A couple of observations from a fairly neutral standpoint.

It's become reasonably clear that the debate between Andy Brook and
Steve Lehar is terminological.  That is, they don't disagree in any
relevant respects about what's going on in the brain, in experience,
or in the world.  They just differ in how they use the terms "direct
perception", "representationalism", and maybe "perceive".  As far as I
can tell, what Andy calls "directly perceiving the world through the
use of a representation", and what Steve calls "indirectly perceiving
the world through perceiving a representation" are exactly the same
thing.

I'd say this situation ought to be somewhat worrying for Steve,
though.  The "direct representationalist" position Andy is advocating
is more or less the orthodox view in contemporary philosophy of mind
and in cognitive science.  Steve takes himself to be arguing against
the orthodox view in philosophy of mind and cognitive science.  But
now it looks like the two views just differ in their use of language.
If so, then where matters of substance (rather than language) are
concerned, Steve agrees with the orthodox view after all!

Or to put this another way: if the diagnosis above is correct, then
what Steve takes to be the orthodox ("direct perception") view is
quite different from the actual orthodox view.  It appears that Steve
is assuming that proponents of this view are using the terms his way,
and so are making various radical claims that disagree with him, when
in fact they're using the terms Andy's way, and are making far less
radical claims.

Of course each of us would no doubt prefer it if others used terms our
way.  Arguably, Steve's use of the terms is closer to the way they
were used in academic circles 100 years ago, while Andy's use of the
term is closer to the way they're used in those circles today.  But
really, not much of substance depends on how words are used.  And a
battle to make a whole community use terms differently is pretty
futile.

So it's better to get past the terminological issues and concentrate
on matters of substance.  It may be that there is some other
substantive, non-terminological respect in which the two views
disagree.  But if so, I haven't seen it in this discussion.

Suggestion: to find a substantive thesis on which the sides differ,
one must state it without using any of the contested terms above.  If
one can find a neutrally-stated thesis about which the two sides
disagree (for non-terminological reasons), that will be progress.  If
one can't, so that the two sides turn out to agree on matters of
substance, that will be progress too.

--David Chalmers.

Reply to David Chalmers:

Chalmers >
It's become reasonably clear that the debate between Andy Brook and
Steve Lehar is terminological.  ... As far as I
can tell, what Andy calls "directly perceiving the world through the
use of a representation", and what Steve calls "indirectly perceiving
the world through perceiving a representation" are exactly the same
thing.
< Chalmers

No, there is something more fundamental at stake here than mere
terminology. Brook believes that the spatial structure of our experience is
the structure of the world itself, whereas representationalism states that
the structure of visual experience is a structure in our brain, and only in
secondary fashion is that structure also representative of a more remote
external world.

It comes down to the question of whether it is valid to make observations
about the principles of visual representation by examining the nature of
visual experience. According to Brook, visual experience gives us knowledge
*of* the external world. According to representationalism the dimensions of
conscious experience necessarily map directly to the dimensions of the
representational machinery in the brain, and therefore it is valid to make
observations on the representational machinery of the brain by observation
of experience.  For example the first and most obvious observation is that
the visual representation is *analogical*, that is, objects and surfaces
are represented explicitly by objects and surfaces in a spatial
representation.

Chalmers >
But now it looks like the two views just differ in their use of language.
If so, then where matters of substance (rather than language) are
concerned, Steve agrees with the orthodox view after all!
< Chalmers

Oh horror of horrors! Lehar, orthodox? I would rather be dead!

Actually, I *aspire* to hold the orthodox view, although unfortunately it
will involve bringing the consensus around to my point of view!

Chalmers >
Suggestion: to find a substantive thesis on which the sides differ,
one must state it without using any of the contested terms above.  If
one can find a neutrally-stated thesis about which the two sides
disagree (for non-terminological reasons), that will be progress.  If
one can't, so that the two sides turn out to agree on matters of
substance, that will be progress too.
< Chalmers

I think the core issue behind this disagreement is whether or not there are
analogical or pictorial representations in the brain that explicitly encode
every aspect of our experience. And whether or not the principles of the
organism interacting with the environment necessarily involves an analog
replica of the organism, its environment, and the forces in the world, as
suggested here.

  http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/cartoonepist/cartoonepist44.html

It is clear that it is *that* idea which the direct perceptionists find to
be incredible. And it is not just a question of terminology; the visual
brain is either analogical/representational, or it is not.

