Laudan reactions (was: Old paradigm debate revisited)
se...@polisci.umn.edu
resolve our debate by reading the book *Science and Relativism* by Larry
Laudan.
In reading the book, I first would point out a few things that seem to
reinforce the points I was making in the debate:
pp. 35-36: everyone agrees that all science and explanation is "theory
laden". That includes the positivist, realist, pragmatist and relativist.
That goes against the claim by Dave Boucher (as I understood it) that theory
was unimportant to science. Also, all think epistemological issues are very
important to science.
pp. 57-58: All agree that truth can't be proven, especially the realist who
ties it directly to theory. Each agree that its based on convention, though
with various trust in those conventions. This again is the main point I was
trying to make in the debate.
In general, the points I was pushing in the debate seem to be agreed upon by
all four, though the implications of that agreement are subject to debate.
I wouldn't consider myself any one of those four "voices." On page 55 the
realist pushes the relativist on why he's a strong relativist rather than a
weak relativist. If I had to position myself within those terms, I would
say that I'm a weak relativist, since I take the critiques of the relativist
seriously while not being ready to throw out our ability to make
judgements. Rather than trying to base it on a claim that our judgements
represent "truth," I'm happy with saying this is a convention that makes
sense. This means I have something in common with the realist.
Accordingly, I would recommend the book "Pragmatism without Foundations:
Reconciling Realism and Relativism" by Joseph Margolis as an explanation of
how one can take relativist criques seriously and yet still develop a
pragmatic approach.
For me the key is a abit different than Margolis
claims, because I see the pragmatism built on accepting social reality (
that is, our theories and explanations) as socially constructed and not
windows on objective truth. As long as they work and are useful, that is
enough; the subject of objective truth is irrelevant. On the other hand, I
wouldn't become a total pragmatist here, since the critiques of relativism
would force me to continue questioning and critiquing any given state of
affairs and look at alternatives. The goal would not be to simply de-
construct (like the radical relativist) but to critique with practical
objectives (explore untraditional possibilities, question theories based on
unprovable assumptions, etc.)
So, I guess I'm a foundationless pragmatist, with a view towards
epistemology inbetween relativism and realism. I'm not quite sure this is
all that much different than some views by American pragmatists such as
William James, but I haven't read them for so long, my memory may be
distorting what they wrote.
So Jim or Dave, any reactions?
-Scott Erb
Dept. of Poli-Sci
U. of Minnesota
Minneapolis, MN 55455
Boucher David
#This is in response to the idea from Jim L. for Dave Boucher and I to
#resolve our debate by reading the book *Science and Relativism* by Larry
#Laudan.
Unfortunately, my local library doesn't seem to have this book, so I'm
at a disadvantage, having to wait for an inter-library loan. With any
luck I might get it before Christmas.
#In reading the book, I first would point out a few things that seem to
#reinforce the points I was making in the debate:
#
#pp. 35-36: everyone agrees that all science and explanation is "theory
#laden". That includes the positivist, realist, pragmatist and relativist.
[...]
#pp. 57-58: All agree that truth can't be proven, especially the realist who
#ties it directly to theory. Each agree that its based on convention, though
#with various trust in those conventions. This again is the main point I was
#trying to make in the debate.
#
#In general, the points I was pushing in the debate seem to be agreed upon by
#all four, though the implications of that agreement are subject to debate.
This looks to me like a pretty good example of "theory-laden" research --
you read the thing and, sure enough, it pretty much supports everything that
you already believed. I think if Laudan were fair to all four viewpoints
he would have to concede that the "agreements" you cite must be agreements of
words rather than concepts (e.g., that while all might agree that science is
"theory-laden", each would have a different concept of what the term means).
Meanwhile, having at least temporarily relieved myself of the task of
debating whether or scientific research is "theory-driven", I have been
busy studying paramagnetic properties in certain compounds that I recently
discovered -- properties which "theoretically" should not exist. My boss,
who has published dozens of papers on related compounds, can't understand
why the compounds are paramagnetic even after having seen the x-ray
structures. Two other guys in the department who are experts in electron
spin resonance can't explain it either. When I told my former research
director (who is a very brilliant guy, btw), he said "Wherever in the
world did you get the idea of doing this reaction and then looking for
an ESR signal?" Because, according to theory, such a signal should not
appear, why should anyone look for one? The best answer I could come
up with is that if you don't see what you expect to find, start looking
for things that you DON'T expect to find. That's what I do -- and anyone
who really does science will always run into situations in which they
don't find what they expect to find.
That is what I hope will happen when I finally read Laudan's book -- that
I won't find what I expect to find. You've read it, and conclude that
Laudan pretty much agrees with you. I think that is a perfect illustration
of how your approach to science differs from mine: I look for both the
expected and the unexpected -- but you only look for (and only accept) that
which reinforces what you already believe, your pre-existing "theory". You
think that "everybody does it" that way -- but I don't.
- db
--
************************************************************************
"Come on down to the Big Dig. Can't get around the Big Dig."
- Don Van Vliet (Smithsonian Institute Blues)
************************************************************************
se...@polisci.umn.edu
>This looks to me like a pretty good example of "theory-laden" research --
>you read the thing and, sure enough, it pretty much supports everything that
>you already believed. I think if Laudan were fair to all four viewpoints
>he would have to concede that the "agreements" you cite must be agreements of
>words rather than concepts (e.g., that while all might agree that science is
>"theory-laden", each would have a different concept of what the term means).
No, Laudan, who is definitely an anti-relativist, is simply pointing out in
the voices of the others what I've been trying trying to say: truth is based
on convention, and research is always theory-laden, requiring us to think
about epistemology. However, his view is different than mine, and the
positivist, realist, and pragmatist go different directions after the admit
the above, which they admit by saying something like "yes, of course we all
know there isn't an objective standard of truth and it's convention,
but..." The viewpoints simply reflect a few standard agreements among
almost all philosophers of science, but they disagree greatly on what these
things mean.
(some deletions)
Congrats on your research, but nothing in my philosophy of science would
suggest that we should assume current theories are correct, just the
opposite.
>That is what I hope will happen when I finally read Laudan's book -- that
>I won't find what I expect to find. You've read it, and conclude that
>Laudan pretty much agrees with you. I think that is a perfect illustration
>of how your approach to science differs from mine: I look for both the
>expected and the unexpected -- but you only look for (and only accept) that
>which reinforces what you already believe, your pre-existing "theory". You
>think that "everybody does it" that way -- but I don't.
Hmmm. This is rather tricky Dave. You're basically saying that if I find
agreement in the book with my view, then I'm doing a poor job. SO the only
way I'm doing a good job is if it doesn't agree with me, in which case it
can be used against me. In other words, you're trying to rhetorically pin
me into a lose-lose situation by defining any result (I find agreement with
Laudan or not) as being negative. Sounds like sophistry. Anyway, I don't
agree with all four positions, but I understand them so I only pointed out
the two or three major points our debate came down to, points of almost
universal agreement by different schools. I limited my debate to those
points at the end to find what I assumed would be at least some common
ground because that common ground exists in almost all philosophical schools
of science. But you can read the book and decide.
Plus, you're interpretation that I found only what I agreed with (which isn'
t the case, I disagreed with different positions being offered by different
voices) shows that you read me to do be doing what you expected me to do,
and in all these posts I've felt you've often reacted to what you expect of
me rather than what I wrote. So maybe the charge can cut both ways.
-Scott
James J. Lippard
>In article <serb.1225...@polisci.umn.edu> se...@polisci.umn.edu writes:
>#pp. 57-58: All agree that truth can't be proven, especially the realist who
>#ties it directly to theory. Each agree that its based on convention, though
>#with various trust in those conventions. This again is the main point I was
>#trying to make in the debate.
They do NOT all agree that truth is "based on convention." They all
agree that theories cannot be *deductively* proven to be either true
or false. Read the realist's remarks on pp. 57-58 again.
Jim Lippard Lip...@CCIT.ARIZONA.EDU
Dept. of Philosophy Lip...@ARIZVMS.BITNET
University of Arizona
Tucson, AZ 85721
se...@polisci.umn.edu
>They do NOT all agree that truth is "based on convention." They all
>agree that theories cannot be *deductively* proven to be either true
>or false. Read the realist's remarks on pp. 57-58 again.
Unfortunately I loaned the book out to a friend so I don't have those pages
available (he may bring it in tomorrow), but according to my notes and to my
understanding of scientific realism (which is based on theoretical
constructs describing and explaining reality) the search for some amorphous
"truth" is reduced to defining certain sets of assumptions and standards of
inquiry which are, for various reasons, deemed useful. I have a feeling
that I may have used the term "convention" while the book might not have,
but the bottom line has to be that if truth can't be deductively proven,
then whatever standard is used is a construct (which would certainly be the
realist perspective). If it is a construct, then isn't its acceptance by
the academic community a matter of convention? Is it the word "convention"
you find problematic? If so, our disagreement on this matter could be
purely definitional or perhaps even connotational.
I get the impression that, especially in the philosophical community, many
tend to have knee-jerk reactions to any criticism of science/philosophy
which bares some of the marks of post-modernism and relativism. (Despite
his antipathy to relativism, Laudan does a decent job showing the arguments,
and has the other "voices" more tolerant and willing to explore the issues
than some I know). I see that in some of your reactions, you seem to
believe that taking relativist critique seriously, and recognizing the
constructed nature of truth claims (based on the fact they can't be proven
deductively -- or by abduction or induction), that you assume I'm saying
what the relativist in the Laudan books says -- that there is no progress,
no ability to make truth claims, that its all a joke, etc.
That is the claim of Laudan's fictional "Quincy," and of many relativists
who, upon discovering that social reality is contingent, try to make it seem
as if every claim and belief-system is just as legitimate as another simply
because none can be proven. Many of us "weak" or "pragmatic" relativists
would simply assert that this unprovability simply means that scientists and
philosophers should give up the arrogance of thinking that we have one path
to truth and/or enlightenment, and recognize that we're going along a path
that we've created, and we should always be self-questioning and self-
critical. Contrary to the relativist, progress exists. But progress is
only a word, and it exists because we define its parameters. That doesn't
mean we throw it out, like many relativists argue, but rather we recognize
that it isn't based on some heroic quest for truth on perfection, but our
own way of going through this world and trying to understand it.
Before reacting to "relativist" arguments with a rather knee-jerk dismissal,
think about how some of the critiques can be fit in with a more pragmatic
view of epistemology. After all, just as a lot of brilliant minds are
postivists, realists and pragmatists (though Laudan stereotyped the views
somewhat, I think), so are a lot of brilliant minds relativists, strong and
weak. If John Stuart Mill is right that there is some truth to every
proposition, perhaps and any blanket condemnation of a school of thought is
simplistic. Sometimes it seems that those condemning relativist critiques
without taking them seriously are reacting psychologically: they hate losing
the power, authority and "respect" that being scientists and philosophers in
search of "the truth" provide. As with the priests at the temple of syrinx,
that kind of arrogance is, in the long run, stifling.
There. Fun to start the day with a little philosophical treatise. Now to
work.
-Scott
James J. Lippard
>In article <30NOV199...@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu> lip...@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu (James J. Lippard) writes:
>
>>They do NOT all agree that truth is "based on convention." They all
>>agree that theories cannot be *deductively* proven to be either true
>>or false. Read the realist's remarks on pp. 57-58 again.
>
>Unfortunately I loaned the book out to a friend so I don't have those pages
>available (he may bring it in tomorrow), but according to my notes and to my
>understanding of scientific realism (which is based on theoretical
>constructs describing and explaining reality) the search for some amorphous
>"truth" is reduced to defining certain sets of assumptions and standards of
>inquiry which are, for various reasons, deemed useful. I have a feeling
>that I may have used the term "convention" while the book might not have,
>but the bottom line has to be that if truth can't be deductively proven,
>then whatever standard is used is a construct (which would certainly be the
>realist perspective). If it is a construct, then isn't its acceptance by
>the academic community a matter of convention? Is it the word "convention"
>you find problematic? If so, our disagreement on this matter could be
>purely definitional or perhaps even connotational.
Realist: I have been biding my time while Quincy talks this gibberish
because I wanted to give him a chance to have his say. But I really
think it is time to call his bluff. His whole analysis rests on the
assumption that we are entitled to accept or reject a theory only if
it has been proven--or disproven. Hasn't he heard that we're all
fallibilists these days and that no one is claiming that either
confirmations of falsifications establish once and for all the truth
or falsity of our theoretical beliefs? We don't have to be able to
prove that a theory is true before we have a warrant for accepting it
nor do we have to demonstrate its falsity before rationally rejecting
it. All that the work of Duhem and Hume shows is that deductive
logic has insufficient resources to allow us to do natural science.
That would be a troubling concession for realists like me to make
only if I thought that deductive logic exhausted our epistemic
resources for talking about the relation between theory and experience.
But we all know better than that.
The realist's point here is that we don't have to *prove* truth or
falsity in order to have epistemic *warrant* for accepting or rejecting
a theory. But he says nothing at all here about whether or not there
*is* such a thing as truth. The fact that he is a realist means that
there *is* such a thing as truth, and it is *not* a matter of mere
convention. A statement's truth has to do with both the meaning of the
statement and the state of the world--they have to fit each other
appropriately in order for the statement to be true.
Having warrant for a theory is to have some reason (but a non-conclusive
reason) for thinking the theory to be true. What it means for a theory
to be true is that it accurately describes reality. This condition is
metaphysical, not epistemic.
>I get the impression that, especially in the philosophical community, many
>tend to have knee-jerk reactions to any criticism of science/philosophy
>which bares some of the marks of post-modernism and relativism. (Despite
>his antipathy to relativism, Laudan does a decent job showing the arguments,
>and has the other "voices" more tolerant and willing to explore the issues
>than some I know). I see that in some of your reactions, you seem to
>believe that taking relativist critique seriously, and recognizing the
>constructed nature of truth claims (based on the fact they can't be proven
>deductively -- or by abduction or induction), that you assume I'm saying
>what the relativist in the Laudan books says -- that there is no progress,
>no ability to make truth claims, that its all a joke, etc.
It does, at least at times, seem to me that you are defending those times.
At other times, you seem to take more of the pragmatist's approach.
>That is the claim of Laudan's fictional "Quincy," and of many relativists
>who, upon discovering that social reality is contingent, try to make it seem
>as if every claim and belief-system is just as legitimate as another simply
>because none can be proven. Many of us "weak" or "pragmatic" relativists
>would simply assert that this unprovability simply means that scientists and
>philosophers should give up the arrogance of thinking that we have one path
>to truth and/or enlightenment, and recognize that we're going along a path
>that we've created, and we should always be self-questioning and self-
>critical. Contrary to the relativist, progress exists. But progress is
>only a word, and it exists because we define its parameters. That doesn't
>mean we throw it out, like many relativists argue, but rather we recognize
>that it isn't based on some heroic quest for truth on perfection, but our
>own way of going through this world and trying to understand it.
I agree with much of what you say here--I begin to disagree at the sentence
"But progress is only a word ...." It's a word, but it has meaning, and
whether or not the world is such a way that there is progress is either
true or false independently of what anyone happens to think is the case.
The way to test it is to look at the history of science. I think that
this test shows that there *is* progress in science. (One good defense
of this is ch. 5 of Kitcher's _The Advancement of Science_.)
se...@polisci.umn.edu
Thanks for retyping that -- the guy I loaned the book knows Laudan or knew
him at some point and wanted to read it when he saw I had it. Anyway, as I
understand realism, knowledge is directly connected to theory, meaning that
all claims to truth are theoretical concepts that are accepted if they
provide explanation (thus subatomic particles are "real" even if never seen,
since we can posit their existence due to effects we measure). That seems
to at least suggest a constructed notion of truth.
> Having warrant for a theory is to have some reason (but a non-conclusive
>reason) for thinking the theory to be true. What it means for a theory
>to be true is that it accurately describes reality. This condition is
>metaphysical, not epistemic.
So is actual truth irrelevant? As long as we have some non-conclusive
reason for thinking the theory true, does actual "truth" remain simply a
metaphysical concept? If that's the case, then it seems that accepting
truth as a human construction that is changable makes sense in talking
about epistemology, but truth as you define it is not epistemic. So should
we just jettison any use of the word truth in favor of theory or knowledge?
That make reduce confusion.
(some deletions)
>It does, at least at times, seem to me that you are defending those times.
>At other times, you seem to take more of the pragmatist's approach.
