[...]
-
>> >I don't know what "around here" refers to, but I've been on
>> >the Net for about ten years. It may have escaped your
>> >notice that this thread is posted to several newsgroups, and
>>
>> Such a gift for understatement: "several" newsgroups.
>>
>hehehe
>
>> >I don't read them all regularly.
>>
>> But you post to them anyway? You're a jerk.
>>
>You are posting as much as he is. (So am I for that matter...but less
>often.)
>
>Pot. Kettle. Black.
You are correct. And I am willing to apologize and excise the excess
groups as soon he tells me just which group he is posting from. I
assume it is sci.skeptic, but since that is the third group on his list
I do not feel safe in acting on that assumption.
BTW, it apepars he initiated the giant cross-psot, while I simply
carried them along in my response. Accordingly,. please consider this
pot to be dark grey rather than black.
[...]
>> It's hard to take anyone seriously that cross-posts to so many
>> off-topic newgroups.
>
>And this goes for you as well. Ever heard of mirrors? Speaking of which
>I am going to cut some crossposts out of the follow-up...
Sounds good to me. Reckon he'll see it? Be a shame if he mssed your
spirited defense of him.e
I do sometimes wish that headers carried the posted-from newsgroup
explicitly.
--
********** DAVE HATUNEN (hat...@netcom.com) **********
* Daly City California *
* Between San Francisco and South San Francisco *
*******************************************************
+all good parallel parkers know
+this viscerally, but I cannot believe anyone actually
+applies the Campbell-Hausdorff formula and the exponential
+mapping from the Lie algebra to the Lie group in a conscious
+way.
More than viscerally; without claiming to apply quite so
much analysis to the matter, I know that I consciously
*do* exercise a moderately well-trained intuition about
tangent vector fields in parking in NYC -- and have at
times surprised the natives about the spots I can get
into (and out of!) This is especially important when you
have moved (in consequence of "alternate side parking")
to the other side of the street and some jerks have later
closed to within centimeters before and behind.
--
Michael L. Siemon (m...@panix.com)
Cast your bread on the Internet -- and be nibbled to death by dorks.
You tell me. I didn't make the claim.
-Dave
Pick up thread HERE ----> *
Wyatt seems to believe that the concept of friction is somehow alien to
Newtoniam mechanics. It's not. Why are folks like Wyatt so proud of their
ignorance?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Carl J Lydick | INTERnet: CA...@SOL1.GPS.CALTECH.EDU | NSI/HEPnet: SOL1::CARL
Disclaimer: Hey, I understand VAXen and VMS. That's what I get paid for. My
understanding of astronomy is purely at the amateur level (or below). So
unless what I'm saying is directly related to VAX/VMS, don't hold me or my
organization responsible for it. If it IS related to VAX/VMS, you can try to
hold me responsible for it, but my organization had nothing to do with it.
OK. Now I take you seriously.
Did that help?
g...@panix.com (Gordon Fitch) writes:
|>You mean outside the human mind? If so, can you say where?
|>It's my belief that "physical laws" are human constructions
|>of patterns observed in phenomena, and that they do not exist
|>separately from someone thinking about them.
Carl J Lydick <ca...@SOL1.GPS.CALTECH.EDU> wrote:
| >Ah, yes. He *IS* one of Erb's fellow morons. They exist in the patterns,
| >shit-for-brains.
ds...@faraday.clas.Virginia.EDU (David Salvador Flores):
| Can you prove this? Can you prove, for instance that F=Gm(1)m(2)/r^2
| exists in the gravitational force that two bodies m(1) and m(2)
| separated by r exert upon each other, as opposed to F=Gm(1)m(2)/r^2
| merely describing that force. And how would the universe be different if
| F=Gm(1)m(2)/r^2 merely described the force, as opposed to existing
| in the force?
I kind of like the idea of all the little particles and
forces having all the formulas which they "obey" inscribed
on them. If one could only get the right kind of
microscope one could catch, say, an electron, and read it
-- read _everything_ -- not just _our_ versions of the
laws, either, but any other set of laws which might account
for its behavior. In different languages, too, or maybe in
some master language. And why not? It's all sort of
Borgesian, except I guess Borges would have one electron be
the key to all the others, and one would have to hunt
through the universe for it. "Leibnizian" would be better;
Leibniz's monads were each supposed to reflect the whole
universe, were they not? And so each one would have Carl
Lydick saying "moron, moron" as well as Marilyn Monroe, the
Hunchback of Notre Dame, and a reminder not to forget to
perform F=Gm(1)m(2)/r^2 regularly with all the other
particles.
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
I think we've seen a good example of that in this thread.
While the performance in question was merely humorous
because the audience was reasonably well-informed, as a
regular practice it could frighten small children and turn
them into little dogmatists in turn. Hence I question the
supposed value of science education, since it turns science
into its opposite; maybe the phrase "science education" is
an oxymoron.
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
Because, you goddamned moron, people do, in fact, use Newtonian mechanics all
the time. They may not apply it via formal models most of the time, but in
their everyday interactions with the world, they're constantly applying
Newtonian mechanics informally. Now, as to why one should teach them the
formalism, do you think that the fact that it could save lives to do so would
be a sufficient reason? If so, then I suggest you conduct a small survey,
asking the following question:
If it takes your car 30 yards to stop after you've applied the brakes
while travelling at 30 mph, how long would it take the car to stop
after you applied the brakes while travelling at 60 mph.
Chances are that most of the people you ask will give a figure of somewhere
around 60 yards. Did you ever wonder just why it is that spectacular
multi-vehicle collisions on highways during foggy weather are relatively
common? A major part of the problem is that the drivers consistently
underestimate how long it will take to stop, given that they're travelling at
highway speeds. They haven't had much experience trying to stop for a
suddenly-appearing stationary obstacle on a highway (though they're likely to
have some experience doing so on surface streets). So they've got to
extrapolate from their experience at surface-street speeds to highway speeds.
And because they don't understand any formal model of Newtonian mechanics,
they've got a tendency to extrapolate incorrectly. They make the assumption
that if you're going twice as fast, it'll take you twice as long to stop,
instead of four times a long.
[...]
>>Ah, yes. He *IS* one of Erb's fellow morons. They exist in the patterns,
>>shit-for-brains.
>
>Can you prove this? Can you prove, for instance that F=Gm(1)m(2)/r^2
>exists in the gravitational force that two bodies m(1) and m(2)
>separated by r exert upon each other, as opposed to F=Gm(1)m(2)/r^2
>merely describing that force. And how would the universe be different if
>F=Gm(1)m(2)/r^2 merely described the force, as opposed to existing
>in the force?
Ah. A Scholastic. You were born a millenium too soon.
Please define "existing in the force" for us. I can't seem to make any
sense out of that usage.
>| ...
>
>mckn...@ix.netcom.com (Lawrence E. McKnight):
>| No, let's prove that most people have NO understanding of Newtonian
>| mechanics. No body should graduate from high school with such a feeble
>| understanding. Correct that: nobody should get out of junior high with
>| such a feeble understanding.
>
>Okay, this is one of the things I wanted to get at. Why do
>we feel this way, when most people actually never use
>Newtonian mechanics in their lives? I'm not denying it's
>nice to know (an aesthetic principle) but the schools
>aren't teaching even much more elementary things, like how
>our economic, political, and legal systems work -- things
>which _do_ affect people's daily lives.
>
>I'm not saying the information shouldn't be readily
>available to those who want it, and I don't want to get into
>an ain't-it-awful contest about how the schools don't even
>teach students to read and write. I'm just curious about
>what I called before the "quasi-religious" nature of
>science education. When my son was in high school, they
>were not only attempting to teach Newtonian mechanics but
>Relativity as well -- yet these same students had no idea as
>far as I could discern about the Constitution, their rights
>and duties as citizens, the difference between civil and
>criminal law, how corporations are organized, how the money
>system works, how laws are made in the United States and
>elsewhere -- well, I could go on at length. Are all these
>students going to never worry about such things, but go to
>Cal Tech with my buddy Carl and curse out blasphemers on
>the Net? (I'm assuming that's what "science" is these days
>since it comes to us with such august credentials.) I don't
>think so....
Yes, they should never graduate with such a feeble understanding of all
those things, too. You have just pointed out that their ignorance is
multifaceted.
That in no way justifiies the level of ignorance in science.
>--
> }"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
---------------
Larry McKnight
(this space unintentionally left blank.....
g...@panix.com (Gordon Fitch) writes:
| =Okay, this is one of the things I wanted to get at. Why do
| =we feel this way, when most people actually never use
| =Newtonian mechanics in their lives?
| Because, you goddamned moron, people do, in fact, use Newtonian mechanics all
| the time. They may not apply it via formal models most of the time, but in
| their everyday interactions with the world, they're constantly applying
| Newtonian mechanics informally. ...
Well, according to the stories we've just been reading, they
_aren't_ applying them, even informally. In fact, it was a
discussion of their failure to do so that started this
thread.
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
David Salvador Flores <ds...@faraday.clas.Virginia.EDU> wrote:
| >Can you prove this? Can you prove, for instance that F=Gm(1)m(2)/r^2
| >exists in the gravitational force that two bodies m(1) and m(2)
| >separated by r exert upon each other, as opposed to F=Gm(1)m(2)/r^2
| >merely describing that force. And how would the universe be different if
| >F=Gm(1)m(2)/r^2 merely described the force, as opposed to existing
| >in the force?
hat...@netcom.com (DaveHatunen):
| Ah. A Scholastic. You were born a millenium too soon.
We're going to have scholasticism back? In a thousand
years?
| Please define "existing in the force" for us. I can't seem to make any
| sense out of that usage.
It's the same as "existing in the patterns" -- see above.
Hey, we don't have to wait for the next millennium (which
is right around the corner, anyway); we can start talking
about substances and essences and stuff. F=Gm(1)m(2)/r^2
_exists_, Out There Somewhere, made of Something....
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
ca...@SOL1.GPS.CALTECH.EDU:
| =ca...@SOL1.GPS.CALTECH.EDU:
| =| Ah, yes. He *IS* one of Erb's fellow morons. They exist in the patterns,
| =| shit-for-brains.
| =| ...
g...@panix.com (Gordon Fitch) writes:
| =Do they? How do you know? Suppose two constructions of
| =some set of phenomena both explain the phenomena; do they
| =both exist in the phenomena, side-by-side?
ca...@SOL1.GPS.CALTECH.EDU:
|If the two formal models make the same predictions, then they are, in fact, THE
|SAME MODEL, even if the labels are changed. If they do NOT make the same
|predictions, then your premise is not met.
I believe one can concoct a version of the Ptolmaic system
which is as accurate as one wants, if one specifies enough
epicycles; therefore, one could be as accurate as any given
realization of the Copernican-Newtonian model. It's
just a lot clumsier, and calls for entities like
"crystalline spheres" which are even more improbable than,
say, action at a distance in the form of "gravity." So
you're saying these are really the same model?
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
ca...@SOL1.GPS.CALTECH.EDU:
| Are you simply trying to prove that you ARE a moron? Go out and measure the
| motions. They match the formula. Hence the formula is implicit in the
| motions. ...
What do you mean by "implicit"? Is the formula written in
the motions?
I would say that the formula comes out of human beings
attempting to cast their observations of the motions into
language. I know Creationists like to say that there has to
be some sort of intelligence Out There if it takes so much
intelligence In Here, and language as well, to match up
language with the phenomena and make accurate predictions,
but I think this is a matter of belief. In point of fact I
don't think formulae, theories, intelligence, or anything
like them have ever been observed outside of animal brains
and some of the devices certain animals have constructed to
mimic their mental activity. I'm very skeptical that
orbiting masses, or their orbits, know anything about
F=Gm(1)m(2)/r^2 even though they "obey" this "law." If you
can show otherwise, though, please go ahead, after you've
uttered the requisite number of abusive epithets, of course.
