wrote:
>>> From what I've read flying the U-2, particularly in the early days,
>>> was
>>> even more of a nail-biting experience than the SR-71. At least with
>>> the SR-71 you could divide up the work between two crewmembers; the
>>> A-12 must have kept its pilot very busy indeed.
>>
>> I asked that of Frank Murray, one of the project pilots. He said that
>> there was enough automation on the recon gear that the workload wasn't
>> too bad.
>
> If you read between the lines on this formerly classified project
> history, it suggests that the A-12 was overall more of a success than
> the SR-71: http://www.blackbirds.net/sr71/oxcart/successortou2.html
> ...due to the larger space available for the cameras.
That's not quite the case, Pat. The A-12s could be equipped to handle a single
mission - Wide field photo, narrow field photo, SLAR, or ELINT.
The Air Force figured it was better to equip the SR-71s to be able to handle all
of them. While that meant they couldn't haul the Great Big Camera, they were
still able to provide successful take, and also get the ELINT intercept info and
radar maps in the same flight. (After all, do we really need to know the number
of pimples on Kim Il Sung's butt? Or, rather, that the General Staff all showed up
at his house at the same time that the smuggled Pepsi delivery truck arrived?)
>I'd still like to
> learn more about Project KEMPSTER and the ion sheath to defeat radar, as
> the Russians have been doing work on the same concept, apparently with
> some success: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plasma_stealth We discussed
> this years back here, and apparently the A-12 used in the KEMPSTER tests
> still exists in a museum, and still has the holes in it where the the
> ion beams were emitted.
The Ion Sheath stuff kinda works, but only if the thickness of the sheath is closely
matched to the radar wavelength looking at it. If the sheath doesn't closely match
the radar, it increases the radar signature by at least one order or magnitude.
Keeping the sheath thickness consistent is very, very difficult, especially in the
airflow around an airplane. The fact that whoever the target is is going to be using
many radars with much different wavelengths to search makes the while idea
rather useless.
--
Pete Stickney
Failure is not an option
It comes bundled with the system
Pat Flannery
>> If you read between the lines on this formerly classified project
>> history, it suggests that the A-12 was overall more of a success than
>> the SR-71: http://www.blackbirds.net/sr71/oxcart/successortou2.html
>> ...due to the larger space available for the cameras.
>
> That's not quite the case, Pat. The A-12s could be equipped to handle a single
> mission - Wide field photo, narrow field photo, SLAR, or ELINT.
> The Air Force figured it was better to equip the SR-71s to be able to handle all
> of them. While that meant they couldn't haul the Great Big Camera, they were
> still able to provide successful take, and also get the ELINT intercept info and
> radar maps in the same flight. (After all, do we really need to know the number
> of pimples on Kim Il Sung's butt? Or, rather, that the General Staff all showed up
> at his house at the same time that the smuggled Pepsi delivery truck arrived?)
Well, here's what the history says:
"Four days later, Schultze handed Helms a draft memorandum for the
President
requesting a decision either to share the SR-71 fleet between CIA and
the Air Force
or to terminate the CIA entirely. Having just received new information
indicating
that the SR-71's performance was inferior to that of the A-12, Helms
asked for
another meeting to review this data. His concern was the SR-71 could not
match the
photographic coverage that the A-12 could provide. Only one of the
SR-71's three
camera systems was working anywhere near the original specifications,
and that was
its Operational Objective system which could only photograph a swath 28
miles wide
with a resolution of 28 to 30 inches. The A-12's Type-I P-E camera could
photograph
a swath 72 miles wide with a nadir resolution of 12 to 18 inches and
oblique
resolution of 54 inches. Thus the A-12's camera covered three times as
much territory
as the SR-71's cameras and did so with better resolution. In addition,
the A-12 could
fly 2,000 to 5,000 feet higher than the SR-71 and was faster, with a
maximum speed of
Mach 3.1 compared to the SR-71's Mach 3.0. [8 spaces] "OXCART Story", p.
31 (S); OSA
History, pp.133-134 [14 spaces]"
To some extent, both the A-12 and SR-71 were flops; the whole reason for
their speed and altitude capabilities was to let them fly over the USSR
undetected, or if they were detected, at least let them avoid
destruction by SAMs and AAMs.
By interlocking the radar displays of their command centers, the Soviets
were able to track an aircraft overflying them at Mach 3, and the SA-5
SAM and the MiG-25/AA-6 aircraft and missile combo gave them a means of
engaging an aircraft operating at the Blackbird's altitude and speed
(they also doomed the B-70 bomber for the same reasons), so neither
aircraft was ever used on operational missions over the Soviet Union as
had been the intention at the beginning of the program.
This repeated part of the U-2 program's problems, because Lockheed had
thought that Soviet radar was limited enough in capability that a U-2
could fly over the USSR undetected despite its fairly low speed, because
of its high altitude.
When the U-2 overflights were begun, the Soviets were able to track
every one of them from the first day, and it only took the development
of the SA-2 to allow them to be shot down.
A good lesson from all of this is that you shouldn't design military
systems with a long lead time to evade today's threats, but rather the
threats your opponent is liable to have by the time your system comes on
line. If we ever did get into a real fight with the Russians, we might
find out our much-vaunted stealth technology is a lot more vulnerable
than we were expecting.
Pat