Instrumentalism V Realism
Jeff O'Brien
was lost in the copy+ paste from MS Word. Ifanyone would care to have a
copy, primarily for the sake of references, feel free to email me-
jeffo@***uvic.ca
----
"There is no need for [these] hypotheses to be true, or even to be at all
like the truth; rather, one thing is sufficient for them- that they should
yield calculations which agree with the observations."
The role of science is to determine causal anthropomorphic laws that explain
or predict phenomena. These laws are meant to serve strictly pragmatic
purposes in that it is useful to be able to explain past events or to have
the ability, to predict future events or particu-lar potential occurrences
of a phenomenon. It is not the case, however, that science should be
inherently concerned with determining the Truth, or even be interested in
find-ing objective truths that are independent of our existence or awareness
of such truths. Contrary to what I perceive to be common belief, and the
common cannon of thought in the philosophy of science, science should serve
strictly that of an explanatory role, and be concerned with the explanation
of and prediction of phenomenon. Realism and Instru-mentalism differ in
their ontological framework; nonetheless, they share the same meth-odology.
Realism posits the existence of objective truths that are independent of our
existence and independent of our potential awareness of their existence.
Akin to Platonic forms, real-ism purports the existence of a supreme truth
that exists in the real world and is apt to be discovered by humans. Karl
Popper suggests that realists are interested with three doc-trines:
1) The scientist aims at finding a true theory or description of the world,
which shall also be an explanation of the observable facts.
2) The scientist can succeed in finally establishing the truth of such
theories beyond all reasonable doubt.
3) The best, the truly scientific theories, describe the 'essences' or the
'essential nature' of things- the realities that lie behind the appearances.
Similarly, Hilary Putnam suggests the following formulation of realism: "A
realist holds that (1) the sentences of that theory or discourse are true or
false; and (2) that what makes them true or false is something external. it
is not (in general) our sense data, actual or potential, or the structure of
our minds, or our language, etc." Putnam contends that scientific objects
are real and exist quite separate from our knowledge of such existence.
Philip Kitcher, another scientific realist, suggests that science should be
concerned, and is concerned, with the truth-value of important questions as
well as finding dependencies between objects. However, science should not
simply be concerned with the truths of par-ticular statements, rather,
science should attempt to discover what real natural kinds exist in the real
world. Kitcher contends, "Sober realists who understand human cognitive
limitations will see that the whole truth is not something that we want. in
some cases the attempt to achieve truth would interfere with our primary
aims." The primary task of science is to ". achieve a language that
recognizes natural divisions and a set of ex-planatory schemata that pick
out dependencies."
Instrumentalists, on the other hand, posit that scientific theories and
their corresponding entities and objects do not necessarily exist; rather,
they are merely instruments or tools that are useful for explaining past
phenomenon as well as predicting future events. The important philosophical
difference, hence, between realism and instrumentalism concerns ontology. A
realist would contend that a scientific entity exists and has a particular
be-ing, or existence, in the natural world. The instrumentalist would
contend that a scientific entity does not necessarily exist, and is simply a
tool for explanatory purposes, or to po-tentially fill a gap in a theory.
It is crucial to note that instrumentalists do not necessarily believe that
entities and ob-jects posited by scientists exist. In fact, they might
indeed exist. But how is it possible to determine the existence of another
object in the absolute fashion that most realists, with the exception of
Kitcher, wish to do?
It is not possible to recognize truth unless one has access to what is
actually true, and can therefore make a comparison between what may be true,
and what is true. The same is true for scientific entities; unless we have
access to the true form, or essence, it is ridicu-lous to posit that such
form or essence exists. Thus, it is paradoxical to assert that we can have
access to the objective truth of anything, for we do not yet have access to
any objec-tive truth in order to make the comparison to see exactly what
truth looks like. We know something is red because we have an idea of what
red is. That is not to say that red ex-ists, rather, it is more sensible to
say that we can see a red object. But clearly, that is not making an
existence claim, nor is it stating the existence of the entity in the real
world. I am in agreement with Bas van Fraassen when he contends that it is
a leap of faith to make the move to realism, and that pragmatism (or
instrumentalism) is agnostic in that no leap of faith is required.
The aim of science, therefore, should be to explain causal relationships
between objects, as well as the prediction and explanation of past and
future events, rather than concern itself with the truth-value or existence
(the ontological nature, perhaps) of these objects. In the explanation of
such causal relationships, it is not necessary for any object to actu-ally
exist. One can postulate a particular entity to fulfill a gap in a theory,
and hence, have stipulated a causal relationship between 2, or more entities
in the theory- without ever making any existence claim whatsoever on behalf
of any of the entities. However, it is not the case that the mere
postulation of a fictional entity will automatically render that it does not
exist; rather, as I have stated above, the instrumentalist makes the
assertion that the postulation of a fictional identity does not necessarily
mean that the entity does not exist. It is fictional at the time of
postulation for it has yet to be discovered; however, upon later discovery,
which may or may not occur, one may find that it actually does ex-ist.
Consequently, I propose that there can be a viable movement, and quite a
plausible one, from that of instrumentalism to realism. But such is not
necessarily the concern of science- the concern should be on the causal
relationships between entities, rather than the ontological status of
entities.
Realism and Instrumentalism are both concerned with the same objective
(causal rela-tionships between entities and the explanation of events).
