Abstract Space Time and Ether
beda pietanza
Henry Haapalainen <mon...@icon.fi> wrote in message
BMM76.534$sb1....@read2.inet.fi...
>HH: ............GR does not explain gravity.
>
> Henry Haapalainen
>
Beda pietanza reply:
Exactly, GR (and SR) don't explain anything or add anything,
they just are math model to represent approximately the reality
in the wrong assumtion to do without the "postulate ether".
In order to avoid the "postulate ether" (that does give us a better
and easier visualization of reality), SR introduces a Space-Time
mixture that doesn't exixt in nature.
GR goes farther in the misshaping reality, instead to put gravity
in Space it shapes Space (Space-Time) to gravity:
It is a tragic metodological error, and this error has nothing
to do with the correctness of SR-GR predictions, ( which are
foulty for the misuse of frames ).
The Space and Time, in which we should situate our abstract
model of reality, are them self abstractions we cannot do without.
The pretence of relativists to do without the abstract Space and
Time and without the "postulate Ether"(another abstract concept)
is so confusing for themself and for us all that common logic and
common sense is almost banned from science.
Recovery science to common sense is our task and our goal.
It is very simple: just put your law, you are so bright to discover,
into a abstract Space and Time with the abstract Ether, these
abstractions are so neutral that can contain everything you can
imagine real or unreal now and forever.
best regards
beda pietanza
Tom Roberts
> GR (and SR) don't explain anything
Let me assume for the moment that "explanations" (in the sense you apparently
mean) are possible. Then _NO_ physical theory _EVER_ has "explained anything"
in the sense you mean. INCLUDING any and all ether theories, Newton's laws,
Maxwell's equations, QED, SR, GR, and all the rest. This is so because _EVERY_
one of them makes some sort of assumptions about the world, without ever
attempting to "explain" those assumptions. For instance, _ALL_ ether theories
assume there is an ether with some predetermined properties, and they are
utterly unable to "explain" those properties.
If you think about it a bit more, you will realize that such "explanations"
are impossible, as the world as it is is unknowable to us, and all we can
ever hope to do is create accurate models of the world (based upon our
perceptions of it) and to _explain_ things in terms of those models. This is
part and parcel of being human....
This last is the usual meaning of "explain" -- all explanations are
ultimately given in terms of models of the world....
Your attempt to criticise SR and GR is ridiculous; you omit applying the
same standard to ether theories.
Exercise for Beda: apply your desire for "explanations" to a
theory which should be quite familiar to you: Newton's laws.
In particular, "explain" the first, second, and third laws, and
then "explain" the absolute space and absolute time....
The rest of us prefer to do _science_, not whatever it is you are trying to
do.
Tom Roberts tjro...@lucent.com
Kevin Aylward
"beda pietanza" <beda-p...@libero.it> wrote in message
news:pW186.40580$eB2.4...@news.infostrada.it...
I have to agree with Tom, for once, here beda. If you accept that apples and
Tellytubbys all fall the same in the same gravitational field, then G.R.
just about automatically follows, by and large. It does not actually matter
what the mechanism is that "causes" gravity, it would not change the
equations one iota. The theory is simply independent of why things do what
they do.
Anyway, I quite like the fact that Dr. Who is for real, i.e. traveling fast
is essentially equivalent to time travel. Well, so long as those Cybermen or
those nasty Solerains keep out of the way that is.
Kevin Aylward , Warden of the Kings Ale
ke...@anasoft.co.uk
http://www.anasoft.co.uk - SuperSpice "Cheap, No Shit!", a currently free
GUI xspice, unlimited component, mixed-mode Windows simulator with Schematic
Capture, waveform display, FFT's and Filter Design.
Opinions of my employer are not necessarily indicative of my own
Oscillators don't, amplifiers do"
Patrick Reany
beda pietanza wrote:
> Henry Haapalainen <mon...@icon.fi> wrote in message
> BMM76.534$sb1....@read2.inet.fi...
>
> >HH: ............GR does not explain gravity.
> >
> > Henry Haapalainen
> >
>
> Beda pietanza reply:
>
> Exactly, GR (and SR) don't explain anything or add anything,
> they just are math model to represent approximately the reality
> in the wrong assumtion to do without the "postulate ether".
If standard physics education would teach the history and philosophy of
relativity as it teaches the subject itself, arguments against
relativity such as your could be obviated.
I distinguish at least six kinds of "reality":
1) Common reality in which common sense rules (most the time)
2) Scientific conventional reality, in which science declares that which
is to be accepted as "real" by them
to bootstrap the enterprise into existence
3) Physicality -- the abstract set of all observable events -- the realm
in which measurements are made
4) Deep reality, in which we presume the formal (or for the realists,
actual) existence of things we can
never touch with our instrumentalities
5) Physical law
6) Theoretical understanding
It is important to realize that these six views of "reality" are not
mutually consistent!
In any case, I think that you completely under appreciate just what
Einstein accomplished.
Time out for a thought experiment:
A rock is dropped from a train moving in near inertial motion. From the
viewpoint of the
observer who dropped the rock the path of the rock is a straight line.
From an observer
on the ground the path is a parabola. Which is the TRUE path of the rock
through
space? (Einstein)
What's your answer to this? What Einstein said is that we don't have to
formulate physical theories to be consistent with presumed structures
that we have no means of proving the existence of. We have no means of
determining the "preferred" path of the stone through "space" so we can
choose to give such a path no meaning in physical theory. Now, this is
not to say that one cannot arbitrarily assign a fundamental role for
some adscititious super-preferred frame of reference if one chooses to
do so, but Einstein says that we don't HAVE to do so. Science need only
be consistent with physicality. This is a libertarian view. So what does
that make your view?
Any anti-Einsteinian theory should attempt to answer the same questions
that Einstein sought to answer:
1) Why is it that gravitational and inertial mass are the same?
2) Why is it that classical physics is dependent of the existence of a
"ghostly" preferred reference frame
which is needed to "justify" acceleration?
3) How should physics formulate a relativistic field formulation of
gravity, as opposed
to the nonrelativistic formulation of Newton?
4) Why should physical law depend on the state of motion of a reference
system?
It is not true that Einstein's relativity does not provide a better
understanding of the world than Newtonian-Maxwellian physics. But it
depends on one's definition of "understand." To Einstein understanding
(or explanation) came through unification. And the primary mode of
unification to him was in the artifice -- Yes, artifice! -- of
relativistic field theories. What he accomplished allowed for a
reduction in the number of independent axioms that physics has to deal
with and to provide for a generally effective methodology to be used in
mathematical physics.
Now, how do you answer this question from Einstein?
"What has nature to do with our coordinate systems and their state of
motion? If it is
necessary for the purpose of describing nature, to make use of a
coordinate system
arbitrarily introduced by us, then the choice of its state of motion
ought to be subject to
no restriction; the laws ought to be entirely independent of this choice
(general principle
of relativity)." (First printed in 1919. Appeared in Albert Einstein's
General Relativity,
Crown Publication, New York, 1979, p63.)
Patrick
"Getting the right answers is easy. It's asking the right questions
that's hard." -- Dr. Who
beda pietanza
Patrick Reany <re...@firstworld.net> wrote in message
3A61BDA4...@firstworld.net...
Sorry, I can't take all that up, my mind is to slow.
I would say it is your burden to reply to the part of my
post (you skipped) first. Should be easier for you.
ort da sport
beda,
yes, i think STR-GTR is the tip of the iceberg.
galileo, newton, einstein and others will be honored as long as beings
exist.
dave orton
--
pardon my small letters, i am _physically_ disabled.
http://www.fh-niederrhein.de/~physik07/knobelecke/k_dorton.htm
®rt da sport http://www.fh-niederrhein.de/~physik07/index.html
Sent via Deja.com
http://www.deja.com/
Patrick Reany
beda pietanza wrote:
[snip]
> >
> > http://www.ajnpx.com/html/Relativity.html
> >
>
> Sorry, I can't take all that up, my mind is to slow.
But surely you can take in some of it. I suggest that you read the book, The
Evolution of Physics, by Einstein and Infeld, if you can find it.
> I would say it is your burden to reply to the part of my
> post (you skipped) first. Should be easier for you.
>
> """"""""In order to avoid the "postulate ether" (that does give us a better
> and easier visualization of reality), SR introduces a Space-Time
> mixture that doesn't exixt in nature.
It is nice to be able to visualize, but this is not most important. Just the
same, SR has its own means for visualization through the use of the Spacetime
diagram. But visualization is not the ultimate goal -- finding equations that
describe behavior is the ultimate goal, and sometimes to reach that goal other
things must be sacrificed. If you prefer a physics based on easy-to-visualize
models then invent it yourself. Physicists have not arrived at the state of
physics today capriciously.
As for your statement that "SR introduces a Space-Time mixture that doesn't
exist in nature," I must ask in what sense do you mean "exist"? The mixture of
space and time in SR does a very good job of describing experimental results,
thank you. If you mean existing at a level deeper than our instruments can
reach, then you are talking Natural Philosophy, not physics.
> GR goes farther in the misshaping reality, instead to put gravity
> in Space it shapes Space (Space-Time) to gravity:
I tried to get you to see that there is more than one notion of reality. At the
"reality" of observation GR is MORE in line with "reality" than is Newton's
gravity.
> It is a tragic metodological error,
I don't follow what you mean here.
> and this error has nothing
> to do with the correctness of SR-GR predictions,
Are you saying that GR is correct in its predictions?
> ( which are
> foulty for the misuse of frames ).
faulty for the misuse of frames? What does that mean?
> The Space and Time, in which we should situate our abstract
> model of reality, are them self abstractions we cannot do without.
As long as you admit that we use "abstract" models of "reality," why don't you
allow for the abstractions of GR? And there's a point here that may have
escaped your attention: Physicists create models, but those models need not
have any truth relationship to the world. The models exists to facilitate
descriptions of physicality. Look at it this way. Physics has to deal with
behavior. What truly underlies that behavior is like the so-called Black Box.
Physicists are free to model the inner workings of that Black Box in any way
they please so long as the descriptions on the behavior of it is correct. (It
is clear that modern education has to take the blame for not teaching all this
stuff to students. For some reason it's so-called "relativity" that takes the
blame for the way science is done generally.)
> The pretence of relativists to do without the abstract Space and
> Time and without the "postulate Ether"(another abstract concept)
> is so confusing for themself and for us
What confusion?
> all that common logic and
> common sense is almost banned from science.
I have never before heard this kind of argument against "relativists." What do
you mean by "do without the abstract Space and Time"? I see no pretense at all.
Relativists are ALWAYS talking about space and time! (Do you accept Newtonian
physics? If so, then you too are a relativist, for it is based of Galilean
relativity.)
> Recovery science to common sense is our task and our goal.
Then you'd better start with classical physics because that is where
commonsense was first thrown away. Why don't you provide a definition of
commonsense for us.
> It is very simple: just put your law, you are so bright to discover,
> into a abstract Space and Time
they already are in abstract space and time, though perhaps not in the manner
that you prefer
> with the abstract Ether,
what's so important about an Ether??? Perhaps you should define what you mean
by "ether."
> these
> abstractions are so neutral that can contain everything you can
> imagine real or unreal now and forever.""""
Neutrality is irrelevant. Effectiveness is very relevant. But to be effective
we need to allow physicists to have much freedom to invent theories as they see
fit.
Patrick
Ilja Schmelzer
> It is nice to be able to visualize, but this is not most important.
But nice.
> Just the same, SR has its own means for visualization through the
> use of the Spacetime diagram.
Which is the same people would use for a Lorentz ether, only with less
mystical words.