  Steve

Quoting David Chalmers <chalm...@ANU.EDU.AU>:

I'm not convinced that the dispute is purely terminological.

For one thing, Andrew Brook appears to be an atypical direct
perceptionist, because he acknowledges that we can be aware
of representations, not just transparently through them,
and because he isn't constantly accusing Steven Lehar of
mistaken reification, category mistakes, etc.  :)

For another, Steven Lehar is defending a version of a sense-data
theory, which is what direct perception theories oppose.
Are sense-data really part of "the orthodox view in contemporary
philosophy of mind"?  If so, it's not only Stevel Lehar who's
seeing a difference when there isn't one.  The book _Perception_
by Howard Robinson, for example, would exemplify the same
mistake, as would reviews of it that I have seen, web pages
that discuss the issues, and so on.

In part that's an illusion, because Andrew Brook's "direct"
supposedly applies to whatever is happening in "paradigm cases".
So he doesn't disagree with what people say about implementation.
Nonetheless, some possible implenentations of human perception
would make it indirect according to his definition of direct
perception.

(By "possible" there, I mean epistemically.)

So long as the debate largely glides above any discussion of
what actually happens in our perceptual systems, it will
naturally tend to appear to be merely verbal, because it
can look like both sides agree about the "facts".

One example is that I think (I'm inclined to say "know") that
I am aware of representations far more often than Andrew Brook
thinks we are.  I don't know where Steven Lehar stands on that
point; perhaps he agrees with Andrew there.  But I certainly
don't.

-- Jeff

I corresponded a little bit on this issue with Andrew Brook off the forum on this issue, and I think I understand his position. (I hold a very strong version of the indirect view, perhaps stronger than Steve's, but we'll see).

When Steve Lehar says:
No, there is something more fundamental at stake here than mere
terminology. Brook believes that the spatial structure of our experience is
the structure of the world itself, whereas representationalism states that
the structure of visual experience is a structure in our brain, and only in
secondary fashion is that structure also representative of a more remote
external world.

I think that Brook might (don't want to speak for him) accept that the spatial structure of experience is in some sense both a structure of our representations as well as of the world, so that this point might not separate the two positions after all.

Nor do I think that it is a good idea for the indirect view to hang everything on the existence of pictorial brain states.

So let me suggest the following:

The direct theorist claims that the qualities (or properties, etc.) that we are aware of in ordinary cases of perception are in fact qualities of the external world. (They may also turn out to be qualities of our representations, but that's an open question subject to investigation of the brain and its representations).

The indirect theorist claim that these qualities or properties, although they seem like they are qualities of the external world, are actually only *as far as we can tell from ordinary perception and introspection* qualities of our representations, whatever those representations might turn out to be (maybe brain states, maybe dualistic thoughts, maybe imagistic, maybe in some sense digital reps.) These qualities are how we represent the external world. And in many cases (e.g. shape) we may represent correctly-those qualities may actually exist in the world. In other cases they may not actually exist (e.g. color). But the question of whether or not those qualities that we immediately experience in perception actually exist in the world cannot be decided by introspection or the like. It takes scientific investigation (or philosophical metaphysics, if there really is such an enterprise) to determine that. (The indirect view is consistent with skepticism and idealism, even if th!
 ey turn out to be wrong, the direct view is not consistent with those views.)

(Perhaps this is an acceptable elaboration of what Steve means by "secondary fashion" and "remote")

Larry

P.S. As I've said in earlier posts I'd go one more step of indirectness and say only that these are qualities of the way we represent our representations (this is my reading of Kant's view as well) but I'm fairly certain that Steve doesn't agree with that.

See below

Leharr:

Brook:
I believe no such thing, as I have said repeatedly and as Steve know perfectly
well. I believe that our experience *represents* spatial structure. But it
certainly does not *have* spatial structure, not the kind it represents anyway.
(Brain states have some kind of spatial structure but there are no little
analogues of the world in our brains.) Bill Seager's message adds to the battery
of reasons that I have given for saying this. Steve just doesn't believe that we
mean what we say.

But the debate is not *just* terminological either. I believe that we are
directly aware of the world arround us. Steve believes that we are directly
aware only of states of our own brain. Now, there is a terminological dimension
to this debate because Steve cannot say what more would have to be added to
achieve direct awareness of the world around us. But that point is rather more
sophisticated than what is standardly meant by a terminological point. And I
believe that he is misdescribing direct awareness as something indirect (and he
believes the reverse of me). But that matter is also ... . (I am on the road and
will respond more carefully Sunday or Monday. I imagine that most of you can
hardly wait ;-).)