Accordingly so, there is no methodological difference between the two
stances, only an ontological difference. But ontology should not be the
concern of science, as I have previously stated. In effect, it should not
matter if one is a realist or an instrumentalist: what matters is to what
degree the theory works. A theory works when it has explanatory power, in
that it can explain a relationship between two or more entities, fictional
entities or not; empirical adequacy, in that what the theory says about
observations is true, and the theory does not go any deeper that what can be
observed. Such would be entering into the realm of speculative
metaphysics, or ontology, a realm that science should not venture into.
The common argument in favor of realism stipulates that it is common sense
to accept realism because science works- science is what puts airplanes in
the air, keeps trains on their tracks, and constructs bridges across
otherwise impassable terrain. While all this is true, it does not
necessarily follow that because of science's success one should make the
leap of faith and immediately fall victim to the speculative metaphysics of
realism. Sci-ence will work independent of the existence of entities
proposed by realism. Real proper-ties are not necessary for doing science,
rather, it is only necessary to observe phenome-non, and conceive of
relationships and deductions between such phenomena. Why is it necessary to
delve into speculative metaphysics simply because science works? It just
does not follow. Instrumentalism can explain everything that realism can,
as both have the same methodology and goals- without the absurd metaphysics
of realism.
Instrumentalism can also account for the apparent mistakes made in the past
in the history of science. There have been many changes in the supported,
most popular cannon of thought in all areas of science. Phlogiston theory
worked up until the late eighteenth cen-tury- and was useful in explaining
observed phenomenon in that era. David Bloor states:
Phlogiston was tentatively identified with the gas we call hydrogen. The
chemists of the eighteenth century knew how to prepare this gas but their
conception of its properties and behavior was very different to ours. They
believed, for example, that phlogiston would be absorbed by a substance they
called 'minimum' or 'lead calx' - or what we would call 'lead oxide'.
Furthermore they believed that when it absorbed phlogiston the minimum would
turn into lead (cf. Connant (1966) ).
Joseph Priestly was able to provide a convincing demonstration of this
theory. He took an inverted gas jar filled with phlogiston which was
trapped over water. Floating on the water was a crucible containing some
minimum. This was heated by using the sun's rays concentrated by a burning
glass. The result was exactly what he expected. The minimum turned into
lead, and as an indication that it had absorbed the phlogiston the water
level in the gas jar rose dramatically. Here surely was a demonstration
that the theory corresponded with reality.
It is interesting to compare Priestley's analysis on this experiment with
our ver-sion, because as far as we are concerned his theory. does not
correspond with reality at all. We do not say that the phlogiston was
absorbed into the minimum or that the water emerged from the minimum. We
say that the gas in the jar is hydrogen and that the minimum is lead oxide.
On heating, the oxygen comes out of the oxide leaving the lead.
Given the above, how then does a realist account for such? Many
paradigmatic shifts have been made in the sciences; Newtonian physics to
Einsteinian physics, phlogiston theory to hydrogen and the corresponding
elements, Ptolemaic to Copernican to Galilean view of the universe, and so
on. A realist is in a tough place in accounting for these dis-crepancies.
It is seemingly necessary for the realist to state that these past systems
and the corresponding theories embedded in these systems were false. They
were incorrect, and I suppose, not in touch or did not represent the real
world of objective forms or enti-ties. The instrumentalist does not have to
take such a stance, however. The instrumental-ist can easily accommodate
such paradigmatic shifts in science because it is not necessary for the
instrumentalist to account for what reality actually is. Rather, these past
systems worked, they were pragmatic and served a useful role in the
explanation of common phe-nomenon and observed events. It is not the case
that these past theories were necessarily incorrect, as the realist would
like to suppose. Clearly, the same can be said for the theo-ries that we
hold today. Is it true that today's scientific theories are representative
of what reality actually is? Not necessarily, it would be very difficult to
determine whether or not they are indicative of what reality actually is,
for the truth-correspondence problem I out-lined above (the requisite
acquisition of truth for comparison to see what truth is and whether or not
something is indeed true). The instrumentalist can easily account for such.
Today's theories, and those of the past, merely serve a pragmatic,
explanatory pur-pose. But again, it is not the case that these entities
that the instrumentalist and the realist discuss are necessarily
theoretical, or false, rather, they may indeed exist, but we are not able to
determine such without engaging in speculative metaphysics.
--
Andreas Osiander in his preface to Copernicus' De revolutionibus; as
found in: Popper, Karl. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of
Scientific Knowledge. New York: Routledge Press, 1963. P 98.
Ibid., 103.
Putnam, Hilary. "Realism in Mathematics and Elsewhere." In Scientific
Inquiry: Readings in the Phi-losophy of Science, edited by Robert Klee. New
York: Oxford Press, 1999. P 317.
Kitcher, Philip. "Realism and Scientific Progress." In Scientific
Inquiry: Readings in the Philosophy of Science, edited by Robert Klee. New
York: Oxford Press, 1999. P 330.
Ibid., 331.
Van Fraassen, Bas. "Alternatives to Realism." In Scientific Inquiry:
Readings in the Philosophy of Sci-ence, edited by Robert Klee. New York:
Oxford Press, 1999. P 326.
Ibid., 322.
Bloor, David. "The Strong Programme in the Sociology of Science." In
Scientific Inquiry: Readings in the Philosophy of Science, edited by Robert
Klee. New York: Oxford Press, 1999. P 244.