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
I would congratulate Fitch for criticizing the essentialism of
his respondent, but I find it curious that in doing so, Fitch
advocates a view of language based on representation. People
create formula to "cast their observations ... into language."
These descriptions are good when language and the phenomena
"match up," supporting "accurate predictions."
Are there no postmoderns out there who will take Fitch to task
for this old-fashioned view, much as he has done with his
respondent, for the respondent's down-right antiquated view?
Russell
--
Signature quotes are not just to show a famous person's agreement with one
of the poster's opinions. They can be a wise, joyful, sarcastic, humorous,
or salacious idea well expressed, or a good (or evil) sentiment from an
unexpected source. Anything that entertains or edifies. Give it a try.
| Wyatt seems to believe that the concept of friction is somehow alien to
| Newtoniam mechanics. It's not. Why are folks like Wyatt so proud of their
| ignorance?
That wasn't his point; his point was that Newtonian
mechanics was contrary to intuition and common experience,
and he demonstrated his point with good examples. (One of
the reasons Newton's work is so impressive is that his
results are not at all obvious from ordinary observation.)
Even so, you missed his point, which I suppose makes you
the "ignorant" party, in the sense of ignoring what's
directly in front of you. Since you've been doing this
sort of thing in the view of the thousands of people who
breathlessly hang on our every word, maybe you could answer
your own question.
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
If the two formal models make the same predictions, then they are, in fact, THE
SAME MODEL, even if the labels are changed. If they do NOT make the same
predictions, then your premise is not met.
Are you simply trying to prove that you ARE a moron? Go out and measure the
motions. They match the formula. Hence the formula is implicit in the
motions. Or are you simply claiming the same bullshit that Scott does,
wherein we don't simply discover how the world works, but our knowledge is
"invented," and therefore all claims to knowledge are equally valid?
You certainly must, since you're the only person making that claim, you lying
moron. Once again you demonstrate that you're incapable of distinguishing a
particular formal model from the object that it describes. Newtonian
mechanics is the term used to describe the patterns. You, however, insist,
that Newtonian mechanics refers simply to one particular formal model of those
patterns. I suppose if we just went in and change every occurrence of the word
"force" in the model to the word "ecrof" that you'd then claim we now had a
distince model, eh?
+I believe one can concoct a version of the Ptolmaic system
+which is as accurate as one wants, if one specifies enough
+epicycles; therefore, one could be as accurate as any given
+realization of the Copernican-Newtonian model. It's
+just a lot clumsier, and calls for entities like
+"crystalline spheres" which are even more improbable than,
+say, action at a distance in the form of "gravity." So
+you're saying these are really the same model?
No. IF (print that in 96 pt. type, with screamers) one limited
a model to *specifically* the earth-observed track of the
classical planets, and IF (equally big if) one dissociated this
track with ALL other phenomena, physical and astronomic,
and IF (probably a still more extravagant assumption) one
allowed for a Greek model with function-theoretic metrics
and convergence, THEN one could *conceive* of a _soi disant_
Ptolemaic astronomy that would have the "same" accuracy of
ephemerides as our current Newtonian-cum-Einsteinian one
(courtesy of JPL :-)), or any given earlier Newtonian one.
To obtain such "agreement" one MUST ignore the brightness
of the planets, mutual perturbations (except by totally _ad
hoc_ series in which each case is totally unconnected to all
other cases), potential for cosmological investigation, etc.
etc., et nauseating cetera. This "Ptolemaic" model would --
as it claimed from its start in Plato's progam -- tell us
NOTHING about any part of reality that it did not stupidly
grind into its parameters. If you do *not* understand why
Newtonian mechanics is more than this, you are simply
showing your ignorance.
Such a "model" would be useless, for example, for sending
a probe to Mars -- or getting Apollo-the Nth back from the
Moon. It would be the model of an idiot - full of observation
and detail, signifying no contact with any reality whatsoever.
In Copernicus' day, the choice of his system over Ptolemy's
turned almost entirely on a matter of taste -- and the
Copernican triumph *can* be seen in pomo terms, as a pure
matter of different interests driving a different selection
of model. After Kepler, even; certainly after Newton, the
matter is driven to a much deeper level of contact with the
nature of Nature. Pope's line about Newton is, in simple
fact, true -- before Newton, there was NOTHING worthy
of the name natural philosophy. Afterwards, there is much
to learn about nature -- but there is also a starting point.
[The same contrast holds, incidentally, for Darwin and
biology, to point this response to talk.origins.] It is no
longer a matter of philosophical taste. Reality *compels*
an acceptance of (something sufficiently like) Newton (as
to not matter in this context.)
The point of the remark you THINK you are responding to is
that Newton's model is in fact omnipresent in ALL physical
phenomena on non-atomic and non-cosmic scale (and is a
good first approximation there, as well.) Any different
model that does as well is a reasonable substitute in our
understanding and usage. But Ptolemaic epicycles need
not apply for this position, as that "model" is impoverished
beyond measure in almost all situations in which Newton
can point us to what is, in fact, going on.
Newton's three laws, with his law of gravitation, give us
huge orders of magnitude more than the rickety construct-
ions of Ptolemy -- which are already ludicrous if one tries
to infer the brightness of the objects from their supposed
paths. Until you have a CLUE what you are talking about, I
strongly suggest you just shut up.
--
Michael L. Siemon (m...@panix.com)
"Stand, stand at the window, as the tears scald and start;
You shall love your crooked neighbor, with your crooked heart."
-- W. H. Auden
[...]
[Regarding the claim that a Ptolemaic model is just as valid
as a Newtonian model]
: Such a "model" would be useless, for example, for sending
: a probe to Mars -- or getting Apollo-the Nth back from the
: Moon. It would be the model of an idiot - full of observation
: and detail, signifying no contact with any reality whatsoever.
You've got to admire somebody who can work a bit of Macbeth
into a debate about Newtonian vs. Ptolemaic models of orbital
mechanics.
[...]
: Until you have a CLUE what you are talking about, I strongly
: suggest you just shut up.
Things would be quiet indeed.
--
Grant Edwards
gra...@winternet.com
Oh? Then why, oh moronic liar, did he say, that "we do not live in a Newtonian
world"? Why did he claim that objects coming to a stop some how makes them
non-Newtonian.
You're obviously as proud of your stupidity (in your case, it goes well
beyond simple ignorance) as Wyatt is of his ignorance.
=and he demonstrated his point with good examples.
Every one of which is perfectly consistent with Newtonian mechanics. Only
a moron who decided to bullshit about Newtonian mechanics when he's utterly
clueless (i.e., somebody as stupid and dishonest as you) would claim otherwise.
m...@panix.com (Michael L. Siemon):
| No. IF (print that in 96 pt. type, with screamers) one limited
| a model to *specifically* the earth-observed track of the
| classical planets, and IF (equally big if) one dissociated this
| track with ALL other phenomena, physical and astronomic,
| and IF (probably a still more extravagant assumption) one
| allowed for a Greek model with function-theoretic metrics
| and convergence, THEN one could *conceive* of a _soi disant_
| Ptolemaic astronomy that would have the "same" accuracy of
| ephemerides as our current Newtonian-cum-Einsteinian one
| (courtesy of JPL :-)), or any given earlier Newtonian one.
| ...
Yeah, well, that's what I meant. I was talking about
predicting the classical motions of the classical planets,
not other phenomena, which is what Newton was theorizing
about. I wasn't taking Relativity into consideration. My
point being that more than one theory, that is, more than
one sequence of symbols, can be matched up to a set
phenomena. Probably given any finite set of phenomena, an
infinite number of theories could be generated which match
up to them (meaning all of them appear to have predictive
power). Then, if as Carl Lydick says, the theories are
somehow inscribed in the phenomena or the entities which
give rise to the phenomena, we want to ask where they are
and how they are encoded and where room is found for them.
That the Ptolmaic system doesn't work too well for all
20th-century observations is beside the point.
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
[...]
>Yeah, well, that's what I meant. I was talking about
>predicting the classical motions of the classical planets,
>not other phenomena, which is what Newton was theorizing
>about.
It is not what Newton was theorizing about, although he used the data
to come up with his theory. The theroy is far more general, and applies
to such objects as artificial satellites, which Newton himself first
described. There is no way that any theory involving epicycles will
explain artificial satellites.
Also, as Newton was well aware, good theories must fit into an overall
framework. For instance, his theory of gravitation *and* other parts of
his mechanics, work together, such as allowing for the effect on
observations affected by the fact taht the earth-moon system is
revolving around their common center of mass. And, of course, there is
no way that epicycles can explain the tides, as Newton did with
gravitation.
Gravitation and epicycles cannot co-exist, and epicycles explained
nothing and were merely descriptive.
Your lack of understanding of the content of science is on display here
for all to see.
On 1 Jan 1996, Gordon Fitch wrote:
> Laura Wesson <la...@ewald.mbi.ucla.edu>:
The fallacy here is thinking that what is taught in physics classes is
based on the same inadequate foundations as typical religious beliefs.
Although students may not understand the well-founded basis for
scientific principles and facts, those bases are nonetheless more valid
than non-scientific foundations for knowledge.
Although this reasoning justifies the teaching of science in a _seemingly_
dogmatic way, I strongly believe that students should primarily be
learning the methods by which scientific facts and principles acquire
their well-deserved respect.
Best wishes and much hope for a more enlightened New Year!
Take care
Jim
============================================================================
James M. Clark (204) 786-9313
Department of Psychology (204) 786-1824 Fax
University of Winnipeg 4L02A
Winnipeg, Manitoba R3B 2E9 cl...@uwinnipeg.ca
CANADA http://www.uwinnipeg.ca/~clark
============================================================================
I asked Professor Bauderritard, who is in town to deliver a
series of lectures at CBGB's, to respond to your query.
"This Mr. Fitch [the professor said] ees very, how shall
I say, _cagey_ in zat he does not _ansist_ that his
conceptualization is to be ze regnante paradigm, but merely
ze observation zat he observes -- layke zat sneaky Scottish
fellow UME. However, we must inquire, does he not see, is
he not conscious of, ze fact zat ze celestial entities
ANSCRAYBE on ze Heavens ze ecriture, ze SCRIPTUURE, of
zere "existaance" soi-disante? In which, we must add, ze
laws, ze customs of zere being are, as Mr. Lydick has
said, IMPLICITE, hidden wizzin, so zat a moderne
improvisation of Cabalistic gematria, can it not, indeed,
reveal ze infinite levels of meaning in zese, as one might
say in-ze-beginning-was-ze-Words? Zis en-arche-en-ho-
Logique?
But Mr. Fitch is sans doute one of ze many Americains who
have foundered under ze inundation of televaised simulacra
of ze mechanaized Sainte Vierge in commodified disguaise,
ze repression of image and object, and waste his hours on
ze Internet thinking he is engage'. A sad yet risible case.
Je m'en Fitch."
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
hat...@netcom.com (DaveHatunen):
| It is not what Newton was theorizing about, although he used the data
| to come up with his theory. The theroy is far more general, and applies
| to such objects as artificial satellites, which Newton himself first
| described. There is no way that any theory involving epicycles will
| explain artificial satellites. ...
Well, I was trying to come up with an example that would
make clear what I was talking about. As usual, people who
don't want to accept the idea it exemplifies will pick on
the example and find some irrelevant detail to invalidate
it. Apparently you want to believe that Newton's theories
are somewhere Out There in the heavens, "implicit" in the
motions of the planets and so on. I have no objection to
this as a religious belief; I just don't see any reason to
believe it, materialistically speaking.
