Tim Furniss e-book on 'The Challenger Coverup'
Jim Oberg
Tim Furniss e-book on 'The Challenger Coverup'
Jim Oberg notes: "Tim was for many years a respected space journalist at
'Flight International' magazine. Was that all counterfeit, or has he only
recently gone off the deep space end? Like, where did he EVER get the
notion the crew even HAD an 'emergency SRB jettison' command? No,
he really did good stuff for a good many years -- and seems to have lost
that ability, judging from this blurb. Sigh. Sic transit...."
SPACEPORT PUBLISHING...PRESENTS:
"A Life in Space" by Tim Furniss, featuring the Challenger cover-up
Buy the e-book at HYPERLINK "http://www.spaceport.co.uk"
www.spaceport.co.uk ! 12 pounds UK Available now! Easy purchasing via
PayPal for download!
The Challenger Cover Up
The Space Shuttle Challenger accident on 28 January 1986 was not caused by
an O- ring failure on one of the solid rocket boosters but by a structural
failure of the booster in the region of the semicircular attach ring, which
attached it to the external tank.
As Challenger rose into the skies, the right hand booster was shedding
pieces from the damaged booster and was fishtailing slightly through the
sky - a fact that was clearly recognised by the crew, who had worked out was
wrong, were on the point of saving the orbiter and crew but ran out of time.
They were within 1 sec of saving the mission with a contingency abort!
This is revealed in a book published by British spaceflight journalist Tim
Furniss, who was the spaceflight correspondent of Flight International
magazine from 1984-2006.
Chapter 10, which covers the Challenger accident, is 37,000 words long.
"A Life in Space", an ebook, tells the story of a 12 year-old boy whose
enthusiasm for space was fired by Yuri Gagarin's flight on 12 April 1961.
Tim purchased his first copy Flight International in 1962, when the magazine
featured a Space Special issue and continued to read it every week.
Tim's ambition was to become a spaceflight journalist and to meet
astronauts, visit spaceports and to see launches. He witnessed Apollo,
Shuttle and other launches from Cape Canaveral, Kennedy Space Centre and
Baikonur.
In 1984 he became Flight International's space correspondent. His ambition
reached its peak, when he was the first British journalist to watch a manned
launched from the Baikonur Cosmodrome, in 1988. As he stood on Gagarin's
launch pad 1, Tim remembered with thanks to God for that day in 1961.
His inspirational story - like "The Rocket Boys" (October Sky) and "Billy
Elliot" - screenplay in progress - is linked with a first hand history of
the space age, which began on 4 October 1957, with the launch of Sputnik 1 -
from the same launch pad that launched Gagarin - to the present day,
including all the main events, including Gagarin, Apollo 11 and the
Challenger accident.
The official cause of this accident was an O-ring failure, a conclusion made
in great haste by the Rogers Commission, which overlooked or disregarded
vital evidence but was also not provided with the full information from
NASA. Like a good detective story, concerns about the O rings in cold
weather were raised by engineers at Morton Thiokol but these were actually a
red herring.
As Challenger rose into the skies, the right hand booster was shedding
pieces from the damaged booster and was fishtailing slightly through the
sky - a fact that was clearly recognised by the crew, who had worked out was
wrong, were on the point of saving the orbiter but ran out of time. Dick
Scobee and Mike Smith were within 1 sec of saving the mission with a
contingency abort!
NASA very carefully censored any images that showed what was really
happening - unlike the hundreds of views from several angles that were
usually published after a launch. The space agency also misidentified the
crew cabin falling into the sea, which explained why it took so long to find
the fallen seven-person crew, which included the schoolteacher, Christa
McAuliffe.
Amateur video coverage seen from the north of the Kennedy Space Centre,
clearly shows the right hand booster shedding debris and trailing a third
"spluttering" contrail.
American aereospace engineer, Ali Abutaha dedicated years investigating the
accident but was persecuted and rubbished by NASA, which took all his
findings aboard and redesigned the Shuttle - including a
fully-circumferential attach ring - which was clear to see on the Shuttle's
Return to Flight in 1989. "No reader could find what you're writing about
anywhere else!", says Ali.
"A Life in Space", the inspiring, amusing, moving, frank, intimate,
surprising and feel-good read, can be purchased from Spaceport Publishing as
a download on Tim's website, www.spaceport.co.uk. An outline synopsis is
also available on the website. A short biography is also available.
Contact details: t...@spaceport.co.uk (+44) (0)1237 477883.
Challenger snippets
... "messy" contrail coming from one of the SRBs .TV image going in and
out of focus .the SSMEs gimblal in an unusual fashion.it has been reported
that Challenger hit a "54kt wind shear at T+50s" in the flight... NASA did
not launch Space Shuttles into wind shear!.The "wind shear" was the
Challenger "zigzagging" due to a breached booster. NASA photo team noticed
the third plume seen from New Smyrna Beach north of the KSC and even told
the Commission but this was not taken up!..a private video taken from the
north shows an extra trail. the Rogers Commission showed only the final two
seconds!...Five key pieces of the SRB fell off during the launch .an
airline pilot flying SE said smoke was seen streaming "out of the wall" of
the right hand booster. he saw the SRB separation motors fire...who fired
them? . the crew knew the SRB was in trouble!!.Ali Abutaha, a dynamics
engineer examined hundreds of Time magazine images .some show that the fire
started at lift-off and continued through the ascent! .Time never published
them!.the crew was obviously aware, used the readouts from the upper cable
tray (giving the pressure in the upper segments) and punched the SRBs away -
but it was just too late.NASA took six weeks to the find the crew
compartment because it identified the wrong object!..Abutaha's findings
were rejected by NASA but the agency used his analysis to change the
Shuttle ... MUCH MORE!!!!.
Revision
Red herrings are getting a lot of bad PR.
> was not caused by an O- ring failure
Of course, hot plasma flowing through that joint was no problem.
> a structural failure of the semicircular attach ring, which attached it
> to the external tank.
Yeah, let's cover up *THAT* problem and blame it on the more acceptable
O-rings.
Yo Ali Abutaha we need you to check the water fountains at JSC for heavy
metals, I think.
--
Posted via a free Usenet account from http://www.teranews.com
BradGuth
Still covering thy Zion butts, we see.
How about we talk ABL or TWA flight-800 ?
How about a 30% inert massive rocket with a mere 60:1 ratio of rocket
per payload, going for the moon?