Which is why I put myself in more of a weak relativist position of
pragmatism not relying on metaphysical foundations but rather on socially
constructed concepts. It is a rather difficult position to defend -- not so
much intellectually, but socially. Relativists (like the fictional Quincy)
attack such a view as a sell out, a refusal to take a critique to its
logical end, while most others can't understand why I want to accept
a more radical skepticism on foundations. But I actually developed my ideas
more after reading Hume than the relativists, so I always considered myself
more a scientific skeptic...but I read these things as a hobby and you do it
professionally, so I'm sure you have a better grasp on these issues.
(deletions)
>I agree with much of what you say here--I begin to disagree at the sentence
>"But progress is only a word ...." It's a word, but it has meaning, and
>whether or not the world is such a way that there is progress is either
>true or false independently of what anyone happens to think is the case.
This seems problematic. Whether or not its true that progress exists
depends also on how progress is defined. Progress is defined like any word
is defined, through convention. (And progress in the scientific discourse
may be defined differently than in another, of course). If you are
accepting that meaning as a starting point, then I agree with you. Except I
would point out that the meaning is contingent.
>The way to test it is to look at the history of science. I think that
>this test shows that there *is* progress in science. (One good defense
>of this is ch. 5 of Kitcher's _The Advancement of Science_.)
I don't disagree, except I again see progress as a contingent concept,
defined within the realm of science. Practically, that means little for how
we do science, except to perhaps raise in our minds questions of assuming
progress the way we define it is natural for other cultures and belief
systems. I disagree with those who see *only* one path of development and
scientific growth, with progress defining it. There could be different
paths and different ways of giving meaning to life. But those would be
outside of science as we define it.
-Scott Erb
Dept of Poli-Sci
James J. Lippard
>In article <1DEC1993...@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu> lip...@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu (James J. Lippard) writes:
>Thanks for retyping that -- the guy I loaned the book knows Laudan or knew
>him at some point and wanted to read it when he saw I had it. Anyway, as I
>understand realism, knowledge is directly connected to theory, meaning that
>all claims to truth are theoretical concepts that are accepted if they
>provide explanation (thus subatomic particles are "real" even if never seen,
>since we can posit their existence due to effects we measure). That seems
>to at least suggest a constructed notion of truth.
Realism says that there is no real explanation without truth, and that
truth is metaphysical truth. Pragmatism says that theories are just
instrumental to obtaining other goods--they're useful.
>> Having warrant for a theory is to have some reason (but a non-conclusive
>>reason) for thinking the theory to be true. What it means for a theory
>>to be true is that it accurately describes reality. This condition is
>>metaphysical, not epistemic.
>
>So is actual truth irrelevant? As long as we have some non-conclusive
>reason for thinking the theory true, does actual "truth" remain simply a
>metaphysical concept? If that's the case, then it seems that accepting
>truth as a human construction that is changable makes sense in talking
>about epistemology, but truth as you define it is not epistemic. So should
>we just jettison any use of the word truth in favor of theory or knowledge?
>That make reduce confusion.
Truth isn't irrelevant--it is the goal of inquiry even if, as a matter
of fact, we can't tell for certain that we've attained it. (I think
we can attain it, and do attain it, and that sometimes we can even
tell that we have.) Truth is a necessary condition of knowledge--if
you have a belief that's not true, you don't have knowledge even if it
has some other good features such as usefulness or survival value.
I think truth has to be metaphysical rather than epistemic, because
epistemic notions of truth get into serious trouble. (Some arguments
to this effect may be found in the chapter of Alvin Goldman's _Epistemology
and Cognition_ on truth.)
>(some deletions)
>
>>It does, at least at times, seem to me that you are defending those times.
>>At other times, you seem to take more of the pragmatist's approach.
>
>Which is why I put myself in more of a weak relativist position of
>pragmatism not relying on metaphysical foundations but rather on socially
>constructed concepts. It is a rather difficult position to defend -- not so
>much intellectually, but socially. Relativists (like the fictional Quincy)
>attack such a view as a sell out, a refusal to take a critique to its
>logical end, while most others can't understand why I want to accept
>a more radical skepticism on foundations. But I actually developed my ideas
>more after reading Hume than the relativists, so I always considered myself
>more a scientific skeptic...but I read these things as a hobby and you do it
>professionally, so I'm sure you have a better grasp on these issues.
You might be interested in reading Thomas Reid's reply to Hume in his
_Inquiry_. Selections may be found in Ronald Beanblossom and Keith
Lehrer's edited version of Reid's _Inquiry and Essays_. Basically,
Reid argues that Hume's skeptical arguments begin with doubt about
perception but no doubt about ideas or reason. Reid maintains that
you have no more reason to believe the veracity of your ideas, reason,
or consciousness than you do your perceptions, and so you can't use
the one against the other. Either you accept them all or reject them
all.
>(deletions)
>
>>I agree with much of what you say here--I begin to disagree at the sentence
>>"But progress is only a word ...." It's a word, but it has meaning, and
>>whether or not the world is such a way that there is progress is either
>>true or false independently of what anyone happens to think is the case.
>
>This seems problematic. Whether or not its true that progress exists
>depends also on how progress is defined. Progress is defined like any word
>is defined, through convention. (And progress in the scientific discourse
>may be defined differently than in another, of course). If you are
>accepting that meaning as a starting point, then I agree with you. Except I
>would point out that the meaning is contingent.
Well, I think there's more to the definition of words than mere convention
(or, perhaps a better way of putting it: there are constraints on what
conventions we can adopt which come from our biology, neurology, and
the features of the world). But I do agree that there is a certain
amount of pluralism of conceptual schemes available--different ways of
correctly carving up the world. But truth has to do with the fit of
a conceptual scheme to the world, and both parts (the concepts and the
world) are important to the fit. Once you have defined a word, how
it relates or fails to relate to the world is an objective fact.
Michael Siemon
lip...@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu (James J. Lippard) writes:
>Reid argues that Hume's skeptical arguments begin with doubt about
>perception but no doubt about ideas or reason. Reid maintains that
>you have no more reason to believe the veracity of your ideas, reason,
>or consciousness than you do your perceptions, and so you can't use
>the one against the other. Either you accept them all or reject them
>all.
That seems a terribly broad conclusion to draw from a basically sensible
obervation. Why is it not possible to winnow an acceptable subset of
both by pitting the one against the other? Certainly a *global* invali-
dation from either side fails, given the weakness of each. But consider
something like color, where detailed perception (in laboratory experiment
guided by ideas and reason) allows us to investigate and even deconstruct
the ideas with which we start, triangulating -- if I may metaphorize --
from both sides of the river to the rock in midstream. We still have
only a "fix" on that rock, a joint construct of percept and idea, not
the rock-an-sich. But that may be close enough for folk music.
--
Michael L. Siemon "We honour founders of these starving cities
m...@panix.com Whose honour is the image of our sorrow ...
- or - They built by rivers and at night the water
m...@ulysses.att.com Running past the windows comforted their sorrow."
se...@polisci.umn.edu
>Realism says that there is no real explanation without truth, and that
>truth is metaphysical truth. Pragmatism says that theories are just
>instrumental to obtaining other goods--they're useful.
(some deletions)
>Truth isn't irrelevant--it is the goal of inquiry even if, as a matter
>of fact, we can't tell for certain that we've attained it. (I think
>we can attain it, and do attain it, and that sometimes we can even
>tell that we have.) Truth is a necessary condition of knowledge--if
>you have a belief that's not true, you don't have knowledge even if it
>has some other good features such as usefulness or survival value.
I assume you're defining truth here as a description of objective reality.
Since in inquiry we distance ourselves from objective reality with
language or symbols, I'm not sure if we can ever tell we have truth. Can
you give an example of what you mean there? I'm afraid I'll have to go with
the pragmatist view, because while I can see truth as a goal, the concept
seems to make things messier rather than clearer. It seems that to accept
things as truth we have to have criteria, and that criteria ends up being
determined either by usefulness or explanatory power. Is it true that
certain subatomic particles exist? Realists posit their existence by seeing
their effects, but they are theoretical constructs. The effects might be
caused by something totally outside our existing theories which won't be
discovered for decades. Does it make sense to talk about these things in
terms of truth? Or is truth more complicated?
> I think truth has to be metaphysical rather than epistemic, because
>epistemic notions of truth get into serious trouble. (Some arguments
>to this effect may be found in the chapter of Alvin Goldman's _Epistemology
>and Cognition_ on truth.)
You gave a good recommendation with the Laudan book, so I'll jot this one
down.
>You might be interested in reading Thomas Reid's reply to Hume in his
>_Inquiry_. Selections may be found in Ronald Beanblossom and Keith
>Lehrer's edited version of Reid's _Inquiry and Essays_. Basically,
>Reid argues that Hume's skeptical arguments begin with doubt about
>perception but no doubt about ideas or reason. Reid maintains that
>you have no more reason to believe the veracity of your ideas, reason,
>or consciousness than you do your perceptions, and so you can't use
>the one against the other. Either you accept them all or reject them
>all.
If I have time I'll look at that, but I tend to think that since perceptions
are different than ideas and/or reason, then it may not be necessary to say
that arguments about one apply to the others. On the other hand, one could
say that reason, ideas and perceptions all exist, and thus we can work with
them even if we have doubts about their veracity. In fact, keeping those
doubts in mind assures we'll remain critical about what we're claiming to be
(heres that word again) true.
>Well, I think there's more to the definition of words than mere convention
>(or, perhaps a better way of putting it: there are constraints on what
>conventions we can adopt which come from our biology, neurology, and
>the features of the world). But I do agree that there is a certain
>amount of pluralism of conceptual schemes available--different ways of
>correctly carving up the world. But truth has to do with the fit of
>a conceptual scheme to the world, and both parts (the concepts and the
>world) are important to the fit. Once you have defined a word, how
>it relates or fails to relate to the world is an objective fact.
Except the criteria by which we determine whether or not it relates or fails
to relate to the world rely on other concepts and interpretations of
reality. Objective facts, to me, always end up being regarded as facts due
to the concepts and perceptions in play. Maybe I'd understand this better
if you gave a concrete example of what an objective fact is.
-Scott
James J. Lippard
>In article <1DEC1993...@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu>
>lip...@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu (James J. Lippard) writes:
>>Reid argues that Hume's skeptical arguments begin with doubt about
>>perception but no doubt about ideas or reason. Reid maintains that
>>you have no more reason to believe the veracity of your ideas, reason,
>>or consciousness than you do your perceptions, and so you can't use
>>the one against the other. Either you accept them all or reject them
>>all.
>
>That seems a terribly broad conclusion to draw from a basically sensible
>obervation. Why is it not possible to winnow an acceptable subset of
>both by pitting the one against the other? Certainly a *global* invali-
>dation from either side fails, given the weakness of each.
You misunderstood me, but it's my fault. When I said "you can't use
the one against the other" and "you accept them all or reject them all"
I did not mean (nor does Reid mean) every individual idea, perception,
memory, etc., but rather each *faculty* (perception, reason, memory, etc.).
Reid specifically argues that we can do what you went on to describe--
namely, use our individual perceptions against each other, etc.
Your last quoted sentence here is exactly the point I was trying to make
(and which Reid does a much better job of making).
James J. Lippard
>In article <1DEC1993...@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu> lip...@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu (James J. Lippard) writes:
>I assume you're defining truth here as a description of objective reality.
>Since in inquiry we distance ourselves from objective reality with
>language or symbols, I'm not sure if we can ever tell we have truth. Can
>you give an example of what you mean there? I'm afraid I'll have to go with
Inquiry involves more than the use of words and concepts. It involves
interaction with the world. It is through that interaction that we can
tell when we've hit upon truth.
>certain subatomic particles exist? Realists posit their existence by seeing
>their effects, but they are theoretical constructs. The effects might be
>caused by something totally outside our existing theories which won't be
>discovered for decades. Does it make sense to talk about these things in
>terms of truth? Or is truth more complicated?
I think it does make sense, and that trying to eliminate truth raises far
more complications than it solves.
[recommendation of Alvin Goldman's _Epistemology and Cognition_]
>You gave a good recommendation with the Laudan book, so I'll jot this one
>down.
It's chapter 7, and section 7.2 is particularly relevant.
[recommendation of Thomas Reid]
>If I have time I'll look at that, but I tend to think that since perceptions
>are different than ideas and/or reason, then it may not be necessary to say
>that arguments about one apply to the others. On the other hand, one could
>say that reason, ideas and perceptions all exist, and thus we can work with
>them even if we have doubts about their veracity. In fact, keeping those
>doubts in mind assures we'll remain critical about what we're claiming to be
>(heres that word again) true.
What you have to worry about by trying to make use of ideas/reason and
not perception, is the extent to which we acquire ideas and learn to
reason as a result of our perceptions. If you're going to be skeptical
about perception and be consistent about it, you have to be skeptical
about all the internal stuff produced by past perceptions as well.
>>Well, I think there's more to the definition of words than mere convention
>>(or, perhaps a better way of putting it: there are constraints on what
>>conventions we can adopt which come from our biology, neurology, and
>>the features of the world). But I do agree that there is a certain
>>amount of pluralism of conceptual schemes available--different ways of
>>correctly carving up the world. But truth has to do with the fit of
>>a conceptual scheme to the world, and both parts (the concepts and the
>>world) are important to the fit. Once you have defined a word, how
>>it relates or fails to relate to the world is an objective fact.
>
>Except the criteria by which we determine whether or not it relates or fails
>to relate to the world rely on other concepts and interpretations of
>reality. Objective facts, to me, always end up being regarded as facts due
>to the concepts and perceptions in play. Maybe I'd understand this better
>if you gave a concrete example of what an objective fact is.
Any example I give you via the net will be a sequence of words, against
which you will bring your above objection. But, as I said above, words
are not all that we have to go on. Words are not the fundamental
building blocks of the universe.
Stan Friesen
|> In article <1DEC1993...@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu> lip...@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu (James J. Lippard) writes:
|>
|> > or falsity of our theoretical beliefs? We don't have to be able to
|> > prove that a theory is true before we have a warrant for accepting it
|> > nor do we have to demonstrate its falsity before rationally rejecting
|> >... A statement's truth has to do with both the meaning of the
|> >statement and the state of the world--they have to fit each other
|> >appropriately in order for the statement to be true.
|>
|> all claims to truth are theoretical concepts that are accepted if they
|> provide explanation (thus subatomic particles are "real" even if never seen,
|> since we can posit their existence due to effects we measure). That seems
|> to at least suggest a constructed notion of truth.
Ack, yes, that is a constructed notion of truth.
That is *not* the realist's position; what you have described is
one version of the *pragmatist's* position.
The realist's position is the subatomic particles are either real
or not real, independent of whether we believe them to be so or not.
Our theory that subatomic particles exists is true if and only if
they exist in actuality.
The realist rthen goes on to say that we can never have *final*,
*authoritative* proof that subatomic particles do really exist,
but that the current evidence for them is sufficiently strong
to warrant the rational conclusion that they are real.
Note the difference, the realist *concludes* that subatomic
particles are *really* real, the pragmatist posts their reality
because it is useful to do so (the effects can be so described).
|> > Having warrant for a theory is to have some reason (but a non-conclusive
|> >reason) for thinking the theory to be true. What it means for a theory
|> >to be true is that it accurately describes reality. This condition is
|> >metaphysical, not epistemic.
|>
|> So is actual truth irrelevant? As long as we have some non-conclusive
|> reason for thinking the theory true, does actual "truth" remain simply a
|> metaphysical concept?
No, *not* irrelevent, *unknowable*! There is a difference.
The actual truth is relevent, since it is the final arbiter,
it is just, ultimately, inaccessible.
|> If that's the case, then it seems that accepting
|> truth as a human construction that is changable makes sense in talking
|> about epistemology, but truth as you define it is not epistemic. So should
No. I would rather say that our *beliefs* about truth are, in some
sense, a human construct, but that truth itself is metaphysical.
|> Which is why I put myself in more of a weak relativist position of
|> pragmatism not relying on metaphysical foundations but rather on socially
|> constructed concepts.
I find utilitarian pragmatism, based on the *utility* of the
models in accomplishing goals or predicting results to be more
philsophically valid. Social pragmatism seems to be a thinly
disguised relativism, and not really pragmatism.
Side point 1: I hover between being a realist and a utilitarian pragmatist.