So let's forget the example. I'll ask you to show that for
any finite set of phenomena there is one and only one
explanatory theory. This is equivalent to saying that all
theories that come up with the same predictions are in
effect the same theory. I don't think anyone can do this,
and if no one can do it, then I think we have to say that
the belief in the unity of all valid theories is intuitive
or religious.
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
On 2 Jan 1996, Gordon Fitch wrote:
> g...@panix.com (Gordon Fitch) wrote:
> | +I believe one can concoct a version of the Ptolmaic system
> | +which is as accurate as one wants, if one specifies enough
>
> m...@panix.com (Michael L. Siemon):
> | No. IF (print that in 96 pt. type, with screamers) one limited
> | a model to *specifically* the earth-observed track of the
> | classical planets, and IF (equally big if) one dissociated this
> | track with ALL other phenomena, physical and astronomic,
> | and IF (probably a still more extravagant assumption) one
> | allowed for a Greek model with function-theoretic metrics
> | and convergence, THEN one could *conceive* of a _soi disant_
> | Ptolemaic astronomy that would have the "same" accuracy of
> | ephemerides as our current Newtonian-cum-Einsteinian one
> | (courtesy of JPL :-)), or any given earlier Newtonian one.
> | ...
>
> Yeah, well, that's what I meant. I was talking about
> predicting the classical motions of the classical planets,
> not other phenomena, which is what Newton was theorizing
> about. I wasn't taking Relativity into consideration. My
> point being that more than one theory, that is, more than
> one sequence of symbols, can be matched up to a set
> phenomena. Probably given any finite set of phenomena, an
> infinite number of theories could be generated which match
> up to them (meaning all of them appear to have predictive
> power). Then, if as Carl Lydick says, the theories are
>
> }"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
The idea that theories account for a limited (i.e., finite) set of
observations constitutes a bizarre view of science. Science advances by
proposing alternative explanations for known phenomena and then proposing
new phenomena that will discriminate between the alternative explanations.
Michael correctly pointed out that many observations favour the Newtonian
view and undermine competing views. To promote a view of science in which
such well-known observations must be ignored suggests a lack of interest
in advancing an accurate view of science.
I'm sorry that the point of my post is lost on you.
>
>Please define "existing in the force" for us. I can't seem to make any
>sense out of that usage.
I suggest you ask Carl for a definition. I was merely following
his syntax, extrapolating from his claim that the laws of
nature "[exist] in the patterns."
>
>
>
>
>--
>
>
> ********** DAVE HATUNEN (hat...@netcom.com) **********
> * Daly City California *
> * Between San Francisco and South San Francisco *
> *******************************************************
>
-Dave Flores
That's their intent. But at any given time, only a finite
set of phenomena are available to the theorist. Her
theories, then, will account for these phenomena, as I said.
I don't see anything bizarre in this; perhaps you could
explain?
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
In article <4cbs6m$8...@usenet.srv.cis.pitt.edu>,
Mark McCullagh <mccu...@pitt.edu> wrote:
> I don't see how, in appealing to the fact that there is a
> representational dimension to the use of language, Fitch committed
> himself to an account of language "based on" the idea of
> representation, i.e. one that *starts* with the "x represents y"
> relation and then attempts to explain other aspects of language
> use in terms of facts about the obtaining of that relation.
I don't think Fitch, nor any other representationalist, would
claim that language is based ONLY on representation, so that
this must explain ALL aspects of language. It is fairly easy,
after all, to point to language use that is not representational.
As one example, few people think that the expletives delivered
after someone hits their thumb with a hammer represent much of
anything at all.
This is tangential to the question. Has there not been a
thorough-going criticism of the very notion of representation?
Is this criticism not an important aspect of postmodern thought?
Shouldn't Fitch -- instead of referring to laws as human
constructs that match observation (a view with which I agree) --
speak of those observations also as human constructs, with
representation becoming just ... what? An emphemeral kind of
play between different constructs, a re-presentation or even a
re<presentation> or something like that?
Why Carl, that sounds an awful lot like saying that the formula
describe the motions.
Hence the formula is implicit in the
>motions.
Wait a second here Carl, do the laws exist in the patterns or
are they implicit in them? I'm afraid if you keep changing your
terminology about like that its impossible for anyone to know
what you're talking about. Have you been taking lessons from
Erb?
Or are you simply claiming the same bullshit that Scott does,
>wherein we don't simply discover how the world works, but our knowledge is
>"invented," and therefore all claims to knowledge are equally valid?
Does a brain exist in your head, or is the word brain merely
a description of phenomena you wish were in there?
>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>Carl J Lydick | INTERnet: CA...@SOL1.GPS.CALTECH.EDU | NSI/HEPnet: SOL1::CARL
>
>Disclaimer: Hey, I understand VAXen and VMS. That's what I get paid for. My
>understanding of astronomy is purely at the amateur level (or below). So
>unless what I'm saying is directly related to VAX/VMS, don't hold me or my
>organization responsible for it. If it IS related to VAX/VMS, you can try to
>hold me responsible for it, but my organization had nothing to do with it.
-Dave Flores
I don't see how, in appealing to the fact that there is a
No, it's NOT the same thing as "existing in the patterns." Now you've decided
that simply because you're using the words "existing in the," it doesn't matter
what the object of the phrase is, eh?
Fine. Now, shit-for-brains, try using that model to predict the trajectory of,
e.g., the Galileo spacecraft. You can't do it? Well, you certainly CAN use
the Newtonial model to predict such a trajectory. So the two systems DO NOT
make the same predictions.
=It's
=just a lot clumsier, and calls for entities like
="crystalline spheres" which are even more improbable than,
=say, action at a distance in the form of "gravity." So
=you're saying these are really the same model?
Nope. Having some predictions in common is NOT the same thing as making the
same predictions. You really ARE utterly clueless, aren't you? You're
actually opposed to teaching Newtonian mechanics in high school because you
flunked the course yourself, right?
No, I mean that out of all possible formulas, those of Newtonian mechanics are
those which match the motions.
hat...@netcom.com (DaveHatunen):
| When you quoted me, you omitted the part where I accused you of
| ignorance of the nature of science. I hereby repeat it.
| -
| No self-respecting scientist would claim there is one and only one
| explanatory theory for a finite set of phenomena. You simply do not
| understand what science is, and it is unlikely that anyone can explain
| it to you since you already have a mindset about the subject.
I take it, then your buddy Carl is not a self-respecting
scientist, even though he's posting from famed Cal Tech?
Because that's what he seems to have said:
|If the two formal models make the same predictions, then they are, in fact, THE
|SAME MODEL, even if the labels are changed.
As for this "You don't know what science is, and you'll
never know, and I can't explain it to you" mantra, it
makes you sound like Madame Blavatsky. I think it would do
well over a hard trance beat, with some cool industrial
samples screaming in the background, but as part of this
discussion it seems a bit, well, off the wall.
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
ca...@SOL1.GPS.CALTECH.EDU:
| Still trying to set a record for stupidity, Gordon? The stories that were
| posted indicate that folks fail to apply Newtonian mechanics properly to
| situations with which they're unfamiliar. That in no way contradicts the fact
| that they apply it quite successfully to situations with which they ARE
| familiar. The point is, that unless you want all new situations to be dealt
| with purely by trial and error, teaching formal models of Newtonian mechanics
| is useful.
Not with the shopping carts. The Aristotelian model, as
someone just pointed out, works better for shopping
carts. By the way, what you're saying sounds suspiciously
like adherence to some kind of first principles. You never
responded to my request that you quote me on first
principles, did you? If you did, I didn't see it. I'm very
eager to find out what I've written about first principles.
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
Er, can you please explain to us how it is that, since Newtons law of universal
gravitation applies to, e.g., an apple falling from a tree, you conclude that
it dealt only with the classical motions of the classical planets?
Congratulations on once again demonstrating yourself to be a liar.
=I wasn't taking Relativity into consideration. My
=point being that more than one theory, that is, more than
=one sequence of symbols, can be matched up to a set
=phenomena.
Yup. Given enough independent variables, you can "explain" any existing data
set. However, that does NOT mean that your "explanation" will fit new data.
Sure. After all, it was your example.
> I'll ask you to show that for
>any finite set of phenomena there is one and only one
>explanatory theory. This is equivalent to saying that all
>theories that come up with the same predictions are in
>effect the same theory. I don't think anyone can do this,
>and if no one can do it, then I think we have to say that
>the belief in the unity of all valid theories is intuitive
>or religious.
-
When you quoted me, you omitted the part where I accused you of
ignorance of the nature of science. I hereby repeat it.
-
No self-respecting scientist would claim there is one and only one
explanatory theory for a finite set of phenomena. You simply do not
understand what science is, and it is unlikely that anyone can explain
it to you since you already have a mindset about the subject.
Still trying to set a record for stupidity, Gordon? The stories that were
posted indicate that folks fail to apply Newtonian mechanics properly to
situations with which they're unfamiliar. That in no way contradicts the fact
that they apply it quite successfully to situations with which they ARE
familiar. The point is, that unless you want all new situations to be dealt
with purely by trial and error, teaching formal models of Newtonian mechanics
is useful.
On 2 Jan 1996, Gordon Fitch wrote:
One illustration would be your own example of how the Ptolemaic system
could be rendered seemingly "equivalent" to the Newtonian system, but only
be ignoring the wealth of observations that favour the Newtonian view. At
some earlier point in history, there may have been inadequate observations
to eliminate the Ptolemaic view, but that has not been the case for many
years as subsequent generations of scientist examined implications of the
competing views. Both then and now there were a finite number of
observations, but the increased observations (albeit still finite) have
elminated many views from serious contention. I suspect it would be
extremely difficult to generate a serious competing view that would
account for all the currently known phenomena. Probably would garner the
person a Nobel prize!
Even if such an alternative could be generated (not something that I would
necessarily accept), scientists would identify possible observational
implications of areas in which the theories differ and perform tests to
differentiate the competing views. There are a few areas in which this
strategy has not yet been successful, but in the main different
conceptions of known phenomena lead to different predictions about unknown
phenomena. This scientific process leads to the meaningful expansion of
known phenomena (albeit always finite as mentioned above).
I find it strange that people can so easily believe that it is a simple
matter to generate competing hypotheses for _all_ known phenomena in
science. Certainly given any limited observation, then competing
explanations are possible. That is why so much empirical work focusses
on such fine-grained phenomena. But on the grand scale, I doubt that
there are many competitors for major views about natural phenomena. To
argue otherwise simply provides ammunition to anti-scientific views
(e.g., Creationist "Science", New Age "Theories").
|=| Are you simply trying to prove that you ARE a moron? Go out and measure the
|=| motions. They match the formula. Hence the formula is implicit in the
|=| motions. ...
gcf:
| =What do you mean by "implicit"? Is the formula written in
| =the motions?
| No, I mean that out of all possible formulas, those of Newtonian mechanics are
| those which match the motions.
So the theories aren't "in" the motions at all. They're in
the minds of human beings, as I said. Humans tend to like
and keep around those which match up well to phenomena, but
different theories, being mental constructions, could match
up to the same phenomena. The phenomena, or their source,
don't need to "know" anything about the theories. I'm glad
we got that settled.
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
: | =What do you mean by "implicit"? Is the formula written in
: | =the motions?
: ca...@SOL1.GPS.CALTECH.EDU:
: | No, I mean that out of all possible formulas, those of
: | Newtonian mechanics are those which match the motions.