-
"whoever controls the past, controls the future" / George Orwell
-
Brad Guth
Dale Carlson
That alone could get irritating pretty fast... :)
Dale
Paul F. Dietz
>>was not caused by an O- ring failure
>
> Of course, hot plasma flowing through that joint was no problem.
The gas inside an SRB is a *plasma*? Who knew!
Paul
Brian Thorn
wrote:
>> Of course, hot plasma flowing through that joint was no problem.
>
>The gas inside an SRB is a *plasma*? Who knew!
Hence the coverup! :-)
Brian
Henry Spencer
Jim Oberg <job...@houston.rr.com> wrote:
>"he really did good stuff for a good many years -- and seems to have lost
>that ability, judging from this blurb. Sigh. Sic transit...."
And an endorsement from Ali Abutaha, no less. Talk about a clear sign of
what the content is going to be like...
--
spsystems.net is temporarily off the air; | Henry Spencer
mail to henry at zoo.utoronto.ca instead. | he...@spsystems.net
Bill Clecter
<job...@houston.rr.com> wrote:
>
>Tim Furniss e-book on 'The Challenger Coverup'
>
>
>
>Jim Oberg notes: "Tim was for many years a respected space journalist at
>
>'Flight International' magazine. Was that all counterfeit, or has he only
>
>recently gone off the deep space end? Like, where did he EVER get the
>
>notion the crew even HAD an 'emergency SRB jettison' command? No,
>
>he really did good stuff for a good many years -- and seems to have lost
>
>that ability, judging from this blurb. Sigh. Sic transit...."
I think it's high time I write my own Challenger book. My friends have
always told me I'm full of bullshit, it's time I start capitalizing on
it. Let's see...we start with a spine-tingling exerpt:
"Like the fruit given to Adam by Eve, the apple given to Christa
McAuliffe by well-intentioned suit-up technicians meant death for the
Challenger crew. As the mighty ship roared upwards the apple was
ripped from Christa's hands by the tremendous g-forces and flung
downward at great speed, striking the "Ship Destruct" button. In an
instant, the popular Teacher In Space and her faceless assistants
dissolved into plasma. Class dismissed.
Nasa covered up this damning truth, not wanting the world to know of
the onboard "destruct" button which was to be used only in the rare
event of Alien Invasion or flipped-out sex-starved female astronauts
whose passions could not be contained in their diapers.....(to be
continued)
mdic...@seds.lpl.arizona.edu
> Tim Furniss e-book on 'The Challenger Coverup'
>
> Jim Oberg notes: "Tim was for many years a respected space journalist at
>
> 'Flight International' magazine. Was that all counterfeit, or has he only
>
> recently gone off the deep space end? Like, where did he EVER get the
>
> notion the crew even HAD an 'emergency SRB jettison' command? No,
>
> he really did good stuff for a good many years -- and seems to have lost
>
> that ability, judging from this blurb. Sigh. Sic transit...."
Is this the same Ali Abutaha that wanted everyone to believe it was
the "twanging" motion of the SRBs and shuttle stack at main engine
ignition that was the real cause of the Challenger accident (again
touted by Tim Furniss)? So now it's a failure of the attach
ring, huh? Yeah, Tim has gone off the deep end to be suckered by
Abutaha all this time. A pity, really, as Furniss' has always produced
interesting articles on space flight, and to see him fall to something
as wacky as this is truely a tragedy and loss to the space journalism
community.
-Mike
Henry Spencer
<mdic...@seds.lpl.arizona.edu> wrote:
>Is this the same Ali Abutaha that wanted everyone to believe it was
>the "twanging" motion of the SRBs and shuttle stack at main engine
I doubt that there are two people by that name...
Which means it's *also* the same Ali Abutaha who wanted people to believe
that the crawler *going around the curve to pad 39B* was also a major
cause of the accident -- the centrifugal force stressed the SRBs, you see.
(51L was in fact the very first shuttle launch to use 39B, but that was
pure coincidence.)
Joseph Nebus
>In article <1182381630....@c77g2000hse.googlegroups.com>,
> <mdic...@seds.lpl.arizona.edu> wrote:
>>Is this the same Ali Abutaha that wanted everyone to believe it was
>>the "twanging" motion of the SRBs and shuttle stack at main engine
>>ignition that was the real cause of the Challenger accident...
>I doubt that there are two people by that name...
>Which means it's *also* the same Ali Abutaha who wanted people to believe
>that the crawler *going around the curve to pad 39B* was also a major
>cause of the accident -- the centrifugal force stressed the SRBs, you see.
>(51L was in fact the very first shuttle launch to use 39B, but that was
>pure coincidence.)
Was this theory the subject of a recent Discovery Channel-class
program, something like ``Zero Seconds From Disaster Scene Investiations''?
I ran across one a few weeks ago hypothesizing a bit of burnt
casing forming an impromptu seal on the burned-through O-ring --
explaining the puff of smoke at liftoff that then vanishes for the next
minute of flight -- until the shuttle goes through a relatively
high-altitude jet that knocks it loose.
I'd meant to run it across a group like here, but I came in
midway through the program and didn't have the whole routine, and guessed
if I waited a month or so the show would be rerun anyway.
--
Joseph Nebus
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Henry Spencer
Joseph Nebus <nebusj-@-rpi-.edu> wrote:
>>Which means it's *also* the same Ali Abutaha who wanted people to believe
>>that the crawler *going around the curve to pad 39B* was also a major
>>cause of the accident -- the centrifugal force stressed the SRBs, you see.
>
>program, something like ``Zero Seconds From Disaster Scene Investiations''?
Couldn't say -- we haven't owned a TV in years.
> I ran across one a few weeks ago hypothesizing a bit of burnt
>casing forming an impromptu seal on the burned-through O-ring --
>explaining the puff of smoke at liftoff that then vanishes for the next
>minute of flight -- until the shuttle goes through a relatively
>high-altitude jet that knocks it loose.
It does appear that the leak sealed itself for a while -- perhaps just a
matter of the O-rings finally doing their job, perhaps burned crud of
some kind plugging the hole -- but eventually re-opened, probably due to
the SRBs flexing as the stack fought strong windshear starting at T+37s.
Monte Davis
>Which means it's *also* the same Ali Abutaha who wanted people to believe
>that the crawler *going around the curve to pad 39B* was also a major
>cause of the accident -- the centrifugal force stressed the SRBs, you see.
There was videotape of the hubcaps flying off, but NASA suppressed it
along with the *real* Zapruder footage.