Andrew

--

Andrew Brook, Professor of Philosophy
Director, Institute of Cognitive Science
Member, Canadian Psychoanalytic Society
2217 Dunton Tower, Carleton University
Ottawa ON, Canada   K1S 5B6
Ph:  613 520-3597
Fax: 613 520-3985
Web: www.carleton.ca/~abrook

I think I have spotted what leads Steve to keep insisting that I hold that part
of the structure of experience is out in the world. He holds as self-evident
that if X represents Y, then X has to have the same structure as Y. As he said
yesterday, if X represents corners and colours, then X has to have corners and
colours. (So Steve was right when he said that this is one issue between us. Not
the crucial one but it is an issue.) Then when I insist that representations are
of things in the world, he thinks it follows from this that part of the
structure of the representation is not only *of* but *in* the world, a patently
crazy view and a reductio of any form of direct realism. Well, a reductio it
would be -- if we held any such view. But we don't. Nor do most philosophers. As
Bill Seager said, the word 'red' does not have to *be* red to *mean* redness.

Certainly information about the world is encoded in some way in the brain,
information falling on the foveal spot on the retina at least (and analogously
for the other senses), but it would be astonishing if it is encoded in any
analogue form. When I see a tangerine, nothing in my brain is tangerine (and if
it were, I could not sense that, everything being pitch-black in my brain).

(Moreover, of course, that information about the tangerine is encoded in my
brain does not prevent me from being aware of the tangerine, not just my
representation of it. But that is the old debate, not this new one.)

Andrew

--

Andrew Brook, Professor of Philosophy
Director, Institute of Cognitive Science
Member, Canadian Psychoanalytic Society
2217 Dunton Tower, Carleton University
Ottawa ON, Canada   K1S 5B6
Ph:  613 520-3597
Fax: 613 520-3985
Web: www.carleton.ca/~abrook

To develop Larry's suggestion (as a last attempt to understand whether
there is an issue between the direct and indirect views).

If there is an issue, the only way it makes sense to me is a
methodological disagreement (arising from the problem of
intentionality).

That is, perception is a 3-place, not a two-place relation:
X perceives Y as being Z (not X perceives Y).

3-d person descriptions of what's going on:
The direct view: X sees a chair.
The indirect view: X has a perception of seeing a chair.

Mutual accusations:
The skeptical problem for the direct view: how can you be sure that it
is a chair that's causing you to have a perception of a chair?
The causal problem for the indirect view: the causal chain gets
disrupted at the retina, hence the dilemma: a) deny any role of the
external world in the causation of percepts, which is untenable or b)
specify 'Y' in terms other than 'chair', which is probably impossible.

The indirect view has a point: when X is an alligator, we can't
literally predicate it with 'sees a chair' because there are no chairs
as chairs in alligators' world. However, it seems to me that it's
easier to live with the skeptical problem.

Marina

I would say that information about the world *must* be represented/encoded in
the brain in analog form if it is to be part of our phenomenal experience.
This is a crucial point in understanding the biological grounding for
conscious content. There is abundant empirical evidence in support of this
claim. I will be away for the next 10 days, but if this issue is pursued, I
would gladly elaborate on the view that the human brain routinely constructs
analog models of the world it encounters.

Arnold Trehub

I probably agree with Andrew's thesis, as an empirical fact, depending on
what he means by "inference", and I haven't detected anyone on either side
of the debate who clearly disagrees with it. I disagree with it as some kind
of definition or statement of principle.

The deeper disagreement (for me) at least is the notion that "inference" is
the crucial relation that would make something indirect, and also why the
inference needs to be from something else of which we are aware. Why can't
unconscious, non-inferential processes create indirect perceptions of the
world? Andrew's claim seems to be a shallow claim rooted in the way sense
data theorists used to state their position, but not really germane to the
way modernists might think. Others can say if I've read sentiments correctly
or not.

An example of why Andrew's thesis seems uninteresting: imagine a robot that
has a vibration sensor and a few other simple feedback sensors that let it
know when some action it is programmed to carry out has completed
successfully.