> But visualization is not the ultimate goal -- finding equations that
> describe behavior is the ultimate goal, and sometimes to reach that
> goal other things must be sacrificed.
Sometimes ... In this case, not.
> Physicists have not arrived at the state of physics today
> capriciously.
The use of "spacetime" is capricious - in the sense that it is a
particular metaphysical choice, or choice of interpretation.
>> GR goes farther in the misshaping reality, instead to put gravity
>> in Space it shapes Space (Space-Time) to gravity:
>
> I tried to get you to see that there is more than one notion of reality.
That's not an argument against reality.
> At the "reality" of observation GR is MORE in line with "reality"
> than is Newton's gravity.
With GR we cannot describe our reality. More accurate, the
combination of realism and GR is falsified with the violation of
Bell's inequality.
> Physicists are free to model the inner workings of that Black Box in
> any way they please so long as the descriptions on the behavior of
> it is correct.
In theory. But if you use a preferred frame in these constructions,
you are immediately an outsider. (At least you have to tell that you
want to remove any dependence on the preferred frame later, and your
work is not finished until this is done.) That the realistic model
describes the behaviour correctly doesn't matter.
> (It is clear that modern education has to take the blame for not
> teaching all this stuff to students. For some reason it's so-called
> "relativity" that takes the blame for the way science is done
> generally.)
I disagree. "Relativity" uses argumentation against realistic models
which is uncommon in other sciences. Other sciences have had similar
directions (behaviourism in psychology) but they have never reached
such an influence.
>> all that common logic and common sense is almost banned from
>> science.
> I have never before heard this kind of argument against
> "relativists."
I have heard them a lot of time. Its sufficient to mention the phrase
"common sense" to be faced immediately with a comparison of common
sense and flat Earth theory. Never heard about "quantum logic"?
>> Recovery science to common sense is our task and our goal.
>
> Then you'd better start with classical physics because that is where
> commonsense was first thrown away.
With the rejection of flat Earth theory?
> Why don't you provide a definition of commonsense for us.
The things we use to justify the scientific method.
>> with the abstract Ether,
> what's so important about an Ether??? Perhaps you should define what
> you mean by "ether."
A realistic explanation of clock time dilation requires something
which influences the clocks. Why not name this "something" ether, by
tradition? To name this "something" "vacuum" instead of "ether" is
only confusing.
The funny result is that in quantum descriptions of real condensed
matter (superconductors) people talk (by analogy) about "vacuum
states" where we have in no way a vacuum but usual condensed matter.
Ilja
--
I. Schmelzer, <il...@ilja-schmelzer.net> , http://ilja-schmelzer.net
Gerry Quinn
>I distinguish at least six kinds of "reality":
>
>1) Common reality in which common sense rules (most the time)
>2) Scientific conventional reality, in which science declares that which
>is to be accepted as "real" by them
> to bootstrap the enterprise into existence
>3) Physicality -- the abstract set of all observable events -- the realm
>in which measurements are made
>4) Deep reality, in which we presume the formal (or for the realists,
>actual) existence of things we can
> never touch with our instrumentalities
>5) Physical law
>6) Theoretical understanding
>
>It is important to realize that these six views of "reality" are not
>mutually consistent!
>
Unfortunately, your conflicting definitions of 'reality' have led you to
attempt to 'purify' science by eliminating the concept...
- Gerry Quinn
Patrick Reany
Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
[snip]
> > Just the same, SR has its own means for visualization through the
> > use of the Spacetime diagram.
>
> Which is the same people would use for a Lorentz ether, only with less
> mystical words.
I can't think of anything more mystical than your own search for Truth without
any criterion of Truth.
[snip]
> > Physicists have not arrived at the state of physics today
> > capriciously.
>
> The use of "spacetime" is capricious - in the sense that it is a
> particular metaphysical choice, or choice of interpretation.
Yes, some physicists take the notion of spacetime literally and reify it in
their own minds. But some do not. Personally, I treat it as existing formally,
as a mere theoretical element which facilitates theoretical description. Just
the same, there is nothing capricious about Minkowski spacetime. It's
acceptance was a LONG, HARD-FOUGHT battle played out in open forum against
loud opposition. It won on its merits.
>
> >> GR goes farther in the misshaping reality, instead to put gravity
> >> in Space it shapes Space (Space-Time) to gravity:
> >
> > I tried to get you to see that there is more than one notion of reality.
>
> That's not an argument against reality.
But it is an argument against the careless use of the term. Careless usage of
philosophical terms is rife on this NG. Ilja, I am far more interested in
presenting logical arguments than in winning arguments.
[snip]
>
> > (It is clear that modern education has to take the blame for not
> > teaching all this stuff to students. For some reason it's so-called
> > "relativity" that takes the blame for the way science is done
> > generally.)
>
> I disagree. "Relativity" uses argumentation against realistic models
> which is uncommon in other sciences.
I dissagree.
> Other sciences have had similar
> directions (behaviourism in psychology) but they have never reached
> such an influence.
Do you believe in Newtonian physics?
> >> Recovery science to common sense is our task and our goal.
> >
> > Then you'd better start with classical physics because that is where
> > commonsense was first thrown away.
>
> With the rejection of flat Earth theory?
Quiz to the average person:
If you add acoustical energy to a confined area, the loudness of the sound in
that area must always
a) remain the same
b) go up
c) go down.
If a large truck T and a small car C have a head-on collision on the street,
which of the following is true?
a) The force of T on C is greater than the force of C on T,
b) the force of C on T is greater than the force of T on C,
c) the force of T on C is the same as the force of C on T.
You already know that commonsense gets these answers WRONG! And if I took a
little more time, I could write down a lot more. The laws of Newtonian physics
are NOT commonsensical! (And the above doesn't even deal with the motion of a
spinning top, which can take physics students by surprise!)
> > Why don't you provide a definition of commonsense for us.
>
> The things we use to justify the scientific method.
I wouldn't call that a definition. You give an implicit definition in terms of
the scientific method?!
My definition: Commonsense is the set of common beliefs (often in the form of
"rules-of-thumb") that most people use to predict and correlate (but not
necessarily explain) the behavior of the common (everyday) world of their
experience.
> >> with the abstract Ether,
>
> > what's so important about an Ether??? Perhaps you should define what
> > you mean by "ether."
>
> A realistic explanation of clock time dilation requires something
> which influences the clocks. Why not name this "something" ether, by
> tradition? To name this "something" "vacuum" instead of "ether" is
> only confusing.
>
Do you want a cause for everything? What is the cause of the ether? What
causes the ether to act as it does?
Patrick
Patrick Reany
Gerry Quinn wrote:
Illogical. All one is supposed to do is to stipulate which definition or meaning of "reality"
one is using at any given time. I would like to purify rational argument by eliminating
obvious ambiguity. Yes, I'll certainly admit to that! The real question is why people love to
purposely use ambiguous terms that they ardently refuse to provide (stipulate) a definition
for. Are they afraid of being pinned down?
Some physicists define "reality" in physics as "capable of being measured." Others define it
as "referring to things which are frame independent." These definitions are neither right nor
wrong. They are merely stipulations for a certain context. What's so hard to understand about
that?
Patrick
Gerry Quinn
When I said "reality is what is" you were quite outraged. Clearly the
word "is" is far too ambiguous for your tastes.
>
>Some physicists define "reality" in physics as "capable of being measured."
> Others define it
>as "referring to things which are frame independent." These definitions are
> neither right nor
>wrong. They are merely stipulations for a certain context. What's so hard to
> understand about
>that?
On the contrary, those definitions are, quite simply, wrong. (Insofar
as they equate to a bizarre misappropriation of the word in a context
which is unrelated to any normal meaning of it.)
The second definition is too ridiculous to take seriously at all (how do
you define these "frames", whatever they are, without first developing a
concept of reality?).
The first definition is an attempt to discuss certain issues seriously,
but the term "capable of being measured" on close inspection, is
paradoxical. If I didn't measure something, was it "capable of being
measured"? The blithe phrase skips over the entire quantum measurement
issue. When the measurement problem is understood to be also part of
reality, it is instantly apparent that the first definition is inept.
- Gerry Quinn
Ilja Schmelzer
> I can't think of anything more mystical than your own search for
> Truth without any criterion of Truth.
The search may be justified instrumentally - if I know the true
theory, I can make true predictions. That's useful, not?
If I have no criterion of truth, I have no certainty that I have found
some truth. That's not nice, but its nothing mystical.
> acceptance was a LONG, HARD-FOUGHT battle played out in open forum
> against loud opposition. It won on its merits.
In a situation where positivism was very popular, Popper's logic of
scientific discovery not yet written, and a lot of things we know
today not known.
>>> I tried to get you to see that there is more than one notion of reality.
>>
>> That's not an argument against reality.
>
> But it is an argument against the careless use of the term.
I don't use reality in a careless way. I use it in a well-defined
way, following EPR and Bell. See gr-qc/0001101 for a definition.
>> "Relativity" uses argumentation against realistic models
>> which is uncommon in other sciences.
>
> I dissagree.
>
>> Other sciences have had similar
>> directions (behaviourism in psychology) but they have never reached
>> such an influence.
>
> Do you believe in Newtonian physics?
I don't.
> Quiz to the average person [about some NM questions]
> You already know that commonsense gets these answers WRONG! And if I took a
> little more time, I could write down a lot more. The laws of Newtonian physics
> are NOT commonsensical! (And the above doesn't even deal with the motion of a
> spinning top, which can take physics students by surprise!)
But a person with common sense can understand Newtonian mechanics and
accept this theory as reasonable.
>>> Why don't you provide a definition of commonsense for us.
>>
>> The things we use to justify the scientific method.
>
> I wouldn't call that a definition. You give an implicit definition in terms of
> the scientific method?!
Let's look at this from the other side. We have the scientific method.
This method is justified in some way by common sense. We can use
science to throw away a lot of this common sense - but not the part we
need to justify the scientific method itself.
How to refer to this part of common sense which cannot be rejected by
science? Its part of common sense, the part we really need.
>>> what's so important about an Ether??? Perhaps you should define what
>>> you mean by "ether."
>>
>> A realistic explanation of clock time dilation requires something
>> which influences the clocks. Why not name this "something" ether, by
>> tradition? To name this "something" "vacuum" instead of "ether" is
>> only confusing.
>
> Do you want a cause for everything?
Not necessarily. I know that the "whats the cause of ..."-game is
infinite. But to understand the cause of something is always
interesting - the most interesting thing in science.
Patrick Reany
Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
> Patrick Reany <re...@firstworld.net> writes:
> > I can't think of anything more mystical than your own search for
> > Truth without any criterion of Truth.
>
> The search may be justified instrumentally - if I know the true
> theory, I can make true predictions. That's useful, not?
>
> If I have no criterion of truth, I have no certainty that I have found
> some truth. That's not nice, but its nothing mystical.
OK, you do not see it as mystical. I still do.
> > acceptance was a LONG, HARD-FOUGHT battle played out in open forum
> > against loud opposition. It won on its merits.
>
> In a situation where positivism was very popular, Popper's logic of
> scientific discovery not yet written, and a lot of things we know
> today not known.
OK, the naysayers can still topple it if they can sell their alternatives,
positivism or not. Do you classify Einstein as a positivist?
[snip]
> >> "Relativity" uses argumentation against realistic models
> >> which is uncommon in other sciences.
> >
> > I dissagree.
> >
> >> Other sciences have had similar
> >> directions (behaviourism in psychology) but they have never reached
> >> such an influence.
> >
> > Do you believe in Newtonian physics?
>
> I don't.
Not in any situation?