Side point 2: In practice accomplishing goals and making predictions are
effectively equivalent, at least in terms of the constraints
they place on beliefs.
|> >I agree with much of what you say here--I begin to disagree at the sentence
|> >"But progress is only a word ...." It's a word, but it has meaning, and
|> >whether or not the world is such a way that there is progress is either
|> >true or false independently of what anyone happens to think is the case.
|>
|> This seems problematic. Whether or not its true that progress exists
|> depends also on how progress is defined.
True. But for any given definition, it is either true or false that
progress in that sense occurs, independently of any individual's beliefs.
The different definitions roughly correspond to different sets of
truth conditions on reality. You choose one, and then check the
data to see if it is rational to conclude that reality conforms to
the chosen definition.
This is why scientists spend so much time establishing precise
definitions, so that they are all applying the same truth conditions
in testing their theories. (Or, at least that is the goal, even if
it is not always achieved).
|> Progress is defined like any word
|> is defined, through convention. (And progress in the scientific discourse
|> may be defined differently than in another, of course). If you are
|> accepting that meaning as a starting point, then I agree with you. Except I
|> would point out that the meaning is contingent.
And I would say, so what? In studying reality one merely needs a set
of standard yardsticks, not one particular one. It makes no *real*
difference if I describe something as 1.0 inch long or as 24 millimeters
long - the length is the same either way.
So it is with different definitions of 'progress' (or any other word),
all that is changed is the set of labels used to express the facts,
not the actual facts themselves.
--
sar...@teradata.com (formerly tdatirv!sarima)
or
Stanley...@ElSegundoCA.ncr.com
The peace of God be with you.
asia z lerner
>
>> Having warrant for a theory is to have some reason (but a non-conclusive
>>reason) for thinking the theory to be true. What it means for a theory
>>to be true is that it accurately describes reality. This condition is
>>metaphysical, not epistemic.
>
>So is actual truth irrelevant?
?? How does that flow from the above?
As long as we have some non-conclusive
>reason for thinking the theory true, does actual "truth" remain simply a
>metaphysical concept? If that's the case, then it seems that accepting
>truth as a human construction that is changable makes sense in talking
>about epistemology, but truth as you define it is not epistemic. So should
>we just jettison any use of the word truth in favor of theory or knowledge?
>That make reduce confusion.
>
The question is whether you want to go on calling yourself a realist. The
above might very well not make a difference for the observable behaviour,
so perhaps you are arguing for Occam's razor?
>
>>I agree with much of what you say here--I begin to disagree at the sentence
>>"But progress is only a word ...." It's a word, but it has meaning, and
>>whether or not the world is such a way that there is progress is either
>>true or false independently of what anyone happens to think is the case.
>
>This seems problematic. Whether or not its true that progress exists
>depends also on how progress is defined. Progress is defined like any word
>is defined, through convention. (And progress in the scientific discourse
>may be defined differently than in another, of course). If you are
>accepting that meaning as a starting point, then I agree with you. Except I
>would point out that the meaning is contingent.
>
As a pragmatist, do you have a problem with the Kuhnian notion of
"progress-only-within-paradigm?"
>>The way to test it is to look at the history of science. I think that
>>this test shows that there *is* progress in science. (One good defense
>>of this is ch. 5 of Kitcher's _The Advancement of Science_.)
>
Kitchner has a funny notion of moral progress: "they ought to have belived
Darwin...".
Asia
se...@polisci.umn.edu
>Any example I give you via the net will be a sequence of words, against
>which you will bring your above objection. But, as I said above, words
>are not all that we have to go on. Words are not the fundamental
>building blocks of the universe.
Our disagreement seems to boil down to this. Neither of us would say that
words are all that exists, nor would either of us say that words and
concepts are unimportant. My point is that any claim we make must use
symbolic interaction (language, drawings, illustrations, gestures, etc.)
which mediates between the world and our understanding of it. We cannot
understand the world in a manner that can be communicated without this
mediation. Even a physical act like a slap on the face or falling down a
hole might have different meanings if different words are attached to it.
When you deal with science and things that aren't as direct, the problem is
magnified.
I don't think that causes a problem: we just recognize that our symbols are
representations of a reality we can try to approximate, but our belief in
the truth of our propositions is ultimately based on criteria which are
epistemic rather than metaphysical. Therefore usefulness, explanatory
power, falsifiability, etc., lead us to what we might call "scientific
truth," though part of science is the notion that any "truth" in that sense
might later be shown not to be truth after all. (Simply, any scientific
theory has to be falsifiable, if its not, then we're not dealing with
science.) *Subjective* beliefs in truth can be different; they can be based
on religion, intuition, personal criteria, etc. But that again isn't
science; though such beliefs can lead one to make certain hypotheses or
propose certain tests which add to science.
Still, if you'd give an example of truth, I may claim its just words since
it will be (by definition on the net), but I would try to listen to what you
mean by those words and not simply use that as a cheap way to try to
attack your position. Perhaps there might even be a way of defining truth
which would deal with my objections.
-Scott
asia z lerner
>In article <serb.1234...@polisci.umn.edu>, se...@polisci.umn.edu writes...
>>In article <1DEC1993...@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu> lip...@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu (James J. Lippard) writes:
>>Thanks for retyping that -- the guy I loaned the book knows Laudan or knew
>>him at some point and wanted to read it when he saw I had it. Anyway, as I
>>understand realism, knowledge is directly connected to theory, meaning that
>>all claims to truth are theoretical concepts that are accepted if they
>>provide explanation (thus subatomic particles are "real" even if never seen,
>>since we can posit their existence due to effects we measure). That seems
>>to at least suggest a constructed notion of truth.
>
>Realism says that there is no real explanation without truth, and that
>truth is metaphysical truth.
Q: I understand the way in which realism makes progress conceptually
tenable, but how [if at all] does it help us proove that it actually happened?
>
>Truth isn't irrelevant--it is the goal of inquiry even if, as a matter
>of fact, we can't tell for certain that we've attained it. (I think
>we can attain it, and do attain it, and that sometimes we can even
>tell that we have.)
Could you specify? Thanx.
Truth is a necessary condition of knowledge--if
>you have a belief that's not true, you don't have knowledge even if it
>has some other good features such as usefulness or survival value.
Unless I define knowledge as a set of usefull beleifs...
> I think truth has to be metaphysical rather than epistemic, because
>epistemic notions of truth get into serious trouble.
Yep.
>
>You might be interested in reading Thomas Reid's reply to Hume in his
>_Inquiry_. Selections may be found in Ronald Beanblossom and Keith
>Lehrer's edited version of Reid's _Inquiry and Essays_. Basically,
>Reid argues that Hume's skeptical arguments begin with doubt about
>perception but no doubt about ideas or reason. Reid maintains that
>you have no more reason to believe the veracity of your ideas, reason,
>or consciousness than you do your perceptions, and so you can't use
>the one against the other. Either you accept them all or reject them
>all.
>
:) Did Hume ever reply to that one?
>
>Well, I think there's more to the definition of words than mere convention
>(or, perhaps a better way of putting it: there are constraints on what
>conventions we can adopt which come from our biology, neurology, and
>the features of the world). But I do agree that there is a certain
>amount of pluralism of conceptual schemes available--different ways of
>correctly carving up the world. But truth has to do with the fit of
>a conceptual scheme to the world, and both parts (the concepts and the
>world) are important to the fit. Once you have defined a word, how
>it relates or fails to relate to the world is an objective fact.
>
A fact who's existance realism posits, but doesn't necessarily help to
discover. A hypothetical fact, so to speak...
Asia
se...@polisci.umn.edu
(some deletions)
>The realist rthen goes on to say that we can never have *final*,
>*authoritative* proof that subatomic particles do really exist,
>but that the current evidence for them is sufficiently strong
>to warrant the rational conclusion that they are real.
>Note the difference, the realist *concludes* that subatomic
>particles are *really* real, the pragmatist posts their reality
>because it is useful to do so (the effects can be so described).
OK, your description makes sense
>|> So is actual truth irrelevant? As long as we have some non-conclusive
>|> reason for thinking the theory true, does actual "truth" remain simply a
>|> metaphysical concept?
>No, *not* irrelevent, *unknowable*! There is a difference.
>The actual truth is relevent, since it is the final arbiter,
>it is just, ultimately, inaccessible.
I don't necessarily disagree but, is the actual truth relevant only in the
sense that it is the reality we are trying to understand, or is it relevant
for our statements about it. If its the former, I agree. But I question
whether or not a metaphysical truth is relevant for how we understand
reality. In other words, does it make a difference that the pragmatist
accepts subatomic particles because they're useful, and that the realist
does so because the evidence warrants claiming they're real? And is since
scientific truth is always open to falsifiability with new and surprising
evidence, is truth the best term to use in dealing with knowledge claims?
>|> Which is why I put myself in more of a weak relativist position of
>|> pragmatism not relying on metaphysical foundations but rather on socially
>|> constructed concepts.
>I find utilitarian pragmatism, based on the *utility* of the
>models in accomplishing goals or predicting results to be more
>philsophically valid. Social pragmatism seems to be a thinly
>disguised relativism, and not really pragmatism.
Perhaps, but dogmatism on either side, relativist, realist or pragmatist
probably misses something valid about the other. And there are good
arguments that relativists and skeptics can give which I am not willing to
dismiss. On the other hand, being a social scientist dealing with human
situations social pragmatism may make more sense to me than to you, since
our questions and subjects of inquiry are different.
>Side point 1: I hover between being a realist and a utilitarian pragmatist.
And in social science, the question of what utility is and how its defined
is very controversial. Utilitarian pragmatism has moral, ethical
implications when used in social science (it could be used to justify social
engineering, for example), thus making it more 'pragmatic' for a social
scientist to have a more relativist notion of pragmatism. Most relativist
social scientists don't try to make a move towards pragmatism, and hence
they tend to endlessly critique and accomplish nothing.
(some deletions)
>And I would say, so what? In studying reality one merely needs a set
>of standard yardsticks, not one particular one. It makes no *real*
>difference if I describe something as 1.0 inch long or as 24 millimeters
>long - the length is the same either way.
>So it is with different definitions of 'progress' (or any other word),
>all that is changed is the set of labels used to express the facts,
>not the actual facts themselves.
Progress is a concept, I don't know if its a "fact". I don't know if there
is any objective notion of "progress" out there (unlike, for instance, "
tree." Although tree may be contingent label, something is out there that
we can touch, see and burn no matter what. Progress is a concept which
describes how we perceive our social actions or knowledge progressing, and
as such it has no referent to nature except for how we define it. I'm not
sure how important that difference ends up being, and I certainly don't
think we should chuck the notion of progress because of it, but here I think
we should at least take the relativist critique seriously that what we call
progress is only one particular path, not a necessary or "best" path. That
doesn't mean we shouldn't walk it though.
-Scott Erb
Dept. of Political Science
U. of Minnesota
Minneapolis MN 55455
James J. Lippard
[I wrote:]
>>>The way to test it is to look at the history of science. I think that
>>>this test shows that there *is* progress in science. (One good defense
>>>of this is ch. 5 of Kitcher's _The Advancement of Science_.)
>
>Kitchner has a funny notion of moral progress: "they ought to have belived
>Darwin...".
On what do you base this exceedingly peculiar statement? I notice you
write of "Kitchner"--is this a typo, or are you referring to someone
other than philosopher of science Philip Kitcher (University of California,
San Diego)?
James J. Lippard
>In article <1DEC1993...@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu> lip...@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu (James J. Lippard) writes:
>Q: I understand the way in which realism makes progress conceptually
>tenable, but how [if at all] does it help us proove that it actually happened?
I'm not sure it helps or hurts. (Except that if you deny realism, it's
not clear that "actually happened" is meaningful.)
>>Truth isn't irrelevant--it is the goal of inquiry even if, as a matter
>>of fact, we can't tell for certain that we've attained it. (I think
>>we can attain it, and do attain it, and that sometimes we can even
>>tell that we have.)
>
>Could you specify? Thanx.
My statement here is a hint that I advocate an externalist theory of
knowledge. (Or, at least, a partially externalist theory of knowledge.)
What ultimately determines whether we know, for our most basic beliefs,
are that certain conditions are met, whether or not we have any beliefs
about those conditions or not. For instance, a reliabilist theory of
knowledge says that if our beliefs are produced by reliable processes,
then those processes yield knowledge--whether we know that they are
reliable or not. (It's not necessary to know that you know in order to
have knowledge--Kp does not imply KKp.) Further, if we have reliable
means of examining our own beliefs--whether or not we know that those
means are reliable--then we can come to know that we know.
If you want more detailed exposition, take a look at some developed
externalist theories of knowledge (e.g., Alvin Goldman's _Epistemology
and Cognition_, Fred Dretske's _Knowledge and the Flow of Information_,
Robert Nozick's _Philosophical Explanations_, ch. 3).
> Truth is a necessary condition of knowledge--if
>>you have a belief that's not true, you don't have knowledge even if it
>>has some other good features such as usefulness or survival value.
>
>Unless I define knowledge as a set of usefull beleifs...
Sure. But that's a non-standard definition.
>>You might be interested in reading Thomas Reid's reply to Hume in his
>>_Inquiry_. Selections may be found in Ronald Beanblossom and Keith
>>Lehrer's edited version of Reid's _Inquiry and Essays_. Basically,
>>Reid argues that Hume's skeptical arguments begin with doubt about
>>perception but no doubt about ideas or reason. Reid maintains that
>>you have no more reason to believe the veracity of your ideas, reason,
>>or consciousness than you do your perceptions, and so you can't use
>>the one against the other. Either you accept them all or reject them
>>all.
>
>:) Did Hume ever reply to that one?
Not that I am aware of, though Reid did send Hume a copy and they
exchanged some correspondence. (I haven't seen what they said to
each other.)
>>world) are important to the fit. Once you have defined a word, how
>>it relates or fails to relate to the world is an objective fact.
>
>A fact who's existance realism posits, but doesn't necessarily help to
>discover. A hypothetical fact, so to speak...
Yes. But realism isn't a methodology of discovery, so I don't see
why you would expect it to help. (It does, at least, tell you that
there is something there to be discovered.)
asia z lerner
>they exist in actuality.
>
>The realist rthen goes on to say that we can never have *final*,
>*authoritative* proof that subatomic particles do really exist,
>but that the current evidence for them is sufficiently strong
>to warrant the rational conclusion that they are real.
>
I think you'll have to justify the "rational" here.
>
>|> Which is why I put myself in more of a weak relativist position of
>|> pragmatism not relying on metaphysical foundations but rather on socially
>|> constructed concepts.
>
>I find utilitarian pragmatism, based on the *utility* of the
>models in accomplishing goals or predicting results to be more
>philsophically valid. Social pragmatism seems to be a thinly
>disguised relativism, and not really pragmatism.
>
I think you might have a problem showing that "accomplishing goals" and
"predicting results" are not socially defined as appropriate truth criteria.
>|>
>|> This seems problematic. Whether or not its true that progress exists
>|> depends also on how progress is defined.
>
>True. But for any given definition, it is either true or false that
>progress in that sense occurs, independently of any individual's beliefs.
>
You would still have to justify a particular definition over all other
definitions.
>The different definitions roughly correspond to different sets of
>truth conditions on reality. You choose one, and then check the
>data to see if it is rational to conclude that reality conforms to
>the chosen definition.
>
Hmm. Definition of truth does not necessarily provide a method
to measure progress. If progress is approaching truth, as per realism, just
how do we check that?
Asia
asia z lerner
>In article <1993Dec2.2...@midway.uchicago.edu>, azle...@midway.uchicago.edu writes...
>[I wrote:]
>>>>The way to test it is to look at the history of science. I think that
>>>>this test shows that there *is* progress in science. (One good defense
>>>>of this is ch. 5 of Kitcher's _The Advancement of Science_.)
>>
>>Kitchner has a funny notion of moral progress: "they ought to have belived
>>Darwin...".
>
>On what do you base this exceedingly peculiar statement? I notice you
>write of "Kitchner"--is this a typo, or are you referring to someone
>other than philosopher of science Philip Kitcher (University of California,
>San Diego)?
>
Typo - definitely. I keep confusing him with the Lord, I guess. I base
my exeedingly peculiar statement on ch.2 (I'm pretty much sure) in his
book, were he discusses progress in the context of Darwinism. I'll look
for the quote, but I'm surprised that you're surprised. I though that
was a very noticable theme in the book. Progress guided by "the right thing
to do".