My emphasis.
--
jeff.
The Immortalist
news:BfMt8.22285$ir6.1...@news1.calgary.shaw.ca...
> Just looking for comments on the following paper. The footnote formatting
> was lost in the copy+ paste from MS Word. Ifanyone would care to have a
> copy, primarily for the sake of references, feel free to email me-
> jeffo@***uvic.ca
> ----
> "There is no need for [these] hypotheses to be true, or even to be at all
> like the truth; rather, one thing is sufficient for them- that they should
> yield calculations which agree with the observations."
>
this author? Hashing around I summerized some of my messy and sloppy junk,
and I put a network 'spin' on it. The statement of "inductively cogent
competitive methodology," below, should be more emphasized in your essay.
The "context wieght" or "corelation ratio," should be made more clear. It's
all here but your argument is actually stronger can thrash harder than it's
statement here. But it stands as it is in my opinion. Correct me here,
typing this stuff fast, my realism and absolute skepticisns needs to be
slightly corrected:
DEDUCTIVE THEORIES
Realist Position:
The belief that everything that exists has a 'self', an intrinsic nature,
which scientific method, over the decades and centuries, is capable of
cataloging in a way that is both correct and exact. The Universe exists in a
way that is just exactly so, and by carefully sifting evidence which we get
from asking the right questions humans can discover that absolute nature.
(Up until now, Realism defaults to Instrumentalism by the act of reasoning
about it since, by doing thus, the chance for error is introduced.)
Absolute Skepticism:
Nothing can be shown or proved with absolute certainty with no chance of
error. Since Absolute Skepticism is the most truth preserving argument, it
holds against "all" arguments herein and hereout. There is no known way to
eliminate all chance of error at this time in history.
INDUCTIVE THEORIES
Revisionist Position:
Similar to Instrumentalism but accepts new knowledge as undefeated
justification. All justification runs some risk of error. All revisionistic
theories are open to improvement if new but fallible knowlege justifies
revision. Any belief for what we believe is fallible. When a justification
is sought for what we believe, the best we can find will inevitably fall
short of gaurunteeing the truth of what we believe. Justification can aim at
truth but cannot eliminate the risk of error. A fallible justification may
prove a trustworthy and reliable guide to truth.
Instrumentalism:
Scientific theories and models of the universe are valid only in the sense
that they are useful in predicting events and explaining data consistently,
while at the same time making no claim that anything they describe actually
exists.
INDUCTIVE METHODOLOGIES
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Succesfully Competitive Inductive Cogency:
Depends upon the evidential and conceptual ("context") of reasoning. An
inductive argument from evidence to hypothesis is inductively cogent if and
only if the hypothesis is that hypothesis which, of all the competing
hypothesis, has the greatest probability of being true on the basis of the
evidence. Thus, whether it is reasonable to accept a hypothesis as true, if
the statements of evidence are true, is determined by whether that
hypothesis is the most probable, on the evidence, of all those with which it
competes.
Cornman, Lehrer, Papas;
Philisophical Problems & Arguments;
Page 33, Fourth Edition, 1992.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"aint this boogie a mess!?" Frank Zappa - pojama people
http://www.imho.com/grae/chaos/chaos.html
http://www.calresco.org/lucas/fuzzy.htm
ursus major
But please tell me, what is the purpose of this paper?
Is it a simple comparison? Are you presenting a position? Are you drawing a
conclusion? Is it expository? Argumentative? Why are you writing it?
Your English grammer seems correct. I won't check your references, but I
will credit you with correct quotations. So does the paper achieve it's
objective? Does the fact that I am asking what that objective is mean
anything?
> The role of science is to determine causal anthropomorphic laws that
explain
> or predict phenomena. [<snip>] It is not the case, however, that science
should be
> inherently concerned with determining the Truth, or even be interested in
> find-ing objective truths that are independent of our existence or
awareness
> of such truths. [<snip>], science should serve
> strictly that of an explanatory role, and be concerned with the
explanation
> of and prediction of phenomenon.
This is your theme.
>Realism and Instru-mentalism differ in
> their ontological framework; nonetheless, they share the same
meth-odology.
What is the relationship between your theme, and this sentence? Are you
going to demonstrate the Realism and Instrumentalism support or oppose your
theme? Are you going to support one or the other of these philosophical
approachs? What should I be looking for when I read the rest of your paper?
> Realism posits the existence of objective truths that are independent of
our
> existence and independent of our potential awareness of their existence.
> [<snip>] The primary task of science is to ". achieve a language that
> recognizes natural divisions and a set of ex-planatory schemata that pick
> out dependencies."
You have described the Realists position. So what conclusions should I have
drawn?
> Instrumentalists, on the other hand, posit that scientific theories and
> their corresponding entities and objects do not necessarily exist; rather,
> they are merely instruments or tools that are useful for explaining past
> phenomenon as well as predicting future events. [<snip>] But how is it
possible to determine the existence of another
> object in the absolute fashion that most realists, with the exception of
> Kitcher, wish to do?
Is this the end of the Instrumentalists position? Is it the beginning of
your position? Where are your references to the Instrumentalist position?
You have supported your statements concerning Realism, you should support
your statements concerning Instrumentalism.
Like reading a mystery, we have to deduce the position you are going to
take, and then search for where you are going to finally state it.
Tell us what you intend to prove. Prove it. Then give us your conclusion.