Andre Lieven
> In article <nebusj.1...@vcmr-86.server.rpi.edu>,
> Joseph Nebus <nebusj-@-rpi-.edu> wrote:
>>>Which means it's *also* the same Ali Abutaha who wanted people to believe
>>>that the crawler *going around the curve to pad 39B* was also a major
>>>cause of the accident -- the centrifugal force stressed the SRBs, you see.
>>
>> Was this theory the subject of a recent Discovery Channel-class
>>program, something like ``Zero Seconds From Disaster Scene Investiations''?
>
> Couldn't say -- we haven't owned a TV in years.
Kinda hard to watch the Spacecraft Films DVDs, eh ? <g>
>> I ran across one a few weeks ago hypothesizing a bit of burnt
>>casing forming an impromptu seal on the burned-through O-ring --
>>explaining the puff of smoke at liftoff that then vanishes for the next
>>minute of flight -- until the shuttle goes through a relatively
>>high-altitude jet that knocks it loose.
>
> It does appear that the leak sealed itself for a while -- perhaps just a
> matter of the O-rings finally doing their job, perhaps burned crud of
> some kind plugging the hole -- but eventually re-opened, probably due to
> the SRBs flexing as the stack fought strong windshear starting at T+37s.
Had the luck held another minute and a half... the problem might have later
killed another Shuttle stack...
Andre
Rand Simberg
dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Andre Lieven) made the phosphor on my
monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that:
>Henry Spencer (he...@spsystems.net) writes:
>> It does appear that the leak sealed itself for a while -- perhaps just a
>> matter of the O-rings finally doing their job, perhaps burned crud of
>> some kind plugging the hole -- but eventually re-opened, probably due to
>> the SRBs flexing as the stack fought strong windshear starting at T+37s.
>
>Had the luck held another minute and a half... the problem might have later
>killed another Shuttle stack...
That seems unlikely. It was an improbable confluence of events
(launching in cold temperature, having the leak appear right next to
the ET support (though that might not have been coincidence), etc.).
Changing any one of them would have saved the vehicle. They shut down
the program for far too long.
Derek Lyons
> I ran across one a few weeks ago hypothesizing a bit of burnt
>casing forming an impromptu seal on the burned-through O-ring --
>explaining the puff of smoke at liftoff that then vanishes for the next
>minute of flight -- until the shuttle goes through a relatively
>high-altitude jet that knocks it loose.
Though there are various theories on what exactly temporarily plugged
the leak, it's pretty well accepted nowadays that something did.
OTOH - it still astonishes me that folks continue to concentrate on
the O-rings failing, rather than on the deeper failure of the joint
design and NASA accepting the SRB's with the known problems caused by
joint rotation. The failed O-rings were a symptom, not the cause.
D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.
-Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings.
Oct 5th, 2004 JDL
hal...@aol.com
> OTOH - it still astonishes me that folks continue to concentrate on
> the O-rings failing, rather than on the deeper failure of the joint
> design and NASA accepting the SRB's with the known problems caused by
> joint rotation. The failed O-rings were a symptom, not the cause.
>
> D.
> --
just like accepting foam loss as normal:(
and schedule rules the world,
till someone dies:(
James Nowotarski
news:jumk73de635of9i2i...@4ax.com...
No, that's just a red herring. NASA has long had use of the alien
secret hubcap regeneration technology that was first publicly
demonstrated on the Charger during the chase sequence in _Bullitt_.
Andre Lieven
> nebusj-@-rpi-.edu (Joseph Nebus) wrote:
>
>> I ran across one a few weeks ago hypothesizing a bit of burnt
>>casing forming an impromptu seal on the burned-through O-ring --
>>explaining the puff of smoke at liftoff that then vanishes for the next
>>minute of flight -- until the shuttle goes through a relatively
>>high-altitude jet that knocks it loose.
>
> Though there are various theories on what exactly temporarily plugged
> the leak, it's pretty well accepted nowadays that something did.
>
> OTOH - it still astonishes me that folks continue to concentrate on
> the O-rings failing, rather than on the deeper failure of the joint
> design and NASA accepting the SRB's with the known problems caused by
> joint rotation. The failed O-rings were a symptom, not the cause.
Agreed. The bigger issue is that NASA was building up a record of
anamolous SRB performance, with a resulting alarming lack of basic
curiousity over that record.
Its impossible to say what might have happened in an alternate time
line, say, one where Challenger's faulty SRB didn't catastrophically
fail before SRB jett. If whatever plugged it for a half minute had
stayed that way for another 90-120 seconds, well, who is to say that
another SRB, with a bigger example of this flaw, might not have gone
Boom in even more benign circumstances.
If one were to suggest that the problem might have stayed OK enough,
absent what happened with STS 51 L, well, that would be failure to
learn from what happened that horrible day.
Andre
Henry Spencer
Andre Lieven <dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA> wrote:
>> Couldn't say -- we haven't owned a TV in years.
>
>Kinda hard to watch the Spacecraft Films DVDs, eh ? <g>
Well, yeah, that *is* a problem. :-) We'll probably eventually end up
acquiring a small one plus a DVD player, just for such things, but we
haven't been in a hurry...
Henry Spencer
Andre Lieven <dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA> wrote:
>Its impossible to say what might have happened in an alternate time
>line, say, one where Challenger's faulty SRB didn't catastrophically
The ideal case would have been a little bit more delay -- perhaps a bit
less windshear on the way up -- so there'd still be a hole in the SRB but
it wouldn't have had time to fatally damage the ET or the attach strut.
If the leak had stayed plugged, agreed that the problem would just have
festered further. But an actual hole in the SRB casing couldn't have
been dismissed quite so easily.
(Another good scenario would be a hole that pointed outward rather than
inward, but there is strong suspicion that the location of the hole was
not random, because it happened in the area where constraints imposed by
the attach struts most likely worsened the effects of joint rotation.)
ETPr...@gmail.com
http://nasa-hoaxes.blogspot.com/2007/06/godsent-vladimir-putin-puts-end-to.html
Joseph Nebus
>nebusj-@-rpi-.edu (Joseph Nebus) wrote:
>> I ran across one a few weeks ago hypothesizing a bit of burnt
>>casing forming an impromptu seal on the burned-through O-ring --
>>explaining the puff of smoke at liftoff that then vanishes for the next
>>minute of flight -- until the shuttle goes through a relatively
>>high-altitude jet that knocks it loose.