> > Quiz to the average person [about some NM questions]
> > You already know that commonsense gets these answers WRONG! And if I took a
> > little more time, I could write down a lot more. The laws of Newtonian physics
> > are NOT commonsensical! (And the above doesn't even deal with the motion of a
> > spinning top, which can take physics students by surprise!)
>
> But a person with common sense can understand Newtonian mechanics and
> accept this theory as reasonable.
The price paid in understanding Newtonian mechanics is to UNLEARN and disabuse
oneself of commonsense.
[snip]
> >> A realistic explanation of clock time dilation requires something
> >> which influences the clocks. Why not name this "something" ether, by
> >> tradition? To name this "something" "vacuum" instead of "ether" is
> >> only confusing.
> >
> > Do you want a cause for everything?
>
> Not necessarily. I know that the "whats the cause of ..."-game is
> infinite. But to understand the cause of something is always
> interesting - the most interesting thing in science.
I thought that the game of "knowing the cause of something" was also a free
invention of the human mind. You're still believing where you cannot prove. You're
still believing in the truth of your mental creations, though you don't believe in
Newtonian mechanics under any situation?!
Patrick
Patrick Reany
Gerry Quinn wrote:
[snip]
> The real question is why
> > people love to
> >purposely use ambiguous terms that they ardently refuse to provide (stipulate)
> > a definition
> >for. Are they afraid of being pinned down?
>
> When I said "reality is what is" you were quite outraged. Clearly the
> word "is" is far too ambiguous for your tastes.
Gerry, the sentence "Reality exists" is a truism, a platitude. It is pointless in rational
debate, except as a mere rhetorical device. Or maybe you should tell me what point it serves
in this thread. And to directly answer your question: "is" in the sense of "existence" can be
very ambiguous. Its philosophical meaning has been argued for millennia, and its ambiguity for
the physics community in general has increased with the advent of so-called modern physics. Do
quarks exist?
> >
> >Some physicists define "reality" in physics as "capable of being measured."
> > Others define it
> >as "referring to things which are frame independent." These definitions are
> > neither right nor
> >wrong. They are merely stipulations for a certain context. What's so hard to
> > understand about
> >that?
>
> On the contrary, those definitions are, quite simply, wrong. (Insofar
> as they equate to a bizarre misappropriation of the word in a context
> which is unrelated to any normal meaning of it.)
Please elaborate on this theme of yours.
> The second definition is too ridiculous to take seriously at all (how do
> you define these "frames", whatever they are, without first developing a
> concept of reality?).
How can a definition be WRONG???? What kind of logic is being used on this NG? Furthermore,
there is no need to define any particular frame, since the definition is independent of such a
choice. All that is necessary to use the definition in the context of some theory is to have
that theory tell you how to define a frame generally.
> The first definition is an attempt to discuss certain issues seriously,
> but the term "capable of being measured" on close inspection, is
> paradoxical.
I never said that either of the two example definitions I presented had any formal or rigorous
meaning in physics. They are mere personal mental aids for physicists to help them find
interpretations that they can understand in some sense, or at least "feel comfortable with." I
know of NO officially accepted definition of "reality" in physics. Do you?
> If I didn't measure something, was it "capable of being
> measured"? The blithe phrase skips over the entire quantum measurement
> issue. When the measurement problem is understood to be also part of
> reality, it is instantly apparent that the first definition is inept.
I did not make any statement that can be used to suggest that the two example definitions I
gave were the only possible ones, or that they were independent of any particular theory --
they are not in fact. Although I can see how that a person who favors a monolithic notion of
"reality" might object to both definitions in any circumstance. I do NOT myself favor using a
monolithic notion of "reality," because I have one notion used to bootstrap science into
existence, and other notions that are built on top of that bootstrapped foundation, and these
other notions are also theory dependent. Perhaps you haven't realized that science can be done
without any use of the contentious term "reality."
To which of the following two concepts is Physics accountable: Reality or Measurement?
How about you provide for us a non-implicit, non-self-referential, non-trivial definition of
"reality" usable by all physicists to DO physics.
Patrick
Ilja Schmelzer
> > > I can't think of anything more mystical than your own search for
> > > Truth without any criterion of Truth.
> >
> > The search may be justified instrumentally - if I know the true
> > theory, I can make true predictions. That's useful, not?
> >
> > If I have no criterion of truth, I have no certainty that I have found
> > some truth. That's not nice, but its nothing mystical.
>
> OK, you do not see it as mystical. I still do.
I see it as a reasonable description of typical common sense
behaviour.
I look out of the window of a train, and see a picture typical for
Berlin. I conclude that I'm now in Berlin. Can I be certain? No,
maybe I'm dreaming about Berlin but really in a bed in Chicago.
So what? I'm searching for truth, because I want to go out of the
train in Berlin. Only if it is really Berlin. That's why I'm looking
out of the window. Without having a criterion of truth.
> OK, the naysayers can still topple it if they can sell their alternatives,
> positivism or not. Do you classify Einstein as a positivist?
I like the following quote I have copied from some posting:
"Perhaps I did use such a philosophy earlier, and even wrote it, but
it is nonsense all the same." Einstein on Bohr's positivism to
Heisenberg in 1926.
> > > Do you believe in Newtonian physics?
> >
> > I don't.
>
> Not in any situation?
I accept it as a reasonable approximation in most situations.
> > But a person with common sense can understand Newtonian mechanics and
> > accept this theory as reasonable.
> The price paid in understanding Newtonian mechanics is to UNLEARN
> and disabuse oneself of commonsense.
> [snip]
An unfortunate snip. I was interested in your answer. So I repeat myself:
Let's look at this from the other side. We have the scientific method.
This method is justified in some way by common sense. We can use
science to throw away a lot of this common sense - but not the part we
need to justify the scientific method itself.
How to refer to this part of common sense which cannot be rejected by
science? Its part of common sense, the part we really need.
> > > Do you want a cause for everything?
> >
> > Not necessarily. I know that the "whats the cause of ..."-game is
> > infinite. But to understand the cause of something is always
> > interesting - the most interesting thing in science.
>
> I thought that the game of "knowing the cause of something" was also a free
> invention of the human mind.
And a very useful one.
> You're still believing where you cannot prove. You're still
> believing in the truth of your mental creations, though you don't
> believe in Newtonian mechanics under any situation?!
I prefer to believe into the best available theory. "Believe" in a
weak sense, open for doubt in any question. But acknowledging that
without making assumptions I'm left with nothing and cannot even
survive. While accepting temporarily the best available theories
makes my life much better.
Ilja Schmelzer
> How about you provide for us a non-implicit, non-self-referential,
> non-trivial definition of "reality" usable by all physicists to DO
> physics.
What about the following:
Definition of Realism
"Reality" is part of theory, or a structure element of realistic
theories. As the definition of multiplication is part of a group
definition, the definition "what is real" is part of a realistic
theory. Thus, we have to distinguish between realistic theories and
other physical theories. Realistic theories have an additional
structure - a definition what is real.
Like a set of four elements allows different, non-equivalent
definitions of multiplication, physical theories (that means theories
which make observable predictions) may allow different "realistic
structures".
For example, for classical Maxwell theory there are two obvious
variants: to consider the field F_ij(x,t) as real, or to consider the
potential A_i(x,t) as real. They possibly make the same predictions,
but even in this case they are different as realistic theories.
The basic principle here is priority of theory: The theory defines
what is real.
Basic properties
Of course, there is a little bit more structure related with these
"real things" as defined by the theory.
What happens should be described in terms of the real objects of the
theory. Especially the results of observations should be real. And if
there is some evolution in time, this evolution should be described as
the evolution of these real objects.
For example, if the F_ij(x,t) are real, the evolution may be defined
by the Maxwell equations. If the A_i(x,t) are real, we have to define
the evolution in terms of the A_i(x,t), for example by fixing a gauge
condition.
This does not mean by necessity that we have to fix a gauge
condition. Evolution may be described also in a non-deterministic,
probabilistic way. But in this case we do not have probabilities
caused by absence of knowledge about reality, but objective
probabilities. The probability distribution for a dice depends on
reality (properties of the dice, properties of the experiment), and
not of the thoughts of observers. If the dice is asymmetric the
distribution is not 1/6, even if the observer does not know this. And
the probability distributions described in realistic theories are of
this objective type.
If we have theories with different gauge conditions, they possibly
make the same observable predictions, but they are different as
realistic theories.
Similarly, all other important notions have to be related with the
real objects of the theory. For example causality. If we consider the
variant of EM theory with Lorenz gauge, we have an Einstein-causal
realistic theory. Other gauge conditions violate Einstein causality.
For all real objects and their relations, classical logic and
classical probability theory (Kolmogorov axioms) applies.
Bell's criterion
Is this sufficient to work with it? Yes. Of course, the purpose of the
previous text was not to give a formal definition, and particular
axioms (say, axioms of partial order for causality) have to be added.
But, for example, the following should be fulfilled:
Assume we have an experiment described by observables $X$ with the
observable probability distribution $\rho_X(X,x)dX$. It depends on a
set of control parameters $x$ which describe the experimental setup
(the decisions of experimenters).
Now, a realistic theory allows to describe this in the following way:
There exist a notion of {\bf reality} -- a space $\Lambda$ (reality)
with probability distribution $\rho_\lambda(\lambda)d\lambda$ -- and a
{\bf realistic explanation} -- a function $X(x,\lambda)$ -- so that
for a test function f
\[ \int f(X)\rho_X(X,x)dX=\int f(X(x,\lambda))\rho(\lambda) d\lambda
\]
I have named this "Bell's criterion" because it is what he has used to
prove his famous inequality. Thus, if this holds, we can prove
non-trivial theorems like Bell's inequality for realistic theories -
theorems which do not hold for non-realistic theories.
You may ask: but in this case, isn't realism falsified because Bell's
inequality is violated? No, because there is another assumption in the
proof of Bell's inequality: Einstein causality. Moreover, Einstein
causality on the level of reality, not observation. Thus, realism is
not falsified, and there exist realistic theories which are in
agreement with observation, especially where Bell's inequality is
violated: Bohmian mechanics, for example. "Reality" is part of theory,
or a structure element of realistic theories. Like definition of
multiplication is part of a group definition, a definition "what is
real" is part of a realistic theory.
>
> Patrick
Patrick Reany
Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
[snip]
> > OK, the naysayers can still topple it if they can sell their alternatives,
> > positivism or not. Do you classify Einstein as a positivist?
>
> I like the following quote I have copied from some posting:
>
> "Perhaps I did use such a philosophy earlier, and even wrote it, but
> it is nonsense all the same." Einstein on Bohr's positivism to
> Heisenberg in 1926.
So what's the point of decrying the state of positivism during the early decades
of the acceptance of SR and GR, while admitting that the champion of the
"relativity" cause was an anti-positivist? Apparently, one did not need to be a
positivist to accept so-called "relativity." I'm not, and I accept it. (I
expected you to say that relativity was in contradiction to positivism.)
[snip]
> Let's look at this from the other side. We have the scientific method.
> This method is justified in some way by common sense. We can use
> science to throw away a lot of this common sense - but not the part we
> need to justify the scientific method itself.
Please specify.
> How to refer to this part of common sense which cannot be rejected by
> science? Its part of common sense, the part we really need.
Perhaps I can clarify by adding to the previous definition of commonsense I gave
a while back. Commonsense is not just a bunch of personal hasty generalizations
made into "rules-of-thumb," it is also a way of looking at the world through
experience -- the CommonSense Method. (It is this way of looking at the world
that I contest so often in science NGs.) Science seems to have been invented to
rectify ALL the faults of the commonsense way of rationalizing the external
world. Where commonsense is largely an individual effort to understand the world,
science NEVER is. Whereas commonsense is quick to infer and codify into "law,"
science is slow to do so. Whereas commonsense is naive and impatient, science is
supposed to be careful and longsuffering to arrive at an accurate description of
the world, cross checked by numerous colleagues under various circumstances.
