What is Naive Realism?
Edward Green
physical models, does not allow us to view the model with "naive
realism", or words to that effect.
Can this concept be moved beyond the affective? That is, beyond the
vague feeling that previous mathematical models were associated with
something "really there", whereas quantum mechanical mathematical
models are not, can we give this distinction logical force?
Lewis Mammel
Your use of the term "vague" is highly prejudicial. When I look at
logic textbooks, I get a vague feeling that it all ought to mean
something. When I see a ball, I see a ball, and I "see" forces on the
ball, there is nothing vague about it. Look at the term "logical force."
You are using a physical metaphor already for what you want to achieve!
There's no escape from naivete.
But even so, I think there is a definite operational difference between
QM and classical in the way the theory stands in relation to the measurements.
A classical orbit can be specified as a set of time sequenced postion vectors
and reduced to an equation which is part of the theory. In QM you can't do this.
You have a very elaborate theoretical apparatus which grinds out results which
can be matched with experiment, but these results do not belong to the theory
the way a classical orbit formula does.
Lew Mammel, Jr.
Edward Green
>Edward Green wrote:
>>
>> The view is sometimes expressed that quantum physics, unlike previous
>> physical models, does not allow us to view the model with "naive
>> realism", or words to that effect.
>>
>> Can this concept be moved beyond the affective? That is, beyond the
>> vague feeling that previous mathematical models were associated with
>> something "really there", whereas quantum mechanical mathematical
>> models are not, can we give this distinction logical force?
>
>Your use of the term "vague" is highly prejudicial.
Perhaps also accurate. Anyway, that was just my question: Can we move
beyond the vague?
>When I look at
>logic textbooks, I get a vague feeling that it all ought to mean
>something. When I see a ball, I see a ball, and I "see" forces on the
>ball, there is nothing vague about it.
Your intention eludes me here.
>Look at the term "logical force."
>You are using a physical metaphor already for what you want to achieve!
>There's no escape from naivete.
I don't know that I could or would care to define "logical
force", but I know it when I see it, and you do too.
An extraction of the first derivative has logical force. A
mathematical proof by contradiction, or exhaustion, or construction,
has logical force. Arguments whose smallest universe of enabling
logical symbols is "English" may sometimes have logical force. To
detect such force, we must not be subject to the clinical syndrome:
Logic Deafness.
>But even so, I think there is a definite operational difference between
>QM and classical in the way the theory stands in relation to the measurements.
Good starting point.
>A classical orbit can be specified as a set of time sequenced postion vectors
>and reduced to an equation which is part of the theory. In QM you can't do this.
>You have a very elaborate theoretical apparatus which grinds out results which
>can be matched with experiment, but these results do not belong to the theory
>the way a classical orbit formula does.
To the extent we could move beyond the vague, to discuss perhaps a
generic difference between the application of theories, I think you
are onto something. But "classical" vs. "qm" is itself an extremely
vague distinction. I would suggest a reasonable starting point would
be a decent metaphysics of measurement and observation; or just a
decent metaphysics in general, onto which certain "classical" and
"quantum" models could be mapped. I think we will find, for example,
that we are not dealing with apples and lag bolts, but only apples and
oranges, and some specifically "quantum" aspects of measurement were
there all along in some classical situations, if we troubled to look
for them, and in general what happened is that we had an extremely
naive implicit "metaphysics of measurement", whose inadequacy vis a vis
twentieth century physics pushed us into "every man his own
philosopher", there not in general being a decently respected
tradition of metaphysics to logically address and codify the questions
raised.
But I rather suspect what you hear is not what I say.