The vibration sensor has two states. It's in state 1 if it senses vibrations
below some threshold, and state 2 if it senses vibrations above the
threshold. If its sensor goes into state 2, it begins a complicated series
of actions involving setting off communication relays, traveling some normal
environment it was designed to travel through, setting off alarms, locking
doors, and so forth, all directed by an internal model of its environment
that has been programmed into it.

According to Andrew's definition, as I read it, the internal model that is
guiding its actions constitutes a "direct" awareness of its environment, as
those representations are not arrived at by inference from anything else of
which it is aware.

I, and I suspect other "indirectionalists", would say the robot does not
have direct awareness of its environment. Furthermore, we would say there's
a continuum of cases between the robot and a Rodney Brook's type system that
navigates its environment without representations, and Andrew has done
nothing at all to help us understand at what point, or along what gradient,
a direct perception theorist thinks things could become indirect.

I say: The process of constructing representations is itself a strong form
of indirectness, whether "inferential" or not, and whether from "other
things of which we are aware" or not, because that process itself
necessarily will embody lots of substantial assumptions about the way the
world is that may or may not be true.

For example: Our ways of constructing representations build into them that
there is such a thing as space. It is certainly possible that, when the
final scientific story is told, there will be no such thing as space at all
but rather just a network of causal connections onto which we usefully
impose a spatial conceptualization. Personally, I believe that's the
direction we are heading scientifically. If we can be wrong about a
perception as "direct" as our perception of the existence of space (and it
must be admitted that it's at least an open question), then I don't see how
any perception is usefully thought of as "direct". We already know things
like the phenomenal colors don't really exist on the surfaces of objects,
that objects don't really have phenomenal tastes inside them (sweetness is
not a chemical property of sugar!), and that lots of other shibboleths of
common sense perception are wrong.

Finally, there is a perfectly good candidate for something of which we are
directly subjectively aware, and that is phenomenal contents (which
sometimes may and sometimes may not have representational properties), and a
perfectly good candidate for wherein that directness lies: in relations of
acquaintance that are not representational (i.e., not assessable for
accuracy) and are epistemically more primitive than conceptual awareness of
the world.

--Gregg

Andrew
I certainly believe that experiences have spatiotemporal properties,
being states of the brain. I just think it unlikely that they *have* the
properties that they *represent* things as having, even when it is
themselves that they are representing. Suppose an experience appeared to
me to be red and square. (My experiences don't -- they just represent
something else as being red and square. But suppose that one of them
did.) Even an experience appearing to have these properties would not
entail that it actually has those properties. As I just said in response
to Cathy, it is possible for experiences to misrepresent themselves just
as much as they can misrepresent other things.

Alex

properties that they *represent* things as having,
, even when it is themselves that they are representing."

The only property that I have discussed is the arrangement
of things in space and time. What you are proposing is
that 3 dots ".  .  ." in conscious experience may not be three
dots in conscious experience, that they might misrepresent
themselves.  I can certainly believe that a report or recall
of conscious experience could differ from the original
experience but how could a conscious experience at a certain
time not be itself? I can also agree that a conscious experience
may not represent a thing in the world that we think it represents
but I cannot agree that a thing is not the same as itself.

This peculiar feature of conscious experience, that it is direct, is
the reason for Direct Realism; there are no inferences within it. Didn't
you make this point yourself earlier? Conscious experience is the
end of the chain of relations. Direct Realists have given this title
to the world itself but I think they have got hold of the wrong end of
the chain. The substrate is most likely in the brain.

All information must have a substrate - there is no disembodied
information - and the substrate is embedded in the space of conscious
experience.

The spatial information is not the same as the spatial information
in the world because it lacks depth. Horizontal and vertical
directions for arrangement are present but things in the radial
direction from the observation point are singular, there are
no arrangements there, just a distortion field. Conscious
experience is a spherical shell of indeterminate radius, it
could have any radius from zero to the maximum size of the
substrate.

Conscious experience is also only one side of things.
As I wrote earlier, a letter 'b' is a 'b' shape because in experience
it consists of vectors directed at a point that emanate from one
side only. Vectors emanating from the other side would make
a 'd' shape.  (cf: Kant and Gardner's reflections on handedness).

If the radius of the shell were zero (ie: the vectors are of zero
length) then the vectors would coincide with the substrate.
This would be a bit like Liebnitz's monads.  If the shell
existed in a normal universe with four space-time dimensions,
one of which is negative (Weyl's classification), then it could
be extended in 3D but have a zero radius in 4D.