>Though there are various theories on what exactly temporarily plugged
>the leak, it's pretty well accepted nowadays that something did.
I'm glad to know that part of the program, at least, wasn't off
base or getting into weird things. I'd paid more attention to the NASA
organizational problems than the specific technical details of the
Challenger accident in my more recent reading, and mentions (particulary
on the Internet) of new theories tend to inspire instant skepticism from
me.
>OTOH - it still astonishes me that folks continue to concentrate on
>the O-rings failing, rather than on the deeper failure of the joint
>design and NASA accepting the SRB's with the known problems caused by
>joint rotation. The failed O-rings were a symptom, not the cause.
I'm not sure what's astonishing about that, actually. There are
after all two interesting things to study. The big question that's of
value to society as a whole, really, is how can an organization like
NASA with good numbers of well-trained, intelligent people get together
and make disastrously bad decisions. That's the underlying cause of the
Challenger (and Columbia) accidents after all, and understanding how bad
decisions get made is of value to any group activity.
However, this particular specific failure is still interesting
on its own, just as the failures of the Tacoma Narrows bridge or the
Kansas City Marriot skywalk, or the airplane crash at Tenerife are. The
specific set of events causing the disaster may have only vague lessons
to give the rest of human activities (admitting that Tacoma Narrows had
important implications for bridge design), but there's still reason to
be curious about how they unfolded.
--
Joseph Nebus
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paul F. Dietz
> The big question that's of
> value to society as a whole, really, is how can an organization like
> NASA with good numbers of well-trained, intelligent people get together
> and make disastrously bad decisions.
The problem starts from the very top. Bad decisions beget bad decisions.
Unreality-based strategy (that is, that of building and depending on
the shuttle) makes deception a core part of the organizational culture.
It can't be a "learning organization" (as, for example, the nuclear navy
was/is) if gross doublethink is needed for it to function at all.
Now apply this reasoning to NASA's current strategy. Oy.
Paul
hal...@aol.com
NASA insists on specialized manned booster, as a pay off to current
shuttle contractors. Wheras using existing delta and atlas would be
much better operationally and fiancially.
cheaper faster to get running, if delta booster has trouble use atlas,
manned space not grounded...
helps existing booster production rate futher saving money for
everyone.
Now once you lie to the public to serve your own agenda follow up lies
are common.
just like shuttle:(
Andre Lieven
> In article <f5ec43$6m0$1...@theodyn.ncf.ca>,
> Andre Lieven <dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA> wrote:
>>> Couldn't say -- we haven't owned a TV in years.
>>
>>Kinda hard to watch the Spacecraft Films DVDs, eh ? <g>
>
> Well, yeah, that *is* a problem. :-) We'll probably eventually end up
> acquiring a small one plus a DVD player, just for such things, but we
> haven't been in a hurry...
Chacun a son gout... We have four sets on the cable and three of them
have a DVD player and at least one VCR connected to them. And, the
DVD collection just keeps growing, and growing...
( I just watched a clip on YouTube of Harlan Ellison presenting a
writers guild award to Ronald Moore for the SciFi original series
" Battlestar Galactica ", in which Ellison stated that the award
is in no small part for taking one of the worst series ever and
making it into one of the best series ever... )
Yes, most teevee is crap. But, thats just as true of most movies,
most books ( Ever checked out the " romance " and " self help "
sections of your local bookstore ? <shudder> ), and so on...
But, when the visual mediums are used well, the results are worth
at least a couple of hundred bucks for a set and a player...
Andre
Andre Lieven
> In article <f5ffv3$p2b$1...@theodyn.ncf.ca>,
> Andre Lieven <dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA> wrote:
>>Its impossible to say what might have happened in an alternate time
>>line, say, one where Challenger's faulty SRB didn't catastrophically
>>fail before SRB jett...
>
> The ideal case would have been a little bit more delay -- perhaps a bit
> less windshear on the way up -- so there'd still be a hole in the SRB but
> it wouldn't have had time to fatally damage the ET or the attach strut.
> If the leak had stayed plugged, agreed that the problem would just have
> festered further. But an actual hole in the SRB casing couldn't have
> been dismissed quite so easily.
Agreed. It would be hard for any management type to look at engineers
holding an SRB segment with such a hole in it, saying " Its no problem "...
> (Another good scenario would be a hole that pointed outward rather than
> inward, but there is strong suspicion that the location of the hole was
> not random, because it happened in the area where constraints imposed by
> the attach struts most likely worsened the effects of joint rotation.)
Interesting.
Andre
Alejandro Zuzek
[...]
> (Another good scenario would be a hole that pointed outward rather than
> inward, but there is strong suspicion that the location of the hole was
> not random, because it happened in the area where constraints imposed by
> the attach struts most likely worsened the effects of joint rotation.)
I think that the part of the SRB facing the ET was the one that got
more cold on the pad, which also increased the probabilities of the
fail occurring in the ET facing side of the SRB.
robert casey
>
> Agreed. It would be hard for any management type to look at engineers
> holding an SRB segment with such a hole in it, saying " Its no problem "...
>
I've known managers that would try....
Derek Lyons
Derek Lyons
>fair...@gmail.com (Derek Lyons) writes:
>
>>nebusj-@-rpi-.edu (Joseph Nebus) wrote:
>
>>OTOH - it still astonishes me that folks continue to concentrate on
>>the O-rings failing, rather than on the deeper failure of the joint
>>design and NASA accepting the SRB's with the known problems caused by
>>joint rotation. The failed O-rings were a symptom, not the cause.
>
> I'm not sure what's astonishing about that, actually. There are
>after all two interesting things to study. The big question that's of
>value to society as a whole, really, is how can an organization like
>NASA with good numbers of well-trained, intelligent people get together
>and make disastrously bad decisions. That's the underlying cause of the
>Challenger (and Columbia) accidents after all, and understanding how bad
>decisions get made is of value to any group activity.
It's astonishing because it means that the people studying the 'big
question' have poked one eye out and poured battery acid in the other,
thus blinding themselves to the whole picture. Worse yet, they have
done so _wilfully_.
Andre Lieven
> Alejandro Zuzek <alejand...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>On Jun 22, 1:45 am, h...@spsystems.net (Henry Spencer) wrote:
>>[...]
>>> (Another good scenario would be a hole that pointed outward rather than
>>> inward, but there is strong suspicion that the location of the hole was
>>> not random, because it happened in the area where constraints imposed by
>>> the attach struts most likely worsened the effects of joint rotation.)