: So the theories aren't "in" the motions at all. They're in
: the minds of human beings, as I said.
Yes.
: Humans tend to like and keep around those which match up well
: to phenomena,
Some do, some don't. Scientists and engineers do. Astrologers,
chiropractors, homeopaths, water witchers, and Rush Limbaugh
don't.
: but different theories, being mental constructions, could
: match up to the same phenomena.
Right. If the two theories make identical predictions for all
conditions of interest, you use the one that makes the
calculations the simplist. If the predictions for certain
conditions differ, you try to create those conditions to see
which one (if either) is right. If the two theories make
identical predictions for all conditions, then you try to
figure out how to mathematically transform one set of equations
into the other, proving that they are equivalent.
: The phenomena, or their source, don't need to "know" anything
: about the theories. I'm glad we got that settled.
Odd, I don't remember anybody claiming otherwise.
--
Grant Edwards
gra...@winternet.com
Well then, Newtonian mechanics certainly cannot exist in the patters, if
its nothing more than a "term", can it? Its also rather interesting
that you've suddenly made Newtonian Mechanics unfalsifiable. Since
you've reduced "Newtonian Mechanics" to the status of a mere signifier
(a "term" for the post-modernly challenged) that takes the patterns
as its signified, then Newtonian Mechanics remains an accurate description
of reality no matter what we may subsequently learn about the universe and
its patterns, such as...
You, however, insist,
>that Newtonian mechanics refers simply to one particular formal model of those
>patterns.
Considering that Einstein showed rather convincingly that Newtonian
Mechanics is at best a mere approximation of actual celestial movement,
I think that to consider Newtonian Mechanics to be anything but a formal
model is, in this day and age, a bit passe. N'est pas, Mon petit ami?
I suppose if we just went in and change every occurrence of the word
>"force" in the model to the word "ecrof" that you'd then claim we now had a
>distince model, eh?
>
>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>Carl J Lydick | INTERnet: CA...@SOL1.GPS.CALTECH.EDU | NSI/HEPnet: SOL1::CARL
>
>Disclaimer: Hey, I understand VAXen and VMS. That's what I get paid for. My
>understanding of astronomy is purely at the amateur level (or below). So
>unless what I'm saying is directly related to VAX/VMS, don't hold me or my
>organization responsible for it. If it IS related to VAX/VMS, you can try to
>hold me responsible for it, but my organization had nothing to do with it.
-Dave Flores
gcf:
| > That's their intent. But at any given time, only a finite
| > set of phenomena are available to the theorist. Her
| > theories, then, will account for these phenomena, as I said.
| > I don't see anything bizarre in this; perhaps you could
| > explain?
Jim Clark <cl...@UWinnipeg.ca>:
| One illustration would be your own example of how the Ptolemaic system
| could be rendered seemingly "equivalent" to the Newtonian system, but only
| be ignoring the wealth of observations that favour the Newtonian view. At
| some earlier point in history, there may have been inadequate observations
| to eliminate the Ptolemaic view, but that has not been the case for many
| years as subsequent generations of scientist examined implications of the
| competing views. Both then and now there were a finite number of
| observations, but the increased observations (albeit still finite) have
| elminated many views from serious contention. I suspect it would be
| extremely difficult to generate a serious competing view that would
| account for all the currently known phenomena. Probably would garner the
| person a Nobel prize!
Probably. In any case, it would not be worth the effort, as
long as the presently available theories serve the purpose
for which they were devised.
However, old theories may have their uses. It might amuse
people to know that many years ago I obtained a tape of
Fortran programs from the Naval Observatory which predicted
the positions of the planets within, I believe, 1 second of
accuracy for several centuries forward or back. The
programs had been generated by Fourier analysis of
geocentric observational data as a sort of experimental
workout for the generator -- in effect, a Ptolmaic model.
The Naval Observatory did have a more accurate program
based on the Newtonian view, but it was a simulation and
required much more processing power; so they were
distributing the other program as a favor for astronomers
with modest computational resources. I suppose these days
both applications would be trivial fare for one's desktop
PC.
| ...
| I find it strange that people can so easily believe that it is a simple
| matter to generate competing hypotheses for _all_ known phenomena in
| science. ...
I don't think anyone said it was a simple matter to
generate competing hypotheses. Actually, I think it's
rather difficult, which is why (for instance) there are so
few dealing with classical celestial mechanics. But that's
off my point. I thought Carl Lydick had said that the
theories were _implicit_ in the phenomena. (Now he seems to
have changed his mind, or at least his tune.) I'm not sure
what that means, but it seems to me that he was saying that
the _theories_ exist independently of anyone constructing
them -- that they exist somehow in the phenomena
themselves, or in that which generates the phenomena.
It seems to me that if this were the case, the phenomena,
or that which generates them, would have to contain every
possible theory which would explain their behavior, instead
of just behaving. Since the phenomena exist in an
apparently finite universe, I believe there are infinitely
many theories which are consistent with any subset of them,
just as there are infinitely many functions which can
produce any given finite sequence of numbers. This would
mean that the phenomena or their source would have to have
infinite storage space to store the theories.
_Or_, possibly, someone could prove that all the theories
which were consistent with the same set of phenomena were
really the same theory. This would still leave us with the
peculiar notion of the theory being somehow written down in
the phenomena or its source, but at least it would relieve
some of the information-storage difficulties.
I hope we all understand that I'm not insisting that the
theories are _not_ stored in the phenomena or their sources.
Anything is possible, and it's sort of a cute idea,
reminiscent of many "postmodern" authors like Borges and
Philip K. Dick, to say nothing of such classics as the
evangelist John. But no one has seen one there.
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
Gordon Fitch (g...@panix.com) wrote:
| : The phenomena, or their source, don't need to "know" anything
| : about the theories. I'm glad we got that settled.
gra...@winternet.com (Grant Edwards):
| Odd, I don't remember anybody claiming otherwise.
Here you go. I take it you didn't see this exchange, since
you had nothing to say about it:
Carl J Lydick <ca...@SOL1.GPS.CALTECH.EDU> wrote:
|>| Are you trying to demonstrate just how stupid someone can be and still be
|>| capable of posting to a newsgroup? If so, you're doing a damned fine job of
|>| it. Or perhaps you've simply been taking lessons from Scott Erb? The fact
|>| that somebody's never heard of Newton or nor of Newtonian mechanics is
|>| absolutely irrelevant to the question of whether or not he applies Newtonian
|>| mechanics. The physical laws exist, whether one knows that someone else has
|>| described them or not. ...
g...@panix.com (Gordon Fitch) writes:
>=|>You mean outside the human mind? If so, can you say where?
>=|>It's my belief that "physical laws" are human constructions
>=|>of patterns observed in phenomena, and that they do not exist
>=|>separately from someone thinking about them.
Carl J Lydick <ca...@SOL1.GPS.CALTECH.EDU> wrote:
>=| >Ah, yes. He *IS* one of Erb's fellow morons. They exist in the patterns,
>=| >shit-for-brains.
My apologies for repeating the abusive language.
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
|Fine. Now, shit-for-brains, try using that model to predict the trajectory of,
|e.g., the Galileo spacecraft. You can't do it? Well, you certainly CAN use
|the Newtonial model to predict such a trajectory. So the two systems DO NOT
|make the same predictions.
| ...
We're on a different page, now, Carl. Try to catch up.
The Ptolmaic view was brought in as an _example_, not as a
_proof_, and it's a limited example covering a limited set
of phenomena, as most theories do, including the Copernican-
Newtonian model. Examples often don't work when the party
to whom they're shown doesn't want them to work, and it's
pretty obvious that you'd rather say "shit-for-brains,
shit-for-brains" than figure out what anyone's talking
about. This is why you're in the embarrassing position of
having to backtrack away from your claim that theories or
formulae must exist in phenomena, separate from human
consciousness. Unlike you, I can cite text, so if you
need to be reminded of this, let us know.
Or, hey, just go on mumbling "Shit for brains, shit for
brains," thereby adding to the glory of Cal Tech. Who am I
to tell you what to do?
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
[blah blah]
=ca...@SOL1.GPS.CALTECH.EDU:
=| Wyatt seems to believe that the concept of friction is somehow alien to
=| Newtoniam mechanics. It's not. Why are folks like Wyatt so proud of their
=| ignorance?
=
=That wasn't his point; his point was that Newtonian
=mechanics was contrary to intuition and common experience,
=and he demonstrated his point with good examples.
He also said that "we do not live in a Newtonian world". This is
*totally* false. If he thinks that friction somehow makes a world
non-Newtonian (which was Carl's point) then he has a serious gap
in his understanding. It may be that Newtonian physics is contrary
to intuition but it isn't because our world is somehow exempt from
its laws.
BTW - I've nuked most of the newsgroups from the header. I don't think
the nice folks in alt.postmodern really need to hear this.
Alan
----
EFI agrees with me 100% on matters of fact. The above aren't even close.
-----> Mail abuse to: al...@efi.com <-----
I've been mostly scanning and killing this thread since I'm seeing it
in what I consider a playtime newsgroup. Mr. Turpin's comments about
Mr. Fitch's ideas prompted the recall of an article I read in the
November 1995 issue of _Reason_, however. The article, by Gregory
Benford, a professor of physics at the University of California at
Irvine and an award-winning science fiction author, is entitled
"Biology, 2001" and seems especially relevant to a thread that began
life as a discussion of scientific illiteracy in the U.S. and has
mutated to post-modernist trains of thought.
In the main, Professor Benford (somewhat breathlessly) discusses the
cornucopia awaiting us in the coming "Biological Century", and
compares today's millennial visions with those of the dawning age of
physics and electricity of over 100 years ago. He adds, moreover, a
cultural perspective:
From our blinkered perspective, a Biological Century looks
like a fundamental shift in world view, with ramification
that will reach into every cultural corner.
Physics proceeds by atomizing nature, and this habit of
mind has deeply penetrated realms far from science. Every
fiction writer knows that the trick is immersing the reader
in a world, a knitted vision. Yet some schools of literary
criticism have aped physics, deconstructing literature until
it is a swarm of disjoint words, each ambiguous, their
author irrelevant. This stress on contradictory or
self-contained internal differences in texts -- jam jar
labels or novels alike -- rather than their link to a
culture of meaning, merely leads to literature seen as empty
word games.
A biologically sophisticated world view would counter
this, looking for how artists and writers manage their
integrative effects. Current academe often casts a cold eye
on genres, whether the lyric or the epic, the western or the
musical, contending that such overt formal differences don't
matter much. This may be because genres don't yield to
theories of atomized arts, but are best seen as cross-talk,
conversations within communities, progressing down through
time -- evolving. Genres clearly unfold and interact,
ragtime to jazz to blues to rock, suggesting biological
metaphors.
What would a criticism look like, done in a biological
style? Both species and genres have intense interior
interactions. Seen in the large, population statistics in
literature and life may follow similar laws, though of
course occasional individuals can deflect the prevailing
tide, in both culture and in survival fitness. Weighing
these seemingly contradictory thrusts is the integrative
task before us, selectively using conceptual roots from
modern biology.
A great deal more is said, especially in reference to Richard
Dawkins's work. I think a stronger case can be made for emergent
behaviors in interconnected systems than Professor Benford does,
especially as a foil for the post-modernist atomization of literature
and thought. A forest is more than just a bunch of trees growing
together.
As a Parthian shot at PoMo proponents: if you truly believe in the
validity of deconstructive criticism, then not only have you nothing
to say, but also you have no way to say it. 8-)
You will find the complete text of the abovementioned article "Biology
2001" in _Reason_ (ISSN 0048-6906) v. 27 n. 6 (Nov 1995), pg 22 & ff.