I didn't find a conclusion.
Alan Walkington
An engineer and proud of it
Jeff O'Brien
news:ubfbj4d...@corp.supernews.com...
> > "There is no need for [these] hypotheses to be true, or even to be at
all
> > like the truth; rather, one thing is sufficient for them- that they
should
> > yield calculations which agree with the observations."
> >
> Hello, I love this way of stating all this, is there a link to more works
by
> this author?
Indeed,
Andreas Osiander in his preface to Copernicus' De revolutionibus; as found
in: Popper, Karl. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific
Knowledge. New York: Routledge Press, 1963. P 98.
> The belief that everything that exists has a 'self', an intrinsic nature,
> which scientific method, over the decades and centuries, is capable of
> cataloging in a way that is both correct and exact. The Universe exists in
a
> way that is just exactly so, and by carefully sifting evidence which we
get
> from asking the right questions humans can discover that absolute nature.
> (Up until now, Realism defaults to Instrumentalism by the act of reasoning
> about it since, by doing thus, the chance for error is introduced.)
True- I think I adequately captured the essence of what you are saying when
I quote Hilary Putnam-
"A realist holds that (1) the sentences of that theory or discourse are true
or false; and (2) that what makes them true or false is something external.
it is not (in general) our sense data, actual or potential, or the structure
of our minds, or our language, etc." But indeed, what you are saying is
absolutely correct.
> INDUCTIVE THEORIES
>
> Revisionist Position:
> Similar to Instrumentalism but accepts new knowledge as undefeated
> justification. All justification runs some risk of error. All
revisionistic
> theories are open to improvement if new but fallible knowlege justifies
> revision. Any belief for what we believe is fallible. When a justification
> is sought for what we believe, the best we can find will inevitably fall
> short of gaurunteeing the truth of what we believe. Justification can aim
at
> truth but cannot eliminate the risk of error. A fallible justification may
> prove a trustworthy and reliable guide to truth.
Sounds quite Popperian, except for the "aim at [of] truth." Induction w/
probability. And a dash of pragmatism, I suppose.
> INDUCTIVE METHODOLOGIES
>
> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> Succesfully Competitive Inductive Cogency:
> Depends upon the evidential and conceptual ("context") of reasoning. An
> inductive argument from evidence to hypothesis is inductively cogent if
and
> only if the hypothesis is that hypothesis which, of all the competing
> hypothesis, has the greatest probability of being true on the basis of the
> evidence. Thus, whether it is reasonable to accept a hypothesis as true,
if
> the statements of evidence are true, is determined by whether that
> hypothesis is the most probable, on the evidence, of all those with which
it
> competes.
This is new to me. Or not- is this perhaps another term for "Inference to
the Best Explanation" (IBE)?
Anyways, thank you very much for your time
take care,
jeff.
Jeff O'Brien
news:llOt8.142992$S9.10...@news.easynews.com...
> I enjoy reading papers.
>
> But please tell me, what is the purpose of this paper?
> Is it a simple comparison? Are you presenting a position? Are you drawing
a
> conclusion? Is it expository? Argumentative? Why are you writing it?
You are absolutely correct. The paper is definitely a first draft, and I
have failed to adequately tie everything together as well as provide a
cogent outline/stream of thought for the reader. Thank you for pointing that
out to me.
And good point on the lack of support for the instrumentalist side [re: no
references] Another thing I wil touch up.
Thanks
take care
jeff.
ursus major
"Jeff O'Brien" <jeffo@***uvic.ca> wrote in message
news:OvQt8.23267$de1.1...@news3.calgary.shaw.ca...
Mike Dubbeld
Science only ever will know appearances per Kant. That is why science
is so successful. Science does not require of itself a 'Why' explanation or
teleological explanation - only a HOW explanation - based on appearances.
Gravity appears to behave according to F=MA. This tells us HOW gravity
appears. But not WHY. Not why F=2MA is not the case.
>
> Similarly, Hilary Putnam suggests the following formulation of realism: "A
> realist holds that (1) the sentences of that theory or discourse are true
or
> false; and (2) that what makes them true or false is something external.
it
> is not (in general) our sense data, actual or potential, or the structure
of
> our minds, or our language, etc." Putnam contends that scientific
objects
> are real and exist quite separate from our knowledge of such existence.
Realism by any other name.
>
> Philip Kitcher, another scientific realist, suggests that science should
be
> concerned, and is concerned, with the truth-value of important questions
as
> well as finding dependencies between objects. However, science should not
> simply be concerned with the truths of par-ticular statements, rather,
> science should attempt to discover what real natural kinds exist in the
real
> world. Kitcher contends, "Sober realists who understand human cognitive
> limitations will see that the whole truth is not something that we want.
in
> some cases the attempt to achieve truth would interfere with our primary
> aims." The primary task of science is to ". achieve a language that
> recognizes natural divisions and a set of ex-planatory schemata that pick
> out dependencies."
--- Or else we will cut off your research funding. We need information that
we can make a buck on. To hell with the truth.
>
> Instrumentalists, on the other hand, posit that scientific theories and
> their corresponding entities and objects do not necessarily exist; rather,
> they are merely instruments or tools that are useful for explaining past
> phenomenon as well as predicting future events. The important
philosophical
> difference, hence, between realism and instrumentalism concerns ontology.