>>
>>I think that the part of the SRB facing the ET was the one that got
>>more cold on the pad, which also increased the probabilities of the
>>fail occurring in the ET facing side of the SRB.
>
> How did it increase the probability?
One of the books on the topic, I forget which one right now, showed that,
with the prevailing winds, that they propogated some of the intense cold
coming from the fuelled ET more towards one SRB than the other.
Andre
Derek Lyons
Which doesn't actually answer the question... :)
I've heard that theory before, but it's always seemed a bit facile to
me. For one thing, what about that big whompin' mass of fuel grain
adjacent to the joint? For another, at what level was the analysis
performed? The FSS/RSS/MLP/Shuttle stack is big enough and complex
enough in geomety for all manner of vortices and counterflows to
develop.
Andre Lieven
> dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Andre Lieven) wrote:
>
>>Derek Lyons (fair...@gmail.com) writes:
>>> Alejandro Zuzek <alejand...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>>I think that the part of the SRB facing the ET was the one that got
>>>>more cold on the pad, which also increased the probabilities of the
>>>>fail occurring in the ET facing side of the SRB.
>>>
>>> How did it increase the probability?
>>
>>One of the books on the topic, I forget which one right now, showed that,
>>with the prevailing winds, that they propogated some of the intense cold
>>coming from the fuelled ET more towards one SRB than the other.
>
> Which doesn't actually answer the question... :)
Well, it suggests the possibility that the failed SRB was cold soaked
in that way more than the other one.
> I've heard that theory before, but it's always seemed a bit facile to
> me. For one thing, what about that big whompin' mass of fuel grain
> adjacent to the joint? For another, at what level was the analysis
> performed? The FSS/RSS/MLP/Shuttle stack is big enough and complex
> enough in geomety for all manner of vortices and counterflows to
> develop.
Again, if the cold wind is blowing from one side of the stack to the
other, it follows that the far side SRB will recieve the bulk of the
migrating airflow coming off of the ET.
Andre
Derek Lyons
>Derek Lyons (fair...@gmail.com) writes:
>> dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Andre Lieven) wrote:
>>
>>>Derek Lyons (fair...@gmail.com) writes:
>>>> Alejandro Zuzek <alejand...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>I think that the part of the SRB facing the ET was the one that got
>>>>>more cold on the pad, which also increased the probabilities of the
>>>>>fail occurring in the ET facing side of the SRB.
>>>>
>>>> How did it increase the probability?
>>>
>>>One of the books on the topic, I forget which one right now, showed that,
>>>with the prevailing winds, that they propogated some of the intense cold
>>>coming from the fuelled ET more towards one SRB than the other.
>>
>> Which doesn't actually answer the question... :)
>
>Well, it suggests the possibility that the failed SRB was cold soaked
>in that way more than the other one.
"suggests the possibility" =! "increases the probability".
>> I've heard that theory before, but it's always seemed a bit facile to
>> me. For one thing, what about that big whompin' mass of fuel grain
>> adjacent to the joint? For another, at what level was the analysis
>> performed? The FSS/RSS/MLP/Shuttle stack is big enough and complex
>> enough in geomety for all manner of vortices and counterflows to
>> develop.
>
>Again, if the cold wind is blowing from one side of the stack to the
>other, it follows that the far side SRB will recieve the bulk of the
>migrating airflow coming off of the ET.
Agin - no, it does not follow, once you get above the handwaving and
smokescreen level of analysis.
Andre Lieven
> dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Andre Lieven) wrote:
>
>>Derek Lyons (fair...@gmail.com) writes:
>>> dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Andre Lieven) wrote:
>>>
>>>>Derek Lyons (fair...@gmail.com) writes:
>>>>> Alejandro Zuzek <alejand...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>I think that the part of the SRB facing the ET was the one that got
>>>>>>more cold on the pad, which also increased the probabilities of the
>>>>>>fail occurring in the ET facing side of the SRB.
>>>>>
>>>>> How did it increase the probability?
>>>>
>>>>One of the books on the topic, I forget which one right now, showed that,
>>>>with the prevailing winds, that they propogated some of the intense cold
>>>>coming from the fuelled ET more towards one SRB than the other.
>>>
>>> Which doesn't actually answer the question... :)
>>
>>Well, it suggests the possibility that the failed SRB was cold soaked
>>in that way more than the other one.
>
> "suggests the possibility" =! "increases the probability".
Meaning... ?
>>> I've heard that theory before, but it's always seemed a bit facile to
>>> me. For one thing, what about that big whompin' mass of fuel grain
>>> adjacent to the joint? For another, at what level was the analysis
>>> performed? The FSS/RSS/MLP/Shuttle stack is big enough and complex
>>> enough in geomety for all manner of vortices and counterflows to
>>> develop.
>>
>>Again, if the cold wind is blowing from one side of the stack to the
>>other, it follows that the far side SRB will recieve the bulk of the
>>migrating airflow coming off of the ET.
>
> Agin - no, it does not follow, once you get above the handwaving and
> smokescreen level of analysis.
Name calling and Rand like one liners do not a cogent argument make.
" At 3:10 AM the launch crew began pumping in liquid hydrogen and
liquid oxygen into the seperate tanks inside the giant external tank of
Challenger. The twenty seven degree temperature felt cold to the ice
teams on the pad as the ten mile an hour wind blew against the
shuttle. The fuel in the external tank , at less than 400 degrees
below zero, contributed to the cold, and the launchpad was a bitingly
uncomfortable place to be that morning. The field joints, the O rings,
and the putty sealing them now reached a temperature of twenty nine
degrees. The O rings were already shrinking and hardening from the
cold at each of the field joints on the two fifteen story tall SRBs.
The shrunken O rings were so cold that the surrounding putty had
congealed to a cold greasy substance. The ice team does not report
surface temperatures routinely. So the twenty five degrees on the left
booster and the eight degree temperature on the right ( The one that
failed. ) booster were never reported to the launch team in the
firing room. " Page 285, Joseph Trento, " Perscription For Disaster .
Note the two different SRB temps...
> -Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings.
> Oct 5th, 2004 JDL
You're not managing this resolution of yours very well...
Andre
Henry Spencer
Derek Lyons <fair...@gmail.com> wrote:
>I've heard that theory before, but it's always seemed a bit facile to
>me. For one thing, what about that big whompin' mass of fuel grain
>adjacent to the joint?