You will find _Reason_ on the web at
http://www.reason.org/index.htm
Carry on,
:Karl
[snip]
>
>So the theories aren't "in" the motions at all. They're in
>the minds of human beings, as I said. Humans tend to like
>and keep around those which match up well to phenomena, but
>different theories, being mental constructions, could match
>up to the same phenomena. The phenomena, or their source,
>don't need to "know" anything about the theories. I'm glad
>we got that settled.
Here's another view on the issue: Shannon [1943] defines information as a
decrease in uncertainty about the states of a system; this is a
mind-independent property. The uncertainty is defined as follows:
M
_
H = \ P log P
/_ i a i
i=1
H is the uncertainty, M is the number of possible outcomes, and P is the
i
probability of a particular outcome. a is an arbitrary base, 2 if the
uncertainty is to be expressed as a number of bits.
Information is defined as a decrease in H, or H(before) - H(after).
Because any relationship which causes a change in p necessarily causes a
change in H, knowledge of this relationship (again, a mind-independent
property) conveys information about the system. Now, science is about
making predictions, or, in other words, claiming that the uncertainty of a
system is decreased by knowledge of the relationships governing that
system. Thus, science is devoted to discovering (rather than constructing)
the relationships which govern natural systems, and to using the
information conveyed by knowledge of these relationships to make
predictions about these systems.
It should be noted that no informational signal can be noiseless; this
means that there is always some uncertainty in a prediction. However, the
more information is conveyed by a particular theory, the more accurate the
predictions it makes become.
> }"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
--Rob (rdkn...@deepsouth.co.nz)
"As for the mystical writers scrupling to communicate their knowledge, they might less to their own disparagement, and to the trouble of their readers, have concealed it by writing no books, than by writing bad ones."
Robert Boyle, _The Sceptical Chymist_
No it appears you need a little hand holding, let me put it this way:
Carl has claimed that laws "exist in" the observed patterns of nature.
Now "gravitational force" is a word that describes observed and
observable patterns of nature. Granted, these are subset of all the
possible patterns of nature, but still one suspects that if Carl insists
on having laws existing in patterns of nature, these would certainly qualify.
When I ask Carl how the universe would be different if laws merely
described forces, as opposed to being "in" them, I am asking how
the universe would be different if laws merely described patterns
of nature as opposed to being "in" them.
Now don't ask me to tell you what Carl means by laws being "in"
patterns of nature. I don't know. That's why I asked him
how the universe would be different if that weren't so. I'm
hoping to gain this mystical knowledge for myself so that I
might become succesful and famous and attain an amateur or
below level of knowledge about astronomy and all those other
things that make one a sci.skeptic superstud, beloved of God.
>
>
> ********** DAVE HATUNEN (hat...@netcom.com) **********
> * Daly City California *
> * Between San Francisco and South San Francisco *
> *******************************************************
>
-Dave
Carl J Lydick <ca...@SOL1.GPS.CALTECH.EDU> wrote:
| You're confusing description of a physical law with the physical law itself.
| As long as you continue to do that, you'll continue spouting utter bullshit.
Well, stop blustering and tell us the difference. Like, are
you saying there is some _thing_ out there that's a law, a
rule, a theory? If so, I want to know how you know, and I
want to know where it is.
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
I don't have any quotes off hand, but I've seen a lot of references to
the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle and the Schroedinger's (sp?) Cat
example in decon literature. Most have impressed me be being
inappropriate.
--
YoYo |"The truth is sleeping like dynamite / inside this
yo...@io.com | paper flesh." -Bill Mallonee, "5 Miles Outside Monroe"
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
URL: http://www.io.com/user/yoyo/
No, shit-for-brains. I never claimed that the phenomena were conscious. Only
through your abysmal stupidity could you conclude otherwise.
=Carl J Lydick <ca...@SOL1.GPS.CALTECH.EDU> wrote:
=|>| Are you trying to demonstrate just how stupid someone can be and still be
=|>| capable of posting to a newsgroup? If so, you're doing a damned fine job of
=|>| it. Or perhaps you've simply been taking lessons from Scott Erb? The fact
=|>| that somebody's never heard of Newton or nor of Newtonian mechanics is
=|>| absolutely irrelevant to the question of whether or not he applies Newtonian
=|>| mechanics. The physical laws exist, whether one knows that someone else has
=|>| described them or not. ...
=
=g...@panix.com (Gordon Fitch) writes:
=>=|>You mean outside the human mind? If so, can you say where?
=>=|>It's my belief that "physical laws" are human constructions
=>=|>of patterns observed in phenomena, and that they do not exist
=>=|>separately from someone thinking about them.
=
=Carl J Lydick <ca...@SOL1.GPS.CALTECH.EDU> wrote:
=>=| >Ah, yes. He *IS* one of Erb's fellow morons. They exist in the patterns,
=>=| >shit-for-brains.
=
=My apologies for repeating the abusive language.
Now, you copracephalic moron, please tell us where in the above I claimed
sentience of the patterns? That *IS* what you're now saying I claimed.
--
> In article <4cbs6m$8...@usenet.srv.cis.pitt.edu>,
> Mark McCullagh <mccu...@pitt.edu> wrote:
> > I don't see how, in appealing to the fact that there is a
> > representational dimension to the use of language, Fitch committed
> > himself to an account of language "based on" the idea of
> > representation, i.e. one that *starts* with the "x represents y"
> > relation and then attempts to explain other aspects of language
> > use in terms of facts about the obtaining of that relation.
> I don't think Fitch, nor any other representationalist, would
> claim that language is based ONLY on representation, so that
> this must explain ALL aspects of language. It is fairly easy,
> after all, to point to language use that is not representational.
> As one example, few people think that the expletives delivered
> after someone hits their thumb with a hammer represent much of
> anything at all.
> This is tangential to the question. Has there not been a
> thorough-going criticism of the very notion of representation?
> Is this criticism not an important aspect of postmodern thought?
> Shouldn't Fitch -- instead of referring to laws as human
> constructs that match observation (a view with which I agree) --
> speak of those observations also as human constructs, with
> representation becoming just ... what? An emphemeral kind of
> play between different constructs, a re-presentation or even a
> re<presentation> or something like that?
You can yawn your way out of my follow-up if you want, I know it gets
tedious for me to keep bringing this up but: Where do you get this from?
Lets be more specific:
(1) What do you mean by representation and which postmodernist uses which
argument to show its the wrong model for what sort of language in what way?
The problem here is that if, say, Baudrillard knocks CNN's re-presentation
of the gulf war then that is a very specific instance of a self-proclaimed
postmodernist writing about a specific sort of representation and a specific
failure of the representation. You, on the other hand, are extrapolating
from I-don't-know-which texts to ALL postmoderniss somehow being wary of
"representation" in general where I have no idea what the terms are or why
Fitch is accountable.
Actually, for starters, I would be satisfied by a definition, account or
characterization (let alone a THEORY!) of representation.
-Omar Haneef
On 2 Jan 1996, Karl Geiger wrote:
> I've been mostly scanning and killing this thread since I'm seeing it
> in what I consider a playtime newsgroup. Mr. Turpin's comments about
> Mr. Fitch's ideas prompted the recall of an article I read in the
> November 1995 issue of _Reason_, however. The article, by Gregory
> Benford,
> Physics proceeds by atomizing nature, and this habit of
> mind has deeply penetrated realms far from science. Every
> fiction writer knows that the trick is immersing the reader
> in a world, a knitted vision. Yet some schools of literary
> criticism have aped physics, deconstructing literature until
> it is a swarm of disjoint words, each ambiguous, their
> author irrelevant. This stress on contradictory or
> self-contained internal differences in texts -- jam jar
> labels or novels alike -- rather than their link to a
> culture of meaning, merely leads to literature seen as empty
> word games.
Dead right. Some. The deconstructivist viewpoint.
> A biologically sophisticated world view would counter
> this, looking for how artists and writers manage their
> integrative effects. Current academe often casts a cold eye
> on genres, whether the lyric or the epic, the western or the
> musical, contending that such overt formal differences don't
> matter much. This may be because genres don't yield to
> theories of atomized arts, but are best seen as cross-talk,
> conversations within communities, progressing down through
> time -- evolving. Genres clearly unfold and interact,
> ragtime to jazz to blues to rock, suggesting biological
> metaphors.
> What would a criticism look like, done in a biological
> style? Both species and genres have intense interior
> interactions. Seen in the large, population statistics in
> literature and life may follow similar laws, though of
> course occasional individuals can deflect the prevailing
> tide, in both culture and in survival fitness. Weighing
> these seemingly contradictory thrusts is the integrative
> task before us, selectively using conceptual roots from
> modern biology.
Why? You reveal your absolutist bias, just as Benford does. Why choose as
single concept root, with it's messy inherent heirarchies channelling
thought into sad cul de sacs? Yeah, Why not just use the
conceptual roots of modern economics, then the task is already complete.
>
> A great deal more is said, especially in reference to Richard
> Dawkins's work. I think a stronger case can be made for emergent
> behaviors in interconnected systems than Professor Benford does,
> especially as a foil for the post-modernist atomization of literature
> and thought. A forest is more than just a bunch of trees growing
> together.
>
> As a Parthian shot at PoMo proponents: if you truly believe in the
> validity of deconstructive criticism, then not only have you nothing
> to say, but also you have no way to say it. 8-)
Deconstructionism has been dead for 10 years, the carcass rotting for 5
years except in feminist circles. It's valid, alright, but as you pointed
out, it leads to rather boring ever expanding circles of self
negating context (becoming ultimately apolitical as credibility
is unfortunately overwhealmed by personal diatribe). When deconstruction
is practiced poorly Intent is lost, analysis is buried and the primary
insights of the method are subsumed in posturing.
But to associate postmodern thought with deconstructionism... you must be
American right?
Slinky.
Actually, if we take just his above paragraph, I said exactly that. Of course,
it could be that Gordon knows a little about the English language as he does
about physics. For his information:
"implicit in" is equivalent to "implied by"
=Just who is it you are arguing against?
Me. Or the morons who told him he can speak English.
=- >So let's forget the example.
=
=Sure. After all, it was your example.
=
=> I'll ask you to show that for
=>any finite set of phenomena there is one and only one
=>explanatory theory. This is equivalent to saying that all
=>theories that come up with the same predictions are in
=>effect the same theory.
Yup. You've finally got SOMETHING right.
=>I don't think anyone can do this,
=>and if no one can do it, then I think we have to say that
=>the belief in the unity of all valid theories is intuitive
=>or religious.
How do you distinguish them? Oh, wait a minute, I know: You declare that
words are magic, and don't actually refer to anything in the real world;
rather, words DETERMINE the real world. Right?
=When you quoted me, you omitted the part where I accused you of
=ignorance of the nature of science. I hereby repeat it.
Agreed.
=No self-respecting scientist would claim there is one and only one
=explanatory theory for a finite set of phenomena.
Dave, take a look at the actual thing he's denying: He's saying that two
theories with identical implications are actually distinct theories. He's
saying that the words one chooses to use to state a theory are what define the
theory. The relationships between those words, in his analysis, don't count.
In short, we've got another Erb.
=You simply do not
=understand what science is, and it is unlikely that anyone can explain
=it to you since you already have a mindset about the subject.
I think he's just Erb posting under a pseudonym.
Well, what do you expect? Gordon's almost certainly reading this thread in
alt.postmodern. Those folks will deny ANYTHING (except that all their
pronouncements, which their own arguments claim must be suspect, MUST be true,
of course).