Asia
James J. Lippard
>In article <2DEC1993...@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu> lip...@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu (James J. Lippard) writes:
>>In article <1993Dec2.2...@midway.uchicago.edu>, azle...@midway.uchicago.edu writes...
>>>Darwin...".
>>
>>On what do you base this exceedingly peculiar statement? I notice you
>>write of "Kitchner"--is this a typo, or are you referring to someone
>>other than philosopher of science Philip Kitcher (University of California,
>>San Diego)?
>
>Typo - definitely. I keep confusing him with the Lord, I guess. I base
>my exeedingly peculiar statement on ch.2 (I'm pretty much sure) in his
>book, were he discusses progress in the context of Darwinism. I'll look
>for the quote, but I'm surprised that you're surprised. I though that
>was a very noticable theme in the book. Progress guided by "the right thing
>to do".
I am surprised because the book has absolutely nothing to do with
"moral progress." I think the sentence your original quote refers
to is in ch. 2, which uses the development of evolutionary theory
as an historical illustration for the concept of progress which he
develops later in the book (chs. 4 and 5). I think what you're referring
to is on p. 38: "My claim, then, is that naturalists living in Britain
in 1859, starting from any of the biological practices then popular,
*ought* to have modified their practice to accept minimal Darwinism,
in light of the reasoning that I have reconstructed from the _Origin_."
To say, as you have, that this sentence represents Kitcher's
"notion of progress" (I'll leave out the "moral"), is inaccurate.
As his history on the preceding pages shows, naturalists *did* modify
their practice to accept what Kitcher calls minimal Darwinism, and
Kitcher maintains and defends his claim that it was reasonable of them
to do so on the basis of the case Darwin put forth. In chs. 4-5, he
gives his account of what warrants scientific change and what
constitutes progress. Your sentence makes it sound like it's axiomatic
for Kitcher that "You ought to believe Darwin," and that that is what
is the essence of progress. That's just not so.
James J. Lippard
>In article <2DEC1993...@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu> lip...@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu (James J. Lippard) writes:
>>Any example I give you via the net will be a sequence of words, against
>>which you will bring your above objection. But, as I said above, words
>>are not all that we have to go on. Words are not the fundamental
>>building blocks of the universe.
>
>Our disagreement seems to boil down to this. Neither of us would say that
>words are all that exists, nor would either of us say that words and
>concepts are unimportant. My point is that any claim we make must use
>symbolic interaction (language, drawings, illustrations, gestures, etc.)
>which mediates between the world and our understanding of it. We cannot
>understand the world in a manner that can be communicated without this
>mediation. Even a physical act like a slap on the face or falling down a
>hole might have different meanings if different words are attached to it.
>When you deal with science and things that aren't as direct, the problem is
>magnified.
The making of claims involves symbolic interaction, yes. (That symbolic
interaction is itself dependent on there being a world which contains
objects which can act as symbolic tokens.) But the understanding
of claims and the examination of claims is not limited to the use of
symbols. When a scientist conducts an experiment, the result obtained
is produced by the world. The result is typically then recorded in
language, but it is wrong to infer from that that the result is
"socially constructed." (At least, if you're making that claim in
the strong way that, e.g., Latour and Woolgar do in _Laboratory Life_.
They write as though the physical world has *nothing* to do with the
experimental result, that scientists simply "negotiate" with each other
what results they are willing to accept. That's nonsense.) It is
right to observe a social component in the recording of results--the
categories in our language are partly (but not wholly) socially
determined. But it is a mistake to overlook the contribution from the
world.
>I don't think that causes a problem: we just recognize that our symbols are
>representations of a reality we can try to approximate, but our belief in
>the truth of our propositions is ultimately based on criteria which are
>epistemic rather than metaphysical. Therefore usefulness, explanatory
Our *belief* in the truth of our propositions is epistemic. Their truth
is metaphysical.
>power, falsifiability, etc., lead us to what we might call "scientific
>truth," though part of science is the notion that any "truth" in that sense
>might later be shown not to be truth after all. (Simply, any scientific
>theory has to be falsifiable, if its not, then we're not dealing with
>science.) *Subjective* beliefs in truth can be different; they can be based
>on religion, intuition, personal criteria, etc. But that again isn't
>science; though such beliefs can lead one to make certain hypotheses or
>propose certain tests which add to science.
I don't particularly like the use of the word truth in the way you've
defined "scientific truth," though I endorse what you say about how
it "might later be shown not to be truth [metaphysical] after all."
I do think we have good (epistemic) warrant for saying that many of
the products of science *are* true, and will therefore not be shown to
be wrong later on. (I specifically reject the "pessimistic induction"
argument from the history of science that's been given by Putnam
and Kuhn. I think the history of science allows for an "optimistic
induction" argument, though not necessarily at the level of theories.)
>Still, if you'd give an example of truth, I may claim its just words since
>it will be (by definition on the net), but I would try to listen to what you
>mean by those words and not simply use that as a cheap way to try to
>attack your position. Perhaps there might even be a way of defining truth
>which would deal with my objections.
Apparently one of my former fellow graduate students, Marian David, has
just published a book defending the correspondence theory of truth.
(I'm not sure of the publisher; possibly Oxford.) That might be something
to watch for.
(The most popular theories of truth right now seem to be
deflationary--i.e., Tarskian. p is true iff p, and that's all
there is to say about it. "Snow is white" is true if and only
if snow is white. Correspondence says there's more to it than
that, and I agree.)
se...@polisci.umn.edu
>The making of claims involves symbolic interaction, yes. (That symbolic
>interaction is itself dependent on there being a world which contains
>objects which can act as symbolic tokens.) But the understanding
>of claims and the examination of claims is not limited to the use of
>symbols. When a scientist conducts an experiment, the result obtained
>is produced by the world. The result is typically then recorded in
>language, but it is wrong to infer from that that the result is
>"socially constructed." (At least, if you're making that claim in
>the strong way that, e.g., Latour and Woolgar do in _Laboratory Life_.
>They write as though the physical world has *nothing* to do with the
>experimental result, that scientists simply "negotiate" with each other
>what results they are willing to accept. That's nonsense.) It is
>right to observe a social component in the recording of results--the
>categories in our language are partly (but not wholly) socially
>determined. But it is a mistake to overlook the contribution from the
>world.
I don't disagree with any of this.
>>I don't think that causes a problem: we just recognize that our symbols are
>>representations of a reality we can try to approximate, but our belief in
>>the truth of our propositions is ultimately based on criteria which are
>>epistemic rather than metaphysical. Therefore usefulness, explanatory
>Our *belief* in the truth of our propositions is epistemic. Their truth
>is metaphysical.
And hence truth in that sense is unattainable. We're left with our beliefs
about truth, with various criteria which we use to decide if we think those
beliefs are likely to really represent some close approximation of reality,
or metaphysical truth.
>>power, falsifiability, etc., lead us to what we might call "scientific
>>truth," though part of science is the notion that any "truth" in that sense
>>might later be shown not to be truth after all. (Simply, any scientific
>>theory has to be falsifiable, if its not, then we're not dealing with
>>science.) *Subjective* beliefs in truth can be different; they can be based
>>on religion, intuition, personal criteria, etc. But that again isn't
>>science; though such beliefs can lead one to make certain hypotheses or
>>propose certain tests which add to science.
>I don't particularly like the use of the word truth in the way you've
>defined "scientific truth," though I endorse what you say about how
>it "might later be shown not to be truth [metaphysical] after all."
>I do think we have good (epistemic) warrant for saying that many of
>the products of science *are* true, and will therefore not be shown to
>be wrong later on. (I specifically reject the "pessimistic induction"
>argument from the history of science that's been given by Putnam
>and Kuhn. I think the history of science allows for an "optimistic
>induction" argument, though not necessarily at the level of theories.)
I think many of our beliefs about truth will be shown to be rather limited
or incomplete (words which suggest that I am indeed embracing some notion of
progress here), and the *possibility* that the products might later be shown
to be not true is something to take into account. Nonetheless, I don't have
any real argument against your "optimistic induction."
-Scott
James J. Lippard
>>Our *belief* in the truth of our propositions is epistemic. Their truth
>>is metaphysical.
>
>And hence truth in that sense is unattainable. We're left with our beliefs
>about truth, with various criteria which we use to decide if we think those
>beliefs are likely to really represent some close approximation of reality,
>or metaphysical truth.
Your conclusion doesn't follow. If we can get truths, but can't tell for
sure that they are truths, it doesn't follow that we haven't got them.
You seem to be advocating the position that you can't know unless you
know that you know.
se...@polisci.umn.edu
>Your conclusion doesn't follow. If we can get truths, but can't tell for
>sure that they are truths, it doesn't follow that we haven't got them.
>You seem to be advocating the position that you can't know unless you
>know that you know.
OK, let's say that I claim that "A" is a truth, and present my evidence for
believing it (let's say "A" is unfalsifiable). You counter with B, and
claim that it is true, even though it contradicts A. You seem to be saying
that even though we can't know they are true, we both might have truth. I'm
simply saying that claim is really useless, since then any proposition might
be held and claimed as truth. What matters is how we distinguish between
propositions that claim truth. Let's say your claim of "B" is falsifiable
and subject to rigorous tests, which it passes. You have an ability to
argue that B seems more likely to be true, not on any metaphysical claim,
but on epistemological grounds. I might still believe "A" -- it hasn't been
falsified, and it might go along with my intuition. You're right that I
still can believe that and perhaps I can call it truth.
The solution, it seems to me, is to keep metaphysical truth at the
subjective or non-scientific level. I might believe things to be true or
not, based on my world view. In making scientific claims or philosophical
ones, I have to base that claim on results. Truth thus becomes for all
practical purposes epistemic and changeable. That doesn't mean it doesn't
exist, but rather if we don't know for sure if we have it when we do, then
what good does it do us?
-Scott
Stan Friesen
|> In article <931202213...@tdat.ElSegundoCA.NCR.COM> s...@tdat.ElSegundoCA.NCR.COM writes:
|> >
|> >The realist rthen goes on to say that we can never have *final*,
|> >*authoritative* proof that subatomic particles do really exist,
|> >but that the current evidence for them is sufficiently strong
|> >to warrant the rational conclusion that they are real.
|>
|> I think you'll have to justify the "rational" here.
|>
Really, I was mainly trying to clarify what the realist's position
is, not specify my own position. (Although I do lean towards a
realist position).
I think James Lippard's able posts explain how to go from interactions
to rational beliefs about reality quite well, though.
|> >
|> >I find utilitarian pragmatism, based on the *utility* of the
|> >models in accomplishing goals or predicting results to be more
|> >philsophically valid. Social pragmatism seems to be a thinly
|> >disguised relativism, and not really pragmatism.
|>
|> I think you might have a problem showing that "accomplishing goals" and
|> "predicting results" are not socially defined as appropriate truth criteria.
Nope, not as far as I'm concerned. Being able to reliably count on
my actions having certain effects is not socially determined. It either
happens, or it doesn't.
This is the basis of pragmatism as a philosophy of 'knowledge'.
|> >True. But for any given definition, it is either true or false that
|> >progress in that sense occurs, independently of any individual's beliefs.
|>
|> You would still have to justify a particular definition over all other
|> definitions.
No, I simply have to make clear which definition I am using for the
particular discussion at hand. In other contexts I might choose to
use a different definition of progress.
In short, I feel perfectly justified in using whichever definition
is most appropriate for the immediate purposes, so long as I am clear
and explicit about which definition I am using. [This approach to
defintions is, in fact, the basis of technical vocabulary, in which
words are given specific definitions for use within a particular
domain of discourse].
|> >The different definitions roughly correspond to different sets of
|> >truth conditions on reality. You choose one, and then check the
|> >data to see if it is rational to conclude that reality conforms to
|> >the chosen definition.
|>
|> Hmm. Definition of truth does not necessarily provide a method
|> to measure progress. If progress is approaching truth, as per realism, just
|> how do we check that?
Well, using *that* definition of progress (which would only be applicable
in the context of philosophy of knowledge), I would say that the
main criterion is ability to model events. That is, the criterion
is pragmatic. (That is why I hover between pragmatism and realism).
[Note, the occurance or non-occurance of progress in this context does
*not* have any relevence to the occurance of other sorts of progress,
such as social progress].
se...@polisci.umn.edu
>In article <1993Dec3.0...@midway.uchicago.edu>, azle...@midway.uchicago.edu write:
>|>
>|> I think you might have a problem showing that "accomplishing goals" and
>|> "predicting results" are not socially defined as appropriate truth criteria.
>Nope, not as far as I'm concerned. Being able to reliably count on
>my actions having certain effects is not socially determined. It either
>happens, or it doesn't.
Yes and no. But what you choose to study, what equipment is available, what
you've been taught, what theories exist, etc., ARE determined (well, I
supposed determined is too strong a word, let's say highly influenced)
socially. What results do you want to predict? Why? What means do you
use? Why those means and not others? Those things were the result of
social processes of scientific (and at some point pre-scientific)
communication, were they not?
>This is the basis of pragmatism as a philosophy of 'knowledge'.
I've been sounding myself more pragmatist than earlier lately, perhaps
thanks to some of the debate here. But I still prefer a pragmatism that is
also reflective on the social origins of the questions/problems it chooses
to define, and thus problematizes those as well. NATURALLY, there are many
fields where such problematizing is not the work of the every day scientist,
and so I'm not necessarily saying people should all question where their
experiments come from.
>|> >True. But for any given definition, it is either true or false that
>|> >progress in that sense occurs, independently of any individual's beliefs.
>|>
>|> You would still have to justify a particular definition over all other
>|> definitions.
>No, I simply have to make clear which definition I am using for the
>particular discussion at hand. In other contexts I might choose to
>use a different definition of progress.
but...isn't that first sentence a justification -- you are justifying a
particular definition based on the particular discussion which is...by
definition...social.
>In short, I feel perfectly justified in using whichever definition
>is most appropriate for the immediate purposes, so long as I am clear
>and explicit about which definition I am using. [This approach to
>defintions is, in fact, the basis of technical vocabulary, in which
>words are given specific definitions for use within a particular
>domain of discourse].
Of course. But in each case there are reasons for it, and those have to be
socially communicated if your research/discussion is more than subjective.
>|> >The different definitions roughly correspond to different sets of
>|> >truth conditions on reality. You choose one, and then check the
>|> >data to see if it is rational to conclude that reality conforms to
>|> >the chosen definition.
>|>
>|> Hmm. Definition of truth does not necessarily provide a method
>|> to measure progress. If progress is approaching truth, as per realism, just
>|> how do we check that?
>Well, using *that* definition of progress (which would only be applicable
>in the context of philosophy of knowledge), I would say that the
>main criterion is ability to model events. That is, the criterion
>is pragmatic. (That is why I hover between pragmatism and realism).
>[Note, the occurance or non-occurance of progress in this context does
>*not* have any relevence to the occurance of other sorts of progress,
>such as social progress].
So if I defined progress differently that would be perfectly acceptable as
long as it fit in with the context of my research or the issue at hand. I
just have to be explicit about my definition. I'll buy that.
Scott Erb
Dept. of Poli-Sci
Stan Friesen
|> In article <931206174...@tdat.ElSegundoCA.NCR.COM> s...@tdat.ElSegundoCA.NCR.COM (Stan Friesen) writes:
|> >In article <1993Dec3.0...@midway.uchicago.edu>, azle...@midway.uchicago.edu write:
|>
|> >my actions having certain effects is not socially determined. It either
|> >happens, or it doesn't.
|>
|> Yes and no. But what you choose to study, what equipment is available, what
|> you've been taught, what theories exist, etc., ARE determined (well, I
|> supposed determined is too strong a word, let's say highly influenced)
|> socially. What results do you want to predict?
That depends on what I am trying to do, it may be the actions necessary
to get water into my stomach, or the process I need to use to get together
with a friend, or it could be how to get my computer to operate correctly.
|> Why?
I',m thirsty, or lonely, or I need to use my computer.
The point here is that you are starting at the wrong level.
Pragmatism starts at the very most basic level of human behavior,
eating, sleeping, and getting places. The first thing one learns
to predict is the effects of various bodily actions on one's immediate
surroundings. Everything else follows from that.
|> What means do you
|> use? Why those means and not others? Those things were the result of
|> social processes of scientific (and at some point pre-scientific)
|> communication, were they not?