Adjacent, yes, but neither the fuel nor the insulation between it and the
casing was very thermally conductive, whereas the joint was part of the
rather-more-conductive steel outer casing. The casing and the joint
responded much more strongly to outside temperature swings.
Indeed, one of the problems in the pre-launch debates, if I recall
correctly, was that there was a launch criterion for *fuel* temperature,
but none for joint temperature, and they were clearly quite different that
day. The casings were below freezing -- there may have been ice in the
joints! -- while the lowest bulk fuel temperature predicted was 57degF.
>For another, at what level was the analysis
>performed? The FSS/RSS/MLP/Shuttle stack is big enough and complex
>enough in geomety for all manner of vortices and counterflows...
In fact, the temperature analyses done for the Rogers Commission don't
show any big differences between the two SRBs, although I don't know how
much of an attempt was made at airflow modeling.
Andre Lieven
A bit of interest driven research on the web brought me to this:
( The url is too long, so the easier way is to list the basic titles: )
aerospaceweb.org, Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster.
" Cold Temperature
Understanding these various parts of the Shuttle system now allows us
to see what went so horribly wrong in the Challenger didaster. The
prevailing theory, as laid out by the investigatons into the tragedy,
is that neither the primary nor secondary O-rings properly sealed what
is known as the aft field joint in the right SRB. The joint is located
near the lower strut connecting the SRB to the External Tank. The failure
of the O-rings allowed hot 6,000 F ( 3,315 C ) exhaust gasses from inside
the rocket motor chamber to escape and led to a cataclysmic chain of
events.
Most sources cite the fact that the air temperature had dropped to 18F
( -8C ) the night before and 36F ( 2C ) on the morning of the launch.
No previous flights had been attempted below 51F ( 11C ), and the
manufacturer, Morton Thiokol, had insufficient data on how the boosters
would perform at lower temperatures. Although Thiokol engineers were
concerned about launching under those conditions and receommended a
delay, many felt that the boosters should be able to operate safely even
at that low a temperature. However, this simplified explanation often
neglects a number of contributing factors that combined to cause the
O-ring failure in a colplete loss of the vehicle.
The first of these factors is that a stiff breeze blew past the Shuttle
launch pad during the night and early morning preceeding Challenger's
launch. The wind passed over the ET, which had already been filled with
-423F ( -253C ) liquid hydrogen and -300F ( -184C ) liquid oxygen, causing
the air to become super-colled and descend towards the ground behind the
ET. This phenomenon was recorded in photography of the sevice tower the
night before the launch. An eye-wash fountain had been left on over night,
and the spray it created was frozen by the chilled wind and carried along
in the direction of the descending air flow.
Nevertheless, this behavior is not terribly unsual. The passing of wind
over the ET is known to create a layer of ice on the ET and launch pad
even in warm temperatures. As a result, the super-cooled air descended
directly into the lower portion of the right SRB and impinged upon the
aft field joint. An illustration of the wind is depicted below atop a
rear view of the Shuttle assembly shown below. "
I trust that this helps add to the information on this issue.
Andre
Andre Lieven
> In article <46828393....@news.supernews.com>,
> Derek Lyons <fair...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>I've heard that theory before, but it's always seemed a bit facile to
>>me. For one thing, what about that big whompin' mass of fuel grain
>>adjacent to the joint?
>
> Adjacent, yes, but neither the fuel nor the insulation between it and the
> casing was very thermally conductive, whereas the joint was part of the
> rather-more-conductive steel outer casing. The casing and the joint
> responded much more strongly to outside temperature swings.
>
> Indeed, one of the problems in the pre-launch debates, if I recall
> correctly, was that there was a launch criterion for *fuel* temperature,
> but none for joint temperature, and they were clearly quite different that
> day. The casings were below freezing -- there may have been ice in the
> joints! -- while the lowest bulk fuel temperature predicted was 57degF.
>
>>For another, at what level was the analysis
>>performed? The FSS/RSS/MLP/Shuttle stack is big enough and complex
>>enough in geomety for all manner of vortices and counterflows...
>
> In fact, the temperature analyses done for the Rogers Commission don't
> show any big differences between the two SRBs, although I don't know how
> much of an attempt was made at airflow modeling.
A bit of interest driven research on the web brought me to this:
( The url is too long, so the easier way is to list the basic titles: )
aerospaceweb.org, Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster.
" Cold Temperatures:
It is common practice for the ground personnel to use infrared cameras to
measure the thickness of the ice that forms on the ET prior to launch.
Purely by chance, the Ice Team happened to point a camera at the aft field
joint of the right SRB and recorded a temperature of only 8F ( -13C ),
much colder than the air temperature and far below the design tolerances
of the O-rings. Had this wind been blowing in almost any other direction
and not impinged on the aft field joint, it is likely that the O-rings
would have been considerably warmer and the disaster may not have occured.
An additional factor that contributed to the tragedy was that the
information collected by the Ice Team was never passed on to decision
makers, primarily because it was not the Ice Team's responsibility to
report anything other than the ice thickness on the ET. Had the aft field
joint temperature been provided to engineers at NASA and Morton Thiokol,
the launch almost surely wouldve been aborted and the loss of
Challenger avoided. "
Derek Lyons
>Derek Lyons (fair...@gmail.com) writes:
>> dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Andre Lieven) wrote:
>>
>>>Derek Lyons (fair...@gmail.com) writes:
>>>> dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Andre Lieven) wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>Derek Lyons (fair...@gmail.com) writes:
>>>>>> Alejandro Zuzek <alejand...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>I think that the part of the SRB facing the ET was the one that got
>>>>>>>more cold on the pad, which also increased the probabilities of the
>>>>>>>fail occurring in the ET facing side of the SRB.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> How did it increase the probability?
>>>>>
>>>>>One of the books on the topic, I forget which one right now, showed that,
>>>>>with the prevailing winds, that they propogated some of the intense cold
>>>>>coming from the fuelled ET more towards one SRB than the other.
>>>>
>>>> Which doesn't actually answer the question... :)
>>>
>>>Well, it suggests the possibility that the failed SRB was cold soaked
>>>in that way more than the other one.
>>
>> "suggests the possibility" =! "increases the probability".
>
>Meaning... ?
You cannot see that what you said at first and what you later
clarified have completely different meanings?
>>>> I've heard that theory before, but it's always seemed a bit facile to
>>>> me. For one thing, what about that big whompin' mass of fuel grain
>>>> adjacent to the joint? For another, at what level was the analysis
>>>> performed? The FSS/RSS/MLP/Shuttle stack is big enough and complex
>>>> enough in geomety for all manner of vortices and counterflows to
>>>> develop.