Commonsense is just the pop culture way of inefficiently dealing with the
intricacies and complexities of the external world.
In short, the scientific method corrected the inherent errors of the "commonsense
method." Thus the only use that the commonsense method plays in the formulation
of the scientific method is to be an example of what the scientific method should
NOT be.
Patrick
Ilja Schmelzer
> > > OK, the naysayers can still topple it if they can sell their alternatives,
> > > positivism or not. Do you classify Einstein as a positivist?
> >
> > I like the following quote I have copied from some posting:
> >
> > "Perhaps I did use such a philosophy earlier, and even wrote it, but
> > it is nonsense all the same." Einstein on Bohr's positivism to
> > Heisenberg in 1926.
>
> So what's the point of decrying the state of positivism during the early decades
> of the acceptance of SR and GR, while admitting that the champion of the
> "relativity" cause was an anti-positivist?
Not at the time mentioned here as "earlier".
> Apparently, one did not need to be a positivist to accept so-called
> "relativity."
At Einstein's time, yes. Today, after the violation of Bell's
inequality, its another matter. Today you have to choose between
realism in the EPR sense and relativity.
> I'm not, and I accept it. (I expected you to say that relativity was
> in contradiction to positivism.)
Relativity is a physical theory. The metaphysical choice between the
spacetime interpretation and Lorentz ether is heavily influenced by
positivistic argumentation. Nonetheless, classical relativity can be
understood also as a realistic theory.
> > Let's look at this from the other side. We have the scientific method.
> > This method is justified in some way by common sense. We can use
> > science to throw away a lot of this common sense - but not the part we
> > need to justify the scientific method itself.
>
> Please specify.
I think logic cannot be thrown away. If we replace classical logic by
"dialectic" acceptance of contradictions, there is no longer any
reason to modify a theory after its experimental falsification.
I think probability theory also cannot be thrown away. All modern
observations are more or less statistical results.
And I think also that the search for realistic explanations, causes,
of observable correlations should not be thrown away.
> Perhaps I can clarify by adding to the previous definition of
> commonsense I gave a while back. Commonsense is not just a bunch of
> personal hasty generalizations made into "rules-of-thumb," it is
> also a way of looking at the world through experience -- the
> CommonSense Method.
I doubt that the positivistic method of "looking at the world through
experience" is the common sense method. I think the common sense
method is also described in a much more accurate way by Popper's
concept.
> In short, the scientific method corrected the inherent errors of the
> "commonsense method." Thus the only use that the commonsense method
> plays in the formulation of the scientific method is to be an
> example of what the scientific method should NOT be.
I disagree. Your idealization of science in comparison with common
sense is in no way justified, it is simply a form of arrogance. What
children are doing in their job of understanding our world is
following the usual scientific method as described by Popper: trial
and error, priority of theory, rejection of theories by falsification.
Patrick Reany
Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
Well, after many months of trying to get you to present your position
statement of what "realism" is to you in your scientific work, you finally
relented to present it to us on this NG. Earlier would have been better.
Just the same, I think you have done a good job of presenting your case to
us.
My only reply is that I don't care if physicists do or do not employ a
"reality" constraint on their theories. However, I think that there is
strength in a diversity of approaches. When I was younger and I naively
thought that I knew what "reality" was, I wanted physics to use only
"reality" theories. Now I am less naive and I just don't care anymore.
These days I am inclined to believe that ALL physical theories are
phenomenological and do NOT deal with "real" things at all, at least as I
naively used to believe in "real" things. Physics deals with describing
the behavior of putative "things." Physics will always have its "black
boxes" so-to-speak, and one is free to imagine anything at all in that
black box to help describe the behavior of the box. Some will choose fill
their black boxes with ether, others will not. I just don't care either
way. But I do insist that physicists not be required to fill their black
boxes with ether!
The best way I know of to help someone over their naive beliefs about
philosophical notions is to have them define the terms they think they
understand so well. Unfortunately, I usually get either no reply or else a
glib reply.
Patrick
Ilja Schmelzer
> My only reply is that I don't care if physicists do or do not employ a
> "reality" constraint on their theories. However, I think that there is
> strength in a diversity of approaches. When I was younger and I naively
> thought that I knew what "reality" was, I wanted physics to use only
> "reality" theories. Now I am less naive and I just don't care anymore.
Being less naive and accept that non-realistic theories are also a
legitimate part of science is one thing. Not to care another thing.
We care about a lot of things - symmetry groups, simplicity,
predictions, causality, determinism, locality, and so on. Its clear
that a theory remains physical if it does not have one of these
properties. Nonetheless we care.
> But I do insist that physicists not be required to fill their black
> boxes with ether!
Realism means they have to fill the box with something - an element
lambda from the space of possible realities Lambda.
Realism means that the following does not count: "I can fill this box
with lambda_1, or with lambda_2, but cannot detect by observation
which it is. Therefore, there is no reality inside."
Ilja
Gerry Quinn
>
>
>Gerry Quinn wrote:
>
>[snip]
>
>> The real question is why
>> > people love to
>> >purposely use ambiguous terms that they ardently refuse to provide
> (stipulate)
>> > a definition
>> >for. Are they afraid of being pinned down?
>>
>> When I said "reality is what is" you were quite outraged. Clearly the
>> word "is" is far too ambiguous for your tastes.
>
>Gerry, the sentence "Reality exists" is a truism, a platitude. It is pointless
> in rational
>debate, except as a mere rhetorical device. Or maybe you should tell me what
> point it serves
>in this thread. And to directly answer your question: "is" in the sense of
You misquote me. I didn't say "reality exists".
Real things are things that exist, and the nature of a particular thing
partly determines the way in which it may be said to exist. Once that
is understood, there is no ambiguity.
> "existence" can be
>very ambiguous. Its philosophical meaning has been argued for millennia, and
> its ambiguity for
>the physics community in general has increased with the advent of so-called
> modern physics. Do
>quarks exist?
Almost certainly yes, in the mode of existence applying to quarks. It
looks like quarks are real, and it looks like phlogiston isn't. I see
no problem here. Warehouses exist, for example, yet any given structure
might equally be a barn. Pictures exist, but you cannot remove the
picture from the paint. Quarks have not dissimilar constraints on the
way they can exist.
>
>> >
>> >Some physicists define "reality" in physics as "capable of being measured."
>> > Others define it
>> >as "referring to things which are frame independent." These definitions are
>> > neither right nor
>> >wrong. They are merely stipulations for a certain context. What's so hard to
>> > understand about
>> >that?
>>
>> On the contrary, those definitions are, quite simply, wrong. (Insofar
>> as they equate to a bizarre misappropriation of the word in a context
>> which is unrelated to any normal meaning of it.)
>
>Please elaborate on this theme of yours.
>
>> The second definition is too ridiculous to take seriously at all (how do
>> you define these "frames", whatever they are, without first developing a
>> concept of reality?).
>
>How can a definition be WRONG???? What kind of logic is being used on this NG?
If I defined Patrick Reany as an idiot, surely this would be wrong? The
term "definition" can be used to mean something approaching more to the
meaning "description". These physicists you refer to are not defining a
new concept and calling it, by accident "reality". They are attempting
to discuss something which already has a name, and in essence are trying
to describe it.
> Furthermore,
>there is no need to define any particular frame, since the definition is
> independent of such a
>choice. All that is necessary to use the definition in the context of some
> theory is to have
>that theory tell you how to define a frame generally.
I didn't ask for a method of defining a particular frame. I asked how
you can define frames in general (whatever "frames" are in this theory)
without first developing some concept of reality.
>> The first definition is an attempt to discuss certain issues seriously,
>> but the term "capable of being measured" on close inspection, is
>> paradoxical.
>
>I never said that either of the two example definitions I presented had any
> formal or rigorous
>meaning in physics. They are mere personal mental aids for physicists to help
> them find
>interpretations that they can understand in some sense, or at least "feel
> comfortable with." I
>know of NO officially accepted definition of "reality" in physics. Do you?
>
They sound like rather sloppy physicists. Hopefully their poor
metaphysics do not seriously affect the quality of their work.
I know of no officially accepted definition of reality in physics, and I
would pay little attention if some physics official were to pronounce on
it. The term really belongs to the metaphysics underlying physics, not
to physics per se.
>> If I didn't measure something, was it "capable of being
>> measured"? The blithe phrase skips over the entire quantum measurement
>> issue. When the measurement problem is understood to be also part of
>> reality, it is instantly apparent that the first definition is inept.
>
>I did not make any statement that can be used to suggest that the two example
> definitions I
>gave were the only possible ones, or that they were independent of any
> particular theory --
>they are not in fact. Although I can see how that a person who favors a
> monolithic notion of
>"reality" might object to both definitions in any circumstance. I do NOT myself
> favor using a
>monolithic notion of "reality," because I have one notion used to bootstrap
> science into
>existence, and other notions that are built on top of that bootstrapped
> foundation, and these
>other notions are also theory dependent. Perhaps you haven't realized that
> science can be done
>without any use of the contentious term "reality."
>
Just as it can be done without use of any other term. However, the
purpose of science is to investigate the nature of reality. Somebody
could in principle "do football" without understanding the nature and
purpose of the game. But he would be unlikely to play very well.
>To which of the following two concepts is Physics accountable: Reality or
> Measurement?
What do you mean, accountable? The two concepts fall in different
baskets. Physics are a search for reality, and measurements are an
indication of whether we are 'hot' or 'cold' (this follows from the
three axioms I proposed).
>
>How about you provide for us a non-implicit, non-self-referential, non-trivial
> definition of
>"reality" usable by all physicists to DO physics.
Perhaps the concept is intrinsically implicit, like that of truth.
- Gerry Quinn
Patrick Reany
Gerry Quinn wrote:
[snip]
> >How about you provide for us a non-implicit, non-self-referential, non-trivial
> > definition of
> >"reality" usable by all physicists to DO physics.
>
> Perhaps the concept is intrinsically implicit, like that of truth.
>
> - Gerry Quinn
I give up.
Patrick
Paul Stowe
Patrick Reany <re...@firstworld.net> wrote:
Good, since all you have EVER done was to quibble over the meaning of words.
In other words, you love to argue over "how many angels can dance on the head
of a pin".
But somehow I really doubt you 'give up'.
Paul Stowe
Patrick Reany
Paul Stowe wrote:
[snip]
>
> Good, since all you have EVER done was to quibble over the meaning of words.
>
> In other words, you love to argue over "how many angels can dance on the head
> of a pin".
>
> But somehow I really doubt you 'give up'.
>
> Paul Stowe
My apology. I must have been mistaken for thinking that a science NG would promote
rational, logical thought, and place the highest regard for avoiding platitudes,
logical fallacies, dogmatism, rank idealism, and demagoguery. Who knew?
Yes, I see your point! Why should we even bother to care about the meaning of the
words we use. But if that's the way this NG goes, there will be nothing "scientific"
about it remaining.
Patrick
Gerry Quinn
>Gerry Quinn wrote:
>
> non-trivial
>> > definition of
>> >"reality" usable by all physicists to DO physics.
>>
>> Perhaps the concept is intrinsically implicit, like that of truth.
>
Why should the concept not be implicit? Is "truth" also meaningless
(or worse) in your book?
I think it is reasonable to equate the terms "reality" and "existence".
I did point out that the meaning of the word "existence" must be
qualified by the nature of the thing that is said to exist, or not to
exist. You have passed over this because it does not validate the
'monolithic' or religious reality which you would like to impose as a
strawman (a strawman which in truth would still compare favourably with
the toxic postmodern drizzle of "shared realities", "consensus
realities" and divers other 'qualified realities' that you seek to
impose).
