There is a third alternative to
a) the infinite regress/progress in the "consciousness of" approach and
b) the "self-referencing representation" Platonic solution to that
problem.

The third alternative is based on Merleau-Ponty. Very briefly,
consider Pereira´s definition of consciousness as *contentful
subjective experience*. Following this definition, the structure of
consciousnes has three aspects:
a) the contents;
b) the lived experience;
c) the conscious subject.

Now consider that the content is embodied in brain activity and
embedded in the domain of interaction of brain, body and
environment.
And finally assume, with Merleau-Ponty, that the conscious subject
is the living body.

In this view, consciousness is consciousness of contents (not
necessarily representations) generated in the interaction domain,
and processed by the brain. The conscious subject is the living
body, which is a part of the content-generating domain. Therefore,
consciousness implies a (partially) *self-referencing living body*,
not a self-referencing representation.

Best Regards,

Alfredo Pereira Jr.