Care to quote me denigrating Newton? You're imitating your
buddy Carl now, who still hasn't gotten back to us about my
alleged arguments from "first principles."
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
In article <4ceiru$3...@netnews.upenn.edu>,
Silke-Maria Weineck <wein...@mail2.sas.upenn.edu> wrote:
> Quite possibly. And you left out "chaos theory," tres popular.
Indeed, yes. How could I have left this one off?
> ... by the way, Russell, are you confident that you use the
> term "deconstruction" in a technically correct way? ...
Ah, but I carefully referred to deconstructionISTS, a subset of
literary critics I am happy to let those more knowledgeable define,
since I was only expressing skepticism that they could be any worse
in this regard than the larger set. (I could be wrong. Maybe the
deconstructionists are worse in this regard; if so, perhaps the
original poster can explain how and why.)
> ... Can you "state or explain correctly" what it means and does,
> after all these years on ap?
It only seems like years. Ah, well ... women are always telling
me to get past the philosophy and on to the fun stuff.
To answer Silke-Maria's question: No, I cannot explain correctly
what deconstruction does. I fear any explanation I offer (e.g.,
reading between the lines) would be trite and fail to distinguish
deconstructionism from what went on before and after. Remember
that I always had difficulty getting explanations of such things.
I wonder: does my failure in this regard set me apart from most
participants in a.p? From most graduate students in English?
From the deconstructionists?
Russell
--
Signature quotes are not just to show a famous person's agreement with one
of the poster's opinions. They can be a wise, joyful, sarcastic, humorous,
or salacious idea well expressed, or a good (or evil) sentiment from an
unexpected source. Anything that entertains or edifies. Give it a try.
>#On 2 Jan 1996, Karl Geiger wrote:
><snip>
>#> Physics proceeds by atomizing nature, and this habit of
>#> mind has deeply penetrated realms far from science. Every
>#> fiction writer knows that the trick is immersing the reader
>#> in a world, a knitted vision. Yet some schools of literary
>#> criticism have aped physics, deconstructing literature
>Two things:
>1) Physics doesn't atomize nature, it examines it from the smallest
>perspective and attempts to build up the whole picture. One of the
>biggest searches in physics has been to find the GUTs of the universe.
>It hasn't because the subject is so vast and complicated.
Uhh you shouldn't pay much attention to Mr. Geiger on technical issues.
The poor boy thinks that the cost of chip production is a trivial part of
the price you pay for electronics not noting the changes that have
come in the last few years. He is even unable to look at basic
evidence claiming that ideas are the main cost when memory (whose
design is relatively simple and well known) has stayed flat in price
for years despite great competition. Nor does he grasp that AMD is
hoping for a significant competitive advantage through lower production
costs because of the fewer transisters on their Intel clone. The boy
is locked into notions he learned 20 years ago and this includes notions
of science as well as a method of chip production that does not require
billion dollar plants.
The correct word is not "deconstruction" but "reductionist", the debate
over this versus "holistic" approaches has flared for nearly all of this
century. Reductionist retains power simply because "pure science"
(of which mathematically based physics has served as the model) requires
reality to be broken down into an abstract scheme which can be
formalized. Even when the science is less than pure we are forced
to a few variables at a time because this is all that our minds can
handle. As for Mr. Geigers other claim that biology is better able
to provide a holistic view this certainly is subject to debate. Some
biologists are certainly caught up in awe of interconnection (not that
they have successfully modeled it), but there is also an immense
amount of "physics envy". One can also remember the hubris of
a generation ago when they thought that they would soon grasp
the secret of life.
Mr. Geigers espousal of Richard Dawkins is
a symptom of this. The concept of "memes" is just one more in
a rich history of ideas which try to explain the nature of thought.
Anyone with minimal background in philosophy would have seen
numerous. They are enticing because they always link into something.
However if Mr. Geiger has followed discussions some months back
he would see that many of the ideas associated with "memetics" are
questionable such as the claim that like strands of DNA memes keep
their shape as they are transmitted. So is the failure of such
theorists to provide more complex structures or to categorize the
non memetic nature of ideas. If Mr. Geiger is referring to Mr.
Dawkins more recent work in computer generated "life forms", while
interesting there has been much more important work done by
mathematicians and physical scientists for over a generation. "A-life"
is not a new field and its work is more likely to be accepted in
subregions of physics (where the nature of systems (cybernetics) is
understood as an important problem) than in much of biology. Of course
both disciplines are so vast, contain so many specialties (each often
having their own culture) that all generalizations of any type
are subject to question.
.
rdkn...@deepsouth.co.nz (Rob Knight):
| Here's another view on the issue: Shannon [1943] defines information as a
| decrease in uncertainty about the states of a system; this is a
| mind-independent property. ...
It depends what you mean by "mind." You have to have some
kind of receiver or observer in which the decrease in
uncertainty is located, no? This is some kind of informa-
tion-storing and processing organ or capacity, which I'm
referring to as "human mind" without worrying about the
larger connotations of "mind." (I suppose this sort of
thing comes from working with computers, where we say
things like "the computer doesn't know the LAN is down"
without thinking about the computer as being conscious.)
Now, I question if a simple decrease in uncertainty is
what we're talking about when we speak of theories.
Consider the following thought-experiment: a being shows
up from the planet Erb with a book that contains a complete
description of the apparent motions of Mars from the point
of view of Oshkosh, Wisconsin, in the form of an ephemeris
-- a list of numbers -- including its apparent positions for
the next twenty million years in the future. There's no
formula, just a list of numbers. We test the book and it's
always right. The book has reduced the uncertainty of the
motions of Mars to zero, and yet it would be something of a
stretch to say it was a theory, in the usual sense, of the
motions of Mars.
Suppose when we asked the being how it got the figures, it
just rolled its eyes and said, "It'ss Ssscience. Youu
don't know what it izzzz, and I can't explainnn it to
youuu." Most of us would be dissatisfied with this
answer. We would try very hard to figure out how the
Erbian got the figures, certain that it had some kind of
method, a set of formulas, and not just mystic knowledge.
That implies to me that we mean something more than the
reduction of uncertainty when we say "theory." See what I
mean?
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
Carl J Lydick <ca...@SOL1.GPS.CALTECH.EDU> wrote:
|>=| >Ah, yes. He *IS* one of Erb's fellow morons. They exist in the patterns,
|>=| >shit-for-brains.
| ...
Carl J Lydick <ca...@SOL1.GPS.CALTECH.EDU> wrote:
| Now, you copracephalic moron, please tell us where in the above I claimed
| sentience of the patterns? That *IS* what you're now saying I claimed.
No. See above. I said that theories -- "physical laws" --
were human mental constructions, something someone has to
think of. You seem to disagree with this ("He *IS* one of
Erb's fellow morons") unless you're assigning yourself the
role of Erb's fellow moron. Then you say "They exist in
the patterns." In effect, your're saying that patterns
"know" the theory because, according to you, that's where
they _are_, not, as I say, in human minds. Sentience is
beside the point; I'm just talking about where the
information is stored. You do realize that a theory
contains information, right? Well, in my world,
information has to _be_ somewhere. And the information that
makes up a theory is different from its objects -- for
instance, a theory about the orbit of Mercury is different
from both Mercury as a physical object and its orbit; it's
an electrochemical structure in various people's brains, or
possibly an encoding of the structure on a device like a
book or a computer.
Maybe you could clear things up by telling us where you
_do_ think theories exist -- what your "in the patterns"
really means. Would this be very difficult? Just say
"moron, moron," three or four times and it'll probably come
to you.
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
[...]
>Now, I question if a simple decrease in uncertainty is
>what we're talking about when we speak of theories.
>Consider the following thought-experiment: a being shows
>up from the planet Erb with a book that contains a complete
>description of the apparent motions of Mars from the point
>of view of Oshkosh, Wisconsin, in the form of an ephemeris
>-- a list of numbers -- including its apparent positions for
>the next twenty million years in the future. There's no
>formula, just a list of numbers. We test the book and it's
>always right. The book has reduced the uncertainty of the
>motions of Mars to zero, and yet it would be something of a
>stretch to say it was a theory, in the usual sense, of the
>motions of Mars.
First off, you've failed to give an actual theory. I gather your theory
is "from the location of Oshkosh Wisconsin the apparent motions of Mars
can be derived from this set of figures." Then it is a perfectly good
theory. Also a fairly useless theory, unless you're a resident of
Oshkosh with an almost unnatural interest in the apparent motion of
Mars.
>Suppose when we asked the being how it got the figures, it
>just rolled its eyes and said, "It'ss Ssscience. Youu
>don't know what it izzzz, and I can't explainnn it to
>youuu." Most of us would be dissatisfied with this
>answer. We would try very hard to figure out how the
>Erbian got the figures, certain that it had some kind of
>method, a set of formulas, and not just mystic knowledge.
>That implies to me that we mean something more than the
>reduction of uncertainty when we say "theory." See what I
>mean?
Yes, I see what you mean. And you are wrong. The theory about Oshkosh
was a pretty good theory.
The fact that we would like to figure out a more generalizable theory
about the motion of Mars is something else again. Unfortunately, with
only those figures, we are unlikely to come up with anything a whole
lot better.
Your lack of understanding of science keeps making you come up with
lousy examples which you yourself don't fully understand.
|> | The idea that theories account for a limited (i.e., finite) set
|> | of observations constitutes a bizarre view of science. Science
|> | advances by proposing alternative explanations for known
|> | phenomena and then proposing new phenomena that will discriminate
|> | between the alternative explanations.
|> That's their intent. But at any given time, only a finite set of
|> phenomena are available to the theorist. Her theories, then, will
|> account for these phenomena, as I said. I don't see anything
|> bizarre in this; perhaps you could explain?
Gordon,
A theorist inductively reasons a new rule from a finite set of
phenomena. Here's the tricky part: then, the theorist (or an
experimantalist) proposes new phenomena that distinguishes a
prediction of the new rule from existing rules. Someone does the
experiment, and uses the results of the experiment to determine
whether the new rule applies.
Chris
--
Speaking only for myself, of course.
Chris Wood chr...@lexis-nexis.com Chris...@eworld.com
|> I thought Carl Lydick had said that the theories were _implicit_ in
|> the phenomena.
Suggesting that a theory is implied by the phenomena. I'll leave
others to argue whether inductive reasoning is equivalent to
implication in this example.
|> (Now he seems to have changed his mind, or at least his tune.)
It strikes me that Carl is merely trying to change your misperception
of what he's saying.
|> I'm not sure what that means, but it seems to me that he was saying
|> that the _theories_ exist independently of anyone constructing them
|> -- that they exist somehow in the phenomena themselves, or in that
|> which generates the phenomena.
The rules which one uses to make predictions can be communicated from
one person to another, and independently verified by anyone who cares
to take an interest. In that sense, such rules (or a theory, if you
prefer), is independent of the person who constructed them/it. This
in no way implies that there is any relationship between the theory,
and that which is described by the theory. F=ma, F-sub-G = G *
m-sub-1 * m-sub-2 / r^2, a = dv/dt, and v = dx/dt are different things
than the Sun and Jupiter, or even the orbit of Jupiter around the Sun.
|> It seems to me that if this were the case, the phenomena,
|> or that which generates them, would have to contain every
|> possible theory which would explain their behavior, instead
|> of just behaving.
This is your own straw-man construction.
|> Since the phenomena exist in an apparently finite universe, I
|> believe there are infinitely many theories which are consistent
|> with any subset of them, just as there are infinitely many
|> functions which can produce any given finite sequence of numbers.
Agreed. Cue Occam and his Razor.
|> This would mean that the phenomena or their source would have to
|> have infinite storage space to store the theories.
