Jonathan, I entirely agree with you that there are lots of interesting questions
about representation but they were not our questions, certainly not in a version
of our approach that had to meet the constrains of Psyche. You are quite right
that the word 'representation' is used in a great many ways. For example, the
way in which linguists use it is very different from how the AI community uses
it which is very different from how (most) psychologists and philosophers use
it. And that is just at the level of differences in which is being talked about.
Go to theories about these things and the proliferations multiplies by at least
an order of magnitude. So yes, the term has no coherent meaning. But it has
coherent meaningS. We're using one of them.

That said, we laid out how we are using word, by giving examples. About
everything else, including what theory would give an adequate account of what is
going on in these examples, we are neutral, including about the issue that most
interests you, presentation vs. re-presentation. For our purposes, which is
right, if either, just does not matter.

It would be interesting to see some comments on the topics that we do talk
about, as well as on ones that we did not talk about.

Andrew

 > That representation is 'a term of art' would worry me. This seems to  imply
that everybody knows what it means and uses it the same way.  However, most of
us are surely familiar with the fact that it usually  means used in all sorts of
ways to suit the assumptions of the user.  Also, this is a discussion forum on
consciousness for people of all  disciplines so we need to make sure that we do
not use 'discipline- private' meanings. Things often mean something different in
the lab  down the corridor.
 >
 > Fodor and Putnam would seem to have raised serious issues about what
representation might mean, and whether or not it has to be a re- presentation to
something is crucial. Any model that locates  consciousness in a network of
nerves, for instance, implies that  percepts are re-presented to something that
has no meaningful  identity or receiving capacity, since it is an arbitrary
collection  of receiving units, not a receiving unit. In functionalist terms
there can be no presenting. These issues are at the heart of the  problem.
 >
 > I think we need to consider the possibility that we have a word of  art that
has no coherent meaning. Steve Zenith's question seems  pertinent because if
there really is presenting implied we have to  have some idea of a physically
possible context. I am happy with mine  but Steve is probably sceptical so he is
entitled to a suggestion,  maybe?
 >
 > Jo Edwards

--

Andrew Brook

Chancellor's Professor of Philosophy

Director, Institute of Cognitive Science

Member, Canadian Psychoanalytic Society

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