Your question above incorporates a category error. How, for example,
would you provide a "non-implicit, non-self-referential, non-trivial"
definition of "beauty" usable by artists or craftsmen to DO what they
do? If not, is beauty irrelevant to their work?
- Gerry Quinn
Patrick Reany
Gerry Quinn wrote:
I have already given six definitions of "reality." I find them meaningful.
> Your question above incorporates a category error. How, for example,
> would you provide a "non-implicit, non-self-referential, non-trivial"
> definition of "beauty" usable by artists or craftsmen to DO what they
> do? If not, is beauty irrelevant to their work?
>
> - Gerry Quinn
>
Illogical comparison. I wouldn't attempt to define "beauty" for use by a group of artisans
unless I ran a production company for commercial art. Art is primarily an individual endeavor.
At the very least, art can be done by an individual. Science cannot! Science is a group
endeavor. It is ruled by a methodology which places highest value on what the group of
scientists can agree on. I know that this is arbitrarily defined this way, but that's the way
it is. (But it is no more arbitrary than the standards dictated by the owner of a commercial
art company!) What's more, this should be obvious to all. Why can't people see that science is
an arbitrary invention of humanity. Science was invented to fix all the inherent shortcomings
of individual commonsense knowledge of the world.
Again I have to fault the educational system for teaching lots of science, but never teaching
what science is.
Gerry, understand that "implicit" or any other kind of meaning of a term for an individual is
worthless in itself for the group of scientists. Scientists cannot use a term that is not
consistently meaningful to virtually ALL scientists. This is a NECESSARY selection process, so
that what is left can form a common basis of understanding FOR SCIENTISTS doing science.
Naturally, this excludes a lot of possible meaning from the body of science, but not
necessarily from humanity itself. Science is NOT the beginning and ending to knowledge.
Scientific knowledge is just one means among a great many means of finding "knowledge" about
our world. Individuals may believe whatever they will.
The only way to rationalize a means of arriving at "knowledge" is to critique the epistemology
the underlies that "knowledge." If you haven't yet worked out the epistemology, you don't have
anything to critique and no rational discussion on it can even begin.
Patrick
Gerry Quinn
>Gerry Quinn wrote:
>
>> would you provide a "non-implicit, non-self-referential, non-trivial"
>> definition of "beauty" usable by artists or craftsmen to DO what they
>> do? If not, is beauty irrelevant to their work?
>>
>
> of artisans
>unless I ran a production company for commercial art. Art is primarily an
> individual endeavor.
>At the very least, art can be done by an individual. Science cannot! Science is
> a group
>endeavor. It is ruled by a methodology which places highest value on what the
> group of
>scientists can agree on. I know that this is arbitrarily defined this way, but
> that's the way
>it is. (But it is no more arbitrary than the standards dictated by the owner of
> a commercial
>art company!) What's more, this should be obvious to all. Why can't people see
> that science is
>an arbitrary invention of humanity. Science was invented to fix all the
> inherent shortcomings
>of individual commonsense knowledge of the world.
>
I hardly know where to begin tackling this nonsense.
First, if you wouldn't try to define beauty for artists, why are you
trying to impose your (six!) undefined definitions of qualified reality
on scientists? And who said anything about commercial art companies?
Truth, beauty, reality - why do you fear such words so much?
Second, both science and art CAN be done by individuals, though they
will proceed faster if ideas can be criticised by others. Robinson
Crusoe did science, and pondered the aesthetics of his fur hat. You may
say society was represented by a model in his brain, but if everyone has
such a model, there's no point making the distinction. And while an
individual needs a social context in which to develop, he also needs
food - you are not suggesting that food is therefore key to
understanding science.
Third, science was invented to find out the nature of the world.
>Again I have to fault the educational system for teaching lots of science, but
> never teaching
>what science is.
This has clearly been a problem for you.
>
>Gerry, understand that "implicit" or any other kind of meaning of a term for an
> individual is
>worthless in itself for the group of scientists. Scientists cannot use a term
> that is not
>consistently meaningful to virtually ALL scientists. This is a NECESSARY
> selection process, so
>that what is left can form a common basis of understanding FOR SCIENTISTS doing
> science.
Just one post ago you were talking about two scientists who used
different definitions of reality. You appeared to think this was
reasonable of them.
Of course, the discussion of 'reality' belongs not to science per se but
to the necessary metaphysics underlying science.
>Naturally, this excludes a lot of possible meaning from the body of science,
> but not
>necessarily from humanity itself. Science is NOT the beginning and ending to
> knowledge.
>Scientific knowledge is just one means among a great many means of finding
> "knowledge" about
>our world. Individuals may believe whatever they will.
Sure.
>
>The only way to rationalize a means of arriving at "knowledge" is to critique
> the epistemology
>the underlies that "knowledge." If you haven't yet worked out the epistemology,
> you don't have
>anything to critique and no rational discussion on it can even begin.
Your attempt at 'rationalising' the process of science does not
resemble anything that scientists do. Scientists do not 'look for
periodicities in their sense impressions'. They actively think about
how stuff might work, and they perform experiments to test theories
(when possible - it isn't always).
A footballer, in your book, would learn to play not by thinking about
the nature and purpose of the game, but by running about at random and
noticing that the crowd sometimes applauded after he accidentally kicked
the ball. Maybe Derrida, who was supposedly a decent player, learned it
that way, but I doubt it...
- Gerry Quinn
Patrick Reany
Gerry Quinn wrote:
[snip]
> I hardly know where to begin tackling this nonsense.
If you think it is nonsense then you'll probably never get it.
> First, if you wouldn't try to define beauty for artists, why are you
> trying to impose your (six!) undefined definitions of qualified reality
> on scientists?
I'm not. But I am suggesting that a monolithic notion of reality won't capture all the ways
that scientists or NG posters use the term "reality" informally. I repeat to you again: I know
of no officially accepted definition of "reality" in the halls of science. Do you?
> And who said anything about commercial art companies?
Do you have problems with the use of analogies????
> Truth, beauty, reality - why do you fear such words so much?
I don't fear them at all! But I do hate the pretense of the use of a term as though it has
been well defined, when everyone knows that it hasn't. You have yet to offer any definition of
any of these terms you cherish so. Use these terms in the philosophy of science or in Natural
Philosophy where they belong, or else provide a rigorous definition of each of them for use in
science proper.
> Second, both science and art CAN be done by individuals, though they
> will proceed faster if ideas can be criticised by others.
Not by my definition of science. You either adhere to the doctrine of independent
reproducibility or you don't. Period.
This is perhaps your biggest misconception about the nature of science. Science is a communal
activity as a means to guard against an individual's error.
Why don't you define "science" for us.
> >
> >Gerry, understand that "implicit" or any other kind of meaning of a term for an
> > individual is
> >worthless in itself for the group of scientists. Scientists cannot use a term
> > that is not
> >consistently meaningful to virtually ALL scientists. This is a NECESSARY
> > selection process, so
> >that what is left can form a common basis of understanding FOR SCIENTISTS doing
> > science.
>
> Just one post ago you were talking about two scientists who used
> different definitions of reality. You appeared to think this was
> reasonable of them.
As I already said, scientists often use the term both loosely and in many contradictory ways.
Do you deny this or not? It was "reasonable" of them only to the extent that the reader not be
mislead to infer a strong meaning to the term "reality" when it is used so loosely. I prefer
scientists to define the term prior to their using it to avoid confusion. A personal
stipulated definition increases clarity and should decrease rife confusion.
> Of course, the discussion of 'reality' belongs not to science per se but
> to the necessary metaphysics underlying science.
Yes, it DOES belong to the underlying metaphysics of science in my opinion also. But it can
also take on rigorous meaning by the general acceptance of a stipulated definition within
science per se. I don't care either way, though, whether or not this is done. I find, though,
that the use of the term "reality" without a stipulated definition causes more philosophical
misconceptions than the term is worth. Inadequate return on investment.
But are you implying by your statement above that "Abstract Space Time and Ether" are part of
the underlying METAPHYSICS of science? Is that what this thread is about?
> >The only way to rationalize a means of arriving at "knowledge" is to critique
> > the epistemology
> >the underlies that "knowledge." If you haven't yet worked out the epistemology,
> > you don't have
> >anything to critique and no rational discussion on it can even begin.
>
> Your attempt at 'rationalising' the process of science does not
> resemble anything that scientists do.
I disagree.
> Scientists do not 'look for
> periodicities in their sense impressions'.
I think that you are NOT interpreting this phrase as abstracting and as generally as you ought
to be! In short, you just don't understand it. You simply haven't given it even half a chance
before you dismissed it. ALL empirical knowledge of the external realm must eventually arrive
at our consciousness by going through our sense impressions.
> They actively think about
> how stuff might work, and they perform experiments to test theories
> (when possible - it isn't always).
Without patterns (or periodicities) there is no reproducibility. Without reproducibility there
is no science. Scientists often start with periodicities in their sense impressions, and then
they actively think about how to explain it theoretically. That is one popular way to do
science. Another way is to question to what extent the idiosyncratic and anthropomorphic
manner that humans perceive periodicities in their sense impressions and "rationalize" them
through their mental faculties affects the way humans formulate theories inefficiently.
Remember what Einstein said of electromagnetic induction in the opening paragraphs of his 1905
paper on SR?
Patrick
Gerry Quinn
>Gerry Quinn wrote:
>> Truth, beauty, reality - why do you fear such words so much?
>
>I don't fear them at all! But I do hate the pretense of the use of a term as
> though it has
>been well defined, when everyone knows that it hasn't. You have yet to offer
> any definition of
>any of these terms you cherish so. Use these terms in the philosophy of
> science or in Natural
>Philosophy where they belong, or else provide a rigorous definition of each of
> them for use in
>science proper.
I have been using them ('reality' at least) in terms of the essential
metaphysics underlying science.
>
>> Second, both science and art CAN be done by individuals, though they
>> will proceed faster if ideas can be criticised by others.
>
>Not by my definition of science. You either adhere to the doctrine of
> independent
>reproducibility or you don't. Period.
>This is perhaps your biggest misconception about the nature of science. Science
> is a communal
>activity as a means to guard against an individual's error.
>
Independent reproducibility is a useful methodological tool, but not
something that can reasonably be considered central to science. It is
just one of many ways of (trying to) guard against error.
Suppose Robinson Crusoe discovers all manner of science and technology,
eventually building a rocket-powered boat to return to England in
triumph. He has 'done' everything that scientists do. But by your
definition there's something missing - what? Peer review? Cruso knows
whether his theories work before he gets to England.
>Why don't you define "science" for us.
I'm sure I have done so before. Science is the investigation of the
nature of the world. As simple as that. Certain conditions must apply
for it to be possible - I have listed them (as I understand them) more
than once.
[--]
>> Of course, the discussion of 'reality' belongs not to science per se but
>> to the necessary metaphysics underlying science.
I knew I had said this before...
[--]
>But are you implying by your statement above that "Abstract Space Time and
> Ether" are part of
>the underlying METAPHYSICS of science? Is that what this thread is about?
>
I joined it after it started, so I don't know what they refer to. I
don't consider them part of the metaphysics of science.
>> Scientists do not 'look for
>> periodicities in their sense impressions'.
>
>I think that you are NOT interpreting this phrase as abstracting and as
> generally as you ought
>to be! In short, you just don't understand it. You simply haven't given it even
> half a chance
>before you dismissed it. ALL empirical knowledge of the external realm must
> eventually arrive
>at our consciousness by going through our sense impressions.