A
> realist would contend that a scientific entity exists and has a particular
> be-ing, or existence, in the natural world. The instrumentalist would
> contend that a scientific entity does not necessarily exist, and is simply
a
> tool for explanatory purposes, or to po-tentially fill a gap in a theory.
>
Is money at the root of this distinction also?
> It is crucial to note that instrumentalists do not necessarily believe
that
> entities and ob-jects posited by scientists exist. In fact, they might
> indeed exist. But how is it possible to determine the existence of
another
> object in the absolute fashion that most realists, with the exception of
> Kitcher, wish to do?
Sounds like Plato's Theory of Forms to me. Abstact mathematics/reasoning.
Or are these also not real to instrumentalists?
>
> It is not possible to recognize truth unless one has access to what is
> actually true, and can therefore make a comparison between what may be
true,
> and what is true. The same is true for scientific entities; unless we
have
> access to the true form, or essence, it is ridicu-lous to posit that such
> form or essence exists.
Newton could not have discovered anything based on what you just said.
Since he did not know the true form (F=MA) - 'it is ridicu-lous to posit
that
such form or essence exists.'
Thus, it is paradoxical to assert that we can have
> access to the objective truth of anything, for we do not yet have access
to
> any objec-tive truth in order to make the comparison to see exactly what
> truth looks like. We know something is red because we have an idea of
what
> red is. That is not to say that red ex-ists, rather, it is more sensible
to
> say that we can see a red object.
Do I see nominalism creeping in here. Universals all over again.
But clearly, that is not making an
> existence claim, nor is it stating the existence of the entity in the real
> world. I am in agreement with Bas van Fraassen when he contends that it
is
> a leap of faith to make the move to realism, and that pragmatism (or
> instrumentalism) is agnostic in that no leap of faith is required.
This is beating around the buch. Redness is an abstract idea. Nobody says
'Look at that red.' Red is a quality of something. An aspect of something.
And lacking all aspects we could have nothing. If something is stripped of
all its aspects then the mind has nothing with which to relate/compare
something to and therefore is incapable of reaching any sort of rational
knowledge about that something. That is what Bishop Berkley argued.
Old news so what is your point? What is it that distinguishes
instrumentalism
in such a way that makes it different from realism such that it does not
require a leap of faith? It is no secret that we can not know an object as
you
say - except from that which the senses tell us. Since that is all we have
to
go on - phenomena and 2 people can come to agreement on certain aspects
of a phenomea - even though the real 'noumena' can not be known - so what?
"Human" existence is based on phenomena simply because that is all that
is available to the mind - in the form of aspects that can be quantified and
as such - by statistical/empirical reality - exist objectively. The rest is
simply
playing with words. Reality based on the senses is quantified aspects of
phenomena objectified by the fact that 2 or more people can verify it.
(Somthing which can not be said of our subjective senses or transcendental
experiences)
>
> The aim of science, therefore, should be to explain causal relationships
> between objects, as well as the prediction and explanation of past and
> future events, rather than concern itself with the truth-value or
existence
> (the ontological nature, perhaps) of these objects.
It does this NOW. In fact I consider science rather snotty about that very
fact. All other human endevors require WHY explanations. Not Ms science.
In the explanation of
> such causal relationships, it is not necessary for any object to actu-ally
> exist. One can postulate a particular entity to fulfill a gap in a
theory,
> and hence, have stipulated a causal relationship between 2, or more
entities
> in the theory- without ever making any existence claim whatsoever on
behalf
> of any of the entities.
This is something called 'mathematics'.
However, it is not the case that the mere
> postulation of a fictional entity will automatically render that it does
not
> exist; rather, as I have stated above, the instrumentalist makes the
> assertion that the postulation of a fictional identity does not
necessarily
> mean that the entity does not exist. It is fictional at the time of
> postulation for it has yet to be discovered; however, upon later
discovery,
> which may or may not occur, one may find that it actually does ex-ist.
Sounds like Quantum Theory to me.
> Consequently, I propose that there can be a viable movement, and quite a
> plausible one, from that of instrumentalism to realism. But such is not
> necessarily the concern of science- the concern should be on the causal
> relationships between entities, rather than the ontological status of
> entities.
Like the handoff in a quantum leap. You either have it or you don't. It
isn't practical for science to investigate what goes on inbetween because
the very moment of observation changes the outcome of the event
anyway.
>
> Realism and Instrumentalism are both concerned with the same objective
> (causal rela-tionships between entities and the explanation of events).
> Accordingly so, there is no methodological difference between the two
> stances, only an ontological difference. But ontology should not be the
> concern of science, as I have previously stated. In effect, it should not
> matter if one is a realist or an instrumentalist: what matters is to what
> degree the theory works. A theory works when it has explanatory power, in
> that it can explain a relationship between two or more entities, fictional
> entities or not; empirical adequacy, in that what the theory says about
> observations is true, and the theory does not go any deeper that what can
be
> observed. Such would be entering into the realm of speculative
> metaphysics, or ontology, a realm that science should not venture into.
Again this is QM in the nutshell. But based on what you said earlier - they
know that momentum of a particle is related to its spatial sine wave. They
know its spin orientation is related to a spherical wave nodes crossing
the poles. Each of these accurately describe attributes of particles. But
it drives them NUTS trying to figure out how the 2 differnert properties
of the waves relate to each other. Lots of theories. But based on what you
are saying it is not appropiate for science to try to find that
relationship.