>>>
>>>Again, if the cold wind is blowing from one side of the stack to the
>>>other, it follows that the far side SRB will recieve the bulk of the
>>>migrating airflow coming off of the ET.
>>
>> Agin - no, it does not follow, once you get above the handwaving and
>> smokescreen level of analysis.
>
>Name calling and Rand like one liners do not a cogent argument make.
Had I indulged in either, you'd have a point. What I did was point
out your failure to read, understand, and adress the complex issues
involved.
>" At 3:10 AM the launch crew began pumping in liquid hydrogen and
>liquid oxygen into the seperate tanks inside the giant external tank of
>Challenger. The twenty seven degree temperature felt cold to the ice
>teams on the pad as the ten mile an hour wind blew against the
>shuttle. The fuel in the external tank , at less than 400 degrees
>below zero, contributed to the cold, and the launchpad was a bitingly
>uncomfortable place to be that morning. The field joints, the O rings,
>and the putty sealing them now reached a temperature of twenty nine
>degrees. The O rings were already shrinking and hardening from the
>cold at each of the field joints on the two fifteen story tall SRBs.
>The shrunken O rings were so cold that the surrounding putty had
>congealed to a cold greasy substance. The ice team does not report
>surface temperatures routinely. So the twenty five degrees on the left
>booster and the eight degree temperature on the right ( The one that
>failed. ) booster were never reported to the launch team in the
>firing room. " Page 285, Joseph Trento, " Perscription For Disaster .
>
>Note the two different SRB temps...
Note the lack of context as to location on the SRB's.
D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.
-Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings.
Oct 5th, 2004 JDL
Derek Lyons
>I trust that this helps add to the information on this issue.
Not really.
They describe water freezing on the service tower as a result of being
cooled by the ET - which requires the wind to blow roughly
right-to-left (with regards to the Shuttle). This places the RH SRB
on the upwind side.
The annotated photograph used to 'prove' the cold air theory shows the
wind being blown roughly left-to-right - and places the RH SRB on the
downwind side.
The quote in your other message indicates a lower temp on the RH SRB,
so the Aerospaceweb.org seems to add noise rather than signal.
Andre Lieven
> dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Andre Lieven) wrote:
>
>>Derek Lyons (fair...@gmail.com) writes:
>>> dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Andre Lieven) wrote:
>>>
>>>>Derek Lyons (fair...@gmail.com) writes:
>>>>> dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Andre Lieven) wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>Derek Lyons (fair...@gmail.com) writes:
>>>>>>> Alejandro Zuzek <alejand...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>I think that the part of the SRB facing the ET was the one that got
>>>>>>>>more cold on the pad, which also increased the probabilities of the
>>>>>>>>fail occurring in the ET facing side of the SRB.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> How did it increase the probability?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>One of the books on the topic, I forget which one right now, showed that,
>>>>>>with the prevailing winds, that they propogated some of the intense cold
>>>>>>coming from the fuelled ET more towards one SRB than the other.
>>>>>
>>>>> Which doesn't actually answer the question... :)
>>>>
>>>>Well, it suggests the possibility that the failed SRB was cold soaked
>>>>in that way more than the other one.
>>>
>>> "suggests the possibility" =! "increases the probability".
>>
>>Meaning... ?
>
> You cannot see that what you said at first and what you later
> clarified have completely different meanings?
Only if you ASSume that I MUST uncritically believe every bit of data
that I report. Rather, I accept that said finding is reported, and that
the matter is at least available to discuss and examine further.
>>>>> I've heard that theory before, but it's always seemed a bit facile to
>>>>> me. For one thing, what about that big whompin' mass of fuel grain
>>>>> adjacent to the joint? For another, at what level was the analysis
>>>>> performed? The FSS/RSS/MLP/Shuttle stack is big enough and complex
>>>>> enough in geomety for all manner of vortices and counterflows to
>>>>> develop.
>>>>
>>>>Again, if the cold wind is blowing from one side of the stack to the
>>>>other, it follows that the far side SRB will recieve the bulk of the
>>>>migrating airflow coming off of the ET.
>>>
>>> Agin - no, it does not follow, once you get above the handwaving and
>>> smokescreen level of analysis.
>>
>>Name calling and Rand like one liners do not a cogent argument make.
>
> Had I indulged in either, you'd have a point.
Oh, you meant " handwaving " and " smokescreen " is a GOOD way...
> What I did was point
> out your failure to read, understand, and adress the complex issues
> involved.
No, you claimed such: No proof offered ? Ad hominem fact free claim fails.
>>" At 3:10 AM the launch crew began pumping in liquid hydrogen and
>>liquid oxygen into the seperate tanks inside the giant external tank of
>>Challenger. The twenty seven degree temperature felt cold to the ice
>>teams on the pad as the ten mile an hour wind blew against the
>>shuttle. The fuel in the external tank , at less than 400 degrees
>>below zero, contributed to the cold, and the launchpad was a bitingly
>>uncomfortable place to be that morning. The field joints, the O rings,
>>and the putty sealing them now reached a temperature of twenty nine
>>degrees. The O rings were already shrinking and hardening from the
>>cold at each of the field joints on the two fifteen story tall SRBs.
>>The shrunken O rings were so cold that the surrounding putty had
>>congealed to a cold greasy substance. The ice team does not report
>>surface temperatures routinely. So the twenty five degrees on the left
>>booster and the eight degree temperature on the right ( The one that
>>failed. ) booster were never reported to the launch team in the
>>firing room. " Page 285, Joseph Trento, " Perscription For Disaster .
>>
>>Note the two different SRB temps...
>
> Note the lack of context as to location on the SRB's.
Note that the quoted section refutes your claim...
Uh huh. Hand.
Andre
Andre Lieven
> dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Andre Lieven) wrote:
>
>>I trust that this helps add to the information on this issue.
>
> Not really.
>
> They describe water freezing on the service tower as a result of being
> cooled by the ET - which requires the wind to blow roughly
> right-to-left (with regards to the Shuttle). This places the RH SRB
> on the upwind side.
Yes, winds never change direction at all over a 12 hour period.
> The annotated photograph used to 'prove' the cold air theory shows the
> wind being blown roughly left-to-right - and places the RH SRB on the
> downwind side.