What's a "sense impression"? Yes, I do of course understand the
abstraction you are presenting. It is deceptive, because it removes the
active behaviour of the scientist and reduces him to a passive
recipient of so-called "sense impressions".
>> They actively think about
>> how stuff might work, and they perform experiments to test theories
>> (when possible - it isn't always).
>
>Without patterns (or periodicities) there is no reproducibility. Without
> reproducibility there
>is no science
Necessary conditions are not sufficient conditions.
You've probably seen 'The Truman Show'. This is an interesting story
about a man living alone in a pocket universe ruled by the Cartesian
demon Christov and his minions, and attempting to do science. (It turns
out to be possible, because the demon is imperfect.) I don't want to
lay too much stress on a film of doubtful plausibility (and I am not
postulating a demon in our world), but the point is that it is anomalies
and experiments which enable Truman to discover reality (i.e. to do
science). The regularities, the sense impressions, are lies.
Independent reproducibility of results is irrelevant (indeed, because
his world is under near-total demonic control, other peoples' reported
observations always contradict his true ones).
Your Truman is a good little Truman who believes what he's told, but he
is no scientist. He works away doing your sort of 'science' but he will
never get out of the box. Newton, Einstein, etc. - they got out of the
box. There's no demon (we postulate), but sense impressions are
nevertheless sometimes deceptive. Our only guide is the search for
reality. Nothing else is science, and science is nothing else.
- Gerry Quinn
Patrick Reany
Gerry Quinn wrote:
[snip]
> >> Scientists do not 'look for
> >> periodicities in their sense impressions'.
> >
> >I think that you are NOT interpreting this phrase as abstracting and as
> > generally as you ought
> >to be! In short, you just don't understand it. You simply haven't given it even
> > half a chance
> >before you dismissed it. ALL empirical knowledge of the external realm must
> > eventually arrive
> >at our consciousness by going through our sense impressions.
>
> What's a "sense impression"?
Since you brought it up into our discussion (I didn't) I assumed that you knew. A sense
impression is the conscious or subconscious mental awareness of a presumed event in the
environment to our consciousness that affects our sense of sight, taste, smell, touch
(texture), pressure, temperature, hearing, or pain, or any others I may have overlooked.
> Yes, I do of course understand the
> abstraction you are presenting. It is deceptive, because it removes the
> active behaviour of the scientist and reduces him to a passive
> recipient of so-called "sense impressions".
I see no deception on my part, either intentional or otherwise. The phrase itself seems quite
unremarkable and very straightforward to me. Humans receive empirical knowledge through sense
impressions. What humans do or do not actively do as a response to that sense impression is an
entirely separate matter.
Patrick
Gerry Quinn
>
>
>Gerry Quinn wrote:
>
>[snip]
>
>> >> Scientists do not 'look for
>> >> periodicities in their sense impressions'.
>> >
>> >I think that you are NOT interpreting this phrase as abstracting and as
>> > generally as you ought
>> >to be! In short, you just don't understand it. You simply haven't given it
> even
>> > half a chance
>> >before you dismissed it. ALL empirical knowledge of the external realm must
>> > eventually arrive
>> >at our consciousness by going through our sense impressions.
>>
>> What's a "sense impression"?
>
>Since you brought it up into our discussion (I didn't) I assumed that you knew.
> A sense
>impression is the conscious or subconscious mental awareness of a presumed
> event in the
>environment to our consciousness that affects our sense of sight, taste, smell,
> touch
>(texture), pressure, temperature, hearing, or pain, or any others I may have
> overlooked.
>
There are serious issues here (apart from the question-begging
"subconscious awareness" you just postulated). It is a little like the
problems of "measurement" in the Copenhagen interpretation of QM, or the
question of whether we "understand" or "interpret". If we become aware
of a sense impression, is that awareness itself a sense impression, or
something else - and if so, what? Is a "sense impression" part of the
world, part of the scientist, or something else again?
>> Yes, I do of course understand the
>> abstraction you are presenting. It is deceptive, because it removes the
>> active behaviour of the scientist and reduces him to a passive
>> recipient of so-called "sense impressions".
>
>I see no deception on my part, either intentional or otherwise. The phrase
> itself seems quite
>unremarkable and very straightforward to me. Humans receive empirical knowledge
> through sense
>impressions. What humans do or do not actively do as a response to that sense
> impression is an
>entirely separate matter.
I accused the abstract description of being deceptive, because it
ignores the real meat of what scientists do.
- Gerry Quinn
Patrick Reany
Gerry Quinn wrote:
[snip]
>
> >> What's a "sense impression"?
> >
> >Since you brought it up into our discussion (I didn't) I assumed that you knew.
> > A sense
> >impression is the conscious or subconscious mental awareness of a presumed
> > event in the
> >environment to our consciousness that affects our sense of sight, taste, smell,
> > touch
> >(texture), pressure, temperature, hearing, or pain, or any others I may have
> > overlooked.
> >
>
> There are serious issues here (apart from the question-begging
> "subconscious awareness" you just postulated). It is a little like the
> problems of "measurement" in the Copenhagen interpretation of QM, or the
> question of whether we "understand" or "interpret". If we become aware
> of a sense impression, is that awareness itself a sense impression, or
> something else - and if so, what? Is a "sense impression" part of the
> world, part of the scientist, or something else again?
>
>
I would find it much more useful to our discussion if, instead of you picking
(interesting but) tangential swipes at my definition, that you do one of three
things
to respond to my definition and to the reason the definition was made:
1) completely reject that humans gain empirical knowledge through sense impressions
in any way, shape, or form,
2) completely agree with me on all points, or
3) amend the definition and the argument I gave so as to make it more to your
liking.
I consider this just plain good argumentation. But if all you want to do is nitpick,
well........
I will address this one aspect of your reply: Personally, I would NOT define mental
awareness (a brain state) as a sense impression. Sense impressions are directly tied
to
what we ordinarily think of as "the senses." My definition was intended to be
consistent
with that convention. A "sense impression" or "sensation" is part of the person.
Normally,
the senses are stimulated by "external" agents, such as heat, cold, sound, light
etc. But
our senses can also be stimulated by "internal" agents, such as an upset stomach
generating pain (a sensation) or infection causing local heating of the infected
area
(generating a sensation of heat), etc.
Now I have done it! I have used the term "external" in two different ways: One way
when
referring to what's "external" to the mind during awareness, and another way when
referring
to the source of stimulation to one of the senses -- external for outside the body
and
internal for inside the body. Just something to be aware of. Clearly the main source
of this
equivocation is the mutually contradictory ways that psychologists and philosophers
have
used these terms over the centuries.
Patrick
P.S. I think that everyone has had some experience in which some "part" of their
mind was
coordinating the physical motion of their body as a response to some sense
impression, but
doing so a fraction of a second prior to one's conscious mind being aware of it.
This is what
I mean, at least in part, by subconscious awareness. I call that realm of the mind
that can do
this the "metaconsciousness." I believe that subconscious awareness is very common.
So
common in fact that without it there would be a great many more auto accidents.
However,
subconscious awareness has nothing to do with how science gets done at the level I
brought
up earlier in this thread. Ordinary conscious awareness is all that is needed for
the purpose
I invoked "sense impressions." I only included the bit about "subconscious
awareness" for
completeness.
Gerry Quinn
>Gerry Quinn wrote:
>
>> There are serious issues here (apart from the question-begging
>> "subconscious awareness" you just postulated). It is a little like the
>> problems of "measurement" in the Copenhagen interpretation of QM, or the
>> question of whether we "understand" or "interpret". If we become aware
>> of a sense impression, is that awareness itself a sense impression, or
>> something else - and if so, what? Is a "sense impression" part of the
>> world, part of the scientist, or something else again?
>>
>I would find it much more useful to our discussion if, instead of you picking
>(interesting but) tangential swipes at my definition, that you do one of three
>things
>to respond to my definition and to the reason the definition was made:
You see these as tangential swipes, but the truth is that the concept of
a "sense impression" is incoherent in this context, and your abstraction
of science is therefore misleading, as I said.
>
>1) completely reject that humans gain empirical knowledge through sense
> impressions
> in any way, shape, or form,
>2) completely agree with me on all points, or
>3) amend the definition and the argument I gave so as to make it more to your
>liking.
I don't think your definition contained anything about what scientists
do, how they think, and what their purpose is. And there is other
irrelevant stuff about peer review etc. I really don't think this way
of describing science is fixable.
Scientist are not passive entities chained motionless in Plato's Cave,
eyes pinned open as they watch a television screen showing a movie made
by an unknown hand. Yet this is the concrete instantiation of your
abstraction of science.
- Gerry Quinn
Patrick Reany
Gerry Quinn wrote:
[snip]
> You see these as tangential swipes, but the truth is that the concept of
> a "sense impression" is incoherent in this context, and your abstraction
> of science is therefore misleading, as I said.
I disagree. You first introduced the concept of "sense impressions" into our
discussion. I only replied to that introduction. It is true that science deals with
patterns found communally within our sense impressions, but this is not my
definition of "science." In any case, no definition of "science" should spell out
ALL the details about HOW science is to be done -- that could fill up a book.
> Scientist are not passive entities chained motionless in Plato's Cave,
> eyes pinned open as they watch a television screen showing a movie made
> by an unknown hand.
Once again I agree with this statement!!! So why do you continue to throw it at me?
This is my definition of "science":
Science -- an investigative division within Natural Philosophy -- is the search for
a patchwork of theoretical explanations for and mathematical descriptions of the
behavior of natural phenomena founded on intersubjective "reality," and supported
by covariant physical laws with semi-freely created formalisms and models, all
ultimately in conformance with the arbitrary foundations laid down by scientists
that bootstrap the entire enterprise, and on anthropomorphic experimental
(observational) variables whose connection to intrinsic or "deep" "reality" is pure
speculation which lies outside the realm of science proper.
Patrick
Collin Reeves Merenoff
by an unknown hand. However, our eyes are pinned not open but
half-closed, and we do the best we can with our limited
intelligence and information.
If someone thinks they can unchain Plato's Cave, let's see them
conjure up a million dollars out of thin air by defining a theory
of it.
--
Collin Reeves Merenoff
Gerry Quinn
>This is my definition of "science":
>
>Science -- an investigative division within Natural Philosophy -- is the search
> for
>a patchwork of theoretical explanations for and mathematical descriptions of
> the
>behavior of natural phenomena founded on intersubjective "reality," and
> supported
>by covariant physical laws with semi-freely created formalisms and models, all
>ultimately in conformance with the arbitrary foundations laid down by
> scientists
>that bootstrap the entire enterprise, and on anthropomorphic experimental
>(observational) variables whose connection to intrinsic or "deep" "reality" is
> pure
>speculation which lies outside the realm of science proper.
It's very long, and full of undefined things. This "intersubjective
reality" and this other thing called "deep reality" are hard to figure
out. If I observe a scientist saying "X", does that observation have
priviliged status compared to my personal observation of wasps building
a nest? And all this nonsense about "arbitrary foundations" - they are
anything but arbitrary. The foundations are specifically related to the
discovery of the nature of the world we inhabit. "Arbitrary",
"anthropomorphic", "pure speculation" - it reads like rhetorical railing
against a stronger, more natural definition of science.
And why should laws necessarily be covariant? The dictionary says
"varying with something else in order to preserve certain mathematical
interrelations", but it would be simpler to imagine that the laws should
be fixed, and - at least in the region of discourse and experiment -
uniform. Do you have a particular technical sense in mind?
- Gerry Quinn
Gerry Quinn
It is necessary to escape by means of certain unprovable postulates,
that I agree. Postulates that form the basis for my view of science.