It is not unlike a sophist arguement - 'A search for truth? - well if you
don't
know what you are looking for - then you have no basis on which to
conduct a search. And if you do know what truth is - then indeed there
is no need to go about searching for it.'
>
> The common argument in favor of realism stipulates that it is common sense
> to accept realism because science works- science is what puts airplanes in
> the air, keeps trains on their tracks, and constructs bridges across
> otherwise impassable terrain. While all this is true, it does not
> necessarily follow that because of science's success one should make the
> leap of faith and immediately fall victim to the speculative metaphysics
of
> realism. Sci-ence will work independent of the existence of entities
> proposed by realism. Real proper-ties are not necessary for doing
science,
> rather, it is only necessary to observe phenome-non, and conceive of
> relationships and deductions between such phenomena. Why is it necessary
to
> delve into speculative metaphysics simply because science works?
Its not. Realism is more like a mathematical model. Nothing in nature
follows
exactly any laws so far discovered exactly because nothing in nature is
perfect/
not subject to friction/losses/not perfectly round - experimental error. The
mathematical model is only an ideal. A noumena is more of a reminder of of
the limits of your tools. All we ever will have is noumena in the world of
experience from the senses. The mind itself has its own limitations.
It just
> does not follow. Instrumentalism can explain everything that realism can,
> as both have the same methodology and goals- without the absurd
metaphysics
> of realism.
Practically people tend to refer to realism as opposed to existentialism or
idealism
as meaning they lean more heavily to one side or another.
>
> Instrumentalism can also account for the apparent mistakes made in the
past
> in the history of science. There have been many changes in the supported,
> most popular cannon of thought in all areas of science. Phlogiston theory
> worked up until the late eighteenth cen-tury- and was useful in explaining
> observed phenomenon in that era. David Bloor states:
> Phlogiston was tentatively identified with the gas we call hydrogen. The
> chemists of the eighteenth century knew how to prepare this gas but their
> conception of its properties and behavior was very different to ours.
They
> believed, for example, that phlogiston would be absorbed by a substance
they
> called 'minimum' or 'lead calx' - or what we would call 'lead oxide'.
> Furthermore they believed that when it absorbed phlogiston the minimum
would
> turn into lead (cf. Connant (1966) ).
>
'Ether' is comming back again.
> Joseph Priestly was able to provide a convincing demonstration of this
> theory. He took an inverted gas jar filled with phlogiston which was
> trapped over water. Floating on the water was a crucible containing some
> minimum. This was heated by using the sun's rays concentrated by a
burning
> glass. The result was exactly what he expected. The minimum turned into
> lead, and as an indication that it had absorbed the phlogiston the water
> level in the gas jar rose dramatically. Here surely was a demonstration
> that the theory corresponded with reality.
>
> It is interesting to compare Priestley's analysis on this experiment with
> our ver-sion, because as far as we are concerned his theory. does not
> correspond with reality at all. We do not say that the phlogiston was
> absorbed into the minimum or that the water emerged from the minimum. We
> say that the gas in the jar is hydrogen and that the minimum is lead
oxide.
> On heating, the oxygen comes out of the oxide leaving the lead.
>
> Given the above, how then does a realist account for such? Many
> paradigmatic shifts have been made in the sciences; Newtonian physics to
> Einsteinian physics, phlogiston theory to hydrogen and the corresponding
> elements, Ptolemaic to Copernican to Galilean view of the universe, and so
> on. A realist is in a tough place in accounting for these dis-crepancies.
I bet you are a Bohr/Heisenberg fan.
> It is seemingly necessary for the realist to state that these past systems
> and the corresponding theories embedded in these systems were false. They
> were incorrect, and I suppose, not in touch or did not represent the real
> world of objective forms or enti-ties. The instrumentalist does not have
to
> take such a stance, however. The instrumental-ist can easily accommodate
> such paradigmatic shifts in science because it is not necessary for the
> instrumentalist to account for what reality actually is.
Or you could construe this as the instrumentalist copout.
Rather, these past
> systems worked, they were pragmatic and served a useful role in the
> explanation of common phe-nomenon and observed events. It is not the case
> that these past theories were necessarily incorrect, as the realist would
> like to suppose. Clearly, the same can be said for the theo-ries that we
> hold today. Is it true that today's scientific theories are
representative
> of what reality actually is?
As a partial picture. I doubt if anyone in QM is happy with the current
state of affairs.
Not necessarily, it would be very difficult to
> determine whether or not they are indicative of what reality actually is,
> for the truth-correspondence problem I out-lined above (the requisite
> acquisition of truth for comparison to see what truth is and whether or
not
> something is indeed true). The instrumentalist can easily account for
such.
> Today's theories, and those of the past, merely serve a pragmatic,
> explanatory pur-pose. But again, it is not the case that these entities
> that the instrumentalist and the realist discuss are necessarily
> theoretical, or false, rather, they may indeed exist, but we are not able
to
> determine such without engaging in speculative metaphysics.
>
'There is no deep reality'.
You can drive around your neighborhood following the garbage man
and watch him collect peoples trash. But if you do not know the
purpose that he is doing this to start with - you never will know that
purpose by your simple activity of watching them collect garbage.
