Description:
On the nature of consciousness. (Moderated)
|
|
|
Moderator Vacancy Announcement: sci.psychology.consciousness
|
| |
MODERATOR VACANCY ANNOUNCEMENT (MVA) moderated group sci.psychology.consciousness This is a formal Moderator Vacancy Announcement (MVA), initiated because the moderator of above-listed moderated newsgroup has resigned. RATIONALE: Russ Allbery has been running an autoresponder on the submission address... more »
|
|
|
Your removal from the PSYCHE-D list
|
| |
Tue, 31 Oct 2006 00:00:15 You have been automatically removed from the PSYCHE-D list (PSYCHE Discussion Forum (Theoretical emphasis)) as a result of repeated delivery error reports from your mail system. This decision was based on the automatic error monitoring policy in effect for the list, and has not... more »
|
|
|
Consciousness is a state? Or a sequence of events?
|
| |
Hi everyone Andrew Brook ...Agreed...consciousness usually involves activity in varying regions (though it may also be localized, as in Zeki's V4 study). But why assume consciousness is a state? Consciousness is, by all accounts, a process...specifically sequences of discrete events...probably at gamma synchrony (~40 Hz)... more »
|
|
|
What of representation when you don't need a cortex for consciousness?
|
| |
I read the representation debate, which was really interesting and useful. I'm not yet sure into which side I fit. In the process I became a little concerned that there may be a need to reconsider role of the result of the debate within the wider domain of an explanation of consciousness. A recently documented experimental physiology outcome makes a fairly compelling case that consciousness in the form of the 'primordial' emotions is delivered by small groups of cells in the brain basal area(Denton, 2005). The book only just came out in english. (There's another paper in peer review in BBS by another author on the same issue).... more »
|
|
|
Aristotle and the self referencing representation.
|
| |
Brook and Raymont's interesting article in Psyche: The Representational Base of Consciousness [link] raises some interesting issues. The idea of a self representing representation is particularly interesting, as Brook and Raymont put it: "Representations can represent themselves as well as whatever else they may represent."... more »
|
|
|
for circulation: POST-DOCTORAL FELLOWSHIP in PHILOSOPHY of CONSCIOUSNESS
|
| |
*POST-DOCTORAL FELLOWSHIP in PHILOSOPHY of CONSCIOUSNESS* *(Apologies for cross-posting; please pass on to appropriate candidates) * *Department of Philosophy, **University** of **Bristol* ** 9 Woodland Road, Bristol, BS8 4PU, UK** *Preferred start date:* 15 January 2007 *Deadline for applications:* 7 November 2006... more »
|
|
|
Request for comments: 'Orthogonal recombinable competences'
|
| |
...As explained below, I don't like the concept of altricial species. ...I agree that the noun 'consciousness' can lead to confusion, and is best avoided in discussions of mechanisms - as I should have done. In the present context it should be replaced with the concept of 'self-referential process'. Exactly what is meant by this is described in Pages 3, 3a and 3b... more »
|
|
|
SCR: Are animals self-aware?, Morin
|
| |
It is always amusing to see how badly mainstream psychology has mangled this issue. The real question is: Are animals (human and non-human) automatically self-aware? That is, self-aware without a particular sort of history? There is no question that non-human animals may be made self-aware in limited ways, and... more »
|
|
|
|