Some were. So what? I could as easily have applied pragmatism to
any other set of goals. It is a general tool that works independently
of the inputs.
|> >This is the basis of pragmatism as a philosophy of 'knowledge'.
|>
|> I've been sounding myself more pragmatist than earlier lately, perhaps
|> thanks to some of the debate here. But I still prefer a pragmatism that is
|> also reflective on the social origins of the questions/problems it chooses
|> to define, and thus problematizes those as well. NATURALLY, there are many
|> fields where such problematizing is not the work of the every day scientist,
|> and so I'm not necessarily saying people should all question where their
|> experiments come from.
I have no argument with that - I just don't see why it is in any way
special. If my goal is to understand human social interaction, then of
course I must apply pragmatism to social matters.
|> >No, I simply have to make clear which definition I am using for the
|> >particular discussion at hand. In other contexts I might choose to
|> >use a different definition of progress.
|>
|> but...isn't that first sentence a justification -- you are justifying a
|> particular definition based on the particular discussion which is...by
|> definition...social.
No, I am *choosing* a particular definition that is applicable to the
problem domain at hand (whatever that happens to be). If there is no
appropriate definition, then I create a new word and give it the
required definition - that is I coin a new item of technical vocabulary.
|> Of course. But in each case there are reasons for it, and those have to be
|> socially communicated if your research/discussion is more than subjective.
All that needs to be communicated is the actual definition used. That
is sufficient to determine the truth conditions of my conclusions. That
is *given* some arbitrary definition, the truth of any statement involving
it depends only on the definition and on the actual state of affairs.
|> >|> Hmm. Definition of truth does not necessarily provide a method
|> >|> to measure progress. If progress is approaching truth, as per realism, just
|> >|> how do we check that?
|>
|> >Well, using *that* definition of progress (which would only be applicable
|> >in the context of philosophy of knowledge), I would say that the
|> >main criterion is ability to model events. That is, the criterion
|> >is pragmatic. (That is why I hover between pragmatism and realism).
|> >[Note, the occurance or non-occurance of progress in this context does
|> >*not* have any relevence to the occurance of other sorts of progress,
|> >such as social progress].
|>
|> So if I defined progress differently that would be perfectly acceptable as
|> long as it fit in with the context of my research or the issue at hand. I
|> just have to be explicit about my definition. I'll buy that.
Exactly. That is how technical vocabulary works.
se...@polisci.umn.edu
>Pragmatism starts at the very most basic level of human behavior,
>eating, sleeping, and getting places. The first thing one learns
>to predict is the effects of various bodily actions on one's immediate
>surroundings. Everything else follows from that.
I don't know about this. Once you get beyond the basic bodily functions, a
plethora of possible things could follow. Science could develop in a number
of ways, so could social systems. You seem to be making a naturalist
assertion here (what happened was naturally the only thing that could
happen), where I would tend to see reality as constructed (a chose a
particular form of reality). But debating that would get us awfully close
to that free will debate that's been raging, so maybe we should just accept
that these are different starting positions.
>|> What means do you
>|> use? Why those means and not others? Those things were the result of
>|> social processes of scientific (and at some point pre-scientific)
>|> communication, were they not?
>Some were. So what? I could as easily have applied pragmatism to
>any other set of goals. It is a general tool that works independently
>of the inputs.
You treat pragmatism like a genie out of the hat. NO tool works
independently of the inputs. No pragmatist (or scientist) can claim their
tool is independent of the social context. How you choose questions, what
your goals are, what research methods you use, are part and parcel of
whatever you do.
>|> >No, I simply have to make clear which definition I am using for the
>|> >particular discussion at hand. In other contexts I might choose to
>|> >use a different definition of progress.
>|>
>|> but...isn't that first sentence a justification -- you are justifying a
>|> particular definition based on the particular discussion which is...by
>|> definition...social.
>No, I am *choosing* a particular definition that is applicable to the
>problem domain at hand (whatever that happens to be). If there is no
>appropriate definition, then I create a new word and give it the
>required definition - that is I coin a new item of technical vocabulary.
Again, how is that not justifying your choice? Do you chose at random? If
you have reason for a choice or for making a particular new definition up,
then aren't those reasons justifications?
>|> Of course. But in each case there are reasons for it, and those have to be
>|> socially communicated if your research/discussion is more than subjective.
>All that needs to be communicated is the actual definition used. That
>is sufficient to determine the truth conditions of my conclusions. That
>is *given* some arbitrary definition, the truth of any statement involving
>it depends only on the definition and on the actual state of affairs.
I doubt that too much research is done where definitions aren't explained,
research methods justified, and goals laid out and explained in a way that
fits them into pre-existing theories, research paradigms, etc. Anyone can
prove a truth they create by definition.
(rest deleted)
-Scott
asia z lerner
>In article <serb.1241...@polisci.umn.edu>, se...@polisci.umn.edu writes...
>
>>representations of a reality we can try to approximate, but our belief in
>>the truth of our propositions is ultimately based on criteria which are
>>epistemic rather than metaphysical. Therefore usefulness, explanatory
>
>Our *belief* in the truth of our propositions is epistemic. Their truth
>is metaphysical.
>
Could you explain?
>
>I don't particularly like the use of the word truth in the way you've
>defined "scientific truth," though I endorse what you say about how
>it "might later be shown not to be truth [metaphysical] after all."
>I do think we have good (epistemic) warrant for saying that many of
>the products of science *are* true, and will therefore not be shown to
>be wrong later on. (I specifically reject the "pessimistic induction"
>argument from the history of science that's been given by Putnam
>and Kuhn. I think the history of science allows for an "optimistic
>induction" argument, though not necessarily at the level of theories.)
>
Could you say something about the way you would construct an "opimistic
induction?" I must admit that I find Kuhn's pessimism to have a very
convinsing explanatory power of the history of sciences.
Asia
asia z lerner
>
>>Your conclusion doesn't follow. If we can get truths, but can't tell for
>>sure that they are truths, it doesn't follow that we haven't got them.
>>You seem to be advocating the position that you can't know unless you
>>know that you know.
>
>OK, let's say that I claim that "A" is a truth, and present my evidence for
>believing it (let's say "A" is unfalsifiable). You counter with B, and
>claim that it is true, even though it contradicts A. You seem to be saying
>that even though we can't know they are true, we both might have truth. I'm
>simply saying that claim is really useless, since then any proposition might
>be held and claimed as truth. What matters is how we distinguish between
>propositions that claim truth. Let's say your claim of "B" is falsifiable
>and subject to rigorous tests, which it passes. You have an ability to
>argue that B seems more likely to be true, not on any metaphysical claim,
>but on epistemological grounds.
How is the first truth criterium - "A is unfalsifiable" not epistemological?
[which seems to be what you are claiming]
I might still believe "A" -- it hasn't been
>falsified, and it might go along with my intuition. You're right that I
>still can believe that and perhaps I can call it truth.
>
You prefere one epistemology [true if unfalsifiable] over another [true if
falsifiable], yes. Your choice of one epistemology over another still seems
to be a matter of belief.
>The solution, it seems to me, is to keep metaphysical truth at the
>subjective or non-scientific level. I might believe things to be true or
>not, based on my world view. In making scientific claims or philosophical
>ones, I have to base that claim on results.
Well, if you choose to beleive "true if unfalsifiable", the results would
be your lack of ability to falsify.
Truth thus becomes for all
>practical purposes epistemic and changeable. That doesn't mean it doesn't
>exist, but rather if we don't know for sure if we have it when we do, then
>what good does it do us?
How would you convince yourself of the correctness of one epistemology over
another?
Asia
se...@polisci.umn.edu
> Truth thus becomes for all
>>practical purposes epistemic and changeable. That doesn't mean it doesn't
>>exist, but rather if we don't know for sure if we have it when we do, then
>>what good does it do us?
>How would you convince yourself of the correctness of one epistemology over
>another?
Do would I convince myself? Probably evidence, intuition, and whatever
persuades me. But scientific epistemology depends on social processes
whereby certain rules get chosen over others for various reasons (the
ability to predict persuades people, it fits with past conceptions, etc.).
-Scott
asia z lerner
>In article <1993Dec3.0...@midway.uchicago.edu>, azle...@midway.uchicago.edu writes...
>>
>>Typo - definitely. I keep confusing him with the Lord, I guess. I base
>>my exeedingly peculiar statement on ch.2 (I'm pretty much sure) in his
>>book, were he discusses progress in the context of Darwinism. I'll look
>>for the quote, but I'm surprised that you're surprised. I though that
>>was a very noticable theme in the book. Progress guided by "the right thing
>>to do".
>
>I am surprised because the book has absolutely nothing to do with
>"moral progress."
Sorry, this, again, is awkward phrasing. It's not that Kitcher speaks about
a progress in morality, it's that his explanation of scientific progress
has something suspiciously like a moral ought in it.
I think the sentence your original quote refers
>to is in ch. 2, which uses the development of evolutionary theory
>as an historical illustration for the concept of progress which he
>develops later in the book (chs. 4 and 5). I think what you're referring
>to is on p. 38: "My claim, then, is that naturalists living in Britain
>in 1859, starting from any of the biological practices then popular,
>*ought* to have modified their practice to accept minimal Darwinism,
>in light of the reasoning that I have reconstructed from the _Origin_."
Yes, this is the place I was refering to.
> To say, as you have, that this sentence represents Kitcher's
>"notion of progress" (I'll leave out the "moral"), is inaccurate.
>As his history on the preceding pages shows, naturalists *did* modify
>their practice to accept what Kitcher calls minimal Darwinism, and
>Kitcher maintains and defends his claim that it was reasonable of them
>to do so on the basis of the case Darwin put forth. In chs. 4-5, he
>gives his account of what warrants scientific change and what
>constitutes progress. Your sentence makes it sound like it's axiomatic
>for Kitcher that "You ought to believe Darwin," and that that is what
>is the essence of progress. That's just not so.
>
Perhaps the misunderstanding is mine, but I thought the moral ought had an
explanatory importance, because Kitcher sets up a situation in which all
the knowledge relevant to the formulation of the evolutionary theory
pre-exists Darwin (ch. 2). I think the attempt is to explain why evolution
came about at that particular point, but not earlier. Kitcher very
concientiously points out that critics of the theory, such as Robert
Owen, had valid points. I DO NOT think that Kitcher establishes any empirical
criteria by wich you could measure the explanatory power of the theory vs.
it's weak points. That's why the "ought" seems a moral ought.
Asia
asia z lerner
>In article <1993Dec3.0...@midway.uchicago.edu>, azle...@midway.uchicago.edu writes...
>>Typo - definitely. I keep confusing him with the Lord, I guess. I base
>>my exeedingly peculiar statement on ch.2 (I'm pretty much sure) in his
>>book, were he discusses progress in the context of Darwinism. I'll look
>>for the quote, but I'm surprised that you're surprised. I though that
>>was a very noticable theme in the book. Progress guided by "the right thing
>>to do".
>
>I am surprised because the book has absolutely nothing to do with
>"moral progress." I think the sentence your original quote refers
>to is in ch. 2, which uses the development of evolutionary theory
>as an historical illustration for the concept of progress which he
>develops later in the book (chs. 4 and 5). I think what you're referring
>to is on p. 38: "My claim, then, is that naturalists living in Britain
>in 1859, starting from any of the biological practices then popular,
>*ought* to have modified their practice to accept minimal Darwinism,
>in light of the reasoning that I have reconstructed from the _Origin_."
Yes, that was the passage I was talking about.
> To say, as you have, that this sentence represents Kitcher's
>"notion of progress" (I'll leave out the "moral"), is inaccurate.
>As his history on the preceding pages shows, naturalists *did* modify
>their practice to accept what Kitcher calls minimal Darwinism, and
>Kitcher maintains and defends his claim that it was reasonable of them
>to do so on the basis of the case Darwin put forth. In chs. 4-5, he
>gives his account of what warrants scientific change and what
>constitutes progress. Your sentence makes it sound like it's axiomatic
>for Kitcher that "You ought to believe Darwin," and that that is what
>is the essence of progress. That's just not so.
>
I am relying on two parts of Kitchner's analysis:
1) The claim [interesting one, inho] that all the ingredients needed
for the evolutionary theory preexisted Darwin. [Huxley's "I should
have thought about it myself" comes to mind]
2) The notion that VERY relevant criticisms of Darwin were presented by
people like Pobert Owen, who's rejection of Darwin's theories can hardly
be termed unjustified.
In view of the two above conditions, the "ought" did seem suspiciously like
a moral ought.
Asia
James J. Lippard
>In article <3DEC1993...@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu> lip...@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu (James J. Lippard) writes:
>>Our *belief* in the truth of our propositions is epistemic. Their truth
>>is metaphysical.
>
>Could you explain?
The distinction is the distinction between thinking something is the
case (or having reasons for thinking something is the case) and something's
actually being the case. If this isn't clear enough for you, then I'm
afraid I can't be of any more help except by advising you to go read
something like Michael Devitt's _Realism & Truth_ or the chapter on truth
in Alvin Goldman's _Epistemology and Cognition_.
>Could you say something about the way you would construct an "opimistic
>induction?" I must admit that I find Kuhn's pessimism to have a very
>convinsing explanatory power of the history of sciences.
Take a look at chapters 4 and 5 of Kitcher's _The Advancement of Science_.
Or read some Ernan McMullin or Richard Boyd.
James J. Lippard
>In article <3DEC1993...@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu> lip...@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu (James J. Lippard) writes:
>>I am surprised because the book has absolutely nothing to do with
>>"moral progress."
>
>Sorry, this, again, is awkward phrasing. It's not that Kitcher speaks about
>a progress in morality, it's that his explanation of scientific progress
>has something suspiciously like a moral ought in it.
No, it's a *rational* ought. Morality is not the only source of
normativity.
[deletions]
>Perhaps the misunderstanding is mine, but I thought the moral ought had an
>explanatory importance, because Kitcher sets up a situation in which all
>the knowledge relevant to the formulation of the evolutionary theory
>pre-exists Darwin (ch. 2). I think the attempt is to explain why evolution
>came about at that particular point, but not earlier. Kitcher very
>concientiously points out that critics of the theory, such as Robert
>Owen, had valid points. I DO NOT think that Kitcher establishes any empirical
>criteria by wich you could measure the explanatory power of the theory vs.
>it's weak points. That's why the "ought" seems a moral ought.
Sections five and six of chapter two give the reasons which explain the
theory change to "minimal Darwinism." Chapters four and five give the
more general case for rational theory change.
James J. Lippard
>I am relying on two parts of Kitchner's analysis:
>
>1) The claim [interesting one, inho] that all the ingredients needed
>for the evolutionary theory preexisted Darwin. [Huxley's "I should
>have thought about it myself" comes to mind]
I don't see what this has to do with morality.
>2) The notion that VERY relevant criticisms of Darwin were presented by
>people like Pobert Owen, who's rejection of Darwin's theories can hardly
>be termed unjustified.
Richard Owen. Kitcher points out that Darwin had an excellent response
to Owen's objection (see pp. 39-40), and also is only arguing that a
transition to "minimal Darwinism."
I don't see that this has anything to do with morality, either.
>In view of the two above conditions, the "ought" did seem suspiciously like
>a moral ought.
Why? This still looks like a _non sequitur_ to me. What do either of
the above two things have to do with morality?
James J. Lippard
>In article <4DEC1993...@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu> lip...@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu (James J. Lippard) writes:
>>Your conclusion doesn't follow. If we can get truths, but can't tell for
>>sure that they are truths, it doesn't follow that we haven't got them.
>>You seem to be advocating the position that you can't know unless you
>>know that you know.
>
>OK, let's say that I claim that "A" is a truth, and present my evidence for
>believing it (let's say "A" is unfalsifiable). You counter with B, and
>claim that it is true, even though it contradicts A. You seem to be saying
>that even though we can't know they are true, we both might have truth. I'm
I'm certainly not saying that. I don't believe there are true
contradictions. (Not that there aren't philosophers who do think
this, e.g., Graham Priest.)
>simply saying that claim is really useless, since then any proposition might
>be held and claimed as truth. What matters is how we distinguish between
I agree that "any proposition might be held and claimed as truth." Not
all such claims would *be* true.
>propositions that claim truth. Let's say your claim of "B" is falsifiable
>and subject to rigorous tests, which it passes. You have an ability to
>argue that B seems more likely to be true, not on any metaphysical claim,
>but on epistemological grounds. I might still believe "A" -- it hasn't been
>falsified, and it might go along with my intuition. You're right that I
>still can believe that and perhaps I can call it truth.
It's true that the only way we can distinguish truth from
falsehood is epistemological. But there are still possible
consequences which may differ depending on whether we've gotten
it right or wrong.
