Aristotle and the self referencing representation. - sci.psychology.consciousness

Message from discussion Aristotle and the self referencing representation.

Andrew Brook

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More options Oct 22 2006, 1:13 pm

Newsgroups: sci.psychology.consciousness

From: abr...@CCS.CARLETON.CA (Andrew Brook)

Date: 22 Oct 2006 10:13:04 -0700

Local: Sun, Oct 22 2006 1:13 pm

Subject: Re: Aristotle and the self referencing representation.

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Soon we should take this off the list but let me try once more: In the same way
that a perception presents what it is about, a perception presents itself and
oneself as its subject. We do not endorse any particular theory of
(re)presentation and hope that our view is compatible with any reasonably
adequate theory. We define our notion by example, as I have just done. What
matters to us is that, whatever presentation of the world is like, a
representation presenting itself and it presenting oneself as its subject are
the same kind of process. Different target, same kind of process.

A note on the word 'representation'. Another contributor made a sharp
distinction between representation and presentation. We don't. 'Representation'
is now a term of art in cognitive research and no longer has much by way of
links to its etymological roots. For us, what representations do is present
states, properties and events to cognitive subjects. You could call these
presenting states 'presentations' if you wanted but you'd run the risk of not
being understood.

I'm not sure what you mean by 'identity theory'. As the term is used in
philosophy, we are functionalists, not identity theorists, though we don't go
into the matter in the little Psyche paper. That is to say, we think that
representating, thinking, etc., are activities of the brain, not specific
circuits or whatever in the brain. But maybe you have something different in mind.

Andrew

Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:
> On Oct 21, 2006, at 6:36 PM, Andrew Brook wrote:

>> Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:

>>> I would like to hear from Andrew Brook exactly what it means "to
>>> present" in his identity model. To be honest, I could make little
>>> sense of it.

>> ...
>> How does a representation present whatever it is about? How for
>> example does a perception of a painting present the painting? That is
>> how a representation presents itself -- and oneself as it's subject.
>> We see no need to posit any asymmetry here.

> I am not referring to any asymmetry, I am simply asking what - in your
> model - it means "to present." What you have said here does not appear
> to make any more sense than the paper. Simply, what does it mean "to
> present," specifically. It appears to me to be a very vague notion, and
> from my point of view is the flawed basis of the paper since it is then
> even more uncertain as to exactly what you are referring to when you
> discuss "self-representation."

> Further, how would one distinguish your identity theory from any other
> so that we might discover its relative merit?

> With respect,
> Steven

> --
> Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
> Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
> http://iase.info

Andrew Brook
Chancellor's Professor of Philosophy
Director, Institute of Cognitive Science
Member, Canadian Psychoanalytic Society
2217 Dunton Tower, Carleton University
Ottawa ON, Canada K1S 5B6
Ph: 613 520-3597
Fax: 613 520-3985
Web: www.carleton.ca/~abrook

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