- Gerry Quinn
Patrick Reany
Gerry Quinn wrote:
[snip]
> And why should laws necessarily be covariant? The dictionary says
> "varying with something else in order to preserve certain mathematical
> interrelations", but it would be simpler to imagine that the laws should
> be fixed, and - at least in the region of discourse and experiment -
> uniform. Do you have a particular technical sense in mind?
>
> - Gerry Quinn
In the current mindset in physics an equation or inequation would not be considered a physical
law if it were dependent on a specific reference frame for its validity or applicability. This
also is part of the arbitrariness of science. Science gets to invent its own definitions.
Furthermore, anthropomorphic laws (as opposed to True Laws of Nature, if they exist at all)
exist in relation to some particular theory. Newton's "law" of gravity has been replaced by
Einstein's LAW of gravity. And with this replacement came a concurrent change in the meaning
of what a physical law ought to be thought of.
If there really ARE Laws of Nature, then what does our anthropomorphic perspective have to do
with describing those laws? If it necessary to introduce reference frames for the purpose of
transcribing those laws of Nature into human understandable form, then there should be no
restrictions on the kind of reference frames that we may choose (paraphrase from Einstein in
his description of the principle of general covariance). Lawness in physics in now founded on
covariance of some sort. Lorentz covariance is the minimal covariance allowed it seems, and
general covariance is the TRUE goal. It's another one of those arbitrary conventions whether
or not Galilean covariance is good enough to label a rule as a law. We certainly continue to
refer to Galilean-covariant rules as "laws," but this may just be in deference to their
historical importance.
Unfortunately the Establishment loves to teach lots and lots of science to students, but never
considers it the least bit important to teach students what science really is. And this leads
to utter confusion that ends up on this NG.
Patrick
Gerry Quinn
<re...@firstworld.net> wrote:
>Gerry Quinn wrote:
>> And why should laws necessarily be covariant? The dictionary says
>> "varying with something else in order to preserve certain mathematical
>> interrelations", but it would be simpler to imagine that the laws should
>> be fixed, and - at least in the region of discourse and experiment -
>> uniform. Do you have a particular technical sense in mind?
>>
>> - Gerry Quinn
>
>In the current mindset in physics an equation or inequation would not be
> considered a physical
>law if it were dependent on a specific reference frame for its validity or
> applicability. This
>also is part of the arbitrariness of science. Science gets to invent its own
> definitions.
>Furthermore, anthropomorphic laws (as opposed to True Laws of Nature, if they
> exist at all)
>exist in relation to some particular theory. Newton's "law" of gravity has been
> replaced by
>Einstein's LAW of gravity. And with this replacement came a concurrent change
> in the meaning
>of what a physical law ought to be thought of.
[Note: You need to fix your word-wrap to wrap at 72 or so, or your
replies will end up broken up as above.]
Many of the currently formulated laws that physicists currently believe
to be correct are independent of *inertial* reference frames, but not at
all independent of accelerating or rotating frames. General relativity
attempts to go further, but is not believed to be quite correct. There
are quite sensible reasons to postulate, as I have done on certain
threads recently, that general relativity breaks down much more severely
and extensively than its more ardent apologists admit. If that is the
case, at least one sort of covariance of a generally accepted "law" must
be abandoned.
Right or wrong, there is nothing unscientific whatsoever about this
proposition, or about more dubious propositions, for example the
possibility of superluminal signalling, which would break many forms of
covariance quite impressively. Aspect's 1982 experiment is one example
of an experiment which, among other things, tested the possibility of
superluminal signalling. He didn't find any, and nobody was very
surprised by that. But if he had found it, science would not have been
at an end. Testing it was part of the scientific endeavour, which it
could not be under your scheme of things. What do you think Aspect was
doing, participating in a social ritual? What about Michelson and
Morley?
It's simply a matter of observation. Certain symmetries have been
observed, but there is no known a priori reason why they should exist,
or might not be discovered to be violated in some ways. You seem to
think that one thing discovered by Newton (non-detectibility of an
absolute background) has turned into Absolute Scientific Truth, whereas
his law of gravity is still contingent on experiment and observation.
Nope, anyone has the right to take a shot at either coconut. [You might
be interested to read Feynman's chapter on "Relativistic Energy and
Momentum" (it's in 'Six Not So Easy Pieces' and also I think in his red
book #1) in which he clearly makes the point.]
>
>If there really ARE Laws of Nature, then what does our anthropomorphic
> perspective have to do
>with describing those laws? If it necessary to introduce reference frames for
> the purpose of
>transcribing those laws of Nature into human understandable form, then there
> should be no
>restrictions on the kind of reference frames that we may choose (paraphrase
> from Einstein in
>his description of the principle of general covariance). Lawness in physics in
> now founded on
>covariance of some sort. Lorentz covariance is the minimal covariance allowed
> it seems, and
>general covariance is the TRUE goal. It's another one of those arbitrary
> conventions whether
>or not Galilean covariance is good enough to label a rule as a law. We
> certainly continue to
>refer to Galilean-covariant rules as "laws," but this may just be in deference
> to their
>historical importance.
Even low-speed Galilean covariance could be wrong. If tomorrow somebody
finds a rock that can't be moved, then it is. It sure will make science
more interesting, but it won't make science something other than it is
now. [I dare say some scientists *would* probably quit in disgust, but
their places would be taken...]
It's also perfectly possible and even likely, that any ultimate law of
physics won't mention the word covariance at all. In a sense,
'covariance' can be interchanged with 'universality', and asserted of
any reasonable set of universal laws, but your specific interpretation
"obeying special relativity" is simply contingent on observations and
our interpretations of them continuing to support this. They mightn't.
>
>Unfortunately the Establishment loves to teach lots and lots of science to
> students, but never
>considers it the least bit important to teach students what science really is.
> And this leads
>to utter confusion that ends up on this NG.
There is much confusion on this newsgroup, and by no means all of it on
the 'aetherist' side. But I very much doubt whether a philosophy of
science such as you propose would go one whit towards alleviating it.
- Gerry Quinn
Gerry Quinn
>Gerry Quinn wrote:
>
>> Many of the currently formulated laws that physicists currently believe
>> to be correct are independent of *inertial* reference frames, but not at
>> all independent of accelerating or rotating frames. General relativity
>> attempts to go further, but is not believed to be quite correct. There
>> are quite sensible reasons to postulate, as I have done on certain
>> threads recently, that general relativity breaks down much more severely
>> and extensively than its more ardent apologists admit. If that is the
>> case, at least one sort of covariance of a generally accepted "law" must
>> be abandoned.
>
>framework.
No, a target to be smashed! But, anyway, this is a major climbdown on
your part - from the essence of the modern scientific enterprise, to a
"guiding conventional framework". Personally, I'd go for "a property of
some currently conventional theories".
[--]
>
>I disagree. But we will never know until it is tried. It would be interesting
>to get a survey of the opinions of the posters to this NG about how and
>what they think the philosophy of science should be taught in public
>schools, if at all.
>
>The real question is why it is that the Establishment considers it unimportant
>to teach the nature of science to students.
>
Nobody agrees on what it is, so it can't be "taught". Not
scientifically, anyway...
Would we have better music if we taught more musical theory in schools?
I'm not convinced that we would.
- Gerry Quinn
Patrick Reany
Gerry Quinn wrote:
[snip]
>
> >Fine, until then we have a paradigm in place as a guiding conventional
> >framework.
>
> No, a target to be smashed! But, anyway, this is a major climbdown on
> your part - from the essence of the modern scientific enterprise, to a
> "guiding conventional framework".
Then I think that you have not fully appreciate my views on this that I have held from my
first posting on this NG going back to when it was first formed. I have been consistent. I
have never argued that SR is TRUE, only that I agree with Einstein's philosophy that brought
it into being. And as long as SR and GR and all other locally Lorentz-invariant theories
generalized from them continue to work "better" than their competitors, I will continue to
support them. (By "better" here I mean have greater empirical content with the fewer number of
postulates and fewest number of "ghosts".) If there is a discernible "essence of the modern
scientific enterprise" at least in physics, I would have to say that it has been to follow
Einstein in the elimination of all "ghost" from scientific theory. But no tenant in the
philosophy of physics should be thought of as unassailable.
[snip]
> >
> >The real question is why it is that the Establishment considers it unimportant
> >to teach the nature of science to students.
> >
>
> Nobody agrees on what it is, so it can't be "taught". Not
> scientifically, anyway...
Again, I have to disagree. I believe that most physicists agree on what they are
philosophically accountable to according to the conventional standards accepted today.
Scientists in other branches are probably more in conformance with older philosophies of
science. In any case, a survey of the main philosophies of science that were once supported
and also the ones that are still widely supported these days can easily be presented. The
instructor can leave it up to the individual students to decide for themselves which, if any
philosophy, they would choose as working scientists.
More than any other thing I have tried to accomplish on this NG has been to educate people on
what the philosophy of physics really is. On how that it is an arbitrary human invention,
based on communal agreement. How that it is decidedly different than what commonsense would
have us believe. And how that it is decidedly NOT about ferreting out what reality is, and
what all "real" things might exist. This stuff can indeed be taught, along with the major
competitors to it.
Do you really believe that the physics Establishment can't decide how to define the prevalent
philosophy of physics?
Patrick
Gerry Quinn
>Gerry Quinn wrote:
>> >framework.
>>
>> No, a target to be smashed! But, anyway, this is a major climbdown on
>> your part - from the essence of the modern scientific enterprise, to a
>> "guiding conventional framework".
>
>Then I think that you have not fully appreciate my views on this that I have
> held from my
>first posting on this NG going back to when it was first formed. I have been
> consistent. I
>have never argued that SR is TRUE, only that I agree with Einstein's philosophy
> that brought
>it into being. And as long as SR and GR and all other locally Lorentz-invariant
> theories
>generalized from them continue to work "better" than their competitors, I will
> continue to
>support them. (By "better" here I mean have greater empirical content with the
> fewer number of
>postulates and fewest number of "ghosts".)
Elsewhere, you seem to mean "having greatest appeal to the current
establishment".
> If there is a discernible "essence
> of the modern
>scientific enterprise" at least in physics, I would have to say that it has
> been to follow
>Einstein in the elimination of all "ghost" from scientific theory. But no
> tenant in the
>philosophy of physics should be thought of as unassailable.
>
So you concede that an individual working on (say) an aether theory,
despite the fact that the majority of physicists currently think this is
an obsolete conception, is doing science? In short, that what science
is about is essentially unrelated to what is intellectually fashionable
in any scientific community?
>> >The real question is why it is that the Establishment considers it
> unimportant
>> >to teach the nature of science to students.
>> >
>> Nobody agrees on what it is, so it can't be "taught". Not
>> scientifically, anyway...
>
>Again, I have to disagree. I believe that most physicists agree on what they
> are
>philosophically accountable to according to the conventional standards accepted
> today.
I think you should get out more - there is plenty of disagreement. For
example, Stephen Weinberg thinks that positivistic ideas have become a
destructive force in modern physics - does he form part of your
consensus? Or to take another example, Popper is popular, yet he
doesn't seem much aligned to your way of thinking.
>Scientists in other branches are probably more in conformance with older
> philosophies of
>science. In any case, a survey of the main philosophies of science that were
> once supported
>and also the ones that are still widely supported these days can easily be
> presented. The
>instructor can leave it up to the individual students to decide for themselves
> which, if any
>philosophy, they would choose as working scientists.
>
I bet you'd get quite a large crew insisting that philosophy has no part
in science, even as they adopt one!