All you will know is how they collect it. Without the deeper meaning
of WHY they collect it other activities of the garbage men will always
be a mystery to you. But you can justify like you say that it is only
the business of science to observe the garbage men and not try to
know the real purpose of their activities - but your benefactors just
may not see that as holding much water. Science does a pretty good
job of hyping themselves in determining HOW things work but it
leaves much to be desired on many accounts.
Mike Dubbeld
socrates314
Hi Jeff,
I don't have much time and so just took a quick glance over your
interesting paper. So given that I might not have thought enough about
it, here are some quick comments:
1.) I'd try to avoid using phrases like 'objective truths', 'supreme
truth' or 'recognize truth'. There are no truths; truth is a special
sort of relational predicate. It's less misleading and much clearer to
stringently talk about sentences being true, theories being confirmed,
etc.
2.) I don't think that any realist would claim that realism '...purports
the existence of a supreme truth'. So if you think this is a view of
realism, you should give a source.
3.) You claim that instrumentalists claim that the objects as well as
the scientific theories themselves do not 'necessarily exist'. First,
this is misleading, since no realist would claim that they exist
necessarily either. ('Necessarily' is ambiguous between a metaphysical
claim and a common-sense, ordinary language meaning.) Second, if the
theories themselves did not exist, there would be no science. So this
part of the claim must be wrong.
4.) You might need to further work out the motivation of the
instrumentalists. As you present their view, it just doesn't look right.
A theory that talks about entities that do not exist is either (a) wrong
or (b) subject to Occam's Razor because it stipulates entities that do
not exist. You'd need to point out what instrumentalists have to say
about such an objection.
5.) You object to the realists that they dive into speculative
metaphysics, yet I can find no good reason for this claim. In fact,
realists claim exactly the opposite, so at least you'd need to show in
detail why they make metaphysical claims. (You seem to assume that the
existance of objects cannot be confirmed, but most realists claim the
opposite.)
6.) Please avoid phrases like 'necessarily follow' if you just mean
'follow'; it's misleading.
7.) The end of your essay is extremely strange because it mentions one
of the strongest arguments *in favor* of realism as an argument against
it. According to the instrumentalist view you've sketched, the
phlogiston theory would be correct, since it correctly explains the
phenomena. According to the realist, it is wrong because phlogiston does
not exist. Realism can explain some paradigm shifts very easily: It has
turned out that some stipulated entities (like phlogiston or aether) did
not exist, so the theories had to be revised. Instrumentalism cannot
account for that as long as a theory is explanatory correct. Realists
may object to instrumentalists that their view hinders scientific
progress, since according to their view, there would be no need to see
wether the entities talked about really exist or not as long as the
theory makes correct predictions, while the realist theory is under
constant pressure to provide empirical evidence for the existence of
their stipulated entities.
These are just a few points. Otherwise your paper looks fine. But it
needs some more arguments in favor of instrumentalism in order to be
convincing at all. Particularly, there should be more room for arguments
of the instrumentalists against point 7.
Michael Mcneil
English. I love big words but after a couple of sentences they tend to
dazzle me.
--
Posted via Mailgate.ORG Server - http://www.Mailgate.ORG
Leonardo Dasso
"Jeff O'Brien" <jeffo@***uvic.ca> wrote in message
news:BfMt8.22285$ir6.1...@news1.calgary.shaw.ca...
> Just looking for comments on the following paper. The footnote
formatting
> was lost in the copy+ paste from MS Word. Ifanyone would care to
have a
> copy, primarily for the sake of references, feel free to email me-
> jeffo@***uvic.ca
> ----
I think it reads fine. The discussion reminds me quite a bit of
Hacking's " Representing and Intervening." I notice you dont quote
Hacking, though.
regards
leo
The Immortalist
actually "the aim" in my interpratation here
is an attemp at not just qualities resulting from
contextual analysis but also a predictive
element, as in neural networks predicting outcomes
from fallibal, but to the extent that functionality
in solving problems, justifiable. Scenerios or
schemata, or what do you call it in
epistemology? Popper did not like any approach
that attempted to predict....
> > INDUCTIVE METHODOLOGIES
> >
> > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> > Succesfully Competitive Inductive Cogency:
> > Depends upon the evidential and conceptual
> > ("context") of reasoning. An inductive argument
> > from evidence to hypothesis is inductively cogent
> > if and only if
> > the hypothesis is that hypothesis which,
> > of all the competing hypothesis, has the
> > greatest probability of being true on the
> > basis of the evidence.
> > Thus,
> > whether it is reasonable to accept a
> > hypothesis as true, if the statements
> > of evidence are true, is determined by whether
> > that hypothesis is the most probable, on the
> > evidence, of all those with which it
> > competes.
>
> This is new to me. Or not- is this perhaps
> another term for "Inference to
> the Best Explanation" (IBE)?
>
IBE would be a component in a network.
I am currently reinventing the wheel(?) but
I use the statement above and combine it with
a "pattern of organization" theory. It would not
be a single hypothesis that wins in this scenario
but a small group. Beyond that no theories are
rejected but the part that explains within them
is noted (network memory). No theory in this scenario
can be disproved but fits on a hilly "terrain of degrees"
of truthhood and falsity. The truths in each theory or
explaination would be like nodes in a network and should
not be discounted because it have value as a particular
reference in that region of the it's topological domain
space. When particular problems come up then the small
group can consist of partial explainations, originating
from ANY location withing the terrain, but when combined
together produce further, but more evidential producing,
self-referential knowledge growth.