So you destroy your own straw-man. Big deal.
|> Carl has claimed that laws "exist in" the observed patterns of
|> nature.
I believe Carl used the phrase "the observed patterns of motion
implies Newtonian Mechanics"; "implied from" is not the same as "exist
in". The existance of the builder of my house can be implied from the
existance of my house, yet the builder does not exist in my house.
chr...@meaddata.com (Christopher C. Wood):
| I believe Carl used the phrase "the observed patterns of motion
| implies Newtonian Mechanics"; "implied from" is not the same as "exist
| in". The existance of the builder of my house can be implied from the
| existance of my house, yet the builder does not exist in my house.
>=Carl J Lydick <ca...@SOL1.GPS.CALTECH.EDU> wrote:
>=| >Ah, yes. He *IS* one of Erb's fellow morons. They exist in the patterns,
>=| >shit-for-brains.
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
#On 2 Jan 1996, Karl Geiger wrote:
<snip>
#> Physics proceeds by atomizing nature, and this habit of
#> mind has deeply penetrated realms far from science. Every
#> fiction writer knows that the trick is immersing the reader
#> in a world, a knitted vision. Yet some schools of literary
#> criticism have aped physics, deconstructing literature
Two things:
1) Physics doesn't atomize nature, it examines it from the smallest
perspective and attempts to build up the whole picture. One of the
biggest searches in physics has been to find the GUTs of the universe.
It hasn't because the subject is so vast and complicated.
2) The concept of deconstruction is purely politcal and attempts to
gain legitimacy from weak analogies to physics and math. The
analogies that they use are flawed, but they know so little of the
subjects that they aren't aware of this. Deconstruction has nothing
in common with physics, except the oft repeated lie told by the
deconstuctionists!
<snip>
Twi...@hub.ofthe.net
How oft? Got some quotations or references?
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
David Salvador Flores <ds...@faraday.clas.Virginia.EDU> wrote:
| >Now don't ask me to tell you what Carl means by laws being "in"
| >patterns of nature. I don't know.
hat...@netcom.com (DaveHatunen):
| I knew what he meant. I would hazard a guess that a lot of readers did.
| But then, we're used to the way English sometimes uses such figures.
| ...
Well, why don't _you_ tell us what he means, then? Or is
this more of the Mystery which you Just Know but can't
explain -- an category which seems to cover a lot of
ground?
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
Correct. Now, will you please try to get your head out of your ass and
distinguish between a physical law and a formula describing that law?
I doubt the deconstructionists are any more guilty of this than
other literary authors and social critics. For some reason, many
of these kinds of writers, like moths to a flame, are attracted
to Godel's theorem, the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, Bell's
theorem, the entropy law, and a few other technical results. I
have yet to see ANY appropriate use of these by someone who is
not technically educated. It is not just that they reason wrongly
from these results, but that most non-technical authors cannot
even state or explain them correctly. Jeremy Rifkin became
famous among social critics, and infamous in the technical
community, for writing an entire book about entropy, and not once
correctly stating the entropy law!
It seems rather obvious: A theory accounts not just for the observations
already made, it also predicts observations not yet made. The fact that this
is beyond your comprehension was demonstrated by your assertion that I was
claiming that Newtonian mechanics and the Ptolemaic theory were equivalent.
Russell Turpin (tur...@cs.utexas.edu) wrote:
| =: I doubt the deconstructionists are any more guilty of this than
| =: other literary authors and social critics. For some reason, many
| =: of these kinds of writers, like moths to a flame, are attracted
| =: to Godel's theorem, the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, Bell's
| =: theorem, the entropy law, and a few other technical results. I
| =: have yet to see ANY appropriate use of these by someone who is
| =: not technically educated. It is not just that they reason wrongly
| =: from these results, but that most non-technical authors cannot
| =: even state or explain them correctly.
wein...@mail2.sas.upenn.edu (Silke-Maria Weineck) writes:
| =Quite possibly. And you left out "chaos theory," tres popular.
| =But consider that many of these terms are used as metaphors,
| =perhaps incorrectly according to the scientific community.
ca...@SOL1.GPS.CALTECH.EDU:
| Ah, but they're often used as much more than metaphors. They're often used as
| literal justification for a claim.
All four of you seem to know what "decon literature" means.
Could one of you give me an example? I've seen articles
where science was deconstructed (I suppose) but far from
assimilating itself to physics it was attacking aspects of
its practice, so this can't be what you're talking about.
And I've seen New-Agey stuff camping on Goedel and
Heisenberg, but that's hardly deconstruction as I understand
the term. Enlighten me.
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
hat...@netcom.com (DaveHatunen):
| =| When you quoted me, you omitted the part where I accused you of
| =| ignorance of the nature of science. I hereby repeat it.
| =| -
| =| No self-respecting scientist would claim there is one and only one
| =| explanatory theory for a finite set of phenomena. You simply do not
| =| understand what science is, and it is unlikely that anyone can explain
| =| it to you since you already have a mindset about the subject.
gcf:
| =I take it, then your buddy Carl is not a self-respecting
| =scientist, even though he's posting from famed Cal Tech?
| =Because that's what he seems to have said:
ca...@SOL1.GPS.CALTECH.EDU:
| Only to a moron like you. Why is it that you've overlooked the fact that a
| scientific theory not only "explains" past observations, but predicts future
| observations?
I don't see what that has to do with anything. Until the
future arrives, we don't know whether a theory predicts
correctly or not. (Unless you have unusual powers.) So
we're dealing with a finite set of data. When more data
comes in, it's still finite, and it's also now part of the
past. Now, Dave says right above,
| =| No self-respecting scientist would claim there is one and only one
| =| explanatory theory for a finite set of phenomena. ...
which is exactly what I would say, with a few exceptions for
the "no" -- there's one of everything. So do you agree with
him or disagree with him? If you agree with him, then
you've changed your mind about your statement:
ca...@SOL1.GPS.CALTECH.EDU:
|If the two formal models make the same predictions, then they are, in fact, THE
|SAME MODEL, even if the labels are changed.
Which is it?
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
chr...@meaddata.com (Christopher C. Wood):
| Suggesting that a theory is implied by the phenomena. I'll leave
| others to argue whether inductive reasoning is equivalent to
| implication in this example.
gcf:
| |> (Now he seems to have changed his mind, or at least his tune.)
chr...@meaddata.com (Christopher C. Wood):
| It strikes me that Carl is merely trying to change your misperception
| of what he's saying.
gcf:
| |> I'm not sure what that means, but it seems to me that he was saying
| |> that the _theories_ exist independently of anyone constructing them
| |> -- that they exist somehow in the phenomena themselves, or in that
| |> which generates the phenomena.
chr...@meaddata.com (Christopher C. Wood):
| The rules which one uses to make predictions can be communicated from
| one person to another, and independently verified by anyone who cares
| to take an interest. In that sense, such rules (or a theory, if you
| prefer), is independent of the person who constructed them/it. ...
But still exist in some human mind or other. That really
isn't the issue. Here's one of the earlier exchanges:
|Carl J Lydick <ca...@SOL1.GPS.CALTECH.EDU> wrote:
|>||Are you trying to demonstrate just how stupid someone can be and still be
|>||capable of posting to a newsgroup? If so, you're doing a damned fine job of
|>||it. Or perhaps you've simply been taking lessons from Scott Erb? The fact
|>||that somebody's never heard of Newton or nor of Newtonian mechanics is
|>||absolutely irrelevant to the question of whether or not he applies Newtonian
|>||mechanics. The physical laws exist, whether one knows that someone else has
|>||described them or not. ...
|
|g...@panix.com (Gordon Fitch) writes:
|>=|>You mean outside the human mind? If so, can you say where?
|>=|>It's my belief that "physical laws" are human constructions
|>=|>of patterns observed in phenomena, and that they do not exist
|>=|>separately from someone thinking about them.
|
|Carl J Lydick <ca...@SOL1.GPS.CALTECH.EDU> wrote:
|>=| >Ah, yes. He *IS* one of Erb's fellow morons. They exist in the patterns,
|>=| >shit-for-brains.
It appeared to me that Carl was rejecting my belief that
theories -- physical "laws" -- exist in the human mind, not
in the phenomena by themselves, by saying "They exist in the
patterns, shit-for-brains." Would you say otherwise?
Perhaps you can service Carl by rewriting his language so
that it agrees with what you and I seem to agree on in
regard to what theories are and where they exist.
By the way, since you criticize only my alleged
misperceptions here, may I take it you approve of Carl's
language and treatment of factuality?
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
What I said was that the laws were implicit in the patterns. Here again you
fail to distinguish between a thing and a description of the thing.
You're confusing description of a physical law with the physical law itself.
As long as you continue to do that, you'll continue spouting utter bullshit.
Oh? Consider, shit-for-brains, that the Aristotelian model implies that oiling
the wheel bearings of the shopping cart will have no effect on how long it
takes it to stop.
So once again you confuse an object with a description of an object, exactly
the same error that Scott's insisted on repeating for years now.
Only to a moron like you. Why is it that you've overlooked the fact that a
scientific theory not only "explains" past observations, but predicts future
observations?
[ Carl (addressing David Salvador Flores) ]
|> >Once again you demonstrate that you're incapable of distinguishing
|> >a particular formal model from the object that it describes.
|> >Newtonian mechanics is the term used to describe the patterns.
|> Well then, Newtonian mechanics certainly cannot exist in the
|> patters, if its nothing more than a "term", can it?
"Newtonian Mechanics" is a term, yes, that describes a particular
subset of all available patterns of motion.
|> Its also rather interesting that you've suddenly made Newtonian
|> Mechanics unfalsifiable.
Where did Carl do this? Anyone who has mastered University Freshman
physics understands what is meant by "Newtonian Mechanics", and what
kinds of motion would not be Newtonian Mechanics.
What's your point?
Gordon,
what he's saying is that the laws are there, waiting to be _discovered_, not constructed.
It's hard to believe that by now you don't see that this is what he is saying.
-Monique
Congratulations Carl. You are now saying what we've been saying
all along. Now If you'll only admit that Newton came up with
his formulas himself, after studying the motions of the planets
and concocting a set of equations that predicted similar motions, then
you'll have admitted that those formulas are a human construct.
Agree and we'll welcome you into the fore of evil, post-modernist,
deconstructionist, subjectivist, relativist science-haters.
(You will, however, have to rethink your odd convention of
claiming all this by saying that physical laws "exist" in the
patterns.)
>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>Carl J Lydick | INTERnet: CA...@SOL1.GPS.CALTECH.EDU | NSI/HEPnet: SOL1::CARL
>
>Disclaimer: Hey, I understand VAXen and VMS. That's what I get paid for. My
>understanding of astronomy is purely at the amateur level (or below). So
>unless what I'm saying is directly related to VAX/VMS, don't hold me or my
>organization responsible for it. If it IS related to VAX/VMS, you can try to
>hold me responsible for it, but my organization had nothing to do with it.
-Dave Flores
[deletia]
>: The phenomena, or their source, don't need to "know" anything
>: about the theories. I'm glad we got that settled.
>
>Odd, I don't remember anybody claiming otherwise.
Carl had claimed that the laws of physics are "implicit" in
the motions of the planets. That's a rather odd statement,
given that the word "implicit" is usually used to refer
to non-explicit meanings of utterances. We were just
trying to get him to clarify his terms.
>
>--
>Grant Edwards
>gra...@winternet.com
-Dave
[deletia]
>So. You, being a literal-minded type when others' statements are
>involved, decided that Carl must have meant that the laws of science
>were somehow printed -- in Bodoni Bold, perhaps -- on the patterns found
>in nature. Since you do not accept any sort of metaphorical usage, even
>when a common part ofthe language, I will have to be on the alert for
>any in your writings.