The information processing capacity of the brain clearly
pre-processes information before it is loaded into
conscious experience ( cf: illusions, dreams, hallucinations
etc..).  The frequency and temporal encoding of digital
impulses is ideal for this. But, as Steve Lehar, McFadden, Pocket,
John and others have suggested, the field that is the substrate of
conscious experience should be continuous.

The information processing part of the brain
'knows' what it has loaded because it loaded it although
there must be some other feedback occurring.

Best Wishes

Alex Green

I certainly believe that experiences have spatiotemporal properties,
being states of the brain. I just think it unlikely that they *have* the
properties that they *represent* things as having, even when it is
themselves that they are representing. Suppose an experience appeared to
me to be red and square. (My experiences don't -- they just represent
something else as being red and square. But suppose that one of them
did.) Even an experience appearing to have these properties would not
entail that it actually has those properties. As I just said in response
to Cathy, it is possible for experiences to misrepresent themselves just
as much as they can misrepresent other things.

Andrew

--

Andrew Brook, Professor of Philosophy
Director, Institute of Cognitive Science
Member, Canadian Psychoanalytic Society
2217 Dunton Tower, Carleton University
Ottawa ON, Canada K1S 5B6
Ph: 613 520-3597
Fax: 613 520-3985
Web: www.carleton.ca/~abrook

---------------------------------
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Sorry to be a monomaniac Alfredo, but an Indirect Realist model of conscious
experience based on a substrate in a thalamic location achieves what you desire:
a close relationship between lightly processed information from the senses
and heavily processed information from the cortical modelling processors.

Best Wishes

Alex Green

Alfredo Pereira Jr <a...@IBB.UNESP.BR> wrote:

This is a good thesis, specially because it reveals the weakness of
both positions.

Direct perception theorists deny the existence of this kind of inference.
Representationalists are comitted to some kind of inference or at least
to the existence of 'a priori' forms and categories (as in Kant´s
Transcendental
Idealism) that constrain the sensory "matter".

Neither of these philosophical positions allow the interaction of internal
and external patterns to construct conscious episodes. But this is the way
the brain works.

Alfredo Pereira Jr.

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1) Do you agree that all experience is generated within the
brain? (or take the body as a whole to be on the safe side)

I take it that the general view and scientific find is that it
does, but maybe you think otherwise?

2) If all experience is indeed generated within the
(body-)brain, what is wrong exactly with calling it a
representation?

3) If "direct perception" only means that there is an unbroken
physcial chain of events leading up to experience occuring in
the brain... what does that have to do with the whole
discussion on conscious experience, representationalism ie how
experience (the representation) is generated within the brain?

[NOTE: when I chew on a piece of meat..I don't chew on my own
brain cells of course. There really is a piece of meat that I
chew on. (assume I am not hallucinating or having lucid dreams
about eating meat)  But it is my *brain activity that is the
experience of chewing on that meat*.

So you have a healthy "dualism" in this meaty example:

(a) the real meat in my mouth, AND
(b) the real brain activity which IS the experience of meat in
my mouth (with its taste.. etc)

With regards,
JPL

Alex, of course experience have to *be* themselves but they can still
*misrepresent* themselves.

Andrew

--

Andrew Brook, Professor of Philosophy
Director, Institute of Cognitive Science
Member, Canadian Psychoanalytic Society
2217 Dunton Tower, Carleton University
Ottawa ON, Canada   K1S 5B6
Ph:  613 520-3597
Fax: 613 520-3985
Web: www.carleton.ca/~abrook

Jan, you haven't been following what I have been saying. Quickly,

Except for some elements of content that don't matter in this context, yes.

Nothing. I adore representations, couldn't live without them.

Doesn't mean this. It means that I am aware of objects in the world nd not by
inference from intermediaries.

And when I see a piece of meat, I am not aware of my brain cells either.
The representation in my brain makes me aware of the meat, nothing less.

AB

--

Andrew Brook, Professor of Philosophy
Director, Institute of Cognitive Science
Member, Canadian Psychoanalytic Society
2217 Dunton Tower, Carleton University
Ottawa ON, Canada   K1S 5B6
Ph:  613 520-3597
Fax: 613 520-3985
Web: www.carleton.ca/~abrook

Andrew Brook
Alex, of course experience have to *be* themselves but they can still
*misrepresent* themselves.