>More than any other thing I have tried to accomplish on this NG has been to
> educate people on
>what the philosophy of physics really is. On how that it is an arbitrary human
> invention,
>based on communal agreement. How that it is decidedly different than what
> commonsense would
>have us believe. And how that it is decidedly NOT about ferreting out what
> reality is, and
>what all "real" things might exist. This stuff can indeed be taught, along with
> the major
>competitors to it.
>
But you are a proselytist, at least as much as an educator.
>Do you really believe that the physics Establishment can't decide how to define
> the prevalent
>philosophy of physics?
>
Absolutely. They wouldn't even know where to begin. And if they did
succeed, it would only crystallise whatever philosophical accretions
have accumulated on the latest obsolescent paradigm.
Perhaps that is the key to the distrust many physicists feel of
philosophy. One can visualise the new science springing up pure and
incomprehensible, later becoming formalised, philosophised, and *dead*
until new growth emerges elsewhere. Physics as crystal garden.
- Gerry Quinn
Patrick Reany
Gerry Quinn wrote:
[snip]
> >
> >Then I think that you have not fully appreciate my views on this that I have
> > held from my first posting on this NG going back to when it was first
> > formed. I have been consistent. I have never argued that SR is TRUE,
> > only that I agree with Einstein's philosophy that brought
> >it into being. And as long as SR and GR and all other locally Lorentz-invariant
> >theoreies generalized from them continue to work "better" than their competitors,
> >I will continue to
> >support them. (By "better" here I mean have greater empirical content with the
> > fewer number of postulates and fewest number of "ghosts".)
>
>
> Elsewhere, you seem to mean "having greatest appeal to the current
> establishment".
Look, I have been one of the Establishments chief critics on this NG
about how it teaches SR to students. I had to infer on my own what the
Establishment was really getting at, and here is what I came up with.
SR is the best theoretical description physics now has to account for
empirical data, especially in the local application of physical laws,
i.e., locally Lorentz invariant laws. Naturally there is always going
to be some appeal to find consensus for appropriateness. I
simply maintain that the basis for this appeal has been worked out
logically, and I personally find it sound. If it is followed correctly,
it should not appear capricious. The question is, how well is it
followed?
In the past I was not always convinced of this, but now I am, no
thanks to the Establishment. What I fault the Establishment for is
its reliance on just teaching the empirical facts and SR without
teaching the history and philosophy that should be taught along
with them. Nevertheless, I don't ever remember being taught that
SR is True, or that ether theories are necessarily false; nor
was I taught that there is only one meaning to the term "ether."
I'm not sure what the remedy is for this situation. But of one thing
I am sure: It is NOT the appropriate time to introduce the
philosophy of physics to physics students five minutes prior to
presenting SR to them in class. Just as it is inappropriate for
the physics student to encounter for the first time in his
or her formal education the Galilean transformation equations
five minutes prior to beginning a course on SR, because it
has the effect of distorting the historical context that SR
grew out of.
> > If there is a discernible "essence of the modern
> >scientific enterprise" at least in physics, I would have to say that it has
> > been to follow Einstein in the elimination of all "ghost" from scientific
> >theory. But no tenant in the
> >philosophy of physics should be thought of as unassailable.
> >
>
> So you concede that an individual working on (say) an aether theory,
> despite the fact that the majority of physicists currently think this is
> an obsolete conception, is doing science? In short, that what science
> is about is essentially unrelated to what is intellectually fashionable
> in any scientific community?
What is thought of as "obsolete" by the majority is irrelevant. But I
affirm the right of the Establishment to resist changing the edifice of
its body of conventional knowledge on the basis of a contending
theory that is alleged to be as good as, or even just a bit better than
the conventional theory. I see this as an unavoidable practical
requirement to allow for some stability.
The question as to when an activity is "actually scientific" is by my
definition of science very difficult to clearly demarcate. But before
you condemn my definition for its seeming lack of adroitness,
try your own skill at formulating a good definition of science.
I cannot go so far as to say that an activity can be considered as
"scientific" independent of some conventional standard of the
scientific community. But I can state that "fashionable" standards
may not stand the test of time. I think that in the practical sense,
"doing science" is not important except in relation to the awarding
of grant money or some similar activity. In other words, I think
it is less problematic to attempt to "contribute to scientific
knowledge" in the end, than to have a strict standard for
measuring 'being scientific' in real time, so to speak.
I'm sure I understand why this question is important to you in this
context. But I am truly not being coy in my reply to your question.
I have complied dozens of definitions of what science is, and I think
I found no two of them to be very close in meaning. This says
something very profound about the paradoxical nature of the
scientific enterprise. Perhaps correctly defining what Science
really is according to what it is claimed to be invented for,
is one of the most challenging philosophical problems of the last
400 years.
(See http://www.ajnpx.com/html/Science.html .)
> >> >The real question is why it is that the Establishment considers it
> > unimportant to teach the nature of science to students.
> >> >
> >> Nobody agrees on what it is, so it can't be "taught". Not
> >> scientifically, anyway...
> >
> >Again, I have to disagree. I believe that most physicists agree on what they
> > are philosophically accountable to according to the conventional
> >standards accepted today.
>
> I think you should get out more - there is plenty of disagreement. For
> example, Stephen Weinberg thinks that positivistic ideas have become a
> destructive force in modern physics - does he form part of your
> consensus? Or to take another example, Popper is popular, yet he
> doesn't seem much aligned to your way of thinking.
Well, if you are referring to the "old" positivism espoused by
Comte then I doubt anyone follows that at all. I even doubt
that anyone follows Mach's version any more either.
So, I guess I have to say that Weinberg's thinking is largely held by
most physicists. But I don't think that most physicists are aligned with
Popper's radical views, although I would say that most physicists would
agree with Popper that theory greatly influences our expectations of
what can and will be measured. And let's not forget that Comte
contributed to modern science by first insisting that empiricism,
not religious or cultural dogma, should be a foundation for
scientific knowledge. It's just that Comte went too far, I think,
in his appraisal that empiricism can verifiably reveal Truth,
or positive knowledge.
I happen to know physicists who believe in some notion of ultimate
true physical theories or even laws, but when I've pressed them for
proof, they retreat to a position of it being merely a personal belief,
not a viable goal for empirical science. This is similar to Popper's
position.
In short, the positivism vs. Popper debate is set in the framework
of an outdated notion of "the search for Truth." It just isn't very
important to most modern physicists in the same way it was to
Galileo and Bacon and Newton. Most physicists today, I believe,
are most accurately characterized as Instrumentalist, who look
at physical theories as mere instruments of organizing and
predicting empirical data. One problem that arises is that the
Establishment doesn't seem to put much emphasis on scientists
actually learning any philosophy or history of science, so they
may not be very eloquent at describing their philosophical views.
Although it is difficult to define what science is, and may be difficult to
define what a "physical theory" is, it is much less difficult to define
the purpose of a physical theory -- in other words, we can ask what the
role of a physical theory is in a given science, in physics in particular?
My personal view of science is rather eclectic. I take from both Comte
and Popper, but I always de-emphasize any importance that theory
has to the concept of Truth. I take from many others as well.
> >Scientists in other branches are probably more in conformance with older
> > philosophies of science. In any case, a survey of the main
> >philosophies of science that were once supported
> >and also the ones that are still widely supported these days can easily be
> > presented. The instructor can leave it up to the individual students to
> >decide for themselves which, if any philosophy, they would choose
> >as working scientists.
>
> I bet you'd get quite a large crew insisting that philosophy has no part
> in science, even as they adopt one!
Unfortunately, you are probably right. It's hard to be fair about this though,
because philosophy is denigrated quite generally in most parts of modern
society, as though it's some useless relic of the past. Most people are
prejudiced against philosophy per se. I think that scientists have inherited
this distrust and dislike for philosophy from the general culture they grew
up in.
> >More than any other thing I have tried to accomplish on this NG has been to
> > educate people on what the philosophy of physics really is.
> >On how that it is an arbitrary human invention, based on communal agreement.
> >How that it is decidedly different than what commonsense would
> >have us believe. And how that it is decidedly NOT about ferreting out what
> > reality is, and what all "real" things might exist. This stuff can indeed be
> > taught, along with the major competitors to it.
> >
>
> But you are a proselytist, at least as much as an educator.
Well, I don't think that any part of my philosophy is original with me.
I have been influenced by the philosophers I've read, mostly by Einstein.
Most physicists probably don't know how extremely cogent he was in
his philosophical writings. As the joke goes, if it doesn't have equations
in it, it can't be useful. Only, that viewpoint isn't very funny to me anymore.
In fact, it seems tragic to me now.
> >Do you really believe that the physics Establishment can't decide how to define
> > the prevalent philosophy of physics?
> >
>
> Absolutely. They wouldn't even know where to begin. And if they did
> succeed, it would only crystallise whatever philosophical accretions
> have accumulated on the latest obsolescent paradigm.
>
> Perhaps that is the key to the distrust many physicists feel of
> philosophy. One can visualise the new science springing up pure and
> incomprehensible, later becoming formalised, philosophised, and *dead*
> until new growth emerges elsewhere. Physics as crystal garden.
>
> - Gerry Quinn
I have often felt the same way. I went through an entire decade of doubt
about the doctrines of the Establishment. But I came out of it believing
that it has a very strong philosophical position it inherited, and I am
amazed that it refuses to take advantage of it in formal education.
Patrick
sh...@my-deja.com
> Perhaps correctly defining what Science
> really is according to what it is claimed to be invented for,
> is one of the most challenging philosophical problems of the last
> 400 years.
>
> (See http://www.ajnpx.com/html/Science.html .)
What a pleasant surprise. You've got some very nice articles.
> Most people are
> prejudiced against philosophy per se. I think that scientists have inherited
> this distrust and dislike for philosophy from the general culture they grew
> up in.
That could be backwards. I'll posit that science has often helped
lead to a general distrust of philosophy. It certainly has for me.
---Tim Shuba---
Sent via Deja.com
http://www.deja.com/
Patrick Reany
Wayne Throop wrote:
> :: Patrick wrote: Perhaps correctly defining what Science really is
> :: according to what it is claimed to be invented for, is one of the
> :: most challenging philosophical problems of the last 400 years.
>
> : sh...@my-deja.com
> : That could be backwards. I'll posit that science has often helped
> : lead to a general distrust of philosophy. It certainly has for me.
>
> I wouldn't call my position wrt philosophy "distrust" exactly.
> But certainly, science and the application of theory to observation
> eventually led me to a certain perspective on abstraction which
> in turn prevents me from taking *any* *one* philosophical system
> very seriously.
>
> The whole LET/SR observational equivalence thing being a case in point.
> The fact that there are multiple ways to build abstract models, which
> are nevertheless so closely related in terms of observational consequences
> is an example of something that leasds one to this perspective.
Perspective, i.e., an active value system -- a philosophy.
> In short, the realization that science isn't an advance towards the
> Truth, but rather a retreat from error, can lead one to the notion that
> philosophy isn't so much the expression of Eternal Truth as it is an
> expression of a consistent and convenient abstractions.
>
> Sort of. More or less.
Maybe it's just a confusion about how one should define "philosophy"?
If it is defined in terms of reaching some state of Truth or Wisdom,
then I can see major distrust of it. But if it is defined as "the set of all
possible beliefs about everything, including things real, imagined, or
hoped for," then perhaps it seems like everyone is invited to participate.
Similarly, I define Natural Philosophy as "the set of all possible beliefs
about the 'natural' realm."
With the latter definition then "science" deals with a subset of the things
of interest to Natural Philosophy. Science has a particular epistemology
regarding what it can say about Nature. There can be many other
epistemologies setting foundations for other kinds of investigations into
Nature. Science is therefore not just defined by its putative subject
matter, but also by its rules of investigation and inference regarding that
subject matter.
Patrick