No, I was doing this because Carl went off on one of his rants,
directed against Gordon when Fitch suggested that Newtonian
Mechanics was a human construct. Carl claimed that Fitch was
obviously wrong, and that the laws quite clearly existed in
the patterns of observed reality. I think Carl also called
Fitch a moron, or a shit for brains. Probably both.
>-
>>Now don't ask me to tell you what Carl means by laws being "in"
>>patterns of nature. I don't know.
>-
>I knew what he meant. I would hazard a guess that a lot of readers did.
>But then, we're used to the way English sometimes uses such figures.
Why then did Carl claim that his meaning was different from
Gordon's when Gordon's claim was that Newtonian Mechanics
was a human construct that mereley describes nature as opposed
to existing in it?
>-
>>That's why I asked him
>>how the universe would be different if that weren't so. I'm
>>hoping to gain this mystical knowledge for myself so that I
>>might become succesful and famous and attain an amateur or
>>below level of knowledge about astronomy and all those other
>>things that make one a sci.skeptic superstud, beloved of God.
>-
>(Yawn)
Are you yawning because, as one of the annointed, you realize
that its not as fun as you originally thought?
>--
>
>
> ********** DAVE HATUNEN (hat...@netcom.com) **********
> * Daly City California *
> * Between San Francisco and South San Francisco *
> *******************************************************
>
-Dave... the other Dave.
It's the patterns, you fucking moron.
Ah, but they're often used as much more than metaphors. They're often used as
literal justification for a claim.
>Uhh you shouldn't pay much attention to Mr. Geiger on technical issues.
Really stung you didn't he?
You are still wailing about it months later.
Chris Kostanick
Jet Car Neutopian
>| classical planets, and IF (equally big if) one dissociated this
>| track with ALL other phenomena, physical and astronomic,
>| and IF (probably a still more extravagant assumption) one
>| allowed for a Greek model with function-theoretic metrics
>| and convergence, THEN one could *conceive* of a _soi disant_
>| Ptolemaic astronomy that would have the "same" accuracy of
>| ephemerides as our current Newtonian-cum-Einsteinian one
>| (courtesy of JPL :-)), or any given earlier Newtonian one.
>| ...
>Yeah, well, that's what I meant. I was talking about
>predicting the classical motions of the classical planets,
>not other phenomena, which is what Newton was theorizing
>about. I wasn't taking Relativity into consideration. My
Sigh. Gordon: I suspect that there is, lurking deep down, a
viable and relevant reflection on science (as endeavor or as
"product") in your intent -- but you really can't get anywhere
until you have sufficient aquaintance with the material that
your statements don't self-destruct.
The point I was making holds exactly as much for the latest JPL
ephemerides (with their relativistic terms) as for the earliest
crude calculations by Newton and his contemporaries. As it
happens, "what Newton was theorizing" was so spectacularly much
greater (in scope and relevance to EVERY bloody thing in the
cosmos) than his predecessors that he, in effect as a trivial
exercise, deduced from simple laws the entirety of what had
been two millenia of agonizing, sloppy and uncertain "models"
of *deliberately* limited scope.
>point being that more than one theory, that is, more than
>one sequence of symbols, can be matched up to a set
>phenomena. Probably given any finite set of phenomena, an
>infinite number of theories could be generated which match
>up to them (meaning all of them appear to have predictive
>power).
Yes (roughly speaking) up to that last point, which is the crux.
What do you mean by "predictive power"? If we are *given* this
finite set of phenomena, an indefinitely large number of models
could generate all the given data. Ptolemaic methods (like the
"zig-zag" linear approximations of the Babylonians before him)
can allow one to "fit" a series to given data with a real hope
(unprovable by either Babylonians or Greeks, but the constraints
on this *are* understandable in terms of modern math -- largely
in consequence of Newton, I should add.) As long as one *only*
wants the position of the sun or moon, these models can give it
(a fact that we can prove, but Ptolemy could not have dreamed of
demonstrating; Archimedes, maybe. :-)) But they can, literally,
give NOTHING else.
And that is *not* physics. That is Plato's program of "saving
the phenomena" -- a counsel of despair at his *inability* to
understand planetary motion from "first principles." Newton
gave us principles -- maybe not a Greek-style _arkhe:_, but a
damned good substitute! :-)
The whole point of Newton's model is that it applies everywhere,
at all times and in all places -- whether God or Plato are looking
or not. And the model is the equations -- blather in English or
other ordinary language is completely irrelevant, whether that
blather is from a philosopher or a backwoods lout. It is rather
metaphoric for your respondents to tell you that the model is
"implicit" in the reality -- but any reader of poetry has to
have some sense of what that means: the human metaphor/model
permeates all reality to which we have access. But unlike poems,
physical models get no points (in normal situations; here is an
area where if you *knew* more, there would be interesting things
to say, but I dread what you would make of my commets without the
necessary background) for being "arresting" or "unuusal" or
"novel."
Clerk Maxwell published his theory of electromagnetism embedded
in a (preposterously!) complex quasi-mechanical model, apparently
under a philosphical prejudice that he "needed" this in order to
match the overwhelming respectablility of what his contemporary
physicists (and he himself!) could do with mechanical problems
using Newton's laws. A decade or so later Heinrich Hertz JUNKED
the whole of this, with a comment that "Maxwell's theory *is*
Maxwell's equations." A generation later still, Einstein looked
hard at a MATHEMATICAL property of these equations -- constancy
of the propagation velocity of electromagnetic radiation -- and
undid all possibility of "mechanical" (or Newtonian!) "explana-
tions" of the model. But Maxwell's model == Maxwell's equations
is going strong 90 years later (and Newton is doing pretty well
too -- read through an Einsteinian reconstruction.)
What I am getting at is that there *is* material here for you --
there is, frankly, a lot *more* "inter-textuality" in physical
theories than there is in literary texts. The history of the
"conservation laws" from the 18th century to today, or the rise
(and subsequent obliteration by vauge usage!) of "operationalism"
from about 100 years ago, are wonderful examples for pomo or
deconstructionist analysis -- but you can't possibly see the
examples and what they imply unless you *know* the physics.
And popularizations are USELESS for this. They give wildly un-
constrained hints and suggestions about what the real stuff is
like, but these (aside from being nearly unrecognizable because
of the vagueness) include as much misdirection and nonsense as
applicable comment. And no commentary matters a damned bit.
That is the hardest part for someone to understand who has not
has a "scientific education." The study and practice of science
is in a context where
a) provable mathematical equivalence of models (that "seem" to a
casual glance very different) are commonplace -- classic examples
would be the Heisenberg "matrix" formulation and Schroedinger's
"wave" mechanics for Qunatum theory. Or the *innumerable* ways
to state the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics -- very few of which can
been seen equivalent in "popular" presentations.
b) a general agreement that [despte all *sorts* of social and
aesthetic factors that are just *begging* for pomo treatment :-)]
any model that handles the (relevant) range of (indeed, finite)
data equally well is as "good" as any other. This is the point
that you are either taking exception to, or trying to make stick
-- I'm not sure which! -- in this particular sub-thread.
c) The social context of science and scientists *does* imply
that despite b) there tends to be an "orthodoxy" concerning the
model-of-preference in given limited situations, and these
models then become "meta" models of how *other* situations are
to be treated.
d) Nonethless, *zero* epistemic or ontological presuppositions
are required of participants in the endeavor [at most, prevailing
preference may be more or less congenial to people with specific
views on these things. There are *always* scientists who *do*
have decided philosophical views, educated or otherwise, cogent
or not, alongside the large majority who *really don't give a
damn.* These last will tend to "carry" along, by mimicry of
common idiom, philosphical baggage that they could themselves
neither explain, defend nor -- in most cases -- understand. As
I say, there is lots of scope here for both social construction
and literary deconstruction. But
e) The reason this dimension of science is ignored (or trivial-
ized in something stupid like Popper's notion of "The Logic of
Scientific Discovery") is that IT DOESN'T MATTER very much. Oh,
sure it *does* matter for the distribution of prestige and the
getting of grants and other very hard-nosed pratical matters --
and the results of that inflence *will* provide ongoing threads
of causation for historical oddities (like the 19th century
descent into "biologically" justified racism, or modern variants
of the same nastiness.) However, models of the world like that
of Newton, or its successors in the last century, or models of
biological realities are:
- independently evaluable from their historical nexus
- ultimately (given a couple of generations) judged
with total indifference to the human turmoil of their
generation
- basically interchangeable as long as they *do* treat
the relevant data equally well.
f) That leads to my final point (sorry for the length of this!).
It just does *no* good to select out a certain limited set of data
and say that our model will NOT (ever!) say anything about anything
else. Relevant data is *always* lurking "outside" the original scope
of a model, and can be ignored only at the peril of making one's
work pointless. Deliberatly setting aside PART of the problem
(e.g. ONLY planetary position is treated; pay no attention to the
brightness issue laboring behind the curtain) was acceptable at one
time, but the utter transformation wrought by Newton was to make it
impossible for any honest scientist thereafter.
The whole POINT of models is to "make" them apply outside their
originally proposed range -- and if they succeed, keep pushing them
or if they fail, note this as a serious defect.
Everything in nature is connected to everything else, in multiple
and startling ways. Our models are good to the extent that they
capture this linkage, and bad PRECISELY by failing to -- and if
that failure is at the outset (as in the case of Ptolemaic astro-
nomy), then however respectable the intellectual effort involved
in it, it just does not meet the grade. Newton's grade. There is
no higher. The everyday effort of graduate students is precisely
to extend their teacher's models (with secret hopes, often, of
supplanting these with "better" ones -- meaning JUST as good for
the teachers' "limited" data, but handling other data with NO
extra effort, except a bit of math and lab work.)
The notion of a "fixed" and "finite" set of data as what goes
into a model is ludicrous -- unless the fixed and finite data
are bounded only by the bounds of the cosmos. When a model
falls apart on data outside its intended scope, it may still be
respectable science -- but it has nonethless failed the test
that Newton (pbuh) passed: ABSOLUTELY UNIVERSAL applicability.
Then, if as Carl Lydick says, the theories are
>somehow inscribed in the phenomena or the entities which
>give rise to the phenomena, we want to ask where they are
>and how they are encoded and where room is found for them.
>That the Ptolmaic system doesn't work too well for all
>20th-century observations is beside the point.
>--
> }"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
--
Michael L. Siemon We must know the truth, and we must
m...@panix.com love the truth we know, and we must
act according to the measure of our love.
-- Thomas Merton
The point is, that unless you want all new situations to be dealt
with purely by trial and error, teaching formal models of Newtonian mechanics
is useful.
>
>Not with the shopping carts. The Aristotelian model, as
>someone just pointed out, works better for shopping
>carts.
WHAT?! Little air demons or wind spirits that slow the shopping cart down?
Or perhaps the cart was slowed down from spontaneously generated bumps on the
road which would no doubt turn into something living? How about Aristotle's
treatise on why women are less intelligent than men - because they have
less teeth! (Mind you, he didn't actually look in a female's mouth, he
assumed this because of their smaller heads (i.e. smaller frame))
These and other idiocies have led to the inevitable conclusion that
we should disregard Mr. Earth, Wind, Fire, and Water.
>By the way, what you're saying sounds suspiciously
>like adherence to some kind of first principles.
Well, for me, the first principle goes like this: you have a point, you see,
and if you connect it to another point you get a line................
Studying teeny tiny things no one cares about but pays the bills....
Artemis P. Gone