>The solution, it seems to me, is to keep metaphysical truth at the
>subjective or non-scientific level. I might believe things to be true or
>not, based on my world view. In making scientific claims or philosophical
>ones, I have to base that claim on results. Truth thus becomes for all
>practical purposes epistemic and changeable. That doesn't mean it doesn't
>exist, but rather if we don't know for sure if we have it when we do, then
>what good does it do us?
I think there is a lot to be said in favor of the view you take here.
But part of the realist's point is that truth is independent of
"practical purposes." As for what good it does us, there are at
least two possible answers: (1) There may be *future* consequences
of holding truths rather than falsehoods, even in cases where we can't
(now) tell the difference, and (2) The realist *conception* of truth may
have some advantages over an epistemic conception of truth. In
particular, the latter seems to run into some serious problems--I
again recommend the chapter of Goldman's _Epistemology and Cognition_
on truth, especially the second section of that chapter.
asia z lerner
>In article <1993Dec3.0...@midway.uchicago.edu>, azle...@midway.uchicago.edu write:
>|> >
>|> >I find utilitarian pragmatism, based on the *utility* of the
>|> >models in accomplishing goals or predicting results to be more
>|> >philsophically valid. Social pragmatism seems to be a thinly
>|> >disguised relativism, and not really pragmatism.
>|>
>|> I think you might have a problem showing that "accomplishing goals" and
>|> "predicting results" are not socially defined as appropriate truth criteria.
>
>Nope, not as far as I'm concerned. Being able to reliably count on
>my actions having certain effects is not socially determined. It either
>happens, or it doesn't.
>
>This is the basis of pragmatism as a philosophy of 'knowledge'.
>
Not sure about that. I think your are talking about predictive power here,
which is, indeed, empirically demonstrable, but the assumption that
predictive power = knowledge is not obviously true (leastwise, not to
me.) After all, my theory of truth could very well be something like an
intuitive comprehention of a phenomenon in question, a la Decarte, so
that quarks that move between two points without passing through the
intermediate space could not count as true in my formulation, though they
might model the phenomena quite well.
Same with the equation utility=predictive power: I could define
my utility as the attaignment of the psychological state of understanding,
so that U=P is a convention, which certainly blurrs the boundaries between
utilitarian pragmatism, social pragmatism and your boogie :) relativism.
In a nutshell, the usefull is surely, to some extent, culturally defined.
Asia
Boucher David
just beginning the second chapter now. So far it appears as though
Laudan identifies more with the Pragmatist voice rather than with the
Realist as Erb stated not too long ago. I'll post a summary of my
reactions as soon as I've finished the book.
- db
--
************************************************************************
"Come on down to the Big Dig. Can't get around the Big Dig."
- Don Van Vliet (Smithsonian Institute Blues)
************************************************************************
James J. Lippard
>I just got Laudan's book yesterday from inter-library loan, and am
>just beginning the second chapter now. So far it appears as though
>Laudan identifies more with the Pragmatist voice rather than with the
>Realist as Erb stated not too long ago. I'll post a summary of my
>reactions as soon as I've finished the book.
I don't remember Scott saying that Laudan identifies himself with
the Realist, but it is completely correct that Laudan identifies
himself with the Pragmatist. See Laudan's parenthetical remark on
page xi of the preface (first complete sentence on the page).
Stan Friesen
|> In article <931207185...@tdat.ElSegundoCA.NCR.COM> s...@tdat.ElSegundoCA.NCR.COM (Stan Friesen) writes:
|>
|> You treat pragmatism like a genie out of the hat. NO tool works
|> independently of the inputs. No pragmatist (or scientist) can claim their
|> tool is independent of the social context. How you choose questions, what
|> your goals are, what research methods you use, are part and parcel of
|> whatever you do.
True, but the choice of questions is *prior* to the application
of the scientific method (which is just systematic pragmatism).
Once I have chosen a question, I either apply the scientific method
to it, or convert it into a form that can be addressed using the
pragmatism of science.
They are *seperate* issues.
|> >No, I am *choosing* a particular definition that is applicable to the
|> >problem domain at hand (whatever that happens to be). If there is no
|> >appropriate definition, then I create a new word and give it the
|> >required definition - that is I coin a new item of technical vocabulary.
|>
|> Again, how is that not justifying your choice? Do you chose at random? If
|> you have reason for a choice or for making a particular new definition up,
|> then aren't those reasons justifications?
First, I do not make up a new definition, I create a new *word*,
unless there is already a word with a closely similar meaning to
what is required.
The justification is need. If it becomes necessary or desirable to discuss
something, a vocabulary to discuss it is required. So, the most
effective approach is to *develope* the necessary vocabulary as needed.
This is, in fact, what science does. As new ideas are developed,
words are invented, or *slightly* redefined to apply to the new concepts.
|> I doubt that too much research is done where definitions aren't explained,
|> research methods justified, and goals laid out and explained in a way that
|> fits them into pre-existing theories, research paradigms, etc. Anyone can
|> prove a truth they create by definition.
Sigh, that is *not* what I am talking about. I am talking about
extending the vocabulary available to cover a newly discovered
situation. The data - the need - comes first, *then* the new
vocabulary.
Stan Friesen
|> In article <1993Dec7.2...@midway.uchicago.edu> azle...@quads.uchicago.edu (asia z lerner) writes:
|>
|> >>practical purposes epistemic and changeable. That doesn't mean it doesn't
|> >>exist, but rather if we don't know for sure if we have it when we do, then
|> >>what good does it do us?
|>
|> >another?
|>
|> Do would I convince myself? Probably evidence, intuition, and whatever
|> persuades me. But scientific epistemology depends on social processes
|> whereby certain rules get chosen over others for various reasons (the
|> ability to predict persuades people, it fits with past conceptions, etc.).
If you had stopped with the first (evidence), I might be willing to count
that as scientific, but once you get to "whatever persuades me", that
is no longer scientific.
And, in proper science, the *only* criterion for choosing rules is
reliability of results. Unreliable methods are ruled out, reliable
ones are encouraged by the rules.
Stan Friesen
|> In article <931207185...@tdat.ElSegundoCA.NCR.COM> s...@tdat.ElSegundoCA.NCR.COM (Stan Friesen) writes:
|>
|> >eating, sleeping, and getting places. The first thing one learns
|> >to predict is the effects of various bodily actions on one's immediate
|> >surroundings. Everything else follows from that.
|>
|> assertion here (what happened was naturally the only thing that could
|> happen), where I would tend to see reality as constructed (a chose a
I am not quite sure what you mean here. The development of science
is strongly constrained by the evidence accumulated. I do not think
there is as much flexibility in its development as you claim. The
way the world is would tend to channel science into much the same
place eventually.
Stan Friesen
|> In article <931206174...@tdat.ElSegundoCA.NCR.COM> s...@tdat.ElSegundoCA.NCR.COM writes:
|> >
|> >Nope, not as far as I'm concerned. Being able to reliably count on
|> >my actions having certain effects is not socially determined. It either
|> >happens, or it doesn't.
|> >
|>
|> which is, indeed, empirically demonstrable, but the assumption that
|> predictive power = knowledge is not obviously true (leastwise, not to
|> me.)
Quite. The idea that predictive power is knowledge is an *axiom*
of the pragmatist position. (Actually, I am more of a realist
with a pragmatic bias, I would say that predictive power *leads*
to knowledge/understanding rather than being equivalent to it).
|> After all, my theory of truth could very well be something like an
|> intuitive comprehention of a phenomenon in question, a la Decarte, so
|> that quarks that move between two points without passing through the
|> intermediate space could not count as true in my formulation, though they
|> might model the phenomena quite well.
But what if it is really the case that quarks *do* behave that way?
Why should my ability to *imagine* something be a limit to its reality?
[Oops, I am slipping back into the realist postion here - the pragmatist
would say "what does it matter if it works?"].
|> Same with the equation utility=predictive power: I could define
|> my utility as the attaignment of the psychological state of understanding,
|> so that U=P is a convention, which certainly blurrs the boundaries between
|> utilitarian pragmatism, social pragmatism and your boogie :) relativism.
Eh, what does understanding have to do with utility? Utility is the
ability to *use* something for some end. Understanding is neither
necessary nor sufficient for that.
The reason I "equate" utility with predictive power is because that
seems to be the base of what makes something usable. Can you name
anything that you can actually *use* for some purpose where you
cannot predict, at least in probability, what the outcome of a
particular usage will be?
|> In a nutshell, the usefull is surely, to some extent, culturally defined.
|>
No, the *purposes* for which something is utilized are culturally
defined. The utility is dependent solely on applicability to
the chosen purposes.
se...@polisci.umn.edu
>From: lip...@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu (James J. Lippard)
>Subject: Re: Laudan reactions (was: Old paradigm debate revisited)
>Date: 9 Dec 1993 10:51 MST
>In article <CHrtq...@uwindsor.ca>, bou...@server.uwindsor.ca (Boucher David) writes...
>>I just got Laudan's book yesterday from inter-library loan, and am
>>just beginning the second chapter now. So far it appears as though
>>Laudan identifies more with the Pragmatist voice rather than with the
>>Realist as Erb stated not too long ago. I'll post a summary of my
>>reactions as soon as I've finished the book.
>I don't remember Scott saying that Laudan identifies himself with
>the Realist, but it is completely correct that Laudan identifies
>himself with the Pragmatist. See Laudan's parenthetical remark on
>page xi of the preface (first complete sentence on the page).
Yes, I never called Laudan a realist and did read the preface so I knew his
basic position before reading the book. At first I thought he was stacking
the argument abit (especially in having three opposing voices), but by the
end of the book I felt that, although one can't remove one's own perspective
completely, he did a very fair job.
-Scott Erb
David Halliwell
>In article <1993Dec7.2...@midway.uchicago.edu>, azle...@midway.uchicago.edu writes...
>>In article <3DEC1993...@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu> lip...@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu (James J. Lippard) writes:
>>>Our *belief* in the truth of our propositions is epistemic. Their truth
>>>is metaphysical.
>>
>>Could you explain?
>The distinction is the distinction between thinking something is the
>case (or having reasons for thinking something is the case) and something's
>actually being the case. If this isn't clear enough for you, then I'm
>afraid I can't be of any more help except by advising you to go read
>something like Michael Devitt's _Realism & Truth_ or the chapter on truth
>in Alvin Goldman's _Epistemology and Cognition_.
As is often the case, an example may be useful. We begin with a
statement by me: "I am thinking of a number between 0 and 100. What is
it?" A person guesses (or determines) that the answer is "42".
The answer may or may not be 42. If it is, then saying "42" is saying
the truth. It is a true answer, whether or not there is any method of
confirming that it is the truth.
_Establishing_ the truth of the answer "42" is a seperate issue, and
requires an epistemological step. In this rather simple example, asking me
if "42" is correct will likely do. This, of course, assumes that I will
not lie.
If the number I am thinking of is *not* 42, then the answer "42" is
false, regardless of any epistemological claims of truthfulness. A person
could believe all they want that they "know the true answer", but if it is
wrong it is wrong.
I assume this makes me a realist :-)
--
Dave Halliwell
Department of Geography
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
se...@polisci.umn.edu
>True, but the choice of questions is *prior* to the application
>of the scientific method (which is just systematic pragmatism).
OK, but a critical pragmatism would also take that prior process into
account. That may be something more applicable to the social sciences,
however, so I won't quibble.
>|> >No, I am *choosing* a particular definition that is applicable to the
>|> >problem domain at hand (whatever that happens to be). If there is no
>|> >appropriate definition, then I create a new word and give it the
>|> >required definition - that is I coin a new item of technical vocabulary.
>|>
>|> Again, how is that not justifying your choice? Do you chose at random? If
>|> you have reason for a choice or for making a particular new definition up,
>|> then aren't those reasons justifications?
>First, I do not make up a new definition, I create a new *word*,
>unless there is already a word with a closely similar meaning to
>what is required.
>The justification is need. If it becomes necessary or desirable to discuss
>something, a vocabulary to discuss it is required. So, the most
>effective approach is to *develope* the necessary vocabulary as needed.
I hate to nitpick, but you're saying the definition exists prior to the
word? And "need" automatically justifies creation of the word (does it also
create the wordless definition?) I don't necessarily disagree, but I think
you're assuming as unproblematic the process by which need is created (I
know you define that as prior to science, but...) and how definitions and
terms are matched to need (which I don't think can be dismissed as prior).
>This is, in fact, what science does. As new ideas are developed,
>words are invented, or *slightly* redefined to apply to the new concepts.
Yes, but I'm also concerned with the process of idea development. Perhaps
some sorts of inquiry can ignore that process and define it outside of
scientific pragmatism, but that can't be done in the social sciences (note
to flamers: this isn't a claim that social science is per se "different,"
but rather that the epistemological/methodological state of the science
requires consideration of things taken for granted in the natural sciences).
>|> I doubt that too much research is done where definitions aren't explained,
>|> research methods justified, and goals laid out and explained in a way that
>|> fits them into pre-existing theories, research paradigms, etc. Anyone can
>|> prove a truth they create by definition.
>Sigh, that is *not* what I am talking about. I am talking about
>extending the vocabulary available to cover a newly discovered
>situation. The data - the need - comes first, *then* the new
>vocabulary.
And I don't think the emergence of the need -- and what gets accepted as
data -- can be divorced from the scientific process. That's why my critical
pragmatism is different than utilitarian pragmatism. How is utility
determined? Are there potentially different ways of determining it?
-Scott Erb
se...@polisci.umn.edu
>|>
>|> >another?
>|>
>|> Do would I convince myself? Probably evidence, intuition, and whatever
>|> persuades me. But scientific epistemology depends on social processes
>|> whereby certain rules get chosen over others for various reasons (the
>|> ability to predict persuades people, it fits with past conceptions, etc.).
>If you had stopped with the first (evidence), I might be willing to count
>that as scientific, but once you get to "whatever persuades me", that
>is no longer scientific.
Note, however, that in line two I bring up scientific epistemology as
separate from what I state previously. I believe somethings that are
outside of science, and that is what I was talking about in the first part.
>And, in proper science, the *only* criterion for choosing rules is
>reliability of results. Unreliable methods are ruled out, reliable
>ones are encouraged by the rules.
Yes, but again, how reliable and unreliable are determined is not
necessarily self-evident. Again, perhaps in some cases its not important to
consider that, and that might be the cases you are thinking of. But in
other cases those questions might be important.
-Scott Erb
se...@polisci.umn.edu
(some deletions)
> _Establishing_ the truth of the answer "42" is a seperate issue, and
>requires an epistemological step. In this rather simple example, asking me
>if "42" is correct will likely do. This, of course, assumes that I will
>not lie.
> If the number I am thinking of is *not* 42, then the answer "42" is
>false, regardless of any epistemological claims of truthfulness. A person
>could believe all they want that they "know the true answer", but if it is
>wrong it is wrong.
> I assume this makes me a realist :-)
And I would say that whether or not a person is wrong is only important if
being wrong is relevant. For instance, if you weren't thinking of *42* and
instead were thinking of 64, but told the person they were right in order to
make them happy, they would be wrong, but what is the relevance? I assume
this makes me a pragmatist. Of course, I could become a critical
pragmatist to go on to ask why the numbers 0 to 100 were chosen and why this
experiment was set up in this way, but let's not get into that :-)
-Scott
asia z lerner
Define RELIABILITY (evil grin..:)
Asia
asia z lerner
>
>>In article <1993Dec7.2...@midway.uchicago.edu>, azle...@midway.uchicago.edu writes...
>>>>Our *belief* in the truth of our propositions is epistemic. Their truth
>>>>is metaphysical.
>>>
>
> As is often the case, an example may be useful.
Thank you - yes, it was.
We begin with a
>statement by me: "I am thinking of a number between 0 and 100. What is
>it?" A person guesses (or determines) that the answer is "42".
>
> The answer may or may not be 42. If it is, then saying "42" is saying
>the truth. It is a true answer, whether or not there is any method of
>confirming that it is the truth.
>
Just to make sure - it's the potential independence of confirmation
techniques [even the very existance of such techniques] that makes truth
metaphysical in this case?
>_Establishing_ the truth of the answer "42" is a seperate issue, and
>requires an epistemological step. In this rather simple example, asking me
>if "42" is correct will likely do. This, of course, assumes that I will
>not lie.