More or less, a group of these theories, only those
theories that offer any amount of evidence, could be
considered "a species" of knowledge. As differing
problems arise truth arises as waves of like a digital
sign with blinking lights shifting the goalposts in
cyclic regions creating esotericly but fallibal roving foundationalism..
[(foundationalist/contextualism) what a contradiction!]
OR the goal-posts and the boundies adjust themselves
to the terrain of the particular problem dynamics.
making it up as i go along but its out there said in some
other ways. I am useing it as a further component in the
emerging science of socio-complexity. I think it has been
called evolutionary epistemology before but i like to call
it intuitive knowledge. but it sure is fun to find little
areas in cuttin' edge philosophy where you can still
make stuff up...
Kevin Kelly on;
Decentralized remembering as an act of perception:
"memories are like emergent events summed out
of many discrete, unmemory-like fragments stored
in the brain. These pieces of half-thoughts have
no fixed home; they abide throughout the brain.
Their manner of storage differs substantially from
thought to thought-learning to shuffle cards is
organized differently than learning the capital of
Bolivia - and the manner differs subtly from person
to person, and equally subtly from time to time."
http://www.kk.org/outofcontrol/ch2-d.html
Robert Wright on Popper:
(The philosopher Karl Popper felt that "the belief in historical destiny is
sheer superstition." Besides, he added, even if there were a destiny, it
would be unknowable. "There can be no prediction of the course of human
history by scientific or any other rational methods."
Popper's basic argument was simple. History is heavily influenced by the
growth of knowledge. And we can't predict the future growth of knowledge.
After all, if we could say today what new things we'll know tomorrow, then
we'd already know them today, and they wouldn't be new tomorrow. Right?
Right. If we knew today how to build an affordable desktop computer that is
fifty times more powerful than current desktop computers, we'd already have
it on our desks. On the other hand, does anyone doubt that eventually we
will have such computers on our desks? For purposes of prediction, isn't the
fact that we'll have them more important than the question of exactly how
we'll make them?)
http://www.nonzero.org/chap14.htm
Bryan Reed
Jeff O'Brien <jeffo@***uvic.ca> wrote:
>Just looking for comments on the following paper. The footnote formatting
>was lost in the copy+ paste from MS Word. Ifanyone would care to have a
>copy, primarily for the sake of references, feel free to email me-
>jeffo@***uvic.ca
Well, you asked for comments . . .
>----
>"There is no need for [these] hypotheses to be true, or even to be at all
>like the truth; rather, one thing is sufficient for them- that they should
>yield calculations which agree with the observations."
>
Who are you quoting, and what is the subject of the quote? Your paper
starts out by confusing the reader.
>The role of science is to determine causal anthropomorphic laws that explain
>or predict phenomena.
Anthropomorphic? Man-shaped? Don't use a long, inaccurate word where a
shorter, more accurate word would be better. An opening statement should
be perfectly clear.
>These laws are meant to serve strictly pragmatic
>purposes in that it is useful to be able to explain past events or to have
>the ability, to predict future events or particu-lar potential occurrences
>of a phenomenon.
The long construction including both "pragmatic" and "useful" is
redundant. It can be shortened and re-arranged to flow better and be more
easily understood. Your first two sentences also repeat each other
somewhat.
"Particular potential occurrences of a phenomenon" is both wordy and
unclear. Find something shorter that's closer to what you really mean.
> It is not the case, however, that science should be
"Science should not be . . ."
>inherently concerned with determining the Truth, or even be interested in
>find-ing objective truths that are independent of our existence or awareness
>of such truths.
Again, redundant. Isn't that what "objective" means? If you're defining
"objective," make it clear that you are. If you're not, why the
redundancy?
> Contrary to what I perceive to be common belief,
Wordy and pretentious-sounding. Shorten it or leave it out.
>and the
>common cannon of thought in the philosophy of science,
Some redundancy here as well. "Common cannon of thought" is very
pretentious. Also misspelled.
> science should serve
>strictly that of an explanatory role, and be concerned with the explanation
>of and prediction of phenomenon.
Ungrammatical and wordy. And redundant, if not contradictory. It serves
strictly an explanatory role, and it is concerned with explanation . . .
AND prediction?
"Science should be concerned only with the explanation and prediction of
phenomena."
> Realism and Instru-mentalism differ in
>their ontological framework; nonetheless, they share the same meth-odology.
>
Belongs in the next paragraph. Also the sentence construction is
needlessly complex. "; nonetheless," can be replaced by ", but",
improving flow, shortening the text, and making it sound not quite as
pretentious. "differ in their x" might be replaced with "have different
x's", again improving flow. Separating the two parts with a semicolon
indicates that the main idea is in the first part, while the second part
is just a sort of side note. But don't you really want to be talking
about the contrast between the two parts?
In the end, you have, "Realism and instrumentalism have different
ontological frameworks but the same methodology." It includes the same
information, is less misleading, and flows much better.
Work on it. It could be half as long and say just as much, and more
clearly. Drop the pretentious, wordy language and just say what you mean
in plain language. Only use a technical term when the common term won't
do, and define it when you do so.
Bryan
P. S. Please don't take this as me being harsh. I would never have
learned to write if someone hadn't taken the effort to do exactly the same
thing to me that I just did to you. I know what it's like to have your
writing torn apart like this, but I don't know of any other way to learn
good writing.