>
> The quote in your other message indicates a lower temp on the RH SRB,
> so the Aerospaceweb.org seems to add noise rather than signal.
Only if your exposure to meteorology is that of watching local
accuweather...
But, thanks for your handwaving and smokescreening...
Andre
Revision
"Joseph Nebus"
> but there's still reason to
> be curious about how they unfolded.
Yes. It is seldom mentioned that the SRB casings on this booster were
considerably out-of-round, due to a hard impact with the ocean on an
earlier launch. This suggests to me that the thing may have failed
regardless of the temperature. And with the combination of the poor fit
and the cold temps, I wonder if it is necessary to include wind shear as
part of the cause. An unfortunate confluence of events....
--
Posted via a free Usenet account from http://www.teranews.com
Derek Lyons
>Derek Lyons (fair...@gmail.com) writes:
>> dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Andre Lieven) wrote:
>>
>>>Derek Lyons (fair...@gmail.com) writes:
>>>> dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Andre Lieven) wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>Derek Lyons (fair...@gmail.com) writes:
>>>>>> dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Andre Lieven) wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>Derek Lyons (fair...@gmail.com) writes:
>>>>>> I've heard that theory before, but it's always seemed a bit facile to
>>>>>> me. For one thing, what about that big whompin' mass of fuel grain
>>>>>> adjacent to the joint? For another, at what level was the analysis
>>>>>> performed? The FSS/RSS/MLP/Shuttle stack is big enough and complex
>>>>>> enough in geomety for all manner of vortices and counterflows to
>>>>>> develop.
>>>>>
>>>>>Again, if the cold wind is blowing from one side of the stack to the
>>>>>other, it follows that the far side SRB will recieve the bulk of the
>>>>>migrating airflow coming off of the ET.
>>>>
>>>> Agin - no, it does not follow, once you get above the handwaving and
>>>> smokescreen level of analysis.
>>>
>>>Name calling and Rand like one liners do not a cogent argument make.
>>
>> Had I indulged in either, you'd have a point.
>
>Oh, you meant " handwaving " and " smokescreen " is a GOOD way...
There's few other terms available for a simplistic analysis that
ignores possibly relevant facts.
>> What I did was point
>> out your failure to read, understand, and adress the complex issues
>> involved.
>
>No, you claimed such: No proof offered ? Ad hominem fact free claim fails.
Huh? Where *precisely* did you provide any indication that you had
read, understood, and adressed the complex issue I raised?
Or are you just indulging in your favorite way to divert attention
from questions you don't want to answer.
>>>" At 3:10 AM the launch crew began pumping in liquid hydrogen and
>>>liquid oxygen into the seperate tanks inside the giant external tank of
>>>Challenger. The twenty seven degree temperature felt cold to the ice
>>>teams on the pad as the ten mile an hour wind blew against the
>>>shuttle. The fuel in the external tank , at less than 400 degrees
>>>below zero, contributed to the cold, and the launchpad was a bitingly
>>>uncomfortable place to be that morning. The field joints, the O rings,
>>>and the putty sealing them now reached a temperature of twenty nine
>>>degrees. The O rings were already shrinking and hardening from the
>>>cold at each of the field joints on the two fifteen story tall SRBs.
>>>The shrunken O rings were so cold that the surrounding putty had
>>>congealed to a cold greasy substance. The ice team does not report
>>>surface temperatures routinely. So the twenty five degrees on the left
>>>booster and the eight degree temperature on the right ( The one that
>>>failed. ) booster were never reported to the launch team in the
>>>firing room. " Page 285, Joseph Trento, " Perscription For Disaster .
>>>
>>>Note the two different SRB temps...
>>
>> Note the lack of context as to location on the SRB's.
>
>Note that the quoted section refutes your claim...
Try learning to fucking read and think rather than parroting quotes.
>>>uncomfortable place to be that morning. The field joints, the O rings,
>>>and the putty sealing them now reached a temperature of twenty nine
>>>degrees.
Where *precisely* is the source of the data of the temperature inside
the joints?
The only other place that mentions temperatures *and* a location does
_not_ mention locations other than the broad and general "left/right
booster". I'll quote it so you can find it:
>>>So the twenty five degrees on the left booster and the eight degree
>>>temperature on the right ( The one that failed. )
So, where *precisely* is the context as to the locations of
temperature measurments on the SRB?
Derek Lyons
>Derek Lyons (fair...@gmail.com) writes:
>> dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Andre Lieven) wrote:
>>
>>>I trust that this helps add to the information on this issue.
>>
>> Not really.
>>
>> They describe water freezing on the service tower as a result of being
>> cooled by the ET - which requires the wind to blow roughly
>> right-to-left (with regards to the Shuttle). This places the RH SRB
>> on the upwind side.
>
>Yes, winds never change direction at all over a 12 hour period.
Certainly it does. Did it change the night prior to the launch? Did
it change early enough to significantly effect the temperature of the
O-rings? Though steel is highly conductive thermally - it takes time
to cool a mass of it down. (This is an important consideration
considering the Ice Team can only measure the surface temperature of
the SRB.)
As the article stands - the proof of the existence of a LH-to-RH
breeze on the night prior the launch is an event requiring a RH-to-LH
breeze. Logical inconsistencies like requiring black to be treated as
if it was white are normally considered death to a theory.
>> The annotated photograph used to 'prove' the cold air theory shows the
>> wind being blown roughly left-to-right - and places the RH SRB on the
>> downwind side.
>>
>> The quote in your other message indicates a lower temp on the RH SRB,
>> so the Aerospaceweb.org seems to add noise rather than signal.
>
>Only if your exposure to meteorology is that of watching local
>accuweather...
>
>But, thanks for your handwaving and smokescreening...
Let's compare - me thinking and analyzing the evidence. You - quoting
other people and onelining.
Scott Hedrick
> dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Andre Lieven) wrote:
>
>>I trust that this helps add to the information on this issue.
And Shania Twain is *still* from Canada.
Scott Hedrick
"Derek Lyons" <fair...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:4685997a...@news.supernews.com...
> dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Andre Lieven) wrote:
>>>>firing room. " Page 285, Joseph Trento, " Perscription For Disaster .
>>>>
>>>>Note the two different SRB temps...
>>>
>>> Note the lack of context as to location on the SRB's.
>>
>>Note that the quoted section refutes your claim...
>
> Try learning to fucking read and think rather than parroting quotes.
Especially since he couldn't even spell the name of the book correctly.
Unless "Perscription" is a Canadian thing.