>
> If the number I am thinking of is *not* 42, then the answer "42" is
>false, regardless of any epistemological claims of truthfulness. A person
>could believe all they want that they "know the true answer", but if it is
>wrong it is wrong.
>
> I assume this makes me a realist :-)
>
Well, the notion of a "metaphysical truth" would not be in the tool kit of
a pragmatist or a relativist, would it? Since a relativist would argue for a
socially constructed truth, and a pragmatist would maintain that a potentially
non-verifiable truth is not a usefull concept.
Asia
Boucher David
#In article <CHrtq...@uwindsor.ca>, bou...@server.uwindsor.ca (Boucher David) writes...
#>I just got Laudan's book yesterday from inter-library loan, and am
#>just beginning the second chapter now. So far it appears as though
#>Laudan identifies more with the Pragmatist voice rather than with the
#>Realist as Erb stated not too long ago. I'll post a summary of my
#>reactions as soon as I've finished the book.
#
#I don't remember Scott saying that Laudan identifies himself with
#the Realist
Checking my records I find that for once my memory failed me. He didn't
say that Laudan was the realist, he said that Laudan was anti-relativist.
Sorry.
- db
# but it is completely correct that Laudan identifies
#himself with the Pragmatist. See Laudan's parenthetical remark on
#page xi of the preface (first complete sentence on the page).
#
#Jim Lippard Lip...@CCIT.ARIZONA.EDU
#Dept. of Philosophy Lip...@ARIZVMS.BITNET
#University of Arizona
#Tucson, AZ 85721
Stan Friesen
|> In article <931209190...@tdat.ElSegundoCA.NCR.COM> s...@tdat.ElSegundoCA.NCR.COM (Stan Friesen) writes:
|>
|> >of the scientific method (which is just systematic pragmatism).
Oops, I think I probably overstated this. It is probably better to
say that the coice of question is prior to the process of looking
for the answer, which is where pragmatism applies.
Science, in the broadest sense, *does* involve choosing the questions,
but that is not the *critical* part of science (it is even rather
a subjective process).
|> OK, but a critical pragmatism would also take that prior process into
|> account. That may be something more applicable to the social sciences,
|> however, so I won't quibble.
I actually agree, to some degree (and it is actually true in most
sciences).
|> >First, I do not make up a new definition, I create a new *word*,
|> >unless there is already a word with a closely similar meaning to
|> >what is required.
|>
|> >The justification is need. If it becomes necessary or desirable to discuss
|> >something, a vocabulary to discuss it is required. So, the most
|> >effective approach is to *develope* the necessary vocabulary as needed.
|>
|> I hate to nitpick, but you're saying the definition exists prior to the
|> word? And "need" automatically justifies creation of the word (does it also
|> create the wordless definition?) I don't necessarily disagree, but I think
|> you're assuming as unproblematic the process by which need is created (I
|> know you define that as prior to science, but...) and how definitions and
|> terms are matched to need (which I don't think can be dismissed as prior).
No, the need for new vocabulary shows up as one studies some prior
question. It happens when the answer one gets requires several paragraphs
of description to express in the current vocabulary - or must be expressed
in mathematics. New vocabulary enters as part of the process of
expressing and communicating the *results* of a scientific study.
Of course it is often, or usually, true that the newly developed concepts
suggest an entirely new set of questions to ask - and the process repeats
itself for another round.
|> >This is, in fact, what science does. As new ideas are developed,
|> >words are invented, or *slightly* redefined to apply to the new concepts.
|>
|> Yes, but I'm also concerned with the process of idea development. Perhaps
|> some sorts of inquiry can ignore that process and define it outside of
|> scientific pragmatism, but that can't be done in the social sciences ...
No, I am saying that the development of new concepts is the *result*
of applying the scientific method. The (first set of) results comes
*before* the formulation of new concepts, then these concepts are used
in formulating new questions, the answers to which tend to introduce
even more new concepts, and so on.
|> to flamers: this isn't a claim that social science is per se "different,"
|> but rather that the epistemological/methodological state of the science
|> requires consideration of things taken for granted in the natural sciences).
But you are wrong, again. Concepts are very important in most sciences,
and must be carefully expressed, and carefully defined, to be useful.
[In particular, a scientifically useful concept must be expressed in
terms that allow it to be measured or detected or estimated or recognised].
|> >Sigh, that is *not* what I am talking about. I am talking about
|> >extending the vocabulary available to cover a newly discovered
|> >situation. The data - the need - comes first, *then* the new
|> >vocabulary.
|>
|> And I don't think the emergence of the need -- and what gets accepted as
|> data -- can be divorced from the scientific process.
Neither do I - it is the *result* of the scientific process.
|> That's why my critical
|> pragmatism is different than utilitarian pragmatism. How is utility
|> determined? Are there potentially different ways of determining it?
Utility is what works - that should be simple enough to understand.
Utility is a *relative* concept in some senses - the measure of
what works depends on what your goals are.
Stan Friesen
|>
|> Well, the notion of a "metaphysical truth" would not be in the tool kit of
|> a pragmatist or a relativist, would it? Since a relativist would argue for a
|> socially constructed truth, and a pragmatist would maintain that a potentially
|> non-verifiable truth is not a usefull concept.
Yep, that's about right. That is why I am, at heart, a realist.
I just happen to believe that in practice the approach of the
pragmatist is most suited to approaching the metaphysical truth.
se...@polisci.umn.edu
signiture file.
Many deletions because, despite some minor disagreements still, I don't
think there's anything that really leads me to respond. Except one:
>|> That's why my critical
>|> pragmatism is different than utilitarian pragmatism. How is utility
>|> determined? Are there potentially different ways of determining it?
>Utility is what works - that should be simple enough to understand.
>Utility is a *relative* concept in some senses - the measure of
>what works depends on what your goals are.
It's the relative nature of the concept which is precisely the problems.
What are the goals? How were they arrived at? Should our goals be
different? These questions can always be kept in the back of one's head,
and are less important in some endeavors than others.
>--
>sar...@teradata.com (formerly tdatirv!sarima)
> or
>Stanley...@ElSegundoCA.ncr.com
>The peace of God be with you.
-Scott Erb
Dept of Poli-Sci
U. of Minnesota
Minneapolis MN 55455
gregory m. byshenk
>In article <serb.1260...@polisci.umn.edu>
>se...@polisci.umn.edu writes:
>|> ... Science could develop in a number
>|> of ways, so could social systems. You seem to be making a naturalist
>|> assertion here (what happened was naturally the only thing that could
>|> happen), where I would tend to see reality as constructed (a chose a
>|> particular form of reality). ...
In article <931209190...@tdat.ElSegundoCA.NCR.COM>
s...@tdat.ElSegundoCA.NCR.COM (Stan Friesen) writes:
>I am not quite sure what you mean here. The development of science
>is strongly constrained by the evidence accumulated. I do not think
>there is as much flexibility in its development as you claim. The
>way the world is would tend to channel science into much the same
>place eventually.
Just a brief comment: I think that there are actually two issues here,
where we have come from as well as where we are going.
To a full-blown Peircean Pragmatist (or Pragmaticist), there is some
way that the world _is_, and pragmatist inquiry serves to allow us
to converge toward that point. Thus, Peircean pragmatism is a form
or realism. It is true that we have to proceed toward the end through
the search for consensus, but this is due to our own limitations; the
world is such that it guides our search (if we engage in it properly)
toward the truth.
However, this is quite compatible with some indefinite number of
starting points. Science could have begun in a number of different
ways, and can indeed be performed in a number of different ways. The
pragmatist claim (which is to some degree a point of metaphysical
faith) is that inquiry, if pursued according to pragmatist principles,
_will_ converge toward consensus on the truth.
On this view, both Stan and Scott are correct. For a given path of
inquiry, direction is constrained. However, there are (actually or
potentially) any number of paths of inquiry that are equally valid
(and equally constrained). We might say that there are a number
of paths leading to the truth, and the one that we are on is neither
the only one nor the only one which we could have taken.
greg
--
Gregory Byshenk | The University? Hah! Half the time
gbys...@uxa.cso.uiuc.edu | *I'm* not responsible for my opinions!
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Philosophy
"Says Red Molly to James: 'That's a fine motorbike...'" R.T.
asia z lerner
>In article <1993Dec9.0...@midway.uchicago.edu>, azle...@midway.uchicago.edu writes:
>
>|> After all, my theory of truth could very well be something like an
>|> intuitive comprehention of a phenomenon in question, a la Decarte, so
>|> that quarks that move between two points without passing through the
>|> intermediate space could not count as true in my formulation, though they
>|> might model the phenomena quite well.
>
>But what if it is really the case that quarks *do* behave that way?
Too bad for me. But what, on the other hand, if predicting the behaviour
has nothing to do with "understanding?"
>Why should my ability to *imagine* something be a limit to its reality?
>[Oops, I am slipping back into the realist postion here - the pragmatist
>would say "what does it matter if it works?"].
>
Well, I think the position I described is compatible with either realism or
pragmatism - it can either be the case that you define true knowledge as
your ability to instinctively understand, or you can set yourself the goal
of achieving greater level of such understanding because you decide that this
is a usefull thing to do.
>|> Same with the equation utility=predictive power: I could define
>|> my utility as the attaignment of the psychological state of understanding,
>|> so that U=P is a convention, which certainly blurrs the boundaries between
>|> utilitarian pragmatism, social pragmatism and your boogie :) relativism.
>
>Eh, what does understanding have to do with utility? Utility is the
>ability to *use* something for some end.
The relevant end would be to achieve the state of [intuitive, psychological]
understanding.
Understanding is neither
>necessary nor sufficient for that.
>
Again, this is tottaly dependent on how you set your goals. Didn't the
Greek suppose that human beings are curious by nature, and that knowledge,
as a satisfaction of a natural appetite, is a reward in and of itself?
>The reason I "equate" utility with predictive power is because that
>seems to be the base of what makes something usable. Can you name
>anything that you can actually *use* for some purpose where you
>cannot predict, at least in probability, what the outcome of a
>particular usage will be?
>
Depends on what you mean by usage. If my criteria for knowledge is "instinctive
understanding" I can use it in order to feel in harmony with the universe,
or somesuch, and predictive power has nothing to do with it.
>|> In a nutshell, the usefull is surely, to some extent, culturally defined.
>|>
>No, the *purposes* for which something is utilized are culturally
>defined. The utility is dependent solely on applicability to
>the chosen purposes.
>
Don't think so. In order to define something as usefull, you have
to set your goals, and those goals are necessarily culturally defined.
Asia
asia z lerner
>In article <1993Dec8.1...@midway.uchicago.edu>, azle...@midway.uchicago.edu writes...
>>I am relying on two parts of Kitchner's analysis:
>>
>>1) The claim [interesting one, inho] that all the ingredients needed
>>for the evolutionary theory preexisted Darwin. [Huxley's "I should
>>have thought about it myself" comes to mind]
>
>I don't see what this has to do with morality.
>
It has to do with the absence of empirical reasons to switch to Darwinism.
>>2) The notion that VERY relevant criticisms of Darwin were presented by
>>people like Pobert Owen, who's rejection of Darwin's theories can hardly
>>be termed unjustified.
>
>Richard Owen. Kitcher points out that Darwin had an excellent response
>to Owen's objection (see pp. 39-40), and also is only arguing that a
>transition to "minimal Darwinism."
Sorry, but Kitcher's account does not convince me that Owen's agnosticism
as to the creation of species was any less well founded that Darwin's
beleif in the power of natural selection. The persiasiveness of Darwin's
argument is not obvious to me, as in :
"his [Darwin's] principal response to the charge that variation is only
limited is to shift the burden of evidence [to the side that claims that
it is limited" p. 38
Is that terribly persuasive? I see no glaring reason why the burden of proof
should be on one side, rather than the other, taking into account the
overwelming character of the metamorphosis of one species into a different
kind, and the very slight differentiation that one can observe in real
life.
Further on, Kitcher says:
"Owen and Wollaston are thus cast in the role of seeing an account of species
formation in terms of an unknown process subjected to arbitrary constraints
as equally credible as the suggestion that a known process has been at work
and that its effects are magnified on a timescale that greatly exeeds human
observation powers." p. 40
This passage closes off the part of the chapter that deals with variability.
It's not completely clear to me wether Kitcher actually accepts this position
of Darwin as the true representation of things, but if he does, that this
is hardly precise - as Kitcher himself stated, Owen DID NOT assume that he had
an explanation of the creation of species, he was simply agnostic on the
question. So that the choice, for Owen, was not between belief in devine/
misterious process of creation and beleif in Darwins theory, but between beleif in Darwin's theory and agnosticism. I do not see that Kitcher showed that
belief, at this particular point, was better founded, from empirical or
logical point of view, that agnosticism. That's why I fail to understand,
except in moral terms, Kitcher's pronouncement"
"A naturalist who began with any of the main practices favored in Britain in
1859 and who had a clear view of the argument I have presented OUGHT to have
modified practice [that is, to minimal Darwinism]"
I also do not see that anything but hindsight could have inspired the
pronouncement:
"Darwin, I contend, saw the issues more clearly than any of his opponents."
p. 42
In a pasage just preceeding this sentence, Kitcher says:
"Recognizing the force of Darwin's argument was a tremendous cognitive
achivement. To have modified one's practice by undergoing this reasoning
is cognitively superior to doing so by rehearsing a simpler version (say
one that did not consider and reply to one of the important objections);
in it's turn, using the simpler version is cognitively superior to basing
one's modification on something more crude;..." p.42
But the question stands wether Darwin wasn't himself one of the naive
believers in his own theories, or whether it was in any way cognitively
inferior to recognize the OBJECTIONS to Darwin's theories, than to recognize
the evidence that supports them.
In a key passage in which Kitcher differentiates himself from the "legend",
he talks about the old guard, who, as Kuhn rather hartlessly puts it, are
never convinced, but simply die out. It's an important passage, because this
is were I think Kitcher lays out his notion of progress, in an attempt to
make it compatible with the validity of the objections raised by the detractors,
unlike the "legend" and would presumably simply pronounce them to be stubborn
in not seeing the truth:
"As I shall argue in some detail in later chapters, an emphasis on the use
of reasons in the growth of science should not be accompanied by claims that
those who do not fully appreciate the reasons are irrational. Darwin, I
contend, saw the issues more clearly than any of his opponents. But it is
surely true that there were many converts to Darwinism whose cognitive
achivements were inferior to those of intelligent critics, who would have been
unable to reply to important objections that they did not percieve. Hopkins,
Wollaston, Haughton, Owen, and, especially, Fleeming Jenkin engaged in
reasoning of considarable sophistication, even though they did not appreciate
the possibility of Darwinian answerers to their challenges. Labeling them as
"irrational" is somewhat akin to calling the Empire state building "short"
simply because it is no longer the tallest structure in town" p.42
I SERIOUSLY doubt that the rationality of the different participant in the
Darwinian argument could be ordered that easily. I do not see that Richard
Owen's position is ANY less reasonable than Darwin's. Note that "greater
reasonableness" is the linchpin on which Kitcher hangs his progress - there
is progress at certain key moments in science because people follow/ought to
follow the most reasonable course. I do not see that Kitcher sufficiently
proves that in it's temporal context Darwin's position was more reasonable
than that of Owen, I don't see the power of the "ought" - unless it's taken
to be a moral criteria of some sort. I know this isn't how Kitcher intends
it to be, but I think that Kitcher's attempt to fuse a Kuhnian account with
a progressive account doesn't quite jell.
Asia
Stan Friesen
|> ME
|> >Utility is what works - that should be simple enough to understand.
|> >Utility is a *relative* concept in some senses - the measure of
|> >what works depends on what your goals are.
|>
|> It's the relative nature of the concept which is precisely the problems.
|> What are the goals?
From the pragmatist viewpoint, whatever you want them to be,
it doesn't matter (as far as *pragmatism* is concerned* - I
am not acutally a pragmatist, I am a pragmatic realist).
|> How were they arrived at?
However you want.
|> Should our goals be different?
Yes. The alternative is stagnation.
|> These questions can always be kept in the back of one's head,
|> and are less important in some endeavors than others.
|>
True, but they are also independent of pragmatism, per se.