Alex
No, at a given time conscious experience cannot misrepresent itself.  At a given time a conscious experience is itself, there is no flow from one part to another and no inferences between 'you' and the experience.

This is an important point because, if it is conceded, it allows processes to be included with conscious experience. If it is not conceded then conscious experience is the state of an information carrying substrate.

It is possible, in an insane person, that inner speech is saying 'circles' when squares are present but neither the word 'circles' nor the squares are misrepresented, they both occur as a word and a form. It is, of course, possible that a report, at a later time, of a conscious experience misrepresents the original experience.

Best Wishes

Alex Green

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Dear Alex:

to complete your conversion to Interactionism/Constructionism, you
could drop off such metaphysically-charged terms ("Indirect" and
"Realist") and develop a neuroscientific theory of how the brain
receives, stores and recombines external patterns (mostly transduced
by the thalamus), based on internal patterns (mostly
cortico-cortical), to generate conscious content.
Such a dynamical pattern processing is IMHO the key to understanding
consciousness. Again IMHO Grossberg´s ART model is the best
neuroscientifically-based epistemology (did Psyche-D members read
his *Consciousness and Cognition* paper on consciousness?), but it
lacks the details of molecular neurobiology and the physics of
biological resonances.
Your thalamic perspective is appropriate, since the thalamus is at
the center of the interactionist game. But don´t forget the
striatum, the amygdala, the cingulate, the hippocampus, etc. The
explanatory mechanism must include features common to all these
brain sub-systems.

Best Regards,

Alfredo Pereira Jr.

Since you ask ... but I have to be quick. AB

All the stuff that Fodor and Dretske and Burge and .... talk about --
the elements external to a rep that make up, in part, the contents of
the rep.

I say we are (directly, i.e., non-inferentially) aware of objects around
us, Steve says we are thus aware only of our own reps.

Not at all. Bill Seager and I have no problem with anything science
teaches. Our problem is with misbegotten misinterpretations of the
results of science. In particular, we can allow all manner of
'inferential' (really, data transformational) processing. What we cannot
allow is that all we are directly aware of is our own reps, that our
awareness of the world around us is by inference from this.

We do not 'know better'. Quite the reverse. Like most indirect rep
people, you are confusing conscious inference with unconscious
information-processing. Of course lots of unconscious information-
processing goes on but the result is that we are directly aware of the
world around us. Indeed, no other position has even been coherently
articulated in this discussion yet. (I can't repeat my reasons for
saying that but I gave them, for the third or fourth time, in a couple
of messages within the past couple of days.)

Andy

--

Andrew Brook, Professor of Philosophy
Director, Institute of Cognitive Science
Member, Canadian Psychoanalytic Society
2217 Dunton Tower, Carleton University
Ottawa ON, Canada   K1S 5B6
Ph:  613 520-3597
Fax: 613 520-3985
Web: www.carleton.ca/~abrook

In response to Andrew Brook:

Just out of curiosity, what are they?

Ok. But then, what is in a nutshell the disagreement with
Steve Lehar or representationalism in general?

Ok. So the same source-objects are represented differently in
individual cases, but in all cases the perception is direct?

Thanks to science we became aware of them and have started to
unravel of what happens in the brain as a consequence of
bodybrain<->environment interaction when experience is
generated. It even became understandable why we have this
*sense of direct perception*, whilst *in fact* a lot of
intermediairy processes have to take place before experience
occurs.

It appears to me that "direct perception" as you define it, is
the subjective / phenomenological account that does not want
to take into account what science has found to be necessary
"intermediaries", ie all the un- and pre-conscious neural
processes needed to take place before experience takes place.

"Direct percepetion" it appears to me, is simply how we
experience or believe(d) things to be. But we do know better
now, thank gowd.

With regards
JPL

Quoting Steven Lehar <sle...@CNS.BU.EDU>:

I usually agree with what Steven Lehar says, but I can't agree with that.

I do agree that representationalism "is not a conclusion arrived at
by logical reasoning" -- because there's an empirical component, and
because the reasoning isn't strictly deductive or absolutely conclusive.

But it's not an initial assumption either.

Where I started was, if anywhere, with a naive form of direct
perception.  I moved away from that via an exposure to the relevant
science, by considering the arguments for the various philosophical
views, and by considering my own conscious experience.

I also suspect that that's a fairly typical path to follow.

-- Jeff