Stan Friesen
|>
|> >is strongly constrained by the evidence accumulated. I do not think
|> >there is as much flexibility in its development as you claim. The
|> >way the world is would tend to channel science into much the same
|> >place eventually.
|>
|> Just a brief comment: I think that there are actually two issues here,
|> where we have come from as well as where we are going.
|>
|> To a full-blown Peircean Pragmatist (or Pragmaticist), there is some
|> way that the world _is_, and pragmatist inquiry serves to allow us
|> to converge toward that point. Thus, Peircean pragmatism is a form
|> or realism. It is true that we have to proceed toward the end through
|> the search for consensus, but this is due to our own limitations; the
|> world is such that it guides our search (if we engage in it properly)
|> toward the truth.
AHA! That is my position. (What I have been calling a pragmatically
oriented realist, or a pragmatic realist).
[BTW, is that *really* 'Peirce'? isn't it 'Pierce'?]
And, indeed, the comment I made above from from this perspective,
not from the perspective of a proper, pure pragmatist.
|> However, this is quite compatible with some indefinite number of
|> starting points. Science could have begun in a number of different
|> ways, and can indeed be performed in a number of different ways. The
|> pragmatist claim (which is to some degree a point of metaphysical
|> faith) is that inquiry, if pursued according to pragmatist principles,
|> _will_ converge toward consensus on the truth.
Nice way of expressing it. That is, in fact, pretty much what
I *meant*, even if I did not express it clearly.
|>
|> On this view, both Stan and Scott are correct. For a given path of
|> inquiry, direction is constrained. However, there are (actually or
|> potentially) any number of paths of inquiry that are equally valid
|> (and equally constrained). We might say that there are a number
|> of paths leading to the truth, and the one that we are on is neither
|> the only one nor the only one which we could have taken.
Quite true, but I also waould say that the paths tend to converge
over time, and that we are now so far down our own path that almost
any other path would have converged to much the same place by now.
gregory m. byshenk
s...@tdat.ElSegundoCA.NCR.COM (Stan Friesen) writes:
[my article deleted]
>AHA! That is my position. (What I have been calling a pragmatically
>oriented realist, or a pragmatic realist).
>[BTW, is that *really* 'Peirce'? isn't it 'Pierce'?]
Yes, it's really 'Peirce' with the funny spelling; pronounced 'purse'.
>And, indeed, the comment I made above from from this perspective,
>not from the perspective of a proper, pure pragmatist.
There are those who think that Peircean pragmatism is the more 'proper'
form, as opposed to the hash produced by James and Rorty. But late
in his life Peirce stopped using the word 'pragmatism' and began to
use 'pragmaticism' in order to differentiate his position from that
of James, Dewey, Schiller, et al.
A minor note for those unfamiliar with Peirce: Peirce's realism is
in some ways more similar to mediaeveal realism than to contemporary
materialist forms of realism. This may or may not be important to
you, depending on your own metaphysics.
[...]
>Quite true, but I also waould say that the paths tend to converge
>over time, and that we are now so far down our own path that almost
>any other path would have converged to much the same place by now.
You need to be a bit careful here. It is true, according to Peirce,
that paths converge over time. However, the idea that we somehow
now have it "right," and that we have arrived at the truth, is
a very dangerous view, in that it blocks the road to further inquiry.
Peirce was willing to allow that we might never reach the truth;
one of his central points was that we should always be open to the
possibility that we are wrong.
This does not mean that we should not believe that what we currently
believe is true; indeed, he points out that to believe something is
to believe that it is true. The point is that the belief that we
have reached the end of inquiry and discovered eternal truth has
generally served only to set our false beliefs in stone, preventing
us from getting beyond them even when we should.
asia z lerner
>
>|> However, this is quite compatible with some indefinite number of
>|> starting points. Science could have begun in a number of different
>|> ways, and can indeed be performed in a number of different ways. The
>|> pragmatist claim (which is to some degree a point of metaphysical
>|> faith) is that inquiry, if pursued according to pragmatist principles,
>|> _will_ converge toward consensus on the truth.
>
Hmmm. I don't think that this is a standart definition of pragmatism -
at least, I can't see anything that would imply either that pragmatic
principles will lead to convergeance, or that the convergeance would
be specifically on truth.
Asia
James J. Lippard
>[BTW, is that *really* 'Peirce'? isn't it 'Pierce'?]
Not only is it really "Peirce," it's pronounced "purse" rather than
"pierce."
James J. Lippard
>In article <8DEC1993...@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu> lip...@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu (James J. Lippard) writes:
>>In article <1993Dec8.1...@midway.uchicago.edu>, azle...@midway.uchicago.edu writes...
>>>for the evolutionary theory preexisted Darwin. [Huxley's "I should
>>>have thought about it myself" comes to mind]
>>
>>I don't see what this has to do with morality.
>
>It has to do with the absence of empirical reasons to switch to Darwinism.
In other words, nothing. (How does lack of empirical reasons translate
to moral reasons?) I also don't see how you equate "all the ingredients
needed for the evolutionary theory preexisted [sic] Darwin" and "the
absence of empirical reasons to switch to Darwinism," but never mind.
>>>2) The notion that VERY relevant criticisms of Darwin were presented by
>>>people like Pobert Owen, who's rejection of Darwin's theories can hardly
>>>be termed unjustified.
>>
>>Richard Owen. Kitcher points out that Darwin had an excellent response
>>to Owen's objection (see pp. 39-40), and also is only arguing that a
>>transition to "minimal Darwinism."
>
>Sorry, but Kitcher's account does not convince me that Owen's agnosticism
>as to the creation of species was any less well founded that Darwin's
>beleif in the power of natural selection. The persiasiveness of Darwin's
Well, then apparently you disagree with Kitcher's claim, in which case
you should say you think he's wrong rather than reinterpret him to be
making *moral* claims!
>This passage closes off the part of the chapter that deals with variability.
>It's not completely clear to me wether Kitcher actually accepts this position
>of Darwin as the true representation of things, but if he does, that this
>is hardly precise - as Kitcher himself stated, Owen DID NOT assume that he had
>an explanation of the creation of species, he was simply agnostic on the
>question. So that the choice, for Owen, was not between belief in devine/
>misterious process of creation and beleif in Darwins theory, but between beleif in Darwin's theory and agnosticism. I do not see that Kitcher showed that
>belief, at this particular point, was better founded, from empirical or
>logical point of view, that agnosticism. That's why I fail to understand,
>except in moral terms, Kitcher's pronouncement"
I am still completely baffled as to why you are bringing morality into this.
You disagree with Kitcher's claims as to the status of the debate (I think
you're overlooked on p. 40 what he gives as the most important piece of
evidence favoring Darwin as against Owen and Wollaston, the pattern of
similarities between creatures which Darwin's theory explains and which
they leave unexplained), and that's fine--but I don't see why you then
choose to recharacterize his argument in a way he quite obviously did not
intend.
>I SERIOUSLY doubt that the rationality of the different participant in the
>Darwinian argument could be ordered that easily. I do not see that Richard
>Owen's position is ANY less reasonable than Darwin's. Note that "greater
>reasonableness" is the linchpin on which Kitcher hangs his progress - there
>is progress at certain key moments in science because people follow/ought to
>follow the most reasonable course. I do not see that Kitcher sufficiently
"Less reasonable" does NOT equate to "irrational." You disagree with
Kitcher precisely on the point where you say "I do not see that Richard
Owen's position is ANY less reasonable than Darwin's." Kitcher maintains
otherwise.
asia z lerner
>In article <1993Dec13.0...@midway.uchicago.edu>, azle...@midway.uchicago.edu writes...
>>In article <8DEC1993...@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu> lip...@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu (James J. Lippard) writes:
>>>In article <1993Dec8.1...@midway.uchicago.edu>, azle...@midway.uchicago.edu writes...
>>>>1) The claim [interesting one, inho] that all the ingredients needed
>>>>for the evolutionary theory preexisted Darwin. [Huxley's "I should
>>>>have thought about it myself" comes to mind]
>>>
>>>I don't see what this has to do with morality.
>>
>>It has to do with the absence of empirical reasons to switch to Darwinism.
>
>In other words, nothing. (How does lack of empirical reasons translate
>to moral reasons?)
My search for a way to understand the "ought".
I also don't see how you equate "all the ingredients
>needed for the evolutionary theory preexisted [sic] Darwin" and "the
>absence of empirical reasons to switch to Darwinism," but never mind.
>
Firstly, it's a timing problem - i.e., it becomes unclear why the theory
of evolution was formulated at that particular moment by Darwin, rather
that earlier. Secondly it brings home the reason for which Owen and other were
not impressed with Darwin's theory - he wasn't telling them something they
did not already know.
>>>>2) The notion that VERY relevant criticisms of Darwin were presented by
>>>>people like Pobert Owen, who's rejection of Darwin's theories can hardly
>>>>be termed unjustified.
>>>
>>>Richard Owen. Kitcher points out that Darwin had an excellent response
>>>to Owen's objection (see pp. 39-40), and also is only arguing that a
>>>transition to "minimal Darwinism."
>>
>>Sorry, but Kitcher's account does not convince me that Owen's agnosticism
>>as to the creation of species was any less well founded that Darwin's
>>beleif in the power of natural selection. The persiasiveness of Darwin's
>
>Well, then apparently you disagree with Kitcher's claim, in which case
>you should say you think he's wrong rather than reinterpret him to be
>making *moral* claims!
>
Very well - he is wrong. Actually, saying that what he says implies a moral
ought is another way of saving the phenomena, so to speak, since I don't
see that a logical "ought" would be well founded.
>>This passage closes off the part of the chapter that deals with variability.
>>It's not completely clear to me wether Kitcher actually accepts this position
>>of Darwin as the true representation of things, but if he does, that this
>>is hardly precise - as Kitcher himself stated, Owen DID NOT assume that he had
>>an explanation of the creation of species, he was simply agnostic on the
>>question. So that the choice, for Owen, was not between belief in devine/
>>misterious process of creation and beleif in Darwins theory, but between beleif in Darwin's theory and agnosticism. I do not see that Kitcher showed that
>>belief, at this particular point, was better founded, from empirical or
>>logical point of view, that agnosticism. That's why I fail to understand,
>>except in moral terms, Kitcher's pronouncement"
>
>I am still completely baffled as to why you are bringing morality into this.
>You disagree with Kitcher's claims as to the status of the debate (I think
>you're overlooked on p. 40 what he gives as the most important piece of
>evidence favoring Darwin as against Owen and Wollaston, the pattern of
>similarities between creatures which Darwin's theory explains and which
>they leave unexplained)
But notice that this requires beleif in the efficacy of the mechanism
proposed by Darwin. It's that beleif that's not necessitated by the
empirical evidence, imho. After all, if explanatory power was all that
matter, than the devine maker would be the result of the ultimate application
of Occam's razor.
, and that's fine--but I don't see why you then
>choose to recharacterize his argument in a way he quite obviously did not
>intend.
>
Because I felt that Kitcher was pulling in two directions - first pointing
out that there's no empirical reasons to justify the switch [I realize that
you disagree, this is my version], then saying that it HAD to happen. I
should have probably said that I find nothing particularly blameworthy
with moral justifications for action, I wasn't using the term to put Kitcher
down.
>>I SERIOUSLY doubt that the rationality of the different participant in the
>>Darwinian argument could be ordered that easily. I do not see that Richard
****************************
>>Owen's position is ANY less reasonable than Darwin's. Note that "greater
>>reasonableness" is the linchpin on which Kitcher hangs his progress - there
>>is progress at certain key moments in science because people follow/ought to
>>follow the most reasonable course. I do not see that Kitcher sufficiently
>
>"Less reasonable" does NOT equate to "irrational."
Yes, I didn't claim that Kitcher said that.
You disagree with
>Kitcher precisely on the point where you say "I do not see that Richard
>Owen's position is ANY less reasonable than Darwin's." Kitcher maintains
>otherwise.
>
I do so disagree. I disagree that Kitcher SHOWS Owen's position to be
less reasonable. On the assumption that he doesn't do that, do you agree
that he notion of progress does not hold? That in the way that he defines
progress, he MUST be able to show that the most reasonable people won out
in all those historical instances in which we think progress was achieved?
Asia
Karl Kluge
Newsgroups: sci.skeptic
From: azle...@quads.uchicago.edu (asia z lerner)
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 1993 04:16:46 GMT
Firstly, it's a timing problem - i.e., it becomes unclear why the theory
of evolution was formulated at that particular moment by Darwin, rather
that earlier.
First, note that it was formulated by Darwin _and_ Wallace, working
independently and at approximately the same time. Second, I'm unclear on why
it "ought" have been discovered earlier. Darwin and Wallace just happened to
be the ones who synthesized the right ideas. It could have happened sooner,
it could have happened later. So what? Special Relativity is implicit
in Maxwell's equations, one might equally sensibly ask why it took the
Michaelson-Morley experiment to trigger the explicit formulation of SR.
After all, if explanatory power was all that
matter, than the devine maker would be the result of the ultimate
application of Occam's razor.
Actually, this is backwards. Invoking arbitrary divine fiat has no predictive
power whatsoever, and involves an essentially infinite series of ad hoc
hypotheses.
Karl
asia z lerner
>In article <1993Dec17.0...@midway.uchicago.edu> azle...@quads.uchicago.edu (asia z lerner) writes:
>
> Newsgroups: sci.skeptic
> From: azle...@quads.uchicago.edu (asia z lerner)
> Date: Fri, 17 Dec 1993 04:16:46 GMT
>
> Firstly, it's a timing problem - i.e., it becomes unclear why the theory
> of evolution was formulated at that particular moment by Darwin, rather
> that earlier.
>
>First, note that it was formulated by Darwin _and_ Wallace, working
>independently and at approximately the same time. Second, I'm unclear on why
>it "ought" have been discovered earlier. Darwin and Wallace just happened to
>be the ones who synthesized the right ideas.
What Kitcher describes doesn't really match the term "synthesis". It's
more like Darwin/Wallace imbue a certain notion [variability+selective
survival] with an explanatory power the people did not think it had. The
problem is that it's not clear that any additional proofs of the power
of the proposed mechanism were discovered - Darwin simply asks his audience
to beleif that NS does posess those powers.
It could have happened sooner,
>it could have happened later. So what? Special Relativity is implicit
>in Maxwell's equations, one might equally sensibly ask why it took the
>Michaelson-Morley experiment to trigger the explicit formulation of SR.
>
I think that Kitcher's point would be that there's nothing like the MM
experiment in the "origin of the species". I think Popper would agree, too.
[though I heard he changed his mind later about the status of evolution as
science]
> After all, if explanatory power was all that
> matter, than the devine maker would be the result of the ultimate
> application of Occam's razor.
>
>Actually, this is backwards. Invoking arbitrary divine fiat has no predictive
>power whatsoever, and involves an essentially infinite series of ad hoc
>hypotheses.
>
Notice that I spoke about explanatory power, not predictive power.
Asia
James J. Lippard
[most deleted--I attempted a longer response, but our news server now
rejects postings which contain more included than new text, and threw
everything I wrote away. Basically, I think we already found the root
of our disagreement. Asia, you think that Kitcher says that there was
no empirical data which justified the change to "minimal Darwinism," and
I think Kitcher explicitly says otherwise.]
>I do so disagree. I disagree that Kitcher SHOWS Owen's position to be
>less reasonable. On the assumption that he doesn't do that, do you agree
>that he notion of progress does not hold? That in the way that he defines
>progress, he MUST be able to show that the most reasonable people won out
>in all those historical instances in which we think progress was achieved?
I agree that it must turn out that the most reasonable people won out
in all those historical instances in which progress was achieved. I
do not agree that it must turn out that the most reasonable people won
out in all those historical instances in which *we think* progress was
achieved. Kitcher's providing a theory of progress, and it is reasonable
for his theory to have *some* disagreement with pretheoretical intuitions
about progress. (In order to be a plausible account, it does have to
agree with most of our intuitions about progress. That's what makes it
an account of "progress" rather than "schmogress.")
asia z lerner
>In article <1993Dec17.0...@midway.uchicago.edu>, azle...@midway.uchicago.edu writes...
>
>in all those historical instances in which progress was achieved. I
>do not agree that it must turn out that the most reasonable people won
>out in all those historical instances in which *we think* progress was
>achieved. Kitcher's providing a theory of progress, and it is reasonable
>for his theory to have *some* disagreement with pretheoretical intuitions
>about progress. (In order to be a plausible account, it does have to
>agree with most of our intuitions about progress. That's what makes it
>an account of "progress" rather than "schmogress.")
>
O.K. - we did reach a bedrock of disagreement. Sorry about the long post,
and I guess we should stop. Unless you care to discuss Kitcher's notion
of progress towards